

THE SEVEN SINS OF GLOBALISATION: A PERSPECTIVE FROM SMALL DEVELOPING STATES

PETRU DUMITRIU

Petru Dumitriu is Director of the United Nations and Specialised Institutions Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania.

In the extensive debate on the concept of globalisation, one can hardly describe the views of small states as positive. The few most optimistic of them can, at best, acknowledge the opportunities globalisation offers to the majority of countries in the world. However, most small states believe that the boot is on the other foot and that globalisation is a new name for the old game of all-encompassing domination by the developed countries.

There is no need for extensive research to illustrate such an assertion; it is sufficient to go through the statements of Heads of State and Government or Foreign Ministers during the political debate in the United Nations General Assembly. We chose this body to pick up standpoints of small countries for two main reasons. First, the United Nations and its General Assembly, where 188 countries are represented, is expected to be a major protagonist in managing the consequences, particularly the negative ones, of what we conveniently nowadays call globalisation. Second, the General Assembly is still a forum where the views of so many countries put together is prone to bring about some sort of equilibrium on a hot issue such as globalisation. This was not, obviously, the case about, say, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting in Seattle last year.

The intention of this paper is by no means to jump into conclusions. It is merely an attempt to take stock of various apprehensions the governments of developing countries have on the fashionable issue of globalisation. Then, it will try to examine briefly whether and why the United Nations might provide some comfort to countries that feel they have no shelter against the uncontrollable forces of globalisation, which, "if not brought under control...is likely to lead to further disruption in international relations and development plans."¹

The anxiety of small developing States can be translated into the following most common vices associated with globalisation.

1. Alienation

In a prestigious academic definition,² there are three main meanings ascribed to 'alienation'. These meanings can be attached to the notion of globalisation as seen by the leaders of the Third World. Powerlessness would be the feeling that the destiny of many of those countries is not under their control, but determined by the distant forces of globalisation. Then, meaninglessness comes from the fact that, besides some overused clichés, there persists a lack of comprehensibility or consistent meaning of a wider acceptance. In addition, there seems to be a worrying normlessness in the absence of formal and tangible commitments shared by the whole international community that could protect the most vulnerable against abuse and excess. Moreover, normlessness seems to many to take an even more aggressive form of pressure that makes traditional norms shake.

That is why some aim at being able "to tame the tsunami of globalisation and turn it into a benevolent force of reconstruction and equitable distribution of wealth and opportunities, and not the menacing force of destruction and destabilisation it has thus far been".³

The experience of East Asia during the recent financial crisis strongly affected beliefs that developing countries can, after all, take off. "The dizzying flows of capital which in a single day can wreak catastrophic collapse on the economies of entire countries and regions must surely merit special attention from the Organisation. Our peoples fail to understand why they should be affected by breakdowns in the financial system arising out of risk-taking and speculative flows in regions of the world that are remote, alien and even unknown to them."⁴

Developments continue to foster the perception that "the globalisation and liberalisation process is unfolding in a manner which gives developing countries little voice in shaping the policy framework that underpins this procedure."⁵

Alienation is identifiable in the details that contradict the promising message supporters of globalisation express. "We fear that the structural differences between our various economies will require altering the expectations of our peoples, whom globalisation is supposed to serve. We therefore believe that the effectiveness of globalisation will be measured in terms of how it contributes to resolving such sensitive questions as the eradication of poverty, the debt burden, and peace and security."⁶

Among other experiences, the African one appears to be the most frustrating. This conflict-torn continent is facing in full the difficulties of the entire developing world, though the case of Africa is unique. "Whether it is in the area of economic co-operation or with respect to peace and security, our continent continues to be a region of the world, which is the least favoured for effective and meaningful co-operation. The 'We the peoples of the United Nations' mentioned in the Preamble to the Charter and the lofty aspirations contained therein continue to be distant dreams for Africa."⁷

2. Selective Action

Globalisation can be defined in many ways. Many definitions really take on board its multiple dimensions. Others, however, emphasise the economic interdependencies whose effects make the phenomenon manifest in the growth in trade, technology and financial flows. One of the vehicles of globalisation is the liberalisation of trade exchanges. Here is where developing countries see its most disturbing discriminating effects and raise their protests against: "We say no to selective globalisation when it comes to liberalisation, inasmuch as we are being called on to liberalise our trade, investments and financial flows at an accelerated pace, while this impulse to liberalise has not been nearly so strong in the case of products of interest to our countries or in the promotion of access to know-how and technologies."⁸

The developing countries that have few income-generating resources and depend on a limited number of crops cannot share the enthusiasm for the eulogised benefits of trade over the Internet. They resent a more hostile climate and bring testimony: "Under the banner of liberalisation and free competition globalisation has had the effect of eroding or even eliminating preferences providing our commodities with access to the markets of the North."⁹ Sometimes, globalisation takes the shape of the will of the powerful: "...the rules of the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanisms put the interests of the strong ahead of the interests of the weak. Indeed, the anticipated benefits of free trade give little comfort to Caribbean states and farmers dependent as they are on bananas for their foreign exchange earnings and their very livelihood."¹⁰ Developing countries are vulnerable when the pressures upon them in multilateral trade negotiations force them to make commitments beyond their power. They would rather expect a selectivity that would protect them and not one favouring the developed countries: "The negotiating process itself exposes developing countries to the growing disparities of the multilateral trading system. We run the risk of developing countries being further marginalised unless these negotiations give full recognition to their special circumstances, and in particular to those of small vulnerable economies."¹¹

Missing among the engines of globalisation is due consideration for the pace, direction and content of liberalisation in accordance with different levels of development and the building of national capabilities. Above all the flaws, there is "the insistence on the principle of free trade for the developing world and an exemption from the same for the industrialised countries."¹²

There are many descriptions of the unjust impact of globalisation: "a one-way street where all the vehicles travel North, leaving only exhaust fumes in the South"¹³ or an ugly force that threatens to "...destroy the achievements of long years of development and could lead to instability, locally and on a broader scale."¹⁴

On the moral side, there are also selective treatment and double standards. Some have noticed "the disparity in the value placed on human life and tragedy depending on whether one is in Europe or

elsewhere."15 Even freedom, the trumpeted essence of globalisation, liberalisation and interaction, do not seem to serve everybody similarly. "We must choose the path of freedom, but not freedom limited to certain areas. It must be freedom in all its fullness. If political freedom is not matched by economic freedom, how can we justify the efforts of those of us who are trying to change our countries institutionally?"16

On top of that, there is a wind of doubt even upon the most generous promises of globalisation, which seems also to be selective. There is no belief that scientific advance and globalisation can solve the various environmental problems that endanger the world. No consistent scenario is linked to solving the problems of development in poor countries, while curbing and rationalising consumer trends in rich countries. There is no intention to use the potential of science to help prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Measures taken in this respect only aim at small arms and small countries. Many join one Arab leader in not seeing "to what extent globalisation can be utilised to enhance opportunities for improving the quality of education, culture and world-wide intercultural knowledge."17 They simply believe that globalisation is an unilateral imposition.

3. Marginalisation

Small developing countries are almost unanimous in considering that the only palpable and overwhelming consequence of globalisation is their own marginalisation. In most cases, this assertion can be illustrated by facts and figures. "If there is any demonstration of the inequality that exists and how most human beings have been marginalised as we approach the end of the twentieth century, the following is a striking example: the assets of the three richest people are more than the combined GNP of all of the least developed countries; the assets of the 200 richest people are more than the combined income of 41 per cent of the world's people."18

The reality of inequality and widening gaps is admitted also by those who escaped that disease: "The persistence of poverty, still one of our major challenges, is exacerbated by the process of globalisation. Inequality is a major source of the emergence and proliferation of all kinds of extremism and of intolerance, with its concomitant violence, which threatens the very foundations of contemporary civilisation."19

Marginalisation becomes a sort of invented language to describe, in political terms, the situation of countries left out of the mainstream. Among those that are not able to cope with the rapid pace of integration in that mainstream, the least developed countries implore special attention "so that they do not slip further into the abyss of poverty and disintegration."20

After decades when the United Nations worked on elaborate and utopian plans for development and a new economic order, "all kinds of problems linked to underdevelopment, poverty and inequalities between developed and disadvantaged countries have worsened in recent years as a result of the globalisation of the economy."21 The lost years of development, an euphemism used to refer to the failures of the United Nations in that particular matter, may look like good times: "[Globalisation] marginalised the majority of developing nations, in particular small and vulnerable ones, undermining decade-long efforts by these countries to create economic well-being, social justice and sustainable human development."22

Under this light, globalisation is seen as the cause of many evils, including increasing gaps and marginalisation. "Unattended, the disparity will only grow in the twenty-first century of unlimited competition, becoming a factor that could endanger global stability and peace."23

4. Colonial Flavour

Small countries experience an irreparable disillusionment. International co-operation among abruptly unequal entities is no longer credible. "We have lost our innocence; this is the surest legacy that globalisation has visited upon us. We cannot be swayed by the rhetoric of partnership when the relentless logic of globalisation is geared to decimate, to marginalise and to eliminate"24. After decades of post-colonial rhetoric and an exhaustive battle between two world economic

systems, "...we find ourselves obliged to discuss the same problems and the same disputes that we have been facing for over half a century."25

The most militant of the developing countries, whose interests are struck by a series of international sanctions and various manifestations of globalisation, perceive a surreptitious return of colonialism. "Colonialism is coming back in the guise of the IMF, the World Bank, other financial institutions, economic cartels and, when necessary, military alliances. It is coming back in the guise of international conventions imposed through so-called international legitimacy, which is really nothing more than an expression of higher policies dictated through temptation or coercion. Colonialism is coming back in the guise of globalisation..."26

5. Imposition

Many resent the pressure from a pattern imposed rather than consented to: "It is true that globalisation brings both challenges and opportunities, but to many developing countries the challenges are proving overwhelming. But there does not seem to be any alternative, in a world characterised by the *pensée unique*, to making the necessary adjustments to join a fast globalising economy."27

What was once ideological hostility takes new shapes if looked through the prism of those unfortunate nations globalisation has left behind. The perception is that the era of multiple choices is over. Globalisation brings with it a unique dogma in a one-size-fits-all format. "Everything will continue to be cooked in the West. Just as communism and socialism came from the West, liberal democracy, globalisation, a borderless world, deregulation, unfettered free flows of capital and their flights to quality, the disciplining of governments by the market and by currency traders, and a host of other ideas all come from the West."28

The beginning of the phenomenon is associated with the end of the Cold War. At first, that benchmark promised a new dawn and potentialities for international co-operation not obstructed by ideology. Disappointment, alas, soon followed: "These hopes have now been dashed. In reality, the end of the Cold War may have made international co-operation less likely."29

Not surprisingly, the dichotomy of socialism-capitalism has come into use. The complete triumph of one side eliminated tensions but broke equilibrium. The energies the victors unleashed now flood the world with the inclement forces of globalisation. The bitterness sounds genuine: "The destruction of the Eastern Bloc was complete. It could never again militarily challenge the Western liberal democratic free marketers. Now there would be only one choice for the world, and no defection would be possible for the countries of the world, big or small. In this, the liberal democratic free market capitalists saw no more need to be gentle in spreading their systems or in profiting from them. No one would be allowed any other political economic system except what was prescribed by the sole dominant bloc."30

Therefore, the choice is not really a choice if countries believe they are "caught between the spectre of nuclear holocaust and the overpowering and irrepressible phenomenon of globalisation."31

6. Assault on Sovereignty

Maybe this is seen as the capital sin. Sovereignty is affected directly as a state to state relation: "Globalisation leads to the reduction of the sovereignty of states, with the weakest and the smallest being the biggest losers."32 That expresses the unequal relationship between states. However, there is also a threat from another direction. "We are seeing the very sovereignty of countries being eroded by the power of multinational companies. True economic power is being held in fewer hands, and the developing countries are becoming further marginalised. Social problems increase as people lose jobs and capital and currency values are controlled elsewhere."33

The erosion of sovereignty comes with other perils of globalisation; it not only produces consequences for economic welfare, but also for the viability of painfully built institutions and

social stability. One high official describes the "...more insidious dimensions of globalisation, especially those which impinge on the security of states... The spectre of transnational crime has grown to significant proportions, especially in the illicit trade in narcotics and small arms. Together, these instruments of death and destruction represent a significant danger to the internal security of many countries, fostering criminal activities which serve to destabilise and corrupt the social order to undermine democratic institutions and to increase lawlessness."³⁴

For the weakest, globalisation can be merely featured in terms of "the continuing escalation of international crimes of all sorts - drug trafficking, money laundering, human rights violations, terrorism, organised crime and other similar activities which have the potential of placing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of small island states at great risk."³⁵

Some try to explain why globalisation affects the notion of statehood and government, nation and interest, with a view to justifying the view that national boundaries are not necessarily the essential place for international co-operation or collision. "In a globalised economy, national borders no longer include sufficient territory to function as self-contained economic units. Financial geography and economic geography no longer coincide with political geography. This mismatch means that governments no longer have a monopoly of legitimate power within their own state boundaries. This does not challenge the de jure sovereignty of states, but profoundly alters every government's de facto capacity to govern."³⁶

Others, on the contrary, do not find this an acceptable explanation. The principle of sovereignty is shaken to its very foundation, not due to some objective reasons but "because of the high-handedness and arbitrariness, so prevalent in international relations."³⁷

7. Loss of Identity

Maybe the most concise description of the above headline is the strong case Saint Lucia made against the tidal wave of a globalisation that tends to suffocate the fragile identity of some countries: "Saint Lucia can confidently attest to the truth that the small states and the developing world are desperate, and that their desperation is compounded by the fact that the global preoccupation with money and markets is fast destroying the values and sacred norms in our respective countries."³⁸

Global forces are considered to be global threats "which do not differentiate between nationalities, races, colours or creeds and which most certainly recognise no political, geographical, economic and social borders among nations and peoples."³⁹

The globalisation is doubtfully able to serve the entire human race or to improve the quality of education, cultural and world-wide intercultural exchange. The new cultural values, whose vehicle is globalisation, come from "an economic system based on the irrational consumption patterns of the rich countries, which are later exported to our own countries through the mass media."⁴⁰

Globalisation appears to have made cultural diversity obsolete. Cultural sub-cultural products, included those on digital support on the Internet dirty shops, have become the real merchandise. They come from the same cardinal point: "What is from West is universal. Other values and cultures are superfluous and unnecessary. If they remain, there will be a clash of civilisations. To avoid this clash there should be only one civilisation in the world. Everything should be standardised according to Western best practices. They may change only if the West changes. Thus the globalised world will be totally uniform."⁴¹

The very proliferation of inter-ethnic conflicts is seen as a cultural distortion because "to those disoriented by the pressure of globalisation, the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to seek reassurance and a new identity in real or imagined ethnic nationalisms."⁴²

One of the prominent virtues some have associated with globalisation is the value of the individual and his inalienable rights in relation to the once omnipotent state. But this is also considered to be culturally twisted: "The much-touted new global order, where nations live in harmony and peace,

where growth and sustainable development are rights and not privileges and where justice and human rights are upheld remains a promise."43 When enforcement is, however, feasible, it is operated with disrespect for impartiality and depends on the geopolitical value of human lives: "The differential treatment accorded to identical situations of systematic and massive violations of human rights and the war crimes that are occurring in some areas of the world makes it impossible for the international justice system to act with the required effectiveness..."44

A PLEA FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

The above testimonies might look like exaggerations. They are indeed political statements made before a world audience. For many countries, a General Assembly political debate is the only opportunity to raise their cases. In such circumstances, politicians use to play to the gallery. However, let us not be frivolous about that. A world that claims to be responsive to the needs of the individual human being might ignore countries and entire regions. Some give voice to this recognition: "without the United Nations, a micro state such as Saint Kitts and Nevis would never have been heard."45 Others go even further: "as a small country, we depend on the United Nations for our security and for our very existence."46

The small developing countries have genuine reasons to be more vocal about their dramas and to continually be up in arms. Most of their assertions can be backed by international statistics of all sorts, whether they describe trade flows or access to technology and communications. Globalisation does not suggest progress for those countries. International organisations admit the danger: "when the market goes too far in dominating social and political outcomes, the opportunities and rewards of globalisation spread unequally and inequitably - concentrating power and wealth in a select group of people, nations and corporations, marginalising the others."47

Trade Unions around the world are forced to resort to a new species of internationalism to cope with the challenges. They read between the lines in the book of globalisation: "The benefits of the global economy are reaped disproportionately by the handful of countries and companies that set rules and shape markets. The vast majority of trade and investment takes place between industrial nations, dominated by global corporations that control a third of world exports. Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations."48 On the other hand, among the eighty countries whose per capita incomes have declined lately the losers are often the most integrated in global trade.

The United Nations itself sees the dark side of globalisation: "its benefits and risks are distributed unequally, and the growth and prosperity it provides for many is offset by the increasing vulnerability and marginalisation of others."49

Therefore, beyond rhetoric and overstatements, the reality is quite dramatic. Admittedly, there is a serious problem. While the diseases of the Third World cannot be seen as a result of globalisation, they accompany and aggravate it. The opportunities and benefits brought by globalisation are not within the reach of a great majority of countries. Its challenges are too hard for many to cope with. The dangers associated with globalisation are to them real. The bite of globalisation is as bad as its bark.

One should give credit to what small developing countries believe to be the ingredients for a more friendly profile of globalisation. The first is the multilateralism of the United Nations. The United Nations is seen as the only body of universal scope, authority and legitimacy. It deserves the credit for working for a better world. Countries must empower it to invest in multilateralism and partnership. "Augmenting the ability of developing countries to participate fully in the global economy is the win-win solution for all"50 and the United Nations can help in this direction.

To small states, if dealt with in the trustworthy framework of the United Nations, globalisation is less fearful. "In other words, the challenge of globalisation in the new era is not to halt the expansion of the global market, but to find the rules and institutions for stronger governance to preserve the advantages of global markets and competition within a framework of co-operation to enhance human progress. Only the United Nations and other international institutions have the

scope and the legitimacy to generate the principles, norms and rules that are essential if globalisation is to benefit everyone."⁵¹

That presupposes changes in the United Nations itself. The change suggested is radical and implies giving up entrenched habits. The UN "should not be viewed as the institutions of the dominant countries in the five regional groups; and, more than that, it ought to be the body that stands up to the encroachment of multinational enterprises that attempt to stifle the lifeline or lifeblood of legitimate and sovereign countries."⁵²

The United Nations should be further equipped and given mandate "... so as to combat the uncertainties born of an unequal world and to take firm steps to make multilateralism truly democratic. The United Nations remains an irreplaceable tool."⁵³

This is a very sensitive issue and is one that throws us on the horns of a dilemma. Democracy, which is a way to govern and handle the destinies of peoples, has domestic meanings, but can it be operated internationally? The answer is admirably simple and convincing: "What we need is to replicate on a global scale those conditions that have made the pluralistic societies in advanced economies still capable of collective action. No government anywhere can rule by coercion alone or lead legitimately merely because it wields supreme power. Resort to coercion or naked power is more often than not taken to be a symptom of failure of government and not its defining feature."⁵⁴

The small countries really believe that the United Nations can become more democratic: "As the trend towards globalisation continues to strengthen, this body as a whole will need to be more involved in making important decisions - not a permanent 5, not a G-7, but a G-188."⁵⁵

The United Nations is the herald of global governance that can change the sense of human endeavours. There are positive approaches in this respect: "The solution is not to stop the expansion of global markets, but to create and enforce the rules for stronger governance, both national and global, to ensure that globalisation works for people, not just for profits. The crying need for good global governance is not being answered, and it is one of the most important and fundamental tasks facing the United Nations today."⁵⁶

Complaints against the current manifestation of globalisation do not mean rejection by the developing world. They mean that there is a stringent need to change a pattern that for such a long time has prevented a more fair enjoyment of the resources of this Earth. Small developing countries try hard to come to terms with globalisation and liberalisation in a way that would give them a part in reaping the benefits. Their aim is not to get rid of globalisation but to adopt it with "a more human face, one that recognises and makes allowances for the fundamental inequalities between the richer and the poorer nations of the world and makes concessions to allow us the opportunity to take full advantage of its opportunities in due course."⁵⁷

Globalisation with a human face is therefore considered the concept that will marry interests of all. Making such an idea operate as an important concept would be a generous and inclusive revolution. It requires great steering and vision. World leaders should not only state but also decide in such a way that the individual, not the market, is the focus of their policies. If indeed globalisation makes humankind a single whole, "we must establish shared ways to preserve human dignity and well-being, the basic requirements of the human being, which are based on security and human development."⁵⁸

The cement that would bind the various interests is a new comprehensive notion of inter-state relations that will not only emphasise interdependence but also strive to make it mutually beneficial. "What we need in this age of globalisation is a genuine solidarity pact",⁵⁹ says a voice from Africa.

Here again, the United Nations can be the catalyst in producing this cement. "The moral underpinning of globalisation is called solidarity. One could say that in its very structures and goals

the United Nations anticipated contemporary globalisation: the United Nations is all about institutionalised solidarity, and to belong to this organisation means making solidarity the norm of best conduct."⁶⁰

Another ingredient for a friendlier globalisation is dialogue. If there is none, not only will globalisation continue to produce negative effects but also it will fuel hostility. "If the dogmatism and inflexibility of powerful states threaten our survival, then we must band together in a Trade Union of the Poor, to seek justice and humanity. No poison is a necessary drink, and we cannot be expected to swallow globalisation's cup of hemlock for the greater glory of the shapers of the new millennium. We want a new millennium shaped by all member states, addressing the needs and interests of all..."⁶¹

The dialogue should become a new model of interaction among states, small, medium-sized or great and more particularly among various cultures and different value systems. Dialogue should make us "move away from a world driven by exclusion and monologue and to begin the new millennium with a gentler, more civilised approach for a better tomorrow."⁶² Dialogue would allow creativity to preserve intact the cultural diversity that is the beauty of this world.

Globalisation is not yet clearly defined and is still highly controversial. Nevertheless, it is the broadest concept portraying global interaction today. No field of human activity is irrelevant to it. After all, globalisation can forge a political will for concerted action based on multilateralism, democracy, solidarity and dialogue. With all its imperfection and flaws, the United Nations system is the only body that can attempt to manage the complex phenomenon that is globalisation, whose consequences go far beyond the injustices of trade regulations and indiscriminate effects upon the vulnerable.

1 Said Ben Mustapha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, United Nations, A/54/P.V. 17.

2 New Encyclopaedia Britannica 1993, Micropaedia, 1- 270.

3 Surin Pitsuwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, United Nations, A/54/P.V. 14.

4 Carlos Roberto Flores Facusse, President of the Republic of Honduras, United Nations, A/54/P.V. 8.

5 Lakshman Kadirgamar, Member of Parliament and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 11.

6 Augustin Iyamuremye, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Co-operation of Rwanda, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 22.

7 Seyoum Mesfin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 21.

8 Lila Hanitra Ratsifandriamanana, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Madagascar, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 21.

9 Lansana Conte, President of the Republic of Guinea, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 13.

- 10 Janet Bostwick, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bahamas, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 20.
- 11 Norris Charles, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Marketing of Dominica, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 21.
- 12 Patrick Albert Lewis, Antigua and Barbuda, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 17.
- 13 Sama Banya, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of Sierra Leone, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 19.
- 14 Nguyen Manh Cam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, United Nations, A/54/ PV.15.
- 15 Emomali Rakhmonov, President of Tadjikistan, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 20.
- 16 Francisco Guillermo Flores Perez, President of El Salvador, A/54/ P.V. 15.
- 17 Shaikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 16.
- 18 Ralph Maraj, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 22.
- 19 Janos Martonyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 13.
- 20 Ismail Omar Guelleh, President of Djibouti, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 9.
- 21 Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 20.
- 22 Jules Albert Wijdenbosch, President of Suriname, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 9.
- 23 Hong Soon-Young, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 18.
- 24 George Odlum, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Saint Lucia, United Nations, A/54/ P.V.19.
- 25 Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al-Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 18.
- 26 Abuzed Omar Dorda, Libya, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 19.
- 27 Rajkeswur Purryag, Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Mauritius, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 18.
- 28 Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 16.
- 29 Shunmugam Jayakumar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, United Nations, A/54/P.V. 12.
- 30 Mahathir Mohamad, op. cit.
- 31 Yahya Jammeh, President of the Gambia, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 13.
- 32 Patrick Albert Lewis, op. cit.
- 33 Arthur Khoza, Deputy Prime Minister of Swaziland, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 22.

- 34 Seymour Mullings, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of Jamaica, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 17.
- 35 Clement Leo, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vanuatu, United Nations, A/54/ PV. 21.
- 36 Shunmugam Jayakumar, op. cit.
- 37 Paek Nam Sun, Minister of Foreign Affairs of D. P. R. Korea, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 14.
- 38 George Odlum, op. cit.
- 39 Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al-Thani, op. cit.
- 40 Felipe Perez Roque, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 12.
- 41 Mahathir Mohamad, op. cit.
- 42 Shunmugam Jayakumar, op.cit.
- 43 Domingo Siazon, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, United Nations, A/54/ P.V.21.
- 44 Joao Bernardo de Miranda, Minister of External Relations of Angola, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 21.
- 45 Denzil Douglas, Prime Minister of Saint Kitts and Nevis, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 9.
- 46 Nicolae Tabacaru, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 22.
- 47 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999.
- 48 Jay Mazur, Chair of the AFL-CIO International Affairs Committee, in Foreign Affairs, January-February 2000.
- 49 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, General Assembly, Official records, Fifty-fourth Session, A/54/1
- 50 Domingo Siazon, op. cit.
- 51 Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 19.
- 52 Patrick Albert Lewis, op. cit.
- 53 Rodolphe Adada, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Congo, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 18.
- 54 Shunmugam Jayakumar, op. cit.
- 55 Leo Falcam, President of Micronesia, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 9.
- 56 Said Mousa, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Foreign Affairs of Belize, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 18.
- 57 Arthur Khoza, op. cit.

58 Benjamin Ortiz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 18.

59 Kolawole Idji, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Benin, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 15.

60 Andrei Plesu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 11.

61 George Odlum, *op. cit.*

62 Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, United Nations, A/54/ P.V. 12.