

CREATING CONDITIONS FOR PEACEMAKING: THE CYPRUS CASE

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The Cyprus conflict remains one of the complex issues on the global agenda. As one American analyst has said ‘the conflict has resisted with tenacity the efforts of many nations to bring about a solution. It frustrates diplomats, irritates those who believe we have made progress in studying techniques of negotiation...’.¹ Cyprus has been divided by ethnicity, language and religion; approximately 80 per cent of the people speak Greek as a mother tongue and are Greek Orthodox Christians by religion; approximately 20 per cent are Turkish Muslims. The present dispute between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots is the continuation of a bloody struggle between Greek Christians and the Turkish Muslims in the Near East which began in the Middle Ages with the gradual conquest of the Greek-speaking Byzantine empire by the Turks. The Cyprus conflict has developed around the existence of two nations on the island and their struggle to exercise their self-determination – the highest form of patriotism and nationalism.

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In Cyprus, 'Cypriotness' has never existed. The two ethnic groups, Turks and Greek Cypriots (especially from the 19th century onwards) felt an affinity to their motherlands of Turkey and Greece respectively, before identifying themselves as Cypriots. Turkish and Greek national consciousness as a political force was imported from the motherlands to the island parallel to the formation of the national consciousness of the Turks and Greeks in their homelands. Throughout the interaction between the two communities, a 'Cypriot consciousness' was never formulated as political ideology.² Thus, Turkey and Greece became involved in the Cyprus problem whenever relations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots deteriorated, both countries being driven into the scene to protect the interests of their related ethnic communities. In a more general framework the Cyprus conflict is a conflict between Turks and Greeks.

In 1960, Cyprus' bi-communal character of the state was restored as a means of easing tension between the two ethnic groups. A partnership agreement was signed but the coexistence of Turkish and Greek Cypriots lasted only three years. From an historical analysis of specific period (1960-1974), it is possible to identify four distinct factors that seem to be responsible for the breakdown of the 1960 constitutional order. The first is nationalism. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots started acting as the guardians of their community's rights rather than considering the well-being and interests of the Cypriot state. The second was of a constitutional nature. The successful **functioning** of the Cypriot constitution depended on the social and psychological interaction of the two communities. The Cyprus Republic represented an example of consociational democracy. In order to succeed, this kind of organisation needs experience in a democratic system together with acceptance on

¹ Norma Salem, *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, Ottawa: St.Martin's Press, 1992, p.4.

the part of the people. Somehow, both communities were inexperienced and psychologically unprepared for the give and take which the system required. The third factor was political. The Greek Cypriots were politically dissatisfied with the 1960 arrangements. Their main goal remained *enosis*. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots demanded partnership as designed for them in the 1960 agreement or partition. The final factor in the breakdown of communal relations on the island was of an international nature. The resolution of the conflict had been complicated with the cold war interests of the US, as both Greece and Turkey were NATO allies. The cold war interests of the US did not leave much room for manoeuvre or leverage for a long lasting settlement based on the humanitarian and moral needs of the parties. On the other hand, Britain, the guarantor power on the island, had been pursuing a 'wait and see' policy.

Post 1974 developments

Between 1974-2002, the Cyprus conflict remained the focus of a variety of mediation efforts, from power mediation to formulations for settlement by various international actors, most notably the UN. Under the auspices of the UN, intercommunal talks continued for the reconstitution of a united Cyprus. In three decades of intercommunal talks, significant progress was made in establishing some of the characteristics of a new partnership, such as bi-communality and bizonality. The controversial issues, since 1974, were security and external guarantees of territorial arrangements and equality. On all these issues both sides maintained opposing points of views that reflected their history, experiences and perceptions.

² Micheal Attalides, *Cyprus Nationalism and International Politics*, Edingburg: Q Press, 1977, p.59.

On the security the two sides expressed numerous fears. Greek Cypriots concerns arose from the 'invasion' and 'occupation' of 36 per cent of the territory of Cyprus by Turkey and the expulsion from their homes and properties of around 180,000 Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots feared that Turkey, with its overwhelming military superiority (compared to Greece and the Greek Cypriots) had the potential will and means of expansion over Cyprus. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots recalled the intercommunal strife from which they suffered between 1963-74 at the hands of the Greek Cypriots. Thus, they insisted that Turkey should remain as a guarantor to protect them. The settlement of territorial dispute was also vital to reaching an overall agreement by both sides. The Greek Cypriots believed that the area under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriots should not exceed the size of their population. They believed that justice could only be realised if the Greek Cypriot refugees could be resettled in their homes under the Greek Cypriot administration. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots accepted that as part of an overall settlement some land had to be returned to the Greek side, but they believed also that bizonality had to be preserved. The Turkish Cypriots argued, furthermore, that before 1974, the Greek Cypriots had forced them to live in enclaves amounting in total to less than three per cent of the land, proving that the Greek Cypriots had not previously accepted the principle of an equitable distribution of territory. There was one important difference between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots positions on this issue. While the Greek Cypriots wanted to return to their original homes, the Turkish Cypriots were unwilling to go back to South Cyprus.³

³ This fact has been obtained through the informal interviews with both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. The Greek Cypriot refugees live with the hope of returning back to their properties in the

At the heart of these discussions lay the difference between equality of community and the equality of individuals. Both communities interpreted equality from different angles. The Turkish Cypriots believed that the right of equality as a community was entrusted to them in 1960 but was overridden by the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots understood equality to mean the numerical equality in participation and powers of the government. They believed that the right of equality as Turkish Cypriot people should be guaranteed to them by accepting their right of self-determination. The Greek Cypriots were also committed to equality, but from rather a different perspective - the individual equality of all Cypriots. So they regarded the individual equality of all Cypriots as being superior to the community's equality. The Greek Cypriots believed that as a majority of the population, they had the right to represent the country. Therefore, the areas of controversies could not be reorientated into the way of peacemaking through official mediation efforts on its own.

These areas of controversies bring us to the conclusion that there are two different sets of political, legal and psychological perceptions of communities of what the Cyprus problem is and what kind of solution is needed. In the last ten years, this reality has become further complicated by the increasing involvement of the EU.

The EU as an actor in the solution of the Cyprus dispute

Although the past history of this intractable dispute is discouraging, the international context, specially the prospect of becoming a EU member of both societies, seemed to make power mediation more promising. From 1974 till the

north. This issue has been used in the domestic political elections as material. Thus the issue became an end in itself.

1990s, the EU played a cautious role. Until 1990 its involvement was formulated through declarations and votes in the UN General Assembly. The reasons for such a careful role were threefold. First, both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were unwilling to accept the EU as a mediator. Second, the EU had to take into consideration its own interests in such a way as not to destroy its leverage on all the parties to the dispute. Third, there was no common policy to be followed in Cyprus because of EU member state's individual interests concerning Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. When, on 4 July 1990, the Greek community, on behalf of the 'Republic of Cyprus', tabled its application for full membership, the EU considered Cyprus as being eligible for membership. This was an indication that the EU had decided to take a more active role in the Cyprus problem despite Turkish objections.

The turning point came during the June 1994 European Council meeting in Corfu where the council announced that the next phase of enlargement of the union would involve 'Cyprus'. Furthermore, the EU started Cyprus accession talks at the end of 1996. There was the belief that the accession process would act as a catalyst for the solution of the problem. The Greek Cypriots, in particular, believed that 'Europeanisation' would offer an arena in which pressure could be brought to bear on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, for the Greek Cypriots, the accession process would help to find a solution on EU principles and ideals (free movement, free settlement and withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island). The EU's involvement continued at the Helsinki summit of December 1999, when the council delinked membership and the requirements for a settlement of the Greek Cypriot application. During the summit, the EU accepted Turkey as a candidate country as well. At the same time, Turkish accession was linked to Turkey's contribution to the solution of the Cyprus conflict.

With the enlargement of the Union on the 12-13 December 2002, the Greek administration, in the name of Cyprus, waited for its invitation to join. At the same time Turkey was insisting on being given a date for the opening of accession negotiations. As there was more pressure on Greek Cypriot administration (for which there was the potential of full EU membership) and Turkey (a potential date for the start of accession talks for full membership) in the lead-up to the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, the leaders of the both communities on the island finally started face to face talks on December 2001, giving hope of a long lasting settlement being reached.

It was in these circumstances that the UN seized the initiative to present to the sides a detailed peace plan known as Annan Plan. To accelerate the process before the Copenhagen Summit, the UN unveiled a peace plan ('Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem') which it presented to the parties on 11 November 2002. The plan initially was seen as being the last chance to reunify the divided island before the admission to the EU of the Greek Cypriot part of the island. Both the UN and the EU expected that the first stage of the 'solution' - as it was called - would be completed and signed by the two leaders of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Moreover, it was anticipated that the signing would take place before the summit as failure would mean that membership would apply only to the southern two thirds of the island under its internationally recognised Greek Cypriot administration.⁴

⁴ Barnaby Mason, 'Analysis: Make or Break for Cyprus', *BBC News*, 2002.

Both Cypriot communities together with their motherlands studied the plan and presented their objections (instead of signing the required document) to the Kofi Annan. The plan -- which is heavily based on the Swiss model of government, in which cantons preserve wide independence but form a common state at the federal level -- is full of legal intricacies and ambiguities that did not satisfy the two communities. The traditional objections of the parties still revolved around the issues of equality, territory and security. Taking into consideration the points of distress on the issues of territory and refugees, together with the arrangement for the interim period (with the Greek Cypriots objecting to three years of joint presidency with the president of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktaş)⁵, Kofi Annan and his team gave a revised plan to the sides on 10 December 2002, followed by a third and final revision on 28 February.

The aspects of the Annan plan which worried the Greek Cypriots were first that it did not take into account the UN Security Council resolutions with regard to the return of all refugees. This was considered as a justification of de facto partitioning of the 1974 situation. Second, the Greeks had reservations over the composition of the administration (especially the right of presidency to the Turkish Cypriots). The continued presence of the Turkish military in the island was another cause of concern. On the other hand, the Turkish side had its reservations on the issue of territory to be returned, and consequently the right of settlement of the Greek Cypriots in the Turkish administered area, along with sovereignty and security matters in general. In conclusion, it can be said that the plan has not yet received the support either of the political leadership of the two communities or the communities

⁵ Rauf Denktaş is believed to be the main obstacle to the settlement by the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore the Greek Cypriots believe that the main aim of Denktaş is to annex the island to Turkey.

themselves (according to public opinion polls more than 80 percent on the Greek side and half of the people in the Turkish side have rejected the plan).

The UN attempt to use the looming EU deadline as a catalyst to bring a solution to the Cyprus conflict was not realised at the Copenhagen summit. Delegates at the summit were unable to reach a deal on the establishment of a partnership. The EU had hoped that such a deal would have allowed Cyprus to join the union as a united state. However, the de-linkage of the solution issue from the Greek Cypriot agenda in 1999 stood as an obstacle to the prospect of a settlement between the two communities; to a great extent, pressure on the Greek Cypriots for an agreement was decreased. The final declaration in Copenhagen stated that 'Cyprus' would be admitted as an EU member, while welcoming the commitment of the two communities in the island to continue to negotiate with the objective of concluding a comprehensive settlement of the problem by 28 February 2003 (the completion date of the Treaty of Accession) on the basis of Kofi Annan's plan.⁶ With the recent visit (26-28 February 2003) to the island by Kofi Annan, this deadline seemed to have been extended. The idea of a referendum (plebiscite) on the Annan plan, to be held on 30 March, was put forward but was rejected by both Rauf Denktaş and Tasos Papadopoulos.

The strategy of both UN and the EU, based on power mediation, did not pave the way to a settlement in the island. The success of third parties in cultivating the willingness of the two communities to reach a solution clearly would be tested in the months before the expansion of the union in 2004.

⁶ The reunification talks did overstep the UN frame of the 28 February to 16 April 2003- the day of signing the accession treaty of Cyprus to EU.

Major obstacles to a solution

Although, as mentioned, the impasse on the island has been caused by a combination of external and internal factors, the most important problems arise from internal considerations. First of all, until today, neither party seems to see the need to compromise. Otherwise we would have seen a dramatically different approach in the last weeks). After 1974, because of their experiences since 1963, the security factor became the most important issue for the Turkish Cypriots. Economic problems were a secondary matter. Recently, however, this began to change because of severe economic problems (high inflation, closure of many businesses, migration etc.).⁷ While middle-aged people still emphasize security, the younger generation is more concerned with economic welfare and EU membership. Hence, in the northern part of the island, the status quo has become less palatable. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, were more dissatisfied with their situation until **the acceptance** of their application by the EU. Now, to a great extent, they seem content with the status quo. The EU politically has diminished the willingness of the Greek Cypriots to reach a solution. The Greek Cypriot administration has been recognised since 1964 as the sole representative of the Republic of Cyprus. In this way, it has been able to receive a great amount of aid from international actors, including the US and EU. Not only has their economy progressed but it has reached EU standards. After the Copenhagen summit the Greek incentive for a change in the status quo in the island diminished dramatically.

⁷ After the dispatch of Annan Plan, crowded rallies were organised (by the opposition parties) in favour of the plan and the change in the status in the North. According to the survey results (by Kibris newspaper in May) there is a division as to the resolution of the conflict based on the Annan Plan in the North. However, in the Greek side of the island, nearly 80 per cent of the population is against the

The other internal element which has contributed to the impasse is the social-psychological behavior of both the communities in Cyprus. The social-psychological behavior has developed through the perceptions, cognition, attitudes and values held by the parties towards each other. As Volkan explains, perceptions and fears may become magnified with a time lapse; past historical events become an 'ethnic marker'.⁸ In Cyprus, the distinct large group identities of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots has continued to 'rigidify'. On this point Volkan's metaphor of 'ethnic tents' is important in elucidating the psychological content of peace-making. This tent is described as a canvas extending from the pole over the people - representing the large-group identity. The large-group activities centre around the maintenance of the group's identity. In Cyprus, even during times of togetherness (the Ottoman period and three years in the period of the Cyprus Republic), Turkish and Greek Cypriots lived in separate ethnic tents. Belonging to a separate tent has inhibited the spreading of a shared tent in a unified Cyprus.

Having regard to the fact that new generations have been raised in Cyprus since 1974, one would think that traditional political approaches and analogies would be automatically replaced by new ones; thus it should be easier to arrive at a form of coexistence. Yet this has not been the case. The new generations have been indoctrinated through their schools and media (also by the church on the Greek Cypriot side). On the Greek Cypriot side even primary school children are taken to the border to be shown their enemy on the other side. According to a Turkish Cypriot journalist who visited the Greek side recently, children taken to the border

plan. This result is confirmed by the presidential elections (16 February 2003) where ultra-nationalist candidate Mr.Papadopoulos was elected. He is known for his mistrust for the Turkish Cypriots.

⁸ Vamik Volkan, 'The Tree Model: A Comprehensive Psychopolitical Approach to Unofficial Diplomacy and the Reduction of Ethnic Tension', *Journal of Mind and Human Interaction*, Vol. 10, 1999, p.153.

by their teacher stuck close to each other with fear on their faces, “thinking most probably of the evil or the monster ‘others’- the Turks”.⁹ The media, on the Greek side (i.e. on the main television channel PIK), often refers to the territories lost to the Turks under the slogan ‘never forget’. This slogan has also been emphasised by the Greek Orthodox Church in the religious services. On the Turkish Cypriot side the media often refers to scenes from 1963, and by so doing emphasises the untrustworthiness of the other side. There are also frequent references, especially in national day ceremonies, to the intervention of the Turkish army in 1974. Monuments symbolize either the suffering of 1963-74 or the glory of 1974. So both communities remain under the influence of the dictonomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Such an emphasis on the past is a powerful metaphors which represents collective experiences and provide motives which guide group actions for years and generations. Thus, the need to oppose an out-group becomes encoded in the in-group’s identity¹⁰ and its rituals (i.e celebrations or anniversaries). Moreover, the existence of ‘chosen traumas and glories’ which are important aspects of large group identity in building rigid identities in many ethnic conflicts, make the coexistence more difficult . Chosen traumas are

mental representations of an event in a group’s history in which
the group suffered catastrophic loss, humiliation, and helplessness
at the hands of a neighboring group

whereas chosen glories, on the other hand, are

mental representations of a group’s past triumphs and serve
to boost the group’s self-esteem.¹¹

⁹ *Kibris Newspaper*, 29th March 2003.

¹⁰ Sean Byrne, ‘Consociational and civic society approaches to peacebuilding in Northern Ireland’, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 38, 2001, pp.327-352.

¹¹ Volkan, op.cit. (fn 8), p.153.

It can be argued that one reason for the failure of negotiations on Cyprus is that the large-group identity and large group rituals in both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities have been encoded in the negotiation processes for 40 years. The shared mental representations of past traumas are engraved in both Turkish and Greek Cypriots identities. The period of 1963-1974 became a chosen trauma for the Turkish Cypriots due to both physical insecurity and economic hardship. The July 1974 intervention, however, became a chosen glory for the Turkish Cypriots. For the Greek Cypriots, Turkish intervention and loss of their properties in the north have become a chosen trauma. Vamik Volkan puts forward the reasons for high emotional salience of this situation as the inability to mourn and to come to terms with loss. Thus, until such a loss is mourned (the process of mourning involves accepting losses as well as coming to terms with new realities), societies in conflict are unable to alter their positions and develop new relationships with former enemies.

Accordingly, the peace process in Cyprus has encountered obstacles because the psycho-social concerns of both parties have not been sufficiently addressed. In general it can be argued that the aim of unofficial diplomacy is to help communities in conflict to overcome mutual vulnerability through 'confidence-building' (which involves, to some extent, each recognising the other's identity); in this way official diplomacy benefits.

Although between the years 1966-2000 there were attempts to address or contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem, they were neither complete nor sufficient.¹² First of all, there were difficulties in the execution of unofficial diplomacy. To end the 'cycle of hostility' and support the formal negotiation process,

the involvement of the grass-roots into the process had to be regarded as vital.¹³ In the case of Cyprus, this did not happen in any way that could have had a positive result. From 1974 until 1990, neither side was receptive to unofficial interventions. Secondly, there was no organic relation between the two communities: diplomats, UN representatives and Maronites only could commute freely back and forth across the border. Moreover, the contacts between Turkish and Greek Cypriots were subjected to the permission of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot governments. The participants in such gatherings were often regarded as ‘traitors’.

The lack of such contacts, together with the missing cross-ethnic cleavages (existence of more than one split in a country such as religion, nationality or language), contributed to the non-resolution of the conflict as well. The existence of such cleavages might be expected to promote violence and instability; on the contrary, the existence of these different cleavages not only could have helped to break the intractability of the conflict but could have given unique success to a settlement. In politics there are competing interests. However, if there is a split in a country, the country will be in danger of being torn apart by violence. On the other hand if the member state alliances shift through the existence of more than one cleavage then potential tensions will be cancelled out. In Switzerland, the religious cleavage cuts across the linguistic cleavage. These cross-cutting cleavages prevent any side from becoming a permanent majority. The lack of cross-cutting linkages in language, nationality and religion in a territory composed of only two distinct ethno-religious groups has proven to be a disadvantage in peace-making and probably in

¹² Ronald J. Fisher, ‘Cyprus: The failure of mediation and the escalation of an identity based conflict to an adversarial impasse’, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 38, 2001, p.312.

¹³ According to some analysts, one of the reasons for the mass rallies carried out in the North was due to the bi-communal conflict resolution effort activities. But the same willingness as the solution of the

the sustainability of a settlement in Cyprus. An eventual partnership between the two communities -- with the former foe -- is bound to create considerable agony and distress. For peace building, a new unofficial method is needed, so that once an agreement is reached, it will last.

Necessity for a new approach

As is the case in many ethnic conflicts, the Cyprus conflict is a protracted conflict in which each side has apparently incompatible goals, has developed a set of grievances and believes it can change the other party. This state of mind has prevented the cooperation of leaders and their communities in resolving the conflict. As emphasized in 'psychoanalytically informed identity theory'¹⁴ a central role in the origin and persistence of the problem it should be given to identity. According to this approach, attention is paid both to the conscious and unconscious psychology of nations in conflict - large group identity and rituals. As long as underlying identity needs are not brought to the surface and addressed, a 'shared' perception of togetherness is difficult. It can be said that groups and nations can be healed through similar methods used to treat individuals in conflict. In this context the 'Tree Model' gives a central role to identity in the origin and continuation of ethnic conflicts. Developed by the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) at the University of Virginia's School of Medicine, the 'Tree Model' is a suitable method to transform such conflicts (emphasising mourning) and build trust, transparency and openness between two communities at both the elite and grassroots level. It is an interdisciplinary approach to conflict resolution carried out

problem based on the UN plan did not materialise in the South. This is a paradox as to the success of conflict resolution efforts.

by a team that includes psychoanalysts, diplomats, historians and other social scientists. The Tree Model is a multi-year process with three component:

1. Psychopolitical diagnosis (roots of the tree)
2. Psychopolitical dialogues (the trunk of the tree)
3. Institution building (branches of the tree)

The first phase of the process is a ‘diagnosis’ to uncover every aspect of the conflict and the relationship between the two communities. In the case of Cyprus, during the unofficial attempts at a resolution the hidden psychological problems were almost completely left out. These include for the Turkish Cypriots the ‘chosen glory’ of 1974 and the ‘chosen trauma’ of 1963, and for the Greek Cypriots the ‘chosen trauma’ of 1974. These emotions of the two communities (hurt, humiliation and victimisation) affected the decision-making apparatus of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Thus the official apparatus was never able to make the right conciliatory moves.

In the second phase of the process, when the trunk of the tree is developed, mourning is realised with the help of expert ‘facilitators’. It is during this phase that rigid and hostile attitudes of the people in conflict start to change. One important step that can help the mourning process is taking both school children (and the adults) to the other side’s(‘them’) cemeteries or places where ‘they’ were killed in the hands of ‘us’.¹⁵ This would help to face the real facts. Restoration of the

¹⁴ Marc Howard Ross, ‘Creating the conditions for peacemaking: practice in ethnic conflict resolution’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 6, 2000, p.1014.

¹⁵ According to Greek Cypriot lecturer, Dr.Mavratsas the university students do not consider the 1963-1974 as a cause of Cyprus conflict but the Turkish intervention as the main cause of the problem-round table meeting March 2003 in NEU.

Green Line wekk might help the mourning process (especially for the Greek Cypriots). The acceptance of past mistakes and their willingness to seek public forgiveness could also help the reconciliation process.¹⁶ Unless this phase is successful, instituion building will not create the desired success. Finally, the goal is to create common projects, organisations or institutions (NGOs) to support peaceful coexistence and develop working relations with each other. There are many projects, from education to trade to the enviroment, to encourage intergroup contact and facilitate new cohabitation. These projects and institutions become the branches of the tree. Thus, the seeds of an integrated state start to grow.

Epilogue

In the latest developments, following the decision of the TRNC Council of Ministers, the so- called ‘Green Line’ was opened on 23 April, enabling Turkish and Greek Cypriots to move around the island on a daily basis. This opening was a historical moment as from both sides of the island people were allowed to move to ‘the other side’. The ‘banned’ part of the island is now starting to have a human face, as everyday people visit their old villages, homes and friends in search of memories and the distant past at the same time as seeing the reality of the other side. This process can bring the mourning process to a natural end (especially for the Greek Cypriots) and start a reconciliation process in the island. Moreover, for the Greek Cypriots, the exaggerated fear of the Turkish army and Turkish people might fade away as well, now that Turkey has announced that it will for the first time in 40 years accept Greek Cypriot tourists without visas.

¹⁶ Joseph.V.Montville, ‘The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution’, in J.D. Dennis Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and application*, 1993, New York:Manchester University Press.

Since 1964, the UN has failed to convert the situation in the island into a real peace because it was unable to think outside the traditional modes of methods and models. However, it seems that there are now new and more realistic attempts in the island to build confidence, before a constitutional settlement between the two communities rather than the acceptance of a pseudo-solution within unrealistic time frames.¹⁷

¹⁷ Alfred Farrugia, 'The Solution to the Cyprus problem is in need of a paradigm shift- a view from a Maltese perspective' *Unpublished paper, 2003*