

**RETHINKING EMPIRE AFTER 9/11:
TOWARDS A NEW ONTOLOGICAL IMAGE OF WORLD ORDER**

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze significant trends which collectively have enough potential to transform the image of world order shaped through the globalization debates of 90s, by using Hardt and Negri's work (Hardt and Negri, 2000) as a base point. The main trends under review in this article are: the change in the perceptions of time through reconstruction of the past, the reterritorialization of political space, the reemergence of the classical practices of imperialism with its inside/outside duality, the erosion in the powers and effectiveness of international organizations, the restructuring of the international political economy, economic nationalism, a global wave of armament and spread of nuclear capabilities, and the new politics of identity that intends to foster national/civilizational subjectivities. Throughout the article, I compare those trends with Hardt and Negri's ontological map. My conclusion is that the direction of change in the world order is toward a different way from the one depicted in the Hardt and Negri's Empire. I call the principal actors of the newly emerging ontological picture of the world order "nation-empires". The term nation-empire implies the re-regionalization of power either around a great nation state like U.S., China and Russia, or multistate regionalization efforts as they are seen in Europe, Latin America and South East Asia. This new regionalism is not only limited to socio-economic realm, but also includes the rising sovereignty claims of the regional power centers over the functions of multilateral institutions and other cultural, ideological, political and military spheres.

Keywords

Empire, Nation Empires, Economic Nationalism, Globalization, Regionalism

"Theory follows reflection on what happens in the world."

Robert W. Cox¹

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¹ Robert W. Cox, "Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order", *New Political Economy*, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2004, p.307

The aim of this paper is to analyze significant trends which collectively have enough potential to transform the image of world order shaped through the globalization debates of 90s, by using Hardt and Negri's work² as a base point. Main trends under review in this article are: the change in the perceptions of time through reconstruction of the past, the reterritorialization of political space, the reemergence of the classical practices of imperialism with its inside/outside duality, the erosion in the powers and effectiveness of international organizations, the restructuring of the international political economy, economic nationalism, a global wave of armament and spread of nuclear capabilities, the new politics of identity that intends to foster national/civilizational subjectivities.

Throughout the article, I compare those trends with Hardt and Negri's ontological map. My conclusion is that direction of change in the world order is toward a different way from the one depicted in the Hardt and Negri's *Empire*. I call the principal actors of the newly emerging ontological picture of the world order as "nation-empires". The term nation-empire implies the re-regionalization of power either around a great nation state like U.S., China and Russia, or multistate regionalization efforts as they are seen in Europe, Latin America and South East Asia. This new regionalism is not only limited to socio-economic realm but also includes the rising sovereignty claims of the regional power centers over the functions of multilateral institutions and other cultural, ideological, political and military spheres.

The paper is organized as three interrelated parts. The first section is devoted to describe the fundamentals of the "Empire" with the focus on the main dynamics which gave birth to it and distinctive ontological traits separating Empire from previous world orders. The following section is the place in which Hardt and Negri's premises will be examined against the current trends. Also in this section, the direction of change that prepares the terrain for the rise of nation empires will be accentuated. It is preferred to keep the explanation of what nation empires exactly mean to the last section, with the consideration that the contextual frame provided by the previous sections would help to clarify my argumentation.

² Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, London, Harvard University Press, 2000.

Empire: An Ontological Reading of Globalization

In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri reinterpret the ongoing tendencies which some of them are already under discussion as separate topics in the context of globalization debates, within an unorthodox theoretical framework. They deconstruct the contents of essential concepts which were traditionally attributed to state centric image of World Order by historicizing their meanings. Then they reconstruct those concepts like sovereignty and identity over the terrain of two main categories; time and space. At the end, they reach a new ontological image of world order which includes, but is not limited to, power, control and legitimization structures.

Empire, is the name of this emerging mechanism of rule. It claims eternity in time and contrary to nation states, “no territorial boundaries limit its reign.”³ What differentiates this all encompassing entity from the rule of nation state is its new paradigm of sovereignty. Imperial sovereignty, doesn’t accept the inside/outside duality of modern state. As a centerless and deterritorialized apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm, it ends practices of colonialism and dialectic of modern sovereignty between civil order and natural order.⁴

With the removal of inside/outside duality, identity politics take different shapes. In the absence of other that has served through the homogenizing processes of national “civilized” populations, Empire uses new methods to make “multitude” into “people.”⁵ While colonial racism has contributed to the construction of the European “people” and nations in a dialectical relationship with native others, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,⁶ Empire integrates others with its order and then orchestrates differences in a system of control. Rather than constructing the Self by negating the Other, Empire accepts all regardless of race, creed, color, gender, sexual orientation, and so forth.⁷ In other words, whereas modern sovereignty sought to fix pure, separate identities, Empire’s choice is

³ Ibid, p. xiv-xv

⁴ Ibid, p. 37., 187

⁵ Main traits of “people” are oneness, having one will and one action. But the multitude has nearly reverse characteristics; multiplicity, a plane of singularities, an open set of relations and inclusive relations with those outside of it. Contrary to multitude, people offer a constituted synthesis that is prepared for sovereignty. With its single will and action the people often conflict with the various wills and actions of the multitude. Ibid, p.103

⁶ Ibid, p. 103

⁷ Ibid, p. 198

movement and mixture: “Complete cultural assimilation... is certainly not a priority of imperial strategy.”⁸

Identity politics of Empire, which dissolves fixed and biological notions of peoples into a fluid and amorphous multitude,⁹ is not the only indicator that shows the decline of the nation state and modern sovereignty. For Hardt and Negri, as a juridico-economic structure, structural and irreversible decline of nation state that is increasingly unable to regulate economic and cultural exchanges,¹⁰ can be seen through the evolution process of whole series of global bodies, such as GATT, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the IMF.¹¹ The New Order transforms the classical meanings and functions of those old institutions, by turning them to actors which behave not only according to contract or negotiation based definition of international right, but as a legitimate supranational motors of juridical action.¹²

Because economic factors that are controlled by a series of international bodies like those mentioned above gain preeminence, this process also means the disappearance of the autonomy of the political. Control over the equilibria of the trade balances and speculation on the value of currencies is no longer in the hands of the traditional political forces. In Empire, government and politics come to be completely integrated into the system of transnational command.¹³

This system of transnational command reflects the power structure of Empire which resembles a multilayered pyramid. As a superpower, holding hegemony over the global use of force, the U.S. is on the pinnacle of the pyramid. The U.S. shares the first tier of pyramid with a group of other nation states which control the primary monetary instruments and have the ability to regulate international exchanges. Organisms like G7, Paris and London Clubs, Davos etc. bound those states. Other actors in the first tier of the pyramid are a heterogeneous set of associations deploying cultural and biopolitical power on a global level. Transnational corporations which have extended market-networks of capital, technology and population flows throughout the world are positioned in the second tier. They are on the top of

⁸ Ibid, p. 200

⁹ Ibid, p. 195

¹⁰ Ibid, p. xii

¹¹ Ibid, p. 336

¹² Ibid, p. 181

¹³ Ibid, p. 307

the other nation states and operate as filters of the flow of global circulation and regulators of the articulation of global command. The last and broadest tier of the pyramid includes groups representing popular interests in the global power arrangement. The representation problem of large masses is attempted to be solved through United Nations General Assembly and some NGOs.¹⁴

By referring the Polybius, Hardt and Negri see the above mentioned pyramid as unity of three forms of government functioning like a universal republic: Monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. While Monarchic power belongs to the U.S., transnational corporations and nation states in the first tier have the aristocratic power. And the place of Democratic power is nation states, NGOs, media and popular movements.¹⁵

Empire has three main control mechanisms based on the powers attributed to those governmental forms: Atomic bomb refers to monarchic, money to aristocratic and ether to democratic. Monarchic power relies on the monopoly of nuclear weaponry. By taking the power to make decisions over war and peace, which is a primary element of the traditional definition of sovereignty from nation states, imperial concentration of nuclear technologies limits their sovereignty. The second mean of imperial control is monetary. Monetary deconstruction of national markets, the dissolution of national and/or regional regimes of monetary regulation, and the subordination of those markets to the needs of financial powers gave way to the construction of the world market. Like nuclear monopoly which gives Empire necessary authorization for the police power, monetary mechanisms provide it with the primary means to control the market. Hardt and Negri mention the management of communication, the structuring of the education system and the regulation of culture as final fundamental medium of imperial control and more apparent sovereignty prerogatives in today's world.¹⁶ Communication industries have assumed a central position in the Empire because of both its relation with production processes and its ability to project imperial ideology deep in the social structures.¹⁷

Empire's legitimization logic of intervention, with the backing of those mechanisms, deserves special attention. What makes Empire legitimate is its

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 309-311

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 309-314

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 345-346

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 33

capacity to resolve conflicts.¹⁸ And, its intervention earns juridical legitimacy only when it is decided within the chain of international consensus: “The first task of Empire, then, is to enlarge the realm of consensuses that support its own power.”¹⁹ In Empire, right of intervention is not limited only to ensure or impose the application of voluntarily engaged international accords. Essential values of justice which legitimize a permanent state of emergency and exception make the intervention of supranational subjects possible on the basis of not right, but consensus: “the right of the police is legitimated by universal values”.²⁰ So, moral instruments are vital as a prelude to military operations. News media, religious organizations and NGOs practice the moral intervention.²¹

Since its publication in 2000, *Empire* has created a vivid intellectual debate around the topics it deals with.²² Among others, *Empire*’s main arguments on sovereignty,²³ decline of nation state,²⁴ multitude,²⁵ the distinction between old style imperialism and today’s Empire²⁶ has come under criticism. As a response to those reactions, Hardt and Negri wrote a new book, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, in 2004. Although the main focus of it was multitude, “the living alternative that grows within Empire,”²⁷ they also answer the some critics of *Empire*, by emphasizing that “Empire is a *tendency*.”²⁸ In other words, the ontological image of world order depicted in the *Empire* was not a fully realized project, but a “*tendency* of global political order in the course of its formation.”²⁹

¹⁸ Ibid, p. xv

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 15

²⁰ Ibid, p. 18

²¹ Ibid, p. 35. Hardt and Negri show Gulf War as a perfect example of this new kind of intervention. For them, United States led the coalition not as a function of its own national motives but in the name of global right: “The U.S. world police acts not in imperialist interest but in imperial interest.” U.S. peace police role in the Empire should be practiced only with the call of supranational organizations of peace; as were in Haiti, Persian Gulf, Somalia and Bosnia. (Ibid, p. 180-181)

²² Among the body of literature that exists on *Empire*, those two volumes collect numerous important critics of *Empire*: Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Debating Empire*, Verso: London and New York, 2003 - Paul Andrew Passavant, and Jodi Dean, *Empire’s New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri*, Taylor & Francis Books, London, 2004

²³ Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, “Representing the International: Sovereignty after Modernity?” in Paul Andrew Passavant, and Jodi Dean, *Empire’s New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri*, Taylor & Francis Books, London, 2004, pp. 121-142. - Atilio A. Boron, *Empire and Imperialism, A Critical Reading of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri*, trans. by Jessica Casiro, Zed Books, London, 2005, chapter 5.

²⁴ Boron, *Empire and Imperialism, A Critical Reading of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri*, chapters 3 and 5.

²⁵ Ernesto Laclau, “Can Immanence Explain Social Struggles?”, *Empire’s New Clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri*, Taylor & Francis Books, London, 2004, pp. 21-30. - Boron, *Empire and Imperialism, A Critical Reading of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri*, chapter 6.

²⁶ Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture, *Harvard University Press, U.S.A.*, 2002, p. 15-16. - Boron, *Empire and Imperialism, A Critical Reading of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri*, chapter 8.

²⁷ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, **The Penguin Press, New York, 2004, p. xiii**

²⁸ Ibid, p.xiii

²⁹ Ibid, xii. Passages showing that Hardt and Negri’s vision of world order was not the reflection of a finished project also can be found in *Empire*: “We are experiencing a first phase of the transformation of the global frontier into an open space of imperial sovereignty.” (Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 182)

As a *network power*, a new form of sovereignty which includes dominant nation-states, supranational institutions, major capitalist corporations and other powers, Empire is in the process of *emergence*.³⁰

But as Hardt and Negri note, there are counterpowers³¹ within the network of Empire and the trends which will be discussed in the subsequent part of the article show how they can challenge the architecture of it. Behaviours of the Monarch, especially after 9/11, not only opened a terrain for counterpowers to operate more easily, but it also directly damaged the structures which gave life to the “first phase” of Imperial transformation in some instances.³² Through this analysis, the conceptual tools and fresh perspectives that were contributed to IR thinking by *Empire*, help us to understand the complex architecture of the world order which takes shape under the new phase of capitalism and to examine the powers and dynamics which force it to change.

World Order in Change: Collapsing Pillars of Empire

The first collapsed pillar of “Empire” is its self-declared status of representing the “end of history”. Even formal proclamations of war on terror compares the threat which the U.S. claims to fight with Nazism and communism both ideologically and materially.³³ If Empire faces such a powerful rivalry and the full mobilization of war making capabilities of the Monarch is to expel this menace, then it is meaningless to think that last chapter of history is already written.

But what actually interests us is on the other side of the coin. Today, one of the best areas which tectonic power shifts in the world order can be observed is the actual historical debates from Latin America to China, Europe etc. In those debates, future visions of the masses are being reconstructed through reimagination of the past. In other words, in the minds of the people who feel themselves not as subjects of Empire but power gathering nation empires, history is searching its new way, first deconstructing the old tenets of Empire about time, and then revising their understandings of history.

³⁰ Ibid, xii. Passages showing that Hardt and Negri’s vision of world order was not the reflection of a finished project also can be found in *Empire*: “We are experiencing a first phase of the transformation of the global frontier into an open space of imperial sovereignty.” (Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 182)

³¹ Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p.166

³² Ibid, p.182

³³ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America: September 17,2002, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>

Symbolism in the downfall of the statues of historical figures belongs to the past regimes are familiar to those who remember the end of 80s and the beginning of 90s. And today, we can see similar scenes during anti-Empire demonstrations. For example, demolishing the Columbus statue with a public ceremony in Venezuela symbolizes a desire to change motivated by a political vision which reads hundreds years history of a whole continent as the history of continuous oppression that began with the coming of “white man.”

The rewriting of history³⁴ also serves the relativization of current power relationships and opens a place for alternative future trajectories that nation empires seek to represent in the public imagination. Again, if we return to symbolism of Columbus, what gives the political meaning and popularity to Gavin Menzies’ thesis³⁵ that America was discovered 71 years before the Columbus by Chinese admiral Zheng He is the sea change which we experience in world politics. The greatness of the past not only increases the confidence about the “inevitability” of the “rising again,” but also transforms the Empire’s time from eternal present to a passing interregnum between two period of rises, in the eyes of the nation empires’ hopeful subjects both within and outside of its core territories.

As it is seen both in Germany and Japan, another version of historical rewriting also indicates erosion of Empires’ time. The main aim of this version is to gain moral equity with others to legitimize “rising again.” Look at Germany, Jorg Friedrich’s best seller book in his country, translated to English with the title *The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945*,³⁶ tells a less known face of WWII: mass civilian casualties of Germany. Friedrich’s perspective is provocative, and the interest which is showed by German people in his book is meaningful. He accuses Churchill of war crimes because of the concious targeting of civilians during the Allied bombings of Germany which left 635.000 civilian death and 7.5 million homeless. By describing carpet bombing as a method of mass destruction of the age, he equalizes the sins of Hitler with Churchill. Friedrich is not alone in his way, a growing literature focuses the subject like W.G. Sebald’s *On the Natural History of Destruction*.³⁷ And in Germany, making comparisons between

³⁴ In this article, the focus is on the political functions and effects of the historical writing. What I try to show is that anti-Empire versions of history aiming to back diverse political agendas gain popularity in many parts of the world.

³⁵ Gavin Menzies, *1421: The Year China Discovered America*, New York, Harper Perennial, 2004.

³⁶ Jorg Friedrich, *The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945*, trans. Allison Brown, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006.

³⁷ W.G. Sebald, *On the Natural History of Destruction*, trans. Anthea Bell, USA, Penguin Books Ltd., 2004.

Nazi rule and Israel's practices in the occupied territories are not as rare as it was the past; one of the last examples of this are the remarks of two southern German bishops which appeared in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, one of Germany's largest newspapers.³⁸

Former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan's war dead, including convicted war criminals from World War II, and his successor Shinzo Abe's denial the military's role in coercing about 200,000 women from Korea, China, Taiwan, Philippines and other countries into sex servitude during WWII are other examples of the strategy of normalization to "rise again" by means of reinterpreting the "shameful" past.

As another case, gaining moral sovereignty constitutes an important part of Iran's effort to rise in the Middle East. And again, history is one of the main battlefields. Earlier in 2006, Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent a letter to German chancellor, Angela Merkel. After praising the great achievements of German culture, he said that, "the propaganda machinery after World War II has been so colossal that [it] has caused some people to believe that they are the guilty party."³⁹ And then at the end of the year, Iran hosted an International Conference: "Review of the Holocaust: Global Vision." The aim of the conference was declared as to offer "an opportunity for thinkers who cannot express their views freely in Europe about the Holocaust."⁴⁰ Besides other strategic aims of the conference, claiming to protect freedoms which do not exist in the heartland of Empire is a frontline attack to Empire's moral tenets based on a specific imagination of history.

Another source of attacks Empire faces also relies on the reinterpretation of history. Remembering Hardt and Negri, if we define modern sovereignty in relation with imperialism and accept the disappearance of both as indicators of transition to imperial sovereignty, then any act of imperialism occurring within the parameters of modern sovereignty is an assault to the very foundations of Empire. The U.S. led coalition's invasion of Iraq completely fits this logic. And it is not accident that there is an emergence of new literature rewriting the history of imperialism from a positive perspective. Nial Ferguson's *Empire*,⁴¹ a bestseller in 2003 both in Britain and the U.S., is

³⁸ Mark Landler, "German Bishops' Remarks on West Bank Are Denounced", *The New York Times*, 10 March 2007.

³⁹ Anne Applebaum, "Tehran's Holocaust Lesson", *The Washington Post*, 12 December 2006.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Nial Ferguson, *Empire*, New York, Penguin Books Ltd, 2003.

a perfect example of this kind of reinterpretation. By repackaging colonialism as a benign developmental mission aimed to bring freedom, democracy and prosperity to primitive cultures, Ferguson revives the myth of “benevolent empire.” Ferguson is not alone, popularity of Andrew Roberts’ last book *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900*⁴² in some circles indicates that intellectual efforts spend over history to shape today and create a future within the parameters of the imperialist past will continue.

Empire disintegrates in space too. Defining characteristics of Imperial sovereignty are losing ground beginning from the heartland of Empire to the remote parts of it. Reterritorialization, reinforcement of boundaries and search for territorial center of power, revival of the old fashioned imperialism based on the duality of territorially defined zones of civil order/naturel order and inside/outside are the symptoms of fatal illness Empire has suffered.

Rising walls, not the downfallen ones, reshape our political imagination on space.⁴³ The level of control that now exists in some boundaries, has never been seen before in the human history. Fences backed by technologically advanced surveillance equipment and intensified border patrols turn imaginary lines into impassable barriers that separate inside from outside and civil zone from the aliens’ chaotic one. The perfect example of such new fortifications can be seen on the U.S.-Mexico border. It is ironic that the reaction of Mexican President Felipe Calderón against the bill President Bush signed at the end of October 2006, which provides for construction of 700 miles of added fencing along the Southwestern was to remind him of the Berlin Wall.⁴⁴

Boundaries with other neighbors are also under strict scrutiny. Today, the U.S.’ nearly 4.000 miles border with Canada is under surveillance to a degree never seen before. As an answer to increasing pressures of the U.S., like the U.S. Congress’ decision to mandate that visitors begin showing passports at the border by Jan. 1, 2008, Canada declared to arm border guards. Additionally, it will spend \$337 million for the electronic-Manifest program, which allows for computer-automated risk assessments of cargo shipments before they reach Canada. The 18,000 trucks that cross the U.S.-

⁴² Andrew Roberts, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900*, New York, HarperCollins, 2007.

⁴³ Kaplan indicates the double behavior of American Empire: “The American Empire has long followed a double impetus to construct boundaries and patrol all movement across them and to break down those borders through the desire for unfettered expansion.” (Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture*, p.15)

⁴⁴ David Stout, “Bush, Signing Bill for Border Fence, Urges Wider Overhaul”, *The New York Times*, 27 October 2006.

Canada border each day, as well as all railroad, air and marine cargo carriers will eventually be required to file electronic manifests before their shipments arrive.⁴⁵

At the heartland of the Empire, the traditional feeling of safety that natural barriers such as great oceans provided to successive generations, has collapsed. All dimensions of space; land, air, sea and even outer space are seen as insecure. Invaders (read terrorists, illegal immigrants, epidemics, slant-eyed capitalists etc.) are at the gates of the City upon a Hill. And this fear, not the “network power” of Empire, shines today over other parts of the world.

Fortress Europe with its tightened border security against the outside and increasing willingness of the constituent national governments to limit new comer’s freedom of movement within the E.U. are the reflection of similar fears. Once seen as the model for political future of globalization, the E.U. declares its *raison d’être* as a shelter, not a substitute for European nation states against the globalization: alien dynamics which threaten the shared civil order of the continent. President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso’s words clearly display the imagination of EU as a nation-empire in the post-Empire world:

...But the EU needs a new core purpose... Size matters in the globalized world. The actors of globalization, the US, China, India, dwarf any single member of the EU. But the EU has size; 500 million people, the biggest single market and the biggest aid donor in the world... Globalization has reduced the ability of the nation state alone to provide solutions, while failing to provide a realistic alternative at the global level, Europe - with its shared values and diversity of expertise - fills that gap... It is to the nation state that most Europeans feel greatest allegiance. But in an era when the challenges facing nation states are global, governments can best deliver for their citizens by leveraging our common strength as Europe.⁴⁶

Another thing we need to complete the picture Hardt and Negri drew on modern sovereignty is imperialism. At this point, Tony Blair’s foreign policy guru Robert Cooper helps us by highlighting the logic behind the invasion of Iraq. Cooper’s sentences show us the logic which links “dialectic of sovereignty between the civil order and the natural order” with imperialism:

⁴⁵ Beth Duff-Brown, “Canada Unveils Border Security Plan”, *The Associated Press*, 13 January 2007.

⁴⁶ José Manuel Barroso, “You don’t have to love Europe. But do you want to lead or be dragged along?”, *The Guardian*, 18 October 2006.

The postmodern world has to start to get used to double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But, when dealing with old-fashioned states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.⁴⁷

Walls are also spreading outside the Imperial heartland. In recent years Israel has built a huge wall that surrounds Palestinian territories. At the end of the 2006, the Saudi Arabian interior minister said his country will build a massive security fence along its 562-miles land borders with Iraq to prevent infiltration of “terrorists.”⁴⁸ Today, neighborhoods in the Baghdad are separated from each other with walls aiming to prevent sectarian conflict. And Pakistan, as a response to allegations which Pakistani security agencies support the Taliban, declared that it will both mine and build fences along Afghan border which was drawn by British in the early 1890s.⁴⁹

Another of the important areas reterritorialization deeply felt is jurisdiction. According to Hardt and Negri, Empire was the fourth phase of the U.S. Constitutional Project. But Empire’s tendency towards a regime of global jurisdiction that takes its legitimacy not from the contracts, but from supranational right backed by the philosophy of human rights is heavily challenged on the terrain of the U.S. Constitution. The logic behind the CIA’s secret flights and camps outside U.S. territory, and the choice of Guantanamo as a place to jail “enemy combatants” are the same: denial of the necessity to respect basic rights of every person, in every time and place. The source of the rights are a national constitution, so they are under protection only within the territory in which Constitution has jurisdiction, and there is a direct relationship between entitlement as a bearer of rights and citizenship.

Comparing the legal positions of prisoners in Guantanamo and José Padilla before the law can provide us more insight over the subject. After 9/11, The Supreme Court ruled twice that federal statutes empowered the courts to consider Guantanamo prisoners’ habeas corpus petitions challenging the grounds for their detention. As it is known, habeas corpus is a centuries old

⁴⁷ Robert Cooper, “Why we still need empires”, *The Observer*, 7 April 2002.

⁴⁸ “Saudis pressing ahead with fence on Iraq border”, *AFP*, 14 November 2006.

⁴⁹ Imtiaz Gul, “Pakistan army told to plan fence and mines along Afghan border”, *The Guardian*, 27 December 2006.

fundamental right to ask a judge for release from unjust imprisonment. As a response to the Supreme Court, Congress twice rewrote law to limit the detainees' ways of appeal. The last of them, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, was signed by President Bush in October 2006. After that, in February 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the new law did not violate the constitutional provision that bars the government from suspending habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or invasion. The decision, *Lakhdar Boumediene v. George W. Bush*, includes cases of 63 detainees, all are foreign nationals.⁵⁰

In May 2002, an American citizen José Padilla was arrested at Chicago and classified as an "enemy combatant", then sent to a navy prison in Charleston, South Carolina. The U.S. Government's plan was to put José Padilla on trial for allegedly being part of a network linked to international terrorists. But Padilla's lawyers appealed to court by arguing that he is not fit to stand trial because he has been driven insane by the government. Because he is an American citizen, the Supreme Court challenged his status of enemy combatant, and by using the right of habeas corpus Padilla faced an ordinary US trial in Miami.⁵¹

It should be noted that U.S. is not alone in this way. They have followers such as Canada that has a controversial law which allows the Canadian government to detain foreign-born terrorism suspects indefinitely using secret evidence and without charges while their deportations are being reviewed. Although, Canada's highest court struck it down, debate is continuing over the issue.⁵²

For Hardt and Negri, transformation in the behaviors of International Organizations was an indicator of Empire. They were beginning to act as if there were a central authority sanctioning right. Now they are returning back to their contractual origins. And, one of the main factors which influence this reversal is the Monarch's unwillingness to accept the limitations that International Organizations may pose over it.

The U.S.' invasion of Iraq, in spite of the opposition of U.N., is a dramatic example which shows how easily the Monarch can refuse the restrictions of international authority at the expense of eroding the legitimacy

⁵⁰ Stephen Labaton, "Court Endorses Law's Curbs on Detainees", *The New York Times*, 21 February 2007.

⁵¹ Naomi Klein, "The US psychological torture system is finally on trial", *The Guardian*, 23 February 2007.

⁵² Ian Austen, "Canadian Court Limits Detention in Terror Cases", *The New York Times*, 24 February 2007.

of the organization. Actually, while expanding their regulation sphere, the main opposition center which international organisms have to face is usually U.S.: Kyoto and ICC are only two well known examples. After withdrawal of the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court treaty one month into President Bush's first term, then-Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton was describing the court as a "product of fuzzy-minded romanticism . . . not just naive, but dangerous."⁵³

By putting short termed national interest over the Empire's long termed necessities, the U.S. paved the way for other actors to imitate its way of reasoning. This mentality shift turns international organizations into bargaining places reflecting current balances of power, rather than institutions that oversee an international system established over common norms and principles.

Increasing tendency to have recourse to ad hoc mechanisms and conferences rather than decades old institutions to resolve conflicts display revival of the contractual, negotiation based diplomacy. Bilateral relations and regional power balances gains preeminence over global multilateral organizations. As it was mentioned above, the difference between Gulf War and Invasion of Iraq enables us to observe the changing nature of the international system. The Gulf War has ended with a U.N. Security Council resolution that determines the conditions of peace and obligations of the Iraq. And today, the U.S. tries to end conflict in Iraq by way of the international conferences with the attendance of great powers and neighbors. In March 2007, as a first step, the U.S., China, Russia, France and Britain came together with neighbors of Iraq over a table in Baghdad and a second conference was held after one month in Sharm El- Sheyh, Egypt. The meeting place of the last one was Istanbul. Negotiations with North Korea are another example which the same mechanism is already in use.

Another cause of the change in the natures of International Organizations is the structural transformation in the international political economy. During 1990s, the IMF, WTO and WB were the symbols of Empire. All of them are losing either their functions or influences. Because, while booming commodity prices help developing countries to ease their financial burdens, availability of alternative credit sources give them the ability to choose.

⁵³ Nora Boustany, "A Shift in the Debate On International Court", *The Washington Post*, 7 November 2006.

It is ironic to read stories about the financial problems of the IMF resulting from the lack of nearly any borrower country. But today, those kinds of reports are not rare in the economy magazines. To understand what is happening we should look at Latin America. In the past two years, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Nicaragua have all paid off the IMF loans or let lapse the IMF agreements that imposed significant restrictions on their governments. The first factor that helped leaders to cut ties with the IMF was the increase in the commodity prices which caused to fill government coffers with international reserves and led to three years of economic growth. The other is the help of Venezuela as an alternative source of credit. In 2006, when Argentina was paying off its 10 billion dollars owed to the IMF, Venezuela had bought \$2.5 billion in Argentine debt. Last March, Bolivia let its agreement with the fund end, too. Meanwhile, Venezuela has committed more than \$140 million in loans and grants while pledging to invest as much as \$1.5 billion in Bolivia's gas industry in coming years. Again, with the help of Venezuela's financial leverage, Ecuador has cut its ties with the IMF. Venezuela's financial attack is not limited with these countries and seems to continue. As another step, it is proposing a new multinational bank, Bank of the South, to replace Washington-based lenders. According to "The Center of Economic Investigations", Chávez pledged \$47 billion in aid and agreements in 2006.⁵⁴ This is the Latin American version of sovereignty claim from Empire in the realm of economics and constitutes an example of the efforts to build a defensive nation empire through regionalization.

The situation of World Bank is not much different from the IMF. Many countries in the developing world prefer Chinese aid to the World Bank's. Contrary to World Bank, Chinese aid comes with three no's: no bids, no conditions and no need to reform. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Indonesia, Nigeria and Angola are only part of the long list which China has offered aid. Although it is not declared openly, competition with the World Bank is clear. In the Philippines for example, China's offer, a package of \$2 billion in loans each year for the next three years, is much more attractive than \$200 million offered separately by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and a \$1 billion loan under negotiation with Japan.⁵⁵

The WTO, the third pillar of the Empire's global economic institutions, is also in crisis. In July 2006, the Doha Round of global talks to lower trade

⁵⁴ Juan Forero and Peter S. Goodman, "Chávez Builds His Sphere Of Influence", *Washington Post*, 23 February 2007.

⁵⁵ Jane Perlez, "China Competes With West in Aid to Its Neighbors", *The New York Times*, 18 September 2006.

barriers was suspended, and there is not much hope and time to resume it. Powerful farming lobbies in the EU and U.S. press against the additional decrease in the farm subsidies. The U.S. president's fast track authority related to trade issues will end soon, and it is too hard to renew it when we take into consideration the protectionist tendencies of Congress which is dominated by Democrats. So, the center of gravity in trade talks is slipping towards the bilateral FTAs. Trade diversion effects of FTAs evoke the influence zones that were attributed to nation-empires, rather than Empire's all encompassing way of relationship. The EU, U.S., China and Russia, all are busy negotiating bilateral trade agreements with different parts of the world. The reason that lies behind this "scramble" is that bilateral negotiations provide an easier way to gain access to certain economies than multilateral liberalization. The disparity of power between nation-empires and small states can give to the former leverage to make deals in favorable terms and to force the latter to take into consideration other factors which are unrelated directly to trade, such as politics and security during negotiations. So, the imaginary autonomy of economics from the politics in the Empire is becoming meaningless.

We can trace the rise of nation empires through constant demands about transferring functions of Imperial institutions to regional counterparts. Today, many experts are waiting for the establishment of an Asian monetary agency that would rival the IMF in the near future.⁵⁶ Asian leaders want to create an EU-like community called as AEC, or the ASEAN Economic Community. And today, ACU (Asian Currency Unit) is not a hopeless project. At the end of the 2006, South American leaders agreed to create a high-level commission to study the idea of forming a continent-wide community similar to the European Union.⁵⁷ In March 2007, the Organization of the Islamic Conference declared that preferential trade system among member countries will come into existence starting January 1, 2009. The Organization's midterm aim is to first create a free trade area and eventually a custom union among the members.

The shift in the balance between economy and politics is another indicator showing the erosion in the ontological foundations of Empire. Increasing strength of "economic nationalism" swings the pendulum back towards "autonomy of the political." Actually, debate over economic

⁵⁶ Steven R. Weisman, "IMF and World Bank: Swing in global order is apparent", *The New York Times*, 17 September 2006.

⁵⁷ Dan Keane, "S. American leaders aim for EU-like body", *Associated Press*, 9 December 2006.

nationalism is not suspended even in the heyday of Empire, and recent contributions which came from the constructivist approaches only enlarged the context of discussions. Redefining economic nationalism with reference to nation and national identity, rather than state, they even see economic liberalism as a form of economic nationalism.⁵⁸ In this reinterpretation of the concept, acceptance of the autonomous effects of culture and politics over the economic decisions even within a highly integrated neoliberal economic system is very interesting. But it is necessary for us also to review former literature in order to understand what today we face.

When we return back to the basics, we see that beginning from Friedrich List,⁵⁹ many scholars have defined economic nationalism with reference to the special relationship between market and state. Gilpin tried to summarize common points of different “economic nationalisms” which were historically labeled as mercantilism, statism, protectionism, the German Historical School and New Protectionism: “Its central idea is that economic activities are and should be subordinate to the goal of state building and the interests of the state. All nationalists ascribe to the primacy of the state, of national security, and of military power in the organization and functioning of the international system.”⁶⁰

Under the light of these definitions, the main characteristics of current economic nationalism and its rupture points from the Empire can be listed as follows: securitization of economic realm, protectionism of both advanced and developing countries, emergence of sovereign wealth funds and state owned corporations as important actors within a globalized economy.

The state’s intervention in the economic sphere for security reasons takes different forms. What we mainly see are increasing surveillance of private economic activity and financial flows, restrictions over foreign capital by forbidding them to have acquisitions in some sectors which are declared as critical or security sensitive and usage of corporate power as direct instruments of state policies in world politics. All practices above fit the criteria of “subordination of economic activities to the interest of the state.”

⁵⁸ Andreas Pickel, “Recontextualizing Economic Nationalism In a Globalizing World”, in Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel, *Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2005, p.12.

⁵⁹ Friedrich List, *National System of Political Economy*, trans. George-Auguste Matile, Henri Richelot, J.B., Philadelphia, Lippincott & Co., 1856.

⁶⁰ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987, p.31.

Today, the most extensive surveillance policy belongs to the U.S. After the 2001 attacks, President Bush signed the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that gives permission to “investigate, regulate or prohibit” any foreign financial transaction linked to “an unusual and extraordinary threat.” The surveillance program created under the umbrella of this legislation has used a new and broad interpretation of the U.S. Treasury Department’s administrative powers to bypass traditional banking privacy protections. It has scanned large volumes of international money transfers, many of them were made by U.S. citizens and residents. Brussels based banking consortium Swift is accused of violating European and Asian data protection rules by providing the United States with confidential information about international money transfers.⁶¹ The U.S. Treasury Department prepares a data-collection program, called as The Cross-Border Electronic Funds Transfer Program. It will gather information about 500 million cross-border financial transactions a year. Banks and money services are required by law to keep records on all wire transfers of \$3,000 or more. The proposed program would mandate that each of those transactions -if they cross the U.S. border - be reported to the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. The type of data captured would include the names and addresses of senders, the amount and dates of the transfers, the names and addresses of the beneficiaries and their financial institutions.⁶²

In the U.S., the most visible recent examples of economic nationalism in the form of protectionism grounded by security are the congressional opposition to the takeover bid of Chinese Petroleum Company CNOOC for Unocal and the refusal to sell port management businesses in six major U.S. seaports to DP World, a company based in the United Arab Emirates. But U.S. is not alone; Indian steel company Mittal’s desire to buy Arcelor fired a huge debate that is full of nationalist rhetoric in Europe during months. The French government declared 11 strategic commercial sectors that should be protected from foreign takeovers and listed Danone as a “strategic industry” to prevent the sale of the company to PepsiCo. When French waste water and energy company Suez wanted to be acquired by Italian company Enel, the government announced that Suez would merge with the state-owned utility, Gaz de France.⁶³ And, Italian toll-road operator Autostrade’s takeover by the Spanish company Abertis was blocked by the government.

⁶¹ Barton Gellman, Paul Blustein and Dafna Linzer, “Bank Records Secretly Tapped”, *Washington Post*, 23 June 2006.

⁶² Ellen Nakashima, “Vast Data Collection Plan Faces Big Delay”, *Washington Post*, 17 January, 2007.

⁶³ **Tim Franks**, “Patriotism and protectionism in the EU”, *BBC News*, 23 March 2006.

Russia is another country with two laws that would sharply restrict foreign ownership of oil and natural gas fields and ban foreign majority ownership of companies in 40 sectors such as aerospace, military and nuclear power industries. The government agency responsible for the investigation of foreign companies interested in investing in 40 specific industrial sectors spelled out in the law is The Federal Security Service, the successor agency to the KGB.⁶⁴

As was the case in Russia, growing sensitivity over natural resources are called as resource nationalism indicating that resource rich countries tries to consolidate their control over them.⁶⁵ Recent Nationalizations in Latin American countries, such as Bolivia and Venezuela and the Russian government's pressure over Royal Dutch Shell to sell 50 percent plus one share of the world's largest combined oil and natural gas development project in the Sakhalin 2 area are some examples of this new trend.⁶⁶

Legislative restrictions over operations of private firms in sanctioned states are ordinary practices through which states remind "global" corporations that they are still under jurisdiction of home countries. National interest is also matter for private firms when they want to sell "critical" products and technologies abroad although their trade within the territorial boundaries of nation state is free. For example, when Boeing applies a new technology to its planes what it should take into consideration is only the market rules. But if it tries to transfer the same technology to a Chinese company, it becomes subject to approval of security institutions of state. This is the moment in which private property turns to a nationalized one, from being an asset of Boeing to "American technology."

But nation-empires also want to affect other corporations to help their geopolitical aims. The recent case is Iran. The Bush administration has met with European oil companies to warn them not to invest in Iran. Despite the administration's pressure, however, many of the world's biggest oil companies attended a meeting in Vienna held by National Iranian Oil Co. Statements of the Patricia Marie, spokeswoman for the French oil company Total S.A., shows that Oil companies justify their refusal of U.S. demands

⁶⁴ Andrew E. Kramer, "Russian Cabinet approves draft bill on restricting foreign investment", *International Herald Tribune*, 31 January 2007.

⁶⁵ Bill Farren-Price, "Risks for producers in flexing new muscle", *International Herald Tribune*, 18 September 2006.

⁶⁶ Andrew E. Kramer, "Russians Buy Control of Oil Field", *The New York Times*, 22 December 2006.

by underlining that they are under jurisdiction of a different “nation-empire”: “We are listening. . . . But we respect the French law, the European laws; we are not obliged to respect American law.”⁶⁷ The U.S.’ and Israel’s joint pressure on major U.S. pension funds to stop investment in about 70 companies that trade directly with Iran, and to international banks that trade with its oil sector shows the expanding nature of such efforts.⁶⁸

In the Russian and Chinese cases, instrumentalization of corporate power in the service of nation-empire’s geopolitical needs takes a more direct form. Russian state owned natural gas company Gasprom, effectively used energy the dependency of Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia by raising gas prices during the political crises with the Russian state. A new international monopoly, “gas OPEC” is on the way, and everything is happening over the infrastructure of the global economy created by the Empire. Beside its gigantic corporations which are operational all over the world, China has a state owned investment agency. It is anticipated that the large portion of China’s immense reserves of foreign currency, now totaling more than \$1,5 trillion, will be allocated to this fund. This is the part of the Chinese version of Marshall Plan that works through injection of purchasing power by poor to rich economy in order to save the deficits in bilateral trade. Meanwhile, China hopes to construct a sustainable industrial base. Announcements of Chinese officials affirm this two track strategy: China will continue to buy U.S. Treasury bonds, but at the same it will use its hard currency reserves to purchase assets such as mines, oil fields and whole companies.⁶⁹

State ownership of the world’s biggest investment fund means geopolitical concerns will possibly play a role both in the investment decisions and financial operations in the world markets. Especially during the times of great political crisis, the subordination of economic rationality to security needs of the state may be expected. It is clear that this kind of relationship between “trade” and “flag” is contrary to Empire’s tenet of “autonomy of the economic.” Hardt and Negri’s claim that control over trade balances and speculation on the value of currencies are no longer in the hands of political power seems odd, when we look at the IMF’s ineffectiveness and numerous trips of U.S. Treasury officials to Chinese counterparts. Today,

⁶⁷ Steven Mufson, “U.S. Cautions Europeans to Avoid Oil, Gas Deals With Iran”, *Washington Post*, 1 February 2007.

⁶⁸ David Hearst, “Israel tries to cut off Tehran from world markets”, *The Guardian*, 26 January 2007. - Seema Jayachandran and Michael Kremer, “Loan Sanctions: A New Tool for Diplomacy?”, *Washington Post*, 7 February 2007.

⁶⁹ Jim Yardley and David Barboza, “China to Open Fund to Invest Currency Reserves”, *The New York Times*, 9 March 2007.

what determines the value of dollar/yuan parity are state to state negotiations more than transnational forces as market actors.

Currency wars scenarios which were intensified, especially after the Iraq war, are the logical conclusion of the vision that sees economy as an extension of geopolitics rather than an autonomous terrain mainly belonging to non-state actors which operate according to market rationality. As this vision is gaining prevalence, the old “neutral” meanings of market instruments are politicized. The dollar is no longer an unchallenged global medium of exchange under the aegis of Empire, but a nation-empire’s currency in competition with others, and a strategic instrument that is among the targets which rivals would want to attack at the time of conflict. Attempts to price major commodities like oil with currencies other than the dollar and key central banks’ ability to affect the market value of dollar by shifting the composition of their foreign exchange reserves are the fixed components of “war games” only nations can play. Proposals to create “an international currency distinct from national currencies and national interests,” are the result of concerns about the possible devastation such a hypothetical scenario can cause in the global economy.⁷⁰

The magnitude of its social foundations can give us some idea about the future place of economic nationalism in international political economy. In the industrial countries of the West, the mass base of economic nationalism in the form of protectionism mainly consists of the people who cope with the disruptions of new competition arising from globalization. A poll cited by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr. shows that only a third of Americans view free trade as an economic plus, while nearly half say it is bad for jobs and wages. But the source of opposition is not only about job losses. The list continues as follows: downward pressures on wages, concentration of income at the top that benefits from globalization and the erosion of the social safety net.⁷¹ As the last Congressional elections show, those reactions are starting to be reflected in the policy processes. So, it would not be a surprise to see the escalation of protectionist regulations in the near future, beginning in the U.S.

Ontological transformations which are focused on here are also observable in the recent trends that influence the effectiveness of control

⁷⁰ Robert H. Wade, “The case for a global currency”, *International Herald Tribune*, 3 August 2006.

⁷¹ “Trade and the Home Front”, *The New York Times*, 17 March 2007.

mechanisms cited by Hardt and Negri. Because the first of them, monopoly over the atomic bomb, is closely related to the military aspect of the Empire, it is useful to choose “imperial right of intervention” as a starting point of analysis. The U.S. invasion of Iraq without U.N. authorization is the clearest example of a kind of military action which Hardt and Negri attributed to the pre-Empire times’ modern sovereignty by differentiating it from the police act of Imperial sovereignty. There was no “call of supranational organizations of peace” for intervention, on the contrary, Iraq was invaded in spite of the active opposition that arose from large segments of the Imperial Pyramid. According to the U.N. Secretary General, invasion was illegal. Well established members of imperial aristocracy, such as Germany and France joined with Russia to stand against the Monarch and the masses were in the streets of all major cities of world to protest war. None of them could stop the realization of the Bush Doctrine which gave the U.S. a freehand to make war outside the restrictions of Empire, in the strategically significant Gulf region.

The interpretation of the Iraq War within the broader context of the U.S.’ other unilateral actions, like its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, is among the motivations which moved nation-empires to increase their defense capabilities. Those who see the free usage of military power as a geopolitical challenge repeatable near their borders, or in the extreme scenarios against them, accelerated their armament efforts in terms of both nuclear and conventional weapon systems. This is the way of China, Russia and Venezuela that try to create a regional block against U.S. influence in Latin America. For the integrated part of aristocracy, the situation was different. Losing trust to the Empire’s mutually accepted intervention mechanism increased the necessity to have autonomous defense and intervention infrastructures. The first reaction of the EU’s core states, France and Germany, was in this direction, although internal problems of the EU constitute the main obstacle against achieving the declared goals on necessary military capabilities.

It seems that some smaller states also reached similar conclusions. Within the last six years, one of the two simultaneous crises was ended with U.S. invasion, and the other was finished with an agreement which was reached thanks to Chinese help and in return for economic aid and security guarantees, only after years of negotiations. The first was Iraq and the other one was North Korea. Actually, many factors played role in the distinctness of reactions those two “rogue states” have faced, but the place of the “bomb”

deserves special attention among them. The possibility that North Korea may have one more nuclear bombs made it untouchable, but Iraq was under U.N. weapons inspection for years and it was clear that it did not have such weapons. If monopoly over the nuclear weaponry is the “most remarkable evidence of the passage from modern sovereignty to Empire” because this reduces “the every war to a limited conflict, a civil war” as Hardt and Negri has claimed, these two examples show how nuclear programs of small states can create a powerful sovereignty challenges. Additionally, Iraq has proven that this monopoly does not guarantee the victory when the Monarch is obliged to face asymmetric warfare methods in the battlefields of “new wars.”⁷²

In sum, the world order has crossed a dangerous line in Iraq and today we are on the eve of a global wave of armament. Nation empires renew their nuclear weapons and many others demand sovereignty from Empire by trying to acquire the atomic bomb. In March 2007, the U.S. declared the winner of a competition to design the nation’s first new nuclear weapon in nearly two decades. After the approval processes, all American nuclear warheads will be replaced with new designs.⁷³ The British parliament decided to renew the Trident nuclear submarine system by spending \$40 billion dollars.⁷⁴ French President Chirac declared that France may answer possible terrorist attacks that would be organized by a hostile nation state with a nuclear assault. And in November 2006, France tried its new generation intercontinental ballistic missile that can carry nuclear warheads. In January 2007, China destroyed one of its own aging weather satellites by using a medium-range ballistic missile in the space. With this test, China became the third country which owns anti-satellite technology. Recent official declarations from China indicate the persistence of a steady increase in Chinese military expenditures.⁷⁵ Japan with its new administration that is in favor of high level public discussions about the atomic bomb, upgraded the country’s defense agency to a full ministry. The bill passed from the upper house of the Japanese congress with another one which requires schools to teach patriotism in the classroom.⁷⁶ At the end of the October 2006, Germany prepared a new national security strategy; the previous one was adopted 12 years before. The 2006 White Paper cites “the need to expand the constitutional framework for the deployment of the armed forces,” including on home soil in exceptional cases where police authorities

⁷² Mary Kaldor, “Iraq: the wrong war”, 09 -0 6 – 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/wrong_war_2591.jsp

⁷³ William J. Broad, “New Design for Warhead Is Awarded to Livermore”, *The New York Times*, 3 March 2007.

⁷⁴ Alan Cowell, “Blair Wins Vote to Renew Atom Arsenal”, *The New York Times*, 15 March 2007.

⁷⁵ Edward Cody, “China to Increase Military Spending”, *Washington Post*, 4 March 2007.

⁷⁶ “Japan upgrades defence’s status” *BBC*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pt/ft/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/6182087.stm>, 2006/12/15

alone cannot overcome a threat. And it defines keeping sea channels clear for international free trade and “secure access to energy resources” as primary national interests. Today Germany has nearly 10,000 troops outside of its territory.⁷⁷

The U.S.’ plan to build a missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic created harsh criticism both in Russia and some parts of Europe. Russia’s answer against the U.S. missile defense system is to speed modernization of its nuclear arsenal. In December 2006, Russian news agencies reported that military will begin to substitute the single warheads on Topol-M intercontinental missiles with multiple warheads.⁷⁸ Russia also decided to withdraw from a key European arms control treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which limits the deployment of conventional arms in Europe. And like other nation empires cited above a new military doctrine is on the way in Russia. President Putin’s Munich speech which targeted to unilateralism and linked the spread of nuclear weapons with the U.S.’ widespread use of military power in international relations, is an example of how nation empires want to see the future world order. Sergei Lavrov, foreign minister of the Russian Federation, clearly exposes this vision while defending his president: “Another Cold War? Certainly not. A democratic world in which a strong Russia coexists with a strong United States, as well as a strong Europe, China, India, Brazil and others? That is Vladimir Putin’s vision -- and it is well worth considering.”⁷⁹

When we look at the other states from the lower tier of Imperial Pyramid, we see that “crusade against the weapons of mass destruction” created a reverse outcome. North Korea’s nuclear test could not be impeded and Iran continues its uranium enrichment program. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the I.A.E.A., estimates that up to 49 nations now know how to make nuclear arms. For him, global tensions could push some of these countries to develop nuclear weapons. Because: “We are relying, primarily on the continued good intentions of these countries — intentions which are in turn based on their sense of security or insecurity, and could therefore be subject to rapid change.”⁸⁰

⁷⁷ “Germany Retools National Security”, *Spiegel Online*, 25 October, 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,444680,0.html>

⁷⁸ Vladimir Isachenkov, “**Report: Russia to Refit Nuclear Missiles**”, *Associated Press*, 15 December 2006.

⁷⁹ Sergei Lavrov, “One Cold War Was Enough”, *Washington Post*, 25 February 2007.

⁸⁰ William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Restraints Fray As Nuclear Age Grows Globally”, *The New York Times*, 15 October 2006.

Full scale invasion of Iraq also damaged the other supportive pillars of the “Imperial Right of Intervention.” Primary legitimacy argument of the imperial intervention was the conflict resolution. But, after four years of war, Iraq is in a civil war and the possibility that conflict may spread to neighbors threatens the whole region. Because Iraq is on the table as a worst example, intervention mechanisms of Empire could not work in other crisis regions such as Darfur. The Monarch has lost most of its credibility as a “called police force.” When the summer war between Israel and Hezbollah ended, the address of the needed police force that both sides of the conflict could accept was not the U.S. but Europe. America’s friends by comparing its African policy with China’s, Africom versus trade and aid, are accusing it as destabilizer.⁸¹

Moral instruments of Imperial Intervention were the victims of collateral damage, too. Invasion power which declared democratization and good governance based on human rights as its main objectives in Iraq, tortured Iraqi people in Abu Ghuraib prison. Today, the U.S. is among the most criticized countries by international human rights advocacy groups, and State Department’s yearly Human Rights reports share the same column with China’s reports on U.S. human rights violations in media coverage of many countries. The changing structure of the global media is another factor which limits the freehand of Monarch. In addition to the rising share of the internet in the circulation of news and commenting on them, recent developments in the mass media created a more favorable environment for plurality. Now, we should place the Al Jazeera effect, and may be many others, near the well known CNN effect. New television channels with their different visions not only captures regional audiences through the medium of local languages, but also try to compete with their well established rivals all over the world, even in the heartland of Monarchy, by using “globalish.” Today, more people speak English as second language than native speakers. And this Imperial Infrastructure has some similarities with Roman roads; it has served imperial armies that have gone to distant campaigns over them during the age of conquests as well as invaders that have used the same transportation network to attack Empire more effectively. As alternative sources of news and lifestyles, Al Jazeera English, Russia Today and France 24 are leading examples of the current trend which indicates fragmentation of Empire’s information monopoly in the global public sphere with the rising

⁸¹ Salim Lone, “The last thing we need”, *The Guardian*, 12 March 2007.

voices of nation empires. Other new television station plans also should be added the list above. Two of those are: Telesur, a joint initiative of Venezuela, Argentina, Cuba and Uruguay governments and Africa TV, a private pan-African broadcasting project.

While Empire is in the fragmentation process, nation empires seek to homogenize the multitude in the form of “people.” Hardt and Negri’s “imperial racism” leaves its place to a new kind of identity politics that remind us of the practices of colonial era. In contrast to Imperial sovereignty, the new approach affirms the macro identities at the national level and demands from the multitude to be assimilated into the larger whole. With the help of the “permanent state of war” atmosphere created under the banner of the “war on terrorism,” already existing stereotypes are reinforced and used to satisfy the need of “other” in many parts of the Western world. Demonization of Islam feeds the revival and consolidation of national/civilizational identities and gives national governments a meaningful terrain to redefine nationhood in more culturalist terms. Colonial other, symbolized in the homogenized and distorted image of Muslims, is geographically distant from the civil zone, but at the same time within the neighborhoods. So, immigrants coming from Muslim countries can perfectly serve the negative construction processes of European/Western identity as was in the past. Widely cited results of the 2001 census in England and Wales are an early example of homogenizing effect of Islamic other. 71 per cent of the population in the census, 42 million people, considered themselves Christians. Because no other recent survey had found anything close to such a high number, the result was interpreted in academic circles as an answer to rising visibility and activities of Muslim immigrants in the country and a reaction against the asylum-seekers. So, ticking “Christian” was simply a way of saying “we’re white and not Muslim.”⁸² The process of negative identity construction can also be visible in other parts of the Europe. Italian journalist Antonio Polito uses the term “theo-con” to describe secular and atheist Italians who nevertheless support the Pope as a defender of Western civilization.⁸³

Attitudes of governments, mass media and other political actors support the environment in which new identity politics are taking its shape. When racist politicians in Europe begin to redefine themselves as “religionist,”⁸⁴

⁸² Nick Cohen, “Let’s not sleepwalk with the Christian soldiers”, *The Observer*, 3 December 2006.

⁸³ Nick Cohen, “Let’s not sleepwalk with the Christian soldiers”, *The Observer*, 3 December 2006.

⁸⁴ Soumaya Ghannoushi, “Religious hatred is no more than a variety of racism”, *The Guardian*, 13 November 2006.

officially blamed multiculturalism is gradually substituted with a policy of assimilation. With the contributions of new members, racist parties will have a group in the European Parliament. But the effect of racist parties is beyond their power at the ballot boxes. They force the centrist parties to adapt some part of their agenda in order to protect their electoral bases. So, we see an escalation of arrangements about immigration and identity issues in the countries which are ruled by center right/left governments. For example, citizenship tests, full of culturalist questions, are becoming widespread. Citizenship education in schools with other programs aiming to assimilate immigrants within the national society by teaching national language, history and values are among the top priorities of many governments. While old institutions related to immigration are in a process of restructuring, new ones are beginning to be created according to new identity visions of governments. Australia changed the name of its Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to Department of Immigration and Citizenship as a reflection of the shift from celebrating the cultural diversity of its immigrant population to promoting an Australian cultural unity.⁸⁵ New French president Nicholas Sarkozy promised to give France a “Ministry of Immigration and National Identity” during his election campaign.⁸⁶ The similarities between the attitudes of the French president and Napoleon are amazing. But today, Muslims not Jews are in the Hotel de Ville to answer the commitment demands to French definitions of secularism, integration, faith and patriotism.⁸⁷

The shift in the political discourse is dramatic when we remember the political debates on the voting rights of noncitizen residents in 90’s.⁸⁸ New legislations indicate a reverse trend which underlines citizenship as a privilege to access basic governmental services. Discussions on how to prevent illegal immigrants from de facto use of the Medicaid in U.S. is a recent example. With new arrangements, proof of citizenship on original documents or copies certified by the issuing agency is made compulsory to receive Medicaid health benefits.⁸⁹ And citizenship itself will be scarcer. Texas legislators prepared a bill to reject the 14th Amendment and deny the benefits of citizenship to children of undocumented parents born in U.S.⁹⁰ The Report of the European

⁸⁵ Tim Johnston, “Australians debating immigration and national identity”, *International Herald Tribune*, 28 January 2007.

⁸⁶ “Le Pen springs to life”, *The Guardian*, 16 March 2007.

⁸⁷ Michael Goldfarb, “Napoleon, the Jews and French Muslims”, *International Herald Tribune*, 18 March 2007.

⁸⁸ According to Ferguson, the U.S. is more like a “New Rome” than any previous Empire because of its inclusion capacity through a system of open citizenship. So, today’s reverse trend is meaningful when it is compared with this defining characteristic of the Imperial heartland. (Nial Ferguson, *Colossus, The Price of America’s Empire*, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004, p.14)

⁸⁹ “The Medicaid Documentation Mess”, *The New York Times*, 19 March 2007.

⁹⁰ “They Are America”, *The New York Times*, 18 February 2007.

Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia indicates the same patterns in Europe. Workers who do not have Austrian citizenship are legally prevented from being elected to works councils in Austria. In the EU, legal status can determine whether migrants are allowed to change employers or sectors of the economy. Even when third country nationals are legally and permanently resident in a Member State, laws and regulations restrict their rights of access to employment. Third country nationals can be excluded on the grounds of their citizenship status in the cases of certain categories of jobs. According to report, in France, for example, some 7 million positions - over a quarter of the work force - remain closed to some, or all, non-nationals.⁹¹ And Russia, In November 2006, the Russian government prohibited immigrant worker employment in the retail sector.

What completes this picture is the rising nation empires' efforts to foster national/civilizational subjectivities by reinterpreting the traditional roots of national cultures to use them both at home as a unifying force which is able to homogenize "multitude" and abroad to create influence. Examples are numerous. The Chinese communist party seeks to revive Confucianism that advises obedience to authority and prepares to open Confucian Institutes in many parts of the world. Chinese radio stations broadcasts Africa in Han dialect and promotion of "Chinese Way of Development" as an alternative economic model to Washington consensus backs to whole campaign.⁹² Russian Euroasianism relying on the redefinition of Russian identity, which emphasizes the ties with Asia, is another case. Or the Latin American version of "21st century socialism" which tries to ground economic policies in a wider cultural terrain by underlining the indigenous heritage of the continent and reconciling the relations with church.

Lastly, it is necessary to review coloured revolutions and technology effect as reflections of network power under the light of the nation-empires' challenge. In successful cases, like Ukraine and Georgia, the course of political processes which has followed revolutions make it difficult to see those new regimes as stable and lasting. While political cadres of revolutions divide among themselves and begin to compete each other, opposition forces,

⁹¹ European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC): The Annual Report on the Situation regarding Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU, 2006, <http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/ar06/AR06-P2-EN.pdf>

⁹² Wei-Wei Zhang, "The allure of the Chinese model", *International Herald Tribune*, 6 November 2006. - Daniel A. Bell, "China's leaders rediscover Confucianism", *International Herald Tribune*, 14 September 2006.

mainly backed by Russia, gain strength.⁹³ In both countries, recent elections resulted with victories of coloured parties, but only by slight margins.

On the other side, some recent attempts aiming at regime change in the countries like Lebanon⁹⁴ and Belarus ended with complete failure. Other states that are the potential targets of such revolutions, try to protect themselves both by reinforcing the security apparatuses and influencing their civil societies more deeply. Paramilitary groups and nationalist youth organizations that were created by the Kremlin are recent examples of such defensive preparations.⁹⁵

At the same time, authoritarian nation-empires use Western technology to control opposition forces. High tech cameras and surveillance apparatuses supplied by American companies are important instruments of the Chinese regime to identify protesters.⁹⁶ And gigantic internet companies like Yahoo and Google cooperate with state officials to prevent Chinese people from accessing forbidden materials. They also help to Chinese authorities by giving communication records of regime's adversaries.⁹⁷

From Empire to Where?: On Nation Empires

Like Hardt and Negri,⁹⁸ I also do not use the term “nation empire” as a metaphor implying return to a specific historical system. Nevertheless, naming is not arbitrary and says something about the phenomena it signs not only in my choice but also in theirs. Under the light of the current global trends, one of the factors which forced me to think over the “nation empire is the place Hardt and Negri gave to “imperialism” to explain the passage from “modern sovereignty” to “imperial sovereignty.” The age of imperialism with its historical ties to European nation-states was over. If so, coming back to imperialism may be a sign which heralds the consolidation of some other structures related to it, although in different forms and density. Furthermore, there was a inconsistency between the diversity which appeared with “new comers” in international political economy and Hardt and Negri’s thesis

⁹³ Clifford J. Levy, “Orange revolution parties will share power in Ukraine”, *International Herald Tribune*, 16 October 2007. - James Kilner and Margarita Antidze, “Georgia leader hails election win but protests loom”, *Washington Post*, 7 January 2008.

⁹⁴ Hassan M. Fattah, “U.S. support hurt candidate in Lebanon”, *International Herald Tribune*, 9 August 2007.

⁹⁵ Steven Lee Myers, “Youth Groups Created by Kremlin Serve Putin’s Cause”, *The New York Times*, 8 July 2007.

⁹⁶ Keith Bradsher, “China Finds American Allies for Security”, *The New York Times*, 28 December 2007.

⁹⁷ “Yahoo Betrays Free Speech”, *The New York Times*, 2 December 2007.

⁹⁸ Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. xiv-xv

on nation states. For them, the nation state does not have the capacity to satisfy expectations of global economy. The development processes of the international organisms, such as WTO, WB and IMF were the indicators of the structural weaknesses of nation states. Empire was emerging over this terrain, and it was only nostalgic to look at nation states as possible opposition devices against the rule of Empire.

The date was 2000, just one year before the 9/11.

Another author who has studied heavily on imperialism, Parker Thomas Moon, was using the same logic while making predictions about “next step of history,” nearly 70 years before them. For Parker:

The feudal state and city state of the Middle Ages proved too small for the economic facts of early modern times, and were united into national states. The national state of yesterday found itself too small to include the raw materials and markets its industries craved, and so nations expanded into nation-empires. All the Great powers of to-day are nation-empires rather than simple nations... Now the nation-empire finds itself inadequate. Even its expanded frontiers do not include all the needed materials and markets of industry. It is too small. The next step seems to be world-wide international cooperation, reciprocity and regulation...⁹⁹

The date was 1926, just a few years before the Great Depression.

Successive events are well known. On the shadow of worldwide felt economic recession the world turned to another path: nation empires tried to consolidate themselves by rising tariffs and using protectionist methods of economic nationalism. Rather than “international cooperation, reciprocity and regulation,” beggar thy neighbor policies were common practice in the world economy. In the political sphere; the only significant multilateral institution of the age, the League of Nations, completely lost its functions. While some nation empires were in pursuit of acquiring new colonies, the League of Nations could not do any meaningful thing to protect its principles. Totalitarian ideologies were on the march in Europe. State backed racism and xenophobia were in the service of war-preparing nation empires by easing to redesign social fabric. As the prevalent way of conducting diplomatic relations

⁹⁹ Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, New York , The Macmillan Company, 1926.

of the period, bilateral agreements, pacts and alliances were accompanying rapid armament efforts. Eventually, this “twenty years of crisis” ended with the worst catastrophe humanity ever seen.

When we think of this portrait together with pre-WWI records of nation empires, the concept’s huge historical and emotional baggage can be clearly seen. This is the reason why I do not use it as a “metaphor” which hints a “repeating process.” History is open ended and all historical epochs have unique characteristics that limit and direct the way of transformations. Also I am aware of the existence of many other dynamics embedded in socioeconomic terrain and conflict with trends which were underlined in this paper.

On the other side, historical records remind us that integration processes at the global level can be unexpectedly fragile. And as it was sought to demonstrate above, the newly emerging image of world order indicates the fragmentation of Empire. This new image reflects a revival rather than disappearance of the peculiarities Hardt and Negri attributed to “past” that was the world of nation states sustained by modern sovereignty and imperialism. Although this picture still has many grey areas and includes hybrid structures, the dominant characteristic of it is the re-regionalization of power either around a great nation state like U.S., China, Russia or multistate regionalization efforts as they are seen in Europe, Latin America and South East Asia.

“Regionalization” is a well known phenomenon and widely discussed both in IR and IPE literature. So it is important to clarify my usage of the concept. What I mean “regionalization of power” is the rising sovereignty claims of the regional power centers. This claim differentiates it from the phase of “Empire” in which regionalization initiatives were mainly limited to the socio-economic realm and were seen as complementary to economic globalization. However, today the demand of sovereignty includes not only the functions of “Imperial” institutions in the economic realm, but also expands through cultural, ideological, political and military spheres of “Empire.” Because of this sovereignty transfer from Imperial apparatuses to regional power centers, I call them “nation empires.”

What caused the current dissolution of Empire and the rise of nation empires over its heritage? If we put the popular reactions against the Empire which resulted directly from its nature and its failures aside, two interrelated phenomena share the main portion of the responsibility. One is the “rise of others.” “Others” should be analyzed in two separate categories. For those who have a well established place in the imperial aristocracy, rising means demanding for a truly equal relationship with “monarch” and to achieve this by trying to acquire capabilities mainly devoted to monarch in the Empire. Increasing institutionalization and supranationalization of Empire’s apparatuses help aristocracy by holding the monarch within the boundaries of imperial/consensual legitimacy. In other words, established rules, norms and mechanisms of Empire give leverage to aristocracy to balance the excessive capabilities of the monarch. The EU is the case of such a challenge that the U.S. faces.

Coming from the lower ranks of Imperial hierarchy, loosely integrated others do not have such leverage. Those kinds of nation empires like China are seen alien both culturally and institutionally. They are unwilling to obey the rule of Empire without objecting to the place left them in the Imperial pyramid. Their relationship with Empire is comparted. Economically they unite their genuine advantages with Empire’s capital, technology and markets. But at the same time, they are so keen to preserve their political and military autonomy. The existence of them gives a playground to aristocracy when it needs to balance monarchic power, especially during the periods of crisis.

This portrait highlights the second reason behind the demise of the first phase of Empire: the monarchic power’s reluctance to keep it alive. Because Empire has all encompassing logic, it also requires the subordination of the U.S.’ short term national interests for the long term needs of Empire. Although empire gives a “temporary” privileged position to the U.S. in the power pyramid, it is also tied with many responsibilities, not only in the realm of global politics, but also at home: Empire’s very survival means that the U.S. as a nation state will be fused within imperial sovereignty like others. And imperial infrastructure makes easier the power shifts and creates a friendly environment for the “rise of others,” both from the ranks of aristocracy and lower tiers of Empire.

Under these structural tensions, the Monarch’s attempt to centralize Empire to create an everlasting exceptional place for itself, away from the

resolving logic of Empire, while continuing to want from others to obey it, paradoxically paved the way to disintegration of Empire in its first phase. Therefore, the U.S. in the post-imperial world is a great power in the form of nation empire, although the most powerful of all, but not a Monarch of a legitimacy and power producing Empire. And others respond to this challenge by seeking to create/consolidate their nation empires.

Is there any possibility for the restoration of the Imperial order, and the inclusion of counterpowers in the Imperial network? When we look at the enduring infrastructure of Empire, this is also among the possibilities. But it requires radical changes in the polices of the heartland and important revisions in the hierarchy of the imperial pyramid.

In any case, continuing debates on Empire and recent trends that are under focus in this article have a potential to give valuable insights for Turkish foreign policy circles because those are the main dynamics which cause the rapid change in the overall image of world order.