

## HOW, IF AT ALL, CAN AN UNDERSTANDING OF CRIMINAL THEORY ASSIST A SECURITY MANAGER IN THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM?

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### Abstract

*This paper argues that terrorism is a crime where violence is used as a means of communication. Accordingly, those with significant responsibilities for security must learn to understand the messages and the motivations of the sender to counter terrorism effectively. It is argued that the term 'Islamic terrorism' is unhelpful as it is corruption of the Koran which may be used to motivate some terrorist and it is likely that the recent rise of terrorism is based on nationalistic rather than wholly religious issues. The paper argues that terrorism may be rational within the sub-cultural groups from which it springs, and it is this rationality which may be exploited by counter-measures. These should be coordinated and aimed at dealing with the terrorist and defences against attacks; seeking to address social, economic and political conditions which lead to support for terrorism and finally at addressing legal issues. The objective is to dislocating terrorists from their supporters and by removing the motivating factors removing the terrorists' status as a 'local hero'.*

### Key Words

Terrorism, Crime, Sub-culture, Rationality, Motivation, Counter-measures

*"If you know the enemy and you know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles".*

Sun Tzu<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Eng Seng A C, 2002, p1. *The Motivations and Methods of the Terrorist*. Cited in Pointer V28 N3 (Jul-Sep 2002). <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer6back/journals/2002/vol283/7htm>. Accessed 9 October 2005.

In 1969 the British military personnel deployed to Northern Ireland were welcomed by the Catholic community as a force to protect them against Protestant violence. Within a year the situation had changed to one of confrontation between predominantly Catholic Republicans and the British Army. This change was the result of many factors but key was the failure of the British government to implement political reforms to Northern Ireland's system of government, better known as the Stormont regime. In a relatively short period of time, this situation led to the emergence of a new terrorist group, which became recognized around the world as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The Army's response to a rapidly deteriorating political situation and the increasing unlawfulness were curfews, intrusive searches in Catholic areas and internment. Not only did these prove counter-productive but they actually increased the support that PIRA derived from their community and from other parts of the world.<sup>2</sup>

On 11 September 2001 four airliners were hijacked in the USA by Al-Qaeda inspired Islamic extremists. Three were deliberately crashed into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon; it is presumed that its passengers crashed the fourth before it hit its target. These actions combined to claim over 2981 lives in the single most destructive coordinated terrorist attack ever recorded.<sup>3,4</sup> In the 1980s, the principal leader of this group, Osama bin Laden, had been supported by the USA and encouraged to conduct jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Yet, after the US led restoration of the independent state of Kuwait had left foreign troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden denounced the USA for 'occupying the lands of Islam' and opened his terrorist campaign against the West.<sup>5</sup>

These conflicts are just two examples of terrorist actions or the types of actions that have, or may in the future, impact upon local, national and international conscience and behaviour. At each level, security managers whether they be military, civilian or politicians, have a role to play in countering terrorist acts. Crenlinson argues that terrorist violence is a form of communication and as such, it "...possesses a logic and grammar that must

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<sup>2</sup> McInnes C & Kennedy-Pipe C, 2002. *The British Army and the Peace Process in Ireland*. Cited in *The Journal of Conflict* Spring 2001.

<sup>3</sup> 9/11 Commission Report. <http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/22jul20041130/www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/frontmatter.pdf> accessed 14 October 2005.

<sup>4</sup> George B, Button M and Whatford N, 2003, p231. *The Impact of September 11th on the UK Business Community*. From Gill M (Ed) (2003) *Managing Security*; Leicester: Perpetuity Press.

<sup>5</sup> Oberschall A, 2004, p34. *Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory*. <http://www.blockwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x> accessed 20 October 2005.

be understood if we are to prevent or control them".<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, this paper will argue that if security managers, holding strategic level appointments in Government, the military or police forces, are to contribute effectively in the fight against terrorism they must learn to understand the message that terrorists are trying to send and the reasons for that message. Then, with an understanding of criminal theory relating to terrorism, security managers will be in a position to identify the terrorist's points of weakness and to produce and implement a successful counter-strategy.

This paper will be divided into three main areas; firstly, it will define terrorism as a criminal act. Next, it will address aspects of criminal theory concerning the motivation of terrorists. Though there are many factors which can lead to terrorism, the analysis of motivation will be limited in scope to consideration of Sub-cultural and Rational Choice Theories to show that terrorism should not to be dismissed as a series of purposeless acts committed by lunatics, it will also be limited to the consideration of terrorist groups and will not consider the incentives of states that sponsor terrorist acts. With an understanding of some of the motivations of terrorists and the reasons why they may receive at least tacit support from 'their' community, the third section of the paper will explore Crime Prevention Theory. This will reveal points of potential intervention that can be applied to counter terrorist groups and the conditions that cause these groups to rise. The paper will not suggest that all terrorist acts can be prevented, but will argue that an understanding of criminal theory might enable the security manager to reduce their frequency and impact.

Though Bin Laden declared war against the USA in 1998 when he called upon his followers 'to abide by Allah's order by killing Americans ... anywhere, anytime, and wherever possible' and despite considerable rhetoric by politicians, the USA has actually resisted acceptance that it is at war with terrorists. Instead, the US Government defined terrorism as a crime to be dealt with through the judicial process and made new laws to meet this threat.<sup>7</sup> A year after terrorist attacks against the rail network in Madrid, a meeting of former leaders of democratic countries supported this stance in stating that:

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<sup>6</sup> Crelinsten R D, 2002, p77. *Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 14, No2 (Summer 2002). <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/libfddakwpdry14dqjft/contributions/2/b/q/n/2bqnxn0rgtlewbp.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.

<sup>7</sup> Sultz R & Vogt A, 2003, p3. *It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine of Preemption*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.15, No1 (Spring 2003). Published by Frank Cass, London.

Terrorism is a crime against all humanity. It endangers the lives of innocent people. It creates a climate of fear; it fuels global divisions along ethnic and religious lines. Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious violations of peace, international law and the values of human dignity.<sup>8</sup>

This analysis suggests that, from a Westernised democratic perspective, terrorism can be considered to be crime, where a crime is defined as ‘An act or omission prohibited and punishable by law’.<sup>9</sup> If this is the case, terrorism might most simply be defined as crime where violence is used for political ends.<sup>10</sup> However, this definition is crude and a more complete understanding of the problem can be gained from Crelinsten who argues that terrorism is:

...the combined use and threat of violence, planned in secret and usually executed without warning, that is directed against one set of targets (the direct victims) in order to coerce compliance or to compel allegiance from a second set of targets (targets of demands) and to intimidate or to impress a wider audience (target of terror or target of attention).<sup>11</sup>

This definition makes it clear that terrorism is not directed at its immediate victims, indeed they are incidental to the offence; in fact the objects of the offence are the decision makers of the target population and the community in which the terrorists live and operate. However, in a rapidly changing world the security manager must also be able to distinguish between what might be termed ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ terrorism.

‘New’ terrorism is characterised by ‘a determination to inflict mass casualties upon innocent civilians, ... a willingness to kill themselves as well as their victims during an attack and the increased threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction’.<sup>12</sup> Conversely, traditional terrorists generally set out to achieve maximum effect with minimum casualties, striking a balance between spreading fear and creating widespread revulsion against their acts.<sup>13</sup> An example of this behaviour is the PIRA campaign that targeted

<sup>8</sup> The Madrid Agenda: International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security. 8-11 March 2005, p1. <http://english.safe-democracy.org/agenda/the-madrid-agenda.html>. Accessed 20 May 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Collins, 2005, p396. ‘English Dictionary, Edition 7’.

<sup>10</sup> University of Leicester, Department of Criminology, 2003, p8-7. *MSc in Security and Risk Management, Module 1*.

<sup>11</sup> Crelinsten R D, 2002, p83. *Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 14, No2 (Summer 2002). <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/11b1b1ddakwpdry14dqjft/contributions/2/b/q/n/2qnxn0rtglewbp.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.

<sup>12</sup> George B, Button M and Whatford N, 2003, p231. *The Impact of September 11th on the UK Business Community*. From Gill M (Ed) (2003) *Managing Security*; Leicester: Perpetuity Press.

<sup>13</sup> Mockaitis T, 2003, p21. *Winning Hearts and Minds in the ‘War on Terrorism’* <http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/media/mh9xd-nwxwncwyu7pnqt1/contributions/2/4/f/j/24fjd7dakx5gwc50.pdf>. Accessed 27 November 2005.

London in the 1990s. This sought to damage Britain's economy by attacking financial centres in the City of London to achieve a strategic effect. However, the attacks were timed to take place at night when the population occupying the area would be relatively small.<sup>14</sup> This approach clearly contrasts with Al-Qaeda's 9/11 operation and the frequent suicide bombings reported almost daily, from Iraq and other parts of the world, in the Western press since 2003.

Irrespective of whether terrorists follow 'traditional' or 'new' methodologies, it is clear that their crimes can possess tactical and strategic components to influence local, national and international governments and are aimed at producing an effect, which far outweighs the costs to the terrorist. Crelinsten's definition describes terrorist crimes as a form of communication aimed at achieving an objective; therefore, to counter it the security manager must learn to understand the message. This suggests that, at least at the leadership level, terrorism may be sophisticated and rational; therefore, factors that motivate terrorists merit consideration. Just as understanding the language will reveal the terrorists message, understanding his motivation may reveal opportunities for intervention which could enable the security manager to reduce the impact of terrorism upon communities. Consequently, having defined terrorism, the next section of the paper will consider some of the aspects that may motivate terrorists.

The emotional response to acts of terrorism may suggest that the perpetrators are psychopaths, but Dingley argues that studies have shown little evidence to imply that terrorists are mentally ill or behaviourally maladjusted.<sup>15</sup> Oberschall supports this view; stating that 'Terrorism is not the act of madmen or of political and religious sociopaths but of political agents who choose covert, violent means to achieve political goals'.<sup>16</sup> If these offences are not the act of a deranged mind it follows that there must be a positive motivation for individuals to commit these crimes. Oberschall suggests that terrorism is a response to '... a failed political process engaging political regimes and ethnic and ideological adversaries over fundamental governance issues'.<sup>17</sup> As an example, this failure to understand the message

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<sup>14</sup> Gearson J, 2003, p213-230. *Managing Terrorist Targeting of Financial Centres: The IRA's City of London Campaign*. From Gill M (Ed) (2003) *Managing Security*; Leicester: Perpetuity Press.

<sup>15</sup> University of Leicester, Department of Criminology, 2003, p8-29. *MSc in Security and Risk Management, Module 1*, Module 1.

<sup>16</sup> Oberschall A, 2004, p26. *Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory*. <http://www.blockwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x> accessed 20 October 2005.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p1.

that groups attempt to send is apparent in the history of the Northern Ireland conflict described in the opening paragraph. Cohen argues that individuals who have similar beliefs that their 'legitimate' demands for political ends have gone unheard may 'band together and form a sub-culture that is to some extent in opposition to the dominant culture'.<sup>18</sup> Accordingly, the paper will now turn to the theory of sub-culture and its role in terrorism.

Determinist's believe that the criminal act is essentially created by circumstances which are outside of the ability of the individual to control, but which nurture a criminal disposition. Within the range of circumstances that control the individual, sociological problems concerning environmental and cultural issues are seen as potentially important influences. Sub-cultural Theory explains how a lack of opportunity for reaching conventional goals can lead to the emergence of sub-cultures within society.<sup>19</sup> These are perceived to be exaggerations of many themes that may be found in wider society. Some may be benign, such as a particular interest in rock music or being an avid fan of a certain football club or malignant such as organised criminal groups or terrorist gangs. Clearly, security managers are only concerned or interested in those latter groups, which have developed a belief system that condones or promotes criminal acts. However, Rock argues that even these more extreme groups should not be conceived to be utterly distinct from their wider community.<sup>20</sup> Hence it should be recognised that some, possibly even many, terrorist demands, including calls for national independence, social justice, equal treatment for minority views or the establishment of religious law, may resonate with their broader community, and thus develop a degree of popular support. Indeed Oberschall suggests that '...without a legitimising ideology, terrorist violence will lack justification and acceptance within the population that gives cover to the terrorist'.<sup>21</sup> If this is the case, a terrorist group will lack the cover that would otherwise be provided by their communities for their actions and will quickly be exposed to national security forces. With a very basic grasp of Sub-cultural Theory the paper will turn to an explanation of why some people will become involved in terrorism while others facing similar situations and environmental conditions do not.

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<sup>18</sup> Matthew C, Scheider M and Florence J, 2000, p254. *Are we explaining different things? The failure to specify the dependent variable in criminology*, <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/dfdq68f8wpdyknkb9jn9m/contributions/7/7/8/b/778bg8r18h0twxgm.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.

<sup>19</sup> University of Leicester, Department of Criminology, 2003, p1-23. *MSc in Security and Risk Management*, Module 1.

<sup>20</sup> Rock P, 2002, p73. *Sociological Theories of Crime*. From Maguire M, Morgan R and Reiner R (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* Oxford University Press.

<sup>21</sup> Oberschall A, 2004, p28. *Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory*. <http://www.blockwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x> accessed 20 October 2005.

Bernard argues that the disadvantages, which generate tension and demands for change, need not be absolute; indeed, they may be based on no more than notions of relative disadvantage. However, once 'the rules of anger' are formed they will instruct the group and dictate when they 'should' get angry. He explains that anger may turn to violence which in some cultures is considered to be '...a powerful and definitive response to insult and as a good way of restoring honour'.<sup>22</sup> Matthew et al argue that:

The level of cultural deviance varies directly with the extent of involvement in the subculture itself. Those who are more deeply immersed engage in cultural deviance at higher rates than those who are not.<sup>23</sup>

If this is correct, it explains the involvement in terrorism of members of communities at various levels, from supporters to actors, as well as those who play no role in these offences whatsoever. However, once terrorism becomes a way of life, Gunaratna explains that it can develop into a learned behaviour handed down through families and groups through the generations.<sup>24</sup> Davis and Jenkins take this point further in stating that membership and the success of a terrorist group provides 'positives – notably status, power, recruits, and psychological rewards ...it becomes the *raison d'être* of these organisations'.<sup>25</sup> In other words, once a member of a terrorist group, whether that is a small community or even a family based concern, the focus, reward and punishment systems of that group will be totally related to terrorist activity and become self-reinforcing. In these circumstances it may often be difficult, even impossible to leave such a group or alter its path even should an individual wish to do so. These arguments may provide a partial explanation for the emergence of terrorists and their supporters but they do not fully explain the reasons for the rise of 'new' terrorism. It is to this area of the use of more extreme terrorism arguably in its purest and most malevolent form that the paper will turn.

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<sup>22</sup> Indermaur D (1996) p7. *Perceptions of Violence*. From Psychiatry, Psychology and the Law. [http://www.crc.law.uwa.edu.au/\\_data/page/50334/pov.pdf](http://www.crc.law.uwa.edu.au/_data/page/50334/pov.pdf) Accessed 13 November 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Matthew C, Scheider M and Florence J (2000) p253. *Are we explaining different things? The failure to specify the dependent variable in criminology*, <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/dfdq68f8wpdyknk9jn9m/contributions/7/7/8/b/778bg8r18h0twxgm.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Gunaratna R (2003) *The New Face of Al-Qaeda: Understanding the Generational Gradient in Local and Global Jihad Campaigns*. From Pointer Journal Vol 29 No4 (2003). [http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2003/Vol29\\_4/4b.htm](http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2003/Vol29_4/4b.htm) accessed 9 October 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Davis P and Jenkins B (2004) p4. *A System Approach to Deterring and Influencing Terrorists*. From Conflict Management and Peace Science. Taylor & Francis Group. <http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/media/p612amthk0qw9w9xrkc3u/contributions/w/6/4/8/v648cincp3321v4.pdf> Accessed 15 October 2005.

Juergensmeyer argues that unlike traditional terrorism, 'new' terrorism in the form advocated by Al-Qaeda has arisen not as the result of poverty or social injustice, but is characterised by the imposition of control by the sub-groups over their 'parent' communities through the 'religiousisation' of politics and the satanisation of their enemies.<sup>26</sup> In fact the aim of Al-Qaeda is to drive out Western influence from all Islamic states by exploiting the conditions that breed extremism particularly in failing states characterised by excessive political and economic stagnation, corruption and repression. To achieve this, Bin Laden exploits religion through dissemination of a personally revised version of the Koran in order to promote nationalistic fervour.<sup>27</sup> However, it is important to note that exploitation of the corruption of the Koran though globally important is not the only manifest methodology for developing 'new' terrorism and 'new' terrorism tactics and indeed to an extent some argue that it may be misleading to think that this is the case. If we consider the tactic of suicide attacks, Pape points out that:

...there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world's religions. In fact, the leading instigators of suicide attacks are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka a Marxist-Leninist group whose members are from Hindu families but who are adamantly opposed to religion.<sup>28</sup> [Authors Note: The religion of the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka is Buddhism]

More recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan may have altered the position of the Tamil Tigers as the leading exponents of suicide tactics; however the argument is that it is the nationalistic component, in terms of a struggle to exert, or create, a national identity and sovereignty that is one of the keys to the rise of 'new' terrorism. It is suggested that religious and other cultural differences are a method exploited in order to increase the gap between a terrorist group and its supporters and an 'occupying power' in order to create a 'them' versus 'us' situation. In fact Pape identifies three primary factors most likely to create the situation where suicide terrorist campaigns, and possibly by extension campaigns aimed to maximise casualties as a strategic aim are initiated and sustained. These are when (1) a national community is occupied by a foreign power; (2) the foreign power is of a different religion; (3) the foreign power is a democracy.<sup>29</sup> Having considered sub-cultures and

<sup>26</sup> Juergensmeyer M (2001) p358. *Terror in the Name of God*. From Current History November 2001. [http://www.currenthistory.com/org\\_pdf\\_files/100/649/100\\_649\\_357.pdf](http://www.currenthistory.com/org_pdf_files/100/649/100_649_357.pdf) Accessed 13 November 2005.

<sup>27</sup> Sultz R & Vogt A (2003). *It's War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine of Preemption*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.15, No1 (Spring 2003), p3. Published by Frank Cass, London.

<sup>28</sup> Pape R A (2005) p4. *Dying to Win The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House Publishing Group, New York.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p80.

rationalisation in terrorism; the paper will argue that even apparently extreme acts, such as suicide attacks, may in fact be entirely logical.

From a situationalist perspective, Cornish and Clarke commented that ‘offenders seek to benefit themselves by crime, and make decisions and choices which are characterised by a degree of rationality’.<sup>30</sup> Clarke argues that decisions and choices to commit crimes are a result of a cost/benefit analysis made in response to an opportunity. This analysis considers the factors of risk to the individual or group, the potential rewards of success and the ease with which a crime may be committed.<sup>31</sup> When considering the rationality of suicide bombing it may be important to distinguish between the individual and the groups that sponsor the attacks.

Sookhdeo states that potential Palestinian suicide bombers are specially selected and then deliberately indoctrinated with a ‘fanatical hatred of the West and a perception that the West is responsible for all the woes of the Muslim world’.<sup>32</sup> Their training then ensures a single-minded determination to attack. This suggests that suicide bombing can be the result of determined behaviour, as factors external to the individual may be exploited in such a way as to direct behaviour without rationalisation on the part of the actor. However, Bloom argues that suicide bombing is adopted as a tactic, following a cost/benefit analysis, after other strategies have been tried and have failed. She suggests that it will be sustained only as long as the host community supports it, as this provides safe havens, recruits and potential political power. Should the host community turn against the tactic, terrorists will quickly cease to use it fearing that they could lose support and be exposed to counter-terrorist campaigns. Bloom maintains that suicide bombing is most likely to be used, and gain momentum, in situations where a number of terrorist groups are competing for political power and financial sponsorship within the same community; in effect they out bid each other for popular support and funding by staging high profile, successful attacks. These attacks can escalate as groups attempt to outdo each other to achieve and maintain a ‘market lead’ with a view to maintaining their income flow from benefactors.<sup>33</sup> These sponsors may be the host population, individual

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<sup>30</sup> Cornish D and Clarke R (eds) (1986) p47. ‘*The Reasoning Criminal*’ from Coleman C and Norris C (2000) ‘*Introducing Criminology*’ Willan Publishing.

<sup>31</sup> Clark (1980) in University of Leicester, Department of Criminology (2003) *MSc in Security and Risk Management*, Module 1, p1-25.

<sup>32</sup> Sookhdeo P (2004) p160. *Understanding Islamic Terrorism*. Isaac Publishing, New York.

<sup>33</sup> Bloom (2004). *Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror*. From Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror. Columbia University Press. <http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/bloom.0227.pdf> accessed 15 October 2005.

sponsors such as Bin Laden or state sponsors such as that provided by Iran in support of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>34</sup> These arguments do not suggest that individuals may not choose to volunteer to act as suicide bombers for very personal reasons, possibly as an act of revenge or to win financial support for their families from a parent terrorist organisation after a 'successful' attack. However, terrorist organisations will not sponsor these individuals or claim responsibility for their actions if their host society does not support the tactic.

Pape suggests that suicide bombing is most likely to emerge and be sustained as a tactic where conditions of extreme military asymmetry between a 'perceived' occupying force and the terrorist group exist. This is particularly the case where the stronger power represents a democracy, as democratic systems are perceived, though not always correctly, to be more susceptible to coercion than dictatorships. In this case, a strategy available to terrorists is suicide attacks, which are novel, often spectacularly successful and gruesome and are therefore widely reported. In this way the terrorists seek to establish a coercive logic of punishment against the government(s) of the superior military force by attacking economic, political, military or civilian targets to convince the opposing society that the costs to it of staying outweigh the benefits.<sup>35</sup> Throughout these arguments is clear evidence of rational behaviour on behalf of the terrorist groups: the common thread is that terrorist groups will carefully and logically determine how to achieve maximum effect and thereby coerce compliance or compel allegiance from Crelinson's targets of demand<sup>36</sup> at minimum cost and risk to themselves.

Thus far the paper has considered some of the factors that may give rise to terrorism and the development of 'new' terrorism and particularly of the modern use of suicide attacks as a tactic. What emerge are the strong themes of sub-cultural identification and the strategic rationality of terrorist groups. While an understanding of these factors may assist a security officer to gain an insight into an enemy and go some way to following Sun Tzu's advice, it is how this information can be used to counter terrorist acts that are important. UK Government response to the challenges presented by rising levels of terrorism was to form the 'CONTEST' strategy. Its aim was

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<sup>34</sup> Oberschall A, 2004, p32. *Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory*. <http://www.blockwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x> accessed 20 October 2005.

<sup>35</sup> Pape R A (2005) p30. *Dying to Win The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House Publishing Group, New York.

<sup>36</sup> Crelinston R D, 2002, p83. *Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model*. Cited in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 14, No2 (Summer 2002). <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/11bfddakwpdry14dqjft/contributions/2/b/q/n/2bqnxn0rgtlewbp.pdf>. Accessed 15 October 2005.

to reduce the risk from terrorism by consideration of four areas: Prevention, Pursuit, Protection and Preparedness.<sup>37</sup> These have a correlation with the work of Brantingham and Faust who identified three strategic levels of response to crime. In broad terms these are: Primary Prevention which seeks to reduce crime by reducing criminal opportunities; Secondary Prevention which focuses on altering the social causes of crime, and Tertiary Prevention which aims to limit the criminal career through correctional services.<sup>38</sup> The paper will conclude by briefly considering each strategy in turn to identify potential points of intervention that could be employed to counter terrorism.

Primary Prevention seeks to influence a criminal's decision or ability to commit crimes in a particular time or place. South states that the methodology focuses 'on the management, design and manipulation of the physical environment, in order to reduce the opportunity to commit crime and increase the risk of detection if deterrence fails'.<sup>39</sup> In this way the security manager seeks to alter the terrorists cost/benefit analysis outcome by reducing their opportunities to successfully attack critical targets and by making the costs, to the terrorist, of attacking a target prohibitively high. Exploiting this approach, the City of London responded to the PIRA's 1990s bombing campaign by producing the 'Ring of Steel'. This comprised traffic management measures linked to roadblocks and searches all covered by sophisticated surveillance systems.<sup>40</sup> Later these methods were incorporated into the Home Office publication 'Business as Usual',<sup>41</sup> produced to provide guidance on measures aimed at improving the resilience of businesses to attack and their ability to recover should attacks occur. It is arguable that these tactics were successful against both the traditional terrorist group, represented by the PIRA, and, so far, against attacks by groups inspired by Al-Qaeda. Although the plans did not stop the attacks made against the London Underground on 7 July 2005 nor more recent attempts to attack a Night Club in London and Glasgow Airport in July 2007, neither campaign had a strategic effect. In the first campaign, pre-prepared business continuity plans ensured that almost 80% of the London Underground and 100% of the London bus service were functioning within 24 hours.<sup>42</sup> While in the second

<sup>37</sup> Blear H (2005). *The Tools to Counter Terrorism*. The Royal United Service Institute, 24 February 2005. [http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs4/240205\\_h6\\_speech.html](http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs4/240205_h6_speech.html) accessed 20 October 2005.

<sup>38</sup> University of Leicester, Department of Criminology (2003) *MSc in Security and Risk Management*, Module 1, p2-5.

<sup>39</sup> Gilling D (1997) p5. *Crime Prevention: Theory, policy and politics*. UCL Press.

<sup>40</sup> Gearson J (2003) p220. *Managing Terrorist Targeting of Financial Centres: The IRA's City of London Campaign*. From Gill M (Ed) (2003) *Managing Security*; Leicester: Perpetuity Press.

<sup>41</sup> Home Office/Security (1999) *Business as Usual: Maximising business resilience to terrorist bombings, A handbook for Managers*. <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/> Accessed 12 October 2005.

<sup>42</sup> Segell G M, 2006, P50. *Terrorism on London Public Transport*. Defense & Security Analysis Volume 22, Issue 1, 1 March 2006 p45-59. Routledge. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751790600577132> accessed 9 July 2007.

campaign, physical security measures coupled with quick thinking and the rapid responses of members of the public and police forces, conditioned by years of living with terrorism and numerous counter-terrorist education campaigns, ensured that the only injuries were to the perpetrators of the attacks. In fact early indications were that these attacks may have strengthen the resolve of the British public and their political representatives; presumably, the very opposite of the terrorist’s intentions.<sup>43</sup>

Notwithstanding notable anti-terrorism successes and the publication of guidance to businesses, the public, police and military forces, crucial to the successful application of situational crime prevention techniques are consideration of three main factors: the context in which the techniques are applied, the effect that is sought and an understanding of the motivations of terrorists as outlined in earlier paragraphs. Once these are determined for each specific situation, the correct measure or bundle of measures, planned to form a defence in depth, can be applied to deter the criminal or nullify his chance of success. Cornish and Clarke, offer an approach comprising of 25 techniques of situational crime prevention bundled into five groups of five measures based on the checklist reproduced in Table 1 below:

**Table 1. Twenty-Five Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention<sup>44</sup>**

<b>Increase the Effort</b>	<b>Increase the Risks</b>	<b>Reduce the Rewards</b>	<b>Reduce the Provocation</b>	<b>Remove the Excuses</b>
1. Target Harden	6. External guardianship	11. Conceal targets	16. Reduce frustrations and stress	21. Set rules
2. Control access to facilities	7. Assist natural surveillance	12. Remove targets	17. Avoid disputes	22. Post instructions
3. Screen exits	8. Reduce anonymity	13. Identify property	18. Reduce emotional arousal	23. Alert conscience
4. Deflect offenders	9. Utilise place managers	14. Disrupt markets	19. Neutralise peer pressure	24. Assist compliance
5. Control tools/weapons	10. Strengthen formal surveillance.	15. Deny benefits	20. Discourage imitation	25. Control drugs and

<sup>43</sup> BBC News 24 Reporting 1-6 July 2007.

<sup>44</sup> Cornish D B & Clarke R V, 2003, p90. *Opportunities, Precipitators and Criminal Decisions: A Reply to Wortley's Critique of Situational Crime Prevention*. <http://www.popcente.org/Library/CrimePrevention/Volume%2016/OpportunitiesPrecipitators.pdf> accessed 1 September 2006.

When considering the table and the advice that it contains, two things should be noted. Firstly, not all of the measures outlined will be applicable in all situations, indeed Cornish and Clarke's work was produced to counter general criminality and is not specific to counter-terrorism; and secondly, should the security manager implement security measures without full consideration of all relevant factors there may be unforeseen outcomes. In such instances, criminals may counter with different, possibly more violent, responses than those anticipated or simply move to a new location for their activities or attacks. This idea of criminal adaptation to produce new tactics, the same tactics in a new geographical location or a revision of the criminals target list is the concept of displacement. However, Hesselning argues that 'displacement is a possible but not inevitable consequence of crime prevention, further if it does occur, it will be limited in size and scope'.<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, security managers must be conscious of the fact that in the pursuit of their political and strategic aims, strong motivation and commitment to their cause may enable terrorist groups to overcome this argument. This means that security managers must plan their countermeasures accordingly. PIRA's response to the 'Ring of Steel' was to conduct attacks against Canary Warf situated outside of London's financial centre. Later they also planned to attack electricity substations situated outside of London. If these attacks had been successful it is likely that the City of London would have been brought, in all practical senses, to a halt. In the case of the 7/7 suicide bomber attacks against the London Transport System, the motivation of the terrorists was such that the target hardening and surveillance measures were bypassed with lethal consequences. In these examples the determination of the bombers to complete their attacks enabled them to overcome Primary Prevention measures; however, despite this apparent inability to stop the most determined terrorists from attacking, the security manager may be able to use situational methods to determine, or at least guide, where these criminals conduct their attacks.

Planned displacement has been a methodology applied by the Israelis to counter the suicide bomber threat. Though this technique has not been able to stop attacks, the results appear to show a degree of amelioration of the devastating effect that they can have. Perliger and Pedahazur<sup>46</sup> report that of five suicide attacks conducted against shopping malls up to 2005,

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<sup>45</sup> Pease K, 2002, p956. *Crime Reduction*. From Maguire M, Morgan R and Reiner R (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* Oxford University Press.

<sup>46</sup> Perliger A and Pedahazur A (2005). *Factors Influencing The Effectiveness of Defensive Measures in Counter-Terrorism*. PowerPoint. [http://terrorismexperts.org/terrorism\\_research.htm](http://terrorismexperts.org/terrorism_research.htm) Accessed 13 November 2005.

all were prevented from taking place within the building by the situational crime prevention measures in place; in each attack the bombs were exploded at the entrances. As a consequence, the casualty rate per attack was 43.32 compared with a rate of 73.33 for attacks against restaurants where the owners were unable to apply similar measures. The lesson appears to be that if the bombers cannot be stopped it is preferable that they explode against comparatively lower value targets rather than key or critical assets.

In considering potential courses of action against Al-Qaeada, Gunaratna identified the fact that terrorism cannot be resolved through the application of Primary Prevention methods alone. Though these have a role in controlling and suppressing terrorist acts he suggests that:

The Donald Rumsfeld model of fighting the terrorists' operational capabilities and not the ideological message has its limitations. Although targeting operational cells has reduced the immediate threat, the failure to target terrorist ideology and motivations is ensuring that the threat continues.<sup>47</sup>

This suggests that security managers can curb, but not resolve terrorism through situational measures even where their planning is both meticulous and imaginative. Defeating terrorism should be seen as a cross government, business and community Campaign Plan that must contain many lines of concurrent and inter-related activity for success. Situational measures may be represented on tactical lines of development, and winning the tactical battle against terrorists is a vital component. However, to win against terrorist groups, and their world view, also requires strategic level activity in which secondary and tertiary crime prevention measures are represented. Accordingly the paper will consider secondary and tertiary prevention methods, which arguably have the greater potential to actually resolve terrorist problems.

The paper has described how sub-cultural groups form and then act in response to the social and cultural conditions which surround them; therefore, it is apparent that in dealing with these issues, governments have the means to dislocate these groups from their host communities. This provides opportunities to remove the support structures that protect the terrorist and reduce his supply of recruits and funds. Mockaitis supports this view when

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<sup>47</sup> Gunaratna R (2005) p87. *An Examination of Al-Qaeda and its Methods*. From INTERSEC Vol 15 Issue 3 March 2005.

he states that ‘Defeating Al-Qaeda requires not only understanding of its agenda, but, as far as possible, addressing the causes of discontent upon which extremism feeds’.<sup>48</sup> Kitson suggests that winning the battle of hearts and minds against the terrorist group by addressing the community’s real needs and legitimate grievances leaches support away from the terrorists. In turn this enables the production of good intelligence, which allows for the focused use of security forces against the terrorists in such a way ‘so as not to alienate the general population’.<sup>49</sup> Mockaitis adds that ‘Every action should be weighed to consider whether it would make the situation better or worse. Tactical gains should not be made at the expense of strategic goals’.<sup>50</sup> Thus, it is argued, with some justification that though a state may be tempted to adopt a heavy handed approach to terrorism, in the long term, the solution will only be found by addressing the fundamental social, economic and political issues which cause groups to commit or support terrorist acts. Ultimately peace in Northern Ireland was obtained through negotiation and social reform. These undermined Sinn Fein’s arguments while the Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary denied hope that the terrorists could gain victory.<sup>51</sup> Utilised in this way Primary and Secondary strategies are complementary. In the case of religiously inspired Muslim terrorism, in addition to these measures, Western governments need to work with Muslim countries to ‘break the ideology of Al-Qaeda and its associated groups by sending the message that violent Islamist groups are not Koranic but heretical’, not religious but seeking to impose themselves upon the community.<sup>52</sup> In this way, Bloom<sup>53</sup> and Oberschall<sup>54</sup> argue that once the reasonable demands of terrorists are addressed their purpose will be undermined and terrorist acts will stop. If it does not, the host population will recognise the terrorist as criminals rather than as ‘heroic freedom fighters’ and cease to nurture or otherwise support them. Once such a situation has been created a terrorist group’s days are numbered, as they are likely to lose safe areas, funding and other support structures upon which they rely. Moreover, they become highly vulnerable to

<sup>48</sup> Mockaitis T (2003) p30. *Winning Hearts and Minds in the ‘War on Terrorism’* <http://journalonline.tandf.co.uk/media/mh9xdnwxwncwyu7pnqt1/contributions/2/4/f/j/24fjd7dakx5gwc50.pdf>. Accessed 27 November 2005.

<sup>49</sup> Kitson F (1971). *Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*. London: Faber.

<sup>50</sup> Mockaitis T (2003) p31. *Winning Hearts and Minds in the ‘War on Terrorism’* <http://journalonline.tandf.co.uk/media/mh9xdnwxwncwyu7pnqt1/contributions/2/4/f/j/24fjd7dakx5gwc50.pdf>. Accessed 27 November 2005.

<sup>51</sup> McInnes C & Kennedy-Pipe C. *The British Army and the Peace Process in Ireland*. Cited in *The Journal of Conflict* Spring 2001.

<sup>52</sup> Gunaratna R (2003) p8. *The New Face of Al-Qaeda: Understanding the Generational Gradient in Local and Global Jihad Campaigns*. From *Pointer Journal* Vol 29 No4 (2003). [http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safi/pointer/back/journals/2003/Vol29\\_4/4b.htm](http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safi/pointer/back/journals/2003/Vol29_4/4b.htm) accessed 9 October 2005.

<sup>53</sup> Bloom (2004). *Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror*. From *Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror*. Columbia University Press. <http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/bloom.0227.pdf> accessed 15 October 2005.

<sup>54</sup> Oberschall A, 2004. *Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory*. <http://www.blockwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x> accessed 20 October 2005.

intelligence penetration as the wider social groupings become encouraged to report their activities.

Having considered Primary and Secondary Crime Prevention strategies the paper will now consider Tertiary measures to show how using the 3 strategies in concert can undermine and reduce terrorism.

Tertiary Crime Prevention is a legalistic approach to the problem usually designed to limit a criminal career; however, Pease<sup>55</sup> argues that concentration on incapacitation of the criminal will have at best a modest effect. Indeed if the use of the law is perceived as being targeted against a specific community, rather than for the good of the society as a whole, it can be a factor which promotes discontent. However, rather than targeting the individual, measures that deny the group the means to conduct a concerted campaign are likely to bear greater fruit. As Veness argues:

Extortion, hostage taking, large-scale fraud, racketeering, and corruption have been recurrent and developing activities of terrorist groups. As Adams (1986) has observed, the terror groups that have failed in the past 20 years are those who have failed to cross the economic divide between hand-to-mouth existence and sound economic planning.<sup>56</sup>

Thus, one means of complementing a counter-terrorist strategy unlikely to undermine confidence-building measures within the community may be implemented by legally attacking terrorist financing. Utilising this approach, European governments introduced measures to secure and share evidence and assets concerning terrorist groups particularly in relation to cutting financial supply and the means by which money can be transferred around the world.<sup>57</sup> The theory behind this measure being that without money these groups will be unable to sustain their terrorist activities. Thus, they may face three choices: turning inwards towards their supporting communities for a money supply, through a combination of ‘voluntary’ collections, resorting to increasingly transparent criminality such as protection rackets, robberies or drugs dealing as was the case with both Loyalist and Republican terrorist groups in Northern Ireland or they can end their campaign. Should they

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<sup>55</sup> Pease K (2002) p957. *Crime Reduction*. From Maguire M, Morgan R and Reiner R (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* Oxford University Press.

<sup>56</sup> Veness D (2001) p410. *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An International Perspective*. From *Studies in Terrorism and Conflict & Terrorism*. Taylor & Francis Group.

<sup>57</sup> Goldsmith QC, The Rt Hon Lord (2004) p314. *Financial Crime, Terror and Subversion – The Control of Risk in a Destabilised World Economy*. From *Journal of Financial Crime* Vol 11 No 4.

choose the options of increasing pressure to support money collections or overt criminality, a terrorist group runs the risk of becoming alienated and therefore, dislocated from their own non-participating sub-cultural group and they become vulnerable to the efforts of legitimate law enforcement agencies.

Armed with an understanding of criminal theory, security managers will realise that resolution to the problem of terrorism will not occur as a result of quick fixes or harsh responses. However, incidents such as the suicide bombing of a wedding in Jordan on 10 November 2005 provide windows of opportunity for the security manager to exploit. Philp reported that following this attack many Jordanians, who had until then seen the attacks as legitimate resistance, took to the streets to protest against al-Zarqawi<sup>58</sup> an early sign that it may be possible to separate Al-Qaeda from their supporters (Authors note: since this paper was first written al-Zarqawi was killed in fighting with Coalition Forces in Iraq). Provided that security managers consider crime as ‘a product of social conditions, genetic factors leading to criminality and readily available opportunities to commit crime’ they will be able to identify ‘possibilities for blocking the path leading to the criminal event’.<sup>59</sup> Accordingly, close study of the terrorists themselves will reveal their weaknesses and the means by which they can be separated from their host community. This suggests that it is only through an understanding of criminal theory, the adoption of an integrated campaign plan that includes winning the kinetic tactical battles as well as winning over community support that a security manager, operating at a strategic level but with influence over tactical plans, can succeed in preventing or reducing terrorism.

This paper has argued that Terrorism is a significant issue at national and international levels. Defined as crime, where violence is used as a means of communicating messages, it becomes clear that a security manager, working in government, or for significant organisations of government, must understand why terrorism occurs, what motivates terrorism and how to tackle it effectively without exacerbating the problem. Conflict in Northern Ireland and the rise of Al-Qaeda are examples of governments failing to understand criminal theory and by acting inappropriately reinforcing the factors, which cause terrorism. ‘New’ terrorism is distinguished from ‘traditional’

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<sup>58</sup> Philp C (11 November 2005). ‘Protesters rage at “traitor” al-Zarqawi.’ Times Online. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,251-1867378,00.html> Accessed 12 November 2005.

<sup>59</sup> Pease K (2002) p948. *Crime Reduction*. From Maguire M, Morgan R and Reiner R (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* Oxford University Press.

terrorism mainly by the increased scale of causalities and damage that the former seeks to create, by a greater willingness to die in their attacks and by overt attempts by terrorists to assert control over societies. Though some, such as Juergensmeyer<sup>60</sup> have argued that this has arisen as a result of the 'religiousisation' of politics and pointed towards a corruption of the teachings of the Koran others such as Pape, suggest that 'new' terrorism has in fact arisen from stoking 'nationalist fires' through the identification and exploitation of cultural differences; it is argued that these differences may include differences of religion, between a society and a perceived occupier, particularly in conditions of extreme military asymmetry between the parties exist.<sup>61</sup>

'What motivates terrorism?' is fundamental to understanding the crime and determining a strategy to counter it. Determinists see those who break the law as products of their inborn nature or environment; as Dingley and Oberschall argue that terrorists are not madmen it follows that environmental factors may be important. It has been found that where there is an inability to obtain 'an acceptable' response to demands for social change from governments by conventional means, sub-cultures may emerge within communities who are prepared to reinforce their message using violence. Once established terrorism can become learned behaviour and will provide positives to group members in terms of status and power and therefore, may become self-sustaining.

Though terrorist groups may rise as a consequence of social factors the behaviour of the group as opposed to the individual is often rational. Individual actions may be determined, but groups will only turn to suicide attacks after other tactics have failed and following a rational analysis. They will quickly cease to use this method if it does not have the support of the wider community because if they lose popular support they can be exposed to campaigns aimed at dislocating them from their supporters and penetration by legitimate law enforcement agencies.

Finally, this paper has shown that crime prevention strategies can be used in combination in order to counter terrorism effectively, provided they are based on a good understanding of criminal theory and a coherent campaign plan. Situational crime prevention methods can be used to increase resilience

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<sup>60</sup> Juergensmeyer M (2001) p358. *Terror in the Name of God*. From Current History November 2001. [http://www.currenthistory.com/org\\_pdf\\_files/100/649/100\\_357.pdf](http://www.currenthistory.com/org_pdf_files/100/649/100_357.pdf) Accessed 13 November 2005.

<sup>61</sup> Pape R A (2005). *Dying to Win The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House Publishing Group, New York.

and recovery following attacks and although they cannot prevent all terrorist acts, they have a role to play in directing where they occur to reduce their impact. A legalistic approach to the problem can reduce the money supply to terrorists making it difficult for them to function and attempts to address the underlying social problems which led to the rise of sub-cultural groups removes the cause for these crimes and the cover which communities provide to the groups that commit it. Thus, the security manager's fight against terrorism must be based on a coherent multifaceted plan, which includes tactical and strategic elements, and in which all agencies of government work together in concert. The security officers efforts, whether they represent government, military, law enforcement or private business will only be successful where they complement economic, social and legalistic measures.