Binding the Almancı to the “Homeland” – Notes from Turkey

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Abstract

The Turkish-German migration movement did not start with the recruitment agreement in 1961. However, with this agreement, migration from Turkey became a new dynamic. As migration is usually accompanied by return migration, we may also say that the Turkish-German migration movements have not been only characterised by the migration of Turkish citizens to Germany, but also by their return. Consequently, we can observe different types of return migration parallel to the changing nature of migration movements to Germany in the last 50 years. Today, more than 50 years after the recruitment agreement, the population with Turkish migration background has significantly changed. For immigrants with Turkish background in Germany, we can identify several aspects, such as rising age, the increasing number of naturalisations and the rising educational level of the second and particularly the third and fourth generations. As a result, the type of people returning to Turkey has also varied: A rough segmentation reveals three types of returnees today: (i) those retirees who decided to live their retirement days in Turkey, (ii) those retirees who spend half of the year in Germany and half of the year in Turkey and (iii) those second and third generation young and educated people who come to Turkey for job possibilities. In particular, the last group – the young and highly educated – cannot be called returnees as such as they were born in the country where their forebears settled. However, this group of young and educated migrants is often lucky in the sense that their professional skills correspond to the needs of the Turkish labour market. While previous returnees often drove taxis or delivery trucks, built rental houses or set up small businesses and became part of the service sector, they now work in many different sectors ranging from arts and culture to telecommunications, engineering, banking and are often involved in the global economy. In this article, we will first give an overview of the return migration from the 1960s onwards. Then we will refer to the return and reintegration policies of the Turkish state. By doing so, we will not only point to the changing nature of these policies in general, but particularly look at rather new developments, such as the introduction of the Mavi Kart (Blue Card) and the foundation of the Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı (Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities) for binding highly educated Almancıs to their parents’ or grandparents’ homeland.

Key Words

Almancı, return migration, Turkey, Germany, reintegration policy.

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Introduction

Migration is as old as human history and return migration has always been an integral part of humans’ geographical movements. This also applies to the Turkish context. However, the large-scale migration since the early 1960s from Turkey to Europe in general and Germany in particular has considerably influenced the general image of the Turkish migration nexus and has led to the simplistic notion that Turkey is exclusively a migrant-sending country. This image of Turkey, however, characterises only one aspect of the rather diverse Turkish migration reality. An analysis of these manifold migration processes would go beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, we would just like to point out some important dimensions related to this multi-faceted migration activities as a preliminary remark: First, throughout history, Turkey has also always been a host country for important population movements. Second, it has to be underlined that the Turkish-German migration movement did not start with the recruitment agreement in 1961. History has a number of examples. We neither have the time nor the historical expertise to go into this large field in detail, but we would like to point to some examples in order to make clear that Turkish-German migration is not a new phenomenon as such.

Many years before the recruitment agreement Ottoman subjects and Turkish citizens migrated for a long or short time to Germany. Beside envoys, visitors, authors and businessmen who went to Germany either on diplomatic or private basis, there were also Young Turks such as Mehmet Talat Pasha who were fleeing the late Ottoman Empire in 1918. However, also ordinary people such as workers, students and craftsmen settled in Germany for a particular time, mainly for education or professional training. Figure 1 indicates the rising number of Ottoman subjects or Turkish citizens in Berlin between the middle of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.
Third, it has to be stressed that migration from Germany to Turkey also goes back to earlier times. On the one hand, we can observe- sociologically spoken- “return migration” from the above mentioned groups from Germany to Turkey. On the other hand, a glance into historical sources reveals that Germans without Ottoman and/or Turkish background settled in the Ottoman Empire or the young Turkish republic. Well-known examples in this context are the German officers who were invited to reform the Ottoman Army. The German scientists in Turkish exile who fled Nazi Germany are another well-known examples. However, there were not the only prominent people from Germany who ended up in the Ottoman Empire. The first half of the 19th century also many other Germans, including craftsmen, businessmen and domestic workers, migrating to Istanbul. Due to their settlement in Turkey, a large number of institutions, such as the German Hospital, the German School and German speaking Christian churches, were founded.

In spite of this, there is no doubt that the migration from Turkey became a new dynamic with the ratification of the recruitment agreement in 1961. The number of Turkish citizens, who went mainly as so-called “guest-workers” to Germany, rose rapidly from 10,000 in 1962 to 1,607,161 in 2011. The number of migrants with Turkish background- this includes Turkish citizens, former Turkish citizens who have naturalised in Germany and their descendents- is even higher at 2,956,000 in 2011. Turkish citizens and people with Turkish migration background are
the largest group of all foreigners and persons with migration backgrounds in Germany, comprising 18.5% and 23.2% of the totals, respectively.\(^{15}\)

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Migration from Turkey to Germany continued, less due to labour migration but mainly due to family reunification in this period.

Needless to say that the dynamics of return migration have changed over the time, parallel to the altering patterns of out-migration from Turkey to Germany and the modifying characteristics of the Almancı\(^{16}\) in Germany today. Currently, the total number of people in Turkey with life experience in Germany is high, estimated to be around 4 million.\(^{17}\)

In this article we want to analyse the official Turkish state policies to bind Almancıs to their “homeland”\(^{18}\) or Turkey. In this context, we will first refer to the return and reintegration policies of the Turkish state. However, we will not only point to the changing nature of these policies, but particularly look at other and rather new developments such as the foundation of the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, hereafter YTB) and the introduction of the *Mavi Kart* (Blue Card). In order to contextualise our analysis, we initially give an overview on Turkish-German migration flows from the 1960s onwards and evaluate the different stages.

The Main Characteristics of the Turkish-German Migration Nexus

Turkish labour migration to Germany started as a temporary vocational training programme invented by the World Economic Institute (*Weltwirtschaftsinstitut*) in Kiel in 1957, through which trainees from Turkey were sent to Germany with the objective of facilitating German capital investments and branches in Turkey where the trainees should work as foremen.\(^{19}\) In fact, this was the beginning of a long-lasting unofficial labour recruitment without bilateral agreements or regulations and which was organised by private persons and institutions. It was ignored by the Turkish government before it turned into an official labour recruitment agreement between both states.\(^{20}\) With the ratification of a recruitment agreement in 1961, the migration from Turkey became a new dynamic as mentioned above. More and more workers from Turkey were sent to Germany for a limited time,
most of them of middle and “upper lower” socio-economic background in the beginning, followed by members of poorer households. We can characterise this first stage of migration as circular migration organised and controlled by the two states involved. However, the Turkish state had little influence on the increasing extent of out-migration in this first period. So the total number of Turkish citizens in Germany rose from around 10,000 in 1962 to around 530,000 in 1973. Figure 2 shows the number of workers who were sent from Turkey to Germany every year. By 1973 it is estimated that about 2 million migrants from Turkey were involved in this cyclical form of temporary migration.

**Figure 2: The Turkish-German Migration Balance (1961-1973)**

The year 1973 is an important turning point in the history of Turkish-German migration since the German government stopped the recruitment of migrant labour from Turkey. However, as figure 3 indicates very clearly, this policy change did not lead to a migration stop from Turkey to Germany. Migration from Turkey to Germany continued, less due to labour migration but mainly due to family reunification in this period. In addition to that, a large number of refugees came to Germany due to violent struggles in the country and political persecution in the aftermath of the military coup in 1980.

However, this period was also characterised by return migration. As
figure 2 and 3 illustrate, returnees never exceeded 150,000. Only in the period from 1983 to 1984 did the number of returnees reach 310,000 as a result of the return promotion policy of the German state.

**Figure 3: The Turkish-German Migration Balance (1974-1984)**

This return act and the corresponding public debate in Germany is also reflected in a large number of German publications on return migration and support of return through the whole 1980s, many of which also had a political impetus. While after the return promotion policy of the German state the return rates of Turkish citizens rapidly decreased again, from 1985 onwards migration from Turkey to Germany suddenly increased again, with the peak of the Kurdish conflict in East Anatolia seen in the literature as the main reason for this rise.
The migration from Turkey to Germany remained higher than the migration from Germany to Turkey until 2005. From 2006 onwards, the migration rates to Turkey started to become higher than the out-migration from Turkey. In addition to that, it has to be mentioned that the number of German citizens leaving Germany for Turkey started to grow slowly but steadily. As it is assumed that many of these Germans are naturalised Turkish citizens and/or descendants from the so-called guest-workers generation, these figures have to be added to the out-migration rates of Turkish citizens in order to estimate the total amount of people with Turkish migration history in Germany leaving for Turkey.

Source: Statistische Jahrbücher 1985-1999, calculated by the authors.
Parallel to the different stages of the German-Turkish migration history we can also observe a change in the type of returnees: While until 1973, in the first phase, mainly individual workers returned to their families in Turkey, return migration in the 1980s and 1990s was very much a decision made by and for the family. Most of the return migrants settled in their region of origin, became involved in agricultural production (again), especially in this first phases of German-Turkish migration, set up small-scale businesses and/or lived as retirees on rental income, both became increasingly common from the 1990s onwards.30 Generally speaking, returnees at this time invested their savings in consumer goods, housing, land and setting up individual businesses.31 Therefore, they did not really have a significant socio-economic impact on Turkish society in terms of employment, industrialisation or economic development beyond the individual and family level.32 Moreover, according to the Turkish-Dutch Boğazlıyan study of the 1970s, return migration often meant “an acceptance of failing to achieve aspirations”, with family and health issues, unemployment and official expulsion as common return motives. These unsuccessful or failed return migrants, some of which were illegal “tourist” migrants who could not find work in Germany, mostly settled in their villages of origin.33 On the contrary, rather successful return migrants appear to have resettled, at least in part, in Turkish (provincial centre) cities at that time.34 Since the 1990s, direct investments by the second generation, particularly in the textiles industry, have increased.35

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who decided to live their retirement days in Turkey, (ii) those retirees who spend half of the year in Germany and half of the year in Turkey and (iii) those second and third generation young and educated people who come to Turkey for job possibilities. According to Baykara-Krumme and Nauck, the active population aged between 25 and 50 make up the majority among the returnees; only about one quarter of the return-migrants is older than 50 years. This means that Turkey is not only a significant reference point for the first generation of migrants but also for its successor generations.

In particular the last group - the young and highly educated - cannot be called returnees as such as they were born in the country where their forebears settled. Thus it seems to be more correct to refer to them as highly-qualified migrants with a migration background from Turkey. However, this group of young and educated migrants are often lucky in the sense that their professional skills correspond to the needs of the Turkish labour market. While previous returnees often bought taxis or delivery trucks, built rental houses or set up small businesses and became part of the service sector, they now work in many different sectors ranging from arts and culture to telecommunications, engineering and banking. The economically developed cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya and Izmir are the hotspots for these migrants from Germany. Thus it is not surprising that they are often involved in global and transnational economies and considered as prototypes of transnational migrants. However, since transnational ties have various forms, dynamics and levels, the evaluation of an overall transnationality seems to be over-interpreting this phenomenon.

The Changing Nature of Return and Reintegration Policies in Turkey

Turkey as a migrant-sending country promoted the out migration of workers to Europe in the 1960s in the hope for a positive impact on the Turkish economy as part of its national development planning. In order to enhance economic growth and development, the State Planning Organisation (Devlet Planlama Teşkilati, DPT) was established after the Turkish military intervention in 1960 and in response to the high trade deficit in Turkey developed so-called Five Year Development Plans from the 1960s onwards. These plans also targeted the export of labour in the hope that migrant workers would bring foreign currency, reduce unemployment and return with new skills, thus contributing to industrialisation in Turkey.
Therefore, a special exchange rate for migrants’ remittances was introduced after the recruitment agreement with Germany that remained until 1970. Shortly before the German recruitment ban in 1973, the Turkish and German government also signed an agreement on the economic reintegration of the “guest workers”, which included the (not reached) goal of new companies founded by returnees. German-Turkish joint ventures- or rather the establishment of German branches in Turkey- as potential employers for return migrants were also promoted, as the DTP and the Turkish industry chamber was started in the early 1970s. Other regulations introduced in the 1970s included special foreign currency accounts in Turkey for workers abroad in order to encourage them to transfer their savings to Turkey, accompanied by an agreement between the Turkish Central Bank and the German Dresdner Bank that remained valid until 1984. As shown by various studies, the Turkish economy heavily relied on migrants’ remittances to compensate for its trade deficit, although the money sent from abroad mainly increased consumption, imports and private investments rather than national production and employment. Moreover, remittances began to decline in 1974 for the first time and have rapidly declined since the late 1990s.

Apart from these economic aspects, the Turkish government had no specific policy concerning these workers in the first phases of German-Turkish migration, which is illustrated by, for example, a lack of information, preparation and vocational training before and during migration, as well as by insufficient consular or other institutional assistance. After the military intervention of 1971, four short-term governments under martial law pursued similar economic objectives concerning the migrants abroad. During the following election campaigns and again several short-term elected as well as technocrat governments in the 1970s and early 1980s, Turkey’s major political parties increasingly attempted to influence the political opinion of migrant workers and their families at home as well as through the language, religious, and
cultural education of migrants’ children by sending teachers abroad.\textsuperscript{57}

While the German state strongly promoted the return of the “guest workers” in the 1970s and 1980s, the Turkish state promoted the hope for economic growth through emigration and to some economically productive extent return migration after the recruitment agreement.\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, the Turkish state particularly supported village development cooperatives until 1973 and workers cooperatives\textsuperscript{59} from 1966 onwards, which both remained rather unproductive due to various problems, including a lack of coordination, capital and skilled workers.\textsuperscript{60} This similarly applies to other unsuccessful reintegration initiatives by the German and/or Turkish state such as the support of vocational training, shares in Turkish state companies or financial support.\textsuperscript{61} Generally speaking, the Turkish state’s perspective towards return and reintegration during the first few decades of German-Turkish migration appears to be torn between economic goals and cultural ideas. On the one hand, the workers’ return was clearly imagined and promoted in a far future,\textsuperscript{62} and thus there was no attempt to strengthen their rights in the destination countries.\textsuperscript{63} On the other hand, the recruitment ban of 1973\textsuperscript{64} and again the German return promotion policy of 1983\textsuperscript{65} were a shock to Turkish representatives who feared a “mass return” that would cause serious economic problems like a further rise of unemployment in Turkey.

The recently discovered political, socio-economic, ethnic, and religious diversity of the Almancı, the academic and economic potential of the highly skilled as well as their potential political impact in Europe have become a new target of Turkish migration and diaspora policy today.

As the migrants had long been called “guest workers” in Germany, which implied only a temporary stay without permanent settlement, in Turkey they were referred to as bizim vatandaşlarımız\textsuperscript{66} (our citizens), işçilerimiz (our workers) or gurbetçimiz (our people abroad),\textsuperscript{67} which similarly stresses the “natural” bond to the sending country.\textsuperscript{68} As the migrants were assumed to be away only temporarily, from the Turkish perspective they were not seen as actual emigrants.\textsuperscript{69} This view that the migrants still belong to Turkish society was despite there being no national return and reintegration policy (as well as no overall migration strategy) from the 1960s to the 1990s, and instead only had programmes by
business organisations, trade unions and political parties.\textsuperscript{70} This is partly due to the unstable political situation in Turkey as described above, which resulted, for example, in an increasing influence of local politicians interesting in returning migrants.\textsuperscript{71}

Just as the Turkish state had little control over the extent of out migration in the beginning, it later also had- in relation to family reunions, long-term settlement abroad and the decrease in remittances- not much influence on their decisions whether to return or not. Instead, Turkish return migration policy continued to be influenced by migration policies of the host countries.\textsuperscript{72} This was particularly true for Germany’s strong return promotion policy in the 1980s, which was even applied to Turkish asylum seekers\textsuperscript{73} and had a considerable impact on decisions to return in this period (see figure 3). In the context of the increasing return rate in the 1980s, several studies on the schooling of the migrants’ children and their respective education and reintegration problems after their return to Turkey emerged in the third phase of German-Turkish migration.\textsuperscript{74} Mainly due to these problems, reintegration courses (\textit{uyum kursları}) with a focus on the Turkish language and adaptation to rules in Turkey were introduced. Additionally, in order to provide the children of return migrants better chances in the Turkish school system, special secondary schools with German as a main language were established by the Turkish Ministry of Education within the foreign language state schools, referred to as \textit{Anadolu Lisesi}.\textsuperscript{75} In 1986, the governments of Germany and Turkey agreed to cooperate with regard to the reintegration of return children into the Turkish school system, for example by sending German teachers to such \textit{Anadolu Lisesi}.\textsuperscript{76}

In the last decade, the current government then tried with its “colour change” from the Pink Card to the Blue Card to re-define the functions of the card more clearly and improve its usability as well as to extend Turkey’s binding policy to further generations.

With the decrease of return rates, permanent settlement and increasing naturalisation of Turkish citizens in the destination countries, the Turkish state also shifted its policies away from reintegration more and more towards the destination countries. Thus it introduced an identity card for former Turkish citizens (the \textit{Pembe Kart}, Pink Card) in 1995, in order to still provide them
important rights in Turkey even if they had to give up their Turkish citizenship.

Today, in the context of globalisation and transnationalisation, migration policy and research have shifted their attention towards new phenomena. With regard to Turkey, it increasingly deals with irregular migration to and through Turkey (e.g. refugees, asylum seekers, transit migration and trafficking), historical displacements, migrant domestic work in Turkey and labour migration from and to non-EU countries like Russia.87

As for the Turkish state, the General Directorate of the Ministry of Labour for Services for Workers Abroad (Çalışma Bakanlığı Yurtdışı İşçi Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü) assists Turkish labour migrants abroad with the help of new established labour attaches, for example in Germany,78 which shows a considerable policy change compared to the poor consular assistance in the early days of Turkish labour migration. In contrast, the former labour migrants and their following generations in Western Europe, also called “Euro-Turks”,79 are not a major concern of Turkish migration research anymore- and even less in Turkish public discourse.80 Accordingly, the Turkish government neither promotes remittances from Europe today81 nor has developed any specific return or reintegration policy in response to the increasing numbers of return migrants in the last few years.82 Instead, the recently discovered political, socio-economic, ethnic, and religious diversity of the Almançis, the academic and economic potential of the highly skilled83 as well as their potential political impact in Europe have become a new target of Turkish migration and diaspora policy today.84

This is reflected in a variety of new developments by the current government, including the YTB, which was founded in 2010, and the shift from the former Pembe Kart (Pink Card) to the new Mavi Kart (Blue Card) in 2004, with further changes in 2012.

**Binding the Almançis to the “Homeland”**

Even though our focus of this article lies on new developments in the “binding policy” of the Turkish state, we outlined how the emigrants have always been seen as part of Turkish society. This perspective is expressed, for example, by representatives of diverse political parties in Turkey who have referred to them as “our citizens” until today. From the beginning of German-Turkish migration, there have been various political attempts by different
governments to bind the Almancı to their “homeland”, with a particular focus on the economic and cultural/educational dimensions. As most of these policies were not very effective or in part governed by the migration policies of the destination countries, the new developments of the current government can be seen as an attempt to continue, improve and extend former binding policies, under consideration of their own political objectives.

The recently established YTB is also not the first institution that deals with (former) Turkish citizens abroad, but an attempt to coordinate the various organisations involved and to ensure their efficiency. Relatively new is, however, the YTB’s focus on diaspora policies rather than on integration/reintegration policies. 85

Building and keeping ties to Turkic societies and “related communities” are not new either. For example, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, TIKA) was established in 1992 “as a technical aid organisation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to respond to the restructuring, adaptation and development needs of the Turkic (Turkish-speaking) Republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union”. 86 Since 1999, TIKA has been affiliated to the Prime Minister’s Office, providing development assistance and being present “particularly in the countries with whom we have shared values, as well as in many other areas and countries.” 88 With the JDP government, TIKA has extended its activities, development aid and established coordination offices in more countries, mainly in the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa. 89 Moreover, it also cooperates with the YTB’s Cultural and Social Relations Department. 90

Current binding policies with regard to citizenship and “diaspora management” can also be seen as state responses to this globalising and transnationalising world.

For example, the former Pink Card was introduced long before the JDP government, namely by a political coalition of the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP) in the 1990s. In the last decade, the current government then tried with its “colour change” from the Pink Card to the Blue Card to re-define the functions of the card more clearly and improve its usability as well as to extend Turkey’s binding policy to further generations.
However, despite our focus on the Blue Card and the YTB, these are not the only developments of the JDP’s binding policy as part of its overall foreign policy. For example, the Yunus Emre Institute (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, hereafter YEE), established in 2007 and with its cultural centres in various countries, is, according to the former Minister of Culture and Tourism Atilla Koç, supposed to “undertake the mission of presenting the Turkish language and culture to the world just like many other Western institutions such as the Goethe and Cervantes institutes”.91 This goal includes a variety of activities like cultural events or summer schools, in order “to be part of the global world and to contribute to world culture”, as emphasised by its current chairman Hayati Develi.92 Even though the YEE is less directed towards (former) Turkish citizens abroad, the locations of the cultural centres in Europe, the Middle East and the Balkans can be seen in line with Turkey’s overall foreign policy.

In the contemporary world of globalisation and transnationalisation, migrants are able to maintain close transnational ties to their countries of origin and settlement, whereas in the 1970s migrants’ correspondence with their family in Turkey “regularly each month” was considered as frequent in migration research.93 Therefore, current binding policies with regard to citizenship and “diaspora management” can also be seen as state responses to this globalising and transnationalising world.

In the following two sub-sections we will consider Turkey’s politics of binding in greater detail by focusing on the YTB as well as the Pink Card and the Blue Card.

**The Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)**

Turkish governments have given importance, at least in theory, to their citizens who left Turkey in the first step for labour-related reasons and later on for family reunification. Thus it is not surprising that most governments designated state ministers who were in charge of the policies related to these citizens abroad. However, the duties of these state ministers have never been clearly defined, which has led to various coordination problems between the large numbers of institutions involved.94 In order to ensure the efficiency of services, the YTB was set up in 2010.95 This is a public institution and affiliated with the Prime Minister’s Office.

The main objective of the YTB can be summarised in four points: (i) to improve the situation of Turkish citizens abroad as well as to coordinate their activities; (ii) to strengthen and coordinate the “historically determined” social, cultural
and economic ties with Turkic societies; (iii) to coordinate and develop the higher education of foreign students in Turkey apart from projects related to the EU, the Council of Higher Education and universities; and (iv) to support non-governmental organisations by Turkish citizens in Turkey and abroad. In other words, we can say that the YTB is designed to support, shape and control the life worlds, activities, institutions and perspectives of Turkish migrants in Europe and their descendants as well as to set up new policies with so-called “related communities”.

This short overview on the main objectives of the YTB clearly shows that the binding of the Almancı to the “homeland” is by far not its sole objective. As a detailed analysis of the overall goals of the YTB would go beyond the scope of this article, we will concentrate on their activities related to (former) Turkish citizens abroad and the Blue Card.

The YTB’s motto is: “Wherever we have a citizen, kin or relative, there we are” (“Nerede bir vatandaşımız, soydaşımız, akrabamız varsa biz oradayız”). This motto has become its slogan and is on the top of its webpage, various banners etc. It is highly distinctive for this young public institution’s self-conception.

A glance at the YTB’s webpage (see figure 6) confirms this pro-Turkish, activist and service character very clearly.

Figure 6: The Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities’ Webpage

Source: Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Community, at http://www.ytb.gov.tr [last visited 6 August 2013].
On the homepage, apart from the Presidency’s logo and motto, a picture of Atatürk and the toolbar at the top of the webpage, there are also some buttons to click for information on and about the YTB. On the right side there are six buttons for further information on Blue Cards, scholarships, voting abroad, studying abroad, juridical matters and financial support. Just by clicking through these buttons, the user achieves an idea of the main concerns of the Presidency: Besides sensibilities for Muslim issues and clear linkages to the Turkish Republic and the Muslim world, the YTB wants to provide practical information and services for their three target groups: Turkish citizens abroad, Turkic people and students. The providing of detailed information on the Blue Card for former Turkish citizens, new possibilities to participate in Turkish elections for Turkish citizens abroad and scholarships for students can be mentioned in this context.

In addition, the Presidency supports non-governmental organisations that have been established in Turkey or abroad by Turkish citizens, members of kin and related communities and international students by financing particular projects. Kemal Yurtnaç, Chairman of YTB, states in this context that the YTB wants these NGOs to “actively participate in public life in the countries where they are established (and) perceive their ties with Turkey”. Gürsel Dönmez, Vice-Chairman of YTB, underlines accordingly that YTB is open to all NGOs that fulfil the criteria mentioned above and that it supports them as long as their projects “make sense to us”. The criteria of “making sense to us” seems to be part of YTB’s strategy: On the one hand, they intend to be open for ideas and projects they have not thought about before themselves, but on the other hand the ideas have to contribute to achieving YTB’s overall goals while playing their cards close to their chest. However, the support of Turkish NGOs abroad (e.g. by training courses how to defend their rights and interests), an intensified cooperation among each other and the foundation of further new NGOs, appear to be important steps in the context of the YTB’s major strategic goal, the strengthening and mobilising of the Turkish diaspora.

However, neither the service mission nor the support of projects naively fulfil the purpose to facilitate the access to information for (former) Turkish citizens abroad or to support the diaspora, but rather are political instruments in order to attach these people to Turkey. Ayhan Kaya argues in this context:

The current political elite is inclined to position Turkey as a hegemonic power
as well as in various official statements. Yurtnaç notes for instance that Turkey has given up its “inward-looking” foreign policy\textsuperscript{113} and had “sought to expand foreign policy instruments at its disposal, coming to acquire new tools in such fields as public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, development aid and humanitarian assistance.”\textsuperscript{114} Bilge Ayd̩ın, an assistant expert at the YTB, even goes a step further and argues that in the current world of globalisation and transnationalisation policies have to change accordingly.\textsuperscript{115} All this indicates a general rethinking which is clearly visible on various levels of the realpolitik. The foundation of new state institutions such as the YTB and the YEE,\textsuperscript{116} the mission of these institutions, and the development of various other “soft” strategies such as programmes for academics of Turkish origin\textsuperscript{117} can be seen as examples in this context. The efforts with which the YTB tries to improve the Blue Card are another example for this policy. The following section will look at this issue in more detail.

**From the Pink to the Blue Card: Specific identity cards for former Turkish citizens**

The so-called Blue Card and the previous Pink Card is a particular Turkish identity card for former Turkish
the popularity of the Blue Card can be described as rather poor. We will discuss the reasons for this low attractiveness below. At this point we would only like to note that Turkey’s current government is developing new strategies and policies to raise the popularity of the Blue Card. According to some newspaper articles, the number of holders will increase to one million due to these changes.  

It is impossible to say today whether this number will be reached. However, based on a telephone survey, which was carried out after these legal changes in June and August 2012 in Germany, we may assume that these changes have already led to an enormous boost of attractiveness. However, according to E. Elif Gönüllü and İsmail Demiryürek from the YTB, all these numbers are rather speculative. In this context the two experts also pointed out that the goal of the YTB is not simply an increase of Blue Card holders as such, but rather to ensure that they have easy access to all their rights. In addition, it has to be underlined that the main aim of the YTB is not to promote return migration. On the contrary, it rather prefers a strong and successful diaspora with strong ties to Turkey in order to create a political lobby and close economic linkages with the countries of emigration. Ensuring former Turkish citizens several rights in their country of origin is part of this policy.

citizens who have been naturalised in countries where dual citizenship is not recognised. The card provides them with a bundle of rights in Turkey despite their official non-citizenship status there. Although Blue Card holders are legally not Turkish citizens anymore, they are entitled to certain rights such as residence, work, investment and inheritance free from the various restrictions of Turkish laws on foreigners. Blue Card holders have a privileged status among non-Turkish citizens in Turkey. In other words, we can also say that they provide former Turkish citizens with a legal status between formal citizens and “aliens”. For that reason Ayşe Çağlar also refers to this card as “citizenship light” and Vera Artz describes the holders as “nationals in quotation marks” (Bürger in Anführungsstrichen).

Currently, the exact number of Blue Card holders is not known. Estimates only give an idea of approximate numbers. The number of German citizens with Turkish migration background who obtained one is estimated to be between 150,000 and 200,000 the estimated figures of former Turkish citizens worldwide vary between 300,000 and 400,000. Taking into consideration that there are around 3 million people with Turkish background living in Germany and around 6.5 million Turkish citizens living in more than 150 countries,
In this context it has to be noted that the binding of former citizens to Turkey is not a new phenomenon as such since the Blue Card was originally introduced by the DYP-SHP coalition government as the Pink Card in 1995. The main reason for the introduction of this card was that Germany, the main migrant-receiving country from Turkey, and many other European countries with migrant population from Turkey did not and still do not accept dual citizenship.\textsuperscript{128} In these countries naturalisation for migrants mainly meant and means the abandonment of their birth citizenship. Despite the fear of some political circles that the Blue Card would enable minority groups such as Armenians and Greeks, who had renounced their Turkish citizenship in order to acquire another citizenship, to come back to Turkey and reclaim their property, the Blue Card was invented to enable social, political and economic integration of “guest workers” and their descendents in Europe without losing their rights in Turkey.\textsuperscript{129} This primary aim has been stressed throughout the whole process of inventing, establishing and improving the cards.\textsuperscript{130} New, however, is the enthusiasm and efficiency with which this aim is carried out.

According to Law No. 4112, the Law Amending the Law on Turkish Citizenship \textit{(Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanunu)} which led to the introduction of the Pink Card in 1995, those Turkish citizens who obtained their Turkish citizenship by birth and got permission from the Turkish Ministry of the Interior to abandon their Turkish citizenship to obtain another citizenship “continue to have the opportunity to enjoy the same rights such as residence, travel, work, heritage, the purchase or lease of movable and immovable property like Turkish citizens”.\textsuperscript{131} However, this wording led to enormous discussions of how to deal with those rights which are not explicitly mentioned in the law. These discussions were finally stopped due to another amendment in 2004 (Law No. 5203) according to which the wording “rights such as…” was replaced by a list of duties and rights Blue Card holders are excluded from. Among these exceptions are the compulsory military services, the active and passive right to vote, become civil servants and they can import vehicles, instruments or household goods for free.\textsuperscript{132} At the same time the card was renamed the Blue Card.

However, these clarifications were not enough to solve the problems of Blue Card holders and therefore did not raise the attractiveness of the system. Thus another change in the law was made in 2012 (Law No. 6304).\textsuperscript{133} Although this
law mainly reforms the voting rights for Turkish citizens abroad, it also includes important changes for the registration and obtaining of a Blue Card. Concerning the right to apply for a Blue Card it has to be stated that since this amendment not only former Turkish nationals who obtained Turkish citizenship by birth have the right to obtain one, but also their descendants. Until now, it was possible to obtain the Blue Card for children and grandchildren of former Turkish citizens only. However, with recent reforms this right will be extended to further generations.

Within the globalising and transnationalising world, migrants increasingly retain close ties to their countries of residence and origin.

This legislative reform clearly implies the principle of descent and indicates the interest of the Turkish lawmaker to maintain strong linkages to former Turkish citizens and their descendants for generations to their country of origin. In addition to that, the law includes various attempts to coordinate the registration of Blue Card holders, which has been very insufficient before and led to administrative problems. Now a *Mavi Kart Kütüğü* (Blue Card Register) will administer the data in the central civil registration system. With these changes, improvements in the administration of the holders and several facilitations for holders are expected. Advances in this respect are very necessary since the list of problems holders were facing was long and ranged from technical deficits such as missing ID numbers on the card to civil servants, the administrative staff in the private service sector, employers, etc. lack knowledge of the system which led to various problems with official transactions and operations, as well as to problems with purchase contracts and difficulties on the labour market. These and many other difficulties related to the Blue Card are not only highlighted in the literature but also by the holders themselves. Online discussion forums on social networks illustrate for instance that the experiences of Blue Card holders vary not according to the transactions and operations as such but rather to the people (civil servants, clerks etc.) involved in these operations. For that reason, the YTB currently also plans a publicity campaign in order to introduce the Blue Card to civil servants and clerks.

Referring to these problems and the recent amendments, Yurtnaç stated in an interview in 2011 that:

> These people can’t open bank accounts or buy property because their ID...
numbers are no longer active, but these citizens, who are estimated to number between 300,000 and 400,000, will no longer be treated like foreigners. They will not be registered in the Foreigners’ Registry but the Overseas Citizens’ Registry, which has been set up in the General Directorate of Population Affairs. That way, their ID numbers will be active, enabling them to exercise their rights.137

Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ even went one step further by saying that “those who possess the ‘Blue Card’ will from now on be able to benefit from all of the same opportunities as Turkish citizens and won’t have to deal with the problems that they’ve confronted in the past”.138 By proclaiming “Whatever a Turkish identity card does, the ‘Blue Card’ will also do. It will be used like a citizen’s identity card at the land registry office, at the public notary and at all government offices”,139 he describes the Blue Card as quasi-citizenship. However, the fact that for instance retirement issues are still complicated for Blue Card holders indicates that he embellished the situation.140 Nevertheless, time will soon show the degree of improvement due to these amendments. However, it is important to note at this point that the YTB is determined to carry out reforms until Blue Card holders have their rights not only on paper but also in practice.141

Conclusion

In this article, our aim was to analyse the official Turkish state policies to bind the Almancı to Turkey. Therefore, we first gave an overview on the changing return and reintegration policies from the beginning of German-Turkish migration, thereby considering notions of belonging and “homeland” from the Turkish perspective. The chapter has shown a considerable policy shift from reintegration towards residence countries and transnational ties over the years, which has been further extended by the Turkish government in its most recent “binding” policies.

By establishing appropriate policies to achieve the political objectives, it is obvious that they bridge between the old blood- and religion-based understandings of belonging and the new necessities of the globalising and transnationalising world.

Within the globalising and transnationalising world, migrants increasingly retain close ties to their countries of residence and origin. Theoretically, dual citizenship provides
(transnational) migrants with the best legal framework for participating in two societies. However, the invention of the Pink/Blue Card system was a creative tool to by-pass the strict citizenship laws in the immigration-receiving countries, which do not recognise dual citizenship, and to catch up with the needs to develop a legal framework for multiple belongings in the age of migration, globalisation and transnationalisation, while safeguarding the interests of the state.

The establishment of the YTB can be seen in the same vein. It is a newly established state institution with the overarching objective to strengthen Turkey’s ties with (former) Turkish citizens and “related communities” in order to become a strong cultural, political and economic player in and beyond the region. By establishing appropriate policies to achieve the political objectives, it is obvious that they bridge between the old blood-and religion-based understandings of belonging and the new necessities of the globalising and transnationalising world. This bridging, however, is an interesting subject for further research since it gives insights into the functioning of various “soft pillars” of Turkish foreign policy and the understanding of Turkishness.
Endnotes

1 There were for instance several waves of population movements as a consequence of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent nation-building processes. Most important were the immigration of Muslim populations from the Balkans to Anatolia and the emigration of non-Muslim minority groups. For this, see, Kemal Kirişci, “Migration and Turkey: The Dynamics of State, Society and Politics”, in Reşat Kasaba (ed.), Turkey in the Modern World, London, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 175-198; Kemal Kirişci, “Post Second World War Immigration from Balkan Countries to Turkey”, New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol. 12 (Spring 1995), pp. 61-77.


In popular language usage the population from Turkey in Germany is called “Almancı”. The term is composed by the noun Alman (German) and the denominal suffix -cı, which is used to form agent nouns having a certain occupation or a habit. However, the term has got a negative connotation over the time and implies various prejudices of the majority population in Turkey against the “guest workers” and their descendents in Germany. However, as other terms frequently used to describe this group of people, such as “German-Turks” or “Turkish migrants in Germany”, have an ethnical connotation, which ignores the variety of ethnic groups among the migrants from Turkey in Germany, we decided to use the term Almancı.

The former German ambassador Eckart Cuntz mentioned this number in his opening speech at the founding ceremony of the Orient-Institut Istanbul in December 2010 in the energy museum Santralistanbul in Silahtarğa, Istanbul. This estimation appears to be realistic according to various official migration data from the German Federal Statistical Office and the generally known fact that not all return migrants notify the central registration office of their resettlement; Yaşar Aydın, “Der Diskurs um die Abwanderung Hochqualifizierter türkischer Herkunft in die Türkei”, HWWI Policy Paper, at http://www.hwwi.org/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/HWWI_Policy_Paper_3-9_01.pdf [last visited 9 September 2013].

In this article we refer to “homeland” as the country of one’s origin or family roots in traditional opposition to “abroad” or “diaspora”, in line with common language usage and most of diaspora and migration research. See, Nedim Ögelman, “Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics among Germany’s Turks”, The International Migration Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 163-193; Ayhan Kaya and Fikret Adaman, “The Impact of Turkish-Origin Returnees/Transmigrants on Turkish Society”, in Şeyda Ozil, Michael Hoffmann and Yasemin Dayıoğlu (eds.), 50 Jahre türkische Arbeitsmigration, Göttingen, V&R Unipress, 2011, pp. 37-57. This “homeland” is imagined and does not necessarily match the citizenship and/or identity of the actors. We are aware of the limitations of this notion, which has been challenged by new forms of mobility, belonging and citizenship in the globalising world where “homeland” and “diaspora” are rather relative, see, Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, “Citizenship and Identity. Living in Diasporas in post-war Europe?”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 2000), pp. 1-15; and also several contributions at the conference “Travelling Towards Home: Mobilities and Home Making” at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, on 23 and 24 June 2011, at http://www.soas.ac.uk/migrationdiaspora/seminarsevents/23jun2011-travelling-towards-home-mobilities-and-
home-making.html [last visited on 10 September 2013]. However, as the Turkish state, whose binding policies we investigate in this article clearly imagines Turkey as the “natural homeland” of the Almancı we refer to this understanding accordingly.


22 Abadan-Unat et al., Migration and Development, pp. 192-193 and 386.

23 Akgünüz, Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974, p. 104.

24 Kaya and Adaman, “The Impact of Turkish-Origin Returnees/Transmigrants on Turkish Society”, p. 39.


27 Abadan-Unat et al., Migration and Development, pp. 310 and 378; Ali Gitmez, “Geographical and Occupational Re-Integration of Returning Turkish Workers”, in Daniel Kubat (ed.),

28 Kaya and Adaman, “The Impact of Turkish-Origin Returnees/Transmigrants on Turkish Society”, p. 41.


30 Especially the percentage of retirees among return migrants increased from 14% in 1990 to 19% in 2000, as outlined by Özge Aktaş in her presentation “Social and Spatial Integration Pattern of Return Migrants from Germany to Istanbul” at the Orient-Institut Istanbul on 29 May 2013. A small service business was, according to various studies, the most favoured professional activity of the early returnees, even though most of them ended up in the agricultural sector at that time, see, Ali Gitmez, Yurtdışına İşçi Göçü ve Geri Dönüşler, Istanbul, Alan Yayınları, 1983.

31 Rittersberger-Tılıç, Vom Gastarbeiter zum Deutschler.

32 Abadan-Unat et al., Migration and Development; Paine, Exporting Workers: The Turkish Case; Ali Gitmez, “Bați Avrupa’ya İşçi ve Göçü ve Kültürel Etkileme”, Bilim ve Sanat, Vol. 9 (September 1981), pp.32-35; Kaya and Adaman, “The Impact of Turkish-Origin Returnees/Transmigrants on Turkish Society”, pp. 37-57. Whilst there has been broad research consent on migrant workers’ investments after return, this does not apply to their contribution to development in Turkey. For example, Azmaz considered “development” as a normative concept at the national and industrial level, which underestimated individual and socio-cultural changes, see, Advije Azmaz, Migration and Reintegration in Rural Turkey, The Role of Women Behind, Göttingen, edition herodot, 1984, p. 238. Generally speaking, structural issues at the macro level were the focal point of migration research at that time. See, Sema Erder and Deniz Yükseler, “Die türkische Migration nach Westeuropa und die Migrationsstudien in der Türkei”, in Barbara Pusch (ed.), Transnationale Migration am Beispiel Deutschland und Türkei, Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2013, p. 54.

33 Abadan-Unat et al., Migration and Development, pp. 190-193. This view has been challenged in that unsuccessful migrants avoided settling in their villages of origin due to their lack of status symbols, see, Heiko Körner and Manfred Werth, Rückwanderung und Reintegration von ausländischen Arbeitnehmern in Europa, Saarbrücken, Verlag Breitenbach, 1981. Or continued to stay in Germany for a lack of life prospects in Turkey, see, Werth, Rückkehr- und Verbleibeabsichten türkischer Arbeitnehmer; Ursula Mehrländer, “Rückkehrabsichten der Türken im Verlauf des Migrationsprozesses 1961-1985”, in Meys and Şen (eds.), Zukunft in der Bundesrepublik oder Zukunft in der Türkei?, p. 55. Other scholars, however, referred to early Turkish migration and return as material “betterment with high costs” rather than as a failure, see, Azmaz, Migration and Reintegration in Rural Turkey, p. 237.
Abadan-Unat et al., *Migration and Development*, pp. 190-193; Nurhan Akçaylı, “Die türkischen Rückkehrer und ihre Chancen in den Türkei-Auswirkungen des Rückkehrförderungsgesetzes aus türkischer Sicht”, in Meys and Şen (eds.), *Zukunft in der Bundesrepublik oder Zukunft in der Türkei?*, p. 31. In addition, the source of income after return is also important when it comes to the place of resettlement: Villages were places for agricultural work, whereas service work or individual businesses took place in urban regions. In this context, their resettlement has also been characterised as “rurban” (i.e. a combination of rural and urban elements) by Azmaz. According to her study in the 1970s, returnees settled with one foot in villages and one in provincial centre cities. Only a few of the early returnees, however, settled in the largest cities like Istanbul unless they had lived there before. See, Azmaz, *Migration and Reintegration in Rural Turkey*, pp. 78, 103-105 and 244.


Kaya and Adaman, “The Impact of Turkish-Origin Returnees/Transmigrants on Turkish Society”, pp. 37-57.


The statistical data on highly-qualified “German-Turks” are unfortunately very poor. Neither the German Statistic Institute (*Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland*) nor the Turkish counterpart (*Türkiye Istatistik Kurumu*) provides data of the educational and/or professional characteristics of emigrants. However, there are a few estimations about their size: We know that, for instance, in 2009 10% of the 1.65 million Turkish citizens in Germany hold an academic degree and about 15% were mid- and high-level employees, see, Yaşar Aydın, “Der Diskurs um die Abwanderung Hochqualifizierter türkischer Herkunft in die Türkei”; Yaşar Aydın, “Rückkehrer oder Transmigranten? Erste Ergebnisse einer empirischen Analyse zur Lebenswelt der Deutsch-Türken in Istanbul”, in Şeyda Ozil, Michael Hoffmann and Yasemin Dayıoğlu (eds.), *50 Jahre türkische Arbeitsmigration*, Göttingen, V&R Unipress, 2011, p. 63. Accordingly we may assume that 10-15% of German-Turks who leave Germany for Turkey are highly educated. Apart from that, we know from the German statistics that in the last few years 30,000 Turkish and about 4,000 German citizens leave for Turkey annually. According to this, we can estimate around 5,000 highly-skilled German-Turks migrating to Turkey every year. However, we also know from the relevant literature that highly-educated people are more likely to migrate due to their better job opportunities in the global labour market and their higher developed transnational social capital. In addition, we know that many German-Turks don’t officially de-register in Germany for various reasons. This is one reason why Turkish statistics indicate about 73,000 people from Germany who settled in Turkey in 2000. Due to all these factors we may assume that the number of highly-qualified German-Turks coming to Turkey every year is even much higher. See, Barbara Pusch and Yaşar Aydın,


45 Another task of the DPT was the collection of data, support of research, development and control of political strategies with regard to issues at the macro level such as demography, wages and investments of migrant workers; Erder and Yükseker, “Die türkische Migration nach Westeuropa und die Migrationsstudien in der Türkei”, p. 53. For an overview on Turkish migration in Turkish publications until 1984, most of which is research by state authorities, see, Nermin Abadan-Unat and Neşe Kemiksiz (eds.), *Türk dış göçü: 1960-1984. Yorumlu Bibliyografya*, Bonn, Türkiye Araştırmaaları Merkez, 1986.
The political basis for the beginning of this out migration was the fundamental right of freedom to travel for Turkish citizens, established in the constitution of 1961, which at the same time implied a beginning opening of the Turkish society; Nermin Abadan-Unat, *Bitmeyen Göç*, Konuk İşçilikten Ulus-Ötesi Yurtaşlığa, Istanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, p. 53 and 58; Erder and Yükseker, “Die türkische Migration nach Westeuropa und die Migrationsstudien in der Türkei”, p. 52.

Abadan-Unat et al., *Migration and Development*, p. 28. For example, in a conference of experts on “guest workers” in Nuremberg in 1974 with regard to economic aspects, the contributions from the Turkish perspective referred to Turkish out migration as rather positive for the above mentioned reasons. See the two contributions by Emin Atalay and Ekmed Zadil, in Walter Althammer (ed.), *Das Gastarbeiterproblem. Rotation? Integration? Arbeitsplatzverlagerung? Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Türkei*. Ergebnisse einer Fachtagung, München, Selbstverlag der Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1974, pp. 135-149.


Erder and Yükseker, “Die türkische Migration nach Westeuropa und die Migrationsstudien in der Türkei”, p. 59; Kaya and Adaman, “The Impact of Turkish-Origin Returnees/Transmigrants on Turkish Society”, p. 46.


Abadan-Unat et al., *Migration and Development*, p. 54.

The economic dimension of and assumed socioeconomic development by (return) migration has also been a shared interest in international migration research at that time, see, Russell King (ed.), *Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems*, London, Croom Helm, 1986; Philip L. Martin, *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe with Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany*, Genf, International Labour Office, 1991.


Atalay, “Gastarbeit und Industrieplanung”, p. 140; Akçaylı, “Die türkischen Rückkehrer und ihre Chancen in den Türkei-Auswirkungen des Rückkehrförderungsgesetzes aus türkischer Sicht”, p. 35. On the contrary, the German industry capitalised on these cooperatives through an export of its machines to Turkey, see, Şen, *Türkische Arbeiteinnehmergesellschaften*, p. 52.


See the following statements by Turkish representatives: “Of course our citizens cannot stay abroad forever”, Zadil, “Wiedereingliederungsprobleme in der Türkei”, p. 146; “The guest worker must know that he must return when his time comes”. Fevzi Aksoy, “Die Anpassungsschwierigkeiten eines Gastarbeiters”, p. 154.


This term has also been used by Turkish state representatives in the context of the current “binding” policy until today.

In 1974, Fevzi Aksoy, chief physician of the city neurology clinic in Istanbul, who referred to psychological adaptation problems of the “guest workers”, and thus he argued for an opening of cultural sites in the host country by the “home government” in order not to lose their interest in their “homeland”, see, Aksoy, “Die Anpassungsschwierigkeiten eines Gastarbeiters”, p. 154.

This even went as far as referring to a worker’s stay abroad as fulfilling a “mission” to his homeland in the host country, i.e. contributing to the development of his “homeland” with his new knowledge and skills, see, Ibid.
Erder and Yükseker, “Die türkische Migration nach Westeuropa und die Migrationsstudien in der Türkei”, p. 51. This view corresponds with the German perspective which did not consider them as “immigrants” either until recently. It also shows how the so-called “myth of return” was kept alive by the Turkish state as much as by the German state, see, Pöschl and Schmuck, Die Rückkehr – Ende einer Illusion.


Abadan-Unat et al., Migration and Development, p. 98.

Ibid., pp. 41-42.

Institut für Empirische Psychologie, Leitfäden für die Beratung türkischer Asylbewerber zur Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft, Köln, Selbstverlag, 1981.


This surprises as the increasing out migration of (highly-skilled) people of Turkish origin from Germany since 2006 has been widely discussed in German media.

Ahmet İçduyuğ, “International Migrant Remittances in Turkey”, *CARIM Research Reports*, No. 7, European University Institute, Florence, 2006. On the contrary, while remittances from Germany to Turkey dropped even further in recent years, an opposite pattern of increasing money transfers from Turkey to Germany has emerged since 2009, due to economic growth and the increasing number of Almancı in Turkey who send money back to their families in Germany. For further information on this issue, see, Seçil Elitok, “Remittance Flows between Germany and Turkey: A Reverse Trend?”, *IPC-Mercator Policy Brief* (August 2013), at http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Remittance-Flows-Between-Germany-and-Turkey.pdf [last visited 10 September 2013].

For example, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) has launched various scholarship programmes under the name “Target Turkey” to attract Turkish-origin researchers and doctoral candidates to come to Turkey. TÜBİTAK also uses the Framework Programs of the European Commission and the Marie Curie Programmes to attract Turkish-origin scholars from Europe. In addition, the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA) as well as the Higher Education Council of Turkey (YÖK) have also become active in planning to attract researchers and graduates of Turkish origin. Kaya and Adaman, “Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe”, p. 28.


Exceptional in this context are the scholarships and programmes to attract researchers and students of Turkish origin to come to Turkey. According to Kaya and Adaman, the YT Bülbül, for example, to increase the contingent reserved for successful Turkish-origin students to enrol in Turkish universities, see, Kaya and Adaman, “Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe”, p. 28.


Major fields of activity include education, health, water and water hygiene, administrative and civil infrastructure, other social infrastructure and services, see TIKA’s official website,


89 According to TİKA’s website, the number of coordination offices increased from 12 in 2002 to 25 in 2011 and 33 in 2012; ibid. We counted 28 countries with TİKA Coordination Offices on the official website: Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Palestine, Georgia, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Egypt, Mongolia, Moldova, Niger, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Syria, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Yemen, Official website, Coordination Offices, at http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/coordination-offices/3 [last visited 14 September 2013].

90 Bilgili and Siegel, “Understanding the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora”, p. 11.

91 “Yunus Emre Institutes to Introduce Turkish Culture”, Today’s Zaman, 4 July 2007.

92 Hayati Develi, chairman of the YEE, in his discussion of Klaus Kreiser’s presentation “From the House of Friendship to Yunus Emre. A Century of German-Turkish Cultural Relations” at the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) on 4 September 2013.


94 For an overview on the ministries and governmental organizations involved in migration issues, see, Bilgili and Siegel, “Understanding the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora”.

95 The basis of the YTB is the Law No. 485 on the Organisation and Duties of the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun), at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem23/yil01/ss485.pdf [last visited 10 September 2013].


97 On the Presidency’s homepage, “related communities” are defined as societies “in different geographies with whom we share a common culture and feeling”. This is a rather vague definition and is thus open to various interpretations. Gürsel Dönmez, the vice chairman of the YTB, stated three strands in this context: Turkic peoples, Muslim societies and “in-law” societies such as Germany and the Ukraine, due to the rising number of intercultural marriages (personal interview with Gürsel Dönmez, the vice chairman of the YTB, Barbara Pusch, Ankara, 28 August 2013). While the first two can be seen in the vein of neo-Ottoman and Turco-Islamic discourse of the current government, the third strand implies the possibility to attach new relatives.

98 For further analysis, see, Çağlayan Çetin, Turkey’s Identity Question in European Union Accession Process, unpublished master thesis, Istanbul Bilgi University, 2011.

99 Kemal Yurttaç, “Turkey’s New Horizon: Turks Abroad and Related Communities”, SAM Papers, No. 3 (October 2012).
100 See, for instance, the flash news on the nullification/abolishment of the headscarf ban in Swiss schools, at http://www.ytb.gov.tr/index.php/yurtdisi-vatandaslar/947-2013071201.html. [last visited 10 November 2013].

101 For this, see the scholarships for Turkish students abroad, at http://www.ytb.gov.tr/index.php/yurtdisinda-burs-imkanlari.html, and the scholarships for international students in Turkey, at http://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/, that were announced on the Presidency’s website.

102 Law Nr. 6304 gives Turkish citizens the right to vote in embassies and consulate generals abroad. Until 2012 this was not possible.

103 Most scholarships were received by students from the Turkic states in Central Asia, followed by students from Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans, see, Aydın Albayrak, “Turkey Works to Transform Overseas Turks into Diaspora”, Today’s Zaman, 30 April 2013. These regions can also be seen in line, at least in part, with the “related communities”.

104 According to the published financial plan of the YTB in 2013, project proposals can be submitted in the following categories: vocational and academic counselling for international students, education of “our citizens” abroad, expansion of NGOs and not specified “direct projects”. In general, projects that strengthen the cultural and social binding to Turkey, support Turkish families abroad, cultural exchange “or similar activities” are to be financially supported by the YTB, see, “Finanzielle Unterstützung für türkische Familien”, at http://www.sabah.de/de/finanzielle-unterstutzung-fur-turkische-familien.html [last visited 9 September 2013].

105 See, Yurtnaç, “Turkey’s New Horizon: Turks Abroad and Related Communities”.

106 However, as it is not possible for any institution to support all submitted projects and as we do not have a list of supported projects and NGOs, the question of who and what is supported cannot be answered within this article. Nevertheless it seems to be important to note that a lot of critical assumptions circulate in the press. According to German newspaper reports, for example, the YTB organised the speech of the Turkish Prime Minister in Düsseldorf 2011 (see, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/rede-in-duesseldorf-erdogan-warnt-vor-auslaenderfeindlichkeit/3889364.html; http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/erdogan-in-deutschland-ihr-seid-meine-geschwister-fotostrecke-65145-7.html). Other reports, however, mention the “AKP lobby organisation” Union of European Turkish Democrats (Avrupali Türk Demokratlar Birliği, UETD), which is said to have contributed to the foundation of the BIG party in Berlin, as being responsible for the event (see http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/migrantenpartei-big-erdogans-berliner-lobby-truppe-a-786207.html). As an analysis of the YTB’s relations to other state and non-governmental organisations would go beyond the scope of this article, we would just like to point to certain topics the YTB suggested for project proposals of NGOs in general; teaching the Turkish language, encouraging political participation and defending “against the violation of human rights and identity”, see, Albayrak, “Turkey Works to Transform Overseas Turks into Diaspora”. These preferred topics - language, politics and identity - can also be seen in line with the overall binding policy of Turkey’s current government.

107 Personal interview with Gürsel Dönmez, the vice chairman of the YTB, Barbara Pusch, Ankara, 28 August 2013.
In order to reach this goal, a first general assembly of Turks abroad was held in Turkey in 2010 as well as further smaller meetings with diaspora representatives organised by the YTB in recent years. See, Albayrak, “Turkey Works to Transform Overseas Turks into Diaspora”.


The former minister of culture and tourism, Ertuğrul Günay, calls for instance the Yunus Emre Cultural Centres the “pillar of foreign policy”, and Ahmet Davutoğlu notes, “Foreign policy is not only carried out solely with diplomacy but also with cultural, economic and trade networks”, cited in ibid., p. 57. This understanding of culture as a dimension of foreign policy in Turkey as well as its continuities from the beginning of the Republic were outlined by Klaus Kreiser in his presentation “From the House of Friendship to Yunus Emre. A Century of German-Turkish Cultural Relations” at the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) on 4 September 2013.

Personal interview with Gürsel Dönmez, the vice chairman of the YTB, Barbara Pusch, Ankara, 28 August 2013.


This is also reflected in the YTB’s focus on international students in Turkey and cultural exchange.

Yurtnaç, “Turkey’s New Horizon: Turks Abroad and Related Communities”, p. 4.

Personal interview with Bilge Aydın, an assistant expert at the YTB, Barbara Pusch, Ankara, 28 August 2013.


Poland, India and Mexico provide similar identity cards for their former citizens.


Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Migrationsbericht 2011.

These numbers were mentioned by Kemal Yurtnaç in a press interview. See, “Blue Card to grant Turkish Germans special privileges in Turkey”, Today’s Zaman, 12 October 2011.

125 According to this survey, 41% of the sample of former Turkish citizens in Germany obtained a Blue Card, see: http://www.stark-fuer-erfolg.de/sites/www.stark-fuer-erfolg.de/files/user/downloads/Deutsch-Tuerkische_Werte-_Lebenswelten_2012-1.pdf [last visited 3 September 2013]. Moreover, the number of naturalisations of Turkish citizens in Germany increased by 18.3% to 33,246 persons in 2012; Ulrike Pape, “Deutschland: Zahl der Einbuergerungen gestiegen”, in Netzwerk Migration in Europa e.V., Newsletter Migration und Bevoelkerung, No. 7 (September 2013), pp. 4-5. Whether this is related to the Blue Card and its latest legal changes in 2012 or just reflects the general trend of increasing numbers of naturalisations in Germany since 2008, is an interesting question for further research.

126 Personal interview with Barbara Pusch, Ankara, 28 August 2013.

127 Personal interview with Gurses Dönmaz, the vice chairman of the YTB, Barbara Pusch, 28 August 2013, Ankara. See also, Albayrak, “Turkey Works to Transform Overseas Turks into Diaspora”.

128 For a comprehensive overview on the social and political backgrounds of the Pink Card initiative as well as the debate on double citizenship in Germany including its exceptions see, Çağlar, “Citizenship Light”; Kadirbeyoğlu, “Changing Conceptions of Citizenship in Turkey”. For political and public opinions towards the Blue Card, which refer to it, for example, as an interesting approach, a “dual citizenship light” or a part of the JDP’s election tactics, see also several German newspaper reports; Felix Dachsel, “Glücklich, wer ein Türke ist?”, Zeit, 3 March 2011; “Integrationsdebatte: Polenz pflichtet Erdogans umstrittenen Appellen bei”, Spiegel, 1 March 2011; “Erdogan stärkt Auslandstürken”, Fazjob.net, at http://fazjob.net/ratgeber-und-service/karriere-im-ausland/faz-archiv/120228_Erdoganstaerkt-Auslandstuerken.html [last visited 26 August 2013]; “Interesse am Doppelpass light”, TAZ, at http://www.taz.de/!66665/ [last visited 26 August 2013].


130 This is even stated in the preamble of the Law No. 4112 of 7 June 1995. The then Turkish government felt responsible to mitigate the effects of naturalisation in the countries of destination and denaturalisation in Turkey respectively. For this, two reasons are of crucial importance: Firstly, the lawgiver wanted to promote the social, cultural, political and economic integration and consolidation of their citizens by encouraging naturalisation in the countries of destination and secondly, the lawmaker did not want to lose the juridical, social, cultural and economic binding of “their citizens” to Turkey. In this context it has to be underlined that the term vatandaşlarımız (“our citizens”) introduced in section 2 has been used frequently in this context by various political representatives and groups over the last decades. For this, see for instance the opening speech of Suleyman Demirel in Berlin in 1997 cited in Çağlar, “Citizenship light”, and the wording of Kemal Yurtmaz in various interviews “Blue Card to Grant Turkish Germans Special Privileges in Turkey”; Kılıç, “Relinquishing Turkish Citizenship Won’t Affect Rights in Turkey”.

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132 The law is available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5203.html [last visited 3 September 2013].
133 The law is available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6304.html [last visited 3 September 2013].
135 See, for example, the discussions started by Mavi Kart holders in the Facebook group “Rückkehrerstammtisch”, at www.facebook.com [last visited 16 July 2013].
137 Kılıç, “Relinquishing Turkish Citizenship Won’t Affect Rights in Turkey”.
138 “Blue Card’ to Grant Turkish Germans Special Privileges in Turkey.”
139 Ibid.
140 While Turkish citizens living abroad are able to apply for a Turkish pension, Blue Card holders is not given this right yet, see, http://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/ali-tezel-1016/786619-gurbetci-in-borclanma-ile-emeklilik-hakki-bitiyor [last visited 3 September 2013].
141 This was clearly stated by E. Elif Gönüllü and İbrahim Demiryürek during the personal interview with Barbara Pusch, Ankara, 28 August 2013.