

## ARTICLE

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# Grand Strategizing in and for Turkish Foreign Policy: Lessons Learned from History, Geography and Practice

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### Abstract

*Although there is no commonly agreed upon definition of grand strategy in the literature, most analyses of the concept include efforts of states to develop long-term plans, programs and policies to achieve their national interests, utilizing the nation's resources and tools, including their economic, political, military, psychological and moral resources. Turkey has experience in developing a grand strategy in this context, albeit without specifically referring to the exercise as such. This paper looks at the expertise and historical precursors of Turkey's grand strategy experience to identify indicators for its future grand strategizing efforts. In this context, balancing major powers, the primacy of geography, economic development, Western connection, the impact of the international system, a sense of greatness and a wish for regional supremacy are identified as inputs of Turkey's past grand strategies. Moving from these bases, particulars of what could be identified as an "internationalist" grand strategy alternative for Turkey is offered.*

### Keywords

Grand strategy, Turkish foreign policy, Turkish grand strategy, geopolitics, international system, power, regional supremacy.

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## Introduction: Grand Strategy in General

The popularity of grand strategy literature has increased since the end of the Cold War as many decision makers started to look for the next “long telegram” by X.<sup>1</sup> Although most academicians and policy makers seem to have lost their ability to look beyond the “containment policy” of the U.S. during the Cold War as a model for grand strategy, journalists and policy commentators all over the world love to articulate grandiose policy options almost daily, such that most people confuse them with grand strategy. Nevertheless, while not usually referred to as such in official policy documents until recently, grand strategy terminology has existed in academic writing since the 1920s.

One of the problem with the grand strategy literature is that it includes a plethora of definitions and addresses diverse aspects of political life. In general, grand strategy could be described as “the highest level of... statecraft that establishes how states... prioritize and mobilize [their] military, diplomatic, political, economic, and other sources of power to ensure what they perceive as their national interests.”<sup>2</sup> The “grand” in the concept do not mean to be “grandiose” or “ambitious,” but rather denotes an encompassing effort to manage of all a state’s resources “for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term interests.”<sup>3</sup> As most of the literature links up with scientific realism and at least implicitly refers to a reality “that exists independently of the mind of the observer,”<sup>4</sup> grand strategic analyses are in general based on the unit (i.e. the state) level rather than individual or the system.

Although the originator of the concept, Liddell Hart, used the term “higher strategy” instead of grand strategy and described something closer to the narrower notion of military strategy,<sup>5</sup> the grand strategy concept as we use it today refers to a “national strategy” beyond war that aims at utilizing all of the political, economic, diplomatic, psychological and military resources of a state to achieve its national interests/goals.<sup>6</sup> In this sense, Gaddis’s definition of grand strategy as “the calculated relationship of means to large ends” seems more apt for our purposes in this paper.<sup>7</sup>


If we accept Clausewitz’s famous dictum of war as “the continuation of politics by other means,”<sup>8</sup> then war becomes a function of a much wider concept of politics. Even Hart goes beyond the simple conduct of war when he advises students of strategy that grand strategy “should both calculate and develop the military, economic, and moral resources of the nation,” regulating “the distribution of power... between the military and industry” and should apply “financial, diplomatic, commercial, and ethical pressure to weaken opponents’ will.”<sup>9</sup> In any case, the range of instruments modern states employ in pursuing their national interests are extensive and, in addition to military force, “include alliance building, diplomacy, economic policy, financial incentives, intelligence, public diplomacy, and the mobilization of the nation’s political will.”<sup>10</sup>

Grand strategy obviously refers to something larger than “policy,” which is normally directed to a specific and narrow end, or “foreign policy,” which more generally insinuates the end result of a collection of individual policies that may or may not aim at a coherent result. The difference between “strategy” and grand strategy on the other hand is essentially one of scale and the vantage point from which we look at issues. Grand strategy is much more general, deals with greater problems, aims wider and usually extends beyond the foreseeable future.

According to Silove, grand strategy has three separate meanings: A deliberate, detailed plan; An organizing principle, used to guide policy actions; A pattern in state behavior.<sup>11</sup> Silove refers to “grand plans, grand principles, grand behavior” without linking them or creating a hierarchy among them. Nevertheless, the following linkage could be offered:

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**Figure 1:** Grand Strategic Stages and Linkages Between Them



Grand strategy as a plan, following the Clausewitz-Hart-Kennedy tradition, is a detailed, deliberate and well-thought-out written plan. Examples include the *U.S. National Security Strategy Document*, prepared by the National Security Council of the U.S. on the bases of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which requires the document to “address US interests, goals, and objectives; the policies, worldwide commitments, and capabilities required to meet those objectives; and the use of elements of national power to achieve those goals.”<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Russia’s *National Security Strategy Act*, regularly released by the Presidential Office, defines “the Russian Federation’s national interests and strategic national priorities, objectives, tasks, and measures in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy aimed at strengthening the Russian Federation’s national interests.” Turkey’s equivalent document is called the *National Security Policy Document*, which is prepared by the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* or MGK) every five years and revised when necessary. Although it is a secret document and thus its details are not known, there have been various leaks over the years, and its legal framework requires it to identify security threats Turkey is facing and provide policy recommendations to governments.<sup>13</sup>

Grand strategy as an organizing principle means “an organizing or overarching principle or set of principles,” but no detailed blueprint (in terms of a written plan) on how to achieve them is necessary. It could be defined as “overarching guide, a framework, set of ideas or all-encompassing foreign policy doctrines.”<sup>14</sup> Examples include the “containment strategy” of the U.S. that guided most of its foreign policy during the Cold War and to which almost all of its leaders have expressly subscribed.

Grand strategy as a pattern of behavior also does not necessarily need to be attached to an existing plan or even an organizing principle, but may be a pattern that emerges “as consistency in behavior” over time. This is more in line with Luttwak’s assertion that “patterns emerge as a result of strategic cultures.”<sup>15</sup> Obviously, many issues impact the emergence of a country’s strategic culture, including its “geography, climate, natural resources, history, political structure, defense organization, myths, key texts, transnational norms, generational change, and technology,”<sup>16</sup> as well as “an integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs.”<sup>17</sup> Examples include Turkey’s “Western-leaning” foreign policy during much of the Cold War as a result of the ideational linkages of its leadership, systemic influences and regional security evaluations.

There is of course no requirement that any country’s grand strategy has to be defined in terms of one of the above-mentioned alternatives. A grand strategy could very well be stimulated and shaped by any combination of the three, such as the overall U.S. early Cold War grand strategy as a combination of a grand principle (containment), a grand plan (NSC-68) and a grand behavior (Korean War, etc.).<sup>18</sup> In any case, the characteristics of a grand strategy, according to Silove, are its “long-term approach,” its “holistic methodology” covering all areas of statesmanship, i.e. military, diplomatic and economic, and its “concern with state’s priorities,” thus its hierarchy of interests in terms of value and preferences.<sup>19</sup> In this sense, the main aims of a grand strategy for any state under normal circumstances, in order of importance, appear to be survival, sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, relative power position in the world, economic development, etc. There is of course no scientific yardstick to judge a grand strategy’s success except that it maintains a country’s existence and possibly its relative power position within the international system.

Inherent in most of the definitions is that “the roots of grand strategy formulation are deeper than [the] calculations of contemporary policymakers.”<sup>20</sup> Thus, it could refer to a set of ideas rather than a written document, a clearly articulated principle, or even a clear pattern observable in longer periods, that nevertheless guides the actions of a country’s leadership. Thus, Luttwak’s assertion that “all states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not”<sup>21</sup> becomes important, as it refers to grand strategy as something beyond the ar-

tulations of any decision maker. The study of grand strategy in the Luttwak tradition will thus include looking at its sources and evolution, not only the end result.

Grand strategy from this perspective is something that develops over the course of a state's existence, yet is not necessarily formulated by a particular leadership at any given time. Although Luttwak accepts that grand strategy is the "employment of the state's resources, including military strength, diplomacy, and intelligence," the relative importance of these and the ability of leaders to utilize them at any given time change and are usually constrained by such factors as the geography of the state, the history of the nation, the ideational connections of the leadership, the distribution of power in the international system and among the regional powers, etc. As Luttwak aptly puts it, "grand strategy is simply the level at which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern terms intelligence and diplomacy interact with military strength to determine outcomes in a world of other states with their own grand strategies."<sup>22</sup>

Finally, we should be reminded that grand strategy does not amount to a "wish list" of the leaders of a country, which cannot be expected to be realized within reason. Although the literature on grand strategy does not prescribe that grand strategies have to be successful in their execution in order to be classified as a "grand strategy," nevertheless, as Holmes relays from the Greek storyteller Aesop, "it is easy to propose impossible remedies."<sup>23</sup> Hence, while defining grand strategy as "the art of combining diplomatic, cultural, economic, and military tools of influence to [successfully] accomplish national goals broadly construed,"<sup>24</sup> any attempt at grand strategizing should at least attempt at a modicum of reality, reasonability, and possibility. After all, if it is not the "art of the possible," it will then be the subject of fictional literature rather than strategic studies or international relations.

## Grand Strategizing in Turkey

Although most of the activities of states in the international arena consist of day-to-day reactions to other countries' moves, states also try to implement coherent and unified long-term strategies to achieve their national interests. While some countries publish or declare their national strategies openly, most of them either avoid it as a principle or just simply do not do it. Nevertheless, through actions and statements made by decision makers, it is possible to discern the various strategies of any country in its foreign policy.

Foreign policy strategies or doctrines of countries normally reflect the perceptions of decision makers about international and domestic developments, their views on their country's place in the world, a summary of what is perceived as the national interests of the country and the ways to achieve them—thus an attempt at grand strategizing. These strategies could either be elaborate analyses with supporting expert opinions, or short explanations of the

views of decision makers in either oral or written format. What is important is that they reflect the contemporary understanding of a given country of its international relations, inform practitioners and observers about its priorities, and determines the general context of day-to-day diplomacy.

Turkey has never published a full-scale official grand strategy or doctrine paper in the academic sense of the concept, although various versions of the unpublished and secret *National Security Policy Document* contain indications of such a strategy. Similarly, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense do not have traditions of sharing their policy directions and, more importantly, their overall policy frameworks with the public, though the latter used to publish a “white book” dealing with the country’s security and military strategies.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, as Turkey

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on occasion in the past had ministers with less than three months in office, it has been difficult for some of them and even sometimes for governments as a whole to articulate their different policy visions before they were ousted. Even with the longer serving ministers, prime ministers or presidents, it has not been a regular Turkish state practice to prepare or declare doctrines/strategies beforehand in the fields of foreign and security policy.

Although these practices make it difficult to determine and/or denote Turkey’s various strategies or doctrines in its international relations, it is possible with a certain simplification and academic largesse to identify certain stratagems, schemes, tactics, policies and in a more general sense the grand strategies of various governments and/or ministers from their statements, actions and academic analyses.

In this context, Turkey, at least since it created the *National Security Council* in 1933, has had a tradition and experience of producing and revising a “National Security Policy Document” (NSPD) that contains an analysis of the internal and external threats facing the country, as well as the general principles for the country’s foreign and security policies, and an attached “National Security Strategy Paper” that outlines available resources, possible strategies and implementation guidelines. Although the NSPD is a secret document and occasional leaks do not provide us enough material to assess its details, it is quite clear that it represents a “grand strategy as a plan” per Silove’s categorization.

One could safely assume that it consists of such details, at least in its “strategy” attachment, as to which national resources should be utilized in what ways to achieve the country’s national interests as they are perceived-by the government and/or the bureaucratic mechanism that prepared it-at the time

of its preparation. It is again safe to assume that the institutions that prepare such a document would follow up with implementation processes. In any case, since it is entrusted to the governments to implement the recommendations of the NSPD after its adaptation by the National Security Council, which is chaired by the President of the country and made up of government ministers and other state officers,<sup>26</sup> we can safely assume that most of its policy recommendations have been followed through on. Whether the elected governments were pressured by appointed bureaucrats (civil and military) over the years to adopt their versions of the NSPD and have sometimes ignored its premises does not detract from the importance of the existence of such a document. Although it is very difficult to assess the validity of such arguments until various versions of the NSPD are published and researchers get a chance to compare their guidance with the actual policy implementations of various governments, it would still be safe to assume that there has been a wider consensus over the diverse components of Turkish national interests among the political and bureaucratic elites until very recently, and that most of the prescriptions of the NSPD reflected this.

Moreover, the fact that the NSPD has been revised several times over the years does not disqualify it as a “grand strategy document,” since we cannot think of “un-changeability” as a character of a grand strategy document that is supposed to relate to changing circumstances. Also, we should not be deterred by public discussions over the years regarding its “value,” “quality” or “success” when determining whether the NSPD denotes grand strategizing, since none of these features are necessary components of a grand strategy.<sup>27</sup>

In terms of “grand strategy as an organizing principle,” certain alternatives qualify for grand strategy in Silove’s characterization. Prime among them is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s dictum of “peace at home, peace in the world,”<sup>28</sup> recognizing the vital connection between the two and the fact that steady international relations were needed for the internal stability necessary for the planned domestic reforms and economic development of the country after the devastation of the earlier war years.<sup>29</sup> Although most of the governments since then have announced their adherence to the principle and have frequently repeated it, its main usage as a doctrine should properly be situated in the interwar period (1919-1939).

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The impact of Atatürk’s historical legacy on the governing elite of the Republic, though inevitably varied over time, cannot be denied. As such, his political preferences, representing a break with the past and his renunciation of the three grand ideas of the Ottoman Empire (namely, Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism) with principles of Republicanism, Secularism and

Nationalism, respectively, have had important implications for the ideational ecosystem of Turkish decision makers for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>30</sup> The fact that his ideas have been re-invented and/or re-imagined several times, have been partly discarded along the way and have even at times been fervently opposed, do not diminish their importance for modern Turkish political culture. As such, any attempt to design a grand strategy for Turkey should reassess their current value and meaning for the majority of the country and its decision makers.

A more recent example in this milieu would be the “zero problems with neighbors” principle of former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, whose thinking has influenced the strategizing of Turkey’s international relations in the last 20 years.<sup>31</sup> Although his roles in the government ended in May 2016 and his “zero problems” principle was set aside in favor of an “order builder” model in Turkey’s neighborhood even before that,<sup>32</sup> it is arguable that the imagination of Turkey at the center of a new world order in its neighborhood, either by means of soft power, i.e. “zero problems,” or hard power, i.e. “order builder,” still affects Turkey’s foreign and security policy thinking.

Finally, regarding “grand strategy as pattern of behavior,” several of the Republic of Turkey’s patterns of conduct have already achieved such consistency over the years and survived several government changes that they would by now be qualified as parts of a grand strategy. The emergence of some of these patterns even predates the establishment of the Republic, such as balancing off of the major powers in international affairs and benefitting from the competition among them, and pragmatism based on realism. To these one can add multi-dimensionality in international relations, Westernism (*Batıcılık*), especially during the early Cold War period, and the region-based foreign policy of later years, especially the 1970s, 1990s and 2000s.

## Historical Precursors for Turkey’s Future Grand Strategy

### *Balancing Major Powers in International Relations*

Until the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, the foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of modern Turkey, were characterized by a military-offensive approach.<sup>33</sup> When the Empire started to crumble, its main policy line became the preservation of the *status quo* by playing dominant powers against each other, aiming to slow down the loss of territory.<sup>34</sup> The unavoidable decline of the Empire and its weaker position vis-à-vis the greater powers of the time, made the concept of “balancing” and its corollary, “playing one power against another,” indispensable components of its strategic behavior, which were inherited by Turkey.<sup>35</sup>

The very pragmatic approach taken during most of the Ottoman Empire's existence in its last 100 years or so required a realistic reading of international developments, the intentions of various countries and their abilities. As students of this remarkable maneuvering, the founding leaders of the Republic were apt to adopt a similar approach, which over the years became one of the longest-serving Turkish strategies. As such, it should still be considered as one of the cornerstones of any Turkish grand strategy of today and for the future.

Several examples from the Turkish War of Independence, the Second World War, the Cold War period and recent years could easily be listed for this pattern of behavior. For example, the power distribution among the different actors and their rapidly differing outlooks in international relations during the interwar period (1919-1939) perfectly allowed the usage of such tactics.

Thus, Turkey instrumentalized both the rivalries among the Allied Powers-splitting France and Italy from Britain-and the differences between them and the Soviet Union. Playing Allied Powers one against another allowed Turkey, after the evacuation of the Italians from Antalya and the French from Adana Vilayet and Aintab Sanjak on October 20, 1921, to concentrate on the Greek forces in the West, the only remaining ally of Great Britain still on the war-path.

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Similarly, the support the Ankara Government received from the Soviet Union in terms of arms and financial assistance was another balancing factor against the occupying forces. As the Soviet Union became the first state to recognize the National Pact and the Ankara Government in March 1921, the relationship and its balancing component continued until the end of WWII. It also made a comeback in the late 1960s after a period of Western-dependency in foreign policy, and in the 2010s following changes in the international system.

Similarly, Turkey played to the fears of the *status quo* powers, i.e. the UK and France, from the revisionism of Germany and Italy from the mid-1930s on. One of the successful foreign policy move of this period, i.e. the annexation of Alexandretta (Hatay) province in 1939, was the result of such a policy. During the 1930s and later in WWII, Turkey played not only two but three groups of states to each other: (1) Britain and France (and later the U.S.), (2) Germany and Italy and (3) the USSR. As a small power with a weak economy and military, Turkey had to establish a balanced relationship between them. While Turkey's priority at this time was to establish good relations with the first group, its policy toward the second group was mainly to keep its distance in order to protect the country from their possible expansionist policies, and its friendship and close relations with the USSR was utilized as a counterweight to both the first and second groups.

During most of the Cold War, with the exception of the Western-dependency period during the 1950s, Turkey still played to the differences between the Western and Eastern Blocs and benefited from their global competition. As a result, while receiving 3,256 million USD worth of military and economic aid from the U.S. between 1947 and 1961, Turkey also became one of the biggest recipients of the Soviet economic and development aid program in the world outside the Eastern Bloc countries during the Cold War.<sup>36</sup> A similar balancing attempt has taken place since the early 2000s, as Turkey's policy vis-a-vis the Russian Federation has evolved from that of competition during the 1990s in Eurasia to cooperative engagement in the 2000s.<sup>37</sup> As Turkey moved toward a more region-centered and active foreign policy, Russia's countering effect against the weight of the U.S., especially in the Middle Eastern and the wider Black Sea context, has become more important.

### *The Primacy of Geography*

Although Turkey has undergone profound changes since the 1920s, the strategic value of its location has not changed much, even if its relative importance to other states has varied over time. With the location come diverse threats to the country's security, leading to *Sèvres-phobia*, a fear that the "external world and their internal collaborators are [continuously] trying to weaken and divide Turkey."<sup>38</sup> As a result, Turkey's policy making is influenced by the public perception that the international arena remains hostile, that foreign countries, including Turkey's allies, continue to threaten Turkey and that it needs to stand alone rather than joining with other countries.<sup>39</sup>

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Turkey, thanks to its geo-strategic location, has been able to play a larger role in world politics than its size, population, economic strength and military power would indicate.<sup>40</sup> It is historically located on one of the most coveted pieces of territory on the globe—one that controls major routes between the economically developed lands of Europe and the energy-rich lands of the Middle East and the Caspian Basin. This particular ge-

ography, branding Turkey as a Balkan, Mediterranean, Eurasian and Middle Eastern country all at the same time, also makes it susceptible to changes in its neighborhood. The strategic position of the Anatolian peninsula and the possession of the Turkish Straits entails political and military advantages as well as major security concerns. Thus, while Turkey's multidimensional geography could be utilized for political and economic benefit, it could also become a source of weakness, given the number and configuration of its neighbors.

While controlling the only seaway linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, and thus the lifeline of the country situated on the northern shores of

the Black Sea, provided a resource for the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey that could not be duplicated in manpower, it has also brought both states into constant conflict with the Russians since the 17<sup>th</sup> century. While the historic hostility between the Russians and the Turks has been at the heart of Turkish-Soviet relations for many years, having a superpower neighbor has also had its effects on Turkish foreign policy. It was the Soviets' refusal to extend the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality in March 1945 that pushed Turkey to seek protection from the emerging Western alliance. This historical legacy of confrontation turned into a competition after the end of the Cold War that was managed with some tension during most of the 1990s. The dangers of competition and the possibility of facing the renewed Russian power on its northeastern border after 2008, as well as the benefits derived from enhanced economic and energy cooperation, induced Turkey to seek friendlier relations with its northern neighbor. The real effects of the current reality of dealing with Russia on two fronts (North and South) will need to be assessed in the longer term.

Similarly, most of the challenges Turkey is facing in its neighborhood, such as civil wars in Iraq and Syria, a divided Cyprus, dissonance with the Armenians, inability to reconcile with the Kurds and opposition by some EU countries to Turkey's full membership, are all products of the country's long-term historical existence in this geography. Many of Turkey's current disputes with its neighbors can be traced back to the Ottoman centuries. In fact, some of Turkey's contemporary relations, such as its convoluted relationship with Greece or its "competitive cooperation" with Russia, can only be explained with references to history and geography.

The fact that Turkey's neighborhood has witnessed several conflicts in recent decades (the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988, the Gulf War of 1990-91, the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the ensuing civil war, the Syrian civil war since 2011 and the rise and fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (DAESH) in the Middle East, the Nagorno-Karabakh War and the internal Georgian conflicts in the Caucasus throughout the 1990s, as well as the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008 and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 in Eurasia, the wars of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s in Europe) and the fact that most of them attracted international involvement highlight the importance and the value of Turkey's geography. While Turkey managed to stay out of most of these conflicts, increased international interest in these conflicts and rising PKK terrorism as well as its regional connections have led to increased Turkish involvement in regional crises.

As the post-Cold War era opened up, Turkey found opportunities in its neighborhood as well as important security concerns. While the West in general enjoyed the peace dividend that the end of the Soviet threat delivered, Turkey found itself surrounded with traditional security challenges in terms of inter-

state warfare, civil wars and rising terrorism. These forced Turkey to continue to invest in its military and at the same time opt for new openings in its international relations, especially utilizing its historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic connections in its neighborhoods. Moreover, while the end of the Cold War signified a new beginning in international relations, it also indicated to Turkey that it could no longer follow its traditional Cold War policies. While the abandonment of the Communist regime and attempts to democratize Russia and other newly independent states improved the possibility of global cooperation transcending the enmities of the Cold War, the absence of clearly defined mechanisms for preventing regional conflicts, instability within the new states and tensions between them increased the risks of interstate clashes and civil wars around Turkey. As the end of the Cold War diminished the importance of East-West division, regional identities and concerns increased in importance in determining the course of international relations. At this juncture, Turkey appeared as a model to various regions, including Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, and its connection to these regions forced it to become more concerned with its neighborhoods and develop regional policies.

The dramatic changes in the international system thus challenged Turkey's traditional policy of isolating itself from regional politics and forced its active participation in regional issues. These changes also induced Turkey to reevaluate its geography and add regional components to its foreign policy, which necessitated a renewed emphasis on its multidimensional setting and its role in bridging different cultures and geographies. With this understanding of Turkey as a European, Eurasian and Middle Eastern country without relapsing to dichotomies, Turkey had to embrace its new positioning with multiple identities and historical assets. This reimagining of its geography should be one of the key elements in designing a grand strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> century Turkey.

### *Western Connection*

Though Turkish imperial history ended with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, and the Turkish Republic bore little resemblance to its forerunner, it was established in the heart of the Empire's geopolitical territory and retained most of its ruling elite with their top-down reform approach. As they carried out radical reforms to transform the country into a secular state, they also provided the basis of one of the fundamental features of Turkish foreign policy during most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, namely its Western orientation.<sup>41</sup>

At times, this went too far; the Westernism (*Batıcılık*) in Turkish foreign policy during the 1950s and early 1960s in later years resulted in Turkey's isolation from most of the world. An apt example of this policy is Turkey's involvement in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact of 1955, which did not add to Turkey's security after its membership in NATO in 1952, but was conceived as buttressing Western (the U.S.'s in this case) interests in the Middle

East. While Turkey's foreign policy has become more balanced since the mid-1960s, it nevertheless remained firmly within the Western camp during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, however, Turkey's foreign relations have been dominated by a search for alternative connections and attempts to widen its relations and outlook.

While Turkey benefitted from closer relations with the US in the immediate post-Cold War era, the U.S. insistence on playing a direct, ordering role in Turkey's neighborhood in the post 9/11 era, i.e. in the Caucasus, the Black Sea and especially the Levant, has resulted in divergences in interests and security perceptions.

Similarly, Turkey's European vocation in the 1990s and 2000s, accentuated with its full membership bid and subsequent negotiations, helped Turkey's democratic transition and created an accelerating impact on its regional standing and relationships. Though it came to a halt in recent years, this aspect of Turkey's European negotiation process should not be passed over in any attempt to develop a grand strategy. Simply put, Turkey without its European-and indeed Western-connections would just be another country in the Middle East. Similarly, Turkey's "value" to Europe and the West in general emerges, among other sources, from its significance in the Middle East and Eurasia.

### *Impact of the International System*

WWII was an important watershed for Turkey's foreign and security policies, as well as its domestic development. Although its political and economic alignment with the West after the war could be seen as a natural outcome of its desire to modernize (which at the time meant Westernization), its dependence on the West went too far, indicating a clear reversal from its earlier policies. While pre-war Turkey had adopted the institutions and the values of the West to accelerate modernization, this did not imply dependency on the West either militarily or economically. The tilt in the post-war years was very pronounced; the reason for this can be found in the changing international system.

As the international system rapidly evolved into a bipolar structure after 1945, it forced Turkey to choose a side, since "a policy of neutrality was not very realistic or possible for a country like Turkey, a middle-range power situated in such a geopolitically important area."<sup>42</sup> Moreover, while the Soviet Union emerged as one of the superpowers, "meeting the Soviet threat" became a priority for Turkish decision makers.<sup>43</sup> Turkey's move toward a multi-party system at the end of the war also contributed to its willingness to seek closer links with Western democracies.<sup>44</sup> Finally, the fact that the U.S. was the only country in the post-war world capable of lending money limited Turkey's choices for economic aid.<sup>45</sup>

The Cold War, while encouraging Turkey's dependency on the West, also sus-

tained unquestioning Western military, political, and economic support. So long as Turkey felt the Soviet threat and the U.S. was committed to its defense and economic development, there was no reason to question its dependency. However, as the 1960s saw a softening of inter-block tensions and the aid received from the U.S. started to decline, Turkey felt the need for a more complex and multidimensional configuration for its foreign policy. Moreover, the rising economic consciousness of the Global South introduced new actors to the world stage, such as the 'Group of 77' and the 'Non-Aligned Movement', which opened up new avenues for smaller members of the alliance systems to explore.

Following the changes in regional contexts during the 1990s, the international system has been moving from a bipolar world toward a multipolar system with a unipolar moment in between. Two major developments that occurred ten

years apart dramatically affected international politics: the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. and the Arab uprisings from 2011 onward. Largely due to these incidents, and in part due to China's impressive economic growth, the primacy of Western actors in international politics has been challenged. The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks and in Iraq in 2003 not only destabilized the Middle East but also weakened the U.S. claim for unipolarity. Finally, while the global financial crisis of 2008 brought a

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sense of decline in the U.S. and the EU faced several problems, including the Eurozone crisis, the rise of nationalism, the failure of its migration policy and Brexit, China has gradually increased its power and Russia its political clout in world politics.<sup>46</sup>

Eventually, when Turkey was confronted with disturbances in its neighborhood as a result of the September 2001 terror attacks and then the Arab uprisings since 2011, it had to adapt to changing circumstances in the international system and focus on its neighborhoods. Thus, Turkey concentrated on Central Asia and the Caucasus during the 1990s; the Balkans and the Black Sea were added during the 2000s, and its main focus finally came to rest on the Middle East during the 2010s. While there were both security/strategic and ideological/political reasons for this shift, the underlying change in the international system played an important, determining role.

### *Sense of Greatness and Wish for Regional Supremacy*

A sense of greatness, based on belonging to a nation that had created a world empire, is still a point of reference for most Turks. Imperial grandeur and regional influence are aspects of their heritage that ordinary Turks still respond

to and take pride in. Thus, it is frustrating for them to see other powers meddling in the affairs of their neighborhood, which explains in large part their sensitivity toward international involvement there.

Moreover, almost all of the parties across the political spectrum, despite their cultural, economic, social and political differences, support an active and domineering international position for Turkey in its neighborhoods. This is evident from the policies followed by the various governments with different political strands towards Turkey's near abroad when confronted with crises or opportunities to expand. It was the Republican People's Party of the one-party system that annexed Hatay, while the left-of-center Republican People's Party and moderate-Islamist National Salvation Party coalition conducted the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974. It was the center-right liberal Motherland Party that sent Turkish soldiers repeatedly across the Iraqi border in the late 1980s and 1990s, while the coalition of the social-democrat Democratic Left Party, nationalist-right Nationalist Action Party and Motherland Party created semi-permanent military bases in Iraq and, finally, the right-of-center Justice and Development Party that oversaw the expansion of Turkey's international use of its military might from Qatar to Libya in the 2010s.

It is clear from recent history that whenever Turkey felt strong enough to play a regional role and the focus of the global hegemon of the time had moved elsewhere, Turkey stirred to acquire a greater role in its neighborhood. Although Turkey followed a non-interventionist, somewhat isolationist and *pro-status quo* role during most of the post-WWII era, this was mostly due to its economic inability to expand its muscles, the threat it perceived from its nuclear neighbor and the restraints exacted by the bipolar world system from regional middle powers rather than Turkey's innate preference. In fact, Turkey was very much active in its neighborhood prior to the emergence of the bipolar world-taking an active stance in creating the Balkan Entente of 1934, the Saadabad Pact of 1937 and even the Balkan Pact of 1953. While the ensuing Cold War and tightening of bipolarity from the late 1950s onward prevented Turkey from being active in its surrounding area, it expanded its muscles immediately once the Cold War was over, and moved aggressively to carve out an area of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where the regional great power Russia was not able to reassert its control and the global hegemon was not interested enough to establish its dominance. This continued until the former imperial power Russia staged a comeback and the current hegemon moved to establish its dominance over the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East after 9/11. The same could be argued regarding the Balkans until the EU decided to expand and incorporate most of it within its midst.

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As the older divisions of East and West were left behind and the world increasingly witnessed the rising influences of neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism and neo-fundamentalism, Turkey witnessed the growing influence of its formerly underprivileged classes from Anatolia in the 1990s and 2000s.<sup>47</sup> In international relations, with their growing economic power and political influence, they supported Turkey's openings to new regions and created inroads, especially in the wider Middle East. This was accompanied by Turkey's new policy initiatives, such as abolishing visas, creating free trade zones, establishing high-level cooperation councils and joint cabinet meetings, and extensive political, economic and social openings to the region.

Having friendly relations with all its neighbors, and becoming a facilitator in solving regional problems were seen as essential steps at this time for Turkey to become a regional leader that might also be able to play a global role. However, both the resilience of some of Turkey's conflicts with its neighbors, which resisted solution, and the unexpected uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa from 2011 onward, severely curtailed these attempts. In the end, the position Turkey took during the Syrian Civil War and related developments such as the return of "great power geopolitical rivalries" to the Middle East forced Turkey's hand to end its new neighborhood policy by 2013. Although the Syrian Civil War and the threats perceived from the accompanying rise of DAESH, increased PKK militancy, sectarian rivalries, proxy warfare and widespread refugee movements forced Turkey to further interventionism in its neighborhood, this time the emphasis was on a defensive posture rather than an expansion of influence. These developments not only affected Turkey's regional relations, but also its global standing.

### *Economic Development*

Increasing the wealth of the nation by effecting industrial development has always been one of the fundamental undertakings of Republican Turkey. The second part of Atatürk's declaration of "peace at home, peace in the world" in fact included his strong adherence to "his thoughts towards [the] national welfare and development" of the country.<sup>48</sup> Accordingly, Turkey experimented with different development models during the interwar period. In addition to international security and domestic political considerations, Turkey's economic needs at the end of WWII necessitated a Western-leaning posture. Although Turkey, by the end of 1946, had gold and foreign exchange reserves amounting to around \$262 million, this was mainly due to the favorable prices that the fighting powers offered for Turkey's agricultural products and raw materials such as chromium. Moreover, at the end of the war, Turkish officials, who were now considering the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, did not want to use these reserves, and therefore tried to utilize international loans in order to enable Turkey to maintain a large army. Since the only country in the post-war world capable of lending money to Turkey was the U.S., its formal links with the West started to take shape when Turkey began to receive

American aid through the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan (1948). It is important to note that Turkey joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948, four years before it joined NATO.

The urgency of Turkey's economic needs and dependency on Western aid continued during most of the Cold War. Thus, in addition to remodeling Turkey's political life and security mechanisms, its Western connection also created long-term economic dependency patterns that substantially impacted its later policy options. In the end, Turkey's need for foreign aid became an integral part of its foreign as well as domestic policy. This long-standing dependency on foreign assistance inevitably affected Turkey's grand strategic posture during the Cold War.

Eventually, a combination of economic, social, political and international changes prompted Turkey to reconsider its alignments repeatedly during the inter-coup period (1960-1980), and Turkey decidedly moved to develop better political and economic relations with the nonaligned states and the Eastern Bloc countries in the 1970s. The development aid extended by the Soviet Union toward Turkey's industrialization efforts paved the way for this change of heart.

It was yet another developmental necessity and the demands of a growing population that forced Turkey to open up its closed economy and further integrate with the global economy in the 1980s. From then on, the needs of the growing middle classes and the expanding economy became important inputs for Turkey's international connections, which prompted President Turgut Özal to articulate his "Economy First" principle, putting it however briefly in front of security and foreign policies. In a similar fashion, Turkey's openings toward its neighboring regions during the 1990s and 2000s had much to do with the needs of its growing economy, the demands of the middle classes and the aspirations of a young and increasingly educated population. Thus, any attempt at developing an alternative grand strategy for Turkey needs to situate its development goals and the economic welfare of Turkish citizens at its core.

## Conclusion: Building Blocks of an Internationalist Grand Strategy for Turkey

Even though Turkey's foreign relations seem at times like a hodgepodge of reactions to external events rather than elements of a long-term design, a broader perspective could provide the outlines of a general framework (i.e. grand strategy as pattern of behavior), conditioned by its geography and history, the ideational desires of its ruling elites and the limitations of the international system. Even a rudimentary analysis presents a complex mixture of factors affecting Turkey's foreign and security policy strategies and the multilayered approaches it adopts in practice.

While the age-old discussion over the “eastern ideal” and the “western ideal” regarding the exact nature of the country during the 19<sup>th</sup> century seems just as lively today, with alternative anchorages on the West, Eurasia and the

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Middle East, well-delineated near-consensus positions could still be formulated for Turkey’s grand strategy based on the country’s hard-learned experiences and a tradition that has created a set of relatively inflexible principles. Some of these experiences have created a continuum lasting more than a century in Turkey’s foreign and security policies.

Looking from a distance, one can discern, with some simplification, the interplay of several variables that have shaped the course of Turkey’s grand strategy during most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and could very well be used for a future strategizing exercise. An amalgamation of the impacts of Turkey’s geography, historical experience and cultural/ideational inclinations (i.e. structural variables), as well as the economic needs of its citizens, the effects of the international system, domestic

political alterations and the personalities of decision makers (i.e. conjunctural variables) could be employed to develop an alternative grand strategy for the future. Such a grand strategy should at the least encompass the following:

**A multi-faceted foreign policy concept**, linking Turkey with its various neighborhoods and accounting for its simultaneously coexisting identities, i.e. European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian. It has become clear by now that Turkey cannot ignore developments in any of its neighborhoods under any circumstances, as they invariably impact Turkey. The regionalization of foreign, security, cultural and economic policies are realities of the current era, and Turkey is uniquely situated both geographically and culturally to benefit from developing interconnected regional policies. Healthier relations in any of its regions strengthens Turkey’s position in its other regions and vice versa.

**A sustainable, long-term program for economic development**, prioritizing its demands over the political, social, cultural and security (less than and up to the level of survival) aspects of decision making. In today’s world, more so than any other time in history, economic development and strength in terms of technological advances, growth rates and stability of production easily translate into political and military strength, thus becoming the main components of the security of a state. Despite its recent development, Turkey is

still a middle power with limited economic recourses at its disposal, in need of continuous foreign direct investment and international borrowing to grow its economy, and dependent on good political relations to expand its markets. Although highly educated, its now slightly aging population and continuing brain drain, as well as its limited access to cheap energy resources continue to impair its economic development and welfare, and curb its ability to project power abroad and provide for its security.

Creating an **enduring, practical, and viable balance** between its relations with major international and regional powers based on peaceful coexistence, positive agendas and mutually beneficial cooperation programs, while duly benefiting from and allocating its due place to Turkey's transatlantic connection. Turkey simply cannot afford to endanger its membership in any way in the historically most successful alliance system ever. Apart from contributing to Turkey's hardcore security interests, NATO membership also allows Turkey in the current international context to seek closer and balanced relations with non-NATO countries. Without this connection, Turkey's cooperation with Russia, for example, could very well become overbearing in a rather short run.

Creating a **co-centric circle of multilateral cooperation institutions and initiatives**, starting from its immediate neighborhood and widening internationally, benefitting from Turkey's multitude of identities and ability to connect with several sub-regions of the world. In this context, several trilateral connections (such as Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania, Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan, Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia, Turkey-Iraq-Syria, etc.) could easily be imagined in the first circle, together with wider regional economic, political and cultural institutions in the second circle (such as BSEC, the Levant 5, the Caucasus Stability Initiative, the Balkans Cooperation Area, etc.), which would then be surrounded with wider global initiatives and connections in the third circle (such as connections with Qatar in the Gulf, Somalia in the Horn of Africa, Libya in the Central Mediterranean, Bosnia Herzegovina in Central Europe, China in East Asia, and membership in NATO, OSCE, the UN, etc.). These could cater first and foremost to Turkey's regional standing and desire to peacefully carve out an influence area, as Turkey's experience in creating such multilateral partnerships and its extensive connections to the wider world allow Turkey to easily play such a role, and naturally elevate it to a leading position without much effort and without unnecessary confrontations.

To achieve these results and an ultimate grand strategy combining these components, Turkey needs to continue with the process of **reconciliation with its history**, redefining it from a more positive perspective both to its citizens and neighboring peoples, as well as the **recalibration of its geography** with its ability to connect to wider areas, and a **redefinition of its identity** to honor its multi-hyphenated lineage, including hitherto underprivileged sectors of its society such as ethnic and religious minorities, women, Anatolian peasants, etc., which will allow it to assuage some of its identificational uncertainties,

political polarization, cultural divisions and psychological fears, and thus support its national security *vis-a-vis* the rapidly changing world. At the same time, a conscious attempt has to be made to counter the currently very pronounced public tendency to “go it alone” or “stand alone” in the international area, as this is no longer possible or even feasible for any country, let alone a strategically located middle power. Thus, a clear preference for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the conceptualization of various cooperation schemes need to be developed.

## Endnotes

- 1 George Kennan, when he was U.S. *charge d'affaires* in Moscow, wrote a lengthy, 8,000-word analysis on February 22, 1946 to the State Department in an attempt to analyze Soviet post-war policy aims and explain its international behavior. It later became known as the “long telegram” and was credited with imagining the most important component of U.S. Cold War foreign policy, i.e. the containment strategy. Kennan later anonymously published a revised version of his telegram, titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” and signed as “Mr. X” in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947. See the full text at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
- 2 Paul van Hoof, “Grand Strategy,” *Oxford Bibliographies*, August 23, 2017, p. 1, <https://www.oxford-bibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0218.xml> (Accessed August 19, 2020). For other definitions, see Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 13, who sees it as “a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best cause security for itself”; Paul M. Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Towards a Broader Definition,” in Paul M. Kennedy (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, p. 4, arguing that it is “concerned with peace as much as with war. It is about the evolution and integration of policies that should operate for decades, or even centuries;” Williamson Murray, “Thoughts on Grand Strategy,” in W. Murray, R. Hart Sinnreich, and J. Lacey (eds.), *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 3, stating that grand strategy “demands an intertwining of political, social, and economic realities... It must also rest on a realistic assessment and understanding not only one’s opponents but also of oneself;” Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1989), p. 6, arguing that “grand strategy identifies the objectives that must be achieved to produce security, and describes the political and military actions that are believed to lead to this goal;” and Stephen D. Krasner, “An Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy,” *Policy Review*, No. 163 (2010), p. 2, claiming that “grand strategy is designed to detail the resources-diplomatic, bureaucratic, ideational, military, economic-to be allocated for specific policies.” For various definitions and usage of the “grand strategy” concept, see Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy’,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2018), pp. 27-57.
- 3 Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, p. 5.
- 4 Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword,” p. 31.
- 5 Basil H. Liddell Hart, in his ground-breaking book, *Strategy*, New York: Praeger, 1967, pp. 321-22, argued that “the role of grand strategy is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of war-the goal defined by fundamental policy.”
- 6 James M. McPherson, *Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief*, New York: Penguin Press, 2008, p. 5.
- 7 John Lewis Gaddis, “What Is Grand Strategy?,” *Triangle Institute for Security Studies*, February 26, 2009. <http://tiss-nc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/KEYNOTE.Gaddis50thAniv2009.pdf> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
- 8 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret, London: Everyman’s Library, 1993, p. 77.
- 9 Timothy Andrews Sayle, “Defining and Teaching Grand Strategy,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, January 15, 2011, p. 3, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/defining-and-teaching-grand-strategy/> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
- 10 Hoof, “Grand Strategy,” p. 1.
- 11 Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “What is Grand Strategy? Sweeping A Conceptual Minefield,” *Texas National Security Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2018), p. 29. She refers to these as “grand strategy as variable,”

- “grand strategy as process” and “grand strategy as blueprint” (pp. 53-54). Accordingly, grand strategy as a variable agenda “provides a prism through which academics may study the origins of state behavior,” while grand strategy as process “foregrounds the importance of grand strategizing, whether as a governmental strategic-planning process or as a more generic mode of decision-making,” and grand strategy as blueprint “proffers broad visions in hopes of influencing future governmental behavior.”
- 12 For the “Section 3043 Annual National Security Strategy Report” of the Act, see Nathan J. Lucas & Kathleen J. McInnis, “The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress,” *CRS Report*, No. 7-5700, April 5, 2015, p. 4, <https://docplayer.net/28491146-The-2015-national-security-strategy-authorities-changes-issues-for-congress.html> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
  - 13 “Presidential Decree No. 6” based on Article 118 of the Constitution, published at *Resmi Gazete*, No. 30479, July 15, 2018, <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180715-3.pdf> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
  - 14 Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword,” p. 29.
  - 15 Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 409.
  - 16 Darryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 6, No. 10 (2005), p. 4, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=457639> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
  - 17 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), p. 46.
  - 18 Lissner, “What is Grand Strategy?” pp. 57-58.
  - 19 Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword,” pp. 45-47.
  - 20 Sayle, “Defining and Teaching Grand Strategy,” pp. 4.
  - 21 Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*, pp. 409.
  - 22 Ibid.
  - 23 James Holmes, “Grand Strategy and the Art of the Possible,” *The Diplomat*, June 17, 2013, pp. 1-2, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/grand-strategy-and-the-art-of-the-possible/> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
  - 24 Ibid, p. 2 (addition is mine).
  - 25 For the latest example, see the Ministry of National Defense, *White Book 2000*, Ankara: Mönch Media, August 1, 2000. The tradition was discontinued after 2000.
  - 26 Turkey’s National Security Council was initially established in 1933 as the High Assembly of Defence (*Yüksek Müdafaa Meclisi*), which was renamed in 1949 as the High Council of National Defence (*Milli Savunma Yüksek Kurulu*), and finally the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*) in 1982. It received its current restructuring by means of the constitutional referendum on April 16, 2017. The NSC, meeting every two months, is the highest coordination authority of the state in security and foreign policy and is currently comprised of the President, Vice President(s), Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice, the Chief of General Staff and the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force. For details, see <https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/kurumsal/hakkimizda> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
  - 27 Silove “Beyond the Buzzword,” pp. 45-49.
  - 28 This most often repeated policy principle of republican Turkey was first pronounced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in an election declaration on April 20, 1931: “Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkasının müstakar umumî siyasetini şu kısa cümle açıkça ifadeye kâfidir zannederim: Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh için çalışıyoruz (I think the following short sentence is sufficient to clearly express the determined general policy of the Republican People’s Party: We work for peace at home and peace in the world).” See *Atatürk’ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyanmeleri Vol. IV*, Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 2006 (Document No. 681), pp. 606-609.

- 29 Ferenc A. Váli, *Bridges Across the Bosphorus; The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, p. 55.
- 30 Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1999), pp. 171-176.
- 31 See Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, May 20, 2010, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/20/turkeys-zero-problems-foreign-policy/> (Accessed August 19, 2020). For various aspects of Ahmet Davutoğlu's strategic understanding, see Talha Köse, Ahmet Okumuş & Burhanettin Duran (eds.), *Stratejik Zihniyet; Kuramdan Eyleme Ahmet Davutoğlu ve Stratejik Derinlik*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2014. For a critical analysis of his foreign policy and its comparison with the policies of İsmail Cem in the late 1990s, see Mehmet A. Tuğtan, "Kültürel Değişkenlerin Dış Politikadaki Yeri: İsmail Cem ve Ahmet Davutoğlu," *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 13, No. 49 (2016); and Tarık Oğuzlu, "Komşularla Sıfır Sorun Politikası: Kavramsal bir Analiz", *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol. 4, No. 42 (2012), pp. 8-17, who likens it to Turkey's foreign policy in the interwar years, i.e. the Atatürk era.
- 32 The "order builder" rhetoric for Turkish foreign policy was increasingly utilized by Davutoğlu after he became foreign minister in 2009, although he had used it in his analyses much earlier. See Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı," *Radikal*, February 26, 2004, [http://m.radikal.com.tr/yorum/turkiye\\_ulus\\_olmalı-702116](http://m.radikal.com.tr/yorum/turkiye_ulus_olmalı-702116) (Accessed August 19, 2020); and Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001. Its real effect in Turkish foreign policy came after the impact of the Arab uprisings reached Turkey through Syria, as evidenced in Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's speech to Turkey's Ambassadors on January 3, 2011, where he prioritized Turkey's "order builder" role in the Middle East over "zero problem with neighbors," thus emphasizing the usage of hard power tools over soft power. See [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu\\_nun-3\\_buyukelciler-konferansi\\_nin-acilisinda-yaptigi-konusma\\_03-ocak-2011.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-3_buyukelciler-konferansi_nin-acilisinda-yaptigi-konusma_03-ocak-2011.tr.mfa) (Accessed August 19, 2020).
- 33 Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2000), p. 200.
- 34 Ibid, p. 201.
- 35 Mustafa Aydın, "Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey," *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003), pp. 166-170.
- 36 See Gu Guan-Fu, "Soviet Aid to the Third World; An Analysis of its Strategy," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1983), pp. 71-89.
- 37 See Mustafa Aydın, "The Long View on Turkish-Russian Rivalry and Cooperation," *On Turkey Series (GMF)*, June 8, 2020, <https://www.gmfus.org/publications/long-view-turkish-russian-rivalry-and-cooperation> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
- 38 Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 1 (1998), p. 43; and *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*, London: Palgrave UK, 2009, pp. 17-20.
- 39 Research conducted by the Turkey Studies Group at the Kadir Has University since 2013 on public perceptions of foreign policy in Turkey reveals the existence of a consistent threat perception among the Turkish public from many countries in the world, including most of Turkey's long-standing allies. Similarly, the results also show a very narrow "friend and/or ally" perception and a public preference to "go alone" in international affairs. For the latest results, see Mustafa Aydın et al., *Public Perceptions on Turkish Foreign Policy 2020*, İstanbul, June 2020, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.36653.92642 (Accessed August 19, 2020).
- 40 Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis*, Ankara: Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2004.
- 41 Oral Sander, "Turkish Foreign Policy; Forces of Continuity and of Change," in Ahmet Evin (ed.), *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change*, Opladen: Leske Verlag, 1984, pp. 115-130.

- 42 Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, New York: Anchor & Doubleday, 1973, pp. 125-127.
- 43 Fahir Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye," *SBF Dergisi*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1958), p. 163.
- 44 A. Dankwart Rustow, "Turkey's Travails," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (1979), p. 87; Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 188-192.
- 45 Haluk Ülman & Oral Sander, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler, 1923-1968-II," *SBF Dergisi*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1972), p. 6.
- 46 Tarık Oğuzlu, "Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye: Nasıl Bir Dış Politika?" *Panorama*, January 18, 2020, <https://www.uikpanorama.com/blog/2020/01/18/yeni-dunya-duzeni-ve-turkiye-nasil-bir-dis-politika/> (Accessed August 19, 2020).
- 47 Mustafa Aydın, "Foreign Policy 1923-2018," in Alpaslan Özerdem & Mathew Whiting (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics*, New York & London: Routledge, 2019, pp. 373-374.
- 48 See Atatürk'ün *Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri*, pp. 606-609.