NATO at 72: New Issues and Challenges  

NATO’s Transformation into a Global Actor in the Age of Great Power Politics  
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Book Review
Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order  

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Anti-Americanism and American Exceptionalism: Prejudice and Pride about the USA

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EDITORIAL

NATO at 72: New Issues and Challenges

In the 72nd anniversary of its foundation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is confronted with new issues and challenges, which have become even more complicated with the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. Today, in addition to finding an effective way to address the challenges arising from the transformation of balance of power in the international system where non-Western actors like China, Russia, Brazil and India are becoming increasingly prominent, NATO is also obliged to solve its vital internal problems such as burden-sharing, while continuing to respond to asymmetrical threats like terrorism. The disagreements between the member states with regard to the solution of these issues, however, constitute a significant obstacle for the development of common policies within the NATO framework.

With the goal of shedding light on the transformation of the roles of NATO in contemporary world politics, this issue includes articles exploring the various dimensions of the changing objectives and activities of this collective defense organization which also includes Turkey as a member state since 1952. We would especially like to thank Prof. Giray Sadık who kindly accepted to act as a guest editor in this issue and brought together distinguished scholars from Turkey in order to provide the most comprehensive analysis of NATO’s transformed roles in international relations. At a time when the Alliance holds its new summit in Brussels in June 2021, we believe that the articles of this issue are going to be valuable contributions to the already rich academic literature on NATO.

The issue additionally includes two very timely articles that focus on Turkey’s developing economic relations with Uzbekistan and the Turkish peacebuilding efforts in Somalia which both draw attention to the widening scope of Turkish foreign policy in the 21st century.
NATO’s Transformation into a Global Actor in the Age of Great Power Politics

Tarık OĞUZLU *

Abstract

Founded as a collective defense alliance in the early years of the Cold War era and then transforming itself by acquiring new missions during the U.S.-led unipolar period between 1991 and 2008, NATO is once again trying to redefine its core rationale amid growing geopolitical confrontations among key global actors, such as the U.S., China, Russia and the EU. This article mainly seeks to answer to what extent the resurgence of great power rivalries might pave the way for NATO’s transformation into a credible global security organization in the emerging century. Although the chasm between the U.S. and its European allies has continued to widen in recent years, cohesion among NATO members with respect to the emerging multipolar world order and how Russia and China should be handled is now more vital than ever to the persistence of NATO as a credible global security actor. NATO’s future will also be informed by how Russia and China view the existing liberal international order in general and NATO in particular. This article contends that NATO’s transformation in the coming years will be increasingly informed by the evolving dynamics of great power politics.

Keywords

NATO, great power competition, alliance transformation, global actors, the West.

* Professor, Antalya Bilim University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Antalya, Turkey. E-mail: tarik.oguzlu@antalya.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0002-5422-6203.

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Introduction

As the focus of international politics continues to shift from the transatlantic to the Indo-Pacific region in an emerging multipolar world order, NATO is trying to adapt itself to this new reality. Founded as a collective defense alliance in the early years of the Cold War era, and subsequently transforming itself by taking on new missions during the U.S.-led unipolar era between 1991 and 2008, NATO is once again trying to redefine its core rationale amid growing geopolitical confrontations among key global actors, such as the U.S., China, Russia and the EU.

This article mainly seeks to answer to what extent the resurgence of tensions in relations between the western world/actors and major non-western powers, such as China and Russia will pave the way for NATO’s transformation into a credible global security organization in the emerging century. Russia’s recent adventures in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and Syria, and its waging of hybrid warfare against Western democracies have led many Westerners to conclude that Russia now poses the most important challenge to Western security interests across Europe and beyond. Likewise, China’s spectacular rise in global politics over the last decade is another challenge facing the alliance.

The U.S. now defines China and Russia as its global rivals. Both the National Security Strategy document of December 2017 and the National Defense Strategy document of January 2018 mention Russia and China as global rivals to be reckoned with. A recent document issued by the White House in May 2020 defines China as the number one challenge to American primacy and spells out the wisest strategy to adopt to address it. Looking from the American perspective, then, NATO should be transformed into a robust global security alliance that aims to contain Russia and China. If NATO’s European members do not share this American position on NATO and increase their defense spending accordingly, NATO’s relevance to American security interests will likely decrease in the years ahead. The rift between the transatlantic partners seems to have widened in the post Covid-19 era, as the degree of anti-Americanism across Europe spectacularly increased following the failure of the U.S. to demonstrate credible global leadership. The Trump administration’s decision to scale down the American military presence in Germany, in part as a reaction to the reluctance of the German Prime Minister to attend the G7 meeting held in the U.S. in fall 2020, seems to have added further insult to injury.

Unlike the U.S., the European allies seem to be divided as to how to approach Russia and China. Will they increasingly view Russia and China from a geopolitical perspective rather than a geoeconomic one? Even if they increasingly see these countries more as potential rivals or challenges than partners or opportunities and begin improving their hard power capabilities, will they do so within the framework of NATO—or the EU?
What if the bulk of the European allies no longer believe in the credibility of the U.S. as the main security provider of the liberal international order? How will such European perceptions of the U.S., particularly in the wake of the Trump presidency, affect NATO’s cohesion in the future? It is well known that the chasm between the U.S. and its European allies has continued to widen in recent years. Yet cohesion among NATO members with respect to the emerging multipolar world order and the way Russia and China should be treated is now more vital than ever to the persistence of NATO as a credible global security actor. Do the NATO allies believe that the growing political, economic and military cooperation between Russia and China amounts to the emergence of an anti-Western/anti-NATO alliance in the greater Eurasian region?

NATO’s future will also be informed by how Russia and China view the existing liberal international order in general and NATO, the security organization of this order, in particular. If they consider the existing liberal international order illegitimate and take further steps to improve their bilateral cooperation in economic, political and military fields, this might indirectly contribute to the revival of NATO by pushing Americans and Europeans to cooperate more than ever. How, for example, might the recent surge in China’s assertive and muscular foreign policy during the Covid-19 pandemic crisis affect the future of NATO? Can one now confidently argue that the European allies have lately come closer to the American perception of China, given that the EU now defines China as a systemic rival to be reckoned with?4 That said, it would not be an overestimation to suggest that NATO’s transformation in the coming years will be increasingly informed by the evolving dynamics of great power politics.

This article is written with a view to offering an intellectual exercise as to how the future of NATO might evolve in light of growing great power competition. The piece should be seen rather as an attempt at offering food for thought on such a vital issue than an original research article aiming at hypothesis testing. In this sense, the article will first discuss NATO’s transformation since the end of the Cold War era until a multipolar order began emerging in the late 2000s. Then an attempt will be made at demonstrating the main characteristics of the security understanding and international vision of the major global actors that have been increasingly interacting with each other in a multipolar setting. The ways in which the U.S., the EU, China and Russia define their security interests, and how they approach the existing international order are almost certain to have a great impact on how NATO will evolve as a security alliance.
NATO’s Transformation during the Unipolar Era

Having existed in limbo for a long period of time and embracing new missions outside its traditional collective defense mandate, NATO now seems to be once again at a critical juncture in its history. When NATO was established in 1949, it was assigned three main functions to fulfill: to keep the U.S. in, Germany down and the Soviet Union outside Europe. Faced with the existential communist threat to the East, the U.S., the architect of the postwar-era liberal international order, decided to boost the security and economic resilience of the West by midwifing multilateral organizations of a different kind in Western Europe. Rather than bilateralism, multilateralism shaped the American way of dealing with Western European countries. American military presence in Europe, the reasoning went, would be considered more legitimate within multilateral security platforms. NATO and the EU have long been viewed as the two most important institutional linchpins of the Western international community. Bringing the liberal-democratic capitalist states of the transatlantic area together would not only help the West defeat the Soviet menace more easily, but also facilitate the economic and political integration process among European allies by domesticating Germany. Despite periodical crises within the Alliance, in particular concerning the burden-sharing debate, NATO members united around common strategic priorities, threat perceptions and political values throughout the Cold War era.

Indeed, NATO members not only united around common threat perceptions during the Cold War years, but also shared some common political values and norms. Those values also lay at the roots of the liberal international order. Since its foundation, NATO has stood for the security cooperation of the liberal democratic states of the transatlantic area. It had been established against the communist Soviet Union in the past, and some now argue that NATO should be refashioned as the security organization of the so-called league of liberal democracies against the so-called league of authoritarian states.

Although the Cold War era appeared to have come to end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this has not prevented NATO from continuing to exist.

Although the Cold War era appeared to have come to end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this has not prevented NATO from continuing to exist. Although the allies have continued to quarrel among themselves on as many diverse issues as possible, their commitment to NATO membership has endured all hardships. Instead of leaving the alliance and charting their own ways, NATO allies have continued to value NATO’s existence.
Lending support to NATO’s adoption of new tasks, they have contributed to NATO’s cohesion. NATO’s enlargement toward the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe; its prioritization of crisis-management tasks outside the scope of Article-5 missions; its building up of security partnerships with many countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa and the Gulf regions; its development of institutional cooperation with other international organizations like the EU; its entering into security cooperation with such global partners as India, Japan and Australia; and its identification of defeating transnational terrorism as its key task in the post-9/11 era have all contributed to its relevance during much of the post-Cold war era. NATO’s latest strategic concept, adopted at the Lisbon summit in 2010, defines the core mission of the alliance as collective defense, comprehensive security and cooperative security.

Despite its successes, since the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, NATO allies have been quarrelling with each other as to how to redefine the rationale of the alliance. The most important challenge has been finding a common strategic purpose in the absence of common enemies. Neither the transnational terrorism threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, nor the promotion of Western liberal values to the erstwhile communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, nor the internal crises in war-torn countries on Europe’s peripheries, nor the growing salience of such issues as immigration, organized crime, trafficking in drugs or piracy seem to have replaced the Soviet threat as the glue connecting all NATO members to each other through unbreakable bonds. Nevertheless, the unipolar era in which many believed that history came to an end with the victory of liberal democracy, the widespread perception of the U.S. as the indispensable nation and the zenith of the EU’s soft power, seems to have shrouded NATO’s internal crisis. For example, neither the national security strategies adopted by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations in the U.S., nor the first-ever security strategy document of the EU adopted in 2003, mentioned great power competition and ideological polarization as potential threats leveled against the fabric of the liberal international order.

However, what we have been observing since the late 2000s is that the center of gravity of international politics has been gradually shifting from the transatlantic region to the Pacific/Indo-Pacific region.
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Indo-Pacific region. It is not only that the growing material power capabilities of non-Western powers, most notably China, put a dent in Western primacy, but also that the ideational and normative underpinnings of the U.S.-led liberal international order has come under attack. Maintaining NATO as a credible and relevant security organization has become increasingly difficult as multipolarity has gradually set in in global politics.

Revitalizing NATO as a Global Security Actor in the Emerging Multipolar Order

Before ascertaining the prospects of NATO’s redefinition as a Western security alliance against the authoritarian states of the non-Western world, it is worth taking a moment to describe the characteristics of the emerging multipolar order in brief. Over the last decades, great power competition and the accompanying search for spheres of influence have shaped international politics. As hardcore geoeconomic and geopolitical motivations have gradually informed states’ foreign policy behaviors, the dynamics of alliance relationships have also changed in decisive ways. During the last decade, long-term identity-based alliance relationships have been replaced with short-term, pragmatic and issue-oriented strategic partnerships. The practice of forming interest-oriented cooperation initiatives within multilateral and bilateral frameworks has gained ground in recent years. In today’s world, countries of different value orientations, geographical locations, power capabilities and threat perceptions are no longer bound to define each other categorically as enemies or friends. The notion of ‘frenemy’ has already become an identity signifier in interstate relations. The practice of coalitions defining missions has gradually given way to the practice of missions defining coalitions. In contrast to the Cold War bipolarity and the unipolar order during the first two decades of the post-Cold War era, the practice of illiberal authoritarian states engaging in pragmatic, outcome-oriented cooperation with liberal-minded states is now conceivable.

Even though the emerging world order evinces some characteristics of bipolarity, it is much closer to multipolarity. First, the evolving geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China is not as rigid as the one between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era—not only because the degree of economic interdependence between the U.S. and China far outweighs the one between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but also because neither the U.S. nor China has been proselyting its distinctive political, economic and social values in a missionary fashion. Second, the strategic
choices facing other powers are numerous today. Many small and middle powers alike do not have to choose either one of these two behemoths as committed warriors. Their maneuvering capability has increased in parallel to the growing, complex interdependency among many actors. Neither the U.S. nor China is powerful enough to impose its strategic choices and values onto other states in a top-down manner. It is even likely that if many middle powers were to join their capabilities and coordinate their foreign policies, they might be able to form credible balancing coalitions against the U.S. and China.

What Does Russia Want?

The atmosphere in relations between the West and Russia appears to have fundamentally changed over the last decade. Russia has lately come into the international limelight once again following its annexation of Crimea, the support that it gives to separatist groups in eastern Ukraine, its military involvement in Syria on the side of the Assad regime and its continuous political meddling in Western liberal democracies. Russia is believed to have been acting as a nineteenth century power in the twenty-first century.

This state of affairs has led many in the West to argue that Russia’s geopolitical revival under Putin’s rule now offers NATO the opportunity prove its resilience and relevance in the emerging multipolar era. There are some reasons for this. First, Russia has overtly challenged the post-Cold War era European security order by annexing part of a sovereign country in Europe into its territories. Worse, Russia did so by using brute force. The use of force in interstate relations in Europe has long been castigated as inappropriate and illegitimate. The whole story of the European integration process dating back to the early postwar era is about throwing realpolitik considerations and geopolitical rivalries into the dustbin of history.

Second, Russian leaders argue that the European security order should be rebuilt on the principles of great power cooperation and spheres of influence. In Russian strategic thinking, Western institutions, most notably NATO, should not be the main regional platforms in which questions of European security are discussed. One particular Russian priority is that Western powers recognize Russia as a great power and redefine the security structure in Europe in close cooperation with Russia. Coming from an imperial legacy and with immense material power capabilities at its disposal, particularly compared to other countries in its neighborhood, Russians claim that Russia deserves a special status in European security architecture and is entitled to have its own sphere of influence.

Russian decision-makers believe that Western powers promised Russia not
to enlarge NATO toward Russian territories in return for Russian acquiescence to German unification and united Germany’s ascension to NATO in the early 1990s. Despite such Russian expectations, however, NATO continued to enlarge closer to the Russian border. Nevertheless, in 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed, whereby Russia would be able to join NATO meetings in Brussels without having the right to vote on final decisions. The incremental reductions in the military budgets of NATO allies, the near elimination of NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the signing of cooperative agreements with Russia in 1997 and 2002 constitute the background against which NATO enlarged to Central and Eastern Europe. Russia seems to have acquiesced to NATO’s enlargement in return for NATO’s promises not to deploy nuclear weapons and permanent conventional troops in the territories of new members.

Despite the chill that the Kosovo crisis created in Russia’s relations with Western powers, relations began gathering new momentum with the formation of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. Further, Russia was admitted to the G-7 group in 1998 as a consolation prize for not arguing against NATO’s decision to admit Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to membership in 1999.

Relations took a negative turn in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as the Bush administration supported the so-called color revolutions across the post-Soviet geography, first in Georgia, then in Kirgizstan and then in Ukraine, hoping that the successful implementation of liberal democratic practices in those countries would bring to power pro-American regimes. From Russia’s perspective, these revolutionary movements were masterminded by Western circles and carried out by local agents. And indeed, the promotion of democratic values in Russia’s near abroad cannot be seen as isolated from the geopolitical competition between Russia and the West. Notable in this context is the American support to the NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine. The NATO summit held in Bucharest in 2008 decided that Georgia would join NATO sometime in the future, pending its transformation into a democratic and capitalist state. From a Russian perspective, any NATO-led involvement in the internal affairs of other countries without the approval of the UN Security Council appeared illegitimate and illegal.

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Third, Russia’s challenge to Western/European primacy is also normative
and ideological. The social and political values that the current Russian leadership espouses are in abject contradiction with Western values. Russia acts as the most ardent supporter of traditional religious, social and political values, and many of these values are opposed to the secularism, universalism, liberalism and individualism of the Western world.¹² Russian society is built on the primacy of patriarchal and traditional communal values, rather than of self-regarding individualistic morality. Russian society evinces a predisposition to communitarian ethics over individualistic or cosmopolitan ethics. If NATO were to embody the constitutive norms of the Western international community, then Russia’s willingness to embrace traditional values should be considered a threat.

Russia offers an example of a traditional nation-state, in which sovereignty, state survival and territorial integrity are still the most important security issues. Having the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons all over the world, possessing sophisticated conventional military capabilities and sitting on a huge land mass with abundant natural resources are considered to be Russia’s main power resources. To Russian rulers, there are no universally-agreed-upon human rights and the use of force in the name of ‘responsibility to protect’ only masks Western imperial designs on other places. Russian uneasiness with many multilateral UN-led operations can be seen in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011. The Russian position on the Syrian crisis also reveals that the principle of not interfering with states’ internal affairs, no matter how severe the internal conditions are, should be kept sacrosanct. The historic talk Putin delivered at the Munich Security Conference in 2017 is now considered by many as the harbinger of Russian desires to hollow out the foundations of the liberal international order.¹³

Russia defines itself as a ‘sovereign democracy’ and abhors Western attempts at preaching the virtues of liberal democracy and universal human rights. From a Russian perspective, historical experiences, geopolitical realities and cultural values produce different conceptualizations of democracy across the globe.

In order to voice its strong criticism against Western aggrandizement credibly, however, Russia needed to recover from its economic malaise under the strong leadership of President Putin. Russia’s improving economy and the Western powers’ growing need to seek Russia’s help in responding to the geopolitical challenges of the post-9/11 era seem to have emboldened Russian leaders to openly air their grievances with respect to the pillars of the liberal international order.

Fourth, the overwhelming importance that Russian strategic documents
place on nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, in the materialization of Russian security interests, suggests that NATO members would do well to increase their defense spending and build up NATO’s conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities, particularly in regions bordering Russia. For NATO to preserve its credibility in the eyes of its members, particularly those bordering Russia, it needs to improve its reassurance and deterrence capabilities.

Finally, many Russia observers argue that Russia is quite adept at playing the infamous ‘divide and rule’ game in its relations with European states. Rather than addressing the EU or NATO as single-voice, credible international actors, Russia prefers to talk to Western/European states bilaterally. For instance, Russian oil and gas companies present alternative deals to different European states. The well-known example in this regard is the Nord Stream II gas pipeline project connecting Germany directly to Russia. As part of its efforts to woo European allies away from the U.S., the post-Cold War era Russian leadership has consistently sided with key European allies such as France and Germany whenever these countries had strong geopolitical and foreign policy disagreements with the U.S. Likewise, Russia feels sympathy with any European call for a multipolar world order in which Europe and the U.S. might part ways. The Russian leadership would feel content with any European initiative that might potentially hollow out NATO from within.

Moreover, Russian support to illiberal, populist, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, anti-EU and anti-globalist groups across Europe should be seen as Russian attempts at helping create structural divisions within the continent. To Russian critics, Russia has already declared a political warfare against the West that increasingly evinces the thought of former Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov. This will likely be seen as threatening NATO’s internal cohesion and persuasive power vis-a-vis Russia. Russian threats to NATO emanate not only from growing Russian military prowess in its near abroad but also from Moscow’s efforts to increase its influence across the West through the adoption of hybrid tactics, among which political manipulation and disinformation campaigns and supporting pro-Russian political movements stand out the most.

Russian overtures to build a quasi-alliance with China in the greater Eurasian region have attracted further Western ire. However, despite the growing strategic rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing in recent years, one should not conclude that these countries want to establish a military alliance like NATO. The closer Russia comes to China, the stronger the Russian message that Russia is not without alternatives. Active Russian
agency in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICSSs should be read as Russia’s growing determination to soft-balance against the West.

Recently, the intensification of the trade war and a Cold War-like confrontation between the U.S. and China seem to have added up to Russia’s geopolitical clout, because this time China appears to be quite willing to improve its relations with Russia. The recent visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Russia in early June of 2019 undoubtedly demonstrates that these two countries have now entered into a new stage in their relations, with strategic considerations shaping the tenor of those relations more decisively than ever.

China and the Liberal International Order

While the Chinese see their country’s efforts to leave behind ‘centuries of humiliation’ as China’s rightful return to its glorious days, the majority of Westerners tend to feel skeptical about the end results of this process. China is not questioning the Western-led international order in a revolutionary fashion. What it wants is to see its growing ascendance in global power hierarchy accommodated institutionally and peacefully. In case of Western reluctance to do so, China does not hesitate to mastermind the establishment of alternative institutional platforms under its patronage. For example, through such initiatives as ‘One Road One Belt’ and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, China is trying to give the message that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between its development at home and the development of others abroad. The goal is to bring into existence China-friendly regional and global environments in which China’s march to global primacy will not only be uncontested but also accommodated easily. Despite the beliefs of Chinese rulers of the past in the superiority of their civilization and their country as the Middle Kingdom, they did not adopt an imperial mission whose driving logic was to conquer non-Chinese territories and project Chinese norms and values onto others in a universalistic imperial fashion. Reminiscent of its ages-old historical background, today’s China is not pursuing a strategy of global hegemony akin to that pursued by the U.S. since the end of the Second World War.
Chinese leaders have long been of the view that as China grows more powerful each passing day, both militarily and economically, other states would likely accommodate China and pay their tribute to Beijing in return for economic benefits and security provisions. China’s rulers today view China as a benign power having legitimate claims to occupy a central place in East and Southeast Asia. To their minds, Chinese values are superior and China is vital to the developmental needs of many states across the globe. Chinese leaders seem to be very much against the idea of seeking a cosmopolitan vision of uniting all civilizations in a single, universal civilization. They are vociferously against the practices of setting global standards of human rights because they tend to believe that rules, values and norms are relative and products of different time and space configurations.

This does not, however, mean that China does not adhere to a certain set of rules, values and norms in its state-society relations and external dealings. Indeed, what seems to set China apart from Western powers is its commitment to state-led capitalism, society-based morality, hierarchical organization of societal relations, centralized administrative system, defensive realpolitik security culture and Confucian understanding of the Chinese state as a civilization.16

Since the late 1970s, when Chinese leaders decided to open up China, the assumption on the part of Western decision makers has been that China would gradually evolve into one of the responsible stakeholders of the liberal international order and embrace that order’s core values, such as the consolidation and promotion of the principles of individual entrepreneurship, democratic governance, minimum state involvement in the economy, rule of law, free trade, the secularization of societal relations and respect for multiculturalism. As China grows richer, they imagined, it would gradually transform into a liberal democracy.17 The main reason for such optimism was the fact that China benefited from becoming a part of the capitalist world economy, and its double-digit economic development was long made possible by its economic interaction with the U.S.

That Chinese rulers have been pursuing the so-called ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’ strategy in their neighborhood since the late 1970s appears also to have encouraged American leaders to prioritize a ‘strategy of engagement’ over a ‘strategy of containment’ in their relations with China. China has not completed its internal transformation process yet, and for this to happen without interruption, a stable external environment is critical. So stability in East and South Asia remains in the interest of both China and the U.S. In other words, China cannot risk its internal transfor-
mation process at home by confronting its neighbors and key global actors, such as the U.S., head-on.

However, China’s transformation into a state-led capitalist economy has not ensured its adoption of liberal democratic political values. Growing disillusionment on the part of American decision makers appears to have pushed them to reconsider China as a strategic rival, if not an existential enemy, to reckon with. The U.S. under both the Obama and Trump administrations has characterized China as the most important challenge facing American hegemony.

Today, the U.S. has already replaced the ‘strategy of engagement’ with the ‘strategy of containment.’ A bipartisan consensus has emerged in the U.S. that China’s adoption of an ambitious stance in global politics, and its continuing salvos against the liberal international order warrant a radical change in the U.S. approach toward China, away from engagement to containment.

Despite this trend, at closer inspection, it seems that the maintenance of regional and global stability is still in China’s national interests. As of today, particularly given the protectionist trade war that then President Trump waged on China and China’s galloping internal challenges, Beijing is not in a position to risk the gains of its ongoing development process by adopting a hardline approach toward the U.S. and its neighbors. China has the largest financial reserves in the world and its access to the American market, technology and foreign direct investment is still important for its economic modernization. China does not have the luxury of postponing its transformation into an economy in which Chinese companies produce mainly technology-intensive, high-value-added goods and domestic consumption increases to such an extent that China’s economic development is not negatively affected by recessions and contractions in developed Western economies. The Chinese economy cannot survive long on the principles of export-led growth and high domestic savings. Besides, an aggressive stance against its neighbors would likely push them closer to the arms of the U.S., thereby tarnishing Chinese attempts at manufacturing soft power.

China has now become the number one trading partner not only of its neighbors to the South and East, but of many developed countries in the West. China is still the global factory of merchandise goods and it needs to import many raw materials from abroad because it is a resource-poor country. If China wants to benefit from its growing economic relations with other countries, for instance through the Belt and Road Initiative, the message that Chinese leaders have long been giving should continue to resonate:
China’s rise also means the rise of others. For China’s ‘no-strings attached’ development aid policy not to be seen as imperial, China’s economic rise should continue to benefit others as well as itself. The improvement of the infrastructural capacities of the countries on which China is dependent for raw materials and to which China exports goods is, in the final analysis, in China’s national economic interests.

China’s challenge to the liberal world order closely correlates with its civilizational state identity and the core values of Chinese society, such as the father-like status of the state in the eyes of the people, unitary state identity, territorial integrity, realpolitik security culture, societal cohesion, primacy of family bonds over individuality, primacy of state sovereignty over popular sovereignty, the state’s unquestioned involvement in economics and social life, the primacy of responsible and ethical statesmanship over electoral legitimacy, resolving conflicts through societal mechanisms and trust relationships rather than legal instruments, the primacy of hierarchical relations within the society over egalitarianism and the primacy of shame culture over guilt culture.

Another key characteristic of China’s rise is that despite all counter-alle- gations that Chinese foreign policy has become more assertive and aggressive over the last decade, Chinese leaders seem to have been following a low-key foreign policy orientation by avoiding rigid positions on global issues unless its core national interests are at stake, as they are in the status of Taiwan, Tibet, the Uighur region, the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Chinese leaders also avoid taking on global responsibilities. This is a challenge, mainly because the costs of maintaining global stability and preserving global commons will dramatically increase without Chinese contribution. Yet this reluctant approach to global governance might suggest that China is not resolved to replace the U.S. as the global hegemon.

That said, the financial crisis that severely hit Western economies in 2008 seems to have turned everything upside down. The crisis not only weakened the EU’s likelihood of becoming a global power, both in the economic and normative sense, but also made it abundantly clear that the success of the American economic model is to a significant extent tied to the interdependent economic relations developed with the non-Western world, most notably China. The crisis and its aftermath have made it unavoidably clear that the U.S. is today the most indebted country on earth, whereas China is the number one creditor country. Majorities across the globe seem to believe that China, the aspiring hegemon, is on the rise, whereas the U.S., the incumbent hegemon, is in terminal decline. The relative failures
of the Trump administration to manage the Covid-19 disease at home and to offer credible global leadership abroad seem to have encouraged Chinese leaders to pursue more assertive foreign policies, not only in China’s neighborhood but also globally.

While Chinese leaders view China’s spectacular rise in global politics as a direct consequence of the end of the age of humiliation, the U.S. sees in China a strong competitor bent on ending the decades-old American global hegemony. While the Chinese see the end of the ‘age of humiliation’ as China’s legitimate return to its glorious past and the normalization of world history, quite a number of Westerners feel aghast at the prospect of China hollowing out the roots of Western dominance in global politics. In Chinese thinking, China had occupied the center stage of global politics for centuries by the time Western nations outpaced China in terms of economic output, technological innovations and military capabilities in the nineteenth century. Many Chinese believe that China is not an ordinary country, but a civilization-state, whose spectacular rise will surely produce tectonic effects in global politics.18

An Alliance in the Making? Decoding Russian-Chinese Cooperation

Recent years have seen Moscow and Beijing come closer to each other. Is an alliance now in the making between Russia and China? This article asserts that Russia’s recent strategic rapprochement with China cannot be understood without taking into account the dramatic, negative turn in Russia’s relations with the West. Russia’s relations with the U.S. reached their nadir following the alleged claims that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential elections by overtly working for the success of one candidate, Donald Trump, at the expense of the other, Hillary Clinton. Despite all the intentions of President Trump to help improve relations with Putin’s Russia, both Congress and the majority of the American public alike have now adopted a negative tone toward Russia. Despite Trump’s transactional approach toward European allies and extremely critical stance toward the value of NATO, America’s contribution to NATO’s deterrence and reassurance capabilities has dramatically increased over the last five years.
Russia’s strategic rapprochement with China has also been driven by the worsening of relations between China and the U.S. over the last decade. According to Graham Allison, it is highly likely that a war will occur between the established global power and the rising power because the established power will not want to lose its hegemony and privileges within the system emanating from its unrivalled power status. According to this logic, if the U.S. does not want to see its global hegemony under threat in the years to come, it would do well to help contain China’s rise now. Therefore, the downward spiral in American-Chinese relations can be attributed to the meteoric rise in China’s material power capabilities relative to those of the U.S., and the fear this has instilled in American decision makers.

Russia and China are both realpolitik security actors that believe in the primacy of hard power capabilities and tend to define security from the perspectives of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and societal cohesion. Both countries believe that the unipolar era between the early 1990s and the second half of the 2000s was a historical aberration, and that a multipolar environment is required to maintain global peace and stability. Similarly, Russian and Chinese leaders share the view that both Russia and China are entitled to wield geopolitical influence in their neighborhoods and curb American penetration into their regions. A common view shared by both countries is that Western claims to universal human rights, and universal standards of political legitimacy and morality are wrong and, should they be pursued at the point of a gun, the end result will be global instability and war.

The growing rapprochement between Russia and China is more a growing strategic partnership of convenience than a well-orchestrated initiative to help bring into existence a NATO-like collective defense alliance. To be precise, the growing strategic cooperation between Russia and China within the UN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS is an example of soft balancing.

Both Presidents Putin and Jinping see each other as best friends and have taken pride in visiting each other more than thirty times since Xi Jinping’s coming to power in 2012. China is Russia’s number one trading partner, and the volume of bilateral trade is a little more than one hundred billion
U.S. dollars. Yet Russia is not among China’s top trade partners. Russia mainly sells oil and gas to China, whereas China predominantly exports manufactured merchandise goods to Russia. The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Chinese-led BRI have merged with each other as parts of the “Greater Eurasian Partnership.” Both countries are the two most powerful members of the SCO and the so-called BRICS community. Their military cooperation is also noteworthy. Russia is the number one arms exporter to China, and Chinese military modernization has been made possible, among other factors, by Russian technology transfers. Both countries organize joint military exercises in different locations across the globe. Their diplomatic cooperation within the UN and other international settings is also remarkable.

However, it is still the case that both countries define their relations with the U.S. as more vital to their security and economic interests than their own bilateral relations. It seems that neither Russia nor China would accord the other the big brother role in an emerging alliance relationship.

**America and the World**

Since the foundation of the U.S., its leaders have not shown strong enthusiasm to pursue ambitious policies abroad to institutionalize American dominance unless other continents, most notably Europe and Asia, came under the domination of anti-American power blocks or any global power threatened U.S. national interests by trying to establish a strong presence in America’s near abroad.21 However, since the early years of the Cold War era, the U.S. has shifted toward an ‘internationalist’ mentality and an active promotion of its values to other places in the name of its national security interests. Despite the fact that ‘realists’ and ‘isolationists’ have traditionally abhorred adventures abroad and argued against the use of force unless vital national interests were at stake, they have nevertheless sided with liberal internationalists in defining the U.S. as an exceptional country in terms of its norms and values.

The end of the Cold War era paved the way for strengthening American primacy across the globe, as no other power was in a position to shake up the foundations of this unipolar era for about fifteen years. The 1990s and much of the 2000s demonstrated that the U.S. was the indispensable power on earth. The enlargement of NATO and EU toward former communist countries bolstered U.S. primacy in Europe, whereas the percolation of the so-called Washington consensus across the globe solidified the capitalist and liberal-democratic principles in other locations. Hence, the

Yet the steady increase in the material and ideational power capabilities of non-Western powers, the growing costs of military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, the abject failure of American nation-building projects across the globe and the economic crisis that hit the Western world severely in late 2008 have led Americans to go through a soul-searching process over the last decade.

Both the Obama and Trump administrations recognized that the U.S. should no longer play the role of global hegemon in maintaining peace and security. If not rejecting the role of playing the role of the leader of the liberal international order outright, the U.S. now wants to share the costs of maintaining this order with its traditional allies in Europe and across Asia. The main message given by Washington over the last decade is that American support to the security interests of traditional European and Asian allies should be earned, rather than taken for granted.

In the Obama and Trump administrations, America’s focus turned to the focus is now on great power politics and competition. Dealing with China and Russia now appears to be more important than focusing on humanitarian interventions, counter-terrorism and democracy promotion. The latest National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, adopted in late 2017 and early 2018, respectively, testify to this new mentality. An introverted approach and increasing aversion to military engagements abroad seem to have strengthened the realist, pragmatic and isolationist tendencies in U.S foreign policy. Hence growing calls for grand strategies that adopt restraint, retrenchment or offshore balancing.

Both the Obama and Trump administrations recognized that the U.S. should no longer play the role of global hegemon in maintaining peace and security.

Americans appear to have rediscovered that their nation is now more an Indo-Pacific than a transatlantic one. Whereas today’s America seems to adopt a mixture of containment and engagement strategies vis-à-vis China – ‘congagement’ – Putin’s Russia is viewed more as an anti-American headache than an existential global security threat. Americans do not put Russia on an equal footing with China; Russia is a regional power in decay, whereas China is a global power on the rise.

With Donald Trump’s election in late 2016, bilateral relations between the
U.S. and Russia turned extremely negative. Despite Trump’s intentions to improve relations with Russia on a transactional and pragmatic logic, as well as his sympathy with Putin’s strongman rule in Russia, there is now a bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Congress that Russia deserves to be punished for its illiberal authoritarian turn and overt political interference with the American presidential elections.

A sizable number of American troops have now been deployed to Poland, and American efforts to fortify NATO’s military presence in Central and Eastern Europe have tremendously increased.

From the American perspective, NATO would do well to acquire a non-European character during the post-Cold War era by adopting more global missions both as a collective security organization and an expeditionary military machine. Despite the fact that the U.S. had in the 1990s objected to the idea of the EU replacing NATO as the prime security organization in Europe, the Bush and Obama administrations gradually reversed this attitude and the U.S. has encouraged the European allies to take on more security responsibilities since 9/11.

The European allies should both speed up their integration process within the EU and contribute more strategic and military capabilities to NATO. Dealing with the challenges arising from a resurgent Russia, instability in the Balkans and growing anarchy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is first and foremost the responsibility of the European allies. What happens in these locations affect Europe more than the U.S. It is now abundantly clear that the U.S. does not want to channel too much of its attention and capabilities to European and Middle Eastern security challenges. Rather, it would like to see its European allies pay much of the bill in such theatres.

For example, the U.S. is not opposed to a reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which forbids both the Japanese use of force in contingencies other than self-defense and Japan’s participation in collective defense cooperation with third countries. In American eyes, the rise of China and its alleged military assertiveness in East China and the South China Sea is not a threat solely posed to the U.S.: Traditional American allies in the region also feel threatened. Therefore, Washington is keen on the point that defensive security cooperation among American allies in the region is vital. Similar to allies in Europe, East Asian allies should not take it for granted that the U.S. will come to their aid automatically.

Moreover, the gradual replacement of postwar generations on both shores
of the Atlantic by millennials, who are more inclined to take the peace dividends of the globalization process for granted, is likely to hollow out the alliance from within. The power of the security elites within the alliance, particularly in the U.S., who had first-hand experience with the horrors of the Second World War and the psychology of the mutually assured destruction of the Cold War era, has been in decline. New elites in the U.S. have been for a while looking to the Pacific as the new epicenter of global politics, whereas their European counterparts focus their attention on salvaging their post-modern peace project in the face of new-age challenges. That is to say, NATO has not been front and center in transatlantic politics for some time.

**European Union, Wake Up!**

The EU of today is far from fulfilling the desired goals that its founders set decades ago. At stake now is the EU’s ability to deal with emerging modern challenges while remaining true to its post-modern aspirations. Despite all its intention to help midwife a post-modern polity at home and become a role model for others abroad, the EU appears to have underestimated how influential a role traditional power politics would continue to play in Europe and abroad.

The EU has to a great extent failed to deal with the emerging security problems in its near abroad because of its over-reliance on American security protection. The American commitment to European security has long enabled European allies to direct their resources to economic development and the integration process, indirectly diminishing their ability to stand on their feet. Freeriding on American security protection has not only made it difficult for Europeans to develop their own distinctive approaches to many global security issues, but also led them to believe that they could continue underinvesting in their security capabilities. Even though America’s favorability rates have declined sharply in recent years, Trump’s harsh treatment of allies might push Europeans to coordinate their foreign and security policies more than ever.

The Europeans have long dreamed that the post-modern values of the EU integration process, such as cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, secular universalism, multiple interdependencies and soft-power oriented policies abroad, would help them leave modern practices of balance of power politics, realpolitik security strategies, self-other distinctions and the prioritization of hard power instruments in interstate relations far behind. However, the revival of realpolitik security challenges in Europe’s neighborhood, such as Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Syria and Eastern Europe and growing
instabilities in North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, undoubtedly demonstrate that its non-realist understanding and practices are now, still, on shaky ground.\textsuperscript{23}

It is also now the case that illiberal, populist, anti-integrationist, anti-immigrant and anti-globalist parties have become quite powerful across Europe. This makes the task of preserving the EU’s post-modern values even more difficult. If many center-left and center-right parties fail to provide credible solutions to the current problems of many European people and continue to lose elections to fringe parties, this might further erode the legitimacy of Brussel-based EU institutions as well as the idea of Europeanness. As the ongoing efforts to defeat Covid-19 crisis have demonstrated, Europeans have increasingly adopted solutions at national and local levels. This might inadvertently hollow out the legitimacy of European institutions and make it difficult for the EU to transform into a credible global actor speaking with one voice.

The UK’s exit from the EU struck a fatal blow to the EU’s credibility as a strategic actor on a global level. Neither Germany nor France can steer the European ship in the uncharted waters of the emerging century. The EU now suffers from a lack of leadership problem.\textsuperscript{24} It is still far from certain that Germany has accepted the challenge of providing leadership inside the union, and we also do not know whether France, one of the two engines of the integration process, and other members would acquiesce to German leadership. Doubts still exist about whether Germany might turn out to become the European behemoth in the UK’s absence. The specter of Germany evolving into a normal foreign policy actor adopting a realpolitik worldview in dealing with emerging challenges at the European and global levels still irks many member states, while majorities in Germany are still lukewarm to the idea that Germany should prioritize a realpolitik international identity at the expense of its hard-won civilian and normative power identity.

Far from having established itself as a credible actor speaking with one voice, the EU now appears as a weak geopolitical actor in the eyes of other global actors. The U.S., Russia and China all continue to employ the time-tested strategy of divide-and-rule in their relations with EU members. All see the EU as a playground in their geopolitical games. Partnership with European countries inside NATO and
the EU is a must for the U.S. to defeat the Russian challenge in Eastern Europe and contain the Chinese challenge in East Asia, while courting the pro-Russian EU members and supporting the pro-Russian social and political groups across the continent is Putin’s preferred strategy in helping create fissures inside the transatlantic community. Last but not least, China is also courting friendly countries inside the EU, the latest being Italy, in the hope that this will not only deprive the U.S. of strategic partners but also enable China to help materialize its One Road One Belt project in the emerging connectivity wars.

Conclusion

Based on the analysis above, one can now argue that the last decade has witnessed five important geopolitical developments, of which three might potentially help rejuvenate the alliance, whereas two might further dilute its cohesion and legitimacy. To start with the developments that might offer NATO members new justifications to rejuvenate the alliance, one could mention the resurgence of Russian revisionism in and around Europe, the growing Chinese challenge to the primacy of the liberal international order across the globe and the negative consequences of the lack of good governance in the larger MENA region on European security.

Despite the fact that there is not a common view within the alliance on the nature of the challenge that Putin’s Russia poses to the transatlantic security environment, nor how to deal with it, Russian assertiveness in Ukraine and the Middle East seems to have led NATO allies to conclude that today’s Russia is living in the age of nineteenth century balance of powers politics and condones the use of military means to secure geopolitical ends. NATO summits convened over the last decade attest to the fact that deterrence and reassurance have once again become vital to the preservation of the Alliance. Despite the critical rhetoric of the Trump administration, American military presence in Eastern Europe has increased and NATO allies have conducted more military exercises than ever since the early 1990s. Russia’s political meddling in Western democracies and increasing reliance on cyber-warfare tactics seem to have united the allies around the common purpose of redesigning the alliance as a bulwark against a potential Russian threat.

The negative consequences of the post-Arab spring developments on European social peace and economic prosperity are also well-documented. For European allies to deal with the challenges of terrorism and immigration,
which one can confidently link to developments in the MENA region, co-operation within NATO has once again proved to be of vital importance.

What is unique about the threats posed by Russian revisionism and the developments taking place in the MENA region is that such threats endanger European interests more decisively than American ones. It is Europe, rather than the U.S., that should see NATO as vital to its security interests in this context. This is also to say that if the European allies want to see the U.S. remain committed to the Alliance and help Europeans meet such challenges successfully, they should increase their military contributions to the alliance budget and undertake more security responsibilities than ever.

On the other hand, China’s spectacular rise is the geopolitical development that will impact the future of the alliance most profoundly in the years to come. Despite the fact that Americans tend to interpret China’s ascendance through geopolitical and geostrategic lenses, while Europeans adopt a more economic perspective, the need to deal with China is growing more and more important with each passing day. Containing China’s rise has already become the number one preoccupation of successive American administrations over the last decade. There is still a long way to go for European allies to view China from a more ‘American’ perspective. Yet China’s attempts at shaping a more pro-Chinese attitude across Europe through the adoption of Russian style divide-and-rule tactics will likely help awaken European allies to the Chinese challenge. Unlike the Russian and MENA challenges, the Chinese challenge seems to preoccupy the U.S. more than the European allies. What this points to is that if the U.S. wants to see the European allies adopt the American perspective on China and help contain the rising dragon, it needs to reassure them of America’s commitment to European security. All these trends suggest that NATO will be around for years to come because both the Americans and Europeans will continue to benefit from it, albeit for different geopolitical reasons.

Despite the fact that Americans tend to interpret China’s ascendance through geopolitical and geostrategic lenses, while Europeans adopt a more economic perspective, the need to deal with China is growing more and more important with each passing day.

The factors that could contribute to the erosion of the cohesion and legitimacy of the alliance are the growing neo-isolationist trend in the U.S. and the rise of populist and nationalist currents across the European continent. Starting with Obama and continuing apace with Trump, the American public has gradually adopted a more skeptical at-
attitude toward the liberal internationalism of the postwar era and the U.S. acting as the sole global security provider. When this is combined with the Trump era’s nativist nationalism, one could even argue that America’s NATO membership can no longer be taken for granted. Whether or not Trump used the threat of ‘leaving the Alliance’ solely to nudge the European allies to invest more in their armies, his misgivings about the liberal international order is likely to have a corrosive impact on NATO’s future.

Brexit, combined with the growing salience of illiberal populist political movements across the European continent, suggests that NATO’s future prospects are becoming even darker. Although the UK’s membership in NATO will not be affected by its exit from the EU in a technical manner, Britain’s departure from the EU will likely endanger the psychological bond between London and other European capitals. Continental Europeans have already given strong signals that, post Brexit, European allies will look more to the EU than to NATO in finding solutions to their security problems.

While many Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the three Baltic republics, view Russia as their key geopolitical challenge, many Western and European allies are predisposed to see both Russia and China more from a geoeconomic than geopolitical perspective. While they feel quite concerned about the challenges that China and Russia pose to the roots of the liberal international order, the Western European allies seem to share the view that adopting a tough geopolitical approach toward Russia and China would likely diminish any hope left to help revitalize multilateral global governance in the years to come. From a European perspective, it would not be possible to achieve long-term peace and stability across the European continent if Russia were to be excluded from the European security architecture as a legitimate player. Indeed, pushing Russia further into a corner would endanger European security. A similar situation prevails in the context of the Europeans’ relations with China. China offers Europe immense opportunities to tap into. It is quite notable that Germany is not buying into American pressure to stop cooperating with Russia in the Nord Stream II project, nor are many European allies heeding the American warning that they would do well to prevent China from building the 5G telecommunication infrastructure across the continent.

Given that the U.S. is no longer as committed to European defense at it was in the past and does not want to act as the sole leader of the liberal international order any longer, it behooves the European allies to develop their own capabilities to survive as an herbivorous actor among such
carnivorous powers as Russia, China and the U.S. The willingness of the European allies to mantle such a role in the emerging global order is now more evident than ever, and the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Layen has underlined that the EU will have to evolve into a geopolitical actor. This seems to explain why the EU has recently mentioned China in its documents as a systemic rival while signing off on NATO’s latest communique in late 2019 that the rise of China and Russia now offer both opportunities and challenges.

European members of NATO would likely invest in building up their hard and soft power capabilities if this were the only way for them to protect their decades-old achievements alongside the EU-integration process. They need to acquire a more geopolitical vision in order to survive in the emerging great power competitions. It remains to be seen, however, whether they will build up their geopolitical identity within a NATO or an EU framework. It is also uncertain whether they view the U.S. as a committed believer in the liberal international order—or as a rogue global power that adopts a zero-sum perspective toward international politics and sees the world from a sphere of influence mentality. It is an open-ended question whether the transatlantic allies will be able to refashion NATO as a credible global security actor that meets the challenges of the emerging century.
Endnotes


Arif BAĞBAŞLIOĞLU *

Abstract

Burden-sharing is not a new area of contention among NATO members. In the post-Cold War period, due to changes in the international conjuncture, burden-sharing has continued to be on NATO’s agenda through various periods and with different intensities. Among the various differences in attitudes and interests regarding NATO policies between the U.S. and European members, U.S. governments have raised the issue of burden-sharing in particular to emphasize that the U.S. spends more on defending Europe’s security than do the European allies themselves. This article evaluates the burden-sharing issue, explains why it is constantly being raised by the U.S. and suggests concepts and policies with which to solve it. The article also discusses the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on NATO, arguing that the most important challenge will be the pandemic’s effect on the global economy. Relatedly, COVID-19’s impact may also affect the success of NATO’s policies and the U.S.’s influence on its European NATO allies in regard to its policies toward China. This suggests that burden-sharing will continue to occupy NATO’s agenda in the years ahead.

Keywords

NATO, burden-sharing, U.S. foreign policy, European security, smart defense, COVID-19

* Associate Professor, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Çanakkale, Turkey. E-mail: arifbagbasioglu@comu.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0002-8603-5014.
Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has emerged in an international conjuncture in which the concept of security and security perceptions have changed in relation to international actors. COVID-19 has once again reminded us that security cannot be approached solely from a state-oriented and military-strength perspective; rather, health is also a security issue, with pandemics posing a security threat to international actors. Due to international political and economic crises in various regions since the 1990s, a new discourse has been developed against the security discourse centered on the state and threats to the state that can only be responded to by armed force. This new discourse focuses on individuals and unconventional threats from economic and environmental factors, such as economic instability, political pressure, domestic conflicts, pandemics, smuggling, trafficking and migration. This change of discourse has introduced new concepts, such as the responsibility to protect, humanitarian interventions and human security. These concepts are based on the idea that the international community should take special measures to protect the security of people, not just states. Changes in the subjects to which security threats are directed have made a comprehensive concept of human security necessary, one that anticipates and eliminates the political, economic, environmental and social threats that hinder human well-being and happiness. This conceptualization has become widely used and discussed in the international relations literature.¹

Ensuring human security has also come onto NATO’s agenda. Since the Cold War, NATO has been transforming itself from a regional collective defense organization into a global security organization. However, its human security agenda has been limited to humanitarian intervention, which reflects the human security approach within NATO.² Although NATO’s latest strategic concept, published in 2010, accepted health risks as a security threat, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that NATO, like other international organizations, is not prepared enough.³ The pandemic has emerged as a non-military, human security problem that transcends borders and threatens everyone, regardless of status. This indicates that, strategically, the health sector is a component of the security sector. Thus, NATO needs to strengthen its resilience against
different types of threats, including pandemics. The COVID-19 pandemic has also changed states’ financial and economic priorities, which may reduce defense expenditure in the medium to long term. Even before the pandemic, the argument that the Europeans need to spend more on defense to better share NATO’s security and defense burden with the Americans was already tenuous in most European states. European governments’ already dubious appetite for increasing their NATO spending to a level commensurate with that of the U.S. will become even more difficult to sustain post crisis, because the general economic depression that will follow the pandemic will considerably constrain public spending. Indeed, the “more-money-for-defense” narrative will lack credibility in any public debate in which other human security-related priorities have emerged. This trend will also affect NATO’s longstanding burden-sharing debate.

Burden-sharing means acting collectively for a common purpose, so creating and maintaining an alliance concerns how burdens are shared. Inequitable burden-sharing in alliances where the military and economic strengths of its members differ significantly may pose a problem within the alliance. The burden-sharing issue within NATO has been discussed in terms of its different dimensions in the literature. This debate has been dominated by the economic theory of alliances, which interprets “security” (output) as a pure public good or an impure public good. This literature emerged in 1966 with an article by Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances”, in which the authors examine NATO as a military alliance in terms of its economic aspect. Assuming that defense within the alliance is a public property, they develop their economic theory of the military alliance and aim to explore how burden-sharing works within alliances. Reasoning that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a good measure of the benefits derived from collective security, they found a significant positive correlation between military expenditure and GDP. According to them, the pure publicness of NATO deterrence results in an “exploitation hypothesis”, whereby larger and richer allies shoulder a disproportionately large defense burden in terms of military expenditure/GDP compared to small and poorer allies. This means that the latter countries can attempt to freeride on the larger, wealthier members to maximize their benefits while minimizing their own support. In sum, the pure public good of deterrence, which is provided by the richest country, results in the other alliance members freeriding on the commitments of the richest member. This line of reasoning became part of a theory of organizations known as “collective action”.

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Critics, however, contradicted Olson and Zeckhauser’s conclusion by arguing that alliance-based security is an impure public good. That is, larger powers retain the ability to resort to intra-alliance threats about providing security as well as various diplomatic and economic disciplinary instruments to make the smaller powers fear abandonment and marginalization.\(^9\)

Overall then, we can accept that freeriding or burden-shifting incentives are an inevitable component of alliance politics. Numerous further studies have investigated NATO burden-sharing in different time periods, and explored burden-sharing measures.\(^10\) The overall conclusion is that changes in NATO’s strategic doctrine, weapons technology, membership and perceived threats affect the mix of public, impure public and private (ally-specific) benefits derived from the allies’ military expenditure, thereby influencing burden-sharing.\(^11\)

Burden-sharing here refers to the distribution of the costs and risks of accomplishing NATO activities equitably among member states. The worry about burden-sharing and freeriding dates back to the years following NATO’s foundation. Discussions of burden-sharing within NATO on the American side argue that its allies in Europe are freeriding on its military protection. They believe the U.S. should be wary of supporting wealthy European nations that do not want to spend as much on their militaries.\(^12\)

The European side has often responded by pointing out that much of the U.S. spending included in NATO’s published burden-sharing comparisons was for forces required for European missions that were not authorized by NATO, and to which European states were often opposed.\(^13\) While the American side tends to see issue in military terms, Europeans tend to see it as increasingly multi-dimensional. From time to time, the U.S. Congress in particular has taken the initiative of calling for increased European contributions. In the post-Cold War period, due to the changes in the international conjuncture, burden-sharing issues have remained on NATO’s agenda during various periods and with different intensities. The Trump Administration in particular extended its concerns about an unfair and unsustainable burden-sharing arrangement.

Taking a historical perspective by exploring NATO burden-sharing since the 1950s, this article evaluates the issue, explains why it is constantly being raised by the U.S. and suggests concepts and policies with which to resolve it. The article also evaluates the possible implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for burden-sharing in NATO. In the COVID-19 era, the most important challenge will be the pandemic’s effect on the global economy. Its impact may affect the success of NATO’s policies and U.S.
influence over its European NATO allies in its policies toward China. This suggests that burden-sharing will continue to occupy NATO’s agenda.

The Burden-Sharing Issue: A Longstanding Debate

In the early 1950s, U.S. political and military leaders expressed concerns about European dependence on the U.S. security presence in Europe, as they considered this as leaving the U.S. with an unfair share of the responsibility for European security. To develop a more balanced and sustainable sharing of the transatlantic security burden, U.S. leaders focused most often on seeking to compel European allies to increase their national defense budgets. Throughout the Cold War years, the issue was overwhelmingly measured in terms of GDP assigned to defense. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, America’s pressure on its European allies was most forcefully conveyed in the “Mansfield Resolutions”. Expressing opposition to the U.S. presence in Europe, Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a series of resolutions calling for a substantial reduction in the number of U.S. troops in Europe. Although the resolutions failed to be adopted and were not legally binding, they did put continued pressure on the Administration and served as a warning sign to the European Allies. In the 1980s, for instance, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation to cap U.S. force strength in Europe if the allies did not grow their national defense budgets annually by 3% more than inflation. According to former Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger’s report, only the U.S., Canada and Luxembourg had met these conditions each year since 1980. These kinds of solutions are still being proposed. More recently, for example, NATO leaders agreed to ensure that every member country spend 2% of its GDP on defense by 2024 (given its details below).

The problems of collaboration and burden-sharing within NATO have been discussed in different dimensions in the academic literature since the 1950s, and burden-sharing issues have appeared on NATO’s agenda in various periods and with varying intensities depending on changes in the international conjuncture, particularly in the post-Cold War period. The breakup of Yugoslavia and its effects on European security were among the most important issues affecting the debate after the Cold War’s end. During the Cold War, solutions had been sought for issues related to European security under U.S. and NATO leadership. The conflicts in Yugoslavia created a perception among European countries that this situation could be changed in favor of Europe. As Jacques F. Poos, former President of
the Council of the EU and former Deputy Prime Minister of Luxembourg noted, “Now, it is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans” regarding whether to intervene in the Yugoslavia crisis. This comment may be interpreted as the European Community considering this crisis as an opportunity to prove itself to the U.S. regarding European security. Indeed, the U.S. did not show interest in the region after the crisis in Yugoslavia first erupted. Instead, viewing the problem as an internal European issue, it left the solution to the European states.

Under these conditions, it was a natural development for the U.S. to ask its European allies to take on a greater burden regarding European security. NATO then decided to develop a European Security Defense Identity (ESDI) to enable NATO members, with the 1991 Rome Summit and its strategic concept, to use their means and capabilities to ensure their own security for operations in Europe in which non-European allies did not wish to participate. According to the strategic concept, as part of developing a European security identity, NATO’s European members would assume a greater degree of responsibility for Europe’s defense. On January 10–11, 1994, the ESDI initiative was adopted to accomplish a more balanced burden-sharing within NATO. To this end, the Combined Joint Task Forces, “separable but not separate”, were developed to enable European allies to carry out operations using NATO means and capabilities in the absence of the U.S. Arrangements regarding the Joint Common Task Forces were agreed upon at NATO’s 1996 Council of Ministers in Berlin. NATO-EU cooperation, which was developed with the Berlin Plus regulations at the end of 2002 and in early 2003, could not play a significant role in solving this problem. Despite these arrangements, however, transatlantic discussions over burden-sharing continued, because EU member states kept their defense expenditures low and refrained from increasing them to contribute to Europe’s defense.

During the military transformation that took place during the post-Cold War period, various reports were published and activities were carried out within NATO to resolve the burden-sharing issue. During the military transformation that took place during the post-Cold War period, various reports were published and activities were carried out within NATO to resolve the burden-sharing issue.

“Defence Capabilities Initiative”, adopted in 1999, and “the Prague Capabilities Commitment”, published at the Prague Summit in 2002 were documents reflecting the
will to work together and share the burden among NATO members. One example of this approach is the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) developed since 2006 by ten NATO member states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the U.S.) and two Partnership for Peace (PfP) member countries (Finland and Sweden) to improve air transport capabilities.21

As soon as the Soviet threat receded, the U.S. reduced its defense budget and military power allocated to NATO and decreased defense expenditure from 9 percent of GDP in 1989 to 3 percent in 2000. European countries also reduced their defense budgets.22 The active role of the U.S. in NATO-led operations in the Balkans following the disintegration of Yugoslavia highlighted the continued dependence of European allies on the U.S. in terms of carrying out military operations. After the September 11 attacks, American foreign policy multilateralism was replaced by unilateralism. The most tangible effect of this shift was that European allies did not contribute to the Afghanistan operation to the extent desired by the U.S., although it was carried out under NATO leadership.23 These developments meant that the issue of NATO burden-sharing remained unresolved during the presidency of George W. Bush from 2001 to 2009.

During Barack Obama’s presidency (2009–2017), the U.S. called more intensively for equitable burden-sharing in NATO. However, European members still did not increase their budgets to the level the U.S. wanted. During Obama’s presidency, NATO’s Libya operation was a crucial factor in the debate, as it exposed the ability gap between the European allies and the U.S. Although NATO members unanimously endorsed the war in Libya, fewer than half participated and less than one third carried out strike missions. According to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, this situation and the transatlantic gap in defense spending could consign NATO to “military irrelevance” in a “dim if not dismal” future unless the allies met their responsibilities.24 Thus, the reliance of European allies on the power and capabilities of the U.S. during NATO’s Libya operation once again raised the burden-sharing issue. To find a solution, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called on European allies to spend more on “smart defense” by pooling resources and cooperating more effectively, as explained below.

More recently, U.S. President Donald Trump criticized NATO’s European members on various occasions during and after his election campaign, using undiplomatic language and keeping the issue on the agenda. Trump not only repeatedly complained about the unfair fiscal burden carried by the
U.S. compared with its European allies, but even suggested that the transatlantic alliance is obsolete. Trump’s view on the issues was clear from his statements about “America first” in transatlantic relations, describing NATO as “an outdated organization” and referring to Germany as one of the NATO members that “need to pay their debts on defense spending.” Trump consistently criticized the low defense spending of NATO’s European members and questioned why the U.S. should continue to protect “free riders” if they do not significantly increase their defense spending. Trump reportedly even considered withdrawing the U.S. from NATO altogether. Successive U.S. administrations have raised the issue to emphasize their argument that the U.S. spends more on European security than European states themselves, especially given the differences in attitudes and interests between the U.S. and European NATO members regarding alliance policies. Especially during Donald Trump’s presidency, the U.S. administration has tried to prioritize the debate. As Nye highlights, Trump’s foreign and security policy placed much greater emphasis on unilateralism, with a dismaying zero-sum tone to Trump’s pronouncements, while the U.S.’s hegemonic leadership has been replaced with a much more transactional approach toward allies and partners. The European allies responded to these accusations; for example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that it was “no longer the case that the United States will simply just protect us,” and continued by asserting that Europe should take its destiny into its own hands. Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron supported the idea that Europe could not rely purely on the U.S. for its security: “It’s up to us to meet our responsibilities and guarantee our security, and therefore European sovereignty.” However, European members also emphasize that it is unfair to evaluate a country’s contribution to NATO’s common security only through the criterion of defense expenditure.

Despite these debates and the negative atmosphere that surrounds the issue, Schreer is sure that “neither is a U.S. withdrawal from NATO on the cards any time soon, nor are European countries serious about developing strategic autonomy from the U.S.” Although the relationship between the U.S. and its European allies is expected to fluctuate in the future, this is not expected to seriously damage NATO’s solidarity principle.

It is useful here to characterize the structure of the international conjuncture. Specifically, the international system today is evolving toward multipolarity. According to Mearsheimer, the world became multipolar in or close to 2016. This shift away from unipolarity to a new international order is a death sentence for the liberal international order, while the U.S. and
China will lead bounded orders in competition with each other economically and militarily. These developments are making the existing differences in threat perceptions and divergences of interest within NATO more visible. Moreover, the European allies do not even agree on security among themselves. For example, Western European countries, such as the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, believe that security cooperation should focus on sharing intelligence regarding international terrorism, whereas Eastern European countries, such as Poland and the Baltic Republics, prioritize regarding NATO as a means of deterring Russia. In such a conjuncture, it is unrealistic to wait for an issue like burden-sharing to be solved quickly as it is directly related to the defense planning policies of NATO member countries. In short, the burden-sharing issue is constantly kept on NATO’s agenda, especially by the U.S., and particularly during periods of political disagreement and differences of interests between the U.S. and its European allies.

NATO National Defense Spending Criteria: The 2% and 20% Spending Targets

Within NATO, the consensus regarding burden sharing is that the member states’ defense spending should not fall below a certain percentage of their GDP. The Defense Ministers Meeting held before the Riga Summit in 2006 discussed whether member states should increase their defense spending to 2% of GDP. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO leaders agreed formally to aim to spend at least 2% of GDP on annual national defense budgets, of which at least 20% should be devoted to major equipment and related research and development by 2024. In a period when the international security conjuncture changed, it is no coincidence that these decisions were taken at the Wales Summit, where the focal point was the future of relations with Russia, given the crisis in Ukraine and the necessity of securing NATO’s Eastern border. NATO leaders saw these goals as evidence of the Alliance’s deterrence capability.

According to the NATO data shown in Graph 1, seven countries had complied with the commitment to allocate 2% of GDP to defense expenditure by 2019, and all the other member countries have increased their defense
spending since 2014. However, it should be remembered that when this commitment was formalized in 2014, only four states were meeting this commitment. As Graph 2 shows, 16 countries committed to devoting 20% of defense spending on equipment in 2019, compared to four countries in 2013. This indicates that the member countries have tried to meet these commitments. As Graph 3 shows, from 2013 to 2019, non-U.S. NATO countries increased the defense outlays from $252 to $302 billion, while U.S. defense spending decreased from $696 billion to $685 billion. In all, NATO members’ total defense investment could top $1 trillion in 2020.

There are some problems in calculating the ratio of defense spending to GDP. The lack of a common definition of military expenditure makes it difficult to determine which items to consider within this category. NATO data reveal that although staff pensions are considered a military expenditure, it is debatable how much this actually serves the security of the country and the alliance. Another problem is calculating expenditures in countries where exchange rates fluctuate but military expenditure is indexed to the U.S. dollar. Some analysts even see the 2% and 20% spending targets as a completely meaningless discussion. In their view, these targets neither address NATO’s real needs nor contribute to NATO’s deterrence power. According to Cordesman, NATO needs to scrap these targets and focus on developing an effective strategy to deter Russia. Although most analysts agree that these targets do not represent any type of critical threshold in terms of defense capabilities, they are considered symbolically important political tools for keeping the Alliance together.

Graph I: Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries as a Share of GDP (%)

**Graph II:** Equipment Expenditure of NATO Countries as a Share of Defense Expenditure (%)

![Graph II: Equipment Expenditure of NATO Countries as a Share of Defense Expenditure (%)](image-url)


**Graph III:** Defense Expenditure in Billion USD.

![Graph III: Defense Expenditure in Billion USD](image-url)

Smart Defense as a Solution to the Recurring Burden-Sharing Issue

One attempt to solve the burden-sharing issue within NATO has been by means of activities carried out in smart defense since 2011. Smart defense was introduced to the international public in a speech by then NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011. Smart defense, which is a new expression of the common idea of “achieving maximum impact with limited resources allocated to defense,” formally become a part of NATO defense strategy at the Chicago Summit on May 20–21, 2012. Smart defense then became a fundamental element of NATO’s defense planning policy in decisions taken at the Wales Summit on September 4–5, 2014 to approve the NATO Framework Nations Concept, which supports smart defense. This called for willing NATO countries to come together under the coordination of one country to develop various capabilities, with joint projects initiated under the leadership of Germany, the U.K. and Italy.39 There are currently about 40 multinational smart defense projects that will deliver improved operational effectiveness, economies of scale and connectivity among member states’ national forces. These projects range from the NATO Universal Armament Interface, which aims to enable fighter jets to use munitions from various sources and nations, to Women Leaders in Security and Defense, which aims to integrate diversity and gender perspectives into strategic planning, development of capabilities and force preparedness.

The beginning of the process of establishing the concept of smart defense goes back to the discussions about NATO’s function in the early post-Cold War period. In the longstanding debates over the functions of NATO, those who argue that NATO’s institutional identity is no longer fundamentally important under the present circumstances generally offer two main reasons. First, they argue that the underlying transatlantic bond at the heart of NATO can no longer serve the interests of its members. Second, NATO can no longer ensure the security and stability of continental Europe. However, NATO’s continued existence indicates that the meaningfulness of the transatlantic bond does continue to endure, at least within the Alliance.

In the post-Cold War era, crisis management, which involved expanding NATO’s combat and intervention zone, and cooperative security, which was
based on developing relations with non-NATO member countries, were included in NATO’s strategic concepts and declared in 1991, 1999 and 2010. Additionally, NATO defined collective defense as the Alliance’s main aim of establishment. Every new strategic concept reflects an increase in salient threats against the alliance. These new strategic concepts draw attention to the variety of threats against NATO’s current security. For example, the 2010 strategic concept listed as current threats the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, instability or conflict beyond NATO borders, cyber-attacks, terrorism and key environmental and resource constraints. Nonetheless, member countries differ in their perceptions of these threats and their willingness to participate in balancing them. Although these differences have not led NATO to disband, they have caused the European allies in particular to be less eager than the U.S. to participate in and share the costs of NATO’s new global tasks. Since 2009, for example, the U.S., highlighting its interests in the Asia-Pacific—a region where NATO has officially had little role to play—has developed new regional policies. This development has increased the familiar pressure on European countries to allocate more funds to bear the costs of the alliance.

At this point, it is necessary to draw attention to the economic conjuncture that limits the struggle against the security threats NATO has identified, as well as the variety of threats and pressures to be struggled against. Each country’s defense spending is shaped by many different factors, such as the nature of the perceived threats, and each country’s geopolitical position, military capabilities, economic capacities and foreign policy objectives. The quantity and quality of a country’s spending also depends on many factors, such as the quality of the military equipment it owns, and its ability to adapt to technological innovations and sectoral trends. The global financial crisis caused growth rates to decrease to zero or worse in developed economies in 2008 and 2009, especially in the U.S. This crisis, which adversely affected defense capacities, was even more intense in Europe. According to the report of the NATO Political Committee, between 2001 and 2013, European NATO members’ defense spending in terms of real GDP decreased from 1.93% to 1.58%. In contrast, while most European countries cut defense budgets by 10 to 15% between 2008 and 2013, defense spending in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation grew by 43.2% and 31.2%, respectively. The report clearly highlights that the decline of NATO member defense budgets is one of the most important challenges that NATO faces today.

Smart defense is a concept created in an international conjuncture where global threats have increased, while the resources to fight them and, more
importantly, the common will to fight them has diminished and the U.S. has shifted its strategic priorities to the Asia Pacific. Rasmussen describes smart defense as “ensuring greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility.” He considers the decline in the defense expenditure of the European allies as alarming in the current period, when rising powers like China and India have increased theirs. Rasmussen therefore presented smart defense as a solution to a problem that mainly concerns European countries. Smart defense is clearly considered as an opportunity to compensate for this contraction European defense spending while reducing Europe’s military dependence on the U.S. As we know from NATO’s Libyan operation in 2011, the European allies still depend on the U.S. for the critical resources necessary for conducting an advanced military operation, such as combat drones for air intelligence, airlifts, precision-guided weapons and ground control facilities.

It is a common practice for European countries to meet their military needs through cheaper, joint projects. Likewise, smart defense is based on the principle of “pooling and sharing”, which is also an element of the EU Security and Defense Policy. Both before and especially after the establishment of the European Defense Agency in 2004, EU countries have implemented defense projects in which they invest together within this framework. Smart defense is a familiar solution to U.S. criticisms that the European allies are not allocating more resources to cover NATO’s costs. The main reasons for making this idea the most important element of NATO’s defense policy are the financial distress of the European allies and the clear shift in U.S. strategic priorities beyond Europe.

Challenges for Promoting Smart Defense

According to NATO officials, smart defense rests on three pillars: cooperation, prioritization and specialization. These pillars may be seen as NATO’s attempt to rationally adapt itself to the realities of the 21st century. However, it should not be forgotten that applying these pillars is not as
easy as it sounds in the official texts. Those who think that smart defense cannot go beyond a slogan, despite being a good idea, offer three main reasons:47 First, the allies’ trust in each other has diminished, as became evident during the NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Libya. Second, countries often see defense expenditure as a way of reviving their national industries. Third, bureaucratic domestic procedures complicate the provision of military services. In addition, it is difficult to identify exactly where the allies will invest and coordinate private sector involvement in this process.

Specialization is arguably the most difficult principle to realize within the smart defense framework. Specialization is also directly related to national defense industry activities and policies. Provision practices, which constitute the basis of defense industry activities, are a basic building block of sectoral development as well as the target of meeting user needs. Thus, services such as defense industry policies, defense system procurement, project management, industrialization, financing, research and development, exports and defense industry cooperation are carried out through single and centralized institutional structures that can adapt to the changing conditions of the day and are based on project management. Maintaining this centrality in an international organization like NATO is more difficult than it is in a single state. It is therefore hard to determine the criteria under which NATO countries will pursue “specialization” because each nation’s defense industry is directly linked to its national sovereignty. Today, decision-making for defense procurement requires a comprehensive assessment. While NATO members whose economic capacities are relatively small adopt the specialization principle of smart defense and prefer to allocate resources to build cell capacities, states with better economies, such as the U.K., France and Canada insist on having “full scope” defense capacities.48 This disparity prevents specialization from spreading throughout NATO.

Smart defense aims at military integration in every sense among NATO member countries. However, even in a supranational organization based on the delegation of sovereign powers such as the EU, “pooling and sharing” cannot be implemented very successfully. In this sense, an answer to the question, what makes smart defense different from its predecessors and what makes it worth following, is the international conjuncture we have described above and the effects it entails.

The exact form of smart defense depends on coordinating member states’ defense planning policies and their common threat perceptions. Given the
difficulty of agreeing on a common threat within NATO outside official
texts, smart defense cannot be fully realized. However, the “smart defense
discourse” will remain on NATO’s agenda as a label and slogan. Indeed,
smart defense will clearly remain on the agenda, especially because the
number of states needing NATO’s security umbrella has increased due to
the threat they feel, especially from Russia, after the crisis in Ukraine.

Possible Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the
Burden-sharing Issue

COVID-19 has revealed that no international organization can fulfill its an-
nounced mission and that all have created bureaucratic structures that have
inflated over time. Formed as a collective defense organization before
claiming to transform itself into a global security organization following
changes in the international conjuncture, NATO too was caught unprepared
for the pandemic. One focus of criticism is NATO’s failure to provide the
desired cooperation and coordination with two of its member states, Italy
and Spain, after the pandemic first appeared. This failure has brought
NATO’s strategic concept and preparedness against security threats into
question and forced a reevaluation of NATO’s effectiveness in perceiving
and taking measures against non-military global threats to human securi-
ty. The cancellation of Exercise Defender-Europe 20, which would have
been the largest military exercise in terms of both the number and range of
personnel since the Cold War, due to the pandemic seems likely to bring
garrison and medical security onto NATO’s agenda.

After NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that they were
fighting an “invisible enemy,” NATO foreign ministers assigned the Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe on April 2, 2020 to coordinate the air
transport of medical supplies and personnel. Various parts of NATO’s
institutional structure took on the task of ensuring coordination between
member states during the pandemic, such as the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Re-
sponse Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the Committee of the Chiefs
of Military Medical Services in NATO (COMEDS). However, despite
these assignments, member countries failed to establish a common sharing
system for medical equipment and personnel and used their own resources
rather than NATO’s to fight the pandemic. For its part, NATO has taken
some steps to eliminate its deficiencies regarding coordination, particularly
through decisions taken at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting on June
17–18, 2020. Participants discussed plans for a possible second wave and
decided to stock up on critical medical equipment and materials, and create a fund for their procurement.

COVID-19 has shown that security estimates, risk predictions, existing understandings, norms, decision-making processes, institutions and preparations for managing possible crises are not sufficient worldwide. Regarding security policies, as Aydin notes, chemical-biological threats, which have already entered the national security documents of some security organizations and states, but apparently still have not been adequately prepared for, will be among the top concerns in future planning. NATO has also begun to work on creating a new strategic concept to increase dialogue and strengthen solidarity among member states while providing political coordination. Considering that the pandemic has reminded the international community that human health is also a security phenomenon, it can be expected that NATO’s new strategic concept will devote more space to threats to health, food and technology, and to methods for dealing with them.

The last NATO summit before the COVID-19 pandemic emerged was held in London on December 3–4, 2019. This summit is important because it was held after French President Macron claimed in an interview on November 7 that NATO was ‘brain dead’ and there was a lack of strategic coordination in NATO’s decision-making processes. Thus, the reiteration in the Summit Declaration’s first Article that the principles of “solidarity, unity and cohesion” are NATO’s cornerstones was more significant than similar expressions at previous summits. In the Summit Declaration, NATO leaders also declared a strengthening of NATO’s ability to deter and defend with an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities. Space was also emphasized as a new operational domain apart from land, air, sea and cyberspace. The declaration launched an evaluation to strengthen NATO’s political dimension. Within this framework, the NATO Secretary General designated a group of ten experts in March 2020. Based on their report, NATO is likely to create a new strategic concept to enhance dialogue and solidarity among member countries. Finally, the most distinguishing feature of this summit was that the China-U.S. rivalry was officially added to NATO’s agenda. In the Summit Declaration, NATO leaders acknowledged that they cannot ig-
nore the consequences of China’s growing influence and foreign policies. It was thus critical to add China to the agenda as a factor affecting NATO’s security approach, given the ongoing trade wars and the political debates within NATO regarding the economy, technology and cyber-warfare.

In a clear sign of efforts to make China internationally responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic, then U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo referred to the pandemic as “the Wuhan virus” in reference to the city where it supposedly originated, while then President Donald Trump called it “the Chinese virus”, even claiming that it came from a laboratory in Wuhan. The Trump administration’s discourse needs to be evaluated within the framework of internal policy objectives regarding the November 2020 presidential election. China-U.S. rivalry, which had already become more prominent in the three years before the pandemic, is likely to result in a new bipolar or multipolar international system whose economic characteristics will become more evident once the pandemic subsides.

If the international system becomes bipolar again, an international system can be created in which NATO allies can gather around their policies more easily. Considering the current conditions in the U.S., a bipolar system is also compatible with Biden’s domestic and foreign policy objectives because, in such an international system, organizations based on collective defense, such as NATO, can become more significant. In sum, it seems that NATO will become more involved in balancing China in the Asia Pacific Region, given the summit’s official acknowledgment, for the first time, of the challenge to NATO of China’s global policies and the Trump administration’s discourse on China’s responsibility for the global spread of COVID-19. As Aydın emphasizes, the dependence of the global production chain on China, especially for intermediate goods, which became evident during the pandemic, can transform the U.S.’s efforts before the pandemic to create non-Chinese alternatives to certain products into a common effort across the West. Such an effort could bring states on both sides of the Atlantic together for new purposes by ending divergences between the U.S. and its European allies in security understanding and threat perception.

In the wake of the pandemic, the most important coercive factor that may affect the success of stronger NATO policies adopted by all members, as well as the U.S.’s influence on NATO’s European members in its policies toward China, will be the effects of the pandemic on the global economy. These could trigger a period in which European countries, which are already on the cusp of their defense spending, reduce military spending despite being constantly criticized by U.S. administrations. This will inten-
sify discussions about burden-sharing as member states prioritize spending for economic recovery over military spending. Indeed, Dutch Defense Minister Ank Bijleveld has already announced, “it is clear that we will not reach [the defense spending target] by 2024”. The pandemic, which represents a breaking point in traditional security concerns, has sparked new discussions on the mandates of state security, territorial control, border, coast guard, anti-terrorism and public order institutions and organizations.

While it remains unclear when the COVID-19 pandemic will end, whether there will be second or third waves, and what the intensity of these possible waves may be, it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions about how the pandemic will change the functioning of the existing international system and international organizations such as NATO. Yet, even if the pandemic were to end today, it is clear that criticisms of neoliberal policies that do not place people at the center have given momentum to ideas like re-emphasizing social and strong state concepts. Rather than waiting for the pandemic to radically change the current international system, it would be more realistic to expect that the processes outlined above, which had already started before the pandemic, will take effect. Indeed, the pandemic has once again demonstrated the necessity of international cooperation, multilateral policies and functioning international organizations in solving global problems.

In the wake of the pandemic, the most important coercive factor that may affect the success of stronger NATO policies adopted by all members, as well as the U.S.’s influence on NATO’s European members in its policies toward China, will be the effects of the pandemic on the global economy.

Conclusion

After the 2010 Lisbon Summit, when NATO’s latest strategic concept was published, certain developments changed security perceptions and required a reevaluation of the organization’s security and defense policies—perhaps even a new strategic concept. Conflicts following the Arab Spring, the dissolution of state structures in the Middle East, the growth of DAESH, the refugee crisis, the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s invasion of Crimea were significant developments threatening NATO security. In addition, Trump’s
persistent, post-election criticisms of NATO’s European members’ lack of burden-sharing was remarkably effective in revealing the differences in threat perceptions among NATO members. Although there is a consensus in the literature about the need for NATO to adapt to this new security environment, how this adaptation will take place remains a question.

Nevertheless, despite being a recurring issue, burden-sharing disagreements will not cause major structural changes such as NATO’s disintegration. Although the role and power of the U.S. in the international system have arguably decreased as the international system has evolved into multipolarity, these conditions will not change the U.S.’s position in NATO. Today, the debates on burden-sharing between the U.S. and its European allies are historically similar to political crises in NATO since the 1950s. Today’s burden-sharing issue is politically temporary and situational; the defense spending of NATO’s European members has tended to increase since 2014, although efforts within NATO to solve the problem, such as smart defense, may contribute to this problem, albeit relatively. Thus, this issue should be regarded as a way of expressing political conflicts between the U.S. and its European allies, such as relations with Russia and China, and the prioritizing of threats to the Alliance. In fact, the problem of burden-sharing lies in the divergences between NATO member states on security and threat perceptions, which have recently become more visible.

NATO could effectively help combat a threat like the COVID-19 pandemic because it requires global cooperation and solidarity. However, NATO’s internal problems, due to differences in its member states’ geopolitical priorities that preexisted the spread of the pandemic, prevented this. The pandemic has provided a challenging test of NATO, which owes its survival to its ability to adapt to transformations in the geopolitical environment, including changing threat perceptions. The pandemic has revealed that security cannot be addressed from a narrow, state-oriented perspective, and cannot be dealt with merely by means of military power. COVID-19 has made it obvious that health is a security issue that requires states to strengthen their resilience against different types of threats, including pandemics.

As a global phenomenon, the pandemic has rapidly affected many different areas, from the daily habits of individuals to the foreign policies of international actors. Despite uncertainty about how the currently chaotic environment will evolve, the pandemic will influence ongoing processes rather than completely change the current international system. In particular, considering NATO’s recent, official acknowledgement at the 2019
London summit that China is a significant security concern, tension in NATO-China relations, which started before the pandemic, will continue to increase. The effects of the pandemic on the global economy may initiate a period in which European countries, whose defense expenditures have always been targeted by U.S. administrations, will nonetheless reduce those expenditures. If so, the Permanent Structured Cooperation process of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy will lose momentum and NATO will become the preferred platform for European defense cooperation.

Despite uncertainty about how the currently chaotic environment will evolve, the pandemic will influence ongoing processes rather than completely change the current international system.
Endnotes


2 The theoretical dimension of the humanitarian intervention discussions is based on the struggle to demarcate a boundary between state sovereignty, which is regarded as one of the founding features of a state, and human rights, which are regarded as a universal value. NATO’s post-Cold War Kosovo and Libya interventions, conducted without an armed attack on any of the member countries—which considered an out of area/non-article 5 operation—have been extensively discussed in the literature within the framework of the concept of humanitarian intervention.

3 In the document, problems such as the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies, risks against health, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs are evaluated as factors that can affect NATO members’ security policies. For more information, see “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept,” *NATO*, November 19, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm (Accessed August 26, 2020).


Ana E. Juncos, “EU’s Post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (Re)integrating the Balkans and (Re)inventing the EU,” *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (November 2005), p. 88.


Under the SALIS agreement, NATO charters additional commercial airlift to make up the shortfall. SALIS provides assured access to up to six AN-124-100 aircraft (mission-ready within nine days in case of crisis) in support of NATO and European Union operations. SALIS-participating countries have used Antonov aircraft in the past to transport equipment to and from Afghanistan, deliver aid to the victims of the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and airlift African Union peacekeepers in and out of Darfur. For details, see “Strategic Airlift,” *NATO*, September 20, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50107.htm (Accessed January 18, 2020).


41 Ibid.


48 Ibid, p.16.


50 Ramazan Erdoğan, Koronavirüs Sonrası NATO’nun Geleceği, Ankara: SETA, 2020, pp. 8–11.


54 Erdoğan, Koronavirüs Sonrası NATO’nun Geleceği, p. 13.


59 For the full text of the Summit Declaration, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm.


How Can NATO Effectively Counter Terrorism and Hybrid Threats? Analyzing the Benefits and Pitfalls of Joint Synergies

Giray SADIK *

Abstract

When it comes to hybrid threats, there are a number of gaps to be addressed to keep NATO strategically relevant for the Allies’ security. As many experts have observed, despite the potential for terrorist violence as a part of hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism as a response or preventive measure has an unexpectedly low profile in NATO’s policy on hybrid threats. The more NATO addresses these critical issues for Allies’ security through intra-alliance cooperation, the more strategically relevant the Alliance will be for its members. Hence, Alliance cohesion is a key starting point, but perhaps only the first step. The next steps are likely to be built together by working on venues for strategic cooperation and hybrid capacity-building. The security atmosphere of Europe and its neighborhood is becoming increasingly hybrid, and therefore requires the Allies to act accordingly. To what extent NATO can deliver under these circumstances will be the litmus test for the Alliance’s credibility and strategic relevance in the years to come. This article aims to explore how NATO can expand its strategic cooperation and develop effective countermeasures against terrorism and hybrid threats, while paving the way for hybrid capacity-building starting with NATO allies and potentially growing with regional partners.

* Professor, Director of European Studies Research Center, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey. E-mail: gsadik@ybu.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0002-4099-7840. The author would like to thank the Research Division of NATO Defense College (NDC), where he conducted part of this research as an Eisenhower Fellow. The views expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the NDC or NATO.
Keywords

Euro-Atlantic security, hybrid warfare, hybrid threats, terrorism, NATO, new strategic concept

Introduction

The malaise that the U.S. and the West have experienced in recent military campaigns stems in large part from *unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two*. Analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility, and this inadequacy of understanding has spawned new and not-so-new terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the rediscovery of ‘insurgency’ and ‘counterinsurgency’ and leading to a discussion of ‘hybrid threats’ and ‘gray-zone’ operations. New terminology can help, but the change must go deeper.1

Recent NATO summits have illustrated how the Allies can keep talking about issues of substantial relevance with each other without adequately contemplating the potential of their interrelationship. Since 2014, all NATO Summit Declarations have pointed to terrorism and hybrid warfare as the main and most immediate threats to the security of the North Atlantic Alliance and its members. Surprisingly, however, these two threats are largely addressed separately—the fact that terrorism happens to be an important element of hybrid warfare is not mentioned at all.2

Most of the research carried out on NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts focus on theoretical debates such as the divergent views among the Allies on how to respond the terrorist threat or on whether NATO has become a collective security organization in the Transatlantic area or remains committed to collective defence. However, little, if any, research has been carried out which examines to what extent can NATO provide practical content to its vision on countering terrorism in addition to the Transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation.3

When it comes to hybrid threats, a number of areas must be addressed to keep NATO strategically relevant to the Allies’ security. Above all, as Andrew Mumford warned in 2016, “despite the potential of terrorist violence as part of hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism as a response or preventive measure has an unexpectedly low profile in NATO’s policy on hybrid threats.” This critical point remains relevant today in terms of NATO’s doctrines and practices.
The present article addresses the following core question: Should NATO tackle terrorism and hybrid threats together? Analyzing relevant NATO strategies and operations in countering terrorism and hybrid threats will help to identify the critical, common characteristics of and constraints posed to the Transatlantic political and military communities. Building on this analysis, the article explores NATO’s venues for cooperation and strategic learning when developing effective countermeasures against terrorism and hybrid threats. Finally, the article details the policy implications of the hybrid security environment for the development of a comprehensive NATO strategy.

The article is based on analyses of up-to-date NATO documents, such as strategic and military concepts, summit communiques and declarations, as primary sources. To complement these sources with experts’ insights, the author conducted phone interviews with NATO officials and with non-NATO experts with relevant expertise, such as those from the EU-NATO joint Centre of Excellence to Counter Hybrid Threats. In addition, NATO Defense College (NDC) publications and related articles were used as secondary sources.

Growing Importance of Hybrid Threats for Euro-Atlantic Security

The EU has recently found itself facing various crises, from intergovernmental squabbles over the EU constitution to economic hardships, from refugees on its borders to rising concerns over emboldened Russian maneuvers in Ukraine and Syria and the strategic consequences of Brexit for Euro-Atlantic relations. Evidently, these interrelated challenges are of a transnational and hybrid nature, involving state and non-state actors alike. As these challenges affect the European sphere inside and out, the EU needs to devise political strategies to deal with them. In light of these challenging developments, the need for comprehensive analyses and timely solutions has raised research interest in hybrid threats among practitioners and scholars alike.

Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor’s edited 2012 volume, *Hybrid Warfare*, is a flagship example of recent studies on the topic, providing historical background with the aim of tracing continuity and change in devising hybrid strategies. However, as Bernhard Hoffmann notes in his recent review of the book, perhaps in part due to the military background of the editors, “a traditional focus on the battlefield makes me wonder whether the editors were thinking hybrid enough.” Indeed, although the
editors’ background in military history and strategic studies can be an advantage for detailed battleground analysis, it can also hamper the development of the comprehensive outlook necessary to grasp the nature of contemporary hybrid threats. Other, more recent books tend to overemphasize a single dimension of hybrid warfare above all other factors, such as terrorism and regime change. Evidently, these studies also risk not being comprehensive enough to grasp the true complexity of contemporary hybrid strategies.  

Definition: Hybrid War or Hybrid Threat?

As NATO is the core institution organizing Euro-Atlantic cooperation against hybrid threats, its definitions present a meaningful starting point. In a 2011 report, NATO describes ‘hybrid threat’ as follows:

Hybrid threat is an umbrella term, encompassing a wide variety of existing adverse circumstances and actions, such as terrorism, migration, piracy, corruption, ethnic conflict… What is new, however, is the possibility of NATO facing the adaptive and systematic use of such means singularly and in combination by adversaries in pursuit of long-term political objectives, as opposed to their more random occurrence, driven by coincidental factors.

This comprehensive definition of hybrid threats enables researchers to grasp the term’s multi-faceted nature, while also presenting examples of hybrid threats such as terrorism and migration. The same report underlines that “hybrid threats are not exclusively a tool of asymmetric or non-state actors, but can be applied by state and non-state actors alike. Their principal attraction from the point of view of a state actor is that they can be largely non-attributable, and therefore applied in situations where more overt action is ruled out for any number of reasons.

This point in the report is of particular importance for the present research, as it highlights the fact that ‘hybrid’ does not necessarily mean ‘non-state.’ In this regard, this ‘hybrid threat’ conceptualization opens the door for the
consideration of ‘hybrid war’ in the formulation and development of hybrid threats. Accordingly,

Hybrid war encompasses a set of hostile actions whereby, instead of a classical large-scale military invasion, an attacking power seeks to undermine its opponent through a variety of acts including subversive intelligence operations, sabotage, hacking, and the empowering of proxy insurgent groups. It may also spread disinformation (in target and third countries), exert economic pressure and threaten energy supplies.10

In view of the above definition, hybrid war necessitates an orchestrating state actor, which can weave state capabilities such as military and intelligence operations in support of proxy insurgent groups. The most recent examples of such operations can be observed in Russian maneuvers in Ukraine and Syria, involving both conventional military assets such as fighter jets and air defenses, along with local insurgent groups acting as proxy land forces. Although important, hybrid war is only part of the story when the Allies are faced with ever-growing hybrid threats ranging from refugees to terrorism. NATO’s “Bi-Strategic Command Capstone Concept” describes hybrid threats as “those posed by conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.”11 The same concept includes “low intensity asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, resources security, which have also been identified by NATO as so-called hybrid threats.”12 Similar to the earlier hybrid threat definition, this one also includes terrorism and the demographic challenges growing out of a combination of state and non-state actors via conventional and non-conventional means. This constitutes another reason for this article’s choice of the term ‘hybrid threat’ to capture the complexity of the threat environment in which NATO needs to operate. Under these circumstances, it can be observed that Euro-Atlantic relations have been evolving in a constant trial period in which even their rare successes are bound to be repeatedly tested. Still, “European countries are vulnerable to threats from war and political instability in Syria and Iraq. Terrorist groups exploit fragile environment for unleashing violence and attacks in European countries.”13 For this reason, effective Euro-Atlantic cooperation against hybrid threats has become more a question of “how” than of “if.”
Terrorism & Hybrid Threats: Common Characteristics in Theory and Practice

As hybrid threats to international security have evolved, their analysis in scholarly and policy debates have become a source of ongoing confusion. However, it is important to refer to NATO definitions from official reports as primary sources, as these reflect a consensus view among member states about their understanding of these key terms. Definitions present a meaningful starting point, and this article uses the updated NATO glossary for the basics as follows: a hybrid threat is defined as a type of threat that combines conventional, irregular and asymmetric activities in time and space.14

In addition, experts underline that “hybrid threats are not exclusively a tool of asymmetric or non-state actors, but can be applied by state and non-state actors alike. In accordance with NATO definitions, ‘terrorism’ has already been placed under the umbrella of hybrid threats. This constitutes a meaningful starting point for considering them together. NATO has defined terrorism and counterterrorism as follows:

Terrorism: the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.

Counterterrorism: all preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property against terrorist threats and/or acts, and to respond to terrorist acts.15

As highlighted in the above definitions, there is at least an acknowledgement on paper that terrorism and hybrid threats are interrelated. However, so far, only a few experts such as Andrew Mumford and Peter Braun have advocated this point. Still, their observation is relevant today, given the increasing likelihood of growing complexity and threat levels as terrorists acquire capabilities and deploy their tactics in theatres from Libya to Yemen and from Ukraine to Syria. For this reason, instead of dealing with extensive conceptual debates on the use of terms, this section focuses on the fundamental commonalities that could be considered in tandem.
To begin with, on a strategic landscape, acts of terror function as components of hybrid threats. Therefore, terrorism has the potential to become a key part of hybrid strategy in the grey zone where lines between state and non-state, domestic and international, civilian and military, physical and cyber domains are deliberately blurred. At times, terrorist attacks have been used to further complicate the relationship between these domains, so as to have a greater asymmetric impact against an adversary with superior conventional forces. Therefore, in the grey zone it is not practically feasible to isolate terrorism from hybrid threats. Braun highlights this end-means link on the role of terrorism in hybrid strategy as follows:

The main objective of terrorist activity in a hybrid environment is to spread fear and terror, to intimidate populations and degrade the will of an adversary. When multiple terrorist activities follow a central strategy, they can destabilize a state or a society to a considerable degree, even if an individual acting alone may cause relatively little harm.16

In addition to the critical role of terrorism as a key component of hybrid threats, there is also a growing trend that can be coined as the ‘hybridization of terrorism,’ referring to the rising threat of terrorist organizations that have acquired hybrid capabilities. Ongoing clashes in Syria demonstrate how hybrid strategies can be violently pushed to the limits and pave the way for a number of unintended consequences. For example, “all factions are benefiting from material support from external actors, besides the plundering of pre-existent Syrian army depots. As relations between the factions are fluid, weapons often do not end up in the hands of the users for which they were intended.”17 The growing hybrid capacity of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, DAESH, the PKK and their regional variants are only the tip of the iceberg of this rising trend. Furthermore, “nation states may empower terrorists by making heavy weapons (e.g., anti-tank weapons or drones) available to them.”18 These interrelated trends reduce the technological edge states typically have against terrorists, and thus decrease the risk terrorists face when attacking state forces. These parallel trends—the increasing use of terrorism in hybrid warfare and the hybridization of terrorism—can be viewed as the ying-and-yang of each other, paving the way for protracted conflicts (e.g., Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, etc.), increasing civilian casualties and
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resulting in mass refugee outflows with no end in sight. These common characteristics of conflict in the grey zone give rise to a number of shared problems for NATO and the Allies when dealing with terrorism and hybrid threats, all of which need to be analyzed together.

In recent years, NATO has put forward strategies addressing both terrorism and hybrid warfare. At the Chicago Summit in 2012, Policy Guidelines on counter-terrorism were approved. In 2015, these guidelines were supplemented by a military-strategic concept for counter-terrorism endorsed by the Military Committee. The concept, however, simply re-states the overarching political principles and provides only limited additional content. Lastly, in 2015, the North Atlantic Council agreed to a strategy on NATO’s role in countering hybrid threats.19

The joint consideration of terrorism and hybrid threats can be seen as a first step in the right direction. Still, this acknowledgement on paper has yet to materialize into effective countermeasures. So far, the role of NATO has remained one of support to national efforts in countering terrorism and hybrid threats, rather than one of leadership. This backseat approach can be attributed to the underlying perception among many Allies that both terrorism and hybrid threats must first be countered at the national level. Therefore, despite the recognition of the transnational nature of the threats, there is a tendency among many Allies to consider the fight against them as the primary responsibility of the respective Allied governments, not of NATO per se. In short, common threats have failed to trigger common perceptions for many Allies.

NATO has made efforts to adapt to the new security challenges of the 21st century, including international terrorism, by developing broader definitions of threats, restructuring its forces and refining common operational doctrines, which are the constituent parts of NATO’s broader transformation process. In describing NATO’s transformation, E. V. Buckley, NATO’s previous Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations, in a speech to the George C. Marshall Centre Conference, stated that the transformation goes beyond military transformation, and “involves the adaptation of NATO’s structures, capabilities,
policies, doctrines, and relationships to better suit current and perceived security challenges.” With so many blurred lines among the threats themselves, NATO’s role in countering them is far from clear. This lack of clarity need not mean that NATO has no important role to play in countering terrorism and hybrid threats for the Allies and their partners, but rather that limiting its engagement in the hybrid landscape may put NATO’s strategic relevance against these threats at risk.

Benefits for NATO in Dealing with Terrorism and Hybrid Threats Together

The current strategic landscape has become increasingly fluid, and thus needs to be analyzed beyond fixations on hybrid threats only from the East (i.e., Russia) and terrorism only from the South (i.e., MENA). Although NATO’s recent 360-degree approach to security acknowledges that threats can emerge from all directions, the more focused we are on the East-South divide, the more strategically blind we become to threats from other areas. As Lasconjarias and Jacobs point out:

NATO has started to adapt to the hybrid challenge, particularly in reaction to Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine. But the Alliance is still far from a comprehensive strategy against hybrid threats, with particular regard to those emerging in the South. In order to develop such a comprehensive strategy, NATO needs to balance the course it is following to the East and South, as well as further develop its instruments, resources and approaches.

This observation is becoming increasingly relevant today. Now, the real question has become how rather than if. To this end, the key benefits to NATO of addressing terrorism and hybrid threats together should be highlighted:

1) Avoid stove-piping and duplication of the Allies’ efforts

If we keep adding new terms to an already exhaustive alphabet soup, we risk further complicating our limited understanding of these threats. In addition to conceptual limitations, “using different wording for identical content carries the risk of duplication and stove-piping.” These are real risks, and if not addressed in a timely fashion they are likely to proliferate, and be exploited by adversaries and terrorists seeking asymmetric advantages. In a report prepared for the NATO’s Centre of Excellence for Defence against Terrorism in August 2016, for instance, Andrew Mumford concludes that “NATO counter-terrorism planning [...] needs to be fully integrated with-
in the Alliance’s overarching military planning as an acknowledgment of the centrality of terrorism to the waging of hybrid warfare.”

Although progress has been made in various areas since, Mumford’s critical assessment still holds true today. Moreover, this assessment needs to be considered by other international organizations such as the EU (i.e., in ongoing joint NATO-EU counter-hybrid cooperation) and by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), given its important role in European security, when complementing NATO’s military role with political mechanisms to enhance physical (infrastructure, energy security) and informational (cyber, AI/AR, media) resilience against hybrid threats. As a first step, these organizations can begin by “formulating a better-integrated strategy covering both threats, including an all-embracing threat description, followed by a comprehensive response across the full range of different modes of warfare.”

Allied “capacity and willingness to impose costs (both reputational and material) on attackers should also be part of the policy toolbox.”

2) Similar threats require corresponding joint NATO capabilities & countermeasures

If avoidance of stove-piping and duplication is about what not to do, developing joint complementary capabilities is about what to do. In this regard, NATO strategies can be summarized as follows:

Comparing the 2012 Counter-Terrorism Guidelines with the 2015 Strategy on NATO’s role in countering hybrid threats, the lack of coordination and integration becomes particularly evident. While the message of the Alliance’s counter-terrorism strategy is ‘aware, capable and engaged’, the strategy on countering hybrid threats is labelled ‘prepare, deter, defend’. It is obvious, however, that several elements subsumed under the different keywords are more or less identical.

Quanten explains that NATO’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism [established at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002] “foresaw a number of new initiatives, such as intelligence sharing, CBRN measures, the establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, and Civil Emergency planning, as a priority. Yet all these separate initiatives lacked coordination and an overarching vision.”

NATO’s counterterrorism capabilities can be effective when countering emerging hybrid threats. Yet the problem, echoed by an increasing number of experts like Quanten, is not lack of resources (which is another challenge—burden-sharing), but the lack of an overarching strategic mindset. One way to address this problem could be to offer strategies on how to effectively combine Allied efforts in counter-
ing terrorism and hybrid threats. For instance, as Lasconjarias and Larsen suggest, “structurally, the respective forces should be organized around *Special Forces*, assuming that these would better understand and better mirror the adversary’s deployment.”²⁸ Such efforts can also contribute to NATO’s transformation by paving the way for the creation of more flexible, interoperable Special Forces units deployable against hybrid threats and terrorism, especially in light-footprint operations from the Balkans to MENA, where they can be trained and equipped to address challenges from the Eastern and Southern flanks.

3) *Strategic learning & inter-departmental cooperation between transatlantic communities countering terrorism and hybrid threats*

Threats from terrorist and hybrid attacks continue to rise. Perhaps even more important than the number of attacks and casualties is their increasing complexity and growing transnational character. This risk of spill-over remains high today, and has become more of a two-way street, especially where hybrid strategies have been projected from East to South, as with Russia’s increasing assertiveness in MENA countries such as Syria and Libya. Therefore, the narratives that hybrid threats only threaten NATO’s Eastern flank, and terrorism comes only from the South are no longer valid; lessons from the field must be considered for our strategic learning.

When it comes to countermeasures, strategic learning can lead to improved resilience against both terrorism and hybrid threats. Terrorists learn from each other in a hybrid strategic landscape, so our strategies to counter terrorism and hybrid threats must adapt to this constant need for updating. Despite all constraints, “there is ample room for strengthening our collective resilience (at both the state and societal level) vis-à-vis the growing ‘hybridization’ of threats—wherever they may come from.”²⁹ A closer look at the nature of counter-terrorism measures in the societal, state, military, infrastructure and informational resilience domains reveals that they are essential in assuring preparedness and post-attack crisis management against terrorist attacks as well as hybrid threats. Accordingly, our counterterrorism and hybrid threats communities need to start looking to build venues for strategic learning and interdepartmental cooperation.
Constraints on Joining Efforts in Countering Terrorism and Hybrid Threats

Although, as discussed above, there are numerous key merits for joining Allied efforts in countering terrorism and hybrid threats, the fact that they have been addressed independently from each other raises questions about potential obstacles. What are the political and military constraints that hamper the fusion of the efforts in NATO policy-making and implementation? Are some reasons better than others and what can be learned in order to overcome these obstacles? In response, this article identifies two sets of interrelated constraints: the first is political, referring to constraints in policymaking, and the second is military, referring to constraints related to the implementation of Alliance strategies.

1) Political: Allies’ divergences and risk of intra-alliance rivalry among NATO agencies

One of the key issues that various authorities and experts agree upon is the fact that terrorism is politically loaded, and thus combining it with hybrid threats could further complicate countermeasures. Accordingly, political issues emerge as the most critical constraint in Allied efforts in countering terrorism and hybrid threats together. In addressing political divergences among Allied member states on counter-terrorism, the recent assessments of Kris Quanten remain relevant for contemporary hybrid threats as well; for example, his recent overview provides a detailed discussion of the “fault lines” and “transatlantic divide” in counter-terrorism among NATO Allies.30

On the one hand, this is among the top – if not the most critical constraint in Allied policy-making, and thus need to be addressed, considering Alliance cohesion and the strategic relevance of NATO for the security needs of all its Allies. On the other hand, allied consensus can be beneficial in overcoming potential intra-Alliance rivalries among different NATO structures responsible for counter-terrorism and countering hybrid threats. So far, “the way NATO operates at the policy-making level seems to remain stove-piped, and inadequate to the diffuse nature of the threat. Extensive discussions with various leading authorities have revealed structural and budgetary inefficiencies.”31 Evidently, this assessment remains relevant today and has become perhaps even more critical in the context of countering terrorism and hybrid threats. While it is understandable that the Allies have different priorities, in times of budget-crunching and ongoing burden-sharing debates, the argument for cooperation becomes ever stronger.
2) Military: Responses to challenges emanating from the difficulty of attribution

Another feature that terrorist and hybrid threats have in common is their elusive character, making the attribution of responsibility an intelligence challenge that can complicate the implementation of countermeasures.

One can even argue that the camouflage of the attacker is an important part of hybrid strategy aiming to paralyze national and Allied defenders. As General Breedlove warned after Ukraine, “Russian adventurism and terrorists to the South seek to exploit gaps when they arise.”

Difficulties in attribution that delay timely military responses remain among the critical gaps to be addressed when countering hybrid threats; consequently, this has been pushing Allies to make tough trade-offs:

The concurrency, having to deal with complex instability in the East and the South simultaneously, means that NATO governments are not always well-aligned when it comes to priorities. The RAP agreed in Wales prioritizes the East over the South and collective defence over NATO’s other core tasks, but this set of choices has already been challenged.

These hard choices are likely to remain critical. The more the Allies broaden their divergences, the easier their adversaries—state and non-state—can exploit these cracks and render NATO strategically irrelevant for its members. Therefore, despite all the constraints—some more critical than others—there are compelling reasons for NATO to focus on joining efforts against the interrelated challenges emanating from terrorism and hybrid threats.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

Threats in the grey-zone are designed to have an asymmetrical political impact; therefore, by definition, any research on terrorism and hybrid threats is bound to address common policy implications. The strategic landscape will only become more ‘hybrid’, where even so-called ‘domestic terrorism’ will have a global footprint cross-cutting the physical, informational (cyber) and transnational domains. In the current strategic landscape of global terrorism and hybrid threats, challenging mindsets of fixed conceptualizations is a good first step for policymakers. As Braun points out:

Developing an integrated strategy for countering both threats would have two main advantages. First, the Alliance could widen its deterrence and defence posture by addressing a broader range of often interrelated threats.
Second, at the same time, such an approach could help to overcome current differences regarding threat perceptions in the eastern and southern member states. These efforts would contribute to strengthening unity among Allies and hence protecting the Alliance’s centre of gravity.34

In light of the benefits of and constraints against joining efforts in countering terrorism and hybrid threats, this article recommends the following steps to develop effective NATO countermeasures:

1) Improving inter-agency collaboration, CIMIC and resilience lead to a stronger NATO

Most of those interviewed for this study highlighted the need for member states to have effectively functioning inter-agency cooperation to counter these threats, e.g., among the military, police, intelligence and other public and private agencies whose role it is to respond to civilian emergencies. These assessments are also in line with NATO’s 360-degree approach to security and related declarations that it is primarily the responsibility of national governments to counter these threats at home. Here, NATO’s self-proclaimed role of support does not render it less important, but rather conditional on the preparedness and resilience of the Allied member states.

2) Resolve allied differences to improve Alliance cohesion against concurrent threats

Terrorism and hybrid threats are likely to remain concurrent challenges for NATO in the foreseeable future. Therefore, NATO could benefit from countering them simultaneously. In this regard, most of those interviewed identified political divergences as the most critical constraint on joining efforts in countering hybrid threats and terrorism. Even with the current sectional divisions, there is a role NATO can play to reduce Allied differences and assure that Alliance cohesion remains intact. Recently, the creation of a Joint Strategic Direction South Hub based at Joint Forces Command in Naples, Italy can serve as an important example for how Allied cooperation on the Southern flank can lead to improved coordination of efforts in hybrid security.

3) Join efforts to streamline NATO decision-making and policy implementation

Given the persistent political differ-
ences among Allies, some of those interviewed expressed that although a merger of existing NATO structures is unlikely to be beneficial, the sections on counter-terrorism and countering hybrid threats can benefit from each other’s complementary capabilities. If steps are taken in coordination, they can also contribute to avoiding duplication and stove-piping of the Allied efforts. In this regard, as a result of the January 2019 functional review, NATO put the Counter-terrorism and Hybrid Threats (CT/HT) sections under the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD). This is a step in the right direction that is also in line with the recommendations of this article.

4) Improve CT/HT synergies by sharing intelligence & lessons learned; enhanced personnel mobility

When it comes to implementation, the joining of efforts to counter hybrid threats and terrorism has become more a question of ‘how’ rather than ‘if’. A number of those interviewed used the same key term—synergy—when elaborating on the answers to this question. Thus, despite the fact that NATO’s counter-terrorism and hybrid threats sections are likely to remain separate, synergy can still be accomplished by streamlining the sharing of intelligence and lessons learned, and encouraging personnel mobility between the two sections.

5) Foster strategic learning between CT/HT communities at NATO and among Allies

Building on these synergies, NATO international staff can contribute to strategic learning between these sections, and eventually in their respective communities in Allied and partner nations. As these concurrent threats are likely to become even more hybrid in nature, our responses as Allies can mutually benefit each other through the strategic learning of best practices and related countermeasures.

6) Special operations mindset and Counter Hybrid Support Teams (CHST) to identify vulnerabilities and support targeted Allies

There is a growing consensus among experts that hybrid threats can be better understood and countered through a special operations mindset. A number of those interviewed expressed strong support for the Allied development of such a special operations mindset for identifying vulnerabilities against hybrid threats and terrorism. In this respect, it is important to note that the recent addition of Counter Hybrid Support Teams (CHST) to NATO’s toolbox to support preparation, deterrence, and defense against hybrid threats is a critical step in the right direction.
In light of this comprehensive strategy, we need to act together to this end, and not only among these organizations and their members, but also in tandem with the private sector and civil society, whose roles have become critical in sustaining resilience against hybrid threats in the long term. Recently, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stressed the importance of unified efforts against hybrid threats and terrorism during a meeting with the Allied National Security Advisers (NSAs): “many of our countries have suffered from different types of hybrid attacks. In isolation we may not always see the pattern, but together we can connect the dots to see the full picture.” In other words, we all need to connect the dots to find the meaning, and work together for this meaning to be translated into effective countermeasures.

Threats in the gray zone are designed to have asymmetrical political impact; therefore, by definition, any research on terrorism and hybrid threats is bound to address policy implications. This exploratory study puts forward two sets of interrelated implications: one for policymakers, and the other for researchers. Starting with the implications for policymakers, who have been under pressure to function in this grey zone in recent years, the strategic landscape will only get more ‘hybrid,’ and even so-called ‘domestic terrorism’ are likely to have various ripple effects from their audiences to recruits and logistics.

In this strategic landscape of global terrorism and hybrid threats, challenging mindsets with fixed targets can be good for policymakers determined to avoid false assumptions. False assumptions lead to misjudgments and policies that do more harm than good. It is time for a sober assessment of recent interventions in terms of their ‘contributions’ to global terrorism and its increasingly hybrid character. From Afghanistan to Libya from Syria to Ukraine, risks of overreaction versus underreaction remain. Two lessons of relevance are that conflicts are likely to last even longer and potentially with ever more backlash to the homeland, from foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) returning home, to home-grown terrorist attacks perpetrated by sleeping-cells, to cyber formations... the list goes on.

The abovementioned considerations are of immediate concern for policymakers, who need adapt their decisions to the emerging strategic landscape. For scholars, the need for a comprehensive research agenda remains, not only for policy-relevant research but also to keep up with the changing character of war, while engaging with key stakeholders, including policymakers, the military, the private sector and civil society. Therefore, we must practice what we preach when talking about the unity of efforts. Ul-
timately, it is this practice in academia and in policymaking that is going to make a meaningful difference toward making societies more resilient against hybrid threats.
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Endnotes


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NATO-EU Strategic Partnership: Where is it Heading?

Burak TANGÖR *

Abstract
This study examines the security governance between NATO and the EU. I specifically focus on whether the EU-NATO strategic partnership has led to the institutionalization of complementarity between the two institutions. I empirically scrutinize the NATO-EU strategic partnership in the field of security governance. Then, I question whether Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) have marked a drift away from complementarity. PESCO and the E2I have mostly been considered as a challenge to the U.S.-led Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary, I see such initiatives as an enhancer for implementing better practices of security governance. In the first part of the study, the security governance approach to NATO-EU inter-institutional relations is explained. In the second part, the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership and initiatives for stronger European military capabilities are explored. In the last part of the study, the durability of the NATO-EU strategic partnership is questioned. I come to the conclusion that despite the different approaches to Euro-Atlantic security among the leading actors, such as the U.S., France and Germany, the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership will likely continue with complementarity in security governance between these two institutions.

* Associate Professor, Hacettepe University, Department of International Relations, Ankara, Turkey. E-mail: buraktangor@hacettepe.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0002-9527-5343.

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Security governance, NATO, EU, PESCO, E2I, complementarity

Introduction
Now celebrating the seventy-second anniversary of its founding, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the largest and longest-lasting security alliance between sovereign states in modern history. There are undoubtedly many reasons for this, but probably one of the most prominent is NATO’s ability to keep up with change. Most alliances are soon disbanded due to changes in external threats, differences in national interest perceptions among alliance members or the increased cost of maintaining the alliance on alliance members. For example, none of the seven coalitions of the Napoleonic Wars lasted more than five years. One example from the more recent past is the alliance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, which was able to last only two years. A 2010 study by the Brookings Institute showed that over the past 500 years, only 10 of the 63 major military alliances survived more than 40 years. In the study, the average age of collective defense alliances was found to be 15 years.¹

Will NATO, which has responded to the changes in international politics so far, manage to appropriately handle the challenges it faces? NATO continues its search for adaptation to power shifts in international politics and technological advances that play an important role in these changes. In this context, NATO also reviews its relations with international institutions; it searches for ways to engage in cooperative security with international institutions in the face of trials and takes steps to institutionalize this cooperation.

One of the international institutions with which NATO endeavors to develop cooperative security in this context is the European Union (EU). What decisively distinguishes the relationship between NATO and the EU from other international institutions is the presence of 21 states that are members of both institutions. What is the cooperative security conception of these two institutions, which share a majority of members? Why did the EU need to establish an autonomous security and defense policy, despite the fact that its leading members in the fields of security and defense, such as France, Spain, Italy and Germany, are also part of the NATO alliance? What does the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy mean for the NATO alliance? Do these two institutions compete with each other? Are
they alternatives to one another? Or do they, by complementing each other, strengthen security governance?

In light of the practices of these institutions, this article asserts that EU-NATO relations reinforce complementarity and security governance. In the first part of the study, the NATO-EU security governance approach to inter-institutional relations is explained. In the second part, the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership and initiatives launched for stronger European military capabilities are investigated. In the last part, the durability of the NATO-EU strategic partnership is questioned.

Security Governance Approach to NATO-EU Inter-institutional Relations

Since the end of the Cold War, security risks have become more transnational, and thus security has become more difficult to ensure unilaterally. Therefore, states have begun to prefer coordinating their efforts with multiple actors using a variety of cooperation methods. These changes have been defined as “governance without government.” Governance involves the administration, coordination and regulation of activities in a particular subject area by multiple authorities. These three distinctive characteristics, depending on the subject area, are structured for formal and informal regulations, norms, discourses and goals aimed at specific political outcomes.

This trend has continued with the emergence of new security insights and the deepening and expansion of security in terms of potential reference objects and threats. To capture this new complexity, the concept of security governance emerged. Security governance is based on the claim that transnational risks pose challenges for traditional methods of providing security by nation states, and underscores the need for new methods of transnational governance. The concept of security governance first emerged in the context of debates over the transformation of security institutions in Europe after the Cold War. The main advocates of security governance sought to identify the key features of the institutional transformation scheme in Europe, and the first studies categorized security governance systems within and around European security institutions.
Since then, the scope of the concept has broadened. Some studies examine security governance conceptually. Some compare governance approaches in different regions. Finally, some security governance studies, particularly in the 1990s, see liberal values such as democracy, the free market and the rule of law as a universal model. Therefore, many applications of security governance have accepted these ideas as a basis for ensuring peace and security. In addition, the concept has been used to examine a range of specific policies and phenomena, including international efforts for security sector reform in post-conflict countries and the growing importance of private security companies. Recently, researchers have also begun to examine security governance in institutional and cultural contexts outside of Europe. Overall, in the International Relations discipline, “security governance” refers to the shared exercise of administrative, economic and political authority for continued peace and stability in the international arena. The presence of a shared goal should be added to this definition. That is to say, security governance has to rely on proximity of discourses and values as much as an agreement over tangible components.

Security governance is comprised of three indispensable elements. Primarily, it relies on a horizontal (heterarchical) understanding of relationships defined by increased interactions among multiple actors. Secondly, it involves institutionalization with both concrete (organizational structure) and non-concrete (ideational) components. As Mark Webber points out, security governance needs both ideational and organizational foundations. Despite the presence of differing interests, it requires a shared goal. Inter-institutional relations between NATO and the EU incorporate these founding elements of security governance. First, there is no superior-subordinate (or principal-agent) relationship between NATO and the EU, which is in line with the heterarchical nature of security governance. From a legal perspective, these two institutions, as two different legal entities, must live together and respect this difference. As for the political aspect, the policies and activities of these two different legal entities overlap to a large extent. This political dimension brings about the need for the establishment of a complementarity-based partnership between the EU and NATO. The EU Global Strategy states that collective security will continue within the framework of NATO and that EU-NATO relations will not harm the security and defense policies of non-NATO EU members. In this context, it can be deduced that the EU considers its relations with NATO within the framework of the principle of complementarity.
Indeed, for a number of reasons, the NATO-EU partnership has become a central component of the comprehensive security governance architecture. These reasons, along with the similarity of their nature and threats they face, as well as the fact that they operate within a similar geography, bring about a functional distinction. Accordingly, while NATO is the major defense actor, the EU is predominantly a security actor. Due to the erosion of the internal security/external security dichotomy resulting in the indivisibility of security, these two institutions, by developing an explicit and implicit division of tasks, complement each other.

Although defense is clearly expressed in the context of the use of military force, security, as a broader and less coercive concept, more aptly characterizes the EU’s policy. Indeed, the EU has invested in the fields of conflict prevention and mediation, security sector reform (SSR), the rule of law, civil policing, border management, education, capacity-building and peace and resilience development. These activities reflect a comprehensive security approach making use of the security-development connection, which thus goes beyond a single Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) country. This policy proves that EU’s role as a security actor surpasses its role as a defense actor.

Hence, it cannot be claimed that the EU has evolved into a military actor (or a defense actor) since the creation of the CSDP. Even the defense dimension of the 12 military operations carried out to date by the EU remained weak. In these operations, the deployment of military units never meant to use force to coerce the enemy. As a matter of fact, the task and impartiality of CSDP military operations, which implied a reluctance to identify any enemy, have made those missions closer to policing than military activities. Further, coercive military measures were clearly avoided during CSDP operations. Until today, operations have not been exercised as “tasks of combat forces in crisis management” as laid down in Article 43 of the Treaty of Lisbon, and the EU has not prioritized the use of force in CSDP operations. In fact, CSDP operations were never about coercion. Accordingly, battle groups have never been deployed to date. In actual fact, CSDP operations are third-party interventions deployed with the consent of the host state to perform the task of stabilization. In this context, except

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for two naval operations—Operation Atalanta in the South Mediterranean Sea and Operation Sophia in the Gulf of Aden—armed forces acted as police officers or capacity developers rather than as soldiers.\textsuperscript{19}

The intertwining of internal and external security further enhances the complementary aspect of the NATO-EU partnership. Thanks to its regulatory role at the national scale, the EU (including the European Commission) has a comparative advantage in the fields of counter-terrorism, hybrid threats and cyber security, all of which have an important internal security dimension. In contrast, NATO enjoys a comparative advantage in the defense domain. NATO operates inside its Member States’ territories in its response to the Russian threat, whereas the EU can only operate outside of the EU Member States through its CSDP. In other words, NATO is a more suitable actor in the face of threats requiring defense, while the EU is a key actor in responding to attacks threatening security.

Second, the level of institutionalization between NATO and the EU is also in line with the nature of security governance. Regarding the reasoning behind security governance, both NATO and the EU share the same values. Apart from building a strategic partnership, the formation of arrangements, as an organizational element of security governance, are also a component of the NATO-EU cooperation. In 2003, for example, the distribution of tasks between the two institutions provided a rationale for ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements by which the EU could rely on NATO assets for EU-led operations. This relationship also suggests complementarity between the two institutions.

Third, with respect to the shared goal element of security governance, similarities in threat perceptions lead these two institutions to work together with a view to overcoming the same threats (ranging from Russia’s resurrection to terror, cyber threats and general instability at their Southern peripheries). As a result, both institutions have an objective interest in working together to make use of their respective comparative advantages to create synergies and ultimately to maximize impact.

On this basis, in practice, certain instances of complementarity come into play. The most obvious examples are NATO’s presence in the three Baltic States and Poland in response to Russia’s activities in Ukraine. Thus, NATO compensates for the absence of the EU as a defense actor within the territory of its own Member States. In contrast, various EU-led missions and operations have been deployed in Sub-Saharan Africa in the absence of NATO in the South of Libya. While the EU conducts civilian missions within the Palestinian territories and Georgia, a NATO mission in these
regions seems impossible due to political sensitivities. In all these cases, comparative advantages became decisive and the EU and NATO, by deploying in certain locations in the absence of the other, have performed an actual complementarity.

When they deploy in the same location, NATO’s defense dimension rises to prominence in terms of comparative advantages, while the EU acts as the key security actor. This tacit division of tasks constituted to a large extent the rationale for NATO to enter Kosovo via KFOR at the same time the EU launched EULEX, its rule of law mission. Likewise, while NATO was leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the EU engaged in a civilian police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan) there. While NATO was undertaking Operation Unified Protector in Libya, the EU conducted a border mission (EUBAM Libya). Likewise, while NATO implemented reassurance measures in Poland and the Baltic States following the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the EU imposed sanctions against Russia.

Most of the EU’s missions and operations are small in scale and impact. The large-scale operations are those that the EU conducts in cooperation with NATO. Yet they perform different functions. While the EU undertakes geographically limited and relatively low-level operations such as peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention and stability operations, NATO undertakes the functions of peace enforcement, long-range expeditionary operations, and territorial defense. In brief, there exists an operational division of tasks and complementarity between the two institutions.

As can be seen, the security governance approach provides an appropriate perspective with which to explain the inter-institutional relationship between NATO and the EU. The heterarchical dimension of the NATO-EU relationship, the level of its institutionalization and the presence of shared goals make security governance possible. Based on their capacity and capabilities in the field of security and defense, there exists a division of tasks between NATO and the EU that ensures complementarity between these two institutions. Yet, this division of tasks and complementarity are not flawless. The hesitation or unwillingness of the European allies of NATO regarding burden-sharing and the EU’s relatively weak defense capabilities are challenges that should be overcome. These two problems will be scrutinized in the remainder of the study.
Stronger European Military Capabilities: An Enhancer or a Competitor?

Continued tensions between the U.S. and NATO’s European members regarding burden-sharing since the end of Cold War have served to some extent as motivation for the Europeans. The U.S. has increasingly pushed the EU to take on greater responsibility for stabilizing its neighboring regions (the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Eastern border regions). Since 1989, Europe has ceased to be at the center of the U.S.’s strategic radar screen. This has led to various initiatives to bolster the European defense capacity both within NATO (c.f. the short-lived European Security and Defense Identity—ESDI—initiative in the 1990s) and outside NATO (the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy).

The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which was renamed CSDP under the Treaty of Lisbon, was primarily designed as a military policy. As laid down in the 1998 Saint-Malo Joint Declaration on European Defense, the ESDP is subjected to “the progressive framing of a common defense policy,” suggesting that the Union should have “the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces.” When the EU’s CSDP was first launched in December 1998, the key concept was “autonomous action.” The CSDP aimed to allow European forces to respond to regional security challenges, which the U.S. does not want to deal with. The subsequent 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal also incorporated a military element. In the document, the EU Member States called for creating an armed force at the corps level (15 brigades or up to 50,000–60,000 persons) that “will be promptly deployed and will be capable of the full range of Petersburg tasks as specified in the Treaty of Amsterdam.” The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009, provided that the ultimate goal of the EU was to establish a common defense policy. The EU, by improving its institutional architecture, has made significant progress with the CSDP, which aims to generate capacity and to achieve political consensus—or at least a common political understanding. Nonetheless, these efforts have failed to produce the expected results. This problem was discerned in the absence of a unified strategy in the 2011 Libya intervention. Libya is a signifi-
cant turning point in the history of the CSDP. Libya had the ideal characteristics of a regional crisis management operation, which the CSDP was designed to address. Situated close to Europe and in line with the EU’s comprehensive security approach, Libya had all the military and civilian components. In the early days of the crisis, Europeans statespersons reacted with national responses. At first, Italy, Greece and Malta did not endorse the sanctions to be imposed. Later, in the post-intervention period, a lack of capacity to control migration, a highly contentious issue in the EU, became evident. Disagreements between Italy, France and other Member States eventually led to the reinstatement of border controls between certain Member States. In the face of the most serious crisis on the border of the EU since the launch of the CSDP, the Union proved to be incapable of acting in unison. Indeed, the EU’s intervention in the Libyan crisis revealed the weakness of the CSDP’s own intergovernmental institutional structure and decision-making process, in which national sovereignty (and thus national interest) is centered. That limits the effectiveness of the EU in crises that require collective action when there is no convergence of national interests among EU states.

The Libyan case shows that despite all the steps taken toward the CSDP, NATO continues to be at the center of European security. During NATO’s Libyan mission, Operation Unified Protector, the U.S. concept of “leading from behind” was introduced. Even though the NATO mission in Libya largely benefited from the American military input, the Obama administration’s insistence that Europeans should at least be perceived as “taking the lead” in Libya represented a paradigm shift both in political and symbolic terms. The U.S. signaled that henceforth it was ready to delegate responsibility on the European stage to the Europeans.

Simultaneous with those developments within the EU, there was also remarkable dynamism between the EU and NATO at the institutional level. A Joint Declaration was issued at the NATO summit in Warsaw on July 8, 2016, which called for “giving new impetus and new substance to the EU-NATO strategic partnership.” The Joint Declaration underlined the collaboration between the two institutions:

In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step up our efforts: we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond.
Various roadmaps have been presented for NATO-EU cooperation. For example, the 2016 Joint Declaration lists common threats. The declaration called for a new momentum and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership and identified seven areas of cooperation: 1) countering hybrid threats, 2) operational cooperation in the maritime sector, 3) cyber security and defense, 4) defense capabilities, 5) defense industry and research, 6) operations and 7) the resilience of partners.30

In the wake of NATO’s Warsaw Summit, held on July 8–9, 2016, the NATO members undertook to establish “a stronger defense industry across the Alliance” with the aim “to maintain and advance the military and technological advantage of Allied capabilities through innovation.”31 As stated in the Declaration, there is a need for “a stronger defense industry and greater defense research and industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic.” Accordingly, the EU not only published the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), but also developed a specific Security and Defense Implementation Plan (SDIP) and a European Defense Action Plan (EDAP). Each of these documents called on the EU Member States to invest more in defense and defense innovation. These plans also outlined defense cooperation based on financial incentives in the EU.

It is possible to identify four core objectives in the EU Global Strategy. The first objective is the protection of the “European way of life,” particularly in the context of terrorism, cyber threats, hybrid warfare and energy security. These are not threats that require military response. Usually, they are best addressed domestically, but they require serious coordination. The second objective is to provide security both in the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighboring regions, by using force if necessary. The third is to help global maritime trade partners maintain sustainable access, that is to say, to keep maritime trade routes open. The fourth objective is to support and contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. These objectives point out that EU members should expand their armed forces and allocate more budget to defense.32

Thus, Germany and France proposed a European Security Compact that would embrace all aspects of security and defense at the European level.33 The European Council, which subsequently convened in Bratislava on September 16, 2016, issued the “Bratislava Roadmap” for a stronger European defense capacity.34 On November 22, 2016, the European Parliament overwhelmingly voted in favor of the establishment of the European Defense Union.35 On November 30, 2016, the European Commission published the European Defense Action Plan, which would lead to a substan-
tial increase in the EU’s defense capacity, research and development and procurement spending.\footnote{36}

In December 2016, the EU and NATO published a “Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration” involving a common set of 42 actions to be implemented with the active cooperation of the two institutions.\footnote{37} Cyber threats, security sector reform, capacity-building, strengthening resilience in neighboring countries, global governance, maritime security, parallel and synchronized exercises and hybrid warfare were among the special cooperation projects. Reports on progress in these areas are published every six months.

In May 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced, “The era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent.”\footnote{38} Later, then European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker suggested that European integration should be given further momentum through defense policy.\footnote{39} In June 2017, the European Commission published a reflection paper\footnote{40} on the future of European Defense, and the European Defense Fund (EDF), a new instrument designed to allocate billions of Euros for industrial research and technology projects, was launched.\footnote{41} On June 23, 2017, the European Council officially launched the PESCO process, an institutional mechanism that ensures the cooperation of the Member States that have made binding military commitments to one another, as outlined in Article 42 (6) of the Lisbon Treaty.\footnote{42}

The most remarkable of the EU’s current initiatives to improve its defense capacity are PESCO, the EDF and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD).\footnote{43} The EU countries’ inadequate defense spending must somehow be overcome, but the real problems lie in the fragmented structure of the European defense market and its inefficient defense industry.

European countries collectively spend more than $280 billion on defense annually, which, if Europe were a single country, would make it the second largest defense spending in the world after the U.S. Europe’s 1.8 million military personnel outnumber the 1.3 million military personnel under the command of the U.S.\footnote{44} However, it would not be reasonable to consider Europe in this way. The European Commission stated that the deficit of cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defense is estimated to cost between €25 billion and €100 billion every year, which corresponds to between 9 to 36 percent of overall European military spending. “Investment per soldier” among EU countries is merely one quarter of that of the U.S.\footnote{45} The lack of a single market for research, development, procurement, operation and maintenance places a considerable burden on
the EU. An abundance of systems in Europe also makes interoperability difficult. PESCO, EDF and CARD aim to overcome this problem, albeit partly.

PESCO, which was established and launched in 2017, is an EU Treaty-based framework for defense cooperation on capability development or operational projects. The 25 EU Member States participating in PESCO (Denmark and Malta remain outside of PESCO) have agreed to participate in at least one of 34 current projects ranging from common training to development of new capabilities, each led by different member states. The best known PESCO initiative addresses “military mobility,” harmonized procedures and physical infrastructure for the flow of military equipment aiming to introduce something like a “military Schengen area.” PESCO is designed to address an important need at relatively low cost in the framework of the principle of complementing NATO. At present, very few PESCO initiatives envisage investments in hard capabilities or equipment, such as advanced aircraft, vehicles or autonomous weapons systems, which would be the most likely to contribute to European capabilities. For example, the Euroartillery project has only two participants: Italy and Slovakia.

The EDF is an initiative of the European Commission, the executive body of the EU, to co-finance defense research and development with EU Member States. The EDF is the most innovative and perhaps the most important new EU defense initiative, since it, for the first time, involves EU institutions directly in the European defense market. Although the financial scale is not large, the EDF represents a potentially significant change in the way in which Europe invests in defense. The EDF, by incentivizing Member States to pool their resources on common defense investments, aims to reduce fragmentation and enhance the efficiency of European defense R&D.

CARD is an updated EU process for evaluating defense spending and capability development trends. CARD is closely related to the Capability Development Plan (CPD), the EU’s annual statement of defense planning priorities. Both the CPD and CARD reports are products of the European Defense Agency (EDA), an intergovernmental EU agency. CARD aims to link EU defense planning to PESCO and the EDF. By measuring progress toward the goals set out in the CPD, CARD potentially calls upon countries to consider PESCO options for further cooperation, and EDF as a potential funding source.
While all these developments were taking place, French President Emman-uel Macron proposed a European Intervention Initiative (E2I), which was supposed to provide the EU with a high level of capacity for military crisis management.49 Introduced in a speech by the President at the Sorbonne in September 2017, the initiative is designed to enhance European integration and develop the concept of European sovereignty as an alternative to national sovereignty. The aim of the initiative is to respond to crises in regions near Europe’s borders without NATO (or the U.S.). Macron’s aim is to keep the UK within the European defense system, even after Brexit. The initiative in question is supported by Angela Merkel as well. As a matter of fact, E2I has originated from the need for a new approach due to the EU’s failure to meet its defense objectives and to improve its military capabilities.50 The initiative appears as a coalition that will respond rapidly to potential crises outside the EU. This new initiative was developed outside the CSDP framework.

The EU-NATO Joint Declaration of 2018 called for rapid progress in four key areas: 1) military mobility; 2) counter-terrorism; 3) strengthening resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related risks (CBRN); and 4) Women, Peace and Security (WPS).51 In addition, the member states of both institutions endorsed the cooperative process at the institutional level, stressing the necessity to strengthen the political dialogue between the two institutions. In parallel, progress reports are published regularly to maintain the momentum of cooperation.52

Both the EU and NATO are institutions through which European states can engage in European defense-industrial cooperation. Both organizations embody a unique set of institutional tools with which to manage issues such as the high and rising costs of concerning defense procurement, technological innovation, defense R&D, standardization, multinational capability programs and interoperability.53 Both NATO and EU members support defense-industrial cooperation, but their methods of support differ.

In practical terms, the two institutions have tangibly improved cooperation in a number of areas as a result of this process. Three levels of cooperation can be identified. First, political dialogue between the NATO Secretary General (SG) and the Deputy Secretary General on the one hand and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commissioners on the other has become a standard practice. Second, specifically, points of contact have been identified, and staff-to-staff dialogue has facilitated exchanges and information-sharing. Cross-briefings on issues of mutual interest (under one of the seven areas of cooperation) take
place frequently and representatives from each institution participate in the meetings of the counterpart organization.\textsuperscript{54} Third, the two institutions have made progress in their operational cooperation in thematic areas such as hybrid threats, military mobility, cyber security and cyber defense, and on the ground when they deploy missions simultaneously, as is the case in Iraq and in the Mediterranean Sea. This cooperation not only prevents any possible conflict between the two institutions, but also ensures information exchange and policy coordination.

Among other notable instances of progress are the implementation of a “Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defense,” a coordinated response to high profile cyber threats like WannaCry and active cooperation in the field between NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia. The European Commission agreed to contribute €2 million to NATO’s Building Integrity Trust Fund, and NATO has collaborated with the European Defense Agency on the procurement of a European multinational fleet of multirole tanker–transport (MRTT) aircraft.\textsuperscript{55} NATO and EU officials continue to coordinate their respective defense planning processes.\textsuperscript{56}

Recently, the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic has made the need for complementarity among security providers more vital than ever. In terms of the future of NATO-EU cooperation, it is expected that cooperation and coordination between these two security actors will mitigate the devastating and widespread impact of the pandemic. So far, COVID-19 has created new challenges for transatlantic cooperation. As a matter of fact, the COVID-19 agenda for EU-NATO cooperation includes civil-military cooperation.\textsuperscript{57} Strategic communication and combating hybrid threats have already been identified as areas of EU-NATO cooperation.\textsuperscript{58} In particular, military support services for civilian structures, military contributions to resilience-building and improvement of civilian and disaster protection are on the EU-NATO agenda.\textsuperscript{59} This could trigger a new momentum for closer EU-NATO cooperation.

In terms of the future of NATO-EU cooperation, it is expected that cooperation and coordination between these two security actors will mitigate the devastating and widespread impact of the pandemic.

As can be seen, the EU countries, for the sake of complementarity, strive to strengthen their military capabilities and capacities in order to make up for shortages, or to cover the gaps between NATO and the EU. Aside from organizational arrangements to enhance cooperation between the two insti-
tutions, great importance is attached to strategic partnership, and steps are taken to boost it. Despite these efforts, however, the NATO-EU strategic partnership, and more specifically U.S.-European relations, are questioned and the partnership and the future of these relations are debated. In the next section, the permanence of the NATO-EU strategic partnership will be examined.

Challenges to the Durability of the Security Governance

The transatlantic relationship is undoubtably going through turbulent times, sharpening concerns over the future of NATO-EU relations. U.S. relations with many EU Member States in particular, and the EU in general, are bogged down in disagreement on issues ranging from the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (also known as the Iran nuclear deal) to the possibility of imposing new tariffs on specific goods traded between the two sides. In this context, the situation of NATO-EU relations is discussed on the political agenda.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated recently, “NATO is the most successful alliance in history,” citing NATO’s ability to change as the main reason for its success. But, he added, “It is not written in stone that this Alliance will last forever.” Indeed, the potential failure of the resilient Alliance stems from the founding conditions of its formation; when these conditions change, the Alliance’s existence will be thrown into question.

NATO was busy deterring the Soviet threat throughout the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Alliance virtually reinvented itself and managed to survive, undertaking new tasks. In this context, it helped Eastern Europe go through its political and economic transition period in a stable manner and conducted out-of-area operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the African Horn. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO once again concentrated on deterrence activities. Today, NATO simultaneously conducts its activities in the fields of collective defense (Article 5 of NATO Treaty), deterrence and crisis management. For an international security organization, this is not an easy task.

When NATO was founded in 1949, there were 12 founding members. Now in its 72nd year, it has 30 members. Some of the Central and Eastern European states (Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) that later joined the Alliance were former members of an alliance against NATO, the Warsaw Pact. Even the former Soviet Union republics (Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania) chose to join the alliance. All these additions point to NATO’s appeal. North Macedonia joined the Alliance in 2020, as its most recent member.65

Despite NATO’s ability to adapt itself to new conditions, including its expansion, in 2012, then U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned the Europeans about a “dim and bleak future” for NATO if imbalances within the Alliance were to persist.66 The 2012 Strategic Guidance proclaimed that the U.S. had turned its face to Asia,67 and the strategic non-prioritization of Europe on the part of the U.S. has continued to today. NATO’s political dimension cannot be separated from military burden-sharing. Indeed, military burden-sharing has become a litmus test for the U.S. to continue its support for NATO.

Discourses questioning the future of the NATO Alliance are resounding in Europe as well. For example, in 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron called for the creation of a “true European army.”68 The U.S. is disturbed by Macron’s emphasis on a European Army and “strategic autonomy.” The Europeans’ efforts to boost their own defense capabilities may strengthen the NATO Alliance, but there are also concerns that these efforts could undermine it.

Soon afterward, Angela Merkel, in her address to the European Parliament in November 2018, said, “It’s simply true that the times when we could fully rely on others have ended.”69 On January 22, 2019, Germany and France signed a treaty on mutual security (similar to Article 570 of the NATO Treaty and Article 42 (7)71 of the Treaty on European Union), concretizing their wish to lead a defense policy independent from NATO—and even from the EU.72

In fact, neither European defense cooperation nor transatlantic burden-sharing are new issues. European countries have historically considered the integration of security and defense in ‘high politics’ more difficult when compared to other problematic areas. In the meantime, the U.S. has historically sent mixed signals, promptly demanding more of Europe but unwilling to give up leadership. It encouraged Europe to develop its defense capabilities on the one hand, but resisted its proposals for doing so on the other. The U.S., while actively encouraging the EU to develop serious military capacity, also worried that such capacity might lead to Europe being on the same level with the U.S.73

The formula for U.S. policy toward certain European defense efforts gained an unforgettable expression in the late 1990s as the “3 D’s:” no
decoupling [of transatlantic security], no duplication [of NATO], and no discrimination [against non-EU NATO allies]. Americans and Europeans agree—as both have acknowledged in the EU Global Strategy and NATO’s Wales Pledge on Defense Investment—that Europe is insufficiently capable in matters of defense. Despite the discourse that cloaks NATO as an alliance of equal sovereign states with a consensus-based decision-making mechanism, the reality is that all NATO members have actually managed to maintain collective security under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. In other words, the security of the NATO alliance has been ensured by the nuclear umbrella provided by a single member state, the U.S. In fact, the European allies already have doubts whether they can defend themselves against Russia without the U.S. The combined GDP of NATO’s European members is 10 times greater than Russia’s, and their collective military spending is more than 3.5 times that of Russia. However, Russia’s nuclear warheads outnumber those of NATO’s European members thirteen to one. Of the European allies, only France and Britain possess nuclear weapons. After the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019, European allies must choose to either buy missiles or develop their own.

In this respect, PESCO might be the only umbrella under which the European states embrace cooperation and integration to achieve all capability targets set for NATO and the EU. This is what the members of PESCO stated in the Notification on PESCO of November 13, 2017, by which they declared their intention to launch the initiative. According the notification, ‘A long-term vision of PESCO could be to arrive at a coherent full spectrum force package—in complementarity with NATO, which will continue to be the cornerstone of collective defense for its members.’ PESCO’s first list of projects indicates that in practice, it serves both the EU and NATO, although this is not explicitly stated.

The military mobility project is a key example. The project, by tackling both procedural obstacles and infrastructure problems (such as roads and bridges that are unsuitable for heavy military vehicles), aims to facilitate the movement of armed forces across the EU. At one time, NATO was
in charge of such projects, but after the end of the Cold War, the existing mechanisms were neither updated nor extended to new allies in Central and Eastern Europe. Even though the primary objective is to boost the capacity for rapid response in the context of collective defense, today, the EU is much better placed to assume this responsibility. The project has therefore been welcomed by NATO and the U.S. The Euroartillery project is another example. This capability, which aims to develop a new mobile precision artillery platform, is undoubtedly appropriate for the type of high-intensity operations that, at least until now, European states have conducted through NATO or through ad hoc coalitions rather than the EU.79

Then President Trump threatened that the U.S. would go its own way if other NATO countries did not increase their military spending to the desired level and if they abstain from sharing the financial burden of the alliance. He also said the option of pulling his country out of NATO is on the table.80 Despite Trump’s statements, the U.S. Congress gives full support to NATO.81 Likewise, the American public’s support to NATO has increased in recent years.82 In addition, in recent years, the U.S. increased its defense spending by 40% in regard to its military presence in Europe through funds aimed at the European Deterrence Initiative, and dispatched more equipment and troops to Europe.83

European public opinion, except that of Turkey and Greece, is also favorable toward the Alliance.84 The North Atlantic Council continues to take important decisions in its meetings.85 The establishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, the deployment of combat-ready multinational battle groups in Poland and three Baltic States and the ‘Four 30s’ initiative86 are among the examples of NATO’s self-adaptation against the threats it identifies. A new NATO headquarters was recently built in Brussels. In late 2018 and early 2019, NATO tested its capabilities in Exercise Trident Juncture, its biggest since the end of the Cold War.87 On February 1, 2019, the U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty, which banned land-based ballistic missiles with ranges of 500–1,000 kilometers, in response to Russia’s alleged violations of the Treaty. NATO supported the U.S. reaction. It can be concluded in the light of these data that there exists a consensus in the transatlantic community regarding the continuity of the NATO alliance.

At the Munich Security Conference in 2019, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen affirmed that NATO remains “the first choice for our security” and said, “it is more than a military alliance.” She stated that the existence of NATO strengthens the sovereignty of the members, and acknowledged the U.S. demand for higher defense spending from Euro-
pean partners: “We Europeans need to throw more weight in.” In response to calls from the U.S., Von der Leyen called upon all NATO members to spend at least 2% of their economic output on defense, and pointed out the increase in European defense spending. At the same time, she underlined Europe’s efforts toward its own common defense policy, and said, “Europe has finally made its way towards a European Defense Union, which also includes a strengthening of NATO.”

French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian praised Europe’s contribution to NATO as “strong;” referring to recent European initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund, he said that the EU had “created considerable European capabilities” within NATO, and added that the aim of the Europeans should be “to become more and more full within the transatlantic alliance.”

Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz, too, spoke in favor of reinforcing European defense capabilities as long as there is no duplication. He said, “When it comes to synergies in NATO, that is fine,” but he warned that if that means independence from NATO, “we will have problems.” He added “We need an American presence in Europe.”

Likewise, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini stated that more EU “strategic autonomy” and transatlantic cooperation were “two sides of the same coin.” Then President Trump said that he would like to see NATO members pay more than 2% of their gross domestic product for defense. Reiterating that the U.S. pays 4.3% of its GDP to NATO, he called upon the alliance governments to increase defense spending to 4% of their GDP.

Clearly, discourses about the sustainability of the Alliance and the EU’s need for “autonomous action” capacity have brought the nature and future of transatlantic relations onto the agenda. The 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) pointed to the EU’s need to deepen its partnership with NATO, while at the same time emphasizing the Union’s strategic autonomy. The term ‘strategic autonomy’ itself indicates the EU’s wish to boost its defense capacity. Yet there is no consensus among Europeans on what the concept of strategic autonomy means. Autonomy may refer to non-dependence (e.g. self-sufficiency to conduct military operations), but it may also imply ‘separation.’ Accordingly, the concept is argued in countries with particularly strong views on relations with the U.S. Nonetheless, most Europeans see autonomy as fully compatible with NATO.
the discourse level, it is frequently voiced that NATO in particular and transatlantic relations in general play central role in the security of the alliance members, and are vital. European allies will not be able to withdraw from NATO unless the EU countries reach a clear consensus on the CSDP. Thus, given the practical developments described above, it can be foreseen that NATO will continue to exist.

Concluding Remarks

In this study examining the NATO-EU strategic partnership in terms of complementarity from a security governance perspective, it is argued that if one disregards the rhetoric, the practice reveals the existence of elements of security governance. In essence, these two institutions either functionally complement each other or, in cases where the other is not present and common interests (or a shared goal) are at stake, one of the partners takes on a task.

In order to take the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ beyond rhetoric, the EU must provide a high level of coordination among its Member States and achieve an integrated defense capacity. This rhetoric points out the EU’s capability to engage in high-intensity military operations with minimal assistance from the U.S., but there are factors to overcome before the achievement of strategic autonomy. The most prominent of these factors are the permanence of the nationalist perspective of the EU Member States in the field of defense and significant differences in their strategic culture. Without the UK, Europeans appear less fragmented than in the past, but they have a very long way to go before they are considered close to a common defense policy. Aside from these, there are varying opinions among EU Member States on whether or not to integrate in the field of defense, and what percentage of their GDP the defense budget should be. Some Europeans see common defense as an unnecessary duplication of NATO. It seems that the persistence of differences in the EU Member States’ strategic culture as well as in their institutional preferences (whether NATO or the EU) will continue to hamper Europe’s ambition in regard to defense.

Even though they have triggered debates at the discourse level, U.S. criticisms concerning burden-sharing and the EU’s calls for (strategic) autonomy (and PESCO and E2I) in fact strengthen the defense capabilities of both institutions, since they have led to an increased defense capacity in practice. A stronger EU will make NATO stronger as well. This will also serve the EU to complement NATO and allow it to act separately from
the U.S. In both cases, security governance will solidify throughout the existence of shared values and shared goals. Neither NATO nor the EU can cope with all security threats on their own. Therefore, some form of complementarity is needed between the two institutions. Recently, the struggle against COVID-19 has made this need more urgent.

Indeed, such a complementarity is inevitable, as neither NATO nor the EU can deal with transnational security threats based solely on their own assets and capabilities. The EU and NATO are institutions with different characteristics. NATO is required for hard power applications in terms of its military assets and capabilities, but lacks sufficient soft power applications for political solutions. The EU, unlike NATO, has a wide range of civilian capabilities for implementing stability measures accordingly.
Endnotes


20 For an up-to-date and comprehensive overview, see Sarah Raine, *Europe’s Strategic Future: From Crisis to Coherence?* London: Routledge, 2019.


25 See Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union.


30 Ibid.


36 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions European Defence Action Plan Com/2016/0950 Final,” November 30, 2016.
“Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” December 6, 2016.


This is not an exhaustive list of EU security and defense initiatives. See Daniel Fiott, EU ISS Yearbook of European Security, Paris: European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019.


Ibid.


Embarrassed by the collective inability to prevent Serb ethnic cleansing in Kosovo without the help of the U.S., European leaders, at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, set up a target of deploying a full-capacity army of up to 60,000 persons by 2003. Fifteen years later, the so-called “rapid reaction force” is still pending, and European “battle groups” have not yet been used to resolve any conflict in recent years.

Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by President of the European Council Donald Tusk, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, and Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg, Brussels, July 10, 2018.

Reports issued on June 14, 2017 (First Progress Report), November 29, 2017 (Second Progress Report), May 31, 2018 (Third Progress Report), and June 17, 2019 (Fourth Progress Report).


Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, had famously said that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm (Accessed December 10, 2020).

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which states that an attack on one member of NATO will be deemed an attack on all of its members, was operated on September 12, 2001, one day after the terrorist attacks in the U.S. by Al Qaeda, for the first time (and for the last time) in the history of the Alliance.


NATO Treaty Article 5: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

71 The Treaty on European Union, Article 42.7: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The Treaty on European Union, Article 42.7: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter…”


78 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Brussels, November 13, 2017.


81 In the U.S. Congress, both Republicans and Democrats support the NATO alliance. In July 2018, the U.S. Senate voted 97 to 2 to reaffirm American support for NATO. In January 2019, the House of Representatives voted 357 to 22 in support of the NATO Support Act. The Bill prohibits the use of funds to withdraw the U.S. from NATO. See NATO Support Act, HR 676 RDS, January 23, 2019.


83 Ibid.
84 Fagan, “NATO is Seen Favorably in Many Member Countries.”


86 NATO Defense Ministers decided to launch a Readiness Initiative, a costly initiative also known as “Four 30s” to ensure that, by 2020, the allies will have 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels ready within 30 days or less. In this context, they also decided to create two new commands in Norfolk, Virginia and another new command for support and logistics in Ulm, Germany for ensuring rapid movement of forces. See Jonathan Hill, “NATO-Ready for Anything?” NATO Review, January 24, 2019, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/01/24/nato-ready-for-anything/index.html (Accessed December 8, 2020).


89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.


93 Jolyon Howorth, Strategic Autonomy: Why it’s Not About Europe Going it Alone, Brussels: Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2019, p. 17.

NATO and Public Diplomacy: Opportunities and Constraints of 21st Century

Cansu GÜLEÇ *

Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to explain and interpret the evolution of NATO’s public diplomacy efforts in terms of the opportunities and limitations of today’s globalized environment. Public diplomacy refers to the efforts of states and non-state actors to better explain their values to the world. It concentrates particularly on “soft power” tools, such as science, art, culture, sports and media that enable interaction between societies. Because NATO is widely associated with security and defense issues, it is important to understand how it responds to the developments of today’s diplomatic trends with its own public diplomacy and communication activities. As technology continues to change and evolve, NATO’s communication strategies have faced new types of networks and platforms. Now celebrating its 72nd anniversary, the Alliance seeks to embrace and implement a contemporary communication policy with new mechanisms. Within this framework, this paper will provide a definition of the concept of public diplomacy, and explore the historical evolution of NATO’s public diplomacy agenda. NATO’s coordination activities and values, practical means of communication and their expected impact will be discussed.

Keywords
NATO, soft power, diplomacy, public diplomacy, communication

* PhD, Research Assistant, MEF University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Turkey. E-mail: cansu.gulec@mef.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0002-6449-7242.

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Introduction

The term “public diplomacy” contains the word “diplomacy.” As an instrument of statecraft, diplomacy has long been used as a tool by states in their relations with other states. Although it does not have a commonly agreed-upon definition, diplomacy is generally considered to be the conduct and management of relations, through peaceful means, by and among international actors. The major international actors are states, and diplomacy mainly involves relations among states or between states, international organizations and other international actors. Today, diplomacy continues to be conducted mainly by states, but also includes international and regional organizations, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and even individuals. Since the number and types of actors involved in international affairs have expanded, and the interaction among these actors has increased, the agenda and conduct of diplomacy has evolved in line with these developments. The expansion of intergovernmental and regional organizations does not mean the weakening of diplomacy, but rather a shift from traditional state diplomacy to new forms. Especially in today’s world, international and regional organizations generally compete for better visibility, and they consider their image, identity and brand important.

As a collective defense and security organization, NATO has defined itself as the security branch of an institution of liberal-democratic norms and values, and has embraced the main principles of the Western world since its foundation in April 1949. Nonetheless, after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, there emerged deep disagreements about the future role of the Alliance. In today’s global information environment, it is apparent that NATO needs to strengthen its communication tools and approaches, consider public audiences and develop its agenda setting according to the current communication challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, the main purpose of this paper is to understand and interpret the evolution of NATO’s public diplomacy efforts, taking into account the opportunities and limitations of today’s globalized environment.

Public diplomacy is based on the ability of states and non-state actors to better explain their values to the world. It concentrates particularly on “soft power” tools such as science, art, culture, sports and media that enable interaction between societies. As an organization widely associated with security and defense issues, it is important to understand how NATO responds to the developments of today’s diplomatic trends with its public diplomacy and communication activities.
trends with its public diplomacy and communication activities. Since technology has changed and evolved, NATO’s communication strategies must adjust to new types of networks and platforms. Having recently celebrated its 70th anniversary, and now in its 72nd year of existence, the Alliance is seeking to develop a contemporary communication policy and to implement it by means of new mechanisms.

In this framework, this paper will first present a working definition of the concept of public diplomacy; next, the historical evolution of NATO’s public diplomacy agenda will be evaluated. Then, NATO’s coordination activities, its values, its practical means of communication and their expected impact will be discussed. The aim of this study is to explore the effects of the opportunities and challenges of the contemporary international environment on NATO’s public diplomacy efforts.

Definition and Evolution of Public Diplomacy

Diplomacy is derived from a Greek word *diploma* that means an official document or state paper. The Oxford dictionary defines diplomacy as “management of a country’s affairs by its agents abroad and the activity of managing relations between different countries.”¹ As a key process of communication and negotiation in world politics and an important policy device used by international actors, the term diplomacy has been given a number of definitions in International Relations discipline. While some definitions associate diplomacy with the activity of engaging in foreign policy, others use the term to refer to a tool or technique of foreign policy. Accordingly, the term is therefore described as “a foreign policy instrument for establishing and developing peaceful relations between the governments of the various states through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties.”²

As one of the oldest instruments of world politics, diplomacy is seen as an art, specifically the art of managing relations among sovereign actors. Originally, diplomacy was considered an instrument used by states in order to deal with other states. After the establishment of international and regional organizations, these entities too became involved in diplomatic practices. It can be stated that communication is the focus of diplomacy in managing relations among different international actors. In order to create effective communication mechanisms among different players, diplomacy is supported by an established body of rules and practices.³ Since diplomacy is based on the conduct of relationships using peaceful means, these rules and practices should be implemented by governments and other international actors alike. In practice, diplomacy aims to create a favorable image of the global actor. Modern communication, in that sense, functions to shape views and perceptions around the world.
In contemporary global environment, although states and governments remain the main actors within the international system, the number and variety of actors, from governments to regional and intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations and NGOs, have been rapidly expanding. In tandem, the domain and scope of the diplomacy have expanded to involve different sectors that expand beyond traditional high foreign policy issues. Globalization with its complex web of interdependence has increased the range of negotiations, especially in multilateral meetings. Under these circumstances, diplomatic activities require the use of diplomatic tools to directly influence the people of nations as well. In that respect, public diplomacy can be regarded as one of the efficient means of diplomacy in use today. Thanks to this tool, relations between states and global actors progress more peacefully, with inclusion of public opinion alongside that of official representatives.

The term ‘public diplomacy’ was first coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion. According to Gullion, public diplomacy is concerned with the influence of social viewpoints have on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Indeed, the rise of the concept of public diplomacy is best understood in terms of its relationship with soft power. As mentioned above, with the increase in numbers and types of actors, with the expansion of the subject matter or content of diplomacy, and with the change in the modes, types, and techniques of diplomacy, a new terminology of Public Diplomacy as the language of prestige and international image has brought the concepts like soft power and branding to the nation states’ agenda. In IR discipline, power is generally defined as the ability to affect others to obtain desired outcomes. According to Joseph Nye, others’ behavior can be affected in three main ways: threats of coercion; inducements and payments; and attraction that makes others want what you want. While discussing the concept, Nye puts a distinction between hard power and soft power. The former is achieved through military threat or use, and by economic menace or reward. However, in the 21st century, under the influence of technological developments and globalization, international politics is also changing, and a state cannot address its problems or achieve all of its goals by acting alone. In this environment, it is important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, as it is not always feasible or desirable to force them to change by means of threats or the use of military or economic weapons. In that sense, ‘soft power’ co-opt people rather than coerces them. Nye coined the ‘soft power’ as “the ability of affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.”

While military force remains the fundamental form of power in international system, abilities like communication, organizational and institutional skills, have also become important instruments in today’s global environment of growing interdependence. Diplomacy is a crucial instrument enabling allies to cooperate, and adversaries to resolve conflicts without
using force. International actors communicate, influence one another, bargain and adapt their differences through diplomacy. As a key process of communication and negotiation, diplomacy is used as a significant policy instrument by global actors. Today, diplomacy takes place between actors with a wide range of authority, power, tools and impact.

A country’s soft power capacity has a crucial role in the success of an actor’s public diplomacy as much as efficacy of its policies; indeed, a country’s political values, culture and foreign policies are important indicators of its soft power. Credibility is the significant source of soft power. Since reputation has become one of the main objectives of today’s global actors, they make efforts to increase their credibility around the world. States compete with other states, and also with other actors including media, NGOs, international organizations and other networks in the quest to gain and maintain credibility.

Public diplomacy is about relationship building. It is about understanding the requirements of other countries, cultures and people; communicating one’s perspectives; correcting misperceptions; and searching areas of common ground. Nye defines public diplomacy as an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the public of other countries, rather than only their governments. Public diplomacy seeks to attract by bringing attention to potential areas of commonality, interest and attraction through broadcasting, supporting cultural initiatives and organizing exchanges.

The main distinction between traditional and public diplomacy is that the latter involves a much broader group of people on both sides, and a wider set of interests that go beyond those of the government of the day. Listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and international broadcasting are five components of public diplomacy. Understanding, planning and engagement are also very important concepts for the establishment of powerful relationships.

In the 20th century, public diplomacy was considered a state-based tool used by foreign ministries and other governmental entities to engage and persuade foreign publics with the aim of influencing their governments. Today, public diplomacy has become an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values.
Public diplomacy is a process of creating an overall international image that strengthens a country’s ability in order to achieve diplomatic success. This is also important for “propaganda.” Propaganda is an attempt to influence another country through emotional techniques rather than minds by creating fear, doubt, sympathy, anger or other feelings. In order to change or influence other actors’ opinions, actions or policies, propaganda also operates by means of symbols, such as words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing, etc. Propaganda acquired negative connotations in the 20th century, although it was an effective tool of foreign policy during the First and Second World Wars, as well as the Cold War. During these times, propaganda was associated with manipulating populations at home and abroad.18

Unlike public diplomacy, propaganda is generally not interested in dialogue or any meaningful form of relationship-building.19 The main objective of the propaganda is to influence opinion and behavior of its targeted audience. Although both public diplomacy and propaganda intend to convince people to create a favorable image, the distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy lies in the pattern of communication. In that respect, public diplomacy goes beyond propaganda. It is comprised of what is actually said and done by political figures, as well as practices of promotion and other forms of public relations that are utilized by the business sector.20 In other words, public diplomacy, like propaganda, is about creating influence. However, unlike propaganda, that influence is not a one-way street from the speakers to their target audience. Public diplomacy is perceived as a two-way street with a process of mutual influence, in which the foreign public is seen as an active participant.21

In that sense, the objective of public diplomacy is not propaganda, but building a strategic language of communication based on objective facts and truth. Nye asserts that if public diplomacy degenerates into propaganda, it not only fails to convince, but can undercut soft power. Since soft power depends upon an understanding of the minds of others, an efficient public diplomacy is regarded as a two-way street.22

After the end of the Second World War in 1945, a new type of conflict emerged between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, known as the Cold War. The Cold War was based on a contest of ideologies that divided the world into a bipolar competition characterized by a war of words and the threatened use of nuclear weapons, rather than their actual use. In that era, the idea of nuclear war was ever-present in the minds of the international public. U.S.-Soviet relations became the main global, political agenda, and the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 became the symbol of a world separated by the “Iron Curtain.”23 Moreover, in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and in their alliance blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the objective was to convince people that fear of the enemy was genuine, legitimate and justified. This, in turn, would legitimate and justify the need to sustain a
nuclear arsenal that would have to be at least equal to that of the other side, although there might never be a use for it. This climate of fear was also played out in the media. Propaganda exploited these fears, and the ‘other side’ had always to be portrayed as aggressive, militaristic and repressive. In other words, during the Cold War period, propaganda had a special importance in the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. and the USSR. Both used an organized form of propaganda activities with one-sided, deformed messages, mainly based on their respective ideologies; while the U.S. underlined the material prosperity of the Western world and the desirability of individual freedoms, the USSR emphasized the adverse sides of capitalism. This kind of propaganda sought to stress the admirable side of one’s own country, while denigrating the other side by focusing on specific issues.

In order to shape public attitudes all over the world toward their respective ideologies, the main tools used by the two superpowers were international broadcasting and radio stations, such as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe on the American side, and Radio Moscow on the Soviet side. The U.S. government developed a number of propaganda channels through the work of the United States Information Agency (USIA), and promoted the universal attractiveness of such American brands as Coca-Cola, Levi jeans and McDonalds, as well as American music and Hollywood films.

With the end of the bipolar world, the international environment faced new problems with the rapid expansion in the number and scope of interactions. Contemporary challenges emerged in a new, global communication that had different features from that of the Cold War period. Under these circumstances, it can be claimed that the end of the Cold War made public diplomacy much more important.

The spread of democracy, media proliferation and the expansion of global NGOs changed the nature of power and now exert much more influence on the freedom of action of national governments than ever before. With these developments, public diplomacy has been used in non-traditional forms with new participants, such as non-state actors; with new sorts of relations between state and non-state actors; and with new goals, such as gaining the support of foreign actors to maintain profound relations rather than using propaganda to influence them. The mechanisms used by these actors to communicate with the world public are supported by new, real-time, global technologies, especially by the Internet. These new technologies have blurred the formerly rigid lines between the domestic and international news spheres. A new emphasis has emerged on people-to-people contact for mutual enlightenment, with international actors playing the role of facilitator. Consequently, instead of top-down messaging, “relationship-building” has become the chief task of the new public diplomacy.
Although public diplomacy is accepted as a two-way relationship, there is no agreement on how to measure its impact and success, as there is no clear variable that shows the political outcome of public diplomacy initiatives. However, the establishment of daily communications with the target audience to explain foreign policy decisions and the enhancement of lasting relationships with target groups, including individuals, may help to build relationships and to foster understanding. Since public diplomacy begins with listening, one of the pathways of understanding the success of its activities is to measure “public opinion” to see the largest impact of the attraction. In that sense, successful public diplomacy projects increase favorable public opinion toward the practitioner actor. Another pathway for understanding an initiative’s success is “agenda setting,” which determines the issues covered in the media or discussed in the target population. “Framing” is yet another pathway that changes the media coverage of the practitioner actor’s foreign policy in the host country.29

In sum, public diplomacy increases people’s familiarity with one’s country or international institution by making them think about it, update their image of it and change negative opinions. It also increases people’s appreciation of one’s country or international institution by creating positive perceptions, getting others to see issues of global importance from the same perspective. Moreover, it also helps strengthen ties by getting people to understand and subscribe to common values. More importantly, it influences people and/or politicians by making them favored partners.30

NATO and Public Diplomacy Mechanisms

NATO has been established by the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949 with the purpose of safeguarding the Western lifestyle that includes democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and free-market economy. Although the Treaty itself identified no enemy, given the delimitation of the area of responsibility of the allies to defend and the definition of the challenge to the members, it was clearly designed to counter Soviet expansion and balance Soviet Union’s military power.31 The Alliance was founded for the purposes of the “collective defense”, and at the core of the North Atlantic Treaty is the agreement in Article 5 “that an armed attack against one or more of them (the parties to the treaty) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” obligating all member states to
assist the member attacked when the state consents. Nevertheless, while NATO’s main mission was collective defense, from its creation, the Alliance understood that it was essential to communicate to its citizens to ensure their support.

Therefore, NATO’s founding members took some initial steps toward informing public opinion; on May 18, 1950, the NATO Atlantic Council (NAC) issued a resolution in which it aimed to “Promote and coordinate public information in furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty while leaving responsibility for national programs to each country...”

When the historical evolution of NATO’s public diplomacy policies is examined, some initial steps for the development of communication strategies can be seen. For example, in August 1950, a NATO Information Service was initiated with the nomination of a director. Although it did not receive a budget until July 1951, it developed into an information service in March 1952 with the establishment of an International Staff headed by a Secretary. In 1953, the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations was created. The role of this committee was to address the challenges of communicating the Alliance’s policies to the public. It organized regular meetings with NATO Information Service to exchange and share information for the development of NATO’s communication programs. Despite all these institutional structures, however, it is not possible to refer to an effective public diplomacy activity undertaken by NATO throughout the Cold War. Rather, during that period, the leaders of the two blocs carried out “propaganda” activities with the support of their media tools in order to influence the masses. For this reason, the activities of NATO were shaped around the ideological rivalry of the second half of the 20th century, and by a corresponding discourse in which NATO was described as a military alliance.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact after the disintegration of the Soviet Union eliminated the Soviet threat to the security of the West. In that period, NATO sought to advance dialogue and cooperation with the former Eastern Bloc countries in order to extend security and stability beyond the traditional NATO territories. Therefore, the Partnership for Peace ( PfP) Program was initiated in 1994. In the 1990s, NATO sought to transform from a collective defense alliance into an organization embracing European security. The main issues it has faced since that time have concerned NATO’s enlargement, its relationship with Russia, and the scope and nature of its missions.

As mentioned above, with the 21st century, there emerged a global debate on the forms of public diplomacy, and NATO took broad steps to develop an institutional framework for its public diplomacy efforts. For instance, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) in Brussels was created by the former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in 2003. Alongside the
Allies’ own communication efforts, PDD’s programs are created to inform public audiences about security issues and promote the Alliance’s policies and aims in an accurate and responsive manner. Therefore, beyond daily press relations and website management, most of PDD’s activities are designed to have long-term effects. These activities generally include building both relationships and networks with opinion formers and journalists; facilitating dialogue among security experts, policy-makers and NGO representatives; and generating interest in transatlantic issues among larger segments of the population, in particular the successor generations.36

At NATO headquarters, members of the PDD who carry out communications and public diplomacy programs from among the international staff, work closely with the International Military Staff and the Public Affairs and Strategic Communications Advisor to the Chairman of the Military Committee (MC). The PDD also works with staff from Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) who communicate on operations, exercises and other activities. In that sense, NATO engages in communication strategies with interactions between the civilian and military side of the organization.37

In addition, as an advisory body to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on communication, the Committee on Public Diplomacy (CPD) deals with issues about the media and public engagement. The CPD was founded in 2004, succeeding the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR), which was one of the Organization’s first committees to be created. The CPD is responsible for making recommendations to the NAC on “how to encourage public understanding of, and support for, the aims of NATO.”38 In this respect, the Committee is responsible for the planning, implementation and assessment of NATO’s public diplomacy strategy. As part of that process, members of the CPD share their experiences and exchange their views on national information and communication programs and public perception of NATO’s activities. In order to improve and strengthen the information flow in NATO Partner countries, the CPD also specifies Contact Point Embassies (CPEs). In this regard, within non-NATO countries, the CPD agrees on an embassy from a NATO member country to act as the point of contact for information about the Alliance in the respective host country. The CPD also seeks to establish a collaborative dialogue with NGOs such as the Atlantic Treaty Association.39

In fulfilling its main duties and responsibilities, the CPD functions with

Alongside the Allies’ own communication efforts, PDD’s programs are created to inform public audiences about security issues and promote the Alliance’s policies and aims in an accurate and responsive manner.
the support of some working mechanisms. As mentioned above, the Committee includes representatives from each of the NATO member countries with the Assistant Secretary General of the Public Diplomacy Division serving as the Chairperson and the Public Information Advisor representing the Director of the International Military Staff. During committee meetings, the CPD examines and approves an annual Public Diplomacy Action Plan, and may make additional reports or recommendations to the Council as necessary. The CPD meets regularly with member countries, and meets in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) format in order to allow the participation of representatives from partner countries. Representatives from Contact Point Embassies in partner country capitals also join CPD meetings at times.

NATO states its objectives regarding public diplomacy and communication strategies as follows:

NATO communicates and develops programs to help raise awareness and understanding of the Alliance and Alliance-related issues and, ultimately, to foster support for and trust in, the Organization. Since NATO is an intergovernmental organization, individual member governments are also responsible for explaining their national defense and security policies as well as their role as members of the Alliance to their respective publics.

NATO and its member states typically use a combination of press releases, official speeches and public diplomacy initiatives to generate an impact on public opinion. Alliance press offices and spokespersons attempt to tell the organization’s point of view to the widest public through the media, and also seek to influence media portrayals of events. Public diplomacy is about direct contact in order to persuade an international public, as opposed to state-to-state ties. As mentioned above, in order to share values and ideas, international actors use public diplomacy to respond to short-term news events, build positive news agendas and develop long-term relationships with populations. In addition, strategic communications intend to shape the information environment to gain support for particular policies and military operations. NATO’s has used strategic communications to this end during military operations such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

New security challenges, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO’s crisis management experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan and the significance of cooperating with partners around the world drove NATO to scrutinize and review its communication power.
determined some key principles for governing its thinking on a new public diplomacy approach:

1. Public diplomacy is a matter of listening;
2. Public diplomacy must be associated with policy;
3. To be effective, public diplomacy must be credible;
4. Public diplomacy needs to respond to the challenges of the 2.0 web world;
5. The most effective public diplomacy will take place under media spotlights, but at other times, policy issues are better communicated by third parties, such as think tanks and academics than through official statements;
6. Decent planning, training and resources are required for public diplomacy.

NATO’s 2010–2011 Public Diplomacy Strategy identified two key underlying areas that need a special effort: support for NATO’s role and achievements in areas of operations and missions, and the Alliance’s identity and strategic direction. The document stated that “NATO’s overall public diplomacy efforts would continue to aim at promoting awareness of and building understanding and support for NATO’s policies, operations and missions in the short, medium and long term and in a complement to the national efforts of the Allies.”

Under these circumstances, former Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy at NATO, Tacan İldem, highlighted NATO’s policy of “projecting stability beyond NATO’s borders” with neighboring regions as part of its defense and deterrence strategy. He underlines the importance of cooperation between the EU and NATO on issues like joint defense, capability development and burden-sharing. Accordingly, public diplomacy is seen as a long-term process of creating trust, interest and affinity in the public. All of these communication mechanisms demonstrate that the Alliance regards communicating with and influencing publics as very important.

In this context, NATO took some initiatives to expand public understanding of its role. For example, under the headline “WeAreNATO”, the Alliance puts effort to explain NATO’s core mission of guaranteeing freedom and security for its citizens. This concept focuses on the advantages of unity and solidarity between Allies, and the role NATO plays in sustaining Euro-Atlantic security. This Alliance-wide communications effort, with contributions from Allied nations, uses branded multimedia content to display how NATO members work together across numerous areas, including diplomacy, military cooperation and crisis response. İldem stated,
In times of uncertainty and unpredictability, a strong NATO alliance is more important than ever. It’s crucial that all of our citizens understand what NATO is and what we do. Our continued success depends on our citizens understanding the essential role that NATO plays in our security, on which our prosperity is based. We will remain fully transparent and proactive in explaining our essential work to the outside world.47

Furthermore, on 8 June 2019, NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, started an initiative “NATO 2030” which was proclaimed at NATO’s London Summit in December 2019. The goal of this initiative is to make the Alliance, and its member states, more prepared for new threats and challenges. According to Stoltenberg48: “Using NATO more politically also means using a broader range of tools such as military and non-military, economic and diplomatic…”49 Especially during the Covid-19 Pandemic active public engagement and strategic communication in all member states of NATO are seen as necessary. In that sense, NATO citizens and allies should be actively informed about what the Alliance has been doing for them, including providing airlifts, medical support, and transporting patients during the pandemic. In order to meet the challenges of the pandemic crisis, NATO is using digital communications on the pandemic response across all platforms. Moreover, due to the pandemic, NATO’s public diplomacy efforts have pivoted face-to-face events to online engagements to shape the policy debate.50

With the rapid communication and technological developments resulting from globalization, all actors in the international system are looking for new ways to ‘express’ themselves. In pursuit of this aim, NATO has begun to adopt many communication strategies, including public diplomacy efforts. However, in this globalized world, in tandem with evolution in communication strategies and tools, the shape and scope of conflicts has also changed. As a security organization, NATO also faces contemporary security challenges. In this process, it cannot be expected that all NATO’s public diplomacy activities will be carried out impeccably. In today’s world, the Alliance faces many challenges in the conduct of its public diplomacy, as discussed in the next section.

Public Diplomacy Challenges for NATO

In the constitution of NATO’s identity, public diplomacy plays a very crucial role. However, there are some arguments that claim the Alliance faces some public diplomacy challenges and has a public perception problem. According to Wolff, weak or varying public support for the Alliance and its
specific missions, general lack of public awareness of the alliance’s post-
Cold War transformation, diverging opinions on its proper role in the world
and parochial and domestic interests filtering into NATO’s agenda are the
main public perception challenges confronted by NATO.51

Today, the Soviet Union does not exist, and the conflicts and adversaries
NATO faces are more diverse. Moreover, NATO serves as the primary mi-
litary connection between Western Europe and the U.S.52 Since the 1990s,
NATO has been involved in a number of conflicts, including the Balkans
and Afghanistan. More recently, NATO served as a strike force in Kosovo
and Libya and has contributed to combat operations in Afghanistan. Yet
NATO may be conceptualized not just as a military alliance, but also as a
diplomatic network in which many actors and institutions work. While the
unpredictable security environment may impact the role of public diplo-
macy, it remains important to determine what challenges NATO faces and the
best practices that can be applied to address them. After the end of the Cold
War, NATO experienced some changes in public support; public opinion
was mainly affected when the alliance intervened militarily in Bosnia and
Kosovo and when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003. NATO’s command of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan caused a
new wave of public discontent about the function and purpose of the allian-
ce. European populations in particular consistently opposed many aspects
of this mission.53

After the end of the Cold War, NATO underwent a number of changes that
resulted in the adoption of three new strategic concepts. The current stra-
tegic concept, titled “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” was adopted
in November 2010 during the Lisbon Summit; it presents NATO’s three
essential core tasks as “collective defense, crisis management and coope-
rate security.” It also underlines Alliance solidarity, the importance of
transatlantic consultation and the need to engage in a continuous process
of reform.54

Taking advantage of the power of communication and public diplomacy to
cope with the new threats identified in this new strategic concept will be
a complementary element for NATO. However, national and international
surveys show that the public at large, and particularly the post-Cold War
generation, has obscure ideas of the NATO’s new missions and policies.55

NATO’s Former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy
Stefanie Babst states that:

No single government can tackle these expanding problems on its own.
The Alliance remains the best and most effective transatlantic forum to do
exactly this. But NATO’s role as a security provider has not been fully un-
derstood by our publics. For sure, the Allies have come a long way in em-
racing a new and modern understanding of their common communication
policies. Transparency, responsiveness, accuracy of information and direct engagement with people across Allied territory and beyond have become pillars of NATO’s public diplomacy…In recent years, we have especially reinforced our efforts to reach out to the young generation, by facilitating networks among students and young political leaders, offering summer schools and fellowships and organizing seminars and workshops across NATO and partner nations. We have also overhauled our technological capabilities, bringing the NATO website and other audio-visual tools and products up to scratch. Online lectures, videos and discussions have made NATO’s interface to the outside world more transparent and interactive.56

In the contemporary era, NATO faces the problem that the post-Cold War generation does not know very much about the Alliance’s concrete activities and the transatlantic values for which NATO stands. Thus, the Alliance is often burdened with stereotypes within broader parts of the public in both Allied and partner countries.57 National and international surveys demonstrate that although NATO is seen as essential, it needs to make much more effort to regain wider public support. Being supported by the masses is one of the most important criteria in measuring the success of public diplomacy.

For instance, according to a Transatlantic Trends Survey conducted in 2013, 33% of Americans, 42% of Europeans and 40% of Turks thought that their side of the transatlantic partnership in security and diplomatic affairs should take a more independent approach. Nevertheless, NATO was seen as “still essential” by 58% of EU respondents and 55% of Americans. Within the majority that felt NATO was still essential, the main reason given was its identity as “an alliance of democratic countries that should act together.” 15% of Americans, 12% of Europeans and 27% of Turks said that NATO helps share the costs of military action. 9% of Americans, 13% of Europeans and 15% of Turks agreed with the statement that “military actions are only legitimate if NATO supports them.”58 Another, recent survey was conducted by the PEW Research Center in which half of Americans (48%) said NATO does not do enough to help solve world problems; 31% said NATO does the right amount, whereas only 5% said the alliance does too much to solve the world’s problems.59 YouGov conducted a survey in many NATO nations, and found that support for membership had fallen in several European countries over the last three years; while in 2017, 73% of Brits approved of membership, this number had fallen to 59% by 2019. Likewise, in Germany, support fell from 68% to 54%, and in France from 54% to 39%. Nordic nations Denmark and Norway experienced drops from 80% to 70%, and 75% to 66%, respectively.60
In order to overcome its public image issues, the Alliance has determined some key communication priorities. One of them is explaining and promoting NATO’s role and achievements in areas of operations and missions; the other is explaining and promoting the Alliance’s identity and strategic direction. In parallel with these priorities, in today’s global environment, NATO can best use digital tools to reach global audiences, as one of the most immediate ways to reach people is to use digital channels effectively.

Communication technologies such as radio and television have long been the instruments through which public diplomacy messages are conveyed to the public. However, these technologies are also thought to be “twentieth-century public diplomacy mediums” since they consist of one-way information flow that restricts interaction between messengers and recipients. In other words, conventional mass media does not give people the opportunity to respond to messages of public diplomacy. With the advent of global media vehicles and the growth of the digital society, however, the 21st century has witnessed a conceptual change among practitioners of public diplomacy. The expansion of digital tools and social media channels provides opportunities for the “direct engagement with people” called for by NATO’s Former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, Stefanie Babst.

Today, NATO can implement a networked social media strategy that consists of educating the public about its missions, officials and institutions. In addition, networked social media campaigns can focus on NATO’s core activity, its multilateral diplomatic initiatives and its response to the growing international security concerns. The content of such campaigns might be tweeted through the network in order to reach target audiences. Such a strategy would utilize NATO’s assets and may expand the global scope of its online network.

Conclusion

Public diplomacy can be considered an expression of soft power; it is about attraction, persuasion and winning hearts and minds. It is a mechanism used by governments and other international actors, NGOs and even individuals to mobilize resources to communicate with and attract the public of other countries, rather than only their governments. In order to reach their goals and bring about change, every actor in the international environment needs to listen, engage, discuss and influence others. It is not meaningful to investigate the public diplomacy activities developed by NATO since its establishment without understanding the transformations in its identity. Diplomacy is a vital instrument empowering allies to cooperate and adversaries to settle disputes without using force. International actors interact, negotiate, influence one another and adjust their differences through dip-
In the 21st century, diplomacy has been used in non-traditional formats, by new players such as non-state actors, in a context of new types of relations between state and non-state actors and with new priorities. Although this new form of diplomacy does not abolish the conventional understanding of diplomacy, its power has largely been influenced by these new dynamics. The increase of the network society brings more opportunities for public diplomacy activities.

On 4 April 2021, NATO celebrated its 72nd anniversary whose identity has rested largely on its hard power for a long time. Founded as a military-based international organization during the Cold War, NATO’s longstanding communication strategies harken back to its past at the alliance level. Nonetheless, its institutionalization in the field of public diplomacy accelerated in the 2000s. After the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, there was much debate about the alliance’s raison d’être. The debate revealed an essential need for more responsive and effective means of communicating with the public and raising awareness, particularly among young people, of the value of NATO’s role in an increasingly globalized world. The transformation in the identity of the Alliance, the need to go beyond its “collective defense” mission, the attempts at dealing with the conflicts in the Balkans and Afghanistan, the new security challenges of the global era and the turbulence in the Middle East and North Africa have all been very demanding circumstances that the Alliance has worked hard to address. Contemporary security challenges cannot be dealt with by military responses alone. It is also necessary to implement strategic communication tools to achieve public accountability and build public support.

One of the most important tasks in this digital age is the incorporation of public opinion research into public diplomacy. It is apparent that NATO needs time and resources to expand its communication tools and public diplomacy strategy. In analyzing NATO’s public diplomacy efforts and institutionalization process, it should be considered that the alliance is an intergovernmental organization founded by sovereign states. In terms of the definitions of public diplomacy made so far, the main objective of NATO’s public diplomacy is expected to be directed at the public opinion of countries outside NATO. Currently, however, NATO’s public diplomacy efforts are primarily directed at the public opinion of its member states. Therefore, it is important to overcome the political and bureaucratic barriers to building common and holistic public diplomacy within the alliance. An institutional public diplomacy strategy is difficult for NATO to formulate due to the prioritization of individual interests within its member countries; thus, a cooperative, dialogue-based approach will play a crucial role in the development of NATO’s vision and goals in this new era. In that sense, social media platforms should be used more frequently and effectively since they provide simultaneous social interaction among users. NATO’s official statement is pertinent here: “A ‘NATO decision’ is the
expression of the collective will of all thirty member countries since all decisions are taken by consensus. In this framework, NATO’s ability to develop a consistent public diplomacy strategy, to share responsibilities among its members and to support this mission within the Alliance is a test that will show its effectiveness in the field of public diplomacy.
Endnotes

8 Nye also uses the term “smart power” as the combination of the hard power of the coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction.
9 Ibid.

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34 Ibid.


37 “Communications and Public Diplomacy.”


39 Ibid.

40 Ambassador Tacan Ildem was appointed Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy in March 2016. He advised the Secretary General on public diplomacy issues and directs the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), which plays a key role in conveying the Alliance’s strategic and political messages to opinion formers and to the public in general. The PDD works to raise the Alliance’s profile with audiences worldwide and to build support for Alliance operations and policies. For detailed information about Ildem, see: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoq/who_is_who_49771.htm (Accessed July 23, 2020).

41 “Committee on Public Diplomacy.”

42 “Communications and Public Diplomacy.”


To help him with this task, Jens Stoltenberg appointed an expert group that will provide recommendations on NATO reflection process. NATO and the expert group will engage with representatives of NATO member states, public and private sector experts and young leaders and gather their inputs. The findings of NATO 2030 initiative will be presented at NATO Summit in June 2021.


Wolff, “Crafting a NATO Brand,” p. 73.


Ibid, p. 74.


Ibid.

“2010-2011 NATO Public Diplomacy Strategy Note.”


“2010-2011 NATO Public Diplomacy Strategy.”


Evaluation of the Economic Relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan

Nevzat ŞİMŞEK * & Aslı Seda KURT **

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the economic relationship between Turkey and Uzbekistan, placing special importance on trade relations. To this end, the data of selected macroeconomic indicators, selected development indicators, selected demographic indicators and indicators for technology and communication, tourism and foreign direct investments are reported and examined. In order to analyze the trade patterns between Turkey and Uzbekistan, as a contribution to the existing literature, in this paper, we will use a complementarity index and bilateral revealed comparative advantage indexes simultaneously to evaluate the trade relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan in detail. The findings of the paper show that there is huge potential to further develop economic relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey. Strengthening and developing Uzbekistan-Turkey relations will create gravity for the other countries in the region and will play a key role in sustaining not only the relations between Turkey and the regional countries, but the relations among the regional countries.

* Professor, Dokuz Eylül University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economics, İzmir, Turkey. E-mail: nevzat.simsek@deu.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0001-7010-6167.
** PhD, Dokuz Eylül University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economics, İzmir, Turkey. E-mail: asliseda.kurt@deu.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0003-0356-7443.
Keywords

Turkey, Uzbekistan, Central Asia, foreign trade, trade complementarity index, bilateral revealed comparative advantage index

Introduction

Turkey was the first country to recognize the declarations of independence of all the Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan’s declaration of independence on December 16, 1991. Former Uzbek President Islam Karimov was the first leader of an independent Central Asian country to visit Ankara. Since that time, Turkey has attempted to deepen its relations with the Central Asian countries by using official and diplomatic channels intensively, encouraging the newly independent countries’ efforts to shift toward a market economy and build secular democracies. In this regard, Turkey has offered economic assistance to these countries. For example, Turkey’s Eximbank offered credit facilities totaling more than $1 billion to develop their market economies. Joint ventures between Turkish banks and Central Asian banks were created to promote the development of the banking sector. In order to help to modernize these countries’ transportation systems, many Turkish construction firms have been engaged in various projects in the region, and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was established to provide foreign aid to assist these countries in the transition period.

Uzbekistan is the second largest economy in the region after Kazakhstan. With its population over 30 million, market potential, geographical position in the heart of Central Asia, rich natural resources, military power, long history and rich cultural values, Uzbekistan has great potential to become the leading country in the region. Cooperation with Uzbekistan in all fields has always been an attractive prospect for Turkey. Since gaining independence, Uzbekistan has implemented liberal economic policies and has tried to adopt a free market economy model, and economic programs encouraging privatization and free trade have been carried out in the country. Turkey’s geographical position as a strategic hub between Central Asia and the European Union (EU) poses an important opportunity for landlocked Uzbekistan to diversify its trade along the westward energy corridor, and Turkey’s access to the EU markets has attracted the interest of the Central Asian countries including Uzbekistan.

Since independence, bilateral relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan
have followed a positive route. The Turkish-Uzbek Business Council was established in 1993, and more than 90 bilateral agreements and protocols were signed in between 1992 and 2019 in various areas to form the legal basis of relations. Turkish businesspeople have invested in many sectors in Uzbekistan such as infrastructure, energy and communication. Relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan have continued to develop since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992 and have been sustained with agreements, high level visits, trade and tourism—but not at the desired level. Because of the political problems between the two countries, which started in 1994 and worsened in 1999 and 2005, most of the steps taken to promote economic relations could not be fully implemented. Turkey has at times been an important cultural pole for Uzbekistan. For example, 2,000 Uzbek citizens studied at Turkish universities in the 1990s. This tendency made Turkey the most popular country for Uzbeks to study abroad. However, in 1994, the Uzbek government called 1,600 of the 2,000 Uzbek students studying in Turkey to return home. After enduring bumpy relations for more than two decades, relations between the two countries have recently improved.¹

Turkey plays an important role in the trade relations of all the Central Asian countries. For example, in absolute numbers, Turkey realizes the largest volume of bilateral trade with Kazakhstan. However, in 2017, bilateral trade with Kazakhstan was only slightly higher than Turkish-Uzbek and Turkish-Turkmen trade. As far as the share of Turkish trade in the turnover of the Central Asian countries is concerned, it varies from 12% in the case of Turkmenistan (2nd place) to 2.5% in the case of Kazakhstan. Turkey also occupies high positions in the trade volumes of Tajikistan (4th place, 8%), Uzbekistan (5th place, 7%) and Kyrgyzstan (6th place, 4.5%). It can thus be said that, despite poor political ties, Turkey’s trade relations with Uzbekistan seem relatively strong. Although diplomatic relations subsequently worsened, before the adoption of restrictive measures affecting Turkish businesses in the country in 2010, Turkey was Uzbekistan’s 3rd largest export destination and ranked 4th in 2017. In spite of the fact that Uzbekistan then ranked 45th for exports and imports in terms of Turkey’s global trade partners, both grew in 2017. Turkish goods exported to Uzbekistan in 2017 were valued at $680 million, up from $147 million in 2016. Imports from Uzbekistan totaled $823 million in 2017, up from $114 million from 2016, and trade volume in 2017 between Uzbekistan and Turkey reached $1.5 billion. Turkey’s direct investments in Uzbekistan now amount to more than $1 billion, and the number of completed projects has reached 88, with a total value of $2 billion. At present, there are 500 Turkish firms and
companies working in Uzbekistan, 100 of which are representation offices, in sectors such as construction, textiles, food, hotel service, commitment, building materials, medication and plastic. All of the Central Asian countries except Kazakhstan have a surplus employable population, so in addition to the traditional routes of labor migration to Russia, Turkey is regarded as a destination with potential for work. Currently, about 300,000 Uzbek migrants are working in Turkey, most of whom are illegal migrants without documents for temporary residence and work.2

In February 2017, after Shavkat Mirziyoyev took over Uzbekistan’s Presidency, Turkey and Uzbekistan signed a cooperation agreement to enhance economic relations. President Mirziyoyev visited Turkey on October 25–26, 2017, which was the first official visit at the presidential level in 20 years. During this visit, 25 agreements worth $3.5 billion were signed in order to implement around 35 projects in energy, construction, pharmaceuticals, transportation, electronics and agriculture, indicating that bilateral relations were once again normalized, after having been frozen for more than two decades. Since then, bilateral relations have been developing in various areas such as diplomacy, security, economy, culture and education. Trade volume between the two countries is expected to increase in the upcoming years, as both countries are keen to improve economic ties. For example, the presidents of both countries expressed their will and engagement to increase bilateral trade from the current $1.2 billion to $5 billion in the coming years. All of these developments show that there is a move toward the construction of a multi-dimensional strategic partnership in Turkey-Uzbekistan relations.

It is possible to analyze the relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan in social, cultural, political and other fields. In this sense, there is a wide range of literature about relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics. However, there is a very limited number of papers focusing on trade relations by using trade indices, and most of these make descriptive evaluations. Yücememiş, Arıcan and Alkan evaluate the economic relations among Turkey, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan by giving special importance to the banking system. They describe the prominent advantages of Uzbekistan in terms of the richness of its natural resources, high population, customs union possibilities applied with the CIS countries, low input costs (especially energy, raw materials and labor) and its unsaturated and growing market. They also note that, as a landlocked country, Uzbekistan has to work harder to develop international trade.3 Altay, Çelebioğlu and Şen use export and import intensity indices for 68 countries, including Uzbekistan,
to investigate Turkey’s international trade relations. They provide evidence that Turkey’s trade relations are more intensive with countries that share a common border, language, history, culture and tradition. Kızıltan and Sandalcılar analyze Turkey’s comparative advantages in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) region, and find that the fundamental cause of Turkey’s trade deficit against ECO is the import of oil, petroleum products and natural gas. Doğruyol examines the intra-industry trade between Turkey and ECO by using trade indices such as Grubel-Lloyd and Brülhart, finding that the intra-industry trade level is not high between Turkey and ECO members.

The focus of this paper is on the economic relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan, and it attaches greater importance to international trade. In this framework, a general-to-specific methodology has been followed. First, data on the main macroeconomic indicators of the two countries, and then various economic data are evaluated to reveal the individual and bilateral economic performance and potential of the two countries. After determining the overall macroeconomic structure of two countries, the foreign trade data is examined. Specifying the general structure of foreign trade, trade indices are used to clearly prove the foreign trade potential of the two countries. The indices used in this paper present evidence related to comparative advantage and complementarity. While the findings gathered via trade indices are evaluated throughout the text, the policy implications of these findings are presented in the conclusion.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the methodology of the paper. The following section evaluates the historical background of Turkey-Uzbekistan economic relations and current economic developments; the next section discusses the trend and structure of these countries’ trade and analyses the trade pattern between the two countries using various trade indices. The final section is the conclusion, which includes recommendations for improving bilateral trade between Turkey and Uzbekistan.

**An Evaluation Based on Main Economic Indicators**

In this section, the economies of Turkey and Uzbekistan are evaluated based on main economic indicators. These indicators are presented as follows: selected macroeconomic indicators, selected development indicators, selected demographic indicators, indicators on technology and communication, tourism and foreign direct investments.
Selected Macroeconomic Indicators

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a key indicator for measuring the performance of a country’s economy. It shows the market value of all the final goods and services produced in an economy over a specific time period. Nominal GDP is measured by current prices and shows general economic performance, while real GDP is measured by constant prices and represents the goods and services produced in a country. When these indicators are considered, it can be readily seen that GDP has grown in both countries in recent years.

Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 1992–2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>UZBEKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (current $) (billions)</td>
<td>158,460</td>
<td>272,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (constant 2010 $) (billions)</td>
<td>386,460</td>
<td>520,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%), (compared to the previous year)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (current $)</td>
<td>2,842</td>
<td>4,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (constant 2010 $)</td>
<td>6,932</td>
<td>8,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation, GDP deflator (%)</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although GDP and GDP growth rates are the most commonly used macroeconomic indicators, they ignore population. So, it is also important to take per capita GDP into account. This indicator implies welfare, which is accepted as the final purpose of all economic activities. According to the World Bank classification, Turkey is an upper middle-income country, while Uzbekistan is in the group of lower middle-income countries regarding income level per capita.

Inflation rate also affects welfare. Inflation reduces real incomes and causes a decline in competitiveness. The uncertainty stemming from inflation can lead to a lower investment level and lower economic growth rate. It should be noted that both countries have high inflation rates within the period considered.

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Evaluating the production structure of economies clarifies the dynamics of economic growth. Economies are generally divided into three sectors: agriculture, industry and services. Figure 1 shows that the sectoral share of agriculture in GDP has decreased over time in both countries. In Turkey, the contribution of services is much larger than the other sectors. Despite political measures applied to promote industrialization, the share of industry in GDP has remained quite stable in Turkey.

In Turkey, the share of agriculture decreased by 60%, the share of industry decreased by 6.45% and the share of services increased by 6% in 2017 compared to 1992. In Uzbekistan, the share of agriculture decreased by 51.4%, the share of industry decreased by 19.4% and the share of services increased by 33.3% in 2017 compared to 1992.

Selected Development Indicators

Selected development indicators are summarized in Table 2. According to this table, the two countries have almost the same level of life expectancy at birth in each year. Longer life expectancy implies greater development level. The Human Development Index (HDI) is one of the leading, comprehensive indicators of development. HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in three key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. If the HDI value of a country is between 0.700–0.799, the country is classified in the high HDI category. In previous years, Uzbekistan was in the medium HDI category, while Turkey was in the high HDI category. In 2017, Turkey and Uzbekistan were both in the high HDI category, ranking 64th and 105th out of 189 countries, respectively.
Table 2: Selected development indicators, 1992, 2000, 2010, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life expectancy at birth, total (years)</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>UZBEKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>65.275</td>
<td>66.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>70.008</td>
<td>67.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>74.154</td>
<td>70.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>65.275</td>
<td>66.368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDI (value)</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>UZBEKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>0.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.734</td>
<td>0.710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.791</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDI (rank)</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>UZBEKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>83rd</td>
<td>95th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>85th</td>
<td>102th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>83rd</td>
<td>105th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>64th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Selected Demographic Indicators

As for demographic indicators, Turkey has a larger population than Uzbekistan. Population in the world grew at a rate of around 1.16% in 2017; Turkey and Uzbekistan have higher population growth rates than the world average. This means that Turkey and Uzbekistan both have young populations, unlike many countries in the world. Having a young population implies having more innovative minds, which is a key factor in the developing world. On the other hand, if there is a young labor force but not enough job opportunities, countries have higher unemployment rates, implying important socio-economic problems. Turkey has a higher unemployment rate than Uzbekistan. The unemployment rates of these two countries, and their female unemployment rates, are higher than 5.65% and 6%, which are the average unemployment rate and female unemployment rate of high-income countries in 2017 respectively. When labor force participation rate, especially female labor force participation rate indicators are considered, it can be seen that both rates in Uzbekistan are higher than those in Turkey. Furthermore, as of 2017, the female labor force participation rate in high-income countries is 52.23%, which is lower than that of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s labor force participation rate (total) is also higher than high-income countries’ labor force participation rate, which is 60.25% in 2017. Finally, urban population is lower in Uzbekistan when compared to Turkey. Turkey’s young and urban population makes this country an attractive market for the rest of the world.
Table 3: Selected demographic indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>UZBEKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population, total (millions)</td>
<td>55,750</td>
<td>63,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate (%)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (% of total)</td>
<td>60.52</td>
<td>64.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force (total), (millions)</td>
<td>20,180</td>
<td>21,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force participation rate, total (%)</td>
<td>55.44</td>
<td>48.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force participation rate, male (%)</td>
<td>79.59</td>
<td>72.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force participation rate, female (%)</td>
<td>34.56</td>
<td>27.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate, total (%)</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>6.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate, male (%)</td>
<td>8.91</td>
<td>6.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate, female (%)</td>
<td>7.59</td>
<td>6.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In recent years, the number of Uzbeks in Turkey has been growing. It increased by 90.08% in 2018 over 2016. Most Uzbeks come to Turkey with a short-term residence permit. Many Uzbeks reside in Turkey with a family residence permit, a work permit or by means of other opportunities.

Table 4: Number of Uzbeks in Turkey with a residence permit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18,270 (8/10)</td>
<td>,,</td>
<td>34,727 (8/10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with a short-term residence permit</td>
<td>11,884 (5/10)</td>
<td>23,995 (,,)</td>
<td>24,319 (7/10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with a family residence permit</td>
<td>2,330 (8/10)</td>
<td>2,781 (6/10)</td>
<td>3,537 (6/10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with a work permit</td>
<td>2,081 (6/10)</td>
<td>,,</td>
<td>3,573 (6/10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with other motives</td>
<td>1,580 (6/10)</td>
<td>3,321 (5/10)</td>
<td>2,701 (8/10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Republic of Turkey’s Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management (accessed April 5, 2019).
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate the ranking of Uzbekistan in Turkey’s top 10.

Migration and emigration have an important effect on economies. Many citizens migrate in search of better life standards and economic conditions. While many Turkish people migrate to other countries, there are even more people immigrating to Turkey. Uzbekistan is in 6th place on the list in Table 5, which shows the top ten countries whose citizens immigrate to Turkey.

Table 5: Immigrants and emigrants in Turkey by country of citizenship, 2017 (Top 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of citizenship</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Emigrants</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>466,333</td>
<td>244,083</td>
<td>222,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Republic citizens</td>
<td>101,772</td>
<td>59,360</td>
<td>42,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign nationals</td>
<td>364,561</td>
<td>184,723</td>
<td>179,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>97,054</td>
<td>51,174</td>
<td>45,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>37,747</td>
<td>22,342</td>
<td>15,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>28,189</td>
<td>17,613</td>
<td>10,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>20,865</td>
<td>10,736</td>
<td>10,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>20,317</td>
<td>8,093</td>
<td>12,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>17,871</td>
<td>5,663</td>
<td>12,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>17,794</td>
<td>9,471</td>
<td>8,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>8,982</td>
<td>2,529</td>
<td>6,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>8,582</td>
<td>5,432</td>
<td>3,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8,440</td>
<td>4,028</td>
<td>4,412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Foreign remittances are money transfers from workers abroad to their home countries. They are of great importance in terms of balance of payments and economic growth. Remittance flows to Turkey fell by 77.02% after the 2008 global financial crises. The data on foreign remittances are not available for Uzbekistan in 2000 and 2017. Foreign remittances to GDP ratio is below 1% for Turkey, while this ratio is almost 5% in Uzbekistan in 2015.8
Table 6: Foreign remittances (million $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4,560,000</td>
<td>1,819,000</td>
<td>1,048,000</td>
<td>-77.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2,858,000</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Indicators on Technology and Communication

When their young and educated population is taken into account, the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) sector appears to be a promising sector in both Turkey and Uzbekistan. The ICT development index has been published since 2009 by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is the United Nations specialized agency for ICTs to monitor and compare developments in ICTs between countries and over time. This index consists of three sub-indices: ICT access, ICT use and ICT skills. While Turkey rose five places, Uzbekistan rose eight places in 2017 compared to 2016. So, it can be said that the ICT sector is developing in both countries.

Table 7: ICT development index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Value 2016</th>
<th>Value 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


E-government index can be evaluated as an indicator presenting the adoption level of national governments to ICTs. It is a composite measure of three dimensions: provision of online services, telecommunication connectivity and human capacity. Table 8 shows that both Turkey and Uzbekistan have made progress in these dimensions in recent years. Utilizing information and communication technologies in public services will increase service quality and speed even further.
Table 8: E-Government development index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>0.4780</td>
<td>0.5900</td>
<td>0.7112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>0.4498</td>
<td>0.5434</td>
<td>0.6207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Tourism**

Turkey benefits from its rich cultural heritage, with seventeen World Heritage cultural sites, two World Heritage natural sites, several international fairs and exhibitions and strong creative industries.9 Turkey has begun to offer attractive prices on sun-and-beach products similar to those of competitors in the Mediterranean against the economic crisis. At the same time, Turkey has started to direct its destination-marketing efforts toward more diversified travel segments, such as winter sports, cultural experience, health tourism and sailing tourism.10 In terms of tourism receipts, Turkey is ranked 14th and 6th in the World and in Europe, respectively, in 2017. Turkey is ranked 8th and 5th in the World and in Europe, respectively, in terms of international arrivals in 2017.11

Table 9: Tourism statistics, 2000, 2010, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International tourist arrivals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(thousand people)</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9,586</td>
<td>31,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International tourism inbound receipts (current million $)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7,636</td>
<td>26,318</td>
<td>31,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average receipts per arrival ($)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>796.6</td>
<td>839.1</td>
<td>847.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>208.6</td>
<td>124.1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Uzbekistan is one of the leading countries in the world in terms of its rich cultural and historical potential. The country has more than 7,000 monuments of cultural heritage, including the historical centers of Bukhara, Khiva, Samarkand and Shakhrisabz, which are inscribed on the UNESCO
World Heritage List. After Uzbekistan gained independence, a policy of promoting the tourism sector was adopted. The number of tourists traveling to Uzbekistan has consistently increased, as seen in Table 9.

**Table 10: Tourism between Turkey and Uzbekistan, 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arrivals from Uzbekistan to Turkey</th>
<th>Arrivals from Turkey to Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage change in 2017 over 2016</td>
<td>195,745</td>
<td>48,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.72</td>
<td>21.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Republic of Turkey’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism (accessed April 18, 2019).

The number of people traveling from Uzbekistan to Turkey and from Turkey to Uzbekistan has been increasing over the years. However, it should be noted that these numbers are well below the potential.

**Business Environment and Foreign Direct Investments**

The ease of doing business index is widely used to measure business regulations and the environment of the economies. This index measures regulations on various areas related to business life, namely, starting a business, dealing with construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. Minor revisions are made almost every year. For example, in 2017, getting electricity, protecting minority investors and resolving insolvency are included, while employing workers, closing a business and protecting investors are excluded. Both Turkey and Uzbekistan have been making progress in conducting business operations and improving their investment climate in recent years. Uzbekistan’s achievement is especially remarkable. Uzbekistan rose 63 steps from 2010 to 2017 with the help of the measures it has taken to attract foreign investments.

**Table 11: Ease of doing business**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>Change in Position in 2017 vs 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>73\textsuperscript{th}</td>
<td>69\textsuperscript{th}</td>
<td>4 positions up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>63.85</td>
<td>68.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>150\textsuperscript{th}</td>
<td>87\textsuperscript{th}</td>
<td>63 positions up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>38.74</td>
<td>61.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is desirable for sustainable growth and development, especially in under-developed and developing countries. FDI inflows to Turkey and Uzbekistan dramatically increased in 2017 over 1992. However, the FDI inflow to GDP ratio is generally below the world average. According to the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, the largest portions of FDI are directed to the following sectors in Turkey: finance, manufacturing, energy, ICT, wholesale and retail trade, transport and storage and construction. Oil and gas, power generation, telecommunication and IT technology, construction and construction materials, road construction, drinking water supply and sewage, textiles, agriculture and water management are the sectors to which FDI is directed in Uzbekistan.\(^{13}\)

### Table 12: FDI inflows (thousands $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>844,000</td>
<td>982,000</td>
<td>9,099,000</td>
<td>10,886,000</td>
<td>1,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>74,700</td>
<td>1,636,449</td>
<td>95,770</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>153,248,000</td>
<td>1,461,000,000</td>
<td>1,864,000,000</td>
<td>1,950,000,000</td>
<td>1,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of world income</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Consequently, it can be summarized that Turkey is an upper middle-income country, while Uzbekistan is a lower middle-income country in terms of income group classification. Both Turkey and Uzbekistan have high HDI scores. While Turkey is a World Trade Organization (WTO) member, Uzbekistan is not. These factors make it interesting to analyze the trade patterns of these two countries.

### Table 13: Basic classifications, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Income Group Classification</th>
<th>HDI Classification</th>
<th>WTO Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Upper middle income</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Lower middle income</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An Evaluation of Trade Relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan

Foreign trade is of great importance in both the Turkish and Uzbek economies. According to data gathered from the World Bank, the share of exports in GDP is 14.39%, 19.45%, 20.45% and 24.80% in Turkey in 1992, 2000, 2010 and 2017, respectively. The share of exports in Uzbekistan’s GDP is quite a bit higher than Turkey’s. The export/GDP ratio is 24.66%, 31.27% and 29.80% in Uzbekistan in 2000, 2010 and 2017, respectively. The data implies the importance of exports in terms of national income and economic growth, especially in Uzbekistan.

Table 14 shows the trade volume and growth between Turkey and Uzbekistan. Turkey’s trade relations with Uzbekistan started in 1992, and Turkey’s trade balance was generally positive in the first years of bilateral trade. After 2003, there was an unbalanced trade structure between these countries in favor of Uzbekistan. Bilateral trade grew dramatically from 1992 to 2017. Turkey’s exports to Uzbekistan increased by 1,148%, while Turkey’s imports from Uzbekistan rose by 3,817% in 2017 over 1992. As seen in Table 14, the economic crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001 had a great effect on Turkey’s foreign trade. In these years, Turkey’s exports to Uzbekistan substantially decreased. As for import dynamics, Turkey’s imports from Uzbekistan were more volatile during the period considered.
Table 14: Turkey-Uzbekistan bilateral trade volume and growth (1992–2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export (to Uzbekistan)</th>
<th>Growth Rate (%)</th>
<th>Import (from Uzbekistan)</th>
<th>Growth Rate (%)</th>
<th>Grade Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>54,483,118</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,019,268</td>
<td></td>
<td>33,463,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>213,507,941</td>
<td>291.88</td>
<td>31,933,572</td>
<td>51.93</td>
<td>181,574,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>64,473,039</td>
<td>-69.80</td>
<td>78,625,080</td>
<td>146.21</td>
<td>-14,152,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>138,039,808</td>
<td>114.10</td>
<td>61,528,676</td>
<td>-21.74</td>
<td>76,511,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>229,793,568</td>
<td>66.47</td>
<td>56,477,976</td>
<td>-8.21</td>
<td>173,315,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>155,863,488</td>
<td>-25.96</td>
<td>96,201,832</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>59,661,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>82,129,921</td>
<td>-17.11</td>
<td>85,794,461</td>
<td>80.73</td>
<td>-3,664,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>93,472,575</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>75,196,689</td>
<td>108.62</td>
<td>18,275,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>138,422,361</td>
<td>48.09</td>
<td>99,461,910</td>
<td>32.27</td>
<td>38,960,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>145,225,516</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>178,671,343</td>
<td>79.64</td>
<td>-33,445,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>151,070,824</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>261,466,105</td>
<td>46.34</td>
<td>-110,395,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>175,995,482</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>415,840,964</td>
<td>59.04</td>
<td>-239,845,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>225,612,432</td>
<td>28.19</td>
<td>613,809,936</td>
<td>47.61</td>
<td>-388,197,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>337,130,217</td>
<td>49.43</td>
<td>580,810,110</td>
<td>-5.38</td>
<td>-243,679,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>282,666,367</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>861,373,489</td>
<td>108.53</td>
<td>-578,707,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>449,884,446</td>
<td>26.91</td>
<td>813,287,488</td>
<td>-13.47</td>
<td>-363,403,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>562,525,829</td>
<td>25.04</td>
<td>815,416,701</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-252,890,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>603,013,101</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>780,706,584</td>
<td>-4.26</td>
<td>-177,693,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>488,653,539</td>
<td>-18.96</td>
<td>711,555,111</td>
<td>-8.86</td>
<td>-222,901,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>533,018,382</td>
<td>9.08</td>
<td>709,292,468</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-176,274,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>680,104,359</td>
<td>27.59</td>
<td>823,274,751</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>-143,170,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://comtrade.un.org/ (accessed April 12, 2019),

Bilateral trade between Turkey and Uzbekistan needs improvement. Namely, Uzbekistan’s share in Turkey’s total exports is 0.30%, 0.25% and 0.43%, while Uzbekistan’s share in Turkey’s total imports is 0.16%, 0.46% and 0.35% in 2000, 2010 and 2017, respectively.
**Table 15:** Turkey’s trade partnership ranking with Uzbekistan (1992–2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Export Ranking</th>
<th>Import Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Export Ranking</th>
<th>Import Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://comtrade.un.org/ (accessed April 12, 2019),

Turkey’s trade partnership rankings with Uzbekistan are shown in Table 15. In the period covered, Uzbekistan is one of Turkey’s top 65 trade partners. Among Turkey’s export partners, Germany was at the top, while the United Kingdom was second, The United Arab Emirates was the third, Iraq was the fourth and the United States was positioned in fifth place in 2017. China, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United States and Italy were the top five countries (from the top to the fifth) from which Turkey imported in 2017.

**Table 16:** Uzbekistan’s top trade partners in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Export (million $)</th>
<th>Import (million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The top destinations for Uzbekistan’s exports are Switzerland, China, Russia, Turkey and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan’s top import origins are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, South Korea and Turkey. Turkey is thus one of Uzbekistan’s biggest trading partners.

The data used hereafter is annual with three-digits compatible with the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), taken from the United Nations Comtrade Database covering 1992, 2000, 2010 and 2017. We classified these industrial data in terms of factor-intensity based on Hufbauer and Chilas, including labor-intensive industries (LI-I), capital-intensive industries (CI-I), raw material-intensive industries (RMI-I), easy-to-imitate research-intensive industries (EI-I) and difficult-to-imitate research-intensive industries (DI-I). Two hundred fifty eight different industries at the three-digit level (61 labor-intensive, 45 capital-intensive, 78 raw material-intensive, 23 easy-to-imitate research-intensive and 50 difficult-to-imitate research-intensive industries) are employed in the calculation.

When the trade structure between Turkey and Uzbekistan is considered, the sectoral shares of Turkey’s exports to Uzbekistan indicate that there is a shift from raw material-intensive industries to difficult-to-imitate research industries. Figure 2 shows that the share of easy-to-imitate research goods remains almost the same. The share of labor-intensive goods increased significantly in 2000 when compared to 1992. There is a gradual decrease in the share of labor-intensive goods afterward. This may have resulted from reduced demand for labor-intensive goods in Uzbekistan, the fact that this need was provided from another lower-cost country, or from the development of Uzbekistan’s import substitution industries in this area.
Figure 2: Sectoral share of Turkey’s exports to Uzbekistan, 1992, 2000, 2010, 2017 (%)

Source: Calculated by authors using STIC Rev.3 from http://comtrade.un.org/ (accessed April 12, 2019).

As for the sectoral share of Turkey’s imports from Uzbekistan, Turkish imports mainly consisted of labor-intensive goods in 1992. The share of raw material goods gradually increased during 1992–2010. Also, there is a sharp increase in the share of capital-intensive goods within the period 2010–2017. The share of labor-intensive goods reached its lowest level in 2017.

Figure 3: Sectoral share of Turkey’s import from Uzbekistan, 1992, 2000, 2010, 2017 (%)

Source: Calculated by authors using STIC Rev.3 from http://comtrade.un.org/ (accessed April 12, 2019).
Considering Figure 2 and Figure 3 together, one can conclude that Turkey has exported difficult-to-imitate goods to Uzbekistan and imported capital-intensive goods from Uzbekistan in recent years.

**Trade Pattern Indices and Results**

Trade complementarity index and bilateral revealed comparative advantage measurements are used in order to analyze the trade patterns between Turkey and Uzbekistan. These measurements are briefly introduced below. Later, the findings are also presented and evaluated.

**Trade Complementarity Index**

The trade complementarity index was introduced by Michael Michaely to measure a country’s trade structure complementarity with other countries.\(^{17}\) This index is useful to predict the potential of trade agreements by showing to what extent the two countries are “natural trade partners.”\(^{18}\) So, a high degree of this index implies that two countries will benefit from enhancing their trade volume.

The trade complementarity (TC) index is calculated as follows:

\[
TC_{ij} = [1 - \Sigma (|m_{ik} - x_{ij}|/2)]
\]  

In Equation 1, \(m_{ik}\) represents the share of goods i in the total imports of country k, while \(x_{ij}\) represents the share of goods in the total exports of country j. If the index is zero, it means that no goods are exported by one country or imported by the other country. The index is 1 when the export and import shares perfectly overlap.

**Table 17:** Trade complementarity index between Turkey and Uzbekistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey-Uzbekistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan-Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluating the TC index for the years 1992, 2000, 2010 and 2017, Table 17 shows that Turkey and Uzbekistan are initially competitors, rather than complementors, when the Turkey-Uzbekistan part of the table is considered. In other words, Turkey’s import structure does not fit very well with the goods exported by Uzbekistan. Similarly, the Uzbekistan-Turkey part of the table indicates to what extent Uzbekistan’s import structure matches with Turkey’s export structure. The values are higher and increasing, as seen in Table 17. The TC index value reached 0.49 in 2017, which is quite high, meaning that Uzbekistan’s import structure fits with the goods exported by Turkey. It implies that Uzbekistan has the potential to be an export market for Turkey.

Bilateral Revealed Comparative Advantages

In the theories of international trade, comparative advantage is an important concept for explaining the pattern of trade represented by the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model. Comparative advantage underlies economists’ explanations for the observed pattern of inter-industry trade. According to the H-O model, a country’s comparative advantage is simply determined by its relative factor scarcity. Balassa proposes that it may not be necessary to include all the constituents affecting a country’s comparative advantage. Instead, he suggests that comparative advantage is revealed by observed trade patterns, and in line with the theory, one needs pre-trade relative prices, which are not observable.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, inferring comparative advantage from observed data is called “revealed” comparative advantage (RCA). In practice, this is a commonly accepted method in analyzing trade data.\textsuperscript{20}

Although this index is usually computed in comparison to world trade, it is also possible to compute a bilateral RCA (BRCA). BRCA gives us an indication of how much a given country is exporting to a given market relative to how much the world is exporting to that market. A bilateral RCA above one will tell us that for that particular good, country i has a revealed comparative advantage in country j’s market, compared with the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{21} BRCA is calculated as follows:

$$BRCA_{ik}^j = \frac{(x_{ik}^j / X_{ik})}{(x_{wk}^j / X_{wkt})}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

In Equation 2, \(x_{ik}^j\) and \(X_{ik}\) are country i’s export of goods j and its total export to country k, and \(x_{wk}^j\) and \(X_{wkt}\) are the world’s export of goods j and the world’s total export to country k. A value of this index smaller than 1 reveals a comparative disadvantage in country j, while an index value above 1 represents a comparative advantage in country j.
Table 18: Bilateral revealed comparative advantage (BRCA) index for Turkey’s export to Uzbekistan (1992, 2000, 2010 and 2017) (number of product groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>BRCA&lt;1</th>
<th>Export share</th>
<th>BRCA&gt;1</th>
<th>Export share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by authors using SITC Rev.3 from http://comtrade.un.org/ (Accessed April 15, 2019)

In order to assess whether Turkey-Uzbekistan bilateral trade is consistent with the comparative advantage principle, or to assess the comparative advantages of Turkey’s exports to Uzbekistan’s market, BRCA was calculated for four years (1992, 2000, 2010 and 2017). The summary of the BRCA of Turkey’s export to Uzbekistan is reported in Table 18. Overall, the trade values of high BRCA product groups (BRCA>1) account for over 85% of Turkey’s export to Uzbekistan. Though its number of products that have high BRCA increased from 23 to 110, the export share of those items slightly decreased in these years. In 1992, Turkey displayed BRCA in 23 industries, out of a total of 53. By 2017, about 90 industries enjoyed comparative advantage out of the total 207. If we consider the number of industries that have comparative disadvantage, then one observes that these generally constitute the majority. Hence, measures for competitiveness improvement should be considered for Turkey to promote its exports further.
**Figure 4:** Turkey’s BRCA>1 industries by category (1992, 2000, 2010, 2017)

Source: Calculated by authors using SITC Rev. 3 from http://comtrade.un.org/ (accessed April 15, 2019). Graph indicators are lined from left to right.

To be consistent with the empirical work employed in the previous section, exports are divided into five categories: labor-intensive industries, capital-intensive industries, raw material-intensive industries, easy-to-imitate research-intensive industries and difficult-to-imitate research-intensive industries; the industries with BRCA>1 are grouped in terms of these five categories. The composition of BRCA>1 in 1992 is dominated by raw material-intensive industries, in 2000 by labor-intensive industries, and in 2010 and 2017 by difficult-to-imitate research-intensive industries. Except for 1992, the share of raw material-intensive industries is small and has a decreasing trend in other years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1992</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI-I</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI-I</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI-I</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI-I</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI-I</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI-I</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI-I</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI-I</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI-I</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI-I</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI-I</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI-I</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI-I</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Considering comparative advantage by industry, the top 10 industries are reported in terms of high BRCA scores for 1992, 2000, 2010 and 2017 in Table 19. Export shares of these industries are also shown in the same table. Generally, it can be said that Turkey enjoyed a comparative advantage primarily in raw material-intensive industries in 1992, and labor-intensive
industries and difficult-to-imitate research-intensive industries in other years. Taken together with high BRCA score and export share, 061 Sugars, molasses, and honey (RMI-I), 542 Medicaments (incl. veterinary medicaments (EII-I) and 783 Road motor vehicles (CI-I) in 1992, 062 Sugar confectionery (RMI-I), 786 Trailers & semi-trailers (CI-I), and 642 Paper & paperboard, cut to size or shape, articles (LI-I) In 2000, 651 Textile yarn (LI-I), 642 Paper & paperboard, cut to size or shape, articles (LI-I) and 581 Tubes, pipes and hoses of plastics (EI-I) in 2010 and 642 Paper & paperboard, cut to size or shape, articles (LI-I), 727 Food-processing machines (excluding domestic) (DI-I) and 531 Synthetic organic coloring matter and color lakes and preparations based thereon (CI-I) come to the forefront.

Conclusion

Located on the historical Silk Road, Uzbekistan was the center of many economic and cultural activities and a homeland for many civilizations for centuries. At the present time, the world is in a process in which the balance of economic power is shifting from West to East. In this sense, the importance of all the Central Asian countries on the Silk Road, including Uzbekistan, has increased and will continue to increase. Especially since 2013, China has played an active role in Central Asia by launching the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, and China’s economic power in the region has been increasing. For example, in 2017, Uzbekistan’s major trade partner was China, and China invested in Uzbekistan’s transportation and energy infrastructure, as it did in other Central Asian countries. Due to the fact that Uzbekistan is located in the middle of the Central Asian countries, i.e., double landlocked in terms of access to the seas, the OBOR initiative should be carefully considered in terms of its potential benefits and challenges.

Turkey aims to improve its relations with the Turkic-speaking countries in Central Asia in particular by developing trade-oriented relations and by diversifying and deepening the institutional basis of these relations. This means that Turkey gives priority to trade and cultural relations with these countries in both the short and medium term. Turkey’s ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious links with these countries have definitely made a great contribution to deepening trade cooperation. Moreover, Turkey’s geographical position presents a great opportunity for the landlocked Central Asian countries to diversify their trade and energy exports to the EU following a westward energy corridor. However, compared to other powerful actors such as China, Russia and the United States, Turkey has not
been able to play as influential a geopolitical role. Turkey should follow a new, realistic road map after making a decision about its priorities and the primary problems related to the Central Asian countries by taking regional issues and axis shift into consideration. Turkey should construct a strong connection with the countries in Central Asia by considering the other actors that play an active role in this region. In other words, Turkey should pursue a foreign policy that aims at cooperation—or at least good relations instead of competition—with these actors. In brief, instead of regional competition, Turkey should strengthen its relations with the region by sustaining cooperation, because this kind of approach is also compatible with the ‘balance policy’ of the Central Asian countries.22

The Uzbekistan economy under and after Karimov can be analyzed as follows.23 Looking at main macroeconomic indicators, per capita GDP at $1,533 is the third lowest of the ex-Soviet countries, ahead only of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2017, the unemployment rate was over 7%, and this rate rose to over 8% in 2000 and 2010. Unemployed Uzbeks had to immigrate to Russia to work. It is generally stated that unemployed young Uzbeks are also more vulnerable to radicalization and exhibit a rising tendency to join terrorist organizations. Import substitution and self-sufficiency were the priorities of foreign trade and investment. As for currency liberalization, until September 2017, the official exchange rate was tightly pegged. The floating of the Uzbek currency, the som, had an immediate and dramatic effect. Almost overnight, the currency devalued by almost half, and the black market disappeared. In the longer term, currency liberalization should help to attract more investment while making the economy more open and competitive. Currency liberalization is probably the biggest single step toward making Uzbekistan more attractive for investors, but other measures are also being taken to simplify some of the bureaucratic procedures faced by entrepreneurs. Additional measures were announced to attract foreign investments in Uzbekistan in 2012. In this context, a wide range of new initiatives were implemented, such as providing visa convenience to investors and their families and lowering taxes.24 These improvements are reflected in Uzbekistan’s ranking in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index, which jumped from 150th out of 190 countries in 2010, to 87th in 2017. Since 2016, 11 new free economic zones have been created, in addition to three pre-existing ones. In spite of all these developments, however, there are still many factors preventing foreign investment in Uzbekistan. Telecommunications, finance, media and transport are some of the sectors in which foreign investments are prohibited or severely restricted. Many investors are ready to invest when they see an opportunity, yet uncertainty in an investment climate is avoided. In trade, Uzbekistan
has significantly reduced tariffs and set a roadmap for accession to the WTO. The country currently benefits from reduced tariffs on some exports to the EU under the latter’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences, and hopes for additional tariff reductions under the GSP+. In order to qualify for the latter scheme, Uzbekistan still needs to ratify two out of 27 international conventions.25

In Uzbekistan, there are some important economic reforms that need to be emphasized. For example, in order to help to tackle the unemployment problem, the government handles the country’s education system, vocational education in particular, to make it more suitable for the needs of employers. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is taking steps to strengthen the independence of the Central Bank. From 2016 to 2018, Uzbekistan’s ranking in the Economic Freedom Index, which reflects the country’s efforts to loosen state control, rose to 152nd place out of 180 economies. According to Uzbek government figures, economic performance has improved in some areas. For example, FDI increased by 40% in 2017. On the other hand, economic growth has slowed, from an average 8% during the previous ten years (7.8% in 2016) to a still impressive 5.3% in 2017. Despite all these figures, the Uzbek economy is still regarded as a closed and state-controlled economy. The IMF recommends lifting price controls, for example on energy prices, which are still heavily subsidized.

A draft Presidential decree titled “Uzbekistan’s Strategy for Further Development” for 2017–2021, in addition to Uzbekistan’s main foreign policy priorities, identifies some other important policies related to the economy as follows: improving state and social construction, ensuring the rule of law and reforming the judicial system, developing and liberalizing the economy and developing the social sphere. The policies raised in the Decree suggest that Uzbekistan is ambitious to become a more active regional actor and an attractive country in the region for foreign investments.

Saud (2018) presents a wide-range evaluation of the changing dynamics of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy and emphasizes the importance of regional integration.26 As Karimov’s protectionist trade policies are gradually lifted, the economic relations between the two countries are expected to expand in the coming years. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who came to power after Karimov, adopted a more liberal policy in foreign relations. Then Uzbek Minister of Finance Jamshid Kuchkarov stated that they have met with companies such as Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s and stated that they are determined to participate in the international economy. The main economic goals of the new administration include ending protectionism, increasing exports, attracting international investments, establishing
a free market mechanism and creating a new private entrepreneur class. In addition, Mirziyoyev’s call for investments from Turkish businesspeople strengthens the expectations that economic relations between the two countries will increase in the future. Visas with many countries have been abolished to improve tourism. All of these developments are expected to affect the trade between the two countries positively.

As stated in the research objectives, this paper is exploratory and preliminary. The findings of this paper may serve as recommendations, through the usage of trade indices as an input into the process of evidence-based policymaking, for policy makers to improve bilateral trade between the two countries. From the TCI results of recent years, it can be deduced that Turkey and Uzbekistan are becoming complementary countries. This means that bilateral trade benefits both countries. In today’s world, increasing globalization pushes countries to develop not alone by themselves, but through regional and global cooperation.

All five Central Asian countries and Turkey are members of the ECO. Although the ECO has not been able to actualize its full potential, as stated by Öğütçu, it could nonetheless provide significant opportunities for Turkey and the Central Asian countries. The ECO aimed to create a regional approach on connectivity issues even before the China-led initiatives, thus offering alternative options to help member countries diversify and benefit from complementary opportunities. For this reason, the ECO should be discussed while negotiating to enhance bilateral relations between the countries.

Turkey has a relatively balanced relationship with Uzbekistan, based on the bilateral trade dimension. Strengthening and developing Uzbekistan-Turkey relations will create gravity for the other countries in the region, and also will play a key role in sustaining not only the relations between Turkey and the regional countries, but also relations among the regional countries. Moreover, with their geostrategic positions, strong geo-economic potential and the opportunities stemming from their young, dynamic and well-educated population, there is a huge potential to further develop the economic relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey. However, it will be necessary for both countries to further strengthen their relations in order to increase trade and bring investments to higher levels in the coming years. From this perspective, developing a “Strategic Partnership” between Turkey and Uzbekistan gains great importance. However, if the necessary measures are not taken, it can be said that Turkey’s economic relations with Central Asia will not be developed faster than the ties with other regions.
Endnotes


7 If a country’s HDI value is less than 0.550, this country is classified in the low HDI category. If a country’s HDI value is between 0.550–0.699, this country is in the medium HDI category and if the HDI value of a country is higher than 0.800, this country is in the very high HDI group. “Human Development Indices and Indicators 2018 Statistical Update,” UNDP, 2018, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf (Accessed April 5, 2019).


14 Because of unavailable data for Uzbekistan as reporter country, we had to find all the countries that export to and import from Uzbekistan and sum up these data to reach Uzbekistan total export and import from World countries for 1992, 2000, 2010 and 2017. Despite being aware of the possibility of the lack of some countries trade to Uzbekistan, we assume that this case is rare.


16 This classification is also used by Bahri Yılmaz, “Turkey’s Competitiveness in the European Union: A Comparison with Five Candidate Countries:Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania – and the EU15,” Ezoneplus Working Paper, No. 12 (February 2003).

Evaluation of the Economic Relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan


22 Balance policy means that nations stay alive and maintain their place in the international arena.


26 Adam Saud, “Changing Dynamics of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy under Shavkat Mirziyoyev: Prospects for Central Asian Regional Integration,” Central Asia Journal, No. 82 (Summer 2018).

Revisiting Liberal Peacebuilding: BRICS and Turkey in Somalia

Volkan İPEK *

Abstract
Maintaining and providing peace and security in conflict-affected states are among the most crucial missions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Among the methods of peacemaking and peacekeeping it employs, the UNSC also offers peacebuilding, which consists of helping conflict-affected states that are making the transition from war to peace. Unlike great powers that prioritize military intervention in their peacebuilding strategy, the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and Turkey as models to rising powers prefer a political, institutional and economic development rather than military intervention, which makes their peacebuilding strategy liberal. Despite this general adoption of liberal peacebuilding however, their practices in Somalia are different. Turkey has taken more liberal peacebuilding steps in Somalia than the BRICS, both in terms of approach and quantity. This article analyses the liberal peacebuilding strategies of the BRICS and Turkey, and explores how these strategies have been implemented in Somalia.

Keywords
BRICS, Turkey, Somalia, liberal peacebuilding, Africa

* Assistant Professor, Yeditepe University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Turkey. E-mail: volkan.ipek@yeditepe.edu.tr. ORCID: 000-0002-8476-9364.

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Introduction

Even today, Giovanni Botero’s 16th century classification of states into granddissime (great powers), mezzano (middle powers) and piccioli (small powers) retains its validity. A great power is defined by, but not limited to, a state’s material resources, chiefly its relative military capability. A great power meets geographical challenges in their immediate region to prevent the influence of other nearby states, develop a global role that can easily stir the concern of regional states and take the opportunity to exploit regional conflicts for their own advantage. Success or advantageousness in conjunctural indicators such as geography, population, economy, resources, military, diplomacy and national identity is inevitable for great powers too. In addition to its material power, a great power honed its ability to use soft power with appeal and attraction. A middle power, on the other hand, occupies an intermediate position in the power-based hierarchy, with a stronger position than small powers but a weaker position than great powers. To have sufficient authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others is one characteristic of a middle power. It often looks for solutions to global problems through multilateral solutions, diplomacy, compromise and good international citizenship. An ability to recognize capacity, cooperation, creativity, coalition-building, credibility, context, content and choice in international politics is also critical for a state to be considered a middle power. A small power is the opposite of a great power: a state that cannot enforce any conditions that a great power can enforce.

In Botero’s power classification, special attention has been paid to middle powers since the emergence of rising/emerging powers at the end of the Cold War. The fact that rising powers are a relatively new class in global politics, originating from middle powers, highlights a debate on whether they are different from middle powers, and if so, how they differ and what characteristics they have in general. Despite little consensus on rising powers thus far, it is agreed that rising powers, above all, are emerging economies that seek to play a more central role in a capitalist economy. Their wish for a more central role is also visible in international politics, where it appears as a willingness to challenge the status quo and revise the dominant forms of the system to reflect their own interests and values. Rising and middle powers intend to claim for more responsibility in international system, which they believe that it has been dominated by great powers, especially the USA. This brings the revision of such a system in a more legitimate and fair way that shall bring more role to rising and middle powers, consequently.
Like other middle powers, the question of whether Turkey should be considered a rising or middle power Turkey’s status as a rising or middle power has been widely discussed, largely with reference to the implementation of Turkish foreign policy in the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) period. Turkey’s practices of humanitarian diplomacy around the globe; its intensive multilateralism, especially with the East and the South; its wish to take more responsibility in solving international problems like terrorism; its strong discourse about the need to revise the structure of international institutions; and its significant efforts toward reducing its material dependency on the West make Turkey an interesting case to consider whether it is a middle or a rising power. On one hand, Turkey has been considered a rising power because its government is committed to playing a greater role in an international system it characterizes as broken by global injustices, economic and social inequality, excessive militarization and undemocratic representation in international institutions. On the other hand, Turkey has been seen as a middle power because it has sought to play a greater role in international cooperation to solve global problems by adopting humanitarian diplomacy since the Arab Spring. Moreover, its balance between East and West, evidenced by its efforts to be a member of the EU and a leader of the Muslim world, in addition to its unwillingness to join the BRICS group make it a middle power.

Temporary membership in the UNSC in 2009 and 2010 doubtlessly gave Turkey the chance to take on a greater role in international politics. Moreover, the temporary membership allied Turkey with Brazil, China and Russia—three of the BRICS—in peacebuilding. Speeches in 42 of the 204 UNSC sessions held in 2010 clearly indicate these countries’ consensus in supporting peacebuilding in conflict-affected states. The shared emphasis on South-South Cooperation, the centrality of the sovereign state, the international community, state-building and development in peacebuilding indicate Turkey’s closeness not only to Brazil, China and Russia but to all of the BRICS countries. A form of peacebuilding adopted from the Western model but avoidant of military interventionism is the BRICS countries’ path of choice.

Stemming from this consensus between the BRICS countries and Turkey on peacebuilding, the article’s aim is twofold: It first intends to compare Turkey’s peacebuilding strategies with those of the BRICS countries, and second, it takes Somalia as case study to analyze these practices. In this process, the article seeks answers to the following questions: What is peacebuilding and how is liberal peacebuilding distinguished from peace-
building more generally? How is it criticized? How do the BRICS consider liberal peacebuilding in general? How does liberal peacebuilding differ from the traditional Western states’ peacebuilding? Are the liberal peacebuilding strategies of all the BRICS countries the same or do they differ? What does Somalia mean for Turkey and the BRICS countries? How are Turkey and the BRICS countries implementing liberal peacebuilding in Somalia? It should be noted from the outset that although both the BRICS countries and Turkey have adopted liberal peacebuilding strategies, Turkey has a greater presence in Somalia than the BRICS countries. As methodology, the article uses secondary resources on the theory of liberal peacebuilding, the liberal peacebuilding strategies of the BRICS and Turkey, and their specific practices in Somalia.

Peacebuilding versus Liberal Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is one of the tools used by the United Nations (UN) alongside, for example, peacekeeping and peacemaking, to provide and maintain peace and security in conflict-affected states. Peacebuilding is referred to by the UN as the effort to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace and to reduce a country’s risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding activities are surveilled by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as an intergovernmental advisory body of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC, which are the organs responsible for all peace efforts in conflict-affected states.

A considerably recent term first coined by former UN Secretary General
Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992, peacebuilding also means an analytical framework for promoting sustainable peace in societies that are emerging from or potentially entering into conflict. In practice, peacebuilding most often takes place in the final stages of conflict, immediately following the cessation of violence. It is incorporated into an analytical framework that seeks out the sources of and solutions to conflict, and explores practical approaches to preventing conflict, building consolidated peace and engaging in reconstruction/development. It typically focuses on stabilization, reconstruction and institution-building. Peacebuilding serves as an umbrella term that is used to help security- and development-related actors find a common denominator for strategic design and practical implementation. The ultimate goal of peacebuilding is to create a secure and stable environment in which the state is able to deliver security services in accordance with the rule of law and human rights, an environment of dialogue, reconciliation and functionality and a framework through which donors and international actors can engage in the field in a coherent way. Peacebuilding has also been regarded as an international effort to create conditions for peace in countries emerging from civil war.

In practice, peacebuilding consists of peacemaking and peace enforcement missions that intend to secure local civilians and international governmental and non-governmental bodies operating in war-torn territories.

Among the state and non-state actors that might implement peacebuilding, the most notable are the great powers which have defined peacebuilding as a wide range of approaches from limited observation to broad mandate operations, including military interventions and civilian rehabilitation missions. The agencies of the great powers that implement peacebuilding are the U.S. Department of State, the UK Ministry of Defense, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Federal Foreign Office, and Japan’s International Cooperation Agency. According to these powers’ agents in peacebuilding are managed from capitalist or regional safe hubs with delivery through other partners, such as national technical development agencies that are present on the ground, with close links to their embassies. Their general approach includes preparing country assessments and programming with limited consultation with the conflict-affected state’s government, and using sanctions for political and economic conditionality linked to peace and development interventions. They address immediate conflict and humanitarian crises by preventing instability and violent extremism; contributing to health education and social sectors; adopting multilateralism and strong
coordination through country assessments with other partners and using structured monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems harmonized to OECD systems.

Compared to great powers’ peacebuilding agents and policies, the peacebuilding of the BRICS countries and Turkey as rising powers is different. Direct aid delivery through presence on the ground; humanitarian and developmental assistance through multiple national government agencies; joint assessments and programming with local governments and people of the conflict-affected state; non-interference and respect for sovereignty with no direct or indirect conditionality; usage of solidarity, regional influence and soft power to increase trade and foreign investment; provision of political engagements and trade deals; infrastructure- and institution-building; strong bilateralism; little coordination with other development partners; and absent or weak monitoring and evaluation mechanisms distinguish the peacebuilding activities of the BRICS countries and Turkish from those of great powers. Moreover, the peacebuilding of the BRICS countries and Turkey tends to take place within South-South coordination, characterized by more locally appropriate knowledge and experiences, with emphasis on shared history, culture and religion, offering development with more flexibility and greater capacity to respond to challenging security environments when compared to great powers.²⁵

**Table 1:** Differences between the peacebuilding strategies of great powers, the BRICS countries and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Great powers’ peacebuilding strategies</th>
<th>BRICS’ &amp; Turkey’s peacebuilding strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect services and assistance delivery</td>
<td>Direct services and assistance delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference to partner with their embassies in conflict-affected states</td>
<td>Preference to partner with national government agencies in conflict-affected states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited consultation with the government in conflict-affected states</td>
<td>Unlimited consultation with the government in conflict-affected states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usage of sanctions when the conflict-affected state does not accept peacebuilding services</td>
<td>Non-usage of sanctions when the conflict-affected state does not accept peacebuilding services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditionality before delivery of peacebuilding services</td>
<td>Non-conditionality before delivery of peacebuilding services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention in the sovereignty of the conflict-affected state</td>
<td>Non-intervention in the sovereignty of the conflict-affected state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to create a multilateral network while dealing with the conflict-affected state</td>
<td>Efforts to create a bilateral network while dealing with the conflict-affected state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structured monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of services</td>
<td>Weak monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving under UN auspices</td>
<td>Serving under but independent from UN auspices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With these differences, the BRICS countries and Turkey implement a type of peacebuilding strategy that is liberal and operates on the premise that political, economic or institutional fabrics such as strong political representation, market economy, security sector reform, democratization and rule of law must be constructed in order to guarantee peace and stability, which are not established on the basis of military intervention. Their peacebuilding is liberal to the extent that tenets of liberal peace, such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and a capitalist market economy are implemented, instead of just an intervention to stop violence in affected states. They consider providing a liberal democratic model in a conflict-affected state with a political, institutional and economic institution-building, reconstruction and social engineering with the tools of democratic process, rule of law, free market and development, nurturing security for the state and a more active civil society rather than a military intervention.

In practice, the formal ending of wars and the usage of soft power are seen not as a basis for recovery, but rather a fundamental transformation toward peace, stability and development, including a transition to peace, democracy and a market economy.

Liberal peacebuilding is defined in the UN Agenda for Peace, along with accommodation, reconciliation, emancipation, autonomy, social justice, and installation of liberalism in political, institutional and economic spheres. In accordance with, a more peaceful state is the ultimate goal, which is a product of liberal peacebuilding on the basis of democracy and a market economy. The liberal peacebuilding of Turkey and the BRICS coincides with an emancipatory model involving a bottom-up rather than a state-centric approach, with local participation and sensitivity to culture to the fullest extent possible. Deliberately, it differs from the conservative model that focuses on top-down, state-centric approach that ignores the assistance of local people and institutions for peacebuilding in the conflict affected state, and the orthodox model, which is the mixture of both top-down and state-centric approach and the intrusion of local people and institutions for peacebuilding in the conflict affected state.

Even though it seems more ideal than just peacebuilding, serious critiques have been raised to liberal peacebuilding. First, liberal peacebuilding that favors economic and political institutionalism over security neglects that security is the product of liberalism that drives the contemporary development and peacebuilding discourse of post-conflict assistance. Since security was neglected by liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, for example, conflict did not end. Second, the changes that liberal peacebuilding tries to bring about must first be comprehended and internalized by the local
people of the conflict-affected state. Liberal peacebuilding tries to structure political and economic institutions, but it does not examine whether the local people of the conflict-affected state really endorse them. Third, the installation of democracy has always been one of the unsolved problems. States that offer liberal peacebuilding at first promise to set up a consolidated democracy, but they all try to install their own democracy model in the end. Fourth, liberal peacebuilding is regarded by some as a new stage of colonialism, with the revival of the idea of *la mission civilisatrice*, the ‘civilizing mission.’ Once liberal peacebuilding starts, they argue, the conflict-affected state becomes dependent on the liberal peacebuilder states, which tend to redefine concepts like civilization, modernization and development on their behalf. It also leads to political control, physical occupation and domination over recipient states. Fifth, even though traditional liberal peacebuilding suggests no military intervention in theory, there is always a military intervention in practice even in the most liberal one. Sixth, peacebuilder states become more authoritarian over time, and start controlling the process of peace on their own without the need of any internal or, especially, external actor. Seventh, liberal peacebuilding is quite one-sided on the side of the donor state, and tends to have no moral foundations, as is evidenced by racist practices. Last, liberal peacebuilding has a serious problem of sources, which become insufficient after a very short time.

Liberal Peacebuilding of the BRICS Countries and Turkey: Strategies

**Brazil**

As the largest slave-importing state in the Americas, as well as the last state to abolish the slave trade, Brazil’s peacebuilding was constructed on the basis of its pacifist *consolidação da paz* (peace consolidation) ideology that goes back to 1822. Brazil’s pacifism is emphasized in all of its Constitutions, in which Article 4 always states that the Brazilian state will not engage in war or conquest. In addition, *consolidação da paz* expresses Brazil’s respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of conflict-affected states, a position reemphasized in the Sanya declaration announced in 2014. Brazil’s position of non-interventionism, commitment to South-South cooperation, support for developmental assistance and emphasis on the importance of engaging in political dialogue with conflict-affected states all originate from *consolidacao do paz*. As a state that highlights the
South-South cooperation in its foreign policy, Brazil considers cooperation as the most important pillar of peacebuilding. That is why, Brazil not only played an important role in the establishment of BRICS and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) but also expanded its technical cooperation with post-conflict countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and East Timor. Supporting the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), founding the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) are several examples of Brazil’s liberal peacebuilding.\(^{36}\) Brazil was elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission for its contributions to the UN budget.

**Russia**

Russia’s liberal peacebuilding does not stem from a pacifist ideology, as Brazil’s does, but like Brazil it supports non-conditionality in conflict-affected states. Russia tends to consider conflict-affected states as business opportunities rather than as actors to cooperate with. Hence, Russia’s view of South-South cooperation is not identical to Brazil’s. Contextually, Russia articulates its foreign policy on the basis of its national interests, rather than an assessment of which state needs what in terms of peacebuilding. For instance, the nuclear deal that Russia signed with South Africa in 2014; Gazprom’s holding stakes in various Libyan oil and gas concessions, its involvement in joint ventures with Algeria’s state-owned hydrocarbon exploitation company, SONATRACH; the signing of a memorandum of understanding with both Algeria and Libya in 2008; and the signing of gas cooperation agreements with Nigeria in 2009 are examples of how Russia manages its relationships with African states for its own national economic interests.\(^{37}\) Russia’s gas and oil deals with African states have concerned Europe, which does not want Russia’s natural gas supplies to be empowered.\(^{38}\) Like Brazil, Russia rejects conditionality in peacebuilding by condemning the Lomé Conventions of 1975 and 1990 and the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 as symbols of a European conditionality that forces conflict-affected states to have ‘good governance,’ referred to as the transparent, accountable management of the human, natural, economic and financial resources of sustainable development. Like Brazil, the assurance of reforming human rights, democracy or rule of law as a condition for peacebuilding is not necessary for Russia. Regarding
Africa, Russia uses peacebuilding to sign defense cooperation agreements, such as the African Union (AU) peace agreement in 2019, as a means of building better cooperation in Africa, coordinating with the AU for more regional economic cooperation and Regional Economic Communities, pushing to disarm terrorist groups in Africa and transferring technology to African states.\textsuperscript{39}

As a state that favors non-interventionism, Russia makes exceptions for the military interventions it carries out unilaterally in its bordering regions, regardless of whether or not they are classified as peacebuilding operations. It contributes hardly any troops to UN operations, and its interest in international peacebuilding operations is limited to preventing such operations from becoming instruments of Western influence.\textsuperscript{40} Russia is one of the two BRICS that was elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission directly by the UN Security Council.

\textbf{India}

Like Brazil and Russia, India underlines South-South cooperation in its liberal peacebuilding strategy. By regarding liberal peacebuilding within the framework of partnership with conflict-affected states, rather than being merely a donor to them, India believes that it is an international responsibility and obligation to share resources with poor and conflict-affected states. The Indian Development and Partnership Architecture, founded in 1947 by Prime Minister Nehru, describes the economic development of all countries as an obligation of the whole international community. India, which holds that liberal peacebuilding can be best accomplished through development, therefore established the Indian Aid Mission (IAM) in 1954. Many ministries have been involved in the Indian Development and Partnership Architecture, such as the Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization, the Center for Integrated Rural Development of Asia and the Pacific, the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program, the Pan African e-network, the India Africa Programs and the India Afghanistan Programs.\textsuperscript{41} The First India-Africa Forum was held in 2008, and the second in 2011. Specific to Africa, the Focus Africa Program with 24 African states, the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement with eight African states, the Pan Africa e-network Project, the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation, the India-Africa Forum Summit and the India-Africa Trade Ministers Dialogue were founded. The decision to extend the Indian Ministry of Finance for Indian Development and Economic Assistance to 2014–15 with 8.5 billion USD, which included the addition of water pumps, irrigation systems, solar-based mobiles and water purifiers
in Africa, is an example of India’s liberal peacebuilding. Even though India shares the South-South cooperation motive with Brazil and Russia, its aim to get a permanent seat in the UNSC is clearer. Moreover, unlike Brazil, which defends non-interventionism in peacebuilding, India stresses the importance of military intervention in the event of large-scale human rights violations, and at times uses very robust practices in the context of UN missions. In addition, India’s membership to the UN Peacebuilding Commission is limited with providing military personnel and civilian police to UN missions, compared to Brazil and South Africa that were elected to UN Peacebuilding Commission by the General Assembly, and China and Russia that were elected to UN Peacebuilding Commission by the Security Council.

**China**

In its liberal peacebuilding, China considers development as the objective, with good government as the focus, assistance orientation and non-intervention as a principle, reactivity as a strategic culture and empowering state capacity-enhancing national identification and promoting economic recovery as a method. Like Brazil, Russia and India, China stresses that economic development is important for liberal peacebuilding. The financial and technical support given to African states through the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security and is an example of the Chinese peacebuilding praxis. China prefers engaging with matters on African security that aim to address the complexities of its expansive role in international institutions and a significant economic presence. The policy of non-interference and South-South cooperation have also been in the orbit of China’s peacebuilding, like that of Brazil, Russia and India. Relatedly, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation and New Initiative for a China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, established in 2012, play a significant role in South-South cooperation for China. In terms of non-conditionality, China shares the view held by Brazil, India and Russia, and prefers asking nothing in return for its services. More so than Brazil, Russia and India, China has enjoyed acting as a bridge between the Third world states and the Western states, a
role that facilitates China’s reputation and peacebuilding maneuvers, especially in Africa. As an outcome of its zouchuqu zhanlue (going abroad for peace) strategy, Chinese peacebuilding is deeply trusted in conflict-affected states. Like Brazil and Russia, China was also elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission directly by the UN Security Council.

**South Africa**

As a great power in Africa, like China is in Asia, South Africa’s strategy of liberal peacebuilding is based on mediating conflicts in the African continent. Its political narrative frames its relations with other African states as an equal partnership rather than a donor-recipient partnership, and it uses the language of solidarity, horizontality and ubuntu (humanity toward others). South Africa defines its development cooperation quite broadly; it includes private and public projects such as the donation of 1 million USD to the Central African Republic and the stationing of AU peace troops in Burundi. Unlike other BRICS, however, South Africa intervened in the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with its troops in the UNFORCE Intervention Brigade, which provided the Congolese army firepower to defeat the M23 rebellion. The South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation has defended the interventions, arguing that they took place upon the request of the conflict-affected states. Despite its intervention in the DRC, South Africa has been one of the leading actors of continental cooperation by supporting the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the AU and African Peace and Security Architecture. Its efforts in facilitating the AU’s 2013 decision to set up the African Capacity for Immediate Response to conflicts in Africa are noteworthy. South African liberal peacebuilding retains the mark of the lessons learned from the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, in terms of not imposing any pressure on other African governments while peacebuilding. Anti-imperialism, South-South cooperation, respect for sovereignty and the legacy of protecting human rights are the main tenets of post-apartheid South African peacebuilding. Peace diplomacy has always been at the center of South African peacebuilding, characterizing its involvement in continental peacemaking with diplomatic interventions in the form of mediations, negotiation processes and AU network-based peacebuilding. South Africa was elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission by the Economic and Social Council.

**Turkey**

Turkey began highlighting the importance of maintaining global peace and
security from the very beginning of the Republic in 1923, under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s *Yurtta Sulh Cihanda Sulh* (peace at home, peace abroad) principle. Turkish liberal peacebuilding involves an active and preventive diplomacy that constructs bridges between societies. The Alliance of Civilizations, proposed by Spain in 2005 and co-sponsored by Turkey; and the Group of Friends of Mediation, established in 2010 and co-chaired by Turkey and Finland, are examples of Turkey’s bridge initiatives. Contextually, seven strategies highlight Turkish liberal peacebuilding. First, is non-conditionality. Turkey, like the BRICS, does not expect any political or economic conditions from conflict-affected states in return for its peacebuilding. Second, is the shift toward people beyond the state. Turkey prefers interacting with the local people in conflict-affected states instead of merely the governments. Third, is direct delivery on the ground. Turkey prefers that its services be directly delivered to conflict-affected states without the need for secondary agents. Fourth, is support of economic development. Like the BRICS, Turkey believes that economic development in a conflict-affected state is one of the best ways to implement peacebuilding. Fifth, are education programs. Turkey offers scholarships for undergraduate and graduate studies in its universities to students from conflict-affected states. As a non-member to the UN Peacebuilding Committee, Turkey set up its peacebuilding in Africa initiative on the basis of the Africa Opening plan declared in 1998.

**Turkish liberal peacebuilding involves an active and preventive diplomacy that constructs bridges between societies.**

**Turkey & BRICS Liberal Peacebuilding: A Comparison**

Even though they implement liberal peacebuilding to conflict-affected states and agree on the principle of non-conditionality, direct delivery and cooperation of state and non-state actors, nuances remain in BRICS and Turkish strategies. One is worldview. Except for Russia, the liberal peacebuilding efforts of Brazil, India, China, South Africa and Turkey were constructed on different worldviews of pacifism. *Consolidaio do paz* in Brazil, *satyagraha* in India, *zouchu qu zhanlue* in China, *ubuntu* in South Africa and *yurtta sulh cihanda sulh* in Turkey were successfully instrumentalized to each country’s peacebuilding. The second one is their approach to the South-South cooperation. Thanks to their colonial experiences, Brazil, India and South Africa among the BRICS managed to develop a strong sensitivity about conflict-affected Third World states. A similar sensitivity
to the Third World is evident in Russia, China and Turkey, maybe not in terms of colonial experiences but in terms of a challenge to the American hegemony over the Third World. In addition, the principle of non-intervention in the sovereignty of conflict-affected states is critical. Unlike Russia and India, which consider interference necessary if conditions require; and South Africa, which actually practiced intervention in the DRC; Brazil, China and Turkey have not only had full respect for the sovereignty of conflict-affected states, but have not exerted any interference. To Turkey and the BRICS countries alike, economic development is essential. All the BRICS and Turkey reckon that economic development, which consists of augmenting imports, exports and investments, is one of the best methods for peacebuilding. Yet they have varying levels of involvement. In this sense, among the BRICS, China is the most successful so far, with Russia seeing peacebuilding as an opportunity to expand its economic influence. Last comes organizational structure. Russia and China are the only two BRICS that were elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission directly by the Security Council, unlike Brazil, India and South Africa. Turkey, on the other hand, is not a member of the UN Peacebuilding Commission yet. In addition, unlike India, Russia, China and Turkey, which base their peacebuilding strategy in Africa through forums on Partnership with Africa, South Africa and Brazil have not announced such a contextual framework for Africa yet.
**Table 2:** Nuances between BRICS and Turkey’s liberal peacebuilding strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worldview</strong></td>
<td>Consolidação da paz</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Satyagraha</td>
<td>Zouchu zhanlue</td>
<td>Ubuntu</td>
<td>Yurta sulh Cihanda sulh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>State and non-state</td>
<td>State and non-state</td>
<td>State and non-state</td>
<td>State and non-state</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>State and non-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention</strong></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>If needed but never practiced</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>If needed and practiced</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South-South Cooperation</strong></td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Supportive but limited to Africa</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic development</strong></td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Supportive with profit making view</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conditionality</strong></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
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<td>Against</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Structure</strong></td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission member</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission member</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission member</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission member</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission member</td>
<td>Not a UN Peacebuilding Commission member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BRICS and Turkey: Liberal Peacebuilding Practices in Somalia**

Somalia’s importance stems not only from its need for liberal peacebuilding, but also from the approach BRICS and Turkey have taken with it. Specifically, there are significant differences in how each of the BRICS countries and Turkey approach Somalia—differences that guide their liberal peacebuilding practices. Among the BRICS, Brazil is the least interested state in Somalia, and still does not have an embassy there, due to the general disconnection it has had toward Africa, especially post the Lula da Silva presidency. Among the twenty five official visits to Africa paid by Da Silva, none of them was to Somalia. In addition, the consistency that was shown in Brazilian foreign policy to-
ward Africa by Da Silva rule was not shown by his successors. In addition to the initiatives of private enterprises in Africa, Brazil’s liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia consist of supporting the AU Mission there; sending observers to the U.S.-led Obangame Express, which brings together mostly African and European countries in carrying out antipiracy joint exercises in the Gulf of Guinea; donating 38,000 tons of food to Somalia and 15,000 tons of food to Ethiopia in 2011; and donating 300,000 USD for a project run by the UN Population Fund to address gender violence in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia in 2013.

One of Brazil’s recent activities for liberal peacebuilding in Somalia took place in 2017, when the state condemned the terror attack committed by Al Shabaab. Somaliland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Saad Ali Shire’s confirmation as speaker at the 6th Brazil-Africa Forum in 2018 caused tension in bilateral relations. Apart from this, Brazilians do not hear the name “Somalia,” except in reference to the football player named Somalia who has been playing in the Botafogo club.

In contrast to Brazil which had approached Somaliland by 2018, Russia has strengthened its political economic relations with Somalia, which has been taking more space in Russian foreign policy since the declaration of “Russia’s National Security: Russian Federation to 2020” in 2015 taking the development of political, economic, trade and military cooperation with African and Latin American states into account. Russia had already started to show more interest in Somalia’s oil, gas and uranium resources when Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarken, asked for Russian assistance in fighting Al Shabab in 2016. Even though Russia also does not have an Embassy in Somalia yet, like Brazil, it regularly condemns all attacks from Al Shabab and Somaliland to the Somali state. Nonetheless, parallel to the economic significance Russia has attributed to Africa in general, Russian liberal peacebuilding in Somalia as an idea was born from the Russia-Africa Economic Forum in 2019 in which Russia stated the importance of the Somali market to Russia.

Unlike Brazil and Russia, India has long seen Somalia as an important trade partner. India-Somalia historical ties date back to colonial and post-colonial times, during which 200 Indian families settled in Somalia in the 1940s, as an example. Structured in the context of this historical background, India served as Chair of the UNSC’s Somalia-Eritrea Committee in 2012, traded 391 million USD in 2015 with Somalia, included Somalia in its Pan African-network and donated 9 million USD to the Somali state in 2012. Moreover, India offered Technical and Economic Cooperation
training scholarships and Indian Council for Cultural Relations scholarships to Somalia in 2014. Militarily speaking, the Indian navy has been sailing off the shores of Somalia since 2008 as part of the UN Contact Group on Piracy.

Like Russia, China’s economic interest in Somalia comes from its motivation to participate in regional security governance in the Middle East for its growing energy, investment and trade interests. The Road and Belt Initiative is an important catalyst for Chinese support of Somalia’s development, since China wants no conflicts in states where the Initiative is planned. Besides economic interests, Somalia has also been regarded a project to enhance a diplomatic discourse to prevent Western states from dominating the Middle East, and as the gateway to develop relations with the Horn of Africa to gain support in such UN arbitrations as the South China Sea case against the Philippines. In terms of liberal peacebuilding, the Chinese state-owned company CNOOC signed an oil exploration agreement with the Somali state in 2007; reconstructed the National Theatre, the Benadir Hospital, the Mogadishu Stadium and the road between Glyako and Burao in 2013; signed off on the promotion of continuous development of China-Somalia relations in 2018 and urged the global community to help Somalia in 2019. Moreover, the launch of diplomatic relations between Somaliland and Taiwan in July 2020 empowered political solidarity between China and Somalia.

Even though it openly states in its liberal peacebuilding strategy that conflicts in Africa would take priority, South Africa’s practice for Somalia is quite limited, more so than all the other BRICS members. The state reestablished formal relations with Somalia in 2012, after the end of the latter’s civil war. The state sent 11 million USD to help rebuild Somalia’s infrastructure and institutions that were damaged by Al Shabab. With its support of AMISOM in Somalia, South Africa is more effective in peacekeeping than peacebuilding.

Compared to that of the BRICS, two factors—location and shared cultural ties might explain the Turkish approach in Somalia, which is both active and extensive and will be described in detail below. First, Somalia is situated in a critical strategic location between the Arabic Peninsula and the Horn of Africa; Turkey’s military base there enables it to supervise the activities of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf of Aden and the civil war in Yemen. This became especially important after these two states supported Khalifa Haftar, while Turkey supported the UN-backed government, in the Libyan Civil War. Second, Somalia’s relatively homogenous
society compared to other Sub-Saharan African states facilitates the implementation of a constructivist foreign policy for Turkey, characterized by a preference for interacting with other states through common identity and common history claims. Contextually, Turkey’s liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia involve not only the political and economic but also the social development of the Somali state and people, and were preceded by cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organizations. In addition to the Turkish Embassy, the Turkish Consulate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Food Agriculture and Livestock, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice, the Turkish Armed Forces and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities have been responsible for specific political steps. These include restructuring the Somali army and police force, donating patrol boats, establishing training capacity-building programs, founding a Somalia Agricultural school, supporting a Mogadishu city plan, providing low income housing, rehabilitating Galyako Prison and giving direct budget support to the Somali government, training Somali diplomats, and deploying soldiers to fight piracy and Al Shabab, a group that has repeatedly attacked Turks living in Somalia. Policies to develop the security of the Somali people and state were also discussed in the Turkey-Somalia Conference in 2012 and the High Level Partnership Forum in 2016.

In addition to state agencies, institutions such as AFAD, TUBITAK, TIKA, the Housing Development Administration, the State Hydraulic Worlds and Religious Affairs Directorate distributed food during Ramadan, provided shelter, rendered emergency medical services, constructed logistics and supply centers, trained medical specialists, provided equipment to hospitals, constructed hospitals and health clinics, constructed schools, gave technical support and provided scholarships. Between 1992 and 2020, 1,092 students from Somalia received scholarships from the Turkish state. Business groups such as Albayrak Ltd., which built capacities for fisheries and maritime activities, and Favori Ltd., which renovated the International Mogadishu Aden Abdelle Airport, are models of Turkish business presence in Somalia. In addition, humanitarian institutions such as the Turkish Red Crescent and the Turkish Religious Foundation, Doctors Worldwide, have drilled water wells, constructed urban roads and installed street lighting. All of these agencies have been working toward eliminating Somalia’s international isolation, providing intensive and comprehensive humanitarian aid, rebuilding infrastructure, helping restore security in the country by supporting Somali security forces and AMISOM and supporting the process of
political consensus and state-building in the country. In addition, prioritizing institution-building and knowledge transfer; helping with political party development, constitutional reform and the creation of accountable institutions; establishing a standardized and transparent bidding process for contracts and subcontracts to avoid empowering predatory business people; helping Somalia create a professional, decentralized police force; and keeping Turkish business people operating are also components of the Turkish liberal peacebuilding strategy in Somalia.

The principle of non-conditionality is evident in Turkey’s non-demand of anything in return from Somalia for all its peacebuilding activities, and from its people-oriented approach is evident in Turkish agencies’ interactions with the Somali people alongside the Somali state when they pay an official visit. The 200-bed Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital and Digfer Hospital, established in 2015, and the project to construct 10,000 low-income houses, Turkish Airlines’ delivery of 60 tons of food supply with the national campaign called #TurkishAirlinesHelpSomalia and the delivery of ventilators to the Somali people during the COVID-19 pandemic are examples of how these agencies have cared for the Somali people while peacebuilding. President Erdoğan’s 2011 visit not only consolidated Turkish liberal peacebuilding in Somalia but also revitalized social relations between Turkey and Somalia with food assistance to Somali people who were suffering from a regional famine. Last but not least, Somalia’s economic development was highlighted with 200 million USD in donations from the Turkish government and 350 million USD from Turkish NGOs in 2011. Between 2012 and 2014, Turkey’s official development assistance to Somalia increased by nearly 30% from 1.2 billion in 2012 to 3.6 billion in 2014. Besides donations, infrastructure projects were also launched in Somalia as part of Turkey’s liberal peacebuilding efforts. Turkish companies got contracts for the management of the Mogadishu airport and for the reconstruction of the Mogadishu seaport in the 2012 Turkey-Somalia Trade and Investment Forum. In 2013, Turkey allocated 4.5 million USD of direct budget support each month between June and December for the funding of salary shortfalls, and a three-year plan for security between Mogadishu and Ankara was signed.
In 2016, Turkish exports to Somalia reached 115 million USD and Turkish Airlines started to fly to Mogadishu. That same year, President Erdoğan and Somali President Mohamud co-hosted a private sector Investment Conference in Istanbul to promote Turkish investments in Somalia. Turkey also contributed to help Somalia pay back its debt to the IMF in 2020 by sending 3.4 million USD upon the campaign launched by the IMF for heavily indebted states.

Table 3: BRICS and Turkey’s approach to Somalia and number of liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia

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<th>Brazil</th>
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<th>South Africa</th>
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<td>Approach to Somalia</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Historical-Economic</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Humanitarian &amp; Historical-Political</td>
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<td>Number of liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
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Conclusion

All states, great, middle, small or rising, may experience conflicts that necessitate serious peacebuilding practices. Nevertheless, global politics show that peacebuilding practices are mostly required for small states, rather than great, middle or rising ones. In the event of such conflicts, great and middle powers, as well as rising powers, have different perceptions of peacebuilding. Great powers try to practice a military intervention-based peacebuilding with corresponding strategies under UN auspices. Rising powers such as the BRICS countries and Turkey, on the other hand, have adopted a liberal peacebuilding strategy that does not locate military intervention at the center of the action but instead focuses on enhancing the political, economic and social dynamics in conflict-affected states to prevent the eruption of conflicts in the future. In addition, unlike great powers that prefer to engage in peacebuilding under UN auspices, the BRICS and Turkey prefer to develop their own liberal peacebuilding practices, independent from the UN programming.

The findings of this article not only reveal different strategies of liberal peacebuilding among the BRICS countries, but also show that Turkey has much more intensified and numerous liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia than all of the BRICS. Turkey enjoys significant advantages while practicing liberal peacebuilding in Somalia. A more settled diplomatic pre-
sentation, a humanitarian-historical and political approach to Somalia rather than solely economic, its geographical closeness to Somalia, its record of more infrastructure projects it realized in Somalia, its more shared history with Somalis, its more rooted African Opening Plan are some of these advantages Turkey has, compared to BRICS, that renders Turkish liberal peacebuilding more feasible and effective in Somalia. Considering former American President Trump’s derisive description of Somalia as having “No government, no safety, no police, no nothing, just anarchy,” Turkey has the potential to show how seriously it takes Africa with its capacity for liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia from nation building to state building. Liberal peacebuilding is very critical for a state like Somalia that is dealing with the tormenting outcomes of its civil war and struggle against Al-Shabab. When the fact that conflicts often occur in pre- and post-election periods in Africa, it becomes much more critical to consider the forthcoming 2021 elections in Somalia. Turkey shall continue its stable liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia, and make efforts to convince the BRICS countries to take more responsibility there as well.
Endnotes


33 Kurtenbach, “Why is Liberal Peacebuilding So Difficult?”


Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order

By Timothy Andrews Sayle

In Enduring Alliance, Timothy A. Sayle, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Toronto, provides a chronological history of NATO from its foundation in the late 1940s to the beginning of the 1990s. As the title of the book reveals, throughout the chapters, the author pursues the crises that NATO has encountered in its history, and explores how these crises have been overcome each time, which has helped the alliance to endure until today. Sayle argues that the main threat for NATO and Pax-Atlantica has never been a military attack in essence. Instead, he believes that the dangerous choices of the democratic electorate within NATO member countries to prevent any further war in time of a blackmail by Russians could result in the political disintegration of the allies in Europe.

The timing of the book is noteworthy; Enduring Alliance is one of the few books published on the 70th anniversary of NATO aiming to offer a sweeping history of the alliance. Sayle’s book, published concurrently with Linda Risso’s edited book titled NATO at 70: A Historiographical Approach, follows a different path in unravelling the essence of the enduring alliance. While Risso’s book rejects the crisis-led approach to explaining NATO’s evolution, Sayle focuses on important crises in each of the chapters, such as the Suez crisis in the second chapter, the Berlin crisis of 1961 in the fourth chapter and the French exit from NATO in the sixth chapter. What Sayle focuses on in these crises is not the events, but how the approaches and strategies of the allied leaders, NATO officials, high-level diplomats and scholars of the era worked to maintain NATO and helped it survive.

Sayle’s use of sources is quite satisfactory, and the book is considered a comprehensive compilation of NATO-related quotations by the competent authorities of the time. It is clear from the footnotes that the author, as a historian, conducted extensive archival research while writing the book. Sayle’s main focus in terms of the direct quotations is on U.S., UK, French
and German leaders and advisors and NATO Secretary Generals. Throughout the book, the author does not extensively deal with the official documents of NATO or other allies, but instead tries to uncover the real intent behind these official written pieces.

The book is riveting and impressive for readers who already have enough background knowledge on NATO. However, it cannot be recommended as a main book on transatlantic relations, since the chapters do not aim to provide a comprehensive historical account of the alliance, with all of the details such a task would require. For readers who have a basic understanding of NATO, *Enduring Alliance* can provide a valuable and distinctive angle to understanding why it has survived until this day, despite the various crises it has confronted. Furthermore, the book may offer some surprises to readers due to its inclusion of frank quotations from statements made by allied leaders while they were conducting diplomacy.

The recurring debates and crises addressed in the book are crucial in terms of understanding the basis of today’s discussions about NATO. As a contemporary example, from the book, it can be understood that the U.S. pressure on the European allies to increase their defense spending has actually always been a hot topic in NATO’s history, although lately this discussion has become rather identified with the requests of former President Trump. Similarly, the book is quite successful in its discussion of the processes that led to the signing of agreements on the elimination of nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the continuing concerns of the European allies about the leaders that could come to power in the U.S. This is interesting when one considers that these same concerns are shared by today’s allied leaders in terms of the future of transatlantic relations. Another topic discussed in the book is the history of the establishment of EU-NATO relations. As the current relations between these two important international organizations are based on the principles they adopted in their history, the book could be regarded as a timely piece in this regard as well.

One of the main problems of the book is the period it covers, as it abruptly finishes with a chapter that corresponds to the beginning of 1990s, around the time that the decision to expand toward the former Soviet bloc was taken. Given that it was published on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of NATO in 2019, the book could have included at least one more chapter to cover more recent developments—especially the impacts of the Russian aggression toward Ukraine in 2014. One could understand the author’s choice to avoid discussing the most recent events,
as a historian; however, for instance, the use of Article 5 for first time in the history of NATO in 2001 is a very important event and mentioning the “war on terror” with only a few words in the conclusion—even less coverage than the book devotes to the Trump era—seems an odd decision. Although Sayle argues in the conclusion that it would be impossible to deal with the more recent developments, readers would still like to learn more about issues such as how NATO expanded to include East European countries, how it acquired new roles in the war on terror or how out-of-area operations like the ones in Bosnia and Kosovo were decided behind closed doors. Yet all these questions are left unanswered in the book.

Nevertheless, the problems stated above cannot diminish the value of this book, which could be aptly defined as a timely, significant and unorthodox contribution to NATO’s historical evolution, especially at the time of its 70th anniversary. Therefore, *Enduring Alliance* will most likely satisfy readers in search of a novel perspective on transatlantic relations.

*Aybike Yalçın İspir*

PhD, Independent Researcher
ORCID: 0000-0001-5801-9802
BOOK REVIEW

Anti-Americanism and American Exceptionalism: Prejudice and Pride about the USA

By Brendon O’Connor


Although “anti-Americanism” and “American exceptionalism” are frequently used in the media and academia, the meanings of these concepts have not been clear. In *Anti-Americanism and American Exceptionalism*, Brendon O’Connor aims to define these two terms in an extensive manner. The book consists of seven chapters; in which, O’Connor analyses many of the sources written so far on the subject, while comparing how the meanings of these two concepts changed during the Bush, Obama and Trump periods.

In the introduction, O’Connor argues that both terms are frequently misused and therefore, it is necessary to define them. He briefly introduces what anti-Americanism and American exceptionalism mean and states that one of the goals of the book is to criticize the U.S. without being anti-American (p. 3). The author also indicates that the difference of this book from other works on the subject is that it examines the terms ideologically (p. 6).

In the first chapter, O’Connor states that anti-Americanism has two sides. A significant number of those who criticize the U.S. policies do so for the sake of anti-Americanism and identify the president with the people, which is a crucial mistake O’Connor argues. On the other hand, the accusation of anti-Americanism is also used by the U.S. administration and its proponents to silence dissidents; this occurred notably during the wars in Iraq and Vietnam. O’Connor rightly pays attention to the 9/11 attacks, a milestone for anti-Americanism, since some of America’s European allies did not support the invasion of Iraq and there was even sympathy for Bin Laden, especially in some Muslim countries (pp. 27–29). The author concludes that there are five understandings of the term, based on the usage of the word: as a dichotomy, as a tendency, as a pathology, as a prejudice and
as an ideology. Among these understandings, seeing anti-Americanism as a prejudice and an ideology are the most useful ways of understanding the term, since these interpretations force us to care about details and straightforwardly debate what anti-Americanism is and what just criticism is (pp. 35, 48).

The second chapter deals with the history of anti-Americanism, and aims to find out the root of the hatred. O’Connor highlights how America was the “New World” for Europeans, and therefore, there was a bias toward it during the 18th and 19th centuries. In fact, during that time, the most prominent anti-Americanist views came from people who had never traveled to the country. They simply perceived the U.S. as an inferior version of Europe (p. 63). The stereotypes that developed at that time were varied, and included ignorance, bad weather and rudeness; they have been repeated ever since and have stuck with the Americans (pp. 154–155). From this chapter, one can see that anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon; therefore, it cannot be easily overcome.

In chapters three and four, O’Connor tries to find out the difference between anti-Americanism and criticism of America. He focuses on the Bush effect on anti-Americanism. In the first case, he gives the example of a pro-American senator in Austria who sued a channel for being anti-American during the Korean War because of his political views. The second example is about an Austrian pro-Communist journalist and his fake reports during the Korean War. As can be seen from these examples, anti-Americanism is used both to silence the opponents of American policies and to undermine these policies. The author concludes that the decision of the Bush administration to invade Iraq and label those who do not support the U.S. as terrorists have also contributed to anti-Americanism.

Chapter five introduces American exceptionalism. Although the term is generally used to mean that America is different or superior to other nations, the author does not agree with this definition due to the difficulty of measuring it. Instead, O’Connor argues that American exceptionalism is an ideological part of American nationalism; accordingly, since the United States is considered superior to other nations, it needs to lead them (pp. 121–122). In other words, we need to understand the concept of American exceptionalism to understand America’s military intervention abroad.

Chapter six investigates the validity of one of the most well-known American stereotypes: lack of geographic understanding. It concludes that compared to other nations Americans show weakness in geography, international affairs and foreign languages. The reasons for this dearth are “a lack
of school study of geography; less likeliness among Americans to travel overseas compared to citizens of other nations; less time watching or reading foreign news; and less likeliness to study a foreign language” (p. 150).

In the last chapter, the author explores how Trump has affected American exceptionalism and anti-Americanism. First, he argues, non-Americans do not identify Trump with the American people, in contrast to the conflation of the president with the people prevalent in the Bush-era (p. 181). Second, the author argues that popular culture helped Trump become president, since “popular culture and the internet have made the once unacceptable fairly commonplace.” Also, many people, especially politicians, underestimated how these tools can shape people’s perceptions (p. 168).

Anti-Americanism and American Exceptionalism is an up-to-date and well-researched book that is also rich and diverse in terms of its bibliography. The author is right that the definition of anti-Americanism and American exceptionalism are not clear and therefore, a clear definition is needed for both of the terms. O’Conner also rightly points out that the meaning of the concept of anti-Americanism has changed, since people have finally realized the difference between the American president and the American people. However, while the author thinks that this is because of the strong internal opposition to Trump, (p. 41) the fact that he (unlike Bush) did not order the occupation of a country based on “deliberately manipulated intelligence,” and did not label as “terrorists” those who did not cooperate with his administration (as the Bush administration did) is also helpful to make this difference for non-Americans.

O’Connor is right about how the invasion of Iraq shaped anti-Americanism in the 21st century; however, his failure to elaborate on this issue undermines the quality of the book. The fact that American soldiers committed war crimes during the war, such as targeting women and children, massacring civilians and using torture, has significantly contributed to anti-Americanism. Another shortcoming of the book is that O’Connor does not go into the details of America’s Israeli policy. Even though U.S. support for Israel shaped Islamist anti-Americanist sentiment during the 20th and 21st centuries, this policy is only briefly mentioned in the book. In other words, the impact of America’s influence over Israel on countries in the Middle East and North Africa is not adequately discussed.

In conclusion, although some important aspects of anti-Americanism have been left unexplored in the book, Anti-Americanism, and American Exceptionalism is nevertheless a timely and useful contribution to American studies. The framework of the book is not only beneficial to understanding
these terms, but also to realizing and overcoming misunderstandings about them.

Hüseyin Pusat Kıldıș
PhD Student
Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University,
Department of International Relations
ORCID: 0000-0002-4916-7341
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PRO King’s Remembrancer’s Memoranda Roll, E159/69, m. 78. BM Add. MS 36042, fo.2 (plural fos.). Four-figure numerals without comma or space: 2572. Titles of other record repositories, and names of collections of papers, in full in first reference: Scottish Record Office (hereafter SRO), Airlie Papers, GD 16, section 38/82, April 5, 1844. Compton Papers, kept at the estate office of the Marquess of Northampton, Castle Ashby (hereafter CA), bdle. 1011, no.29.

**Official Papers**

Parliamentary Papers: Select Committee on Manufacturers (Parl. Papers, 1833, VI), 0.456. Subsequent references as: SC on… (PP, 1839, VII), 00.2347. Hansard (Commons), 4th ser. XXXVI, 641–2, 22 Aug. 1895.

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