Three decades after Gorbachev’s 1986
Glasnost campaign, the sudden death of
the Soviet Union still continues to keep
diplomatic historians busy with its momentous
implications. The mutually excluding political
realms of the Cold War forged a conservative
American historical discourse, which perceived
the Soviet Union as an evil empire. Existing
biases against Moscow continued after the
Soviet collapse and were conjured up in a new
scholarly genre that might properly be termed as
“the Reagan Victory School”. The adherents of
this school suggest that President Reagan’s resolve
and unsophisticated yet faithfully pragmatic
foreign policy designs – the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) in particular – became the
major factor behind the Soviet Union’s demise
and America’s “triumph” after the Cold War.
Looking at several influential monographs on
the subject, this paper seeks to demonstrate the
well nuanced yet often mono-causal notions
vocalized by American scholars of Cold War