Qatar: A Modern History

By Allen J. Fromherz

Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development

By Matthew Gray

Qatar: Small State, Big Politics

By Mehran Kamrava

Sixty years ago, today’s glittering cities like Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha were tiny Bedouin or fishing villages with no real infrastructure or urban history, usually labelled “sleepy backwaters” of the Persian Gulf by the scholars of the Middle East. All this changed, however, with the advent of oil. With the incorporation of the profits arising from hydrocarbon resources, Arab Gulf states started to build their countries from scratch. The rise of the oil industry starting from the 1950s not only brought enormous wealth into the region, but also raised the profiles of Gulf oil-producing states in the eyes of Arab nations. Talk of a shift in the gravity of power in the Middle East from the Levantine to Khaleeji world became commonplace.

Nearly all Arab Gulf countries or Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states have experienced tremendous structural changes in the last two to three decades, but Qatar has been a very special and distinctive “success story.” Qatar has emerged not just as an important oil and gas producer which has become the world’s wealthiest country per capita but has also started to be perceived as an influential diplomatic
actor; a sought after mediator and a \textit{bona fide} powerhouse in the Middle East and beyond, even despite its small size and limited human resources.\textsuperscript{2}

Nevertheless, in spite of the growing significance of the country in the international medium, the academic literature on Qatar remains limited. Observers and scholars of the Middle East have long neglected the smaller states of the Arabian Peninsula, and those who have studied the region have mostly focused on Saudi Arabia and to some extent on the United Arab Emirates. Indeed, prior to 2012, academic books specifically dedicated to Qatar could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Here we should mention the late Rosemarie Said Zahlan’s \textit{Creation of Qatar} (Croom Helm, 1979), Jill Crystal’s \textit{Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar} (Cambridge University Press, 1995), which, although a comparative study on Qatar and Kuwait, remains one of the essentials of the field, and Habibur Rahman’s \textit{The Emergence of Qatar} (Kegan Paul International, 2005).\textsuperscript{3}

Fortunately, in the last 18 months, three new volumes on Qatar have appeared.\textsuperscript{4} Although written before Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani handed power to his son, Sheikh Tamim– a historical moment not just for the country itself, but also for the Arab world in general, where cases of stepping down voluntarily and deliberate power transitions are rare–these three volumes contribute a lot to our understanding of contemporary Qatari politico-economic structure. The concerns of the authors of the three volumes are also complementary: Fromherz, a Middle Eastern historian who also taught at Qatar University, emphasizes the modern political history of Qatar, while Gray stages a vigorous analysis of the political-economy of the country, and Kamrava focuses on the emergence of Qatar as an influential and significant player in the international politics of the Middle East and elsewhere.

Fromherz’s book, \textit{Qatar: A Modern History}, fills a gap in the academic literature as it provides an up-to-date account of the making of Qatar, while also underlining the continuities and changes in country’s power structure configuration. In the first three chapters, Fromherz describes in detail the emergence of modern Qatar and the establishment of Al Thani rule. In chapters 4 and 5, he portrays the Qatari relationship with the British until independence while in the following chapters he discusses the drastic transformation during the “Hamad era,” briefly visiting “rentier-state” debates and analysing the nature and challenges of the exercise of authority in the country.
The three main arguments of the book can be summarized as follows: First, the “Al Thani ruling family has used historical myths and heritage to maintain their rule”, second, “mediation is key to Qatar’s success,” and, lastly, “tribes and lineage still matter within Qatar’s internal political scene” (p. 29–31). Fromherz rightly criticizes the universal claims of Western philosophical and sociological perspectives on debates over tradition vs. modernity and elucidates why French sociologist Emile Durkheim’s well-known notion of *anomie* is not applicable to Qatar. Thus, despite massive socio-economic changes, he argues, “individual Qatars are still grouped according to traditional lineage and tribal connections” (p. 6) and are thus “less impacted by the anomie of modernization than by the inheritance of tradition” (p. 158).

Perhaps rightly, Fromherz identifies the historical roots of the contemporary power configuration of Qatar, arguing that “the British elite’s understanding of the [Gulf] Sheikhdoms as authoritarian, desert aristocracies created the legal foundations of present day authoritarianism” (p. 69). Fromherz also shows how Al Thani rule came to dominate Qatar and how the ruling family’s grip on the state and society transformed from a purely paternalistic to a more institutionalized control. No doubt, the legacy of the British era is crucial for understanding the making of Qatar and the rest of the Arab Gulf, but the “authoritarianism issue” should certainly have been elaborated in a more detailed manner.

Reductionist economic determinism that attempts to tell the story of modern Qatar based only on its discovery of oil and gas surely overlooks the cultural and historical aspects that shape the country. However, the hydrocarbon industry and its related sectors certainly account for the lion’s share of “the great transformation” experienced in the country. Fromherz thus arguably downplays the importance of oil and gas. He rather maintains that a complex and real set of historical and social influences make up the particular circumstances of Qatari society today. While that is undeniably true, it still misses or downplays the essential part of the picture. Finally, a critical remark should be made about the numerous typing and copyediting errors in Fromherz’s book. Hopefully, they can be corrected in the next edition.

Mathew Gray’s *Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development* is a very well-conceived book and a product of solid academic research, especially in the field of energy. After a brief elaboration of the historical context, Gray focuses on the energy-driven political economy of the country and demonstrates Qatar’s transition from a classical rentier state to
an “late rentier” one. Gray conceptualized “late rentierism” in an earlier paper, and he applies the notion in detail to the case of Qatar in this book. According to Gray’s conception:

The GCC states have become more globalized and seemingly spend their rentier wealth more intelligently to develop their economies and societies, diversify away from their strong reliance on oil, build new international images and roles for their cities and states, and even change the state’s relationship with society.

Gray describes Qatar’s political economy as rentier and under the rule of Hamad bin Khalifa (1995–2013) as “late-rentier,” noting that country’s strong state capitalism is intensely interrelated with its rentierism. He further argues that, due to the very nature of merchant class-government relationship (e.g., the reliance of the weak merchant class on the royal family for commercial opportunities), some sort of state capitalism would have emerged even in the absence of hydrocarbon reserves (p. 22).

Gray points to the insufficiency of the classical conceptualization of the rentier state by Giacomo Luciani and Hazem Beblawi and others, as contemporary rentier states are more activist and economically engaged and the state is no longer autonomous from society (p. 88). He indicates that the royal family and the political elite are of the society and intimately linked to it and that the Qatari state therefore cannot be separated from the actors and individuals that constitute its political order.

In chapters 4 and 5, Gray ably elaborates the oil and gas sectors and the energy-driven economic model of Qatar. Referring to an anonymous Qatari gas policy expert, he indicates that the broad external involvement in the gas-related sectors especially, “is a deliberate attempt by Qatar to build its international linkages and increase the number of firms and states with an interest in its long-term stability, thereby demonstrating and strengthening an explicit link between its energy and foreign policies” (p. 99).

Needless to say, Qatar, like other GCC members, pays close attention to the diversification of its economy. Although the oil and gas related sectors still constitute the majority of state revenues, varying yearly from about 50 to 70 percent, diversification is high on the agenda. As a good example of this sensitivity, the country’s Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), valued at approximately US $115 billion at the end of 2012, “does not invest in the Qatari energy sector” (p. 105). Although a late-comer compared to similar SWFs in Kuwait, Oman and UAE, the QIA has invested heavily in Western markets.
since its creation in 2005. For instance, QIA either outright owns or has stakes in many international firms, including UK supermarket chain Sainsbury’s, the London Stock Exchange, Barclay’s Bank, London’s famous department store Harrods, the Parisian department store Printemps, and a major French soccer club, Paris Saint-Germain. Qatar also has large stakes in Volkswagen and Siemens of Germany, Banco Santander of Brazil, and the Agricultural Bank of China. Very recently, QIA decided to invest more than US $600 million in developing City Center DC; a shopping and residential complex in Washington DC. In light of this, Gray claims that QIA “was created either primarily or partly as a deliberate strategy of the Emir toward balancing out the fluctuations in energy rents and diversifying the economy” (p. 107).

The overall theme of Gray’s book is that, even though there has been some true reform and diversification of the economy, little economic power has shifted from the state to the private sector, and that, therefore, the political economy is still rentier because of the centrality of energy rents and their allocation by the state (p. 119). In conclusion, Gray points out that Qatar’s diversification strategy has been somewhat successful, but its ultimate success is uncertain as the economy remains so energy centred (p. 151).

Mehran Kamrava, a well-known expert on the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, continues to contribute immensely to the intellectual life of Doha where he has been working since the establishment of Centre for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Therefore, his book entitled Qatar: Small State, Big Politics came as no surprise and indeed is very much welcome.

Kamrava finds the study of Qatar important in four significant respects: First of all, it allows us to re-examine some of the basic premises of rentier state theory; secondly, the country’s hyperactive diplomacy makes it an interesting case study; thirdly, one can draw broader lessons in the discipline of international relations from the country’s profile and diplomatic initiatives; and, finally, Qatar’s very experimental nature as a country offers students of this field insights into the processes of state and nation building, with another main argument of the book revolving around the developmental capacity of the Qatari state (p. 10-12).

Regarding international relations, Kamrava poses the fundamental question regarding the prognosis for Qatar’s active foreign policy role, arguing that, despite all its limitations, Qatar’s powers are more than temporary. He states that there has been “a steady
shift in the regional balance of power in the Middle East away from the region’s traditional heavyweights” and in the direction of GCC states. Furthermore, he points to the changing nature of power in international arena in general and its utilization by Qatar in particular, labelling the new form of power that Qatar has carved out “subtle power”.

Kamrava’s description of this subtle power focuses on a combination of interrelated elements such as, military security, wealth, an aggressive national branding campaign and active diplomacy. He argues that “traditional conceptions of power no longer adequately describe emerging trends shaping the international system,” and that realist and neorealist conceptions of power in terms of access to and control over tangible resources like manpower and military strength cannot properly account for the rise of a small state like Qatar in the international area (p. 47).

According to Kamrava, “small states can indeed become influential players in the international arena, and, although they may be in need of military protection from others, they can use foreign policy strategies such as hedging to greatly strengthen their leverage” (p. 48). He also points out that “Qatar’s influence and power are neither military nor cultural, but are derived from a carefully combined mixture of diplomacy, marketing, domestic politics […] and increasing access to and ownership over prized commercial resources” (p. 49). To sum up, Kamrava underlines the fact that, during the leadership of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa (1995–2013), “Qatar has successfully employed a combination of diplomatic hyperactivism and hedging, the American security umbrella, economic prowess and branding to position itself as an influential actor in the region and beyond” (p. 102).

As Kamrava correctly suggests, at least for the foreseeable future, Qatar’s prospects for continued growth remain positive, mainly due to its immense hydrocarbon reserves and clever policy-making (p. 169). We therefore have many reasons to continue studying the experience of this tiny but influential country in the coming years.

All in all, these three volumes on Qatar will all be of immense help to students of the Arab Gulf states and policy-makers. Not only will they help the readers to gain a sound understanding of the subject matter, but will also open the door for further research.

Erdem Tuncer,
Chief of Section, Deputy Directorate General for Northern Europe and the Baltic States, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and Ph.D. candidate at Sciences-Po Lyon and the Middle East Technical University
Endnotes


2 Qatar’s overall population is estimated to be around 1.8 million by 2013, of which only less than 15 percent are native Qataris, and the peninsula is just 11,571 square kilometers.

3 We might also mention the less well-known work by Zekeriya Kurşun which appeared in English as *The Ottomans in Qatar: A History of Anglo-Ottoman Conflicts in the Persian Gulf*, Istanbul, Isis Press, 2002. And then in Turkish as *Basra Körfezi’nde Osmanlı-İngiliz Çekişmesi: Katar’da Osmanlılar*, Istanbul, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2004. Unfortunately, many established scholars of the Arab Gulf miss this important volume in their analysis, although it mines both the Ottoman (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri) and Qatari Archives (Archive of the Emiri Diwan) in a detailed manner. While most of the scholars in the field, including Fromherz, Gray and Kamrava, continue to rely on British and other Western sources, for a more objective analysis of the history of Arab Gulf sheikhdoms, Ottoman and Iranian accounts should also be taken into consideration.

4 Francophone students of the Arab Gulf and Qatar might also wish to include Nabil Ennasri, *L’énigme du Qatar*, IRIS Editions, 2013; Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot, *Qatar: Les secrets du coffre-fort*, Michel Lafon, 2013 into their reading lists, although the latter is written in a non-academic fashion.

5 This point was originally raised by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen in his review of Fromherz’s book in *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, No.1 (January 2013), p. 222.


7 Ibid., p. 2.

8 Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, *The Rentier State: Nation, State and the Integration of the Arab World*, London, Croom Helm, 1987 is widely seen as the classic account of the rentier state model.
The end of the First World War resulted in the dissolution of long-lasting old empires and the formation of new nation states in the Balkans and Europe. As the new map of Europe was drawn, millions of people with different ethnic, religious, and linguistic characteristics had no option but move from one place to another. In particular, most of the persons belonging to Europe’s historical, imperial, and national minorities had to leave their historic lands and migrate to lands that were new to them while others remained in situ and continued living on native lands though governed by new regimes ‘alien’ to them.

The Muslim minority in Western Thrace is one example of the latter group of historical minorities in Europe. All Muslim Turks residing in Western Thrace were exempted from the population exchange that took place between Greece and Turkey in the early 1920s. Under the 1923 Peace Treaty of Lausanne, they became citizens of Greece and were granted the status of an official minority, and the ethnic Turkish, Muslim and minority identities still survive across the Western Thrace region of Greece. Notwithstanding that a number of fundamental problems of the minority’s group-based rights still await a solution in Greece, the minority regime established in the 1920s persists.

Researchers studying the minority have elaborated many aspects of this community. There are numbers of academic studies, primarily in Greek and Turkish, which focus on the past and present of this community. However, until recently, almost no Greek or Turkish academic studies of the minority of Western Thrace focused analytically on the turbulent decade of the 1940s when Greece had to fight first the invasion of the Axis Powers (Germany and Bulgaria during the first half of the 1940s) and later the Greek Civil War (1946–1949);
one of the most influential phenomena in contemporary Greek history. Due to this oversight, a number of interrelated questions, albeit complicated, remain unanswered about the history of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace: Why did members of the Muslim Turkish minority remain overwhelmingly passive and disengaged during the decade of the 1940s? Although they suffered greatly under the Axis Occupation and the Greek Civil War, why did they show great loyalty to Athens when there were different opportunities to fragment the unity of Greece, e.g., siding with the Axis Powers or the Communist Army in the Greek Civil War?

First printed in English by Palgrave Macmillan in 2011 and later translated into Greek, The Last Ottomans is the first major study to try to find answers to the aforementioned passivity of the Muslim Turkish minority during the 1940s; one of the least-studied periods regarding the minority presence in post-Lausanne Greece. The book is composed of nine chapters written collectively by the authors where issues relating to the minority in the 1940s are analysed chronologically. Although the research focuses primarily on issues related to the Muslim minority, it often provides information on smaller ethic and religious groups living within Western Thrace such as Jews and Armenians (pp. 221–234). In fact, Featherstone et al. do not solely explain events inside Western Thrace, but also give information about general conditions in wider Greece and the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey, providing a broader and clearer picture of the country in the 1940s.

In the Preface, the authors begin by underlining the “sensitivity” of tackling matters of the Western Thracian minority, which may seem quite strange for those readers with little knowledge of Turkish-Greek relations. Also, they clarify why they prefer using religious denomination, i.e., Muslim, and the term “The Last Ottomans” while referring to a minority group whose members are citizens of Greece but do not refrain from declaring their ethnic Turkish identities as well. Chapters 1 and 2 provide extensive information on the general characteristics of the Muslim Turkish minority and Western Thrace while Chapter 3 studies different minority-related phenomena of the Second World War. Chapter 4 constitutes one of the most significant sections of the book since it provides extensive analysis of Western Thrace under Belomorie (White Sea in English), which refers to the Bulgarian administration of the region between 1941 and 1944; one of least elaborated periods of the historiography in both Turkish and Greek academia.
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 explore issues faced by the minority before and during the Greek Civil War, which raged so rampantly across Greece that even brothers could be found on opposite sides of the war, fighting and killing each other primarily on an ideological basis, as Communists or Anti-Communists/Royalists. Here, Featherstone et al. want to show the reader why the minority remained passive and constituted no threat at all to Athens during the Civil War although it seemed caught between the devil and the deep blue sea; under the control of the Communist forces during the night and the Royalist forces during the day. In the final chapter, the main findings of The Last Ottomans actually challenge the Greek argument that the Muslim Turkish minority in Western Thrace assumed the role of Turkey’s ‘fifth column’ or ‘Trojan Horse’ throughout the 1940s.

Overall, Featherstone et al. most frequently mention and scrutinize the following issues relating to the passivity of the Muslim Turkish minority: the Greek policies that contributed to the marginalization and disengagement of the Muslim minority, enabling them to come closer to neighbouring Turkey; the schism between traditional and modernist factions of the minority; the differences of living conditions between those minority members living in the highlands and lowlands; the lack of a uniform group identity and a single leadership; the growth of anti-Bulgarian and anti-Communist sentiments inside the minority, and; the role of Turkey as the external actor and kin state of the minority.

The Last Ottomans has several strengths. First, it uses various sources printed in different languages, primarily Greek, Turkish, English and Bulgarian. It is a usual practice amongst Greek and Turkish academics to prefer sources written in their own respective languages when writing about issues of the minority in Western Thrace. Unusually, Featherstone et al. use various available sources printed in all four relevant languages. In this respect, The Last Ottomans provides a valuable academic contribution regarding the historiography of the Western Thrace minority.

Second, it provides data from diplomatic archives, charts, maps and statistical data some of which were either previously either unknown to or unused by researchers studying the history of the minority, e.g., names and service numbers of the minority soldiers who died during the World War II, including those who are missing (pp. 148–153). Third, the voices of the minority are still absent from most of the research
into the Western Thracian minority, but are present in *The Last Ottomans*, albeit not fully, through a number of interviews, participant observations and local Turkish newspapers. The aforementioned points not only increase the objectivity of this research but also help the reader to see the multiplicity of perspectives and interpretations on this particular aspect and period of modern Greek history.

As for the study’s weaknesses, the Greek archives are frequently used while the usage of those from Bulgarian and Turkish archives remains comparatively limited. Moreover, there should have been more references to records gathered from interviews conducted with older minority informants who witnessed the 1940s and are still alive, which would have strengthened the minority voices in this project. As Featherstone et al. aptly underline (p. 507), further research is needed to clarify two key topics: First, the stories of Bulgarians who were settled in Western Thrace by the Bulgarian administration and later migrated back to Bulgaria after the end of *Belomorie* in Western Thrace, and second, the individual narratives of those minority members who witnessed both the *Belomorie* and the Greek Civil War and then migrated to Turkey in the late 1940s.

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned weaknesses, strengths and contributions, I recommend *The Last Ottomans* to any student, scholar and researcher interested in the history of the Muslim Turkish minority of Western Thrace and that of Greece. Although this book is about a particular period in the history of the Muslim Turkish minority, it still sheds light on some current issues that have to do with the minority and Greece, providing a clearer picture of the past and present of the Western Thracian minority. Last but not least, the main theme of this book is quite relevant for Turkish-speaking people living inside or outside Turkey. Therefore, following its translation from English into Greek, I highly recommend the translation of this book into Turkish so that it can be accessible by a wider community of readers interested in the historiography of the Western Thracian minority.

Ali Hüseyinoğlu,
Assist. Prof. Dr., Balkan Research Institute, Trakya University
Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America’s House in Order

By Richard N. Haass

The American politician Richard N. Haass has been the president of the Council on Foreign Relations since 2003, having previously served in the George H.W. Bush, Reagan and Carter administrations. Haass has written twelve other books, and the present work has grown out of two of his previous books, The Reluctant Sheriff (1997) and The Opportunity (2005). Foreign Policy Begins at Home is focused on the domestic policy of the United States of America.

The book is divided into three parts. The first is focused on the structure of the world after the end of the Cold War, where America played a primary role and governments tried to both administrate their countries and develop cooperation abroad. The author maintains that shortcomings at home threaten America’s ability to exert influence abroad and set an example for other countries. America is thus underperforming, for the author, in both its domestic and foreign policy, as U.S. policy should focus on what countries do outside their borders rather than within them.

Haass argues that today’s world is not dominated just by one power, but is a non-polar world which with time will be influenced by several states exemplified by economic, military, or cultural powers. Ruling such a world will become more difficult as types of power are diffused and it becomes ever harder to maintain a balance. For Haass, “states are challenged from above by regional and global organizations and from below by militias, cartels and the like, from the side by NGOS and corporations”. (p. 16). The author is of the opinion that, even though the U.S. is not the only dominant country, it remains one of the most powerful countries worldwide because it shares the world’s greatest economy, with an annual GDP of US $16 trillion -one-fourth of global economic output- and still possesses the world’s most capable military. All these facts are exemplified in the book by the various policies applied by the U.S., especially after the 9/11 attacks.

In the first part of the book, the author enumerates the potentially biggest powers
today according to their economic, military, and political capacities; among them, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, and Russia. Haass argues that China has the potential to become the second pole of the global system, if the world is indeed to become a bipolar one.

The present era is different because of the number of actors attempting to have an impact on the world. At the same time, there exists a global gap between what the world requires and the real situation; a gap which spoils the balance of global forces, allowing conflicts to appear. By describing the economic and military characteristics of certain countries, the author outlines existent threats such as Iran and Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons which threatens the world’s stability and safety. The Middle East region is defined by Haass as “the least successful region of the world […] a patchwork quilt of top-heavy monarchies, authoritarian regimes trying to hang on, sectarian strife, unresolved conflicts between and among states, regional rivalries, and nationalities that cross and contest boundaries.” (p.74). Thus, for Haass, the Middle East is a region with an uncertain future and limited capacities.

The second part of the book focuses on what America should and should not do abroad. For the author, America should take a new approach to both its domestic and foreign policy. Here the author introduces a new choice of American foreign policy according to which the government should concentrate more on the Asia-Pacific and Western Hemisphere regions rather than on restructuring the Middle Eastern countries. Haass suggests new foreign policy doctrines by which the American government can succeed abroad: spreading democracy (a rather problematic issue); humanitarianism; counterterrorism (a doctrine which became a challenge for America after 9/11 attacks, though the author nevertheless proposes combating terrorism); integration (by bringing countries together and/or to a common ground); and restoration (of the internal sources of American power). The new doctrine of restoration implies rebuilding domestic policy and refocusing on the foreign one. Only by putting its own house in order will the U.S. have the resources necessary to remain an exemplary country.

The third part of the book concentrates on how America should approach its domestic challenges. Haass is of the opinion that one centrally important foreign policy that strengthens America is the success of its economy and political system; but still, in order to aspire even higher, the U.S. should increase the number of international trade agreements and forge and sustain
policies at home that allow the country to remain strong and able to face threats.

As the author states himself, the main argument of the book is that America is able to do many things but not everything. At the same time, the U.S. does not need the world’s permission to act but is certain of the fact that it needs the world’s support to be able to act successfully, as, for Haass, “the world needs American leadership, but this requires the United States to put its house in order.” (p. 160).

Haass’ book is a considerable contribution to the field, especially for those who are interested in exploring the domestic and foreign policies of the U.S.. Taking in account the fact that at present the biggest threat to America’s security and prosperity comes not from abroad but from within, it is essential for America to restore the domestic foundations of its inner power. The book is worth reading not only because it presents the policies which the U.S. Government is applying at the moment, but also because of the author’s clear-headed analysis of the current deficiencies of U.S. policy.

Cristina Mindicanu,
MA student, Department of International Relations, Uludağ University

Regional Powers and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework

By Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier

Regional Powers and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework by Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier offers a comprehensive analytical framework that helps scholars and students of international politics examine the ways in which regional powers influence regional security orders. Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll raise a set of questions in this regard (p. 3): How does one know which states to identify as regional powers? Do all states that possess a substantial concentration of regional power serve the function of a regional power? What functions do regional powers play within the design and maintenance of order? What sorts of behaviours do regional powers engage
in that set them apart from other states within their regional systems? How can the various effects of specific regional powers be compared across regional domains in order to develop a better understanding of the overall influence of regional powers? The authors attempt to answer these questions by introducing their own concepts through extensive discussion in the book.

The book stands apart from other works that focus on regional security issues largely owing to its proposed framework, called the Regional Powers and Security Framework (RPSF), “for identifying regional powers and exploring the nature of their influence on regional security orders and on the region’s relationship with the broader international system that considers state strength as well as behaviour” (p. 3). The RPSF consists of three essential pillars: regional structure, regional power roles and regional power orientations. The authors give importance to two of these pillars in the book within separate chapters and comprehensively discuss them. Yet, in their empirical domain, Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll employ the RSC (Regional Security Complex) framework, defined as “set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” which was developed by Buzan and Waever (p. 6). Specially, they apply their theoretical findings in three RSCs: Central Eurasia, South America and South Asia. Due to the unipolar structure of these three RSCs, they are able to concentrate on the variation in regional power behaviour since this has had significant impacts upon the diversification of regional security orders. The authors have not arbitrarily selected the cases to support their theoretical arguments but instead have systemically chosen the cases that will help the application of the framework to other cases and RSCs. The authors contend that decolonisation and the end of the Cold War have heightened the prominence of regional systems. These transformative events have allowed several regions to exist independently, as well as given the states in the regions the potential for influence on their own regions.

After the introductory chapter, the authors focus upon the dependent variable of their theoretical framework, i.e., the regional security order, in Chapter 2. Revising the term “regional security order” that they borrow from Morgan, they define it as “the governing arrangements among the units of a regional system, including their rules,
principles and institutions, which are designed to make security-related interactions predictable and to sustain collectively salient goals and values related to patterns of securitization and de-securitization” (p. 20). After examining the literature on the typology of regional security orders, concentrating primarily on the “patterns of management” that are intended to promote security within the region, they provide five ideal categories of regional security orders: hegemony-based, strength-based, concert-based, integration-based and unordered. In their empirical part, where they are exploring the three RSCs, they propose that Central Eurasia, South America and South Asia have been classified as strength-based orders and not as hegemony-based due to their being in a transition process.

In Chapter 3 the authors explore regional structure as the first pillar of the RPSF. The authors identify three components of regional structure: the geographical boundaries which designate and identify a particular RSC, the membership which falls within each designated region and the polarity of the region within the confines of the established boundaries and membership. They also allow for multiple RSC membership as long as the relevant state is geographically attached to each RSC of which it is a member. The third key component of regional structure is distribution of power, which helps in understanding which states are more likely to have a significant influence upon regional structure regarding assessing the region’s polarity. Since they define regional powers as “states who possess sufficient capabilities to project power throughout and who disproportionately influence the security dynamics within their RSC” (p. 50), they agree with realist scholars that the possession of material capabilities will make a state more capable and likely to behave as regional powers. By paying attention to material capabilities when identifying regional powers, the authors also give weight to the behaviours of regional powers that provide a set of case studies that demonstrate how differences lead to divergent outcomes in the nature of regional security orders. Yet, even though the authors assert that they integrate realism and constructivism within the theoretical construction of the RPSF, it appears that they are not able to succeed in this. However, as seen in their definition of regional powers, they only focus their attention on material capabilities. On the other hand, paying attention to the behaviours of the regional powers does not mean that they have achieved a balanced theoretical account between
realism and constructivism. To do so, they would need to pay attention to socio-cultural differences in the regions, as well as the different identities and religious perspectives. Focusing simply on the behaviours of regional powers and ignoring the behaviours of other regional members is a major shortcoming of their theoretical framework.

In Chapters 4 through 6, the authors focus upon the behaviours of regional powers as they argue that the possession of a substantial share of the region's material capabilities is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for being a regional power. Building on the second component of the RPSF, the authors establish a typology of three foreign policy roles that regional powers play: leadership, custodianship and protection. First, they provide a definition of each role and determine its principal components, and later they provide a more practical analysis by evaluating how important and effective each role is in Central Eurasia, South America and South Asia. The authors contend that it is possible that regional powers may perform one, two or all of these three roles. While analysing the influence of regional powers upon their regional security orders, the RPSF approaches these roles in a holistic manner, which means that these roles are not mutually exclusive.

In Chapters 7 through 9, as the final component of the RPSF the authors examine foreign policy orientation, which is defined as “the inclination, disposition (satisfaction or dissatisfaction) or preferences of a state with respect to the development and maintenance of the security order” (p. 12). They assess foreign policy orientations along three separate axes: status quo vs. revisionist, unilateral vs. multilateral and proactive vs. reactive. Since the end-points of each are ideal classifications, the authors do not contend that every state will neatly fit into any of these categorisations. Reasonably, regional powers will tend towards one or another and these tendencies will have a substantial impact on their own regional security order. Again, they explore the cases of Russia, Brazil and India with specific reference to their foreign policy orientations and the implications of this for their particular security orders.

All in all, this book puts forward a novel practice for identifying regional powers and their influence in their regional security order, and addresses not only international relations but also the fields of regional and security studies by introducing a theoretical framework and using case studies. Whereas Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll determine 12 different RSCs in the world, they argue that
the Middle East exhibits a multi-polar structure with Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional powers. Thus, this theoretical framework might be useful in studying the latest developments in the Middle East. It could be interesting to see to what extent this theoretical framework and conclusions can be applied in today’s Middle East, since Turkey’s foreign policy towards the region has been studied from many angles.

Nihal Kutlu,
M.A. Candidate, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of International Relations