TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS

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INTRODUCTION
Turkey is not one of the great powers of the Twentieth century. Her geopolitical location, however, has enabled her to play a potentially more influential role in world politics than otherwise would have been possible. She holds the key not only to the Turkish Straits but lies along the roads from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. She is a member of the biggest surviving military bloc and most European organisations, as well as a candidate for European Union membership. Her political involvement and exposed position assign her an importance hardly matched by any other medium power. Accordingly, the correct evaluation of this country's policies is of crucial importance. Furthermore, as one of the small number of non-western societies successfully struggling to modernise both country and people, together with the aim of evolving a workable parliamentary democracy, she has long seemed to offer lessons and insights into an important political process.

Yet, the interest she is getting in the western media and the amount of scholarly works on Turkey, produced especially from an international relations perspective, do not match the importance
conferred upon her by other players in international politics. Given her frequently expressed strategic importance on the edge of Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union, this may seem surprising. For this very reason, however, it is difficult to place Turkey into any neat category that the area specialists and foreign policy analysts like to draw before starting their research. Not only does Turkey not appear to fit any one geographical category, but it does not fit any one cultural, political or economic category either. About 97% of her land mass lies in Asia, yet Turkey’s progressive elite consider their country to be part of Europe and about 70% of her population supports her European Union membership. About 98% of her population is Moslem, and yet Turkey is a secular country by choice and her religious development through the years has taken a different path to that of other Islamic countries. Culturally, most of the country reflects the peculiarities of a wider Middle Eastern culture, and yet she, with an equal persistency, participates in European cultural events. She professes to have a liberal economic system, but the remnants of the planned economy still hamper the country's development. In religious, historical and geographical senses she is a Middle Eastern country, yet any development impinging upon the status quo of the Balkans and the Caucasus directly affects Turkey just as much. These conflicting factors indicate wider uncertainties about the placing and role of the country.

A sense of confusion about Turkey seems to reign not only in external appearances, but also in the deep-rooted convictions of her people. Age-old discussions within the country about the "eastern ideal" and the "western ideal" regarding the exact nature of the country and her people appear to be as lively today as they have ever been. This uncertain self-identity and sense of confusion about Turkey’s intentions and foreign policy priorities is likewise common among western statesmen, scholars, and journalists alike. Particularly since the 1970s, western political analysts, statesmen and the media have seemed increasingly confused about Turkey’s intensified rapprochement with Islam, in both the domestic and international spheres. Although they seem to agree that the implications of a reversal in Turkey’s western-oriented, secular foreign policy could be serious for western security interests, they do not appear yet to comprehend the extent of changes both in Turkey and in her foreign policy. If one looks through recent literature about Turkey, it appears that almost everyone seems to agree that something is happening in Turkish foreign policy - something that has not been satisfactorily explained by Turkey specialists. But there seems to be no agreement as to what is happening and where it leads the country.1

During the 1980s, while Turkey was passing through one of the most extensive transformations the Republic had witnessed, some argued that


Kemalism was "in the process of being buried with Özal",2 and Turkey was "... facing the most serious threat from Islamic forces since the inception of the modern republic".3 Others, while not sure as to whether "Turkish secularism [was] likely to be compromised" in the international and domestic spheres,4 nevertheless maintained that "...if pressures from international politics become too strong, it is not inconceivable that they will strengthen those who would like to see greater emphasis on Islam as a guide in the conduct of internal affairs".5 Such a development could, naturally, have serious foreign policy implications for Turkey. Others disagreed, arguing that a "newly diversified Turkish foreign policy is bound to weaken even further the demagogic appeal
on the Turkish domestic scene of such themes as Islamic fundamentalism and neutralism. Thus it will contribute indirectly but materially to the country’s political stability.6 Moreover, they maintained that "the tendency to move away from Western culture", which had been enjoyed only by the elite, was natural in a "democratic age of consumerism".7 One may ask, then, why there are so many conflicting arguments about Turkey and her intentions. The obvious answer is that, in the absence of in-depth studies covering exclusively different aspects of Turkish foreign policy and its fundamentals, it would be too optimistic to expect any analysis to be accepted without further critical inspection. The truth is that studies of Turkey and Turkish foreign policy in general, have not yet progressed to the point where a "standard" view of the country and its prospects have emerged. Isolated by Ottoman history, language and culture from the west, and by Republican history and political choice from the east, Turkey thus stands as a unique case, one which has not often been considered to be of great interest to scholars of international relations.

Hence, Turkish foreign policy appears to be of interest only to Turks and a narrow circle of Turkish-speaking scholars, who, under various constraints, seem to concentrate their studies on the relatively narrow paths of practical descriptions of Turkey’s relations with a number of countries such as Greece, the United States and more recently the European Union. As a result, the very small number of general foundational analyses of Turkish foreign policy and the various attempts to present the Turkish reality as a coherent whole have long been outdated by the rapidly changing character of the country.8 Furthermore, since there is a new surge of argument, yet again, about Turkey’s options after the "collapse of the Turkish-American strategic partnership" in the wake of the American invasion of Iraq, it may be worthwhile to look deep into the Turkish experience to see what, in general, drives Turkish foreign policy.

Although foreign policies are played out in international fora and thus are affected by these fora, it is clear that "the foreign policy of every single state is an integral part of its peculiar system of government" and reflects its special circumstances.9 Therefore, our understanding of foreign policies is likely to be much more productive if we avoid looking at general forms of behaviour in international relations that could explain all the relationships between states,10 and instead, attempt to locate each case in its specific conditionality within the international system. In this context, Turkey is one of the unique players in the international system, encountering a complex set of interrelations with other players. Although one part or another of her interrelations could be fitted into, or explained by, one of the various different international relations and foreign policy analysis approaches, almost all of them, however, fail after a certain point to explain Turkish foreign policy as a coherent whole.11

Nonetheless, foreign policies are not made in a vacuum. Foreign policy making bodies of any state receive inputs (demands for action, values, threats, feedback) from the outside world and respond to these inputs.12 If we wish to make sense of the foreign policy process we need to look at these

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4. Walter Weiker, "Turkey, the Middle East and Islam", Middle East Review, Special Issue on Turkey, Vol. 17, No. 3, Spring 1985, pp. 30-32.
5. Ibid., p. 32.
7. Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey", p. 765.
inputs and their interrelationship. What makes it difficult to use these factors (inputs and outputs) as a useful tool of analysis is their elastic character, which needs to be adjusted and changed to fit a given historical and concrete situation. Therefore, it is hardly possible to specify a precise number of factors which affects foreign policy making in all countries, in the same way, all the time. Moreover, analysis of a specific policy or a specific situation may require a different emphasis on various factors. Thus, especially when studying the foreign policy formulation of a specific country in a specific time period, some thought should be given beforehand to the factors that contribute to the foreign policy decision-making. Clearly, the factors that can determine and condition the plans and choices made by foreign policy officials are too many and too varied to be enumerated, and the fact that foreign policy formulation is more often a response to immediate pressures from other states and the flow of events, rather than a result of long-range planning, makes it all the more difficult to get to the root of the matter. Nevertheless, experience and tradition over time - in combination with basic values and norms - create a set of relatively inflexible principles. What affects the process of formation of these principles varies from state to state. I argued elsewhere that, while looking at the elements that shape Turkish foreign policy, one can see, with some degree of over-simplification, the interplay of two kinds of variables. One kind, which may be called structural variables, is continuous, and rather static. The other, which may be termed conjunctural variables, is dynamic and subject to change under the influence of domestic and foreign developments. The structural factors are not directly related to the international political medium and the daily happenings of foreign politics. They can exert a long term influence over the determination of foreign policy goals. Geographical position, historical experiences and cultural background, together with national stereotypes and images of other nations, and long term economic necessities would fall into the category of structural variables. Conjunctural variables, on the other hand, are made up of a web of interrelated developments in domestic politics and international relations. Although not displaying any long term continuity like the structural static factors, these dynamic factors do exert temporary influence on a country’s foreign policy and especially on its daily implementation. Conjunctural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, shifts in the world’s present balance of power, domestic political changes, daily scarcities of economic factors, and the personalities of specific decision-makers, would fall into this category. Since, in this context, in order realistically to portray any country’s foreign policy, one has to appraise carefully, first of all, the elements and principles which shape it, this paper will first look at structural and conjunctural determinants of Turkish foreign policy. Then, we will look at the factors that affected Turkish foreign policy just before and after the end of the Cold War, in an attempt to realistically portray future orientations of Turkey.

16. Ibid., p. 141.
18. This line of categorisation of the sources brings to mind Roseau’s time continuum, in which he puts the sources that tend to change slowly at one end, and the sources that tend to undergo rapid change at the other end. His categorisation also includes the systemic aggregation, which includes systemic, societal, governmental, and idiosyncratic sources. See Roseau, "The Study of Foreign Policy"; and James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971).
STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS AND THE OPERATIONAL SYSTEM

During the early years of the Ottoman Empire, its foreign policy was motivated by its military-offensive character. Subsequently, when the Empire first stagnated and then started to crumble, the main foreign policy objective was the preservation of the status quo by military and diplomatic means, of which the latter had had very little significance at that time.19 When, finally, the Turkish nation-state came out of the ashes of the Empire, she was surrounded with a new international environment which was no longer identical to that which had existed prior to World War I. First of all, the break-up of the Ottoman, Russian and Austria-Hungarian Empires signaled change for the international system. The disintegration of these three empires increased the number of actors in the international system. Most of the new actors were politically unstable and economically weak compared to the victorious powers of World War I. Furthermore, throughout the war the international system had ceased to be a "European system" and became a global one in which Europe was no longer predominant. Moreover, the new Turkey was no longer an empire, but a nation-state. She had no desire for territorial conquest and had no power to do so even if she had desired it. She needed a new, realistically sound foreign policy which could respond to the challenges of the new international system without endangering the existence of the state. Atatürk’s new directions for Turkish foreign policy were extremely important at this point. His foreign policy objectives reflected a departure from the expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire. He was mainly concerned with independence and sovereignty, thus with his motto of peace at home, peace in the world, he, while aiming to preserve the status quo, sought a deliberate break with the Ottoman past in every aspect of life.

19. For a detailed study of early foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire see Lord J. B. Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977); and Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

Nonetheless, the new Turkey could not totally disassociate herself from her Ottoman heritage. Today, the Turkish nation carries the deep impressions of the historical experiences of being reduced from a vast empire to extinction, and then having to struggle back to save the national homeland and its independence. The struggle for survival and the play of realpolitik in the international arena, together with an imperial past and a huge cultural heritage left strong imprints on the national philosophy of Turkey and the character of her people.

Furthermore, historical experiences cannot be separated from the present day life of a nation. Like individuals, nations react to both internal and external forces within the international political arena, based on their historical impressions, prejudices and national image of themselves and other nations. Good or bad, right or wrong, historical experiences colour a nation’s reaction to events and forces in the political system. They limit the foreign policy options of the political leadership and are filters for viewing international reality.20

Some other important foreign policy inputs of Turkey grew out of the country’s geopolitical reality. As Rosenau puts it, "the configuration of the land, its fertility and climate, and its location relative to other land masses and to waterways...all contribute both to the psychological environment through which officials and publics define their links to the external world and the operational environment out of which their dependence on other countries is fashioned".21

The Turkish Republic, inheriting, from the Ottoman Empire, the historic role of serving as both a land bridge and a fortress between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, constitutes a very good example of how, and to what degree, geography determines a country’s foreign policy. The foreign relations of Turkey, and the Ottoman Empire before her, have been in the large part, governed since the eighteenth century by the attempts of the Russians to gain control of the Straits, and the efforts of Britain and France (and lately the United States) to stop them.
Turkey has undergone profound changes since the 1920s. But one thing, that has not changed is her location and its strategic value. Even if her relative importance to other states has changed, the perceptions of Turkish decision makers regarding their geographical importance and the perceived threats resulting from this particular location have not yet radically changed. As far as the foreign policy making of a country is concerned, the perception of decision makers about themselves, their country and other countries, is the most important factor to take into account. Accordingly, below we will deal with three main traditional inputs of Turkish foreign policy; namely the Ottoman experience and its long lasting legacy; the geopolitical realities of Turkey; and the ideological foundations defined under the leadership of Atatürk.

THE LEGACY OF EMPIRE
Turkish imperial history ended with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923, after three years of nationalist struggle, replaced the dictated Peace Treaty of Sévres and established the new Turkish nation-state with complete sovereignty in almost all the territory included in the present day Turkish Republic. Although it contained a few restrictions on the Straits and granted some commercial and judicial privileges, the Treaty of Lausanne was essentially international recognition of the demands expressed in the Turkish National Pact.

The Sévres Treaty in contrast was detrimental to Turkish independence and destructive of its homeland. It stipulated that Greece was to receive the remaining portion of the Empire’s European territory (except the Straits Region which was under Allied occupation) as well as İzmir (Smyrna) and its hinterland in western Anatolia. In addition to the abandonment by the Turks of all Arab lands, a sovereign Armenian state and an autonomous Kurdistan were eventually to be formed in eastern Anatolia. Furthermore, France, Italy and Britain were allowed to carve out "spheres of influence" from the remaining Anatolian heartland. Capitulations, abolished during the war, were to be restored, and the Straits were to be governed by an international regime. Thus the Turks were only allowed to keep a small part of desolate central Anatolia, under various restrictions. However, the Treaty of Sévres was still-born, as the Nationalists, organised around Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia, refused to accept it and successfully fought to overturn its terms.

Nonetheless, the fact that the sovereign rights and independence of the Turkish people had been disregarded by the Entente powers, and that the Turks were forced to fight to regain their independence and the territory they considered as their "homeland" after rapidly losing an empire, was to have an important effect upon both subsequent Turkish attitudes vis-à-vis foreign powers and on their nation-building efforts. Moreover, it should be mentioned that, though displaced by a later treaty, the Treaty of Sévres, together with the arguments and counter-arguments about the Armenian deaths during the First World War in Ottoman lands, formed the basis for subsequent...
of the new state from 1924 onwards and the full-fledged development of Turkish national consciousness from the 1930s onwards that the Kurdish and Turkish interests seemed to diverge.28

Constructive Legacies

The Turkish Republic was born out of the Ottoman Empire, but bore little resemblance to its forerunner. The new Turkey was not an empire, but a relatively small nation-state; not autocracy or theocracy, but a parliamentary democracy; not a state founded on expansionist principles, but a nation dedicated to maintaining the existing status quo; not a multinational, multiracial, and multi-religious state, but an almost "homogenous" society.29 Her aims were not to create and expand an empire, but to build and perpetuate a strong, stable nation within the boundaries of her homeland. Those were not ephemeral happenings at that critical time of history but the facts created by the deliberate choices of the leaders of the new Republic. Though at one time the Turks formed an important part of the ruling classes, they were actually one of the smaller nations within the multiethnic empire. Moreover, the Ottoman sultans did not consider themselves Turks as such, but as Ottomans. Therefore, when the Turks fought for their independence after the First World War, they did not fight only against the Entente invaders, but also against the Ottoman Sultan and the forces of the old system: a point that is usually overlooked.30 Hence, it is not surprising to see that the leaders of the new

25. Right to use and govern the area were given to Greece, but not sovereignty. However, there was a possibility of transfer of sovereignty by majority vote in a plebiscite that was to be held after five years of Greek administration.
27. Philip Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue", International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1993, p. 659; and Richard Sim, "Kurdistan: The Search for Recognition", Conflict Studies, No. 124, 1980, p. 4. The Treaty itself, although it did not define the exact territory of proposed autonomous Kurdistan, stipulated that after one year it might ask the League of Nations for a confirmation of its status as an independent state. Confirmation of this status was to be based on the evaluation of mandatory power(s).
28. Sim, ibid., pp. 17-18; Geoffrey L. Lewis, Turkey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1955), pp. 84-88; For contemporary discussion of how the Kemalist Turkey dealt with the Kurdish issue see Toynbee/Kirkwood, Turkey, pp. 259-274.

Turkish state sought to break with the Ottoman past, which they identified with ignorance, corruption, backwardness and dogmas. To establish a truly new state, they had to clear away the ruins of the Empire, disown its legacy and discover new virtues based on the Turkish nation. The new Turkey had to have no relationship with the old.31 Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the Turkish Republic did not inherit some of the fundamental features of the Ottoman Empire. A closer look at these features would help one to understand the background of Turkish foreign policy.
The new Turkey was established not only in the very heart of the old Empire’s geopolitical setting, that of Asia Minor and Thrace, therefore acquiring its complications, but it also retained most of its ruling elite. Since the bureaucratic elite of the Empire in its last days was dominated by Turks, the new Turkish state had found an experienced bureaucracy, an important value of which other post-empire states ran into scarcity. Fortunately 19th century experiments with western education had produced an educated official class. Later this elite group of administrators, under Atatürk’s guidance and within the one-party authoritarian regime, formed the nucleus of Turkey’s modernising elite - the Republican People’s Party, and imposed revolutionary changes from the top. Though this elite, on the one hand, secured a strong political power base for Atatürk and thus enabled him to carry out the most needed radical reforms to break down the traditional social and spiritual culture of Turkey and transform it into a secular and western culture, on the other, they somewhat contradictorily supplied a material connection between the Empire and the new Turkish Republic.32

One of the fundamental features of Turkish foreign policy has been its western orientation. Despite the fact that Turkey had fought against the western powers during the First World War, after independence she opted for the western World. This was expressed first in cultural and, after World War II, in political and military terms. This orientation has been so deliberate and continuous that one

should look into history, which has helped to shape Turkish understanding of its environment and governmental philosophy, to find out the underlying motivations behind such a long standing policy posture, despite various setbacks in the form of European rejection of Turkish overtures. Throughout history, the Turks have been connected to the west, first as a conquering superior and enemy, then as a component part, later as an admirer and unsuccessful imitator, and in the end as a follower and ally. Ottoman settlement, after the Mongol invasion of Anatolia in the Valley of the Karasu, where they were in direct contact with the Byzantines, was the beginning of the influence which had such a profound effect on their subsequent history. They began, indeed, to face the west; before they had any status in Asia Minor, the Ottomans already had an empire, based largely in South-east Europe (Balkans). "It was only during the course of the fifteenth century that they became an Oriental power as well as a European".33

Not only did Europe have an effect on the Ottoman Empire, but the Turks, from the time that they first entered the European continent, played a role in the destiny of Europe. They were not only the enemy of the European monarchs, but frequently allied themselves with one or more of the European powers against others, and operated within the European system. It is, however, one of the ironies of history that the Ottoman Empire, whilst it had progressively become more and more alienated from Europe through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was "officially" re-admitted to the European legal system at the Paris Congress of 1856.

It is only natural that the Ottoman rule over one-third of Europe for four hundred years, would have important effects on the Empire’s outlook.34 Its adaptation of a somewhat secular state system, especially in the conduct of foreign affairs and in the administration of the various millets, was part of this influence. Although it must be admitted that serving the cause of Islam was an important element behind most of the Ottoman conquests, it is also a fact that, so long as the

state was strong, the Ottoman rulers did not use the title "caliph", the religious leader of the Muslim community. It was only after the continuous dismemberment of the Empire’s non-Moslem
subjects in the 19th century that the sultans, notably Abdülhamit II, upheld the idea of Pan-Islamism in order to prevent the disintegration of the Empire's Moslem subjects. In fact, the Ottoman Empire, in time, had come to create its own peculiar understanding of Islam, somewhat "secular" and different to that of the Arabs. Moreover, it must be remembered that there was no institutionalised religious authority independent from the state. Therefore, it was easy for the Ottoman Sultan to make peace with the infidels, whenever he considered it necessary, and to look for western help when modernisation of the empire was needed.

Given this background, the introduction of the western-oriented, secular state in the 1920s was not contradictory to the overall experience of the Turkish people. In fact, modernisation in terms of the west, had been started after a series of Ottoman defeats at the hands of the western powers. Most Ottoman and Turkish modernisers did agree upon one basic assumption, as declared by Abdullah Cevdet, that "there is no second civilisation; civilisation means European civilisation, and it must be imported with both its roses and thorns". Turkey owed a great deal to the late Ottoman intellectuals, who advocated most of the reforms, which were finally realised under Atatürk’s leadership in the 1920s and 30s. Atatürk’s success derived from his willingness to accept European civilisation with "both its roses and thorns", whereas earlier reformers had only tried to imitate them with limited success.

Another point of historical significance is the realistic outlook of Ottoman diplomacy, which was shaped during the nineteenth century with extraordinary success. During the last hundred or so years of its life, the Ottoman Empire was weak in comparison to the western Powers and was forced to pursue its foreign policy among the tensions between its own interests and those of other powers. Nonetheless, by playing one great power against another for survival, the Ottomans were, for a long time, able to maintain the territorial integrity of much of the Empire. Thanks to the contemporary international system of the "balance of powers", and the Ottoman understanding of its main features, the Empire’s decline took three hundred years and its collapse came only with a world war.

As a student of this remarkable diplomacy, Atatürk would later use all the advantages of the international system, such as the differences between England, France and Italy at the end of the First World War, and the greater antagonism between the western powers and the Soviet Union. One can also see that after the Second World War, Turkey’s well-played role as a continuously threatened nation, gained resulting American aid which, at its highest point amounted to $738.9 million for the year 1986, only third after Israel and Egypt.

Problematic Legacies
Along with above-mentioned constructive elements, Turkey also inherited some complications from its Ottoman past which still show themselves today in Turkish foreign policy construction. The line of foreign policy, which the Ottomans pursued through their last years, that is of playing powers off against each other for survival, necessitated the Ottomans in being extraordinarily wary about their environment and suspicious about other powers’ intentions. They also learned, as a result of centuries-long hostilities with their neighbours, not to trust any state, to rest on nothing but their power, and to be ready to fight at any given time, which is reflected in the common Turkish saying "water sleeps, the enemy never sleeps".
Consequently, Turkish diplomats are famous today, among other things, for being sceptical and cautious. The Foreign Ministry always takes its time in responding to any given foreign statement or memorandum, as if they were searching for the real intentions behind the lines. There is also a sense of insecurity in Turkey, a direct legacy of the Ottoman Empire, reflected in such statements as "Turkey’s historical position indicates that she is obliged to pursue a policy based on being strong and stable within her region... (since) she is surrounded by unfriendly neighbours".39

When discussing cautiousness and scepticism in Turkish foreign policy, one should bear in mind the fact that the Empire had been subjected repeatedly to propaganda attacks, exploitation and outright aggression by the self-appointed protectors of her minorities. The Ottoman Empire restricted itself to minimum interference in the affairs of the subject peoples. The authority granted to the head of millets, or religious communities, included church administration, worship, education, tax collecting and supervision of the civil status of their co-religionists. Because the Ottoman rulers did not seek to impose the Turkish language on their subjects and did not require the conversion of Christians and Jews but rather used the religious leadership of these communities to administer their co-religionists, the persistence of a strong non-Muslim religious identity and linguistic differences, served as a natural basis for the growth of nationalism and eventual separatism, by the subject peoples in the nineteenth century. These religious communities, by attracting European attention, therefore brought about the continued involvement of the west in Ottoman affairs. Thus, when the central authority weakened, the millet system, once an excellent instrument of governing, precipitated the self-destruction of the empire. In particular, Greek Orthodox and Armenian communities had been used as a means of interfering in Ottoman authority throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Hence, Turkish sensitivity about Greece’s efforts on internationalising the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul, or any possibility of accepting Armenian genocide claims, has to be seen against this background.

Naturally, western Christian nations’ interference in Ottoman authority, on behalf of her Christian minorities, caused a feeling among Turks that this difference in religion, though rarely articulated, is relevant to their international relations. This is especially true for those who usually refer to the European Union as a "Christian Club" and air their worries about whether these Christians would accept an Islamic country among them.

Another bitter legacy of the late Ottoman Empire for the Turks, is the memory of the financial control on Turkish soil, exercised by the European powers through Duyun-u Umumiye, the Public Debt Service, after the Ottoman Empire went bankrupt in 1881. Thus, it was not surprising, to hear from Atatürk that "...by complete independence we mean of course complete economic, financial, juridical, military, cultural independence and freedom in all matters. Being deprived of independence in any of these is equivalent to the nation and country being deprived of all its independence".40 Knowing that the Ottoman Empire, in its last years, had lost its independence, to a large extent due to foreign interventions, privileges granted to foreigners, and the capitulations, the Ankara governments were thus very sensitive about infringements upon their sovereignty as well as about foreign economic entanglements. In the economic sphere, this suspicion showed itself by tight control over foreign companies operating in Turkey and strict rules governing financial problems.

Still another point of historical significance is that there is a sense of greatness, in the common Turkish mind, based on belonging to a nation which had established empires and been master of a world empire, which was only brought down by a world war. Given that in the final years, the empire was nothing more than a name, devoid of all real power, nonetheless it was a name, a symbol to which most of the Turks responded and in which they took pride. Though the grandeur
of empire and its pride are matters of the past for contemporary Turks, it is still frustrating for them to be in the position of, and regarded as, a second-rate power. This frustration, perhaps in large part, explains Turkish sensitivity to insult and criticism, related to her dependence upon the great powers, and to exclusion from important international conferences. On the other hand, centuries old Ottoman supremacy over the Arab states and the Balkans left the Turks with a conviction of their superiority. The ordinary Turk is inclined to look down upon the Arab as a man who really cannot control his own affairs in a civilised fashion. The periodical reoccurrence of conflicts in the Middle East tend to confirm, in the ordinary Turkish mind, this prejudice. A vicious circle is thus established as the Arabs react to Turkish haughtiness.  

On the other side of the fence, the long, and in its last days inefficient and unpopular, Ottoman domination in these countries left ill will against the Turks, and modern Turkey has to face the legacy of neighbours who have bitter memories of Ottoman rule. Certainly, the Imperial past has something to say about the bitterness between Turkey and Greece. The late nineteenth century witnessed rising Greek nationalism and Greece became the first nation-state in the Balkans to come into existence as a result of clashes between nationalism and the Ottoman Empire. In the early twentieth century, the Turkish struggle for independence reached a climax when, in 1915, the Greek army landed in İzmir, to attain the Megali Idea (the long-lived Greek dream of reconstituting the Byzantine Empire) the Turks had to fight against the Greeks to claim their independent nation-state. The frustrated hopes of the Greeks of reaching the Megali Idea, and the Turks having been forced to fight against an ex-subject people for its independence, together with the stories about wartime atrocities on both sides, were reason enough for the continued bitterness in the early 20s and 30s. Though some of the potential for conflict was eliminated between Atatürk and Venizelos by the arrangement of a compulsory population exchange in the 1920s, past bitterness provided a base for hostility when differences erupted from the mid-1950s onwards.

Another important historical fact is that one of the pillars of Turkish security policy, namely, that of its northern neighbour representing the primary threat to Turkey’s security, also had its roots deeply embedded in history. Since the 17th century, Russia’s expansionist policies had helped it to become the “arch enemy” of the Ottomans. A succession of major defeats at Russian hands had consistently confronted the Ottoman Government with the realities of its declining power. Moreover, it was Tsar Nicholas I, who described the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe" when he proposed to the British in 1853 that the Ottoman Empire be partitioned. The last of the thirteen Russo-Turkish wars was, of course, the First World War. This course of conflict, over the past four centuries, had naturally generated a full measure of hostility and distrust between Turks and Russians. Even during the period of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, when good neighbourly relations were enjoyed by both sides, the historical Turkish distrust of the Soviets was well evident. In 1934, during a conversation with General Douglas MacArthur, Atatürk predicted a major war in Europe around 1940, and also saw the real victors of the war as the Soviet Union. A history of distrust, hostility and continued wars, made the Turks extraordinarily wary. Hence they did not hesitate to accept American aid when the Soviet Union placed great pressure on Turkey for territorial cessions and special privileges on the straits.  

GEOGRAPHICAL REALITIES

Modern Turkey, thanks to her geo-strategic location with borders in Europe, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union, has been able to play a role in world politics far greater than her size,
population, and economic strength would indicate. Historically, Turkey is located on one of, if not the most, strategic and traditionally most coveted pieces of territory. She controls the historic invasion routes from the Balkans and the Caucasus mountains onto the high Anatolian

plateau, which in turn commands the entire Fertile Crescent down to the oil rich Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Moreover, Turkey is also at the crossroads of major air, land, and sea routes of modern times, joining the industrially advanced lands of Europe with the petroleum-rich lands of the Middle East. Furthermore, she possesses the sources for most of the water irrigating lands as far as the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, during the Cold War she was also on the line of conflict between the zones of two military superpowers and their respective alliances. And from the north to the south, she was in a rather sensitive part of the Mediterranean, where both superpowers have tried to expand their spheres of influence and counter-balance each other.

This particular geographical position makes Turkey a Balkan, Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern country, all at the same time. It also makes Turkey doubly susceptible to international developments near and far and, therefore, greatly sensitive to changes in the international and regional political balance. Thus the peculiarities of the Anatolian peninsula are worth looking at, before anything else, since the various effects of Turkey’s geographical position, which influence Turkish foreign policy, are derived from these peculiarities.

Settlement in Anatolia dates back as early as 7500 BC. Being at the crossroads of land connections between Europe, Asia, and Africa, on the one hand, has increased the importance of any state established in Anatolia. However, on the other hand, being also the main channel for migrations from the east, and invasions from both the east and the west, has encouraged a sense of insecurity as well. The Anatolian peninsula is highly mountainous in the east, permitting only small gateways between the mountain ranges. Each side of Anatolia is surrounded by the sea, and along the coasts in the north and the south, run parallel mountain ranges with forests and rivers, which make this area all but impenetrable As Toynbee describes, "only towards the west does the plateau sink in long fertile river valleys to a clement and sheltered coastline".44 This geographical setting has forced all states located on the Anatolian peninsula, including the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, to look to the west rather than to the east for trade and cultural exchange.

The physical features of a land may make it easy to defend or penetrate from outside. From the military point of view, the Anatolian peninsula is a "strategic region".45 The seas on both sides and the fortress-like mountainous terrain in the

42. Quoted in Shaw/Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 483.
43. "We Turks, as Russia’s close neighbour, and the nation which has fought more wars against her than any other country, are following closely the courses of events there, and see the danger stripped of all camouflage....The Bolshevists have now reached a point at which they constitute the greatest threat not only to Europe but to all Asia". Cited in Lord Kinross, Ataturk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990), p. 464.

east are difficult to penetrate by using force, and make natural boundaries for Turkey. European Turkey, on the other hand, is difficult to defend and the Straits are also vulnerable to air attacks. It is true that possession of the Straits conveys political and military advantages, and raises Turkey from the position of a purely local power to one having crucial international influence. Simultaneously, however, the Straits pose one of Turkey’s major security concerns by attracting potential aggressors. The fact that Turkey deployed her most powerful First Army to protect the Straits and the area surrounding them shows the full realisation of this phenomenon by Turkey. Another important factor in Turkish security thinking is that the Aegean Islands, if under the control of an enemy power, would deny Turkey the use of her two principal harbours, Istanbul and İzmir, and could prevent access to the Straits. In this case, navigation would be safe from the
eastern Mediterranean, as long as the island of Cyprus, which could block the area, was controlled by a friendly government. Hence, the scenario that Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) would cut Turkey off from the open sea, encouraged Turkey’s resistance to such designs since the 1950s. It is the very same fear that is behind the Turkish declaration of casus belli against Greek claims about twelve-mile territorial waters in the Aegean, thus putting all open-sea exits from the Aegean within her territorial seas.46

Another important reason for Turkey’s geographical insecurity is the fact that she is surrounded by many neighbours with different characteristics, regimes, ideologies, and aims; and that relations between them and Turkey may not always be peaceful, and especially in the Middle East, may occasionally take the form of armed clashes. A country’s borders may be a source of strength or of weakness depending on their length, the number and intentions of the neighbours, and the relative power available to the affected parties. In the early days of the Republic, Turkey had borders with seven states, including four with major powers; Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Great Britain (mandate in Iraq and possession of Cyprus), France (mandate in Syria), and Italy (possession of the Dodecanese Islands). Although the Soviet Union and Iran posed no threat at that time, their predecessors, the Russian and Persian Empires respectively, had deadly quarrels with the Ottoman Empire. Bulgaria, though an ally during the First World War, had fought against the Ottoman Empire for its independence and the memories of Balkan Wars, during which she had advanced as far as the fortresses of Istanbul, had not been forgotten by Turks.

In the interwar period, though she enjoyed good neighbourly relations in general, Turkey had problems with Britain (concerning Mosul), with France (concerning Hatay/Alexandretta), and with Italy because of her open imperialistic tendencies towards the eastern Mediterranean after the 1930s. After the Second World War, Turkey’s borders dropped to six, leaving Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq and Syria as neighbours, and the Republic of Cyprus joined them in 1960. At the end of the Cold War, three Caucasian states (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) replaced the Soviet Union on Turkey’s north-eastern border. This composition of neighbours leaves no need for further explanation and Turkey’s sense of insecurity proves what Most and Starr argue; "...a nation that borders on a large number of other nations faces a particularly high risk that it may be threatened or attacked by at least some of its neighbours...and confronts its neighbours with uncertainty because it must protect and defend itself against many potential opponents".47

To counter-balance potential opponents and to reduce her sense of insecurity, Turkey has sought alliances with regional states and outside powers. Between 1920 and 1955 Turkey entered a number of pacts and alliances, as well as signing friendship declarations with all her neighbours and bilateral security treaties with the United States. This sense of insecurity went too far as she entered the Balkan Pact (1953) and Alliance (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), all of which meant nothing any more, as far as Turkey’s security was concerned, after Turkey’s adherence to NATO in 1952.

Another geographical influence on Turkish foreign policy derives from the facts that Turkey effectively controls the only sea-way linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean; that the Soviet Union was a major Black Sea power as well as being a superpower; and that Turkey also shared a common border with the Soviet

199. Under present arrangements, about 35% of the Aegean is designated as Greek and 9% as Turkish territorial sea. The Twelve mile arrangement would result in 64% Greek and less than 9% Turkish territorial seas, and the rest as international waters. Figures from Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, Adelphi Papers, No. 155 (London: International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1980), pp. 36-37.

Union. As mentioned above, by possessing internationally important waterways, Turkey had been able to exercise much more influence on world politics than would otherwise have been possible. As summed up by Vali "...an Anatolian state that did not control the bridge toward Europe would only be another country of the Middle East; united with this historic region however, it is bound to play a more eminent role either offensively or defensively".48 This intercontinental position has proved an element of strength as well as of weakness. For five centuries, Istanbul provided a home base for the Ottomans "from which they were able to exercise control in all directions, in the Balkans and central Europe, the Black Sea region, the Aegean and Mediterranean, Mesopotamia and Arabia, Syria and North Africa".49 The Straits have also supplied a resource for the Ottoman Empire and its successor, the Turkish Republic, that could not be duplicated in manpower, as a means to influence the actions of the Russian Empire, later the Soviet Union, and finally the Russian Federation.50

However, controlling these vital waterways brought the Ottoman Empire into constant conflict with the Russians, beginning in the seventeenth century when Peter the Great began his drive to the south. It has always been vitally important for Russia to have its outlet to the Mediterranean unimpeded, independent of its neighbours’ goodwill. But it has been equally important for western powers not to let Russia gain control over this strategic passage. So much so, that Napoleon is said to have placed such importance on the Turkish Straits that he declared his willingness "to abandon mastery over half the world rather than yield Russia those narrow Straits".51 Indeed, during the nineteenth century, the struggle for control of the Ottoman Empire in general, and of the Straits in particular, was the major part of the assertions of European diplomacy. And in the latter half of the nineteenth century the "eastern question", in essence the fate of the Ottoman Empire, became the major factor in the global balance of power. Consequently, the Ottomans, "even though militarily weak, economically bankrupt and politically anomalous", were still able to subsist for another century

48. Váli, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, p. 44.
49. Ibid.
51. Váli, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, p. ix.

"on the conflict of interests between Russia, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary, France, Britain, on the other".52

While the question of the Turkish Straits and the historic hostility between the Russians and the Turks has been at the heart of Turkish-Soviet relations for many years, having a superpower neighbour also had its effects on Turkish foreign policy. During the first two decades of the Republic, relations with the Soviet Union, which supplied political and material support to Turkey, were good and were strengthened by the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression of 1925. This era of mutual understanding came to end on March 15, 1945, with the Soviet’s unilateral denunciation of the 1925 Treaty and demands for a new treaty "in accord with the new situation".53 They further demanded territorial concessions from Turkey and bases on the Bosporus. These Soviet demands strongly influenced Turkish foreign policy attitudes and reinforced its western orientation. Since Turkey was only able to refuse these demands with the backing of the United States, the Turkish Government sought a formal alliance with her, and the link with the western defence system was formalised with Turkey’s accession to NATO on February 18, 1952.

Though, after Stalin’s death, the Soviet government officially declared that its policy towards Turkey had been wrong and that the Soviet Union had not had any territorial claims on Turkey,54 it was too late for the Soviet Union to repair its relations with Turkey, since the historic Turkish distrust of the Russians had reappeared on the horizon. The belief that the Soviet Union posed a primary threat to Turkey’s security dominated relations between the two countries during the cold war, and it was only after the blow of Johnson’s letter, that Turkey showed interest in Soviet
efforts to normalize relations. It took nearly a decade for Turkey to accept the fact that détente between the Soviet and the western Blocs had begun in the 1960s, and a further decade to improve its own relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, having a common border with the Soviet Union was still a

54. For Khrushchev’s letter, dated June 28, 1960, see Ferenc Váli, Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 302-305.

cause for concern and remained one of the factors contributing to Turkey’s extremely cautious foreign policy and her continued membership of NATO.55

Another complication in Turkey’s political and security thinking is the fact that Turkey is a Middle Eastern country as well as a Balkan and Mediterranean one. The strategic importance of the region does not need further elaboration. The single fact that the Middle East owned most of the known oil resources made the region one of the most important in the strategic thinking of all parties concerned. Turkey, like most of the western countries, is dependent on Middle Eastern oil56. Therefore, Turkey’s growing political and diplomatic concern in the region has been, in part, a result of the intensifying economic ties which were forced upon her by her dependence on Middle Eastern oil.56

The significance of geography on Turkey’s destiny has never been more clearly demonstrated than by the loss of the oil-rich Arab lands, after the First World War, which the Ottoman Empire once controlled. This left Turkey with a need to import oil that encouraged financial dependence on the west and contributed to periodic economic crises, which in turn caused social and political instabilities within the country. Though consecutive governments in Ankara continuously declared that Turkey had no territorial demands on any country, the memory of losing these territories with their extensive resources is still fresh in the ordinary Turkish mind. This can explain, in part, Turkish sensitivity about developments concerning the Aegean seabed. The determination not to give up possibly oil-rich areas once again, is one of the reasons behind Turkish arguments that the eastern portion of the Aegean seabed is an extension of the Anatolian continental shelf. Therefore, Turkey should have jurisdiction for purposes of exploration and exploitation, of seabed and subsoil resources.57 The fear of losing another potentially oil-rich area (though any prospect of finding substantial oil resources in the Aegean is fairly remote)58 is so strong in Turkey that she still insists on her claims to the Aegean seabed, even at the risk of a military confrontation with Greece, while the dispute remains unresolved.

58. Wilson, ibid., pp. 4 and 30.

Apart from oil, there are other reasons why the Middle East possesses an important place in Turkish security thinking. The region has been continuously unstable since the First World War and the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, while depending on status quo, requires stability, and any destabilizing development in the region would create security problems for her. Thus the general insecurity of the region has attracted a great deal of concern from Turkey. It is sufficient to point out that four Arab-Israeli wars, the unending Palestinian problem, the Lebanese civil war and foreign interventions, the Suez crises, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War, operation northern watch in the 1990s and the later invasion of Iraq by the United States have all occurred within the immediate reach and security zone of Turkey. Such developments, and the ever-increasing possibility of superpower
involvement, have inevitably created great concern in Turkey over her immediate security. Beside cultural aspirations and ideological, economic, and political factors, the stability of Europe in comparison to the Middle East since the Second World War, has also encouraged Turkey to remain in the western camp. A secure place within the multinational fora, which has created stable political, social, and economic conditions in Europe, has always had a considerable attraction for Turkey, a country which is placed in one of the most unstable and insecure regions of the world.

IMPACT OF KEMALISM
Although experiences and memories of the Ottoman past, together with its geo-strategic location, served as a foundation for and influenced the subsequent foreign relations of Turkey, it is Atatürk’s theory and practice of foreign policy which has been the most important factor in shaping Turkish foreign policy. He not only completely controlled Turkish foreign policy in his lifetime, but he also put forward an ideological framework by which the pursuit of Turkish foreign policy could be achieved. Though the original Kemalist goals of national foreign policy underwent various mutations, practically all Turkish governments, regardless of their standpoints, put his "indisputable dogma" into their programmes and have not, and could not implement policies that ran counter to Kemalist principles. His influence over the Turkish people, in general, and through Turkish foreign policy in particular, has been so deep and so fundamental that there are at times intimations, and often open warnings, that anything other than strict adherence to his principles would be disloyal to him and to the country.

Atatürk’s foreign policy views, like his political views, represented a break with the past. He aimed at a renunciation of three strains which had been important during Ottoman times: the imperial-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turanism. Incidentally, policies which could break these strains coincided with three of his political principles; Republicanism, Secularism and Nationalism respectively.

Atatürk’s foreign policy was clearly an extension of his domestic policies. He recognised the vital relationship between the internal organisation of the new Republic and its foreign policy. He also realised that a peaceful foreign policy was needed in order to achieve his far-reaching reforms inside Turkey. Once he said, "What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is founded is the internal organisation of the state. It is necessary that foreign policy should agree with the internal organisation". Therefore it is not surprising to see that in his famous motto - "peace at home, peace in the world" - while he was connecting internal stability with international peace and order, he put the home front first.

Atatürk did not want to see the Turkish nation as a foreign or hostile community set apart from the nations of the world and did not want the nation to belong to any group holding such views. He wanted Turkey to be a part of the civilised world. However, in order to achieve this, change was necessary, apart from change in the system of government - "in the mental disposition of the Turkish people". His political reforms were directed towards achieving this aim, namely, to change the centuries-long backwardness and ignorance of the Turkish people, and to accustom them to the modern way of life. The ideological guidance, which was necessary to achieve this end, was to be derived from his political principles, which were formalised at the 1931 Congress of the Republican People’s Party and written into the constitution in 1937. They were symbolised by the emblem of the Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi): "six arrows". Each of them actually represents one of the key words of Kemalist ideology: Nationalism, Secularism, Republicanism, Populism, Statism, and Reformism. These six key words did not encompass all aspects of the Kemalist ideology but they did, in a concise manner, represent its pillars and many of them had foreign policy implications.

59. Váli, Bridge Across the Bosporus, p. 55.
61. Váli, Bridge Across the Bosporus, p. 55.
As the foundation of Kemalist ideology, Republicanism comprises the notions of popular sovereignty, freedom and equality before the law. It was against the totalitarian tendencies and the notion of the Empire, which was revisionist and imperialist. While accepting the existing status quo as a main foundation of the new state, Atatürk said that "...the state should pursue an exclusively national policy...I mean...to work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country...". Republicanism was not only a change in the governmental system, but also a turning point in the political philosophy of the Turks. The new Turkish Republic was a nation-state founded by the Turkish nation, by its own accord. Throughout history all Turkish states had been dynastic. Therefore, the extra stress on republicanism was necessary to help accustom the Turkish people to the idea that the change in regime after the War of Independence was non-reversible. From this point of view, republicanism constituted a doctrinal barrier against those who still hoped for a return to the Sultanate and the Caliphate.

62. The 1982 Constitution (as well as 1961 Constitution) presented a modified version of Kemalist principles declaring in Article 2; "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble". The preamble gave renewed credit to the Kemalist achievements and ideology by expressing "absolute loyalty to...the direction of concept of nationalism as outlined by Atatürk...[and] the reforms and principles introduced by him". It also expressed "desire for, and belief in peace at home, peace in the world", and its determination not to protect any "thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish National interests...the nationalism, principles, reform and modernism of Atatürk, and that as required by the principle of secularism...".


Secularism was a necessary component of modernisation, covering not only the political and governmental but the whole social and cultural life. From the foreign policy point of view, it has a much more general meaning than one which refers more narrowly to a specific process of separating religion from the state. Indeed, the main struggle of Kemalist secularists was not over the question of separating the spiritual and temporal, but over the difference between democracy and theocracy. A theocratic Islamic state, as a way of government, was obliged to see Christian powers as infidels and according to Islamic belief the state of warfare never ended between believers and infidels. By choosing a democratic system of government and dismissing the idea of an Islam-protector nation, the new Turkish state ended centuries of hostility and established the basis for peaceful relations with western Christian countries. Another reflection of Secularism in terms of Turkish foreign policy can be seen in its rejection of the idea of Pan-Islamism. To unite different Muslim nations, under one common name, to give these different elements equal rights, and found a mighty state, was seen as a brilliant and attractive political solution for the Empire’s problems in its last years. But it was a misleading one. The new state would not be world-conquering or Islam-protecting any more. Such claims could endanger the existence of the state. There is nothing in history to show how the policy of Pan-Islamism could have succeeded or how it could have found a basis for its realisation on this earth. History does not afford examples as regards the result of the ambition to organise a state which should be governed by the idea of world supremacy and include the whole humanity without distinction of race. For us there can be no question of the lust of conquest...


Since the Islamic Ottoman Empire could not try its Christian subjects under Sharia (Islamic law), it allowed them to be tried before Christian courts, which in turn resulted in foreign interventions and caused the Ottoman Empire to become involved in conflicts against the western powers over the supremacy of the Millets. Hence, it seemed that the Islamic religious establishment of the Empire had played a major role in accelerating and enhancing the Empire’s decline and decay. Consequently, Mustafa Kemal was determined not to allow the same thing to happen to the new Turkish state. In other words, he would not give the western powers any cause to intervene in Turkish affairs.
Nationalism, as a source of Turkish existence, stood for a Turkish-nation state in place of Ottomanist or Pan-Turanist ambitions, and was bound up with the national borders, which were first laid down by the National Pact of 1920 and later legalised by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Nationalism, a movement which was re-discovered by the Empire’s Christian subjects in the early 19th century, and was therefore partly responsible for its disintegration, had come to the notice of the Turkish population only in the early 20th century. When the Entente powers started to partition the Empire’s heartland, it became clear that they were taking advantage of the lack of a unified nationalist movement. It was obvious to Mustafa Kemal that the main requirement for the independence of a nation was the effort towards a common goal and public awareness of the nation’s historical consciousness. The creation of nationalism on the European model was essential for a successful independence struggle against the supremacy of the Imperialist European powers. Therefore, the idea of a Turkish nation in Turkey was the basic innovation in the early days of the Kemalist revolution.

Mustafa Kemal’s declaration in the Amasya circular of June 21-22, 1919 that "only the will and the determination of the nation can save the independence of the nation", became the main principle of the National Independence Struggle. This principle invited every individual of the nation to share a common obligation and responsibility. Atatürk had realised the necessity of basing his movement on the reality of "nationhood". But it was no easy task to accustom a people who had been attached to a religion and a dynasty, to the new meaning of Turkey. Even the expression "Turkey" was neither used nor known by the people. The concept of nationalism, and the establishment of a national state, which had begun in the west centuries before and had slowly spread and become the very property of the people, was unfamiliar to the Turks. Therefore, with the war of Independence and the realisation of the reforms following it, non-national political and social values had to be replaced by the values of the Turkish people.

Yet, he also realised that any nationalist claims must be supported by a very strict definition of National identity. He was opposed to the expending of the country’s energy on a quest for virtually unobtainable goals. Directing the country in the path of adventurism could very well result in the loss of what had already been achieved. Therefore, he rejected the utopian ideas of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism and did not build Turkish nationalism on religion or race. He defined nation as "a political and social body formed by citizens bound together by the unity of language, culture and ideas". Hence, Turkish nationalism, like that of Europe, was based on common citizenship, and did not extend its aims beyond the national borders.

Basing Turkish nationalism on a common citizenship instead of "ethnicity" was a realistic option, for the population of Turkey consisted then, and still does, of "individuals from many different ethnic backgrounds but, according to the Turkish Constitution, all citizens of Turkey are Turks". This official, legalistic, approach to Turkish "national homogeneity" allowed the early Turkish leaders, in accordance with the principle of populism, to be representative of all the peoples of Turkey irrespective of their class, religion, or ethnic origin. People were defined as "all individuals who, without demanding any privileges, accept absolute equality before the law". In this context, the nation was regarded as resulting from "historical and sociological conditions", different from race which "is a biological occurrence", and from umma "which is a group of people believing in universal religion". The role of nationalism then, was to "form a bond between the People’s collective memories of the past and adherence to the goals of the future".

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From this point of view, various ethnic groups within the Turkish state were accepted as "building blocks of the nation" which "joined together to create the national culture". In connection with this, the demands of ethnic groups for national status, "regardless of the social anxiety causing the demand", were considered contradictory to "the spirit and law of history" and thus "unrealistic and wrong". As a result, when faced with different ethnic claims emerging within the "unified Turkish nation", the Kemalist regime chose to dismiss them as plots of "enemy agents", an attitude held until the 1990s. In the process, however, what started as an attempt to create a homogeneous Turkish nation through constitutionalism using public consensus, turned into an attempt to force various elements within the Turkish state into a homogenous society through demographic homogenization.

This, on the one hand, contradicted the original claims of the Kemalist ideology, and on the other hand, alienated the masses who felt ethnically distinct from the Sunni-Turkish speaking majority. When coupled with the persistent denial of the Turkish ruling elite of the latter’s existence, especially from the mid-1970s onwards when the latter groups started to express and demand their cultural distinctiveness through organisational structures, "ethnicity" issues came to determine the ideological boundaries of Turkish national identity, and also constrained its constitutional evolution. This aspect of Turkish nation-building is especially relevant to our discussion of Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s as it essentially interacts with the Kurdish issue which became an element of both Turkey’s domestic and external policies during this period.

Turkish national liberation should also be distinguished from the anti-imperialist movements of the post-1945 period during which the African and Asian peoples who struggled for their independence came into conflict with the colonial powers where political, economic and social ideas were concerned. Nationalism in Turkey, however, was an anti-imperialistic programme for independence, on the one hand, but it was also, paradoxically, a programme for cultural and political westernisation. Atatürk himself often reiterated that his struggle was directed against western imperialism rather than against the west itself. Turkey fought the west, but by fighting with the west, entered into the western sphere and the western system of society.

Other Kemalist principles, which were interlocked, also had somewhat indirect effects on the foreign policy of the new state. Populism, by referring to the equality of citizens and by denying the existence of social classes in Turkish society, expected to avoid creating class conflicts and, therefore, would maintain internal peace and stability, a concept, according to Kemalist ideology, that international peace and order should be based on. Statism was a programme of economic
development. All these principles were protected by nationalism against foreign aggression, and kept alive by the revolutionary dynamic process of the transformation of the Turkish state and society toward the modern western ideal. The revolution meant a transformation in outlook, the adoption of a western way of life, a fight against ignorance and superstition, the import of new techniques, economic development, and, in particular, a constant change in People’s minds. In this sense, Kemalist reformism was more like an evolutionary ideal, different from the intentions of other reformist states. Its main aim was to protect the results of the Turkish reforms from counter-revolutions, not to export its ideas and influences outside the boundaries of Turkey as many contemporary revolutionary movements did. Like Turkish nationalism, the revolution was an internal not an external phenomenon.

83. Since "...we live in an economic era...the new Turkish state will not be a world conquering state. The new Turkish state will be an economic state". Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçler, Vol. 1, p. 215.

Such ideas as these Kemalist principles led Turkey to develop good neighbourly relations and collaborate internationally to ensure collective security and peace. Moreover, Turkey’s western orientation in foreign policy was a natural adjunct to Atatürk’s overall embracing of the west and rejection of the east. As he said at the end of the War of Independence "there are many nations, but there is only one civilisation. For the advancement of a nation, it must be a part of this one civilisation...We wish to modernise our country. All of our efforts are directed toward the establishment of a modern, therefore western, government". As seen, Atatürk identified "modernisation" with "westernisation" and used them synonymously.

In the Atatürk period Turkey’s western-directed foreign policy was carried out in conjunction with the establishment of cultural ties with the west. The victories won against the western states during the National Struggle gave a psychological boost to the Turkish nationalist movement and thus, as stated above, enabled swift westernisation to take place. Turkey’s peculiarity of never having been a colonized country and consequent lack of post-colonial resentments, unlike other Third World countries which gained independence after World War II, was also an important factor affecting Turkey’s attitude towards the west. But above all, the influence of Mustafa Kemal, who even during the period of National Struggle favoured a western style of thinking, was of great importance in this orientation.

At the beginning of the National Struggle, Mustafa Kemal’s major goal was the liberation of the country from foreign occupation and the establishment, within national boundaries, of a Turkish national state which would be master of its own fate. In its foreign policy actions, the government of the Grand National Assembly favoured the application of the basic principles arrived at during the peace deliberations following the First World War. Since every nation was to be permitted to form a state of its own, it was felt that Turkey also should be allowed to enjoy this right of establishing an independent country. In fact, the Grand National Assembly was the result of one of the newest national movements in 1920; which was very similar to the European national independence movements that took place during the last century. This Turkish belief, too, attracted Turkey to the west’s democratic ideals.

After the War of Independence, the main concern of Atatürk’s foreign policy was complete independence. Because of foreign interventions, privileges granted to foreigners, and the capitulations, the Ottoman Empire in its last years had to a large extent lost its independence. Following its defeat in the First World War, the last Turkish state was in the position of being completely erased from the map. This was the reason for Mustafa Kemal’s initiation of the War of Independence. Thus, "by complete independence" he said to H. Franklin-Bouillon, representative of France, on 9 June 1921, "we mean of course, complete economic, financial,
juridical, military, cultural independence and freedom in all matters. Being deprived of independence in any of these is equivalent to the nation and country being deprived of all its independence".87

Furthermore, he in no way accepted the idea of a "mandate" or a "protectorate". But this principle was not against the alliances or the political and military agreements made with other countries. Article 7 of the Sivas Congress Resolution reads that "...we shall gladly accept technical, industrial and economic aid from any state which will show respect for the ideals of nationalism and will not pursue the aim of seizing our country".88 Therefore, "complete independence" does not mean that a state cannot enter into military and political cooperation with other states for the purpose of balancing its own power with that of potential aggressors, as long as these allies are respectful of the country’s right to existence. Atatürk himself, played the leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Pact in 1934 and the Sadabad Pact in 1937, and accepted economic aid from the Soviet Union.

86. National Pact argued that, "in order to render possible our national and economic development and to succeed in achieving orderly administration, like all states we must possess absolute independence and freedom in the achievement of our development. For this reason we are opposed to all limitations on our political, juridical or financial development. In the settling of our assessed debts there shall no change in this matter". Atatürk, Nutuk, Vol. 3, Doc. No. 41.

One of the key elements of Atatürk’s foreign policy was that the new Republic would seek to preserve the national territory encompassed by the armistice line of 1918, and would renounce any other territorial claims. In the Treaty of Lausanne, the borders determined by the National Pact were, for the most part, realised. With Turkey’s territorial situation settled by the Treaty of Lausanne, and satisfied with its new borders, there was no reason for military adventurism on Turkey’s part. This was one of the overall principles of Mustafa Kemal’s foreign policy. As a state which was defeated in the First World War, the position of Turkey with regard to the situation existing in Europe after the war is noteworthy. If Turkey had acted emotionally it would have been natural for her to join the bloc of nations opposed to the status quo. But Atatürk, who had taken the responsibility of determining the direction of Turkish foreign policy, avoided leading the country down the general path of adventurism. Thus, although Turkey attempted to maintain good relations with all states, she nonetheless established closer ties with non-belligerent states in their opposition to those states which were attempting to destroy the international peace.89 In contrast to a good number of other contemporary states, Turkey showed great willingness to solve its major problems by legal means. During the interwar period, it could have been possible to resolve some of Turkey’s problems left behind by Lausanne by force or fait accompli without waiting for an opportunity to solve them peacefully, but Atatürk rejected such adventures.90

As a soldier, he knew the horror of war well and promised in 1920 "to refuse absolutely to waste the nation’s time and resources in the pursuit of dreams of domination".91 It has been observed by Most and Singer that "success may embolden a nation’s leaders’ notion of confidence and optimism and thereby stimulate their entry into subsequent conflicts".92 The Turkish case, however, has proved otherwise; the victory over the Entente powers decreased the likelihood of subsequent conflicts. As Edward Weisband concluded, of all the "great socio-political revolutions in the history of the modern state...the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey represents the only one that has produced an ideology of peace".93

This line of foreign policy also shows, on the part of Turkish leaders, the full realisation of the country’s limitations. As Lenczowski puts it, "...perhaps the greatest merit of Kemal [Atatürk] and his followers was their sober realisation of limitation and their moderate, realistic foreign policy. There was nothing romantic or adventurous in Kemal’s foreign policy". In fact, his foreign policy had to be free from adventurism in order to give him time to initiate the socio-economic reforms necessary for the modernisation and reconstruction of the Republic.

Bearing in mind these principles, Turkey, during the interwar period, was able to establish a long-enduring peace with the western powers by renouncing her claims on Mosul and western Thrace, which would cause problems. Atatürk’s realism further showed itself in Turkish-Soviet relations. Although he was against the ideals of communism, he signed the Turco-Soviet Friendship Pact of 1921. This cooperation was the natural outcome of the conditions prevailing at the time, and the product of Atatürk’s realistic foreign policy. According to him, states had no eternal enemies, and no eternal allies. They do have national goals. A state which recognises these goals and can help to achieve them could be a friend. At any particular time, it was not ideology, but national and international realities which determined his foreign policy towards any particular state.

EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL FACTORS ON FOREIGN POLICY

For a correct evaluation of Turkish foreign policy, it is important to distinguish between the fundamental goals of Turkish national foreign policy and its long or short term objectives. Although the short-term policies for the realisation of the national goals have undergone considerable changes through the years, the fundamental goals of national policy, as determined under Atatürk, have not radically altered until recently.

Atatürk attempted to replace the traditional beliefs of the Turkish people with "national" values in order to transform the old imperial society into the modern nation-state. Since then, her foreign policy too, has been appraised in terms of national interest. Because the evaluation of the national interest is more often than not a controversial issue, Turkish decision-makers have based their individual decisions on Atatürk’s "dogma" and terminology thereby guaranteeing, at least, the support of the ordinary Turk and often the Kemalist military and civilian elite. As long as Atatürk’s "dogma" remained unquestioned, foreign policy could be based on his ideological framework. The national goals, put forward by Atatürk, together with the effects of Imperial history and the geostrategic location, are the traditional inputs which have long governed Turkish foreign policy.

Since the traditional inputs are not only confined to the past, historical legacies that continue to contribute to Turkish foreign policy may thus be summarised:

- Turkey’s important and sensitive geostrategic position has meant that national security concerns have always been paramount in foreign policy considerations. A critical element in these concerns has been Turkey’s proximity to and traditional distrust of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the fact that Turkey has borders with the Balkans and the Middle East, areas of traditional conflict, makes Turkey very sensitive to changes in both the international and regional political balance.
- Turkey’s security thinking is also coloured by the historical experiences of foreign intervention and economic dependency. As a result, the foreign relations of Turkey, since Atatürk’s time, have been dominated by concerns for genuine independence and sovereignty. Though the Soviet threat...
after the Second World War persuaded Turkey to move away from Atatürk’s uncommitted posture to seek politico-military alliances, she is still sensitive to any real or implied infringements on her sovereignty.

-Turkey’s location at the intersection of the "west" and the "east" (the USSR and the Arab and Islamic world) also resulted in an identity crisis, both national and international. The tendency of the Kemalist ruling class to look towards the west for inspiration has not alienated the cultural and religious affiliation to the Arab-Islamic world by the general public.

As Turkey moves toward its 82nd anniversary, the question of religion and secularism on the one hand, and the related issues of ethnicity, nationhood and the territorial state on the other, continue to disturb the certainties that comprise the self-image of the ruling class. This self-image is based upon belonging to a modern, European-oriented, secular Turkey. Though the legacy of the Turkish state and nationalism, embodied in the ruling class with a strong commitment to Kemalist principles, still greatly affects Turkey’s internal and external policies, it is increasingly challenged by ethnic groups and the religious right. In this context, despite the emergence of a seemingly homogeneous, Turkish-speaking, traditionally Sunni-Moslem society within Turkey’s borders, the failure of the Kemalist attempt to homogenise Turkey, based on a majority language and western ideals, continues to haunt both the Turkish identity and the Turkish state. Still, the ruling elite refuses to acknowledge the structural pluralism of Turkish society "which should be understood as essential to the formation of a modern multiethnic democracy".

Turkey’s self-desire to become an economically developed country has not changed since the early days of the Republic. Apparently, her economic development is not only a social need but also a source to strengthen the power of the nation. Moreover, economic development, in the eyes of the Kemalist elite, is one of the prerequisites of a European identity. Turkish ambition for development and modernisation is not confined to technological equality with the industrially advanced western countries. They wish to be recognised as Europeans and to be assimilated into European civilisation, a civilisation which was acknowledged as superior by Atatürk.

-Another important factor, through which Turkey’s foreign policy should be viewed, is the legality of her actions in the international arena. It has been seen in Turkey as honourable to comply with international commitments. Any suggestion to the contrary, such as the United States allusion about her NATO commitments during the Cyprus crisis of 1964, usually causes widespread surprise and astonishment as well as disappointment in Turkey. Although her inflexible policies, which have often resulted from an all too legalistic approach toward international questions, have delayed and sometimes prevented possible solutions,
nations, it is not surprising to see that even the military junta of September 12, 1980, both before and after the intervention, had been sensitive to perceptions abroad.101

In conclusion, it should be emphasised that structural factors, as discussed above, have played a stabilising role in, and ensured the continuation of, Turkish foreign policy. Therefore the characterisation of Turkish foreign policy as having a high degree of rationality and sobriety has much to do with the heritage of the Ottoman Empire, which was forced to pursue its foreign policy amid tensions between its own interests and those of other powers.103 At the same time, it is also in accordance with the demands placed upon Turkey by her geopolitical situation: the fact that Turkey lies on the boundaries of Europe, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union, necessitated, during the past and in more recent times, a balanced, multi-sided foreign policy.

100. Vâli, Bridge Across the Bosporus, p. 71.

CONJUNCTURAL DETERMINANTS AND CHANGING PATTERNS

Thanks to the structural determinants and their strong influence upon Turkey, she has been able to display a remarkable degree of continuity in her foreign policy, in contrast to frequent internal changes. It is, to a large extent, due to these factors that Turkish foreign policy has been praised for its rationality, sense of responsibility, long term perspective, and "realism found in few developing nations and far from universal even among the democracies of the west".104 Yet, there are other factors that have affected Turkish foreign policy in its daily operation. These factors, the result of international and domestic changes over the years, have also helped to shape Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy. Due to their dynamic and changeable character however, they exerted a temporary influence on the country’s foreign policy, especially on its implementation. But due to these factors, Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone some rapid changes in its implementation, even if no major deviations from the ultimate national goals have occurred. They have modified the foreign policy of Turkey through the years to establish a better defined and more relevant foreign policy, to meet the requirements of the contemporary world. Though there are several of them, in this paper I shall deal with only a few major conjunctural factors that have affected Turkey’s foreign policy. Bearing in mind that almost every happening in domestic or international politics could affect and change a country’s foreign policy in one way or another, it is imperative to be selective. The selection of factors has been determined by the importance of the changes that they caused. In this respect, the most decisive reason for choosing certain conjunctural factors was the sudden shift they caused in either the implementation, or more importantly, the foundation of the foreign policy of Turkey.

104. Rustow, Turkey, America’s Forgotten Ally, p. 84.

An overview of Turkey’s foreign relations shows that one of the more important international developments that affected her foreign policy was the transition from the Cold War to détente, and in later years, the end of the Cold War. Another important factor in the making of Turkey’s foreign policy has been the Cyprus issue, which has been a permanent obstacle in Turkey’s foreign relations from the outset. In the mid-to-late 1960s, it was the ongoing Cyprus crisis which gave impetus to a process of reconsideration of the basic orientation of Turkish foreign policy. In the 1970s, it was another Cyprus crisis which led to fundamental changes in foreign policy, though not as dramatic as pulling the country out of the western states system. Other important factors which caused considerable changes in Turkey’s attitudes to certain groups of states, have been the
constitutional and political development of the country, together with its economic ambitions and problems; the different views of political parties and groups which came into existence after the 1960 military intervention; the 1961 Constitution, together with the social and political evaluation it embodied; and the changes in attitudes of certain states towards Turkey.

Some of the conjunctural factors that affected Turkish foreign policy were ephemeral in character. Others continued to affect its patterns for some time and were usually interrelated. Since it is virtually impossible to identify the exact result of each factor separately, and any foreign policy action is influenced by a combination of factors, this section, instead of looking at certain factors and their effects through the years, will attempt to deal with Turkish foreign policy in different periods, distinguishable by their distinctive patterns in foreign policy. The above-mentioned conjunctural factors, then, will be discussed in-depth in their relevant periods, under the overall "guidance" of the traditional inputs.

The interwar period (1923-1939) under the leadership of Atatürk and İnönü saw a Turkey which was western in its inclination but jealously guarding against any indication that her independence, either economically or militarily, might be jeopardised. The foreign policy of this period was shaped by the structural factors as discussed above. Particularly, Mustafa Kemal’s understanding and practice of foreign policy was important. The second period (1945-1960), during which Turkey’s foreign policy was dominated by total western dependence, was followed by a period of disillusionment with the west, late détente with the eastern bloc and rapprochement efforts with the Third World (1960-1970). The 1970s, in addition, saw a pattern of alienation from the west encouraged by the Cyprus crisis of 1974, which in turn showed Turkey the cumulative result of the foreign policy she had been following since the end of World War II: loneliness in the international arena. Hence, the 1970s witnessed Turkey’s efforts to come back to the international arena as a reliable and friendly nation.

DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY’S COLD WAR POLICIES, 1945-1960

Turkey’s western orientation and rapidly modernising features were firmly consolidated under the leadership of Atatürk. His foreign policy was dominated by the priority of peace, sovereignty and national development over expansionist-revisionism. After Atatürk’s death, one of his close associates, İsmet İnönü, took over the presidency of both Turkey and the Republican People’s Party in a one-party political system. He was committed to Kemalist ideology in general, and Turkish foreign policy, under his leadership, remained unchanged. Although "the gathering storm" over Europe in 1939 forced Turkey to enter into an alliance with France and Great Britain, she was able to stay out of the war until the last minute.105 However, after the Yalta summit announced that only states which were in war with Germany by 1 March 1945 would join the United Nations, Turkey declared war against Japan and Germany on 23 Feb. 1945, after Yalta summit announced that only states which were in war with Germany and Japan by 1 March 1945 would join the United Nations. Hence this declaration of war was only a token attempt directed to join the United Nations as a founding member.106

. Despite surviving the Second World War unscathed,106 Turkey soon found that the situation after the war demanded as much careful diplomacy as it had done previously. Throughout the war, İnönü came to the conclusion that Turkey’s biggest problem after the war would be the prospect of facing a powerful Soviet Union. In fact, he was convinced that if Turkey entered the war, the Soviets would occupy Turkey either as a member of the Axis or as a "liberator".107

105. For the text of the treaty, see Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2nd. Volume, pp. 226-228. Under the terms of this tripartite pact, Turkey was obligated to enter the war only if it extended into the Mediterranean, and was exempt if the hostilities involved conflict with the Soviet Union. Turkey used these clauses as an excuse for not entering the war. Finally, she declared war against Japan and Germany on 23 Feb. 1945, after Yalta summit announced that only states which were in war with Germany and Japan by 1 March 1945 would join the United Nations. Hence this declaration of war was only a token attempt directed to join the United Nations as a founding member.

106. For account of Turkish war-time diplomacy, see Türkşah Atatürk, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945 (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1965); Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War; An "Active" Neutrality (London: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-45; and Mustafa Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye, 1939-1945" in Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası, pp. 399-478.


He also foresaw the Soviet post-war domination of Eastern Europe.108 Hence, he was determined not to give them an excuse, though learned soon that all his careful manoeuvring to avoid alienating the Soviet Union had been to no avail.
The Second World War marked an important watershed in Turkey’s foreign policy as well as in her domestic development. Although Turkey’s political and economic alignment with the west after the war may be seen as natural outcome of her desire to become a fully modernised (which meant westernised at the time) country, her dependence on the western powers went too far to represent a reversal in her earlier policies. Although the pre-war Turkish Republic under Atatürk’s leadership had adopted the institutions and the values of the west in order to accelerate the process of modernisation and economic development, this did not, however, imply dependency on the western powers, either militarily or economically. Moreover, she was reluctant to form any economic bonds which might lead to any real or imaginary dependency. On the contrary, Turkish foreign policy before the war was independent in nature, despite a series of regional pacts, and Turkey maintained friendly relations with all the major states of the time, but avoided any formal attachment until 1939. Even during the war, her main aim was to stay out of the war and not to endanger the delicate balance of her relations with all the parties. Why then did Turkish foreign policy deviate following the Second World War?

A number of domestic and systemic factors had pushed Turkey towards western tutelage in general and western-dependent foreign policy in particular. It was no accident that significant changes occurred simultaneously in both foreign and domestic policies, for there was a linkage between the two.


109. Turkey had agreements with all the parties concerned during the war. The Friendship and Non-aggression Pact of 1925 with the Soviet Union; 1939 Mutual Assistance Treaty with Great Britain and France; and 1941 Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Friendship with Germany. For Treaties See Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II, pp. 226-235.

External Factor: Meeting the Soviet Threat
In the international arena there were basically two important and interrelated developments that were instrumental in Turkey’s decision to establish closer ties with the west. First, there was a change in the nature of the international system, which rapidly evolved from a "balance of power" structure to a "bipolar" structure. In such a structure, "a policy of neutrality was not very realistic or possible for a country like Turkey, a middle-range power situated in such a geopolitically important area".110 Second, the Soviet Union emerged as a superpower, with territorial demands upon Turkey. Thus, the impetus for Turkey’s shift to western alignment did not come from the west, but rather resulted from her reaction to Soviet pressures.

Already during the war, it became obvious to Turkey that the Soviets were pursuing a policy designed to gain territorial concessions from Turkey. During the secret German-Soviet negotiations in November 1940, Turkey was one of the bargaining pieces, and was the price asked by the Soviets to enter the Berlin Pact.111 Subsequently, allied with the west, the Soviets brought their demands to the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945.112 Having received Churchill’s acquiescence at the Moscow Conference (October 1944), Stalin presented the Soviet position at Yalta (February 1945) vis-à-vis the Turkish Straits. "It is impossible" remarked Stalin, "to accept a situation in which Turkey has a hand on Russia’s throat".113 Having already received these hints indicating the Soviet intentions towards her territorial integrity, and alarmed by the Soviet note of 19 March 1945, denouncing the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression, Turkey was terrified by another Soviet note on 7 June 1945, demanding Soviet bases on the

111. Gönülbol, et. al., Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, p. 149. For extensive documents about the Berlin talks between Hitler and Molotov, see R. J. Sonntag and J. S. Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941; Documents From the Archives of the German Office (New York: Didier, 1948), pp. 220-260; Also see Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II, pp. 228-230.
112. Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-45, pp. 298-302 and 317-318; Gönülbol, et. al., Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, pp. 183-185 and 195-197.
Straits, in addition to territorial adjustments in the Soviet-Turkish border, as the price for renewing the Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression. President İnönü’s response was sharp and emotional, telling the Grand National Assembly of Turkey that they were "under no obligation to give up Turkish soil or Turkish rights to anyone...We shall live with honour and die with honour".

When Turkey refused these initial demands, the Soviets started to exert heavy political pressure. In return, Turkey unsuccessfully tried "to involve the United States in defending her against the Soviet Union", and "bring the United States position on the Straits into harmony with the minimum Turkish view". However, the United States and Great Britain, under the mistaken belief that meaningful cooperation with the Soviet Union after the war would be possible, stood aside. What they did not know at the time, was that the Soviet demands on Turkey were part of Stalin’s efforts to take advantage of the war-time power-gap and immediate post-war international situation, by making their provisional demands on areas which extended just beyond Soviet borders. Furthermore, Turkey’s neutrality during the war had left her future status ambiguous, in contrast to most European countries, where the post-war spheres were clearly defined. While this ambiguity made Turkey a tempting target for Stalin’s post-war expansionism, the western (United States and UK) attitude at the end of the war, which was slow to adopt a firm position against Soviet demands, must have encouraged Stalin when formulating his proposals towards Turkey.

114. At the time, Soviet territorial adjustments meant return of Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan, captured from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and returned to Turkey by the Treaty of Alexandropol (1920), which was confirmed by the 1921 Friendship Treaty. There were, moreover, hints that the territorial demands would include a larger area on the Black Sea coast southwest of Batum; for on 20 Dec. 1945, Moscow newspapers published an article by two Georgian professors, claiming Ardahan, Artvin, Trabzon and Gumushane. See Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1918-1948, p. 171; G. Golan, The Soviet Policies in the Middle East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 32; Altunmur Kılıç, Turkey and the World, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 125-126.


117. Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, p. 32.

118. For example, Churchill made no remarks about Turkey in his talks with Stalin in Moscow in 1945, whereas he specifically told to him that Greece was in the UK’s sphere of interest. See Winston Churchill, The Second World War (London: Cassel & Co., 1954), Vol. VI, pp. 198-199, 204 and 211.

Meanwhile, at the Potsdam Conference (17 July-2 August), the Soviets sought to obtain an Allied consensus that the problem of the Straits was a matter between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Though the conference broke up without resolving the matter, it was agreed in principle upon a revision of the Montreux agreement. In the meantime, the western attitude towards Turkey, and the Soviet demands in general, began gradually to change. Taken in conjunction with Soviet actions elsewhere, and in the light of the unsuccessful conference of foreign ministers in December 1945, President Truman began to see the Soviet demands as an intention to invade Turkey and control the Straits.

With the declaration in March 1946 by Great Britain that the 1939 Treaty of Alliance was still in force and obliged the UK to help her in the event of aggression, Turkey realised that her post-war isolation had now ended.121 Turkey was further relieved by another sign reflecting the changed American stance: the battleship Missouri anchored at Istanbul on April 15, 1946, carrying the remains of Turkish Ambassador Münir Ertegün, who had died in Washington during the war. This was seen as a sign of American readiness to protect Turkey.

On 7 August 1946, the Soviets presented their proposal regarding the Straits to Turkey. The proposal called for control of the Straits to be in the hands of Turkey and "other Black Sea Powers", with Turkey and the Soviet Union sharing joint defence of the waterways. They also sent strong notes to Turkey to complain about the administration of the Straits during the war. This time the Americans and the British backed Turkey in her rejection of Soviet demands, and in
September 1946, shortly after proposed regulations presented by the Soviets, the United States announced its intention to maintain a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. Although later in September, the Soviets repeated their demands, they dropped the issue toward the end of October 1946 after another refusal from Turkey, backed by the United States and Great Britain.

Whatever the reasons for the USSR’s failure to follow up her claims, Turkey, thoroughly alarmed by Soviet demands, reverted to its historic animosity towards its northern neighbour and sought protection from the west, mainly from the United States. To this end, she attempted to dramatise the Soviet threat, and continued to argue that Turkey’s geographical position made her the key to the Middle East, the final target of Soviet aggression. Although by the end of 1946, the Allied position had hardened in opposition to Soviet demands on Turkey, it was not until 1947, in reaction to Communist activities in Greece and the British announcement of their intention to withdraw from their responsibilities in the area, that the United States became actively involved. The result was the Truman Doctrine which forged the initial bonds between Turkey and the United States, despite the fact that the United States personnel, who began to be stationed in Turkey, quickly aroused memories of the Capitulations.

For a long period, one of the Ottoman protection tactics had been to ally herself with a powerful state, against her traditional antagonist Russia. Now, in the bipolar international system, modern Turkey, faced with a renewed Russian threat, was forced to find an ally to protect her interests against the Soviet Union. There were a number of reasons why the United States was the natural candidate for the post. Apart from the fact that the United States was now assuming the leadership of the western democracies, she was the only country capable of lending money, which Turkey’s economy badly needed at the time. It was also significant to the Turks that the United States had no history of colonial domination over Turkey and was geographically far away.

Interaction between Democracy, Economic Development and Foreign Policy

Although the Soviet threat in the late 1940s stands out as the most instrumental factor in pushing Turkey into the western camp, there were other reasons for her to choose the western course. First, as war ended with a victory for the western democracies, the future seemed to be on their side and with their political system. This belief in the western democratic system must have contributed to Turkey’s willingness to alter her position of non-alignment and seek closer links with the west. Moreover, apart from international and systemic factors, internal political and economic pressures also played an important role in Turkey’s new orientation in foreign policy. Most importantly, a dramatic change in the Turkish political system, the transition to a multi-party system, was
foreign investment, and during the period 1947-1961 Turkey received $1,862 million in military aid.

Turkey's need for foreign aid became an integral part of its foreign policy.127

This pattern of economic dependency continued under the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti), which won a decisive victory over the Republican Peoples Party in 1950. Democrats were at least as anxious as the Republicans to tie Turkey politically and economically to the west, and particularly to the United States. Although they encouraged free enterprise in their campaigns, they soon found it convenient to continue to build up state enterprises after gaining power, thus they came to rely heavily on foreign, mainly American, economic and military assistance. As a result, Turkey's need for foreign aid became an integral part of her foreign as well as domestic policy.

Beyond the political factors, economic needs necessitated a western leaning in foreign policy. Although Turkey, by the end of 1946, had substantial gold and foreign exchange reserves,128 this was mainly due to the favourable prices which the fighting powers offered for Turkey's agricultural products and raw materials such as chromium. Moreover, at the end of the war, Turkey, considering the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, did not want to use its reserves and tried to utilise international loans in order to be able to maintain a large army, the cost of which had serious economic consequences. Under the Republican Peoples Party government, Turkey had already started to receive American aid through the Truman Doctrine (1947), and later the Marshall Plan (1948), although both schemes were not primarily instituted for Turkey, and there were restrictions on the use of American aid.129 Turkey had also established additional formal links with the western community. In 1948 Turkey became a member of the newly established Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (forerunner of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD), which in turn enabled Turkey to be automatically included in the Marshall Plan, and in 1950 she joined the Council of Europe. Turkey's participation in these European organisations was of primary importance for her future economic and political relations and policies. This pattern of economic dependency continued under the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti), which won a decisive victory over the Republican Peoples Party in 1950. Democrats were at least as anxious as the Republicans to tie Turkey politically and economically to the west, and particularly to the United States. Although they encouraged free enterprise in their campaigns, they soon found it convenient to continue to build up state enterprises after gaining power, thus they came to rely heavily on foreign, mainly American, economic and military assistance. As a result, Turkey's need for foreign aid became an integral part of her foreign as well as domestic policy.

127. Although President İnönü was accurate in his assessment of domestic pressures for change, it would also be fair to argue that desire for Western support against the Soviet demands strongly influenced his decision to promote truly democratic, multi-party elections. Though İnönü always resisted such implications that foreign pressure was instrumental in his decision, this was quite evident in his instruction to the Turkish delegation at the United Nations conference in San Francisco to announce Turkey's transition to a multi-party system. See Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 16. Rustow further quotes an anecdote from his interview with İnönü in 1954 in which İnönü, after categorically denying any organic relations between foreign pressure and his decision, remarked "...suppose I had been swimming with the stream; that, too, is a virtue". See Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey's Travails", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, 1979, p. 87. On the other hand, Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 306-309, emphasizes the importance of İnönü's long experience in the liberal and constitutional movement and general change in the climate of opinion in Turkey during the Second World War, and dismissed the idea that the rulers of Turkey changed the form of government merely to please foreign states. Moreover, although there was mounting criticism within the country about a one-party regime, which failed to produce viable economic policies and generated strong opposition with its capital levy during the war, similar criticisms by the United States Congress must have had considerable impact upon İnönü, who was now seeking closer relations with the United States and wishing to join the Western community. See Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics; The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 188-192; and Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernisation of Turkey (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), p. 225.


aid and $1,394 million in economic aid from the United States.\textsuperscript{130} As a result of this extensive support, Turkish leaders became insulated from economic reality and created Turkey’s long standing dependency on foreign assistance.

After an impressive economic start which lasted through 1953, the economic situation in Turkey deteriorated rapidly. Its initial success was due to the expansion of private investment, the boom in agricultural production as a result of government subsidies, the opening of new farming areas, the mechanization of farming, favourable weather and high world prices for agricultural products because of the Korean War. Despite early indications and warnings of serious economic problems, the Menderes government, encouraged by early successes, continued to pursue ambitious but uncoordinated development policies. After 1953, Turkey’s economy began to deteriorate and the foreign trade deficit grew.\textsuperscript{131}

Even though the Turkish government refused to follow its economic advice, the United States continued to provide assistance because of its sometimes exaggerated, view of Turkey’s geographical importance. Finally, when faced with bankruptcy in 1958, Menderes accepted the stabilisation programme imposed by an international consortium comprising the United States, Germany, Great Britain, the European Payments Union, and the IMF. In return the consortium rescheduled Turkey’s debts and provided an aid package of $359 million.\textsuperscript{132}

In addition to establishing Turkey’s dependency on foreign assistance, the fiscal policies of the Democrat Party government led to significant social changes in Turkey. The increased correlation of status with power and the rise of a new middle class, based on economic activity, resulted in a concomitant decline in the status of salaried bureaucrats, intellectuals and military officers. As the Democrat Party government did not seem to understand the new forces of instability in a developing society, the stage was set for domestic conflict.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s main foreign policy objective was to become a full member of NATO. This was based on political and economic factors rather than strategic and military concerns, since, by 1950, the main Soviet threat was already averted. Although Turkey’s wish to enter NATO should be seen as a natural outcome of the foreign policies that she had been following since the Second World War, economic concerns also played a considerable part. The possibility of a decrease in United States interest, and a likely subsequent decrease in aid, as a result of Turkey’s exclusion from NATO weighed heavily in governmental circles. Domestic political considerations of the Democrat Party also played a role in the decision. First of all the Democrat Party, advocating a liberal economy in Turkey, considered it difficult to establish such a system without attaching Turkey to the west. Secondly, the leaders of the Democrat Party believed that Turkey’s entrance to NATO was necessary for the future of the democratic system in Turkey. In fact, it was quite clear from their statements during the election campaign of 1950 that the Democrat Party leaders, under the earlier experiences of a multi-party system in Turkey, were afraid of the possibility that the Republican Peoples Party would not deliver the government even if they lost the election. They thought that joining NATO would prevent the Republican Peoples Party from playing such games.\textsuperscript{133} Finally, in 1952, after the Korean War, and Turkish participation in the conflict, Turkey and Greece joined NATO, which marked Turkey’s military commitment to the west as well as her economic dependence.

Reflections of Turkey’s Western Dependency


\textsuperscript{132} For the background and impact of the 1958 stabilisation programme see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp.74-76.
As a result of her economic and military dependency on the west, Turkey’s foreign policy also tilted toward the west. Turkey’s active role in establishing the

Baghdad Pact and the Balkan Pact, providing no additional security, and the awkward role she played at the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in championing the cause of the western powers, may all be interpreted as a part of the Democrat Party’s efforts to appear as an indispensable ally in order to secure greater aid from the west. Likewise, her support of the western powers during the Suez crisis of 1956; her fierce opposition to the 1958 Iraqi coup; her threats to Syria in 1957, in the heat of the United States-Syrian crisis, to invade should the Communists, or the Soviet Union, gain control over the Syrian government, were all parts of Turkey’s effort to exacerbate the Communist threat on her immediate borders in order to get more economic and military aid, as well as the result of the Democrat Party’s anti-Communist world-view.

Predictably, relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc were far from friendly during the period. After Soviet territorial demands on Turkey, relations further deteriorated, proportionate to Turkey’s alignment with the west through the Truman Doctrine (1947), and her membership of NATO (1952), the Balkan Pact (1954), and the Baghdad Pact (1955). Turkey’s political preference of a multi-party system, based on free elections, and economic choice, centred on free enterprise, were also reflections of her commitment to a western style democratic system. The harsh and often threatening Soviet responses, only helped Turkey to move closer to the west.134 Turkey’s suppression of the leftist parties and their structures during the 1940s and 1950s was also caused, in part, by Soviet hostility. On the other hand, the Soviet fear that Turkey might be used as a base for a western attack against the Soviet Union dictated Soviet policies toward Turkey, which remained hostile and intimidating until 1953 when a culmination of several factors resulted in a change. In May 1953, barely three months after Stalin’s death, the Soviet government denounced its territorial claims on Turkey’s eastern provinces and its desire for control of the Straits.135

Since the Turkish government regarded these moves as a new Soviet tactic designed to separate her from the west, there were no immediate positive results in Turkish-Soviet relations.136 Moreover, Soviet efforts to establish intimate relations with Egypt in 1955 and the Syrian and Iraqi crises of 1957 and 1958 invoked further fears in Turkey about being surrounded by hostile pro-Soviet states. The crushing of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 by the Red Army, only helped to confirm Turkish suspicions about Soviet motives.137 As a result, when the world entered a period of limited détente in 1954, Turkey was left behind in the process of normalisation of east-west relations. When Turkish premier Menderes finally agreed to exchange visits with Krushchev in April 1960, mainly as a result of Turkey’s need for economic assistance and the changes in Soviet policy, which no longer insisted on a change in Turkish foreign policy as the price for improved relations, it was too late, because Menderes was to be ousted by a military coup on 27 May 1960, causing a further standstill in Turkish-Soviet relations for four more years.

During this period, Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries and the Third World in general also reflected her western-dependent foreign policy. Even before Turkey’s accession to NATO, there were enough factors leading to the deterioration of Turkish-Arab relations. First, historical experiences, i.e., the relationship between the rulers (Ottoman Turks) and the ruled (Arabs), coloured the relations. Second, Atatürk’s reforms created a difference between two Islamic peoples, and the general secularisation of Turkey in the name of modernisation created profound resentment and mistrust among Arabs. Moreover, the question of Hatay province, though it was ceded to Turkey in 1939, was still a matter of tension between Turkey and Syria.

133. For the statements of Democrat Party leaders see Ülman/Sander, “Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler II”, p. 6.
135. Text in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 5, No. 29, 1959, pp. 21-22. For an analysis of Soviet note and Turkish respond see Váli, Turkish Straits and NATO, pp. 77-78.
Turkey’s western orientation, which led her to adopt political, social, cultural and economic ideas from the west and to join NATO, had significant impact on Turkish-Arab relations. Turkey was regarded by the Arabs as a pawn of the west. Although not altogether untrue, it was unfair to assume that Turkey was acting only as a western proxy. Indeed, Turkey had a real desire to secure her southern borders. Also, the emergence of Israel had an immediate and long lasting effect on Turkish-Arab relations. Originally Turkey opposed the partition of Palestine, but, after the establishment of Israel, changed her stance to become the first Moslem country to recognise it and exchange ambassadors.

Turkey’s efforts in 1951 to establish the Middle East Defence Organisation and the Arab resentment against this, as yet another form of western and Turkish imperialism in the region, worsened the relations. Though the Middle East Defence Organisation failed, Turkey later joined the Baghdad Pact of 1955, which was also opposed by many Arab countries, especially Egypt. Though the effectiveness or the utility of the Baghdad Pact was questionable, the role it played in the alienation of Egypt and her allies from the west in general and Turkey in particular was obvious.

During this period, Turkey’s foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, as mentioned above, mirrored her pro-Western alignment and reflected Turkey’s fears that the Soviet Union was enlarging its influence over Middle Eastern countries. This led her to believe that Turkey could be soon contained by pro-Soviet and hostile Arab states. Therefore, it could be said that, by contributing to Turkey’s rapprochement with the West, and placing great pressure upon her, the Soviet threat indirectly influenced Turkey’s further alienation from the Middle East.

Turkey in the 1950s, failed to understand the developing trends, the political objectives and resentments of her Arab neighbours. On the other hand, the Arabs, too, failed to understand Turkey’s security needs and fears of the Soviet Union. They were geographically removed from the Soviet Union by the buffer that Turkey and Iran had created between the two areas. For the Turks, the Russians were not merely a dangerous historical enemy but, because of their proximity, a credible threat to their existence.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s defence of the west at the Bandung Conference in 1955 further strained her relations with the Third world. Turkey did not even want to participate to the conference. But, under pressure from the west, she changed her mind and went to the conference in order to warn these states against the threats caused by "middle of the road measures". At the conference, Turkey strongly defended her western alliance, with harsh attacks on non-alignment, socialism and communism. As a result, she isolated herself from the Third world, the result of which would later be felt in the United Nations.

Throughout the 1950s Turkey’s foreign policy was clearly a product of her western alignment and an extension of western policies toward both the Soviet Union and the non-aligned countries. The leaders of Turkey, during this period, did not agree that a "détente" would be possible between the two blocs, and did not believe in the sincerity of "peaceful coexistence", which they regarded as
another tactic by the Soviet Union to deceive the free world.145 Further they believed that non-
alignment would help the Soviet Union to dominate the world in the long run.146 However, in the
1960s, due to systemic and internal changes as well as American policy toward Cyprus, Turkey
began to re-evaluate her strict western orientation.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE INTER-COUP PERIOD,
1960-1980: WESTERN TIE WEAKENED
It would have been hard to imagine in the late 1950s, that the Turks would ever be disappointed
with the west and would join in the world-wide anti-American sentiment. Yet, the Turkish-
American friendship, which began with the Truman Doctrine and flourished in the 1950s, began to
cool down during the 1960s and deteriorated in the 1970s.
It was not only Turkish-American amity that was altered throughout the inter-coup period. The
whole Turkish foreign policy was subject to a

re-evaluation along with the rise of anti-American sentiments in Turkey. Although the 1964
Cyprus crisis is commonly regarded as the turning point in Turkish-American relations, the
process of reorientation in the minds of intellectuals and some politicians, as a result of various
shifts in domestic and international arenas, had started well before. Although the Cyprus question
stands out as being the most significant factor in bringing about the reappraisal and diversification
in Turkish foreign policy during the inter-coup period, clearly there were other factors, both
domestic and international, involved in Turkey’s policy shift.

Détente and Turkish Foreign Policy, 1960-1970
The détente and the loosening of the bipolar balance initiated important changes in world politics,
and affected Turkey’s international position. The Cold War, while necessitating Turkey’s
dependency on the west, also sustained unquestioning western military, political and economic
support. During the 1950s, Turkey felt that the Soviet threat was so significant, that there was no
reason on the Turkish part to question her total dependence on the west, as long as the west
(mainly the United States) was committed to protecting Turkey from Soviet aggression. But the
1960s saw a softening of inter-bloc tensions, growing interdependence among nations, and the
increasing role of secondary states in world politics, which created a more complex and
multidimensional configuration.
Paralleling this, the rising economic consciousness of the south brought into being a set of political
consequences which introduced new actors to the world political stage. Of these actors, the "Group
of 77" on the economic stage, and "Non-aligned Countries" on the political stage became the
representatives of rising consciousness of the so-called "Third World" countries. They introduced
the concept of economic development to world politics and initiated considerable
cross-alliance relations. While the world became more interdependent, both economically and
politically, the period of détente, which slowed the superpower rivalry, also made it possible for
smaller members of alliance systems to have broader economic and political relations with
members of the opposite bloc. In such a fragmented world, Turkey had to expand its relations to
the new centres of economic, political and military power, in order to take full advantage of her
economic and political potential.
Moreover, an official NATO report, the Harmel Report, issued in December 1967, gave way to
inter-alliance relations and dispelled Turkish apprehensions that her changing relations with the
eastern bloc could jeopardize her position in NATO. The report stated that since all NATO
members are "sovereign states, the allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective
decision...each ally can decide its policy", and called on the Allies to seek improved relations with the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe.147

Effects of Pluralist Democracy: The 1960s

During the inter-coup period, Turkey went through important socio-political changes, a combination of which affected the thinking of Turkish people and their approach to the matter of foreign policy.

Since the 1960 coup was a result of various social, economic and internal political factors rather than any foreign policy consideration, its immediate affect on foreign relations was minimal.148 The only visible foreign policy modification of the military junta was an attempt to improve relations with the Arab countries, and a desire to establish closer contacts with the newly emerging nations.149 It also tried to regularise the various bilateral agreements with the United States and emphasised Turkish national interests in this connection.150 Although the 1960 coup and the military government afterwards did not produce any immediate foreign policy changes, the relatively free political

atmosphere after the coup and the "liberal" constitution of 1961 had a significant impact on Turkish domestic, and subsequently foreign policy. Up until the early 1960s, foreign policy-making remained the exclusive privilege of a small, elitist group. Public criticism of government foreign policy was generally considered unpatriotic. Under the presidencies of Atatürk and İnönü, the very nature of authoritarian single-party politics precluded any real opposition. Under the Democrat Party governments too, public discussions of foreign policy, and indeed all other issues, were tightly controlled, in parallel with the government’s effort to suppress opposition in the country.

Beyond suppression, it is evident that the opposition Republican Peoples Party’s views on foreign policy were very similar to those implemented by the Democrat Party governments. Although Menderes did not consult with the opposition party on matters of foreign policy, he was usually criticised only on matters of implementation rather than on the decisions themselves. For example, the opposition criticised his decision to send Turkish troops to Korea, one of, if not the, most important foreign policy decisions of the 1950s, more on the way it was made than for its content.151 One of the foreign policy acts of the Menderes government did in fact create unrest among Turkish intellectuals and the Republican Peoples Party, shortly before the 1960 military coup. It was the 1959 bilateral agreement between Turkey and the United States, which stated that the United States would come to Turkey’s aid in the event of "direct or indirect" aggression.152 The term "indirect aggression" caused concern among the intelligentsia and the opposition, who saw an American commitment in the agreement to intervene on behalf of the Menderes government in the event of a coup, or even an electoral defeat.153

147. Quoted in Ahmad, Turkish Experiment in Democracy, p. 409. See also, Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 158.
149. As a result of this drive, for the first time in history Turkey voted with the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations on the issue of Algerian independence.
151. The decision itself was taken by a small group, consisting of President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, the Chief of Staff, and the Commander of the Army. Prime Minister had consulted neither the opposition nor the Grand National Assembly, where he enjoyed overwhelming majority. In fact, he informed the Assembly and took necessary mandate from it only after Turkish troops had been dispatched to Korea. See Ahmad, Turkish Experiment in Democracy, pp. 390-391.
153. This view was expressed by Bilent Ecevit, a spokesman for the Republican Peoples Party, who pointed out the important resemblance between the agreement and 1958 American intervention in Lebanon, which was based on President Chamoun’s invitation on the face of internal opposition. Cumhuriyet, 6 February 1960.
The opposition was so strong that the government postponed submission of the agreement to Parliament for ratification for a year.154

Still, discussion of foreign policy matters was limited, and in any case, confined to the intelligentsia. However, after the 1960 coup and the reconstruction of the constitutional government, Turkey’s foreign relations entered inter-party discussions, together with relatively pluralist political life, and attracted People’s attention.

Moreover, the constitutional and electoral changes introduced by the Milli Birlik Komitesi (National Unity Committee - NUC; the military junta) influenced Turkish politics, both foreign and domestic.155 The new electoral law introduced a system of proportional representation which allowed small parties to enter parliament and therefore created multiplicity in foreign as well as domestic policies. The new constitution, moreover, created a series of checks and balances to prevent the turning of the democratic system, in effect, into one-party totalititarianism, as had happened during the 1950s. On the negative side, however, the new electoral system made it increasingly difficult for a single party to obtain a majority. What followed was a series of weak and generally ineffective coalition governments.156 Due to ideological differences between various political parties, the long periods of coalition rule created an atmosphere, within which a general consensus on policy, either foreign or domestic, was rarely reached. This resulted in ineffectiveness and inactivity in Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s.

The new system also created a plural society by spelling out in the 1961 Constitution the "fundamental rights" - freedom of thought and belief, freedom of press, of publication, of association, and many others. Under this air of freedom, foreign policy, like domestic policies, became a topic of open public discussion.


156. Between 1961 and 1980, only one party, Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel, formed a majority government, first in 1965 and then in 1969. All other times, however, Turkey was governed by either coalition or minority governments, except "technocrats’ government", established by the military after 1960 and 1971 interventions.

This was contrary to the previous practice of the Republic, in which the public was generally silent on matters of foreign policy.

Another factor that contributed indirectly to the reorientation of Turkey’s foreign policy was the emergence for the first time in Turkey of a genuine socialist movement. It was signalled by the publication of the weekly Yön (1961) and the establishment of the Turkish Worker’s Party (TIP—also in 1961), which was later outlawed after the 1971 military intervention. They advocated the eradication of Turkey’s ties with the west and the normalization of relations with the non-aligned and communist countries. They were against the strong American presence on Turkish soil and ran an anti-American campaign throughout the country.157 Although campaign attracted many followers from the intelligentsia, it did not attract widespread support from the masses until the Cyprus crisis of 1964. It was, however, responsible in part for a basic policy shift in the Republican Peoples Party, which adopted a "left of centre" stance on the eve of the 1965 general elections, in an attempt to win back the intellectuals from TIP and to gain support from the working classes.158

Concomitant with the Worker’s Party, other splinter parties advocating nationalistic and religious ideas also emerged. Parties and any other organisations, incorporating these ideas, were not allowed before 1960. With the free atmosphere which the new constitution had created however,
these parties found the opportunity to emerge and be represented in parliament. The fragmentation of the Turkish political system after the 1960 coup also played a part in this result.

Another significant feature of the inter-coup period was the extraordinary degree of radicalism espoused by Turkish youth. Though in the late sixties it was undoubtedly affected by the worldwide trend, especially by student insurrection in France in 1968, the relatively free atmosphere and extreme fragmentation of the Turkish political system after the 1960 coup were, at least partly, responsible for the result. What began in the late 1960s as peaceful student demonstrations against poor social and educational conditions, soon assumed political significance, grew radical, and became polarised between the right and the left and turned into bloody armed clashes in the 1970s.

Anti-imperialism was a common platform for both sides. But, while the leftists attacked Turkey’s alliance with the west, which they believed restricted Turkey’s freedom of action, the rightists were strongly anti-Communist and opposed Soviet imperialism, which at the time was no longer an obvious threat to Turkey. The clashes between extreme left and right grew in the 1970s and spread outside the political arena. More importantly, in the 1970s another wave of violence, with its roots in cultural and religious grounds as well as politics, surrounded Turkey. As far as foreign relations were concerned, increasing political and social instability, generated by political violence and terrorism, seriously damaged Turkey’s world image at a time when Turkey was in great need of economic and political support.

Moreover, it was quite certain that during the late 1970s, that any foreign policy action, like any domestic moves, of the government would generate a strong challenge from at least one of the extreme groups. Under these circumstances, governments had to restrict themselves to managing the daily happenings of foreign relations, instead of trying to map out general guidelines for Turkey’s foreign policy problems. This strategy in turn contributed to Turkey’s inactivity and isolation on the international front.

Cyprus Crises and Turkey’s New Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy
Impact of the Cyprus Question: The 1960s
In terms of fostering a new direction in Turkish foreign policy, the factors outlined above involved only a limited circle of politicians and intellectuals until the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964. The democratization of Turkish politics, with the growth of a vocal and fragmented opposition and the emergence of foreign policy as a political issue, created an atmosphere in which a shift to a more independent foreign policy became likely. However, not until the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 did the emerging independent policy trend at the top, find wider support. But more importantly, events surrounding the Cyprus crisis forced Turkey’s leaders to recognise that their strict adherence to a pro-western alignment during a period of a changing international system, had left Turkey isolated in the World. Thus Cyprus was the catalyst that forced Turkey to re-examine her foreign policy in the light of a rapidly changing world.
While the details of the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus are not of prime importance to this paper, it is sufficient to know that various factors made the Cyprus issue one of vital importance for the Turkish government and the Turkish people. First of all, the geographical position of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean made it strategically important to Turkish security thinking. The scenario that a Greek-held Cyprus would cut Turkey off from the open sea had encouraged Turkey’s resistance to Greek designs on the island since the 1950s. Secondly, the large Turkish community on the island, which the Turks felt compelled to defend against the Greek majority, made the issue highly emotional. Furthermore, Enosis (union with Greece), then the Greek position on the island, was seen by many Turks as a first step towards achieving the Megali Idea (re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire), and therefore the Cyprus issue became a matter concerning national pride. This highly emotional and therefore political appeal of the Cyprus issue, meant that the fragile Turkish coalition governments of the 1960s, did not dare to negotiate a compromise when Turkey was drawn into the crisis by the violent clashes between the two communities in Cyprus at the end of 1963.

Initially, Turkey sought support for her position in NATO. However, it was soon evident that the other NATO states, especially the United States, were reluctant to enter into what was seen as a local discord between two members of the alliance. Moreover, the United States was reluctant to impose any solution on the Cyprus dispute for fear of alienating either Greece or Turkey.161 Turkey, on the other hand, was expecting American support, an expectation based on a faulty appraisal of the extent of support the United States could or would extend. It is evident that Turkey failed to take into account the changed circumstances in which international relations were operating during the 1960s. It was easy for the United States to use leverage on Turkey and Greece to reach a compromise on Cyprus in the 1950s, when the effects of the Cold War were felt, and both countries were in need of American aid. By 1964 however, both Greece and Turkey were feeling less constrained by the Cold War. Furthermore Greece, as a result her association with the European Economic Community, became much less dependent on American economic aid, and therefore American economic leverage on Greece had greatly diminished.162 Moreover, Cyprus had become an independent state in 1960 and was now taking a separate and diversified stand from that of Greece.

Another faulty assumption, on which Turkey based her expectations, was that because of her strategic location, Turkey was relatively more important to the United States than Greece. But what Turkish decision-makers could not see at the time, was that the thaw in the Cold War and the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, diminished the American need for Turkish bases to maintain the nuclear balance of power. Ülman also points out the impact of the large and well organised Greek-American community and the scope of world Christian protest against the restrictions Turkey placed on the activities of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul.163 Thoroughly frustrated by America’s and NATO’s neutrality on Cyprus; faced with public outcry at home; and fuelled by the Cypriot parliament decision of June 1964 to establish general conscription for the Greek Cypriot defence forces, PM İnönü informed allies that Turkey had decided upon unilateral intervention.164 The American response was the infamous Johnson letter of 1964, which was described by İnönü in his reply as "disappointing" both "in wording and content".165 The contents of the letter, which was not made public until 1966, but was nevertheless partially leaked to the press, was shocking for many Turks, who now came to the conclusion that Turkey could not unconditionally rely on its allies. In the letter, Johnson warned Turkey that her "NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against
the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies". He further remarked that "the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances".

The second part of the letter, which was to play an important role ten years later, passed more or less unnoticed.166 The questioning of NATO support, however, as İnönü's reply reflected, created concern among Turks and forced them to rethink the reliability of the alliance with the west. They realised, as İnönü put in his reply to Johnson, that "there are...wide divergence of views" between Turkey and the United States "as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance". In the Turkish understanding, the NATO Treaty "imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression unconditionally", and to debate the issue of "whether aggression was provoked" and "whether they have an obligation to assist" would jeopardise "the very foundation of the Alliance...and it would lose its meaning". They further realised that the national interests of Turkey were no longer identical to those of the United States or the western alliances. From then on, the question of re-examining and redirecting Turkey's foreign relations, a notion that the progressive intelligentsia had been advancing for a long time, spread to include the hitherto silent mass; and put all Turkish governments "on defensive in regard to the American connection" as the "memories of the Johnson letter would colour popular impressions of the United States for many years to come".167

Deterioration of Turkish-American Relations
Beyond Cyprus and the Johnson letter, there were other problems concerning Turkish-United States relations. In the 1960s, because of domestic developments there was growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey, even before the 1964 Cyprus crisis. Such problems as American sovereignty over military bases on Turkish soil; misuse of United States installations in Turkey;168 alleged covert activities of the CIA;169 what the Turks considered to be American abuse of the "status of forces agreements";170 alleged United States involvement in domestic policies; and the lack of sufficient American military aid, were already pressuring the Turkish government to re-examine relations with the United States. In addition, two specific events that were to have an impact on Turkish-American relations took place during the 1960s - the Cuban missile "deal" and NATO's adoption of the "flexible response" strategy. Although the two events did

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166. For political developments and pressures upon İnönü previous to his decision to land Cyprus see Süha Bölükbaşı, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus (New York: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 47-74; Also Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 112-114. He maintained that İnönü, who had shown himself throughout his career to be wary of foreign adventures, never wanted to intervene. He further speculates that when İnönü decided for a landing, he was expecting that the Americans, when they learned, would exert pressure on the Greek side to back down and would warn Turkey to use only peaceful means to find solution - a warning that could help İnönü to resist mounting pressure at home.


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168. The Turks have always been sensitive about the use of American bases in Turkey for purposes other than the defence of Turkey or NATO. A major problem aroused when Incirlik Air Base was used by the United States in 1958 to support its military operations in Lebanon. While the Turkish government authorized this action after it happened, the press and the opposition created considerable uproar in the country, see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 66-68; Ahmad, Turkish Experiment in Democracy, pp. 296-297; and Harry N. Howard, "The Bicentennial in American-Turkish Relations", Middle East Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1976, pp. 306-307.

169. For allegations see Ülman/Dekmejian, "Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy", pp. 781-782.
Large-scale black market operations involving the American military postal system; the number of incidence caused by the drunk American soldiers while "on duty"; the garrison mentality of the United States community and its isolation from the Turkish environment; their ignorance of Turkish customs, were some of the complaints that contributed to growing anti-Americanism in Turkey. See Ahmad, Turkish Experiment in Democracy, p. 395; Ülman/Dekmejian, "Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy", p. 781; Richard Campany, Turkey and the United States, The Arms Embargo Period (New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 22-23.

not arouse the Turkish public as much the Cyprus crisis did, they created concern among Turkey’s political and military leaders. At the risk of further alienating the Soviets and making Turkey a prime target, the Democrat Party government had agreed in 1958, to the deployment of medium range atomic warhead Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The missiles had been rendered obsolete even before they became operational in July 1962, and in 1961 the United States had begun negotiations with Turkey for closure of missile sites. Under pressure from the military, however, the Turkish government opposed the idea and the United States dropped the matter.171 As a result, the missiles were still in Turkey when the Cuban missile crisis broke out and became a bargaining point when the Soviets proposed that the Jupiters be withdrawn in exchange for their missiles in Cuba. Although the United States State Department denied any kind of "deal" over the missiles, they were in fact removed from Turkey in 1963, without consulting the Turkish government, which actually owned the missiles, but not their warheads.172

The removal of the Jupiters gave rise to several issues. First of all, the suddenness with which the crisis emerged and the limelight that Turkey shared because of missiles on her soil brought about a basic change in Turkish attitudes. The experience had demonstrated that a war could occur almost without warning and the possession of strategic offensive weapons makes any country a primary target. The realisation that Turkey might become a target for a Soviet nuclear attack because of the United States bases, and that having bases that would attract such an attack might not be in the security interest of Turkey, gave rise to the sentiment in Turkey "in favour of removing weapons systems which the Soviets considered especially dangerous, in order to decrease the likelihood that the country could be dragged into a conflict against her will."173 Equally important, was the impression given by Kennedy’s unilateral action that during a crisis, the United States could and would act in her own interest, without considering or consulting with her allies. The Turkish public was offended by the idea that the United States treated Turkey as a client whose interests were negotiable.174

At about the same time, the Soviet development of thermo-nuclear weapons necessitated a rethinking of NATO’s "massive retaliation" concept, whereby an attack on an American ally would elicit an automatic nuclear strike against the aggressor. Under the prevailing conditions, the United States opted for a strategy of "flexible response" which did not entail an automatic nuclear response.175 In light of previous American actions surrounding Cuba and Cyprus, this new strategy created concerns in Turkey. The outcome of the convergence of all these issues was reappraisal of Turkey’s role in NATO.

Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy Concept

In the late 1960s, all these frictions and problems abroad and the basic changes in Turkey’s socio-political life outlined above were showing only one direction - the need for a reconsideration of the country’s foreign policy. Although the intelligentsia, during the 1960s, "was able to inhibit the activities of the government by constant criticism", it was "never able to force the government to reformulate the policy".176 Though the signs of re-evaluation of basic fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy were evident, even in governmental circles after the Cyprus crises of 1963-1964 and 1967,177 the outcry that Cyprus and other problems created eventually died out, or at least was
overshadowed by growing violence and economic problems. Nevertheless, there were basic changes in Turkey’s attitudes, if not in the main directions towards certain countries, in an apparent attempt to break her loneliness in international forums and find support for her position on Cyprus. One of the major changes in Turkish foreign policy in the late 1960s was the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Although there had been a movement towards rapprochement as early as 1959 because of economic needs, the real thaw

in Turkish-Soviet relations started after 1964 and was undoubtedly influenced by American actions during the Cyprus crisis. But attempts by Turkey to better her relations with the Communist Bloc were motivated by other factors as well. The desire for Soviet economic assistance, in view of declining American economic and military aid; the development of a highly vocal political opposition; and growing anti-American sentiment in the country, all contributed to Turkey’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Just as important were the signals from Moscow that the Soviets had abandoned their harsh policy towards Turkey and that better relations between the two countries would not be contingent on Turkey loosening her NATO bonds. Clearly, there were a variety of factors dictating the desirability for better relations, but just as clear is the fact that Cyprus was the catalyst for rapprochement.

Ülman/Dekmejian acknowledges three factors, related to Cyprus that forced Turkey to consider rapprochement with the Soviet Union. First, the Turks probably felt that signs of a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement would pressure the United States and NATO into inducing the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to accept a solution favourable to Turkey. Secondly, Turkey hoped to win positive Soviet support for her position on Cyprus, and therefore, secure the support of the Communist Bloc in the United Nations. Finally, the least they could expect was a neutral Soviet position, thereby denying support for the Greek position. Taken into consideration with Turkey’s isolation in the international arena, lack of western support, and the Soviet warning to Turkey during the 1964 crisis about the integrity of the island, this attempt to secure Soviet support on Cyprus seemed all the more appropriate.

What began as a tactic to secure support for her position on Cyprus soon became a firm cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy. Talks and visits between Turkey and the Soviet Union increased after 1965 and dialogue was extended to other matters of mutual interest to the two countries. Perhaps most significant, was

the increase in trade and the beginning of a Soviet aid programme for Turkey. As a result, Turkish exports to, and imports from the Soviet bloc rose rapidly and the share of the Soviet bloc in Turkey’s total trade increased from 7% in 1964 to 13% in 1967.

A basic tenet of Turkey’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union was the belief that the Soviets had abandoned their harsh, militarist policy and would accept, however unwillingly, Turkey’s membership of NATO. Therefore, the Soviet’s armed repression of the liberalisation movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Brezhnev doctrine claiming the right of intervention for the Soviets to uphold the socialist regime in any country, must have had more than a sobering effect in Turkey. It was "a blunt reminder that Moscow had not renounced force where its interests were
concerned". The most immediate reaction to the Czech crisis was the decision of the Demirel government, in a reversal of its previous position, to cooperate in a multilateral force to be created in the Mediterranean under NATO auspices. Although Turkish-Soviet dialogue continued after a short break, two ominous developments outside the realm of diplomatic relations caused growing apprehension in Turkey. The first was the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and the other was the growing ideological impact of socialist views within Turkey. These two developments were to impact on Turkey’s foreign and domestic policies of the 1970s, in that the former, again highlighted Turkey’s strategic location, and the latter created instability in both the political and social life of Turkey.

Concomitant with her rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Turkey also attempted to improve and expand her relations with the non-aligned countries, especially those in the Middle East. Although many factors, such as cultural, geographic and religious affinities; the idea that Turkey, for strategic political reasons, must become a bridge between east and west; and the commercial opportunities in the new markets in the Arab countries, undoubtedly influenced this shift in Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-Third World relations in the 1960s, however, were conditioned above all by the Cyprus dispute. The almost total lack of Third World support in the UN for the Turkish position on Cyprus forced Turkey to realise that her policy toward the non-aligned nations in general and the Middle East in particular had isolated her from the rest of the world. Thus Turkey moved to break away from this isolation. Therefore, behind Turkey’s new Arab policy was the desire to marshal support in the UN for her Cyprus stand, as well as to indicate to the United States that Turkish support on various issues could no longer be taken for granted.

Despite the fact that Turkey’s rapprochement with the Third World initially ended with failure, as the 1965 UN vote showed, Turkey nevertheless went ahead with her new multi-faceted foreign policy initiatives. Illustrative of Turkey’s new policy in the Middle East was the diplomatic position taken by Turkey in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this period, Ankara’s position on the Middle East was one of guarded neutrality. It was characterised by extreme caution designed to avoid antagonising the United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab nations. In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the new direction of Turkey’s foreign policy became evident in the UN. Mindful of the importance of the thirteen potential Arab votes in the UN, Turkey voted for the Yugoslav resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from captured Arab territories. Yet at the same time, in an attempt to balance her interests with the west, she abstained on the Soviet resolution that labelled Israel an aggressor.

Another event manifesting the diversification of Turkey’s foreign policy was the creation by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). It was an economic and cultural agreement parallel to but separate from the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Although Turkish leaders were not initially enthusiastic about turning back to the east, on cultural

181. Ibid.
182. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

The 1965 vote against Turkey was taken with 47 for, 6 against and 54 abstentions. Apart from Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Albania and the United States, who was trying to make amends for Johnson letter, voted against the resolution. While the fact that all the eastern bloc countries abstained, together with the members of NATO, showed the result of Turkey’s recent rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the against votes that Afro-Asian countries cast were the clear indication of the extend to which Turkey’s western policies had alienated the Third World.

and especially Islamic grounds, Pakistan’s proposal for RCD was timely and caught the Turks in the moment of their political isolation. Thus Turkey, whose credit with the non-aligned bloc had been bankrupt in 1964, began to pursue a more independent foreign policy in the Third World, designed to alleviate the impression created at Bandung that she was running errands for the west. However, at the end, there were few Third World countries who actually accepted Turkey’s eagerness to improve relations with them.

Turkish Foreign Policy during The 1970s
Domestic Environment and External Problems
Towards the end of the 1960s Turkey became preoccupied with her internal economic and political problems, and therefore ignored its international situation. Although her multi-faceted foreign policy and restrained position in the 1967 Cyprus crisis paid off, as some Arab states started to take a more favourable stand with regard to Turkey in the international forums, soon Turkey was dragged into domestic conflicts and consequent inactivity in the foreign policy area. The period of caretaker governments of 1971-73 after the 1971 intervention can be identified with the lack of foreign policy initiative. The bureaucrats who occupied government posts without much authority and with limited popular base were in no position to undertake courageous steps in foreign policy. Before another Cyprus crisis dominated Turkey’s foreign policy, there were two developments, one internal and one external, which affected Turkish and American policies during and after the 1974 Cyprus crisis.

Turkey’s biggest problem with the United States during 1966-1974 was the cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey and the reaction of the United states to that cultivation. As early as 1968, the United States started to pressure Turkey to adopt strict controls to prevent the illegal trafficking of opium in Turkey, which they believed constituted 80% of the heroin illegally consumed in the United States. By 1970, the United States Congress started to take an interest in the issue, and in 1971 required the President "to suspend all military sales, aid (and) economic assistance" to governments that failed to prevent narcotics produced in their countries from reaching the United States. In 1971 criticism of Turkey grew and even went so far as to question Turkey’s usefulness to the United States. Finally, United States pressure had an effect on Turkey’s caretaker government after the 1971 military intervention, and the Prime Minister announced on June 30, 1971, that he banned poppy cultivation because of Turkey’s "humanitarian obligations". However, it was clear that although American pressure had finally brought about the poppy ban, it also contributed to anti-Americanism in Turkey. Further, Turks were outraged in August 1972 when they learned that the United States had decided to ask India to increase its opium production to meet the world-wide shortage forecast by the International Narcotics Board. Although very unpopular, the ban remained active until the Republican Peoples Party-National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) coalition government revoked it on 1 July 1974. The United States immediately signalled its displeasure by recalling its Ambassador to Washington for consultations. He was still in Washington when the Cyprus crisis broke out. Congress reacted more harshly to the poppy crisis than did the executive. Members of the House and Senate proposed a number of draft resolutions asking for the imposition of embargoes. Finally when Resolution 507, which provided authority to the President "to terminate all assistance to the Government of Turkey", was approved by Congress on 5 August 1974, the Cyprus crisis was already on the way. As a result, Congress did not pressure the President to implement the resolution because after the second Turkish intervention in Cyprus, on 14 August 1974,
congressional opponents of the poppy cultivation, chose to support the arms embargo favoured by the Greek lobby and "the rule of law" opponents. The Turkish government and the Turkish public were outraged at Congress’s eagerness to adopt coercive measures against a loyal ally. The government further judged Congress’s action as an indication of, at the least, insensitivity toward Turkish national interests. The fact that when the coup took place in Cyprus, the United States ambassador to Turkey had already been recalled to Washington, and Congress was discussing ways to penalize Turkey, symbolically illustrates the lack of trust between the two countries. Meanwhile, an important development took place in Turkey, specifically

inside the Republican Peoples Party, which would later have effects on subsequent Turkish foreign policy in general, and Turkey’s Cyprus policy in particular. Bülent Ecevit, who had been advocating a "left-of-centre" stand for the Republican Peoples Party, replaced İnönü as party chairman in May 1972. Ecevit believed that Turkey could afford to adopt an assertive (in contrast to İnönü’s cautious) foreign policy vis-à-vis the superpowers. His argument, that smaller allies did not need to correlate all of their foreign policy actions with those of the superpowers, reflected a widely shared belief within the Republican Peoples Party and Turkey. He suggested that Turkey should disassociate herself from the Cold War rhetoric of NATO. There was no question of Turkey abandoning her alliances, but within the alliances she would pursue a policy designed to serve her national interests and not those of others. He also criticised Turkey’s assumption of a role in the Middle East on behalf of the United States, and maintained that Turkey’s participation during the 1950s, in schemes like the Baghdad Pact was harmful to Turkey’s national interests.

Though his insistence on more independence within NATO distinguished him from his predecessors, the major characteristic of his administration was his assertiveness in Turkish-Greek relations. His foreign minister told the National Assembly in 1974 that Turkey wanted to live in peace with Greece, but that "just because this is so, Greece will certainly not be allowed to gnaw away at Turkish interests in any manner whatsoever or to upset the balance between the two countries". Unlike his predecessor’s cautiousness, Ecevit was a risk taker when he felt the stakes were high enough, and stakes were soon poised to grow higher.

Cyprus Intervention of 1974 and Its Effects
With these developments inside and outside Turkey, the stage was set for another Cyprus crisis to catalyse change in Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s. The 1974 crisis not only served to intensify animosity between Greece and Turkey, but also stretched Turkish-American relations to near breaking point.

The coup against Cypriot President Makarios in 1974 was apparently inspired by the Greek junta’s need to find a foreign policy success abroad to offset its domestic weakness, and was based on a misreading of United States policy and the international situation, just as Turkey had done in the 1964 crisis. The colonels apparently felt that the United States, based on her tacit approval of their regime, would condone, or at least tolerate the coup and restrain Turkey as she had done in 1964.
and 1967. But the circumstances in 1974 were different from those that had existed in earlier years; Turkish-American relations had undergone a transition, and the United States no longer had the leverage on Turkey that she had in 1964 and 1967. Moreover, the impression given before the Turkish intervention in 1974 was that the United States would not use her leverage even if she had any.197

Furthermore, détente and Turkey’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union had decreased the threat of Soviet intervention. In 1964, the Cold War tension was still felt between the two countries and the Soviets had publicly announced that they would defend Cyprus’ “freedom and independence from a foreign invasion”, and warned Turkey that the USSR could ”not remain indifferent to the threat of an armed conflict” near its southern frontier.198 In 1974 however, Turkish-Soviet relations were much improved and the Soviet Union no longer opposed Turkey’s Cyprus thesis. In addition, the Soviets chose to remain silent about Turkey’s intervention preparations, indicating that they did not oppose it.199 Moreover, Turkey’s isolation in the UN had diminished since 1965. Relations with the Soviet Bloc and Third World countries became ”friendly” and therefore the fear of anti-Turkish resolutions had been reduced.

Within Turkey, the situation was also different from that of the earlier Cyprus crises. The earlier crises had boosted rising anti-Americanism and contributed to a polarisation of domestic policies in Turkey. In turn, these forces contributed to increased political instability. Given the fact that it was not possible to argue that the Greek supported coup was an internal affair in which the guarantor powers - Great Britain, Turkey and Greece - had no legal right to intervene, Ecevit’s weak coalition government had no viable option other than intervention.200

The aftermath of Turkey’s intervention and subsequent invasion of part of the island is well-known. By the end of the summer of 1974, the Turkish army had occupied about forty percent of Cyprus. In February 1975, the United States Congress, under pressure from the Greek-American community, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey.201 Turkish-American relations reached an all-time low, when later in 1975 the Turkish government suspended activities at all American bases in Turkey except those related to NATO. It is important to note that the arms embargo was imposed by Congress but opposed by the President, the State Department and the American military. This difference of opinion allowed the Turks to maintain their relations with the United States, such as they were, and still save face. The embargo, which was partially lifted in late 1975, was fully lifted in the summer of 1978.

Aside from its impact on Turkish-Greek and Turkish-American relations, Cyprus once again highlighted Turkey’s diplomatic isolation. The failure of her diplomatic efforts, begun in the 1960s, to gain support among Arab and non-aligned countries for her policies on Cyprus was strikingly displayed at the 1976 Colombo Conference of non-aligned nations (as it had been at Lima in the previous year), while a UN General Assembly vote on a draft resolution on Cyprus in November 1976 showed 94-1 against Turkey, with 27 abstentions.202 Consequently, Turkey redoubled her efforts to expand friendly relations with not only the eastern bloc countries, but also the Arab and non-aligned countries.

Thus, after 1974, Cyprus became both a main problem for, and a determinant of, Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, because of its emotional and political
Turkey’s unfavourable position in Congress because of the recent opium question; and the alleged violation of the law by the Administration who had continued its assistance to Turkey which had used American arms outside of the borders of Turkey, were just few of them. For a general analysis of the subject see Bölükbaşı, Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, pp. 212-219. Also see Ellen B. Laipson, Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981); Lawrence Stern, The Wrong Horse; The Politics of Intervention and The Failure of American Diplomacy (New York: Times Books, 1977), chapters 18-20; and C. Hackett, "Ethnic Politics in Congress; The Turkish Embargo Experience" in Abdul Aziz Said (ed.), Ethnicity and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1977).


character, Cyprus has affected Turkey’s domestic politics, which in turn determine foreign policy. This new direction in foreign policy must however, be viewed against the background of Turkey’s internal political, social and economic problems.

Economic Factors
Apart from the political and social evolution of Turkey and international developments, economic considerations also played an important role in influencing the course of Turkish foreign policy in the inter-coup period, especially in the 1970s. As far back as the late 1950s, economic necessities had led the Democrat Party government to consider rapprochement with the Soviets in order to obtain economic aid. Among many other considerations, the mismanagement of the economy by Menderes was at least in part responsible for the military takeover in 1960. Seeing the damage done by the uncoordinated economic policies of the previous government, the NUC established the State Planning Organisation (Devlet Planlama Teşkilati - DPT) and initiated the First Five Year Development Plan in 1963, which emphasised the importance of speeding up the rate of economic development.

Economic planning placed a new emphasis on Turkey’s requirements for external capital. When NATO countries refused to sponsor an aid consortium, Turkey turned to OECD in order to assure a steady flow of external financing for her development plans.203 Although the OECD consortium for Turkey was established in July 1962 after strong American behind-the-scene pressure, it never came up to Turkish expectations. A further cut in American aid, with the expectation that the European allies would fill the gap, only helped to exacerbate the disappointment.204 During the Menderes era, Turkey had also tried to link her economic policies to the west through the European Economic Community. In 1959 she applied for an associate status in the European Economic Community. Her application was probably motivated more by political considerations than economic realities. Undoubtedly, Turkey’s desire to be considered "European" influenced her decision to seek closer ties with the European Economic Community, but the fact that it followed so closely a similar request by Greece indicates that the Greek application prompted the Turkish action. As Birand notes, "traditions of Turkish foreign policy required that Greece be watched very closely so that it would not use the political and economic weight resulting from a new relationship with Europe against Turkey".205

Finally, in 1962 Turkey negotiated an agreement of association with the European Economic Community.

In the 1970s, economic factors continued to play important, if not crucial, roles in influencing Turkish foreign policy. In a series of Five Year Plans, Turkey committed herself to a massive economic modernisation effort during the period. Beside, as a result of her NATO commitments and rivalry with Greece, she was compelled to maintain a high degree of military preparedness. The economic trends of the 1970s both within Turkey and in the international arena however, made balancing these objectives increasingly difficult. Although Turkey’s economic growth rate in the 1970s was relatively high, averaging 7-8 percent annually, it was not due to healthy growth of the economy. It was achieved at the expense of massive imports, without any significant

increase in exports, and was financed by heavy foreign loans. At the same time high unemployment and inflation became endemic in Turkey.

Turkey’s economic difficulties had been exacerbated and complicated in the 1970s by her own policies as well as world events. Economic recession in Europe, the world-wide energy crisis of the mid-1970s and the 1974 Cyprus crisis adversely affected Turkey’s economy. While Turkey’s trade deficit with the European Economic Community, its main trading partner, was rising, remittances from Turks working in Europe, the only self generated source of income other than exports, dropped off significantly. These set-backs were further exacerbated by the world-wide energy crisis of 1973. According to 1978 figures, the cost of oil imports equalled Turkey’s entire export earnings.

A dramatic rise in military expenditure following the 1974 Cyprus crisis, as a result of the American arms embargo and the arms race with Greece, also severely strained the Turkish economy. As a result Turkey’s need to obtain credits and loans became all the more pressing. Hence, it is not surprising that Turkey, faced with a long list of austerity measures, as requirements for future loans from the IMF, wanted to expand her foreign relations to include the Soviet Union and oil rich Arabs. Meanwhile, Turkish-European Economic Community relations continued to be strained. The preferences given by the European Economic Community to the former colonies and to several Mediterranean countries, and the failure of the European Economic Community to extend what Turkey considered sufficient credits, led to charges of discrimination in Turkey. Her failure to gain new agricultural concessions and the restrictions imposed on her textile exports disappointed Turkey and created suspicions about the Community’s motives. The probability of Greek accession to the European Economic Community led to worries that the unanimous voting rule in the European Economic Community Council might be used by the Greeks to block pro-Turkish European Economic Community initiatives. Moreover, association with the European Economic Community polarised Turkey’s political parties, which in turn had adverse effects on Turkish-European Economic Community relations.

FOREIGN POLICY SETTING AT 12 SEPTEMBER 1980

During the inter-coup period, Turkish foreign policy changed its structure but not its foundations. While still resting upon the principles of identification and alliance with the west, it was now marked by a trend which stressed the pursuit of Turkey’s national interests in her foreign relations and greater independence in decision making.

This new orientation was influenced by various factors introduced in the 1960s, such as the reversal of the intimidating Soviet attitude towards Turkey; the Cuban missile crisis and subsequent removal of the Jupiter missiles; American attitudes towards the continuous Cyprus crises; the formation of the European Economic Community; NATO’s adoption of the "flexible response" strategy; and the lack of support in the UN for Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Their influence was exacerbated in the 1970s by such events as the 1973 Middle East War and the ensuing oil crisis; a sharp deterioration in relations between Turkey and the United States, first on the poppy question and then on Cyprus; tension between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean; differences with the European Economic Community; and, again, lack of support in the UN for Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

These significant international events paralleled domestic developments in Turkey. Increases in communication, education and social as well as physical mobility led to higher expectations and a greater politicisation of the Turkish people. In turn, together with the factors discussed earlier, they

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207. Middle East Economic Digest, 14 July 1978, pp. 3-5.
resulted in ideological polarisation and party fragmentation. The net result was weak coalition governments, and ineffective and passive foreign policy. Thus, at the time when international political and economic imperatives called for solutions to Turkey’s outstanding foreign policy problems, such as Cyprus, the Aegean, relations with the European Economic Community and the United States, Turkey did not have a government with enough political prestige to make the compromises necessary for lasting settlements.

On the other hand, the insistence on a more autonomous Turkish foreign policy from both the right and the left was strengthened by international events, particularly by the energy crisis which had a devastating effect on Turkey; and the American arms embargo which brought into question Turkey’s western alliance. Therefore, while little or no progress was made on the Cyprus and Aegean issues, Turkey exhibited strong moves in this period toward developing good political and economic relations with the non-aligned countries, particularly those in the Middle East and the Balkans, and the Soviet bloc countries.

The diversification of Turkey’s foreign relations also coincided with Ecevit’s rise to power in the Republican Peoples Party. His political philosophy, which was quite similar to that of the European "social democrats", was closely associated with the pursuit of national interest and independence in foreign policy-making. Therefore, it was clear when Bülent Ecevit won the 1973 election that his government would attempt to exercise more independence in foreign policy. Hence, on the eve of the world-wide energy crisis and the Cyprus intervention, with all its ramifications, the stage had already been set for a search to find new orientations for Turkish foreign policy.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Surrounded by dramatic changes in world politics that accompanied the end of the Cold War, Turkey, once a distant outpost of NATO on the European periphery, moved to the centre of the problematic post-Cold War international politics. She stood encircled by 13 of the 16 threat generating regions, identified by NATO at the end of the Cold War. Yet, from a staunchly pro-western isolationist existence in its immediate neighbourhood, Turkey, at the end of the Cold War, suddenly moved into a posture, intended to have an effect across a vast region extending "from eastern Europe to western China".208 This change in Turkey’s stance and mentality was not accidental, but due to wider changes experienced within and round Turkey during the 1980s. Thus, Without denying the importance of the momentum that was provided by the end of the Cold War, this section aims to explore Turkey’s transformation in domestic and foreign policies during the 1980s and early 1990s, in order to discern developments behind the powerful impetus in Turkey at the end of the Cold War, to grasp opportunities that emerged.

Starting with the military coup d’etat of 12 September 1980, Turkey experienced fundamental changes in every field. Her political structure, economic system, social strata, cultural patterns, religious expressions, and of course foreign policy, evolved beyond recognition. Turkey at the end of the decade was a largely transformed country and the impetus for change is still visible. At the same time, while constant change became the rule within the country, Turkey, from a reverse angle, has been seen as a stabilising force within her unstable and insecure region.

208. For earlier analyses of Turkey’s newly-found self-reliance on foreign policy at the end of the Cold War see Fuller/Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics; Aydin, "Turkey and Central Asia; Challenges of Change", pp. 157-177; Şükri Sina Gürel and Yoshihre Kimura, Turkey in a Changing World (Tokyo: Institute of developing Economies, 1993).

The following factors can be suggested as contributing to Turkish foreign policy formulation during the "pre post-Cold War period" (1980-1991): 1) the nature of the domestic political regime,
including the balance of power within, and composition of, the policy-making system; 2) Socio-
Economic dynamics; and 3) the external environment.

**THE NATURE OF THE REGIME AND FOREIGN POLICY**

During the 1980s, Turkey passed through different regimes: The decade started with a multi-party democracy, entrapped by mounting terrorism and rampant economic disasters, which was abruptly interrupted by the September 12 coup d’État. Three-year military rule and the following transitional period finally gave way once again to a multi-party parliament, if not to full democracy. Thus, from the outset, it might seem that Turkish politics ended the decade where they had originally started. However, Turkey as of December 3 1990, when the Chief of Staff, General Torumtay, resigned because the governing framework at the top clashed with his "principles and understanding of what the state should be",209 or the Turkey of February 28, 1997, when the generals, who thought that the survival of the Turkish state was at stake, chose to work within the system cooperating with the president and the prime minister through the National Security Council, were fundamentally different to the Turkey of September 12, 1980, when the then Chief of Staff, General Evren, led a junta to dislodge the elected government because "the state had been rendered unable to function...and the political parties have failed to bring about unity and togetherness".210

The difference between these actions is important because the September 12 coup and the following developments were hugely important for Turkey’s external relations, especially with European democracies. In general terms, the nature of the political regime of a country and its composition affects its foreign policy mainly for two reasons.211 Firstly, the political regime has the power to define the broader framework of a country’s overall political philosophy, which constrains, if not conditions, its choices in the international arena, since it determines how the regime sees itself vis-à-vis other regimes or states. Secondly, the nature of a political regime also creates images outside the country and any change in the "established" political regime of a country tends to attract reactions from other countries, which might result in pressure for change.212

In principle, similar regimes are assumed to be responsive to each other although one can cite several important exceptions. The frequency of military takeovers in Turkey indicates the important role the army plays in Turkish political life. For all that however, at worst Turkey has been considered in the same league as military dictatorships, or at best, with guided democracies. In particular during the period 1980-83, Turkey was under a full military regime, though it can be differentiated from other military regimes in various ways.213 Its officially proclaimed aim was to guide the country into full democracy as is understood in the West. However, in practice, democratic identity was denied to Turkey, both under the military regime and during the period immediately following it (1983-1987), by a combination of factors, ranging from continued restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms to explicit (implicit for the post-1983 period) use of the military’s control and authority on various aspects of daily life. Not surprisingly then, being less than a full democracy created tensions for Turkey during the 1980s, not only in domestic politics but in foreign policy, as well. Since the military regime up until 1983, or the quasi-democracy thereafter, clearly conflicted with the fundamental values of Western Europe, with which Turkey endeavours to identify itself, it created tensions for Turkish foreign policy where it seemed to matter most. As a result, Turkish foreign policy had to operate

210. "Military Communiqué No. 1", text in General Secretariat of the NSC, 12 September in Turkey, p. 221.
under great strain as the military regime in Turkey attempted to "reconcile the divergent objectives of moving towards integration with Western Europe while defending the rationale of being less than a full democratic regime".214

212. Goldman, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy, p. 4.
214. Sezer, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000", p. 66.

In a more general sense, the frequency of military regimes in recent Turkish political history, together with a general tendency toward the suppression of certain ideas and freedoms, even under civilian governments, have become impediments for Turkish foreign policy in its overall relations with the West. Such practices, especially the Turkish human rights record, have been instrumental in creating a general lack of sympathy for Turkey in Western public opinion.215

Accordingly, during the 1980s, being governed by a military dictatorship or a transitional democracy at best, limited Turkey’s options in the foreign policy arena and put constraints on its already existing relationships. More specifically, this manifested itself in Turkey’s relations with western European countries, mainly because of the nature of her existing linkage patterns with them. Especially those, who were non-committal in their early reactions towards the coup, in time became hostile, because of what they perceived as the impossibility of condoning a military dictatorship, with its deteriorating human rights record, and particularly, the impossibility of accepting it within the European "democratic club". On the other hand, due to the presence of linkage relationship between Turkey and Europe, the Europeans chose to apply pressure on Turkey instead of pushing her out of the European system, and thereby their influence area. However, the ever-lasting foreign (read: European) pressure created a counter-reaction in Turkey, forcing her to look for alternative options to Europe.

Effects on its foreign policy of the democratic nature of Turkish politics, gain meaning primarily in the context of Turkey’s western vocation, since external pressures are effective only if the subject state is receptive to them. It is clear that the internationalisation of Turkey’s domestic politics has created a constant restraint on governments, and as such has effected both the country’s domestic political evaluation and her foreign relations. The crucial factor in this connection has been Turkey’s receptivity towards external, i.e. European, pressures due to the existence of its political, economic, military and ideological links with Europe. While these links enabled Europeans to pressure Turkey on certain aspects of her internal politics, especially over her human rights record and democratisation process, Turkey’s own identification with Europe made her susceptible and responsive to such pressures.

Approached from this angle, it becomes easier to understand why successive Turkish governments reacted harshly when faced with European criticism, and why they attributed such importance to the opinions of an otherwise marginal European organisation, i.e. the Council of Europe. Turkey’s membership of the Council has been an institutionalised proof of her Europeanness for the Turkish westernising elite, whose identification with Europe have demanded being part of that community of nations.

The strength and importance of Turkey’s links with Europe was amply demonstrated by the fact that even during the worst period of European criticism, the Turkish leadership chose to stay and face the criticism instead of taking the country out of the European realm. Thus, during the 1980s, European attempts to influence were strongly felt in Turkey and, whatever the political rhetoric to the contrary, were responded to. Although this response usually manifested itself in publicly
defiant attitudes, most of the time the governments were quietly engaged in diplomatic and propaganda campaigns in the west both to "explain" Turkey’s policies and to curtail further public criticisms.

In the process, however, Turkish foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis Europe, became dependent both on domestic political developments and on European reactions to them. The latter, in turn, were an important input in determining domestic political developments, as well. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact proportion of the effectiveness of European pressure on Turkey’s democratisation process, it is clear that Turkey’s "western vocation" and her long history of westernisation affected this transition to a considerable extent.216 During this process, Turkey and the Europe grew apart, both because of


the Turkish public’s disappointment with the Europeans who "let them down in their hour of need" and also because of the considerable coolness of European public opinion towards Turkey, created by a constant barrage of criticism, highlighting her deficiencies vis-à-vis Europe and as such, built up the "otherness" of Turkey.

It was stated earlier that a critical international environment might create pressures on a country for reappraisal of its hitherto followed policies. In other words, international responses to the domestic policies of a country may force it to reconsider and if necessary change its foreign policy stand. It is clear, in the Turkish case, that the external criticisms and hostile international, i.e. European, environment was instrumental after 1980 in forcing its decision-makers to look for alternative connections and led to Turkey’s openings towards the Middle East and the eastern bloc countries. All this, of course, denies neither the role of internal factors nor the effects of systemic changes in the reformulation of Turkish foreign policy. But the emphasis here, in contrast to the official Turkish view, is on the existence of a linking pattern between international pressures and Turkey's domestic political developments, a connection that ultimately affected its foreign policy.

In this context, the militarist nature of its government did not affect Turkey’s relations with the east European or Middle Eastern countries, which did not raise objections about democracy, or indeed about torture allegations or human rights abuses in the country. In fact, Saudi Arabia was the first state to recognise the Turkish military administration, and others followed suit.217 Unlike European organisations, the Islamic Conference did not send human rights delegations to Turkey to tour prisons and talk to dissidents. For that matter, the change of the regime did not affect Turkey’s relations with the United States either, whose considerations for human rights and democracy were overwhelmed by its global strategic interests in the Middle Eastern region after the developments of 1979 and 1980. Therefore, while Turkey’s relations with Western Europe, which felt unable to understand the

217. Aydın, Foreign Policy Formation, s. 120.

rationale behind the continued level of military intervention, were souring; its relations with the Middle Eastern countries and with the United States, who gave a supportive shoulder, were improved. Turkey’s search for alternative courses of action was also reflected by Presidential visits during 1982 to Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and even China, while no invitations were extended by Western governments. It was obvious that while the military government needed the West for political, military and economic support, it could not bear to be
forced into a position of isolation, as had occurred over the Cyprus issue and, as a consequence, was determined to increase Turkey’s links with other parts of the world.

During this period, the growing political importance of, and Turkey’s increasing reliance on, the Middle Eastern states and desire to use them as a balance against European criticisms was increasingly evident in official speeches. The declaration from General Evren in April 1982 indicated a new direction for Turkey. He affirmed that Turkey was a European country and, at the same time, a Middle Eastern country. The cool relations with Western Europe constituted, together with economic necessities, the principal reason for Turkey’s new drive toward the Middle East. At a political level, Ankara had been striving to break out of its isolated position among the countries of the Third World by intensifying its relations with the Islamic world. At this juncture, the sympathetic attitudes of the Islamic states towards the military regime helped Turkey to turn more eagerly towards the East. Together with sharp upsurge in economic relations, Turkey saw the need to assume a more active role in the Middle Eastern region. As a result, Kenan Evren became the first Turkish President to attend an Islamic Conference in January 1984. Turkey also shared the Conference’s efforts to mediate in the Iran-Iraq war, and since 1984 has hosted the Economic Development and Cooperation Committee of the Islamic conference. Another result of the growing political importance of the Arab world in Turkey’s foreign policy was seen in Turkish-Israeli relations, which were continuously downplayed by Turkey during this period.

The nature of the political system also affects the combination and/or structure of policy-making bodies. The 1982 constitution, prepared by the military regime, gave priority to a strong state and a strong executive within that state, and moreover favoured the president against the cabinet, as reflected in the strong positions taken both by president Evren and later by president Özal in their relations with different governments. This eventually had a spill-over effect on foreign policy, as well as domestic policies, an area which hitherto, governments had tended to leave to experts and foreign ministry bureaucrats.

Equipped with strong powers and charismatic leadership, president Özal, for example, was able not only to canalise Turkey’s external relations towards a realisation of his "vision", but was also able to conduct daily foreign policy as well as determining long-term guide-lines for the future options of Turkish foreign policy. Although Özal’s successors, Süleyman Demirel and then Ahmet Necdet Sezer, used their powers with more restraint than their predecessor, the powers and the institutional structure for forceful presidential domination over Turkish politics are there for future aspirants. Therefore this aspect of Turkish politics should be kept in mind when considering Turkey’s future foreign policy moves. These powers would enable presidents, with a political background and strong convictions about the country’s place in the world, to impose their "vision" on the foreign ministry, possibly against what the latter considers to be the "national interest" of the country. Since obtaining a consensus on what constitutes the "national interest" of a country is a difficult, if not impossible task, this aspect of Turkish politics, with its foreign policy overtures, could create extreme tensions within the decision-making bodies of the country and among public opinion in general, as seen during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.

In a country like Turkey, where the military normally plays a larger role in determining what is in the "national interest" of the country, than in liberal western democracies, a clash between the opinions of the executive and the General Staff always carries dangers of another possible attempt to dislodge those who oppose the military’s vision. Although it has been argued above that the

Turkey of the 1990s and after is much different to earlier periods, and in this context, another outright military intervention in Turkish politics is highly improbable, the possibility can not be
entirely disregarded. One can conceive various future scenarios where the military might find it extremely difficult to resist intervention. For example, hypothetically, a scenario could be imagined where a break-up of the unitary Turkish state might seem imminent because of a Kurdish uprising in the south-eastern corner of the country, or in an Algerian-type situation, where the secular outlook of the country was threatened because of a takeover of power by radical Islamic forces. In these circumstances, the military might consider it as its "duty" again to "save the nation". Of course, which direction Turkish foreign policy might be forced to take if that was to occur, and what would be the external reactions to such an event, which would eventually have an important effect on Turkish foreign policy, could be difficult to predict. However, if the past is in any way indicative of the future, it could be argued that another military intervention in Turkey, even if it was to keep unitary, secular and pro-western Turkey intact within the western political system, could have devastating affects on Turkey’s European relations and its leaders might, ironically, end up severing Turkey’s western connections (if she had not already been forced out) because of the impossibility of sustaining them in the face of mounting criticisms and extreme pressures from Europe.

It is also stated above that changes in the balance of power within the policy-making body can affect a country’s foreign policy. In this context, the dominance of the military within the political system affected both the foreign policy thinking and actions of Turkey. Later, the inclusion of hitherto obstructed Islamic forces in the realm of decision-making bodies, eased, if not directly called for, Turkey’s overtures towards the Middle Eastern Islamic countries. Finally, the dominance within the government of economically minded administrators after 1983, led by the then premier Özal, highlighted the "economy first" principle in foreign relations, and various political and ideological differences were disregarded for expected economic benefits. Of course, the most telling change in the balance of power within the policy-making system during the 1980s was the gradual concentration of powers in the hands of the late president Turgut Özal, which was strongly resisted and opposed by the traditional foreign policy elite.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS; RISE OF ALTERNATIVE IDENTITIES
The political system of a country is not, of course, strictly limited to "politics" per se. It also includes the country’s economic policies, its cultural affinities, ideological inclinations, and its arrangements for social order. In this context, it was clear during the 1980s that Turkey’s international affinities had affected her economic policies. Particularly, Turkey’s move towards a liberal economy in the early 1980's had much to do with her links with, and aspirations to be part of, the western political system. Turkey’s partnership in the western political system and her essential role within western security interests provided her with much more foreign aid and help during her economic transition, than any other country which had tried to do the same thing. Therefore, there came into existence yet another link between Turkey and its western vocation, thorough her transition to a liberal economy.

Furthermore, once Turkey had made the switch, her new liberal economic system demanded a certain set of political actions and international connections. The common attribute of the programme that introduced the liberal economy to Turkey on 24 January 1980, and other austerity programmes introduced since then, with the backing of the IMF and the World Bank, for the recovery of the Turkish economy, is that they all necessitated huge amounts of net foreign currency inflow into the country. The ways to generate the necessary amount included heavy borrowing from abroad, persuading foreigners to invest in Turkey, and increasing and diversifying Turkey’s export potential. However, the crucial point to all the economic measures aimed at achieving these results was that they all, in one way or another, depended on the willingness of other countries to respond in a way that would favour Turkey. Since it is clear that the success of the economic programmes have depended largely on the availability of foreign assistance, it can easily be imagined how Turkish diplomacy had to exert itself to
maintain contact with the various assisting governments and organisations. Therefore, both during the 1980s, as the Turkish economy progressively integrated with the world economy, and during the 1990s, while it became part of global economics, the foreign ministry became increasingly concerned with obtaining the necessary foreign loans, opening up new markets for Turkish goods, and striking deals with foreign governments and companies in order to bring more investment into the country. Thus, as the foreign policy of the country needed to be in tune with its economic programmes, economic necessities became an important variable of Turkish foreign policy making. As a result, as Turkey’s need for fresh markets was growing, so her political efforts to find openings in the Middle East and Eastern Bloc also increased. However, at the same time, the realisation that the huge sums needed by the Turkish economy could come only from western sources, demanded a continuation in Turkey’s links with the West. Any severing in political relations would have dealt a blow to her economic transformation as well.

On the social side too, Turkey experienced important changes during the 1980s. The repression of the liberal and left-wing intelligentsia by the military regime, and also their efforts to promote orthodox Islam as an antidote to extremism in society, led to the perhaps not totally unexpected, but unforeseen, result of a growing visibility of Islam in Turkish society, which was also effected by the world-wide Islamic revival.

Although many influential Motherland Party members were branded as "Islamist" or at least, partial to Islam, by the secular Turkish intelligentsia, it is difficult to find particular instances during the 1980s where they used their influence to achieve and obtained policy changes in foreign relations. Making allowance for the difficulty of separating the possible influence of Islam from other motivating values, and also of distinguishing between Islam’s motivating and/or justifying roles, a possible explanation for this subdued role of the "Islamists" within the Motherland Party, could be that the "Islamic faction" of the party was pre-occupied most of the time with a power struggle against the "idealist" and "liberal" factions. At the same time, the leader of the party, Turgut Özal, who controlled the party completely, had strong foreign policy ideas of his own and thus, thanks to his delicate balancing act between various factions of the party, did not allow any one faction to dictate his policy-making. Moreover, most of the time, the presence of the ever-watchful President Evren, who was against "Islamic" manifestations within Turkish politics, was also a restraining factor for Islamic influences on foreign policy.

As a result, especially up to 1989, the Islamic revival within the country did not particularly affect Turkey’s foreign policy-making - provided that there was a desire and pressure for change from the "Islamists" since this is, save sporadic demands for closer relations with the Islamic countries, also difficult to pin down. Therefore, one of the actions that the Islamists were supposed to oppose strongly, that is the Turkish application in 1987, to the European Communities membership, went smoothly without significant opposition.

However, since 1989, the effects of the Islamic affinities, in connection with ethnic and historic sentiments, seemed on the rise. Yet again, it was still very difficult to ascertain whether the Turkish public’s outcries regarding the Karabakh and Bosnian conflicts were because of Islamic connections, or rather originated from what was perceived, by the public at large, as attempts to wipe out their Turkish ethnic brethren in the east and the Ottoman legacy in the west. The support displayed by the Turkish public to the coalition war effort during the Gulf War indicates the dominance of the latter - although it could be argued that the Turkish public’s support could be seen within the context that the Islamic countries themselves were divided about the issue. It may be sufficient to point out that even within those Islamic countries which sided with the west, there were strong anti-western sentiments, in contrast to Turkey, where most of the opposition came from the outlawed, left-wing, Revolutionary Youth, and calls from the Islamic extremists failed to mobilise the general Turkish public.
In short, it could be argued, that the role of Islam in Turkish foreign policy during the period under consideration, was mostly confined to the justification of the policies for which the government had opted, for other reasons. Turkey’s reorientation towards the Middle East during the 1980s was the result of a combination of factors, among which the Islamic revival occupied a small part. This was indicated by the fact that Turkey turned towards western Europe and the Soviet Union (later the former Soviet Republics) when the political and economic incentives for closer cooperation with the Middle East declined after 1985.

This discussion then, brings us to the question of the Turkish public’s role in the changing patterns of Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s. All the channels of public expression were suppressed under the military regime, (1980-83) to the point that the role of public opinion in foreign policy-making was minimal. Its effects, if there were any, during this period were only indirect. The military regime was anxious to keep the public on its side. Thus, the military leaders might have taken decisions, which, they thought, would go down well with the public, although, due to the nature of the regime, there was no apparent domestic pressure on the military government.

Even after the return of the civilian government, as a result of various restrictions created by the new constitution and other related laws, the recovery of public freedom of expression was slow. Under the new laws, the activities of various groups, through which public opinion could be relayed to the government, were restricted to non-political areas, which by definition excluded foreign policy-making. Thus, during most of the period under consideration, the governments had an "easy-ride" in foreign policy as far as public pressure was concerned. However, as Turkish public opinion became a progressively more important factor in the policy-making process, paralleling the increasing democratisation of society, especially after 1989, the Turkish government had to resist particularly strong pressure over its policies towards the Karabakh and Bosnian conflicts.

From the government’s point of view, both of these conflicts represented no-win situations. As far as the Karabakh conflict was concerned, Turkish public opinion sided heavily with Azerbaijan, and the government was under pressure as long as the fighting continued, not to sit on the sidelines. Non-intervention by Turkey only stirred up public opinion. Intervention, on the other hand, would have been extremely costly for Turkey, impacting on her future relations in the Caucasus, with Russia, NATO, and the United States. Hence, in its official approach to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Turkish government faced difficult policy choices, between domestic pressures, stemming from the sympathy of the Turkish public for the Azeris, who they regarded as victims of Armenian aggression, and its desire to remain neutral and play a moderating role. The complacency, with which Armenian military advances had been received in the west, did not help the severely embarrassed government, which was not only pro-western but did its best to remain on good terms with Armenia as well as Azerbaijan. Thus, the conflict firmly underscored the dilemma that would face Turkey in its future efforts to maintain strict neutrality regarding ethnic conflicts near its borders.

In the Balkans, another manifestation of the growing nationalism in world politics after the end of the Cold War, that is the struggle between the Serb, Croat and Moslem forces over Bosnian territories, aroused great interest in the Turkish public. Though Bosnia is several hundred miles from Turkey’s borders, and the Bosnian Moslems are not ethnic Turks, it seemed that the Turkish public had developed a feeling of kinship and responsibility for the Muslims left behind by the retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans, after around five hundred years of domination. Moreover, the existence in Turkey of between four and five million "Boshnaks", Turkish citizens of Bosnian origin, further increased the identification of the Turkish people with the Bosnian Moslems.

What was important for Turkish foreign policy-making, was that the importance of religious and historical links, alongside ethnic bonds, seemed to be on the increase in the country.223 The
Turkish government, as in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, was caught between domestic pressures and what were considered by decision-makers, as sensible and responsible policies. Thus, while the Turkish government in its official response to the crisis was extremely restrained, and followed a policy aimed at creating coordinated policies with other states, through international organisations such as the UN, NATO, the CSCE and the ICO, in order to avoid charges that Turkey was pursuing pan-Ottomanist policies in the region, the Turkish public, increasingly frustrated by the inactivity of the west, became very critical of what they perceived as the passivity of their government.

Although the Turkish government has averted public pressure and avoided direct military involvement in either of the conflicts, the increased importance of religious and historical bonds may yet result in increased public pressure on the government to act, thereby forcing Turkey to be involved in situations where neither her security nor her national interests are directly threatened. Moreover, there were wider and in the longer-term more important aspects of these conflicts for Turkish foreign policy. Most notably, a reassessment, among the vast majority of Turkish people about the "real face" of "western values" and the place of Turkey vis-à-vis the west, took place. Especially in connection with the Bosnian conflict, while the western inactivity towards Serbian aggression was increasingly interpreted as "western complacency", questions were raised about whether the west would have allowed the Serbs to conduct their so-called "ethnic cleansing" if the victims were Slovenians or Croatians, that is Christians instead of Moslems. Speculation that Serbian attacks were in fact part of a new "crusade" aimed at expelling the last remnants of the Ottomans from Europe was also aired. These events in the Balkans, when viewed together with the Karabakh issue, where, as mentioned earlier, the Turkish public again perceived Christian solidarity against Moslem Azerbaijanis, resulted in the questioning of both Turkey’s western orientation and the desirability of her further integration into Europe. In the meantime, pan-Turkist and neo-Ottomanist ideas gained ground, at least among right-leaning intellectuals. Although these ideas did eventually peter out, without actually leading Turkey along different paths, they, coupled with the frustration felt as a result of continual "European rejection" of Turkey, put the successive weak coalition governments under public pressure, and lead to a process of yet another reassessment of Turkish identity in the early 1990s.

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: SYSTEMIC CHANGES AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The importance of the external environment, particularly regarding western European reactions to the military coup and the subsequent evolution of Turkish democracy, has already been elaborated above. Towards the end of the period under consideration, yet another impetus for change, originating in the external environment, came to dominate Turkish foreign policy-making and forced Turkey to reconsider her place and standing in the world. This was the transformation of Eastern Europe and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, which had enormous impact, both on Turkish foreign and security policies and on the Turkish worldview in general. It has been argued "perhaps no other country outside the former Soviet bloc has seen its strategic position more radically transformed by the end of the Cold War than Turkey". Throughout the Cold War, Turkey was a distant outpost on the European periphery, a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, and a contributor to the security of Europe. Turkey’s geo-strategic "value" was largely limited to its role within the Atlantic Alliance and, more narrowly, its place within NATO’s southern flank.
By the end of the Cold War however, all these were altered by the appearance of new zones of conflict on three sides of Turkey. Further, the emergence of six independent Muslim states to the northeast, opened Turkey’s eyes to a vast territory inhabited by some 150 million fellow Muslim Turkic-speakers, which presented Turkey with an unprecedented historical opportunity, at least potentially, to utilize for political, economic and psychological gains. The fact that the new situation also presented challenges to her, created a lukewarm attitude in Turkey regarding the end of the Cold War, as the mainstream analysts came to an understanding that the collapse of Soviet power and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, were a mixed blessing for Turkey. While the century-old Soviet/Russian threat to Turkey’s security has disappeared, the vacuum created by this departure in the Caucasus and Central Asia, has become the breeding ground on Turkey’s borders, for potential risks and threats to regional security because of the deep tensions between mixed national groups, contested borders, economic difficulties, and the competition of outsiders for influence.

In the meantime, however, an atmosphere of euphoria existed in Turkey as her common cultural, linguistic, and religious bonds with the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasian republics, and her value as an economic and political model for them, were increasingly realised, both within Turkey and further afield. Even limited pan-Turkist ideas were circulated freely. In return, the Turks and Muslims of the former Soviet Union turned to Turkey to help them achieve momentum, consolidate their independence, and gain status and respect in the world. It was not long, however, before this euphoria become tempered by reality, and soon it became clear that Turkey’s financial and technological means were too limited to meet the immense socio-economic needs of the underdeveloped former Soviet republics. Moreover, the links between the Central Asian republics and Russia, in some cases forged over centuries and reinforced by need and dependency, were far more solid than originally suspected. Thus, with optimism gradually replaced by disillusionment, it became clear that Turkey of the 1990s faced tremendous opportunities and potential new risks in Central Asia and the Caucasus, all of which collectively posed extraordinary and complex challenges.

Having based its whole post-war foreign and security policies on the strategic importance to the west of its location, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Turkey, initially hardly welcomed the end of the Cold War. As the relevance of NATO in the "new world order" was opened up to discussion, especially by the western Europeans who were moving towards a new defence arrangement without Turkey, she suddenly found herself in a situation where she felt threatened both by the lingering uncertainties regarding her immediate neighbourhood and by the fact that her western security connection, the anchor of her European vocation, was fundamentally damaged by the end of the Cold War. The realisation that she could find herself facing military threats virtually all around her and it might not be possible to evoke the western security umbrella for protection, shook the

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225. Edward Mortimer, "Active in a New World Role" in Turkey, Europe’s Rising Star; The Opportunities in Anglo-Turkish Relations (London: Lowe Bell Communications, 1993), p. 44.
226. The then Turkish president, Turgut Özal, in his opening speech of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 1 September 1991, described the situation created by the end of cold war and breaking up of the former Soviet Union as an "historic opportunity" for the Turks to became a "regional power", and urged the Assembly not to "throw away this change which presented itself for the first time in 400 years". See Minutes of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Term: 19-1, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 25.
227. As the then Turkish Prime Minister Demirel put it, "we share a common history, a common language, a common religion and a common culture. We are cousins cut off from each other for over a hundred years, first by the Russians under the Czars, and then by the Communist regime". See Mushahid Hussain, "Iran and Turkey in Central Asia; Complementary or Competing Roles?", Middle East International, 19 February 1993, p. 19.
foundations of Turkish security thinking, and the need to reassess its post-Cold War situation vis-à-vis potential threats was expressed at the highest levels. Thus, by 1990, the external stimulus for change in her traditional foreign policy was at its highest. While the disintegration of the Soviet Union came to the fore, Turkey, too, was going through a process of reassessing her foreign policy orientation and some of its essential ideological underpinnings. At this juncture, the emergence of the Turkic states beyond her north-eastern border was a welcome break, and as put by the daily Milliyet newspaper, "it has been a great thrill for Turks to realise that they are no longer alone in the world". The growing awareness and a new sense of ethnicity appeared "in a society not very used to talking about such things", and the talk of a "Turkish speaking community of states stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" became increasingly common. In the process, however, the lines between "Turkish" and "Turkic" became increasingly blurred. In this context, as the perceived "Turkic power" grew in her immediate surroundings, it ignited a greater nationalist flame in Turkish decision-making, thus sparking a more activist Turkish foreign policy and a new quest for influence.

At the same time, a greater Turkish role in the Caucasus and Central Asia was also favoured by the west as a counter-weight against the ambitions of Iran in the region. The fear that the vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet Communism could lead to an emergence of Islamic fundamentalism among the Moslem republics of Central Asia led to the west’s promotion of Turkey as a Moslem, yet secular and democratic model. In President Demirel’s words, Turkey had proved that "Islam, democracy, human rights and market economy could go together, hand in hand". Although cultural, linguistic, and religious affinities were the

stimulating factors for the forging of closer ties, the Turks expected to gain major economic benefits from the development of closer ties with the Central Asian Turkic Republics, which were seen as promising markets for a growing Turkish industry.

As a country that attributes utmost importance to stability and constancy, Turkey has always been sensitive about attempts to change the existing equilibrium within its surrounding region, to the extent that the preservation of the current balance, is usually considered as part of the Turkish national interest. In this context, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has affected both Turkey’s foreign and security polices, and its world-view in general. In a similar pattern, Iran-Iraq and the Gulf wars in the Middle East, the Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosova crises in the Balkans, and the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, all took place in the immediate vicinity of the country and awakened Turkey to the danger of involvement in such regional conflicts that do not represent immediate threats to her borders.

The concerns that emerged from the possibility of setting up an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, as well as the effects of Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Chechnya conflicts over the radicalisation of certain groups within Turkish society have evidenced emergent public pressure within Turkey for a more interventionist policy on behalf of ethnic minorities within Turkey’s vicinity.

Turkey traditionally avoided involvement in regional politics and conflicts. However, international developments, as well as the evolution of Turkish domestic policies, compelled it during the 1990s, to concern itself more with regional events, and to attempt to achieve prominence in international politics and a higher profile in the Middle East and Muslim/Turkic areas of the former Soviet Union. Turkey was drawn into the volatile politics within the Caucasus (especially the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), the Balkans (Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosova), and the Middle East (Kuwait-Northern Iraq), where she was forced to take sides and follow an "active"
foreign policy. For its part, Turkey, mindful of the disruptive impacts of sub-nationalism and ultra-nationalism, has been eager to promote the positive aspects of national formation around its environs. However, the hopes for creating a form of Turkic Commonwealth, able to accommodate most of the new states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which would have countered more ugly manifestations of nationalism and their related problems, proved unrealisable, at least, in the short or middle term. It is also clear by now that a transitional arrangement, based on Islam or political pan-Turkism, will not materialise either in the foreseeable future, although the Turkic belt of influence, stretching from the Caspian Sea to China may still emerge. Accordingly, Turkey has already made clear that such transitional concepts are not part of her external relations policy. In the mean time, a new and ever-deepening Turkish rivalry with Iran emerged over influence in the new states of Central Asia and especially Azerbaijan. If the independence of the former Soviet Azerbaijan at any time threatens to stimulate a parallel separatist movement in northern Iran, it could bring two rivals into severe conflict with each other - even if Ankara does not seek to provoke it. If Russia comes to believe that Turkey’s moves in the region are aimed towards some sort of Central Asian Turkic unity, it will certainly lead to confrontation in the region between Turkey and Russia, especially if Russia perceives that Turkey is willingly undermining its territorial integrity by playing to the existing tendencies in the Northern Caucasus for separation from Russia. Moreover, Russian behaviour close to the Turkish border since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has not left Turkey in doubt about the intentions of the Russian Federation if it finds a favourable situation. Under the more optimistic scenarios, closer ties with Russia, whose trade relations with Turkey are still larger than all of the former Soviet republics put together, could create a more conducive environment, favourable to regional stability.

In short, dramatic changes in Turkey’s traditional policy of isolationism from regional conflicts and her increasingly active participation in regional issues since the early 1990s have, on the one hand, provided her with the potential to fulfill its economic and political expectations, while on the other hand, also brought about new challenges and security problems. The success of her newly emerging posture and her influence in the region has been limited by her own modest economic and industrial resources, and will depend on her success in dealing with ethnic issues within Turkey.

The September 12 coup d’état caused Turkish-European relations to rapidly deteriorate. Although from the beginning, the military regime declared its pro-western attitude, the incompatibility of a military dictatorship with the liberal democratic tradition of the west, coupled with the unwillingness of the Europeans to show an understanding of Turkey’s political problems, resulted in widespread European criticism and strained relations. Consequently, Turkey’s relationships, especially with the European representative institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, suffered considerably. European organisations and governments attempted to use their political and economic leverage on Turkey during the period to obtain an early return to democracy and improvements in human rights. Although these attempts were partly successful, because of Turkey’s receptiveness towards such pressures as a result of her European vocation, they also created counter-reactions among the Turks, as they resented being subjected to foreign pressures.

During the same period (1980-1983), Turkish-American relations expanded, as the latter, in contrast to the Europeans, showed an understanding towards Turkish problems, as a result of its strategic considerations. In the atmosphere of renewed Cold War, American military and economic aid to Turkey increased and a relatively unproblematic period of Turkish-American
relations developed. Strategic considerations and further rapprochement in Turkish-American relations were also instrumental in bringing about Turkey's conciliatory attitude in the Aegean, where Turkish interests clashed with those of Greece. As a result, normal flight conditions were allowed to resume in Aegean air space and, after a personal "promise" from NATO Secretary-General, General Rogers to General Evren, Turkey dropped her objections to Greece’s reintegration into NATO structures. However, this initial conciliatory attitude by Turkey did not result in further normalisation of Turkish-Greek relations, as the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party of A. Papandreou came to power in Greece in 1981 with anti-Turkish rhetoric and propaganda.

Turkey’s political contacts with Islamic and Communist countries also increased, as the former needed new outlets and political allies in the face of mounting criticism and increasing alienation from Europe. The latter’s largely uncritical attitude towards the military regime facilitated these contacts. Moreover, adoption of an export-led growth strategy, demanded new markets and large foreign currency inflows. Given the fact that the political standstill in Turkish-European relations hindered Turkey’s efforts to rally any concerted European effort to save her, she had to turn increasingly to United States-dominated international monetary organisations for the necessary foreign aid, and to the Middle East and former eastern bloc for new export markets. Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq war, towards which Turkey took a neutral stand, was largely instrumental in a new economic surge towards the Middle East, as both countries were forced by the war, to rely increasingly on Turkey for their supplies and connections with the west via Turkish territory.

The most important determinants of Turkish foreign policy during the military regime were, thus, heightened strategic considerations as a result of the renewed Cold War; necessities and demands of the restructured economy; and the nature of the political system in Turkey that largely conditioned Turkey’s European connections.


Although the gradual return to Turkish parliamentary politics from 1983 onwards should have ideally provided a base for normalisation of Turkish-European relations, the reality differed, as European criticism continued to focus on the deficiences of the Turkish political system and the persisting human rights abuses. Consequently, Turkish-European political relations were slow to recover, despite the willingness and attempts of consecutive Özal governments. Towards the end of the decade, paralleling her democratisation process, Turkey had gained most of the lost ground in her relations with the European states and institutions. Yet further progress proved impossible, and the Turkish application for full European Communities membership was refused in 1989, not only in consideration of Turkey’s economic deficiencies, but also its political shortcomings and alleged "cultural differences". This in turn created a new wave of resentment within Turkey and brought about questions over the sustainability, and indeed the desirability, of existing patterns of relations between Turkey and Europe.

Turkish-European economic relations, on the other hand, recovered from their lowest point during the military regime, despite the inability of Turkey to obtain further concessions from the Community for her exports, especially for textile products, and the release of the fourth financial protocol of the European Communities, mainly because of Greek objections. In this recovery, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the decreased purchasing power of Middle Eastern countries as the oil prices declined after 1985, played an important part, since the decline in the Middle Eastern market forced Turkey to turn to her traditional European markets. Gradual relaxation of political tension also played an important role.

Turkish-Greek relations continued to be strained during the period, despite various overtures from both sides for normalisation of relations, and in March 1987 reached a point of almost open military conflict over the Aegean continental shelf. This resulted in consecutive meetings of prime
ministers and foreign ministers of the two countries and from then on, relations gradually improved. The declaration of independence by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in December 1983 was particularly instrumental in earlier worsening of relations. Moreover, constant Greek attempts, after its membership to the European Communities, to make the Community a party to Turkish-Greek disputes and its continuing blocking of the normalization of Turkish-Community relations also created tensions between the two countries.

Turkish-Middle Eastern relations continued to develop during the Özal governments, despite the fact that part of the economic incentive for closer relations disappeared gradually after 1985. In continuation of improved relations, important roles played by the growing ideological and cultural affinities of the ruling political elite within these countries and by the insistence of Özal to open up Turkish foreign policy towards new centres. Moreover, especially in Turkish-Iraqi relations, the perceived common security threat from Kurdish separatists was a source for closer relations. However, towards the end of the decade, and certainly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, relations with Iraq, and also with Syria, were strained because of the water issue, which became so explosive in the region that it was referred to as a possible source of the next Middle Eastern war.

However, "the next war" in the Middle East erupted between Iraq, and the United States-led coalition forces, over Kuwait. Turkey’s policies during the crisis deviated from her established Middle Eastern foreign policy patterns and presented important clues to her post-Cold war foreign policy stand. Turkey’s Gulf policy, which was marked by active involvement, in contrast to the earlier Turkish stand of not getting drawn into Middle Eastern affairs, was heavily determined by president Özal, and as such represented part of his "vision" for Turkey’s future role in regional and international politics. In the process, however, he precipitated a vigorous debate within Turkey over his role as president and the extent of his authority.

Turkish-American relations continued to blossom during the decade, again heavily influenced after 1983 by Özal, who concluded that the United States was the undisputed leader of the world and that Turkey should closely associate herself with it in international politics, in order to attain her deserved place in the world, if not to prevent United States influence over world politics from harming various Turkish interests. It was also true that there was a genuine appreciation, and admiration, of "American ways" by Özal, formed during his stay in the United States. Friendship between the two presidents, Özal and Bush, introduced a personal touch into Turkish-American relations, and strategic cooperation between the two countries reached its peak during the Gulf crisis, when Turkey unequivocally supported the American stand. Afterwards, cooperation, though continued, somewhat cooled down as the change of governments in both countries brought into power people with more restrained foreign policy priorities. Also the logic of strategic cooperation somewhat changed its character, if not actually declined, with the end of the Cold and Gulf wars and the emergence of new conflict centres in the world. Concomitantly, American aid to Turkey declined, creating a Turkey somewhat more reluctant to commit itself to United States priorities in international politics. Moreover, the preference of coalition governments in Turkey after 1991, to improve relations with Europe instead of more dependency to the United States, in contrast to Özal’s earlier preference, was also important.

Turkish-Soviet (and later Russian) relations, also, continued to improve during the second half of the 1980s, and important cooperation, especially in the economic realm came into existence. In this context, Turkey’s innovative attempt to bring together those countries directly bordering or neighbouring the Black Sea, was an interesting attempt and may yet develop into an important organisation in the region, enabling its members to cooperate on political as well as economic areas in future.

In short, during the 1980s, despite widening and expanding her connections with new centres, Turkey kept her traditional, pro-Western orientation intact. Thus through her explorations, guided by the leadership of Turgut Özal, Turkey of the 1980s, while trying to keep her Western pillar
untouched, despite a series of setbacks, added new components - the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans - to the substance of her foreign policy. As the balance of relations was being re-ordered to make room for new actors, Turkey’s multi-dimensional setting was emphasised once more and her role in bridging different cultures and geographical settings was underlined, without, however, losing sight of her Western vocation.

Transition to Post-Cold War

While the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signified the beginning of the end for the communist system that the international community had become used to, for Turkey it introduced new difficulties in her foreign and security policies. During the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy was conducted within well-known parameters. Even though nuclear bipolarity carried within it the dangers of a possible global catastrophe, it also provided a stable, balanced, well known and therefore "secure" environment for countries like Turkey. Within this system, Turkey, entrusting her security to NATO membership and the United States’ nuclear umbrella, was occupied in her foreign policy with well-delineated problems such as the Aegean and Cyprus.

The end of the Cold War, however, changed this. The game that Turkey played for 45 years ended and was replaced by a new game, the rules of which were not yet known. Therefore, while the new era suddenly signified the emergence of new problems for Turkey, it became clear that Turkey could not follow the foreign policies that were formulated under the aegis of the Cold War.

First of all, the abandonment of the Communist regime and attempts to democratise politics within Russia and other newly independent states, improved the possibility of global cooperation transcending the enmities of the Cold War. However, since then, in the absence of clearly defined mechanisms for preventing regional conflicts, perpetual instability within the new states and tensions between them, have increased the serious risk of interstate clashes and civil wars in the heart of Eurasia, where Turkey is situated. The political implosion of the Soviet system has also undermined the international alliances originally designed to counter Soviet expansionism and has created a major risk of socio-political instability, extending far beyond the former Soviet territories into the nearby countries of Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

Former Soviet regions, and nationalities that once seemed of marginal significance for an understanding of international relations, have become critically important. The model that these peoples should emulate in their quest for national identities, political and economic development, and international alliances has become a source of controversy, not only within these states but also among nearby countries and global actors.

A somewhat natural extension of the end of the Cold War has been the diminishing importance of the old east-west division of the international system, which has been replaced by a new line dividing north and south. In such an emerging division, where the bi-polarity of the Cold War era has disappeared, it seems inevitable that regional concerns would play a more important role in determining the course of international relations in the foreseeable future.

Thus, a struggle between aspiring regional powers for supremacy within the various sub-systems of the international system, including the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, seemed to be the likely order of the day.

These dramatic changes have challenged Turkey’s traditional policy of isolationism from regional conflicts, and forced her active participation in regional issues. As a result, while trying to keep her western pillar untouched, despite a series of obstacles, Turkey has added new components - the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans - to the substance of her foreign policy. As the balance of relations was being re-ordered to make room for new actors, her multi-dimensional setting was emphasised once more and her role in bridging different cultures and geographical settings was underlined, without, however, loosing sight of her western vocation. Thus, a decade after the end of the Cold War, despite widening and expanding her connections with new centres, Turkey kept her traditional pro-western orientation intact. As far as domestic influences are concerned, the
Kurdish separatist movement, serious economic difficulties, and the rising power of Islamic forces have become important factors inhibiting the smooth functioning of Turkish foreign policy.


CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is clear by now that Turkey’s ambition to become a full European Union member will dominate her foreign policy in the near future. It is imperative that related domestic and external issues will preoccupy Turkey for a considerable period. In this context, Turkey will continue to follow pro-western policies in the foreseeable future. Despite Turkey’s other involvements, the full membership of the European Union still remains as one of the fundamental objectives of her foreign policy. Whatever the extent of Turkey’s disappointments and frustrations with Europe, it should not be forgotten that none of the scenarios that are presented as alternatives to Turkey’s western vocation, would be able to satisfy Turkey’s economic, security and ideological needs. Thus, so long as Turkey is permitted to enjoy cooperation with the west (not necessarily in the form of European Union membership) she will remain pro-western in her attitudes.

We could of course speculate about the implications of an Islamic regime on Turkey’s foreign policy, though such an eventuality seems highly questionable. Though it could easily be argued that a regime based on Sharia would have worsening affect for Turkey’s Western orientations in favour or more "Eastern" options, we should also highlight the fact that even pro-Islamic parties now openly state their willingness to support Turkey’s European Union membership.

Moreover, in view of the broad consensus among the major political parties regarding foreign policy, the question of which of these parties holds power in the longer term is unlikely to be a significant factor with respect to basic values, objections and instruments of Turkish foreign policy.

Economic factors may still be expected to loosely shape Turkish foreign policy in the coming years. The procurement of foreign credits is likely to remain a task of Turkish diplomacy for the middle to long-term and depend on the evolution of Turkey’s relations with foreign countries. As in the past, the biggest part of foreign aid is expected to come from the West. Turkey’s growing need for export markets may emerge as a new source of tension, albeit transitory, between Turkey and her western allies, especially if Turkey’s much-pronounced disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the European Union after the conclusion of the customs union at the end of 1995 continues.

The nature of the political regime in Turkey will remain influential in Turkey’s relations, especially with European countries. It should be expected that democratic improvements and allegations of human rights abuses would continue to effect Turkey’s European credentials. In this context, ethnic issues, such as Kurdish separatism, would remain explosive and could play an important role in shaping Turkey’s future. It is obvious that containment of the issue within domestic politics and attempts to prevent it from becoming an international topic will remain one of the preoccupations of the foreign ministry. Therefore, in near future, Turkey will continue to try to separate domestic and international aspects of the Kurdish issue, while at the same time striving to forestall developments in northern Iraq from reaching such a stage that they would be conducive to establishing an independent Kurdish state there.

As long as Turkey is not in full control of its domestic situation, her freedom of movement in foreign and security policies will be subjected to, and limited by, the requirements of the Kurdish issue. The problem also clouds Turkey’s further movement towards greater democratic freedoms, which in turn threatens to jeopardise relations with the European Union.

Turkey will continue to hold on to NATO and try to widen her strategic relationship with the United States in the absence of an institutionalised security link with Europe. However, strains related to Iraq’s future and the after-effects of the March 1, 2003, refusal of the Turkish Parliament to let the US forces pass through Turkish territory en-route to Iraq, will continue to be felt in Turkish-American relations for the short-to-mid term. Nevertheless, Turkish-American relations
may be expected to continue pretty much in the same vein as today, unless developments in the region suddenly force the United States to change its attitude. As Turkey is situated in the very centre of the three most insecure areas of the post-Cold War era, security issues are expected to dominate Turkey’s foreign policy formulations during the coming years. Taking into account the current unstable and insecure environment, Turkey has to continue to modernise her military capacity. In this context, in the absence of a new institutional security arrangement with Europe, Turkey’s only other alternative to her United States connection would be to seek security through associations with neighbouring states. Given that her relations with most of them are inherently problematic, this does not seem either a desirable or feasible option. In this context, though the Turkey-U.S.-Israel triangle serves for Turkey’s short-term security needs, it is imperative that this will continue to effect her relations with the Arab world. If Turkey wishes to play a greater role in the Middle East, she should also take into account the sensibilities of regional countries and should try to follow a balanced political role in Middle Eastern affairs.

It is now clear that Turkish foreign policy in the near future will have increasingly focus on three bordering areas; The Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. While Turkey has traditionally avoided involvement in regional politics, "the international environment has changed and the bloc system ended. Turkey has to accept, against her will, that she is a regional power".234 In other words, it is almost inevitable that she will need to concern herself more with regional events, as regional developments will undoubtedly compel her to do so.

In this context, while keeping her traditional pro-Western orientation intact, Turkey, since the early 1980s, despite a series of obstacles, has added new components (The Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East) to the substance of her foreign policy. As the balance of relations was being re-ordered to make room for new actors, Turkey’s multi-dimensional setting was emphasised once more and her role in bridging different cultures and geographical settings was underlined, without, however, loosing sight of her Western vocation.

Finally, it should be mentioned that, in the absence of a driving and forceful leader, exercising a decisive turn about in foreign policy, it is likely that the main principles and areas of emphasis in Turkish foreign policy should be expected continue to exist both in the external and domestic environments during the coming years, unless dramatic international changes necessitate widespread reconsideration of its pillars. As far as domestic impetus for change is concerned, discussions regarding ethnic identities, possible serious economic difficulties, and political Islam should be watched as likely factors inhibiting the smooth functioning of Turkish foreign policy in the near future.


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