Evolving European Security Capabilities
and EU-Turkish Relations

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Summary

This paper focuses on the place and potential of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the European security structure and analyses the perception and reaction of Turkey towards such an emergent European security establishment as an example of a third country’s perception of ESDP. The paper firstly explains the development of ESDP, its content and its relationship with NATO, and discusses its place in the European security architecture. Secondly, the paper summarises the reactions of the US, Russia and other non-EU European NATO members towards the ESDP. Thirdly, the paper focuses on Turkey’s reaction towards the ESDP and analyses the reasons for its veto in NATO against the automatic recourse by the EU to NATO assets, coupled with the perception of the disruption of the balance between Greece and Turkey in the European security architecture. Finally, the paper presents an analysis of the developments that have led to the lifting of the Turkish veto and the agreement reached between the EU and NATO. It concludes that the transformation of the EU into a security actor distinct from NATO has the potential to create new dividing lines in Europe and thus the EU should preserve its civilian power image in order to continue to promote cooperation and inclusion in Europe.

Introduction

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) provides the EU with an important tool for the pursuit of an effective CFSP. The adoption of Petersberg tasks as the aim of the ESDP and the promotion of military and civilian capabilities enhance the EU’s position as a benevolent civilian power

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with military capabilities. On the other side of the coin, however, are the international implications of this achievement: How do the non-EU actors perceive and react to these new capabilities of the EU and how can future achievements in the field of ESDP affect the EU’s foreign relations? These questions are the main focus of this paper. The paper will analyse the questions by taking EU-Turkish relations as an example.

In this respect, the paper will present the prospects for the EU in promoting European security and demonstrate how such a project can be responsible for creating new divisions within the Continent. Turkey perceives its formal exclusion from an emergent European Security and Defence Policy as a threat to its own security since it stands to lose the tools of influence it would have, had the ESDP developed as a result of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. Besides, Turkey’s exclusion from an EU with military capabilities would mean military exclusion from Europe in the post-Cold War era.

Turkey is not the only country whose relations with the EU have been influenced by the emergence of the ESDP and the prospect of an EU with military power. The United States has increasingly made the ESDP, and its subsequent impact on NATO, a topic for discussion in EU-US relations, since the Summit in Gotenburg in June 2001. The EU’s intention to increase its institutional autonomy in defence matters alarmed NATO once again in October 2003 and EU leaders felt the need to reassure the US. The EU’s relations with Russia and the eastward enlargement of the EU could also be affected by the emergence of the ESDP, if Russia starts to perceive the EU as a European military alliance. The Southern Mediterranean partners of the EU also have a tendency to dismiss military cooperation with the EU in the Mediterranean and perceive it as a disguise of military intentions of the Europeans in the region.

For the time being, the ESDP is a voluntary joint action of EU member countries created to carry out those functions which are defined as the Petersberg tasks, functions which are mainly related to crisis-management and humanitarian operations. In the future, however, the development of the ESDP could take on a greater impetus with respect to the debates on the future of Europe.

These debates extend to the prospect of accepting a mutual defence clause among the EU member states as well as the adoption of a European security strategy, as defined in the December 2003 Brussels European Council. Even without these prospects, the current humanitarian actions of the

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2 Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking.
EU could run the risk of placing the EU in the middle of military crises. There are concerns within the EU about the creation of an independent army or an independent military policy. Thus, the emergence of the EU as a prominent actor in European security could change the EU’s relations with its partners. This paper will analyse these concerns and in the second part of the paper, EU-Turkish relations will be used as an example.

In the first part, the paper will evaluate the impact of the emergence of the ESDP on European security: the capacities it has promoted, the forms of cooperation it foresee with its allies and partners, the debate in NATO and the views of the allies on participation in the ESDP. In the second part, the paper will present the evolution of EU-Turkish relations with respect to the ESDP, the reasons for Turkey’s objection to some aspects of it, the solution foreseen by the EU-NATO Declaration of 16 December 2002 and the further evolution of ESDP within the EU-NATO dialogue.

What Does the ESDP Represent for European Security?

The end of the 1990s saw a new factor emerge in the European security debate: the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The roots of the ESDP lie within the NATO concept of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the hopes of the CFSP for the eventual framing of a security and defence policy, which might in time lead to common defence. Whether the ESDP will turn into an effective constituent of European security in the 21st Century is yet unknown. The success of integration in the security field will depend on the future shape of the EU, which will evolve as a result of the current debates on the future of the Union. Although the ESDP is still at a formative stage, it is raising both expectations and concerns among Europe’s allies and partners.

As stated in the 1994 NATO Summit Declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin in 1996, NATO countries fully supported the development of ESDI within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. ESDI would enable all European allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance. According to NATO’s Washington Declaration, issued on the 50th Anniversary of the Alliance, NATO Allies welcomed the further impetus that had been given to the strengthening of European defence capabilities. This strengthening of their defence capabilities would enable European allies to act more effectively together, thus reinforcing the transatlantic link.3 The Strategic Concept agreed at the April 1999 Washington Summit stated that the EU’s decision to strengthen its security and defence dimension would have

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3 NATO Washington Declaration, Washington, 23-24 April 1999
implications for the entire Alliance and all European allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU.4

The merging of the concept of an ESDI in NATO with the EU’s second pillar, namely the CFSP (and its aim for a common security and defence policy which could in time lead to common defence) created the ESDP, whose emergence we witness today. The divergence of Turkish and EU views on the participation of non-EU European NATO countries in ESDP has its roots in the development processes of these two concepts, ESDI and ESDP.

As A.C. Gerry explains, the proponents of ESDP argue that the changing political landscape in the post-Cold War period is driving the need for an independent European defence policy. Accordingly, the old parameters are no longer valid, and the future of US commitment and engagement in Europe is uncertain. Europe is richer and stronger now than at any previous time, and has a population larger than that of the US. These factors, together with the potential for non-state and other threats to stability and security in Europe, mandate that the EU take responsibility for its own defence.5 As Ambassador Marc Otte, who is the Head of ESDP Task Force in the Council Secretariat of the EU, says “the EU has become a political entity whose time has come to develop its own security needs and the means to defend itself.”6 Accordingly, the security strategy paper of Javier Solana, the High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, adopted in the December 2003 European Council outlines the key threats to Europe and the EU’s own strategic objectives in tackling these threats. He defined terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and organised crime, each of which has the potential to combine and interact with each other, as the new threats to European security and advised that the EU contribute to stability and good governance in its immediate neighbourhood; by building an international order based on effective multilateralism.7

The ESDP was established with reference to the second “CFSP” pillar of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. It is a goal of the European Union to promote integration in the security and defence fields. Although it proceeds in the form of intergovernmental integration, the ESDP’s Headline

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4 The Strategic Concept adopted at NATO Washington Summit, Washington, 24 April 1999
6 Stated in Ibid.
7 Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Council, Thessaloniki, 20.6.3002
Goal and the adoption of the Petersberg tasks by the EU presents a commitment by the participating countries to do more for their own security. The emergent ESDP foresees probable use of NATO capabilities and strategic planning and aims to take action in peacekeeping and humanitarian situations where NATO as a whole is not engaged, at the same time supposedly promoting an ESDI within NATO. The development of the ESDP is intended to strengthen the EU’s capacity for action in the field of conflict prevention, crisis management and humanitarian tasks. Where NATO as a whole is not engaged, the EU is determined to launch and conduct EU led military operations in response to international crises.

Under the current framework, ESDP is a benevolent undertaking of EU member countries to enhance their security, when faced with situations defined in the Petersberg tasks. It does not present a decouplement of the participating countries from a collective NATO defence, although there are views that the ESDP should or could develop into an independent European defence unit.

The summer of 2003 saw the emergence of two different schools of thought regarding the path that EU defence plans should follow. In April 2003, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg proposed the creation of a core of collective planning and operational capabilities for the EU without using NATO assets and capabilities. Belgium also proposed the establishment of a European military command headquarters in Tervuren.

The UK, on the other hand, put forward a different view, presenting NATO as the heart of European security and proposing the setting up of a European cell within the NATO command in Mons, Belgium. Both of these suggestions were put to debate at the informal foreign ministers meeting in Riva del Garda, Italy on 5 September 2003.

This meeting resulted in an agreement that the EU should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources. The UK, Germany and France agreed that a planning and implementation capacity should be achieved not only in consensus with the 25 members, but also in a circle of interested partners, i.e. pioneer countries. The plans for a separate headquarters were dropped but not ruled out. Meanwhile,

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8 The European Union has decided to establish a 50-60,000 strong force deployable within 60 days sustainable for at least a year to carry out the Petersberg tasks by 2003, according to the Feira European Council Conclusions.
9 Özdem Sanberk, Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası ve Türkiye, TESEV website, http://www.tesev.org.tr
NATO perceived the plans for a separate headquarters as the most tangible threat to the solidarity in the Alliance.\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{The Current Shape of the ESDP}

The EU is developing an autonomous capacity to take decisions in military matters. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) has been established to deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the ESDP. The Committee will help define policies by drawing up “opinions” for the Council, send guidelines to the Military Committee (EUMC) and receive the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee. The PSC has political control of and exercises the strategic direction of the EU’s military response to crises. The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU: It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework.\textsuperscript{12} The non-EU European NATO members and other countries, which are candidates for accession to the EU, have appointed interlocutors to the Political and Security Committee and established points of contact with the EU Military Staff to facilitate close contacts with these EU bodies.\textsuperscript{13}

ESDP is not intended to be the vehicle for the creation of a European army. The commitment of national resources by member states to such operations will be based on their sovereign decisions. To facilitate this, a Capabilities Commitment Conference was convened in November 2000, followed by a capability improvement conference in November 2001. It is essential for the credibility and effectiveness of the ESDP that the Union’s military capabilities for crisis management enable it to intervene with or without recourse to NATO assets. The promotion of the capabilities of the EU to enable it to take action without recourse to NATO assets would, on the one hand, signal the accomplishment of a whole new independent common foreign and security policy tool for the EU, thus promoting further political integration. On the other hand, it would enhance suspicions about a future decoupling of EU countries from NATO, as well as the drawing of new lines of exclusion and inclusion in Europe.

In addition to the institutional improvement of the ESDP by the earlier Presidencies, the Goteburg European Council also endorsed the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, which will improve the Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action. Accordingly, conflict prevention is stated as one of the main objectives of the


\textsuperscript{13} Presidency Report to the Goteburg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy, Goteburg, 15-16 June 2001
Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant activities, including ESDP, development cooperation and trade.\textsuperscript{14}

The EU is also developing an Exercise Policy. The Exercise Policy identifies EU requirements for categories of exercises, including joint exercises with NATO. The involvement of non-EU European NATO members and other candidates for accession to the EU is also outlined in the EU Exercise Policy. It was confirmed that in relations between the EU and NATO as two different organisations, there would be no discrimination against any of the member states.\textsuperscript{15} The EU would invite NATO, on the basis of reciprocity regarding crisis-management exercises, to observe EU exercises including those, which are not executed jointly. Non-EU European NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU would be invited to participate in the conduct of relevant exercises in line with the provisions for their participation in EU-led operations. Also, in line with the established dialogue, these countries should be invited to observe relevant exercises. Decisions on participation and observation in EU-NATO exercises will be taken after EU-NATO consultations. In this context, the EU also sought to ensure that all non-NATO EU candidate countries participate in or observe these exercises.\textsuperscript{16} At the first meeting of the NATO and EU Military Committees at NATO Headquarters, it was stressed that the autonomy of decision-making within NATO and the EU would be fully respected.\textsuperscript{17}

The aim of the dialogue between the EU and NATO is to ensure effective consultation, cooperation and transparency in determining the appropriate military response to crises and to guarantee effective crisis-management. As the Presidency Report on ESDP to the Nice European Council in 2000 strongly emphasised, the EU and NATO are organisations of a different nature. This should be taken into account when making arrangements, which have an impact on their relationship, and in assessments made by the EU of existing procedures governing WEU-NATO relations, with a view to their possible adaptation to an EU-NATO framework.\textsuperscript{18} This meant that the rights acquired by the non-EU European NATO members in the WEU would be diminished by the incorporation of WEU objectives into the EU framework.

\textsuperscript{14} Goteburg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 June 2001, paragraph 52
\textsuperscript{15} Presidency report!to the Goteburg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy, Goteburg, 15-16 June 2001
\textsuperscript{16} Annex IV “Exercise Policy of the EU” to the Presidency Report!to Goteburg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy, Goteburg, 15-16 June 2001
\textsuperscript{17} First Meeting of the NATO Military Committee-EU Military Committee, IMS Press Release, 12 June 2001
\textsuperscript{18} Presidency Report to the Nice European Council, 7-9 December 2000, Annex VI
**EU-NATO Relationship**

NATO has two concerns about the emergence of the ESDP: Whether the ESDP will bring about a disengagement of the EU members from their Atlantic link, and whether the ESDP will create additional problems among the Allies. The then NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, declared in 2001 that the 19-state NATO’s burden sharing should be approximately 50-50 between the Atlantic and Europe. He went on to say that he supported an EU military force as long as it did not intend to become a European army and did not extend its operational scope beyond the Petersberg tasks.\(^{19}\)

When discussing ESDP, Lord Robertson often stresses that NATO will retain its core collective defence mission, and states that the EU is focusing only on crisis-management. So instead of “NATO or Nothing”, he says, there would now be a European option for handling crises where NATO as a whole was not engaged. The US would be spared the situation where it was dragged into engagement where it did not have direct interests, simply for lack of alternatives.\(^{20}\) As Lord Robertson’s said,

> “Strengthening the EU does not mean that NATO will lose its central role in European security, nor will the transatlantic security link will be weakened. On the contrary, when the long-sought European security identity comes to fruition, Europe and North America will still be working together, only through more flexible arrangements and with more capability at hand.”\(^{21}\)

The NATO-EU stance on European security is crucial in determining the shape of the 21\(^{st}\) century European security architecture, especially due to doubts about the future of NATO and US commitment in Europe. The EU-NATO relationship is also important since it could delineate new forms of inclusion or exclusion in Europe on security matters. This possible inclusion or exclusion is Turkey’s main concern about the future role of ESDP. The process leading to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity took place progressively within NATO over a period of about ten years. As the later development of ESDP was primarily directed by EU member states, non-EU European NATO members found themselves excluded from any potential role in ESDP.

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\(^{19}\) *European Voice*, 8 March 2001, vol.7, no.10


\(^{21}\) Lord Robertson, “European security in the 21\(^{st}\) Century”, *The Officer*, May 2001, vol.77, no.4, pp.29-32
There are no plans for the EU and NATO to merge their memberships. NATO’s enlargement at the Prague Summit in 2002 saw some development in the merging of membership of the two institutions. In the Prague Summit, NATO also decided to create a Response Force. The NATO Response Force would be designed to be flexible, rapidly deployable, and interoperable. It would have initial operational capability by October 2004 and would reach full operational capability by October 2006.\textsuperscript{22}

The existing framework of the relationship between NATO and the EU was strengthened and formalised in December 2002 by the EU-NATO Declaration. For the EU, an important part of the Declaration was to give the EU guaranteed, permanent access to NATO’s planning capabilities, when it was considering an operation involving NATO assets and capabilities. The EU wished to presume the availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities.\textsuperscript{23} This led to the problem of the Turkish veto for the strategic use of NATO assets. This problem was solved by the Brussels European Council in October 2002 and the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002. However, the plans in 2003 for a separate EU Military Headquarters raised concern within NATO, particularly within the US. Following debates within the EU about a separate ESDP headquarters, NATO held an emergency meeting led by the US, in which the EU allies tried to reassure the US that the EU plans did not pose a threat to Alliance solidarity.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{Outsiders’ View on the ESDP}

\textbf{The United States}

US opinion on an ESDI to be developed within NATO ranged from the belief that “the EU force would undermine NATO” to a more positive understanding that “finally the Europeans would do more for their defence and that that could lead to a more equal burden-sharing in the Alliance”.\textsuperscript{25} The establishment of ESDP within the EU raised more concrete concerns in the US. One of the major concerns was that focus by EU members on crisis management should not lead to a two-tier Alliance in which the EU members focused on low intensity situations and the other members focused on high-profile security issues. For this reason, it was suggested that NATO’s

\textsuperscript{22} The Prague Summit and NATO’s transformation: A Reader’s Guide, NATO, 2003, Brussels
\textsuperscript{23} Presidency Report to the Nice European Council, 7-9 December 2000, Annex VII to Annex VI
\textsuperscript{25} Gerry, op.cit.
capabilities for crisis-management should also be enhanced, whilst at the same time, giving the European members the capacity to take the lead in operations where NATO as a whole was not engaged or where the US did not want to participate.\textsuperscript{26}

At the Goteburg Summit, the US welcomed EU efforts to acquire a civilian and military crisis-management capability and the US specifically called for an EU crisis management process that was transparent, fully coordinated with NATO and would provide for “the fullest possible participation of non-EU European allies”\textsuperscript{27}, signalling a warning for the non-alienation of non-EU allies. The US hopes that the ESDP will be managed in a way which adds capabilities to NATO, embeds defence planning in NATO and ensures that activities are planned in such a way that NATO has the right of first refusal and that finally ESDP applies only where NATO has chosen not to act collectively.\textsuperscript{28}

Another concern of the US is that it sees the tension between the EU and Turkey as detrimental to solidarity in the Alliance. A factor of this disagreement, highlighted by the US, is that the development of an effective ESDI is possible only if the then six non-EU European NATO allies are comfortable with their role in shaping EU decisions on crisis management and participation in EU-led operations. It is essential that non-EU European Allies such as Turkey enjoy a special status in their security relations with the EU because of their NATO Article V commitment to the 11 EU Allies. If a crisis being handled by the EU were to escalate, Article V could come into play. Accordingly, regular dialogue, and an atmosphere of inclusion and transparency are needed to develop a decision-shaping role for non-EU Allies.\textsuperscript{29} Put in this way, the US view can be partially taken to support Turkey’s position that European NATO members should not be ousted in the ESDP decision-making process, and NATO should remain the main security provider in Europe.

However, the new security strategy of the US relies on pre-emption, meaning that the US has the right to strike first, without waiting to be

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\item[27] \textit{Joint EU-US Statement at Goteburg Summit}, 14 June 2001
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attacked, thereby securing its interests and the safety of its citizens.\textsuperscript{30} This new American security concept leads to a divergence with the Europeans about the way problems should be solved. Coupled with the rise of a unilateralist tendency in American foreign policy, these changes have led to worries among the Allies about the commitment of the US to NATO. Thus, US-EU relations on security are experiencing tensions in two respects: the EU’s determination to establish its own security conceptions and the US unilateralist tendency to pursue its own interests.

\textbf{Russia}

Currently, Russia does not view the EU and NATO as comparable organisations. For Russia, NATO is regarded as a defence instrument and Russia will have to take the necessary political and defensive measures to resist NATO enlargement, which, with NATO plans to extend membership to the Baltic States, will bring NATO to its own doorstep.\textsuperscript{31} A strategy document published in October 2003 by the Russian defence department stressed that Russia would be forced to reconsider its military restructuring if NATO continued to exist with an offensive military doctrine. Russian officials warned against the expansion of NATO saying that it was an attempt by the US to exert influence in the former Soviet states.\textsuperscript{32}

EU-Russian relations, on the other hand, are regulated under the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. The Nordic Dimension is important in the EU’s relationship with Russia. It aims to promote closer dialogue and cooperation in political and security matters in Europe, to elaborate the concept of a common European economic space, to pursue dialogue on energy cooperation, and to open up EIB lending for selected environmental projects. The launching of the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership by the International Financial Institutions and the European Commission is also expected to help mobilise support for environmental and nuclear safety projects.\textsuperscript{33}

The EU-Russia Summits since 2001 have reaffirmed the commitment to promoting closer dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters in Europe. Possible participation by Russia in EU-led crisis management

\textsuperscript{31} Gerry, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{33} Goteburg European Council, \textit{Presidency Conclusions}, 15-16 June 2001
operations under agreed conditions is also foreseen.\textsuperscript{34} The EU attaches importance to cooperation with Russia on European security as acknowledged by the joint declaration between the EU and the Russian Federation in November 2003 on strengthening dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters.\textsuperscript{35}

**The Non-EU European NATO Members and Other Countries Which are EU Candidates**

The position of the non-EU European NATO countries is similar to that of Turkey. They belong to the collective defence of NATO, but are not a part of the ESDP, which their EU Allies are developing. All these countries are invited to contribute to the EU’s Headline Goal. The non-EU European NATO members can take part, if they wish, in EU-led operations making use of NATO assets. In an EU operation without recourse to NATO assets, these countries can be invited to join in the operation. Permanent consultation arrangements with the non-EU European NATO members in peace-time were agreed at the Nice European Council. During crisis periods, non-EU European Allies deploying significant military forces under an EU-led operation will have the same rights and obligations in day-to-day management of the operation as the EU states taking part in the operation, but not in the strategic management of the operation.\textsuperscript{36}

Norway is among the non-EU European NATO countries, whose position resembles that of Turkey. Norway’s main security concerns lie in the Nordic region, relations with and stabilisation of Russia and arms control.\textsuperscript{37} The three new members of NATO, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, are closer geographically to Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In the debate on the participation of non-EU European Allies, they adopted a position similar to that of Turkey, stating that the ESDP should evolve according to security requirements and not according to institutional design, and insisting that the EU’s arrangements for participation of non-EU European Allies should be built on arrangements existing within the WEU, thus avoiding the

\textsuperscript{34} Presidency report to the Goteburg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy, Goteburg, 15-16 June 2001.

\textsuperscript{35} Joint Declaration between the EU and the Russian Federation, joint Press Statement, 13990/03 (Presse313).2.


establishment of a circle of insiders versus outsiders.\textsuperscript{38} In the Joint Statement of their Budapest Meeting, on the occasion of the first anniversary of their accession to NATO, the Foreign Ministers of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic stressed that the role of non-EU European NATO members must be taken fully into account in the ESDP.\textsuperscript{39}

Although, the three new members of NATO found themselves in a similar position to that of Turkey, their membership of the EU in May 2004 solved their problem of inclusion in the ESDP. The decision of NATO in November 2002 at the Prague Summit to expand membership to include Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania and Bulgaria brought the membership profile of NATO closer to that of the enlarged EU of May 2004. Romania and Bulgaria, by acceding to NATO but failing to accede to the EU in 2004, now find themselves in a position similar to that of Turkey.

The ESDP is rapidly developing institutional arrangements for its enhancement as well as for cooperation with its Allies and partners. It is the expectations about the future role of the EU in European security that make the development of an ESDP a matter of wide discussion in academic, diplomatic and military circles. The ESDP has become quite an important issue in the EU’s foreign relations, currently, primarily, with Turkey and the US, but it can also be expected to arise in the EU’s relations with Russia if the development of the ESDP proves to be successful. It is also coming up in NATO meetings as an issue that seems to cause problems between the EU and non-EU Allies.


ESDP and EU-Turkish Relations

The declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty revitalised the WEU role in European security and invited EU members to become members. Non-EU NATO members were invited to become associate members in the WEU. Thus, EU and WEU membership was thought to converge, although non-EU NATO members were given an associate status in the organisation. As an associate member of the WEU, Turkey was given full and equal rights in the preparation, planning and conduct of WEU-led operations. At the time of its inception this development in the field of European security was not regarded as particularly crucial, it was only later that it gained in importance.

The aim of enhancing EU defence capabilities to a level where they would be able to lead an operation without recourse to NATO assets raised fears in Turkey about being excluded from an emerging new security framework, even though Turkey’s declared contribution to the EU’s Headline Goal stands as the sixth largest contribution in total, surpassing those of ten other EU members. In order to make its concerns heard and gain attention, Turkey chose to veto the use of strategic NATO assets by the EU. Turkey’s fear of exclusion was reinforced when it was ignored in the new weights of decision-making in an enlarged EU determined by the Nice Treaty. Steps towards further political integration in the EU strengthened Turkey’s fears of being left out of “Europe”.

According to Ambassador Onur Öymen, who was Turkey’s Permanent Representative to NATO, Turkey’s concerns about the ESDP could be classified into four categories: 1. Institutional concerns, with respect to preserving the integrity of NATO; 2. concerns on how best to strengthen European security; 3. a matter of principle to respect agreements reached at the level of Heads of State and Government and 4. national concerns with respect to protecting national interests. For the purposes of this paper these concerns will be classified as political and military.

Political Concerns

As already stated, since the beginning of the new enlargement process, Turkey has feared political exclusion from the EU. The EU’s decision not to declare Turkey a candidate country in December 1997, coupled with the starting of accession negotiations with Cyprus, which is expected to present a second veto to Turkey’s accession once it becomes a full

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41 Ibid.
member, the mentioning of Cyprus and Aegean problems in the Accession Partnership document with the final promotion of ESDP in the EU instead of the already agreed ESDI in NATO, are all factors perceived in Turkey as signs of a political will to alienate Turkey from the EU.

It is feared that if the accession process breaks down, Turkey will revert to being a buffer zone on the edge of Europe." Thus, Turkey perceives its candidacy to the EU and its inclusion in the European political and security framework as a matter of security. Secondly, it is also of concern in Turkey that Greece and the Greek Cypriots, once they become members, could use the emergent ESDP against Turkey. It should be remembered that Greece has always favoured a mutual defence clause in EU Treaties, although this has not been a reality until now. However, Greece has sought security in its EC/EU membership and has chosen to upgrade issues in its relationship with Turkey to the EU level, thereby making them issues in EU-Turkish relations. Thus, further securitisation of the concept of EU membership via the ESDP could pose a threat to Turkey in case its membership hopes are not fulfilled. This situation explains why Turkey chooses to preserve NATO, in which Turkey and Greece participate as equal members, as the key institution in a European security structure.

Military Concerns

Turkey shares defence solidarity with NATO members, having constituted the South-Eastern flank of NATO during the Cold War. For Turkey, NATO represented a sign of belonging to the “West” during the Cold War years. The inception of ESDP in the EU of which Turkey is not a member was firstly perceived as a threat to NATO solidarity. Özdem Sanberk articulates this concern in an article on the Internet site of TESEV, a Turkish think tank, that the development of military capabilities by the EU is a rival to NATO and the first step to a military integration, which would diminish NATO’s influence. For Turkey, NATO is the primary organisation for

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43 European Commission, Accession Partnership Document for Turkey, Brussels, 8th November 2000
collective defence and security. NATO also has priority in crisis-management as set out at the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999. Accordingly, the formation of ESDP should develop in conformity with the principles of “indivisibility of security” and “preservation of the Atlantic link”. It is of paramount importance not to create inequality and division within the Alliance. 47

Turkey’s main concern about ESDP is its exclusion from the formal decision making processes because it is not as yet, an EU member. The cooperation foreseen between the EU and the six non-EU European NATO members in the Feira Summit and reiterated in the Presidency Report to the Nice European Council can be summarised as follows:
- Permanent and regular consultation during peace-time. Non-EU countries can also propose meetings, on issues of security, defence and crisis management. Liaison officers can be appointed by the six to the EU military staff other specific liaison arrangements can be organised especially for the exercises.
- In times of crises, at the pre-operational phase consultations are foreseen on the concerns of the non-EU Allies. They will be kept abreast of EU thinking on strategic military options, operations and operational plans.
- During the operational phase, European members of NATO will have the automatic right to participate in EU operations where NATO assets are used. They can be invited to participate, if the operation is made without recourse to NATO assets. If these countries contribute to a EU-led operation they will have equal rights and obligations in the daily conduct of operations, but not in their strategic management. 48

Most of the regions that the EU crisis-management forces are expected to serve in, are neighbouring regions to Turkey and thus are of vital importance to Turkey’s own security. This led to Turkey having quite specific concerns: If the EU is conducting an operation without recourse to NATO assets in a neighbouring region to Turkey, Turkey’s participation is dependent on an invitation by the EU which cannot be taken for granted. Secondly, even if Turkey is invited or participates in an operation making use of NATO assets, it is going to participate only in the daily conduct of operations, which are mainly military decisions taken by professional military staff and not strategic or political decisions about the objectives and purpose of the

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operation. Specifically, in a situation where the EU makes use of NATO planning, then Turkey, which would have contributed to that planning process, would feel completely ousted in the conduct of the operation.\textsuperscript{49}

Evaluating these objections by Turkey to the EU’s mechanism of participation, it can be argued that Turkey now sees the EU not just as a civilian power, but as a power which can lead operations in Turkey’s neighbouring regions without Turkey having any influence on the planning and conduct of those operations.

Lord George Robertson accepts that the EU’s adoption of the WEU’s functions may be perceived as calling into question the benefits of Turkey’s far reaching associate status in the WEU and that recent developments may suggest that Turkey is suffering a diminution in its security status and a net loss of its influence on the evolution of European security. He stresses that Turkey’s proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean puts Turkey at the centre of a vital strategic area. As a secular democracy and a firm NATO Ally, Turkey has a great opportunity to play a role as an agent of positive change. According to him, any attempt to deprive Turkey of this role would be self-defeating and contrary to the West’s own vital strategic interests.\textsuperscript{50} The policy that Turkey adopted with respect to these concerns was to make its voice heard in the NATO decision-making process on the granting of NATO assets to the EU and to preserve the influence it has in NATO over EU policies.\textsuperscript{51} However, this policy could not be sustained for a long period and the Turkish veto was lifted to enable the EU-NATO Declaration in December 2002.\textsuperscript{52}

As expressed by the Turkish foreign ministry in early 2000, Turkey wished to

- participate on a regular basis in day to day planning and consultations on matters related to European security, as has been the case with the WEU.
- participate fully and equally in the process leading to decision-making on all EU-led operations drawing on the collective assets and capabilities of NATO and their implementation,
- participate in the decision-shaping and subsequent preparation, planning and conduct of EU operations not drawing on NATO assets and capabilities.

\textsuperscript{49} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Note to the Press on the decision taken at EU Feira Summit}, unofficial translation, no:103, 20 June 2000
\textsuperscript{50} Robertson, “Turkey…”, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{51} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Note to the Press on the decision taken at EU Feira Summit}, unofficial translation, no:103, 20 June 2000
\textsuperscript{52} Sanberk, “Avrupa…”, op.cit.
In addition to these requests, the Turkish position was strongly influenced by the fear that the EU’s new capabilities could be used against herself in a dispute with Greece over the Aegean or Cyprus. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, it would be helpful to ease relations between the EU and Turkey on this subject, if the EU and NATO had a structural relationship preferably based on a framework agreement to be reached between the two organisations. Such an agreement would facilitate the process of keeping Turkey informed of initiatives related to the development of ESDP within the EU and permit her to express her views in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{53}

Before the Laeken European Council, the UK, the US and Turkey succeeded in agreeing to a formula, which ensured that ESDP would not be used against a NATO Ally and in areas that harmed Turkish national interests. Turkey would lift its veto on the use of NATO capabilities by the EU and give up its wish to be included automatically in any operation that took place in Turkey’s vicinity but did not involve NATO assets. The EU confirmed that Turkey would be requested to take part in EU led operations without recourse to NATO assets, by an invitation agreed by the Council of Ministers.\textsuperscript{54} This agreement whose details were not officially published was rejected by Greece in the Laeken Summit. This proved to Turkey that its initial concern about the use of ESDP by Greece against herself was well-founded.

The October 2002 Brussels European Council resolved the most important parts of the disagreement by concluding that the ESDP would not be used against NATO Allies and the Copenhagen European Council declared that EU members which are not participants in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, i.e. Cyprus and Malta, would not participate in operations using NATO assets. Thus, with the lifting of the Turkish veto, the EU-NATO Declaration on the ESDP of 16 December 2002 established a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU in crisis management and ensured respect for the interests of members of both organisations. The EU ensured the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within the ESDP. In return, NATO granted the EU assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities.\textsuperscript{55}

It should be borne in mind that Turkey, as a candidate to the EU, is expecting a date for the opening of accession negotiations with the EU and is experiencing a certain period of rapprochement with Greece. Turkey’s lifting

\textsuperscript{53} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{note to the press on ESDI}, unofficial translation, 14 February, 2000
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP}, 16 December 2002, NATO Press Release (2002) 142
of its veto in NATO to allow the promotion of ESDP can be considered as a sign of good will to overcome differences and find win-win solutions in the relationship with both Greece and the EU.

The determining question here, as explained by Vershbow, seems to be about the nature of ESDP, i.e. whether the ESDP is about institution building or about problem solving, whether the ESDP is primarily a political exercise, as the latest stage in the process of European integration or whether the ESDP’s main goal is to solve real world security problems in Europe.

If the ESDP is mostly about European construction, then it will focus on institution building and there will be a tendency to oppose interference by NATO and to minimise the participation of non-EU Allies. One could then argue that since the ESDP is an EU project and an achievement of integration, it can only comprise and serve its own members. Thus, with autonomy as an end in itself, the ESDP will be an ineffective tool for managing crises and a source of tension in NATO.

If, on the other hand, the EU’s primary aim is to solve European security problems with the ESDP as a means to that end, then the EU will welcome cooperation with NATO and the contribution of non-EU NATO Allies and NATO will have a stronger European pillar in the process.⁵⁶

For the time being, ESDP seems to be providing the EU with autonomous capabilities, and strengthening itself as a new dimension of CFSP. However, as it matures, ESDP can be expected to develop practical solutions to real world problems. As suggested by Vershbow, the key is to get the balance right. NATO-EU relations on ESDP-ESDI should not be a zero-sum game in which it is considered a concession for one organisation to sit in the same room with members of the other.⁵⁷

Despite the initial emphasis on crisis-management and conflict prevention operations, the results of the recent Summits indicate that the EU’s long-term objective is to acquire a larger domain in the security field, possibly leading to a common defence and further autonomy from NATO.

Since the mid-1990s, the EU has started to get involved in matters Turkey considers related to its own security. The candidacy and subsequent membership of Cyprus and the EU’s involvement in the Cyprus problem presented the first sign that EU-Turkish relations were acquiring a security dimension. The second step has been the promotion of ESDP. Turkey is probably the first country to perceive the EU’s military capabilities worthy of serious consideration in European security.

⁵⁷ Ibid.
Turkey’s concerns about the development of military capabilities by the EU is the first example of the EU’s prospective image. In an expanding Europe, institutions such as NATO and the EU are becoming tools of inclusion and exclusion. They are promoting identities and providing frameworks of security. Their relations with outsiders should not lead to new divisions in the European continent.

Conclusion

The international concerns on the emergence of ESDP and the development of military capabilities by the EU can be summarised with reference to Madeleine Albright’s warning about the “3D’s”: ESDP should not decouple the US from Europe, must not duplicate NATO’s structures and capabilities and must not discriminate against non-EU European NATO members.\(^{58}\) Turkey is the country whose security seems for now to be most affected by the emergence of ESDP. Non-EU European NATO allies could find themselves in a similar position in times of a particular crisis.

The US concerns on the promotion of ESDP are based on the effect of ESDP on NATO’s future, on relations between Allies, but also on its own engagement to Europe. If the ESDP proves to be successful, Russia could one day perceive the EU as an organisation with military capabilities. Such a possibility must be taken into consideration when, through the process of enlargement, EU boundaries approach Russia’s borders. For this reason, it becomes important that the EU preserves its civilian power image.

At the beginning of the 21\(^{st}\) Century, institutions become tools of identity building, inclusion and exclusion. Turkey’s main concerns about being included into the new, emergent military architecture in Europe are about belonging to Europe. In order for the EU to promote European security it must send to its partners, Allies and neighbours the message that it favours cooperation and inclusion for security in Europe.

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\(^{58}\) Quoted in Ted Galen Carpenter, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual Muddle?”, Strategic Studies, vol.23, no.3, September 2000, pp.7-28