

**ASPECTS OF SECURITY “DILEMMA”¹ –
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE MACEDONIAN CASE**

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Abstract

With the end of the Cold War, insecurities over ethnic and national identities have become more important than insecurities over state sovereignty; these insecurities have resulted in many of the cases of intra-state conflicts. In order to understand these phenomena, one needs to look at the changing notion of security since the fall of the bipolar world. In this context, the broader concept of ‘security dilemma’, including societal security besides the traditional state security dilemma, can offer an innovative approach in addressing the sources of insecurity and the response to it. This paper considers the case of the Macedonian security problem, analysing it at three levels: the state-regional level, the community-state level, and the international level, aiming to (normatively) respond to the question of about whose security we need to be concerned. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that although security is a multilayered process involving community, state, regional and international actors, each of them, with their own characteristics regarding preferences and roles, still has the ultimate aim of providing security for individuals. As a policy implication of this, security policies in multiethnic states should aim at security for all, and not only for just a few.

Key Words

Critical security studies, societal security, Macedonia.

¹ The term ‘Security Dilemma’ here is used to cover both the processes at the inter-state level and processes at the intra-state level. “By analogy with the (state) security dilemma, a societal security dilemma might exist when the actions of one society, in trying to increase its societal security (strengthening its own identity), causes a reaction in a second society, which in the end, decreases its (the first society’s) own societal security (weakens its own identity)”. Paul Roe, “The Societal Security Dilemma”, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers, June 1996.

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Clarification: The name Macedonia (for the Republic of Macedonia), as stated in the constitution of the country, will be used instead of FYROM or FYR of Macedonia as preferred by some in the international community.

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, insecurities over ethnic and national identities have become more important than insecurities over state sovereignty; these insecurities have resulted in many of the cases of intra-state conflicts. Such a reality shifts scholars’ interest from the previous ‘classical’ concerns on inter-state security matters to more contemporary issues regarding intra-state security. This scholarly shift of interest has been accompanied with a change on the notion of security. The first and most fundamental change regards the supremacy of the state, both as the actor and the object to be secured.² Second, the agenda of security has been ‘broadened and deepened’³ since the threats to security today are not only confined to inter-state relations but also, and most importantly, to other matters regarding intra-state security. Third, the final goal of security has been focused more on individuals as human beings rather than on state sovereignty.⁴

² Among others Smith will argue that “the central assumptions of neorealism, that the state was the key actor in world politics and that the main, almost defining, issue for the discipline was military security, are now less central to the discipline”. Steve Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (December 1999), p. 77.

³ “The diverse contributions to the debates on ‘new thinking on security’ can be classified along several axes. One... attempts to broaden the neorealist conception of security to include a wider range of potential threats, ranging from economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration. This challenge has been accompanied by discussions intended to deepen the agenda of security studies by moving either down to the level of individual or human security or up to the level of international or global security, with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points”. Keith Krause and Michael Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods”, *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (October 1996), pp. 229-230.

⁴ Opponents of the dominant school of traditionalists “urge a refocusing of the core values of the realist school of thought to consider the human being as the core referent in security thinking”. David Roberts, “Review Essay: Human Security or Human Insecurity? Moving the Debate Forward” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 2006), p. 257.

In order to deal with these new realities, new concepts had to be invented while analytical and theoretical approaches were revisited. In this respect, I argue that the traditionalist approach – although it does provide some analytical background knowledge mostly in terms of levels of analysis and partially of actors involved – falls short of explaining the security problems of today.⁵ Moreover the goal of, as well as the means to, security approached in the traditional way seems old-fashioned and unsuccessful not only in managing intra-state (ethnic) conflicts but also in saving states from disintegration (traditionalist prime concern). In order to meet such challenges, the critical security study and their relative concepts can offer an innovative approach to address the sources of insecurity and the responses to them.

In this paper, I employ an in-depth review of the Macedonian security challenge as it was heavily demonstrated in the 1990s. Although much has been written on the issue, I still maintain that revisiting the Macedonian security case is still important for at least two points. Firstly, although rather modest generalizations can be achieved by studying only one case, the Macedonian example is still representative of portraying the causes of multiethnic security concerns. Secondly and more important, the solution to the security problem, unlike other cases of conflicts at least in the Balkan context, was a ‘good example’ on what needs to be done from all actors involved. In considering the case of Macedonian security problem, I analyse it at three levels (state-regional context, community-state relations, as well as the role of international community) and try to respond to the question of about whose security we need to be concerned. The analysis presented in this paper, although it considers security to be a multilayered process involving community, state, regional and international actors, each of them with their own preferences and roles, still argues that the final aim of all these actors should be above all the achievement of security for individuals.

⁵ David Baldwin, for example, concludes that the answers to today's problems are not to be found in the writings of cold war literature. Here he also admits it is not to neglect all the merits of the previous literature. The point is that the contemporary issues need a more refined and critical approach. See. David Baldwin, “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,” *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1995), p. 141.

A Snapshot on the Development of Security Studies: the Evolving of Notion of Security from the Traditional Approach to the Critical Approach⁶

The Traditional Approach to Security

Inter-state relations were first described by realist scholars and their belief states are situated in the anarchy of world politics where every state purely looks out for its own national interest. In order to protect their national interests, states try to increase their power, especially their military power. By increasing their military power, states improve their security in the international arena. But the more a state tries to improve its security, the less safe other states will feel. Increasing the security of one state will produce a relative loss of security for all others, creating the so-called ‘security dilemma.’ In such anarchic world politics, all states are potential enemies.⁷ The idea is that all states are potential enemies and the insecurity created may devolve into inter-state conflicts. Once initiated these conflicts may become a unending struggle since every state, in order to survive, will continue to fight.

Opposite to the use of force is the institutionalist philosophy. Institutionalists believe that states can achieve security through international institutions which can provide the mechanisms for facilitating cooperation

⁶ Such a snapshot would not be fair to include all the development in the literature. The aim here is to very broadly introduce the topic and theoretically frame the arguments. I suggest that readers further interested in the issue to consult the following article by Patrick Morgan for an excellent summary of the overall developments of traditional security study with a focus not only on Realist and Liberalist approaches but also on their respective variants, such as neorealism and neoliberalism. Patrick Morgan, “Liberalist and Realist Security Studies at 2000: Two Decades of Progress?”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1999). For the critical approach to security studies, see the article by Steve Smith, who identifies at least seven non-traditional theoretical approaches. Steve Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: ...”.

⁷ Realists assume first that “the international system is anarchic” in the sense “that the system comprises independent political units (states) that have no central authority above them” and secondly, “states are potentially dangerous to each other”. John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 9-10.

among states and help states to settle conflicts.⁸ The presence of international institutions harmonizes the anarchy in world politics and instead of the use of force and military power, they promote the use of diplomacy as a tool to resolve inter-state disputes.

Although different in the ways of achieving security, both liberals and realists start from the presupposition that “there can be no security in the absence of authority.”⁹ The object to be secured, in the view of both schools of thought, is the state. In the realist view, what has to be secured was the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the state where the use of force and military power is necessary. For liberals also, the object to be secured is still the state since international institutions are created by the states and respond to state interests although often they reflect only the interest of the most powerful members.¹⁰ In the traditional concept of security, which dominated both the academic and the political worlds until the end of the Cold War, the only focus was the state and its territorial integrity. Such paradigms, although long prominent in the field, seem to be weak in explaining the post-Cold war period,¹¹ where conflicts more than between the states are happening within the states.

The Critical Approach to Security

In order to take proper account of the post-Cold War reality, the Critical Security Studies paradigm was developed as an alternative way of

⁸ “Institutions do not provide the only possible coordinating mechanism. However, in complex situations involving many states, international institutions can step in to provide “constructed focal points” that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent”. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”, *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), p. 45.

⁹ Keith Krause and Michael Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies:...”, p. 232.

¹⁰ In his seminal work, John Mearsheimer maintained that “[t]he most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially ‘arenas for acting out power relationships’”. John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, p. 13.

¹¹ Note here that although many scholars have discredited the realist approach post Cold War, there are still prominent authors in favour of a realist approach. For an outline of the realist explanation of the post-1989 change in world politics, see William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol.19, No.3 (Winter 1994), pp. 91-129.

thinking, challenging the traditional dominant paradigms.¹² Its merits stand not only for ‘broadening’ the security agenda by including other issues in addition to military issues, but mostly for ‘extending’ the security agenda in order to include other so-called referent objects for security in addition to the state. The main criticisms of the traditional approach to security had to do with the centrality of the state and their focus on certain aspects while ignoring others. So in an attempt to re-define the object of security, questions of whose security was being talking about and who needs to be secured had to be re-addressed. In traditional terms when talking about security, we are talking about the security of a particular state, not that of its citizens. This is because “the security of ‘citizens’ is identified with (and guaranteed by) that of the state”¹³. By only focusing on the state as the object of security, we are assuming that maintaining the security of the state *ipso facto* guarantees the security of the individual.¹⁴

It is the ‘Copenhagen School’ which took the first step and made the distinction between state and society, arguing that security studies need to adopt an understanding of the ‘duality’ of security – that it involves a combination of state security concerned with sovereignty and societal security concerned with identity.¹⁵ States are political units and as such it is this political integrity which needs to be secured but states are also composed of societies and societies are about identity, that is, what enables a group of people to refer to themselves as ‘we’. It is the ‘we’ (identity) that matters for societies and is used as a means to collectively identify the object to be secured. The issue of societal security becomes important since often the boundaries of nations and states do not overlap; instead states can include diverse societal ethnic groups.¹⁶ This fact of different societal collectives

¹² “Critical security studies is the most sustained and coherent critique of traditional security studies”. Steve Smith, “The increasing insecurity of security studies:...”, p. 88.

¹³ Keith Krause and Michael Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies:...”, p. 232.

¹⁴ Nizar Messari, “The State and Dilemmas of Security: the Middle East and the Balkans”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 2002), p. 417.

¹⁵ Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morton Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London, Pinter, 1993, p. 25.

¹⁶ Especially this is true for the Balkans as was stated by the then Macedonian president, Kiro Gligorov, (1995) “In the ethnically-mixed Balkans, it is impossible to create compact national states in which only members of one nation can live. This is an absurdity which can hardly be realized in Europe. ... Perhaps one nation can win a victory here and there, but then this would only lead to revanchism on the part of the others, and thus, there would

inside a state may create a societal security dilemma, in the same way as with the state security dilemma. So the idea of societal security, identical to state security, comes as an additional factor to the traditional security issues.

The kind of relationship between ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ inside the state becomes crucial for its security. The security of the state itself will depend on the inner state construction and relationships, specifically whether the state is an open and inclusive self of all its societal groups or if it is an exclusive one. When the state ceases to represent the interests of all its societal groups, the excluded collectives perceive a threat to their identity and that their survival as a community is endangered.¹⁷ These perceptions will lead the threatened societal groups to search for ways to increase their security; requests by the excluded groups for increased community security will cause insecurity for the state itself.

The Three ‘Actors’ Involved and the (Normative) Question of Security for Whom?

The deepening of the notion of security after the fall of the bipolar world added more actors to be considered when dealing with security matters. As scholars have rightly noted, “any attempt to study security has to face the problem of seamless web.”¹⁸ Security, especially in multiethnic states, is multidimensional and has to be understood and explained at all levels. The most comprehensive approach is achieved if the discussion about security is focused on the three interlinked levels. In a bottom-up approach, one has to start at the sub-state level. (Multiethnic) states are composed of societal groups, which are important political units and can play a crucial role in the political life of a state. As such, when dealing with security issues, one has to look first at the communities-state relations. The second analysis has to be undertaken at the state level considering inter-state relations. The regional contexts and the probable influence of other states on a state domestic issue for matters of their concern are also an important point to

never be an end”. Reference from Alice Ackerman, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia*, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1999, p. 66.

¹⁷ Andrea Carla, “Community Security: Letters from Bosnia A theoretical analysis and its application to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, *Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 7 (July 2005), p. 225.

¹⁸ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for the International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 187.

look at when dealing with the security issue. The last point to be investigated is the role of the international community in security matters which aggregate to violence and whose importance becomes of international concern. That is why the following analysis will consider Macedonian security at its three main levels. First of all, the Macedonian state security in the context of Balkan region will be reviewed, then the Macedonian societal security as part of state security will be analysed, and last, the role of the international community in the overall Macedonian security dilemma will be evaluated. In order to fully comprehend the security issues, one has to examine them at all these levels and understand the relationship between them as well as the role they play in security issues. Getting into the analysis at the sub-state, state and supra-state levels gets wider and bolder. This triple analysis in fact does not imply that the three levels are mutually exclusive; in fact there is a great degree of interaction among them. This choice is made for analytical purposes and only to give a more comprehensive and fuller picture of the overall Macedonian security issue.

This kind of approach studies security from the bottom-up and will try to answer, every time, the question: security for whom? Although the analysis in this paper is conducted in three parts to consider societal groups, states and the role of international community, the focus is still on this one question. In fact, at all of these levels of analysis, the security of individuals should take precedence. The ‘object’ to be secured, rather than the state *per se* as an abstraction, is the well-being of individuals.¹⁹ Although the security dilemma starts from the bottom and may escalate up-wards, the reverse answer applies where security should be provided, that is all levels – the ‘international community’, states and societal groups should all provide security to individuals.

Macedonian State Security in the Balkans’ Context

In the Balkans, the fall of the communist regimes was accompanied by the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. The problem began when Serbian military forces were used in an attempt to stop Croatia and Slovenia from declaring their independence, the so-called Ten-day War, and lasting until the Macedonian inter-ethnic conflict in 2001. This entire chaotic situation of

¹⁹ A number of authors have raised this point, see the references in Keith Krause and Michael Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies:...”, p. 233.

violent conflicts and civil wars made regional security a major issue for almost a decade (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993-1995, Kosovo 1997-1999, Macedonia 2001). Many feared that the wars in the area of the former Yugoslavia would have led to a regional war involving more southeast European states; others still consider it a 'Third Balkan War'.²⁰ Even though that was not the case, still the collapse of the former Yugoslavia brought threats and insecurities for the constituent states.

Although Macedonia's drive to independence was not as violent as that for Bosnia and Herzegovina, still the threat emanating from Belgrade was considered real enough to warrant the creation of a preventive peacekeeping force, known as UNPREDEP, in December 1992.²¹ The existence of Macedonia as an independent state made Serbian access to the sea more remote and eliminated its border with its ally, Greece, but the possibility that Belgrade might have to 'reconquer its southern province' by force was however excluded.²² The only serious threat that might have constituted a realistic source of destabilization was Kosovo and its final status, since the fear was that the lack of settlement of the Kosovo situation could further radicalize the Macedonian Albanians. This may explain also the Macedonian position on the recognition of the independence of Kosovo. Bordered not only by Serbia and Kosovo, but also by Albania on the southwest, Greece on the south and Bulgaria on the east, Macedonia was a country coveted and contested by all its neighbours.²³ Most of them delayed in recognizing the new state and some even refused to acknowledge Macedonia for a number of reasons. The major concern of Albania regarding Macedonia was related to ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia. The late recognition of Macedonia by Albania was seen as "support for the status of constituent nation claimed by the Albanian minority."²⁴ In general, the Albanian government has played the role of moderator regarding the Albanian movement's secessionist aspirations, but still the Macedonian

²⁰ Spyros Economides, "Balkan Security: What Security? Whose Security?", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 3, No 3 (September 2003), p. 110.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²² Sophia Clément, "Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia", Institute for Security Studies of WEU, EU-ISS Chaillot Paper 30 (December 1997), p. 19.

²³ Minority Rights Group International, "The South Balkans", No. 4 (1994), p. 8.

²⁴ *OMRI news Digest*, ODD 114, 13 June 1994.

government's policy and position regarding the Albanian community remains an indicator of relations between the two countries.²⁵

FYROM, as Greece calls Macedonia, is also at the centre of another much-debated dispute, which brought a state security threat to the fore in the Macedonian case because of the open conflict with Greece over the legacy of using the name Macedonia. Greece denies the existence of a separate non-Greek Macedonia and refused to recognise Macedonia under this name. Although bilateral relations were established in September 1995, they are conditioned on the modification of the name and state symbols. The question over the name of Macedonia is still unresolved and this made Greece use its veto and suspended Macedonia's bid to join NATO in 2008. On the other side, Bulgaria, although it was the first country to recognize the State of Macedonia (January 1992), it refused to recognize it as a distinct (Macedonian) nationality. As in the case with Greece, bilateral relations have been established but the issues over Macedonian nation and language remain still. Bulgaria aimed to push forward the recognition of the Bulgarian language as the only official one in Macedonia, pretending that Macedonian language is a dialect of Bulgarian invented by Tito to get the territory out of Sofia's sphere of influence.²⁶

The relationships Macedonia has with neighbouring countries have gone through many ups-and-downs. Tensions on a number of issues threatened Macedonian existence. It was the common historical Balkan heritage that Macedonia shared with its neighbours that contributed to many disputes over the Macedonian identity and national belonging.²⁷ The main security issue at the interstate level was not the Macedonian sovereignty and territorial integrity but rather a threat to Macedonian identity and nationality. Although Macedonia was recognised as a state by its neighbours, still the existence of a distinct Macedonian nationality is rejected by many of them. In many cases, bilateral relations remain conditioned on major issues regarding its national identity. The interference in the internal affairs of Macedonia by its neighbours or even the general evolution of the bilateral

²⁵ Clément, “Conflict Prevention in the Balkans:...” , p. 18.

²⁶ Oana Popa, “Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Security in Southeast Europe: A Multidimensional Perspective”, NATO individual Fellowship, Final Report (March 1999), p. 24.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

relations, although important, were secondary factors affecting the country's overall security.

Although such a fragile interstate equilibrium is in itself a threat and can help fuel a dispute, the internal affairs of a country have to be taken into account as a second key variable in any analysis of this kind. We shall look in particular at the domestic context and examine the community-state relationship within Macedonia itself.

Societal Security as an Important Part of the State Security in the Case of Macedonia

It is especially in multiethnic states, as in the case of Macedonia as we are investigating, where societal security²⁸ needs to be considered. In such multiethnic states, the role of the state is crucial to societal security. This is because even if the state represents a solution to the security needs of one group of people, it may be a source of threat to another. Many states, after the fall of their communist regimes, did not represent all of their societal groups. Furthermore, they sometimes represented threats to those societal groups by taking sides in intrasocietal conflict. This made the threatened social groups react and become able to act alongside the state, becoming credible and significant political units posing a security problem for their states. Often the sense of insecurity and threats to these societal groups comes as a result of their status as a minority group within a state. The minority status conferred upon Albanians by the preamble of the Constitution ('Macedonia is a unitarian state constituted as the national state of the Macedonian people') has been a fundamental contradiction between the nature of what Albanians consider as an *a priori* (multiethnic) state and its Constitution, which grants Macedonians of Slavic origin the status as the sole constituent people.²⁹ This statement in the county's constitution was the

²⁸ Such situation is known as 'societal security'. In the academic literature a number of different terminologies are used to refer to this concept, like 'identity security', 'community security' or 'group security'. The common denominator of all of them is that they all consider societal groups as actors who are able to act alongside the state as significant political units in the international system. The main units of analysis for societal security are politically significant groups. As such, societal security refers to the security of groups of people at the sub-state level.

²⁹ Clément, "Conflict Prevention in the Balkans:...", p. 16. The Macedonian constitution was amended in 1989 designating the Yugoslav republic as the "state of the Macedonian

main reason for the start of ethnic debates between the two communities because Macedonian Albanians regarded it as a clear sign of discrimination.³⁰ In such cases, the basis approach of the state itself (the desire to create ethnically homogenous states) becomes *a priori* exclusive for some societal groups distinguishing between ‘first-class’ and ‘second-class’ citizens. As a result, those who are or feel excluded may become a possible threat to the state itself.

In Macedonia in the 1990s, there was a rigid ethnic division with vast political, economic and social disparities between the two communities³¹ establishing a *de facto* division of the two main communities in the state – ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians – who lived in more or less parallel isolated societies, with a high degree of mutual mistrust.³² A number of events and confrontations between the two communities worsened the situation.³³ Discrimination against the ethnic Albanian minority was a structural feature of the state, but without the violence and attempts at ethnic cleansing that characterised Kosovo.³⁴ The Macedonian-Albanian community represented a threat as long as they felt discriminated by their own state. The instability of a multiethnic, multicultural or multireligious state or region often stems from divergences regarding the

people” by replacing the previous one which stated the “state of the Macedonian people and of the Albanian and Turk minorities”. Reference from John Phillips, *Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2004.

³⁰ Popa, “Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Security in Southeast Europe:...”, p. 24.

³¹ Alice Ackermann, arguing about the possible causes of the outbreak of Macedonian crisis of 2001 among four different explanations, put the emphasis on the unresolved longstanding ethnic grievances. “The issue of long-standing grievances deserves particular attention here, not only because the UCK/NLA have made them their “*causa belli*” but political, economic and socio-cultural grievances are most often the causes for ethnic conflict.” Alice Ackermann, “On the Razor’s Edge: Macedonia Ten Years after Independence”, OSCE Yearbook 2001, Nomos Verlag, 2002, p. 122

³² Marina Caparini, “Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilisation: The Case of the Western Balkans” in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds.), *Reform And Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, LIT Verlag, 2004, p. 157.

³³ “The Albanians continue to demand the legalization of the University of Tetovo, which is a symbol of their cultural autonomy. The incidents of July 1997 concerning the Albanian flag flown by the Albanian mayors of Tetovo and Gostivar, which led to the deaths of three people and revived anti-Albanian slogans, well illustrates how fragile intercommunal relations are”. Popa, “Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Security in Southeast Europe:...”, p. 15.

³⁴ Caparini, “Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilisation:...”, p. 157.

definition of nationality and citizenship, and thus the status of minorities and the status of autonomy. “Having a nationality and being recognized a citizen of a country is a key element of human security... Having a nationality is a fundamental human right, and citizenship is ‘the right to have rights’”.³⁵ In this perspective, Albanians have claimed both respect for fundamental human rights - the end of discrimination on the basis of nationality through better access to education, culture and language and recognition of Albanian as an official language alongside Slavic-based Macedonian- and the guarantee of basic democratic rights, such as equal voting rights and proportional representation within state institutions.³⁶ Any rejection of such rights may lead those communities who are excluded to become a threat. But the real threat to security comes when parties involved (such as state – usually as representative of the majority – and guerrillas – as representative of the minority) attack each other.³⁷ By analogy with the (state) security dilemma, a societal security dilemma might arise and societal groups will use arms to defend their identity while states will do so to defend their sovereignty. The problem we are left with here, however, is that the processes of the resultant societal security dilemma would closely resemble those of the state security dilemma,³⁸ a game where no one wins.

³⁵ UN Commission on Human Security, “Human Security Now” Final Report, New York, 2003, p. 31.

³⁶ Clément, “Conflict Prevention in the Balkans:...”, p. 16.

³⁷ Furthermore, in cases of tension escalation the government may lose control and give rise to paramilitary groups formation. “Moreover, the Macedonian government is in danger of losing popular support and is facing a crisis of political legitimacy. There are also concerns over the formation of ethnic-Macedonian paramilitary groups.” Alice Ackermann, “Macedonia: Another Piece in the Balkan Puzzle?” (Viewpoints), *Security Dialogue* Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 378.

³⁸ Roe, “The Societal Security Dilemma.”

The international Community:³⁹ A Decisive Actor on Security Matters

Having mentioned all the above ‘potential or real’ threats to Macedonian security and, more importantly, knowing that Macedonia did not have the resources to meet such internal or external threats,⁴⁰ as well as considering the latest tragedies in the Balkans, all of these factors forced the international community to intervene in Macedonia. The requests by ex-President Gligorov for international guarantees of the country's security illustrate once more that the state has not been able to guarantee security on its own. This inability of states makes them believe that they are more likely to achieve their security goals within, rather than outside of, multilateral institutions.⁴¹

A series of political options are available to the international community, ranging from non-coercive (‘soft’) measures including diplomatic talk, political or economic sanctions, to more coercive (‘hard’) measures, including the use of military force. In the case of Macedonia, soft long-term measures were used and those proved to be the best solution, if not the only one, for preventing a conflict. The strongest incentive the EU used to pressure the two parties to the conflict to conclude a political deal was the looming signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and the Macedonia.⁴² This ‘soft’ instrument of this

³⁹ Some of the main actors ‘behind the international community’ are the US, the EU and other leading Western countries, as well as international organizations (for example United Nations). On the issues of security, the international community particular concerns are the human rights, armed conflict and justice-based solutions. They legitimized their actions by proclaiming that their goal is to reduce the conflict, end the war and restore peace.

⁴⁰ “When the country peacefully extracted itself from the former Yugoslavia, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) from Macedonia in March 1992 left Macedonia, in military terms, the weakest of all the Balkan states, in no position either to threaten any of its neighbours or to defend itself. The country has fewer than 20,000 soldiers, about 120,000 reservists, no air force, no navy and only a handful of recently purchased armoured vehicles and heavy weapons.” ICG Balkans Report N° 38, “The Albanian Question in Macedonia: Implications of the Kosovo Conflict for Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia”, August 11, 1998, p. 14.

⁴¹ Emil Kirchner, “Security Threats and Institutional Response. The European context”, *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005), p. 180.

⁴² Claire Piana “The EU’s Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002), p. 212.

document that would mark start of the probable candidacy for EU membership created the background for an open, inclusive ‘space’ for all the parties involved in a conflict. In other words, ‘collective’ rather than ‘national’ interests were being promoted as a response to the old ethnic-national calculations of the Balkan region. There are these European values of ‘inclusion’ rather than ‘exclusion’ that needed to be embraced by all the actors, be they communities (ethnic groups) or states. The role of international actors, during and after conflict, should have been able to help the Macedonian state to speed up the reforms and the ethnic Albanians to cooperate; this is a priority component of lasting conflict resolution. As a consequence of this logic neither the state institutions, including the military, can be seen as the only agent of security strategies and actions, nor can armed groups substitute for this role.⁴³

The international community's involvement was more a reaction to recover from its previous failures of not intervening at the right time with right measures, as well as to avoid any spill-over of the conflict further in the Balkans. The difference between the international community intervention in the case of Macedonia to that of Bosnia & Herzegovina or even Kosovo was in the preventive measures. The conflict prevention strategy used in Macedonia seem to have brought good results where, by observing early warnings signs and finding solutions at the early stage, the possibility of armed conflict was greatly reduced.⁴⁴ In Macedonia, the international community gave priority to preventive measures. Considering the bad experiences with other cases in the Balkans, this time not only the UN Peacekeeping Force – including US forces – successfully played a crisis prevention role in Macedonia but also the EU played a significant role in restoring peace and preventing the spread of armed conflict by taking into consideration that the EU had suffered from too much rhetoric and too little action when it has come to dealing with international crisis situations.⁴⁵ The multiplicity and complementary nature of preventive measures adopted, together with the coordination that took place between the international organizations represented on the ground, made this, to a certain extent, a

⁴³ Claude Bruderlein, “People's Security as a New Measure of Global Stability”, Paper presented to the International Security Forum, Geneva, 15 – 17 November 2000, p. 7.

⁴⁴ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, London, Sage Publications, 2002, p. 271.

⁴⁵ Kirchner, “Security threats and institutional response:...”, p. 191.

textbook example of conflict prevention,⁴⁶ and the international community has rectified its image with the intervention in Macedonia.

What We have learned from the Macedonian Case

The security threats to Macedonia, both at the interstate and intrastate levels, have been related to national identity. Apart from the threat and influence of neighbouring countries in Macedonian domestic affairs, the main threat and the entire chaotic situation in the country was a result of societal security. Such a societal security problem often arises in multiethnic states when the government considers the existence of different communities inside their territory to be a threat to their sovereignty, so as to justify exploitation and denial of citizenship to the members of these communities. In this way, groups cannot participate in the economic, social and political life of the society.⁴⁷ This type of exclusion makes societal groups act similarly and parallel to the state. If the state neglects these societal groups, or in the worst case attacks them, then the state itself becomes the source of, and not the solution to, security problems.⁴⁸ The inability of the state to resolve the security problem may cause the international community to intervene. In the case of Macedonia, differently from previous cases of international community intervention in the region (e.g. the case of intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo), the use of incentives rather than punishments proved to be more effective in preventing conflict.⁴⁹ All the above issues bring to the argument that the main values that need to be protected by the international community, states and non-state actors are the personal safety and freedom of the individuals.

⁴⁶ Clément, “Conflict Prevention in the Balkans:...”, p. 19.

⁴⁷ Carla, “Community Security: Letters from Bosnia...”, p. 224.

⁴⁸ In her viewpoint Ackermann, stresses that “[f]irst, Macedonia would have to adopt an indigenous approach to prevention, one that first of all addresses problems of group cohesion and social interaction of the ethnic communities. Among the more short-term preventive measures would be the creation of a forum for inter-ethnic dialogue, under the auspices of an intermediary, which would serve in much the same way as a problem-solving workshop and where unresolved grievances, such as the constitutional recognition of ethnic Albanians as a nation, could be addressed without the pressures of imminent military action.” Ackermann, “Macedonia: Another Piece...”, p. 378.

⁴⁹ On the ‘relatively’ successful prevention of violent conflict in Macedonia and the role of ‘soft’ measures not only by the activity of the major players, such as the UN and the OSCE, but also of other actors see Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia*.

What is clear from the analysis presented in this paper is that the study of security is a multilayered process involving community, state, regional and international actors, each with their own characteristics regarding preferences and roles. The final aim of the preceding list of actors should be the achievement of security for all, and not for only a few. "The death of soldiers and civilians is to be strongly condemned. They were unnecessary victims of disorientation, chaos, irresponsibility, incompetence, ignorance, narrow personal and party interests and ambitions, and above all, cowardice."⁵⁰ These threats to people's safety and freedom, which derive from the fact that human beings aggregate in diverse communal groups, are the main concern of societal security. Indeed, societal security stresses the importance of the protection of human rights and individual freedoms, aiming to give each individual, of whatever community, the possibility to expand his or her capacity and improve his or her quality of life. Finding a permanent resolution to the Albanian issue in Macedonia would stand as an excellent and eloquent example that reconciliation and security is possible; although the situation may not ever be totally solved, Macedonia still has a chance of becoming an example of multiculturalism at work in the Balkans, where autonomy and self-determination do not threaten territorial integrity.⁵¹

In examining the way in which security policies have to construct appropriate responses to the threats, of course, the formula "security through integration and cooperation" needs to gain a broad acceptance by all – actors and non-actors at all levels – as being essential for the stabilization of the situation in the region and for the full and equal integration of the Balkan countries into the European and Euro-Atlantic economic, political and military structures.

In this context, the concept of societal security can offer an innovative approach to address the sources of insecurity and the response to it. If the threats/insecurities have an upward escalation, starting from the community level going to state level, and perhaps degraded at the regional/international level, then security should be provided back

⁵⁰ Mirce Tomovski, "Political and Security Crisis in Macedonia: An interview with Mirjana Maleska", Puls, 14 September 2001, available at http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org/mk/OldSite/Issue_3/maleska.interview.eng.asp.

⁵¹ Popa, "Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Security in Southeast Europe:...", p. 32.

downwards from the international to the regional level, from the regional to the state level, from the state to the community level, having as a final aim the individual. Real security can only be reached by completing the localisation of security functions at the individual level.

It is this critical moment that requires state attention to find a balance so as to consolidate its relationships with its own societal communities. One way is through consolidating the democratic regime with “state policies that grant inclusion and equal citizenship and that give all citizens a common ‘roof’ of state-mandated and state-enforced individual rights.”⁵²

⁵² Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 33.