THE ‘OUTER WALL’ OF SANCTIONS AND THE KOSOVO ISSUE

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INTRODUCTION

In the US State Department ‘USIA (United States Information Agency) Wireless File’, issued on 23 November 1995, it was made public, for the first time, the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions concept. It contained the following message: “A resolution will be introduced in the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo against all of the states of former Yugoslavia. Trade sanctions against Serbia will be suspended, but may be re-imposed if Serbia or any other Serb authorities fail significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement. An ‘outer wall’ of sanctions will remain in place until Serbia addresses a number of other areas of concern, including Kosovo and cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal.”

The above message meant that after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, Slobodan Milosevic was being recognised as a new peacemaker to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Accordingly, the UN Security Council first suspended and later totally lifted trade and other sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY - Serbia and Montenegro) as described above. It did so in resolutions Nos. 1022 (22 November 1995) and 1047 (1 October 1996).

Taking into account this sequence of events, it might have been a proper heading of our paper if restated differently so as to cover all issues included within the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions concept. Namely, basics were laid down right at the beginning of the crisis in former Yugoslavia and thus apply equally to the other former Yugoslavia republics, now internationally sovereign and independent states. Unlike these, FRY represents the most extreme case of an entity not acting in accordance with the internationally accepted standards of behaviour as foreseen in international documents to be discussed in the following paragraphs. Consequently, a heading of the paper covering all territories and issues of former Yugoslavia seems to be more far-reaching than the present one.

Save the Dayton Peace Accords and the terms FRY should comply with, especially cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, the rest of the issues remain identical with those obeyed by former Yugoslav republics. Yet, the purpose is different, that is, they should be met by FRY if there is to be a lifting of the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions and the Kosovo issue plays an important role in this chain of events. The present approach is confirmed by the very rapid reaction on the side of the international community to the ongoing events in Kosovo which began in February 1998. The conflict in Kosovo has so far taken the lives of innocent civilians (more than six hundred), mostly children and women.
In the statements of the Contact Group issued since February, there is no mention of the concept under discussion, although it is for sure that the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions represents, for the time being at least, the basic means with which to pressurise the Belgrade regime to peacefully solve the Kosovo issue. It is against this background that we opted for the present heading of the paper.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ‘OUTER WALL’ OF SANCTIONS

The ‘outer wall’ of sanctions concept affects, first and foremost, FRY’s membership of international organisations and access to international financial institutions, the latter being a key source for financial assistance in economic reconstruction. Although the issue of FRY’s membership of international organisations and bodies and access to international financial organisations has been formulated in political terms as the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions, its basic origins lie in the legal documents rendered at the time the former Yugoslav crisis began, starting from the Badinter Commission’s opinions. Despite some political premises, we argue that the concept reflects core legal arguments of the present international regime. The current nature of the concept underlies the means that the West is using to force FRY to comply with the internationally accepted standards of behaviour.

Democracy, the rule of law and respect for human and minority rights were the basic values the West offered to those republics of former communist federations wishing to become independent sovereign states after the end of the Cold War. Save in the opinions of the arbitration commission for former Yugoslavia (the Badinter Commission), rendered between 1991 and 1993, respect for these values had been expressly required by the so-called Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (16 December 1991). The same stance of the West has, ever since the Yugoslav crisis began, been repeated in most international documents, including the recently issued statements of the Contact Group on the Kosovo crisis.

After the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, FRY was not denied the right to independent statehood. Furthermore, it received individual recognition as an independent state by most of the member states of the international community. All it was denied deals with the manner in which the FRY had been established on 27 April 1992 and its further intentions as to the way of running that State. The quite obviously undemocratic way it was created with a view to pressurising others to accept it as the sole successor of the former Yugoslavia, the repression in Kosovo and the non-fulfilment of international obligations stemming from the Dayton Peace Accords (including a very undemocratic approach to running the country), run counter to the democratic principles that a state should respect in its dealing with the international community. This philosophy of Western values about the ways and means to be pursued in striving for the right to self-determination (ie. independent statehood) lies at the core of the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions concept. Its main purpose is to counteract FRY’s non-compliance with the common standards of international behaviour.

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCEPT

In the following, we discuss legal and political documents that represent the foundations of the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions concept. It covers opinions No. 8, 10 and 11 of the Badinter Commission the UN Security Resolution No. 777 (1992) and, finally, the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 47/1 (1992). Based on these documents, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) adopted appropriate documents in which the legal and political basis of the concept is enshrined.
Although unilaterally imposed by the USA, the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions is by no means a category of a purely political nature. It has, as already noted, a strong international-legal basis starting from the above-mentioned documents up to the Dayton Accords. Other documents following the latter have only confirmed the very foundations of the concept. It is mainly these documents that we discuss in the following without neglecting the role the Kosovo issue plays in the possible lifting of the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions.5

As to the process of dissolution and its timing, the Commission was required on 18 May 1992 by the then chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia to give an opinion on the merits. In its answer, the Commission noted that a referendum held in Bosnia-Herzegovina during February and March 1992 produced a majority in favour of independence and that Serbia and Montenegro had established a new state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and adopted a new constitution on 27 April 1992. The Commission further pointed to the fact that the territory and population of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were under the sovereign authority of the new states and that the common federal bodies of the SFRY no longer functioned. In addition, the Commission noted that Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia had been recognised not only by each other but also by all the member states of the European Community and numerous other states and that they had been admitted to membership of the United Nations on 22 May 1992. The Commission also took account of Security Council Resolution No. 757 of 30 May 1992 which referred, for the first time, to the former SFRY and which had emphasised that the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations had not been generally accepted. In the end, it concluded that the process of the dissolution of SFRY referred to in Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991 is now complete and that SFRY no longer exists.6 The UN Security Council endorsed this stance on 19 September 1992. It adopted Resolution No. 777 (1992), which noted that the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had ceased to exist and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations. Therefore, it recommended to the General Assembly that it decided that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should apply for membership in the United Nations, and should not participate in the work of the General Assembly. Having received that recommendation, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/1 in which it noted that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and therefore decided that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should apply for membership in the United Nations and not participate in the work of the General Assembly.7 In December and February 1992, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) supported the same view.8 The latter decisions were a logical consequence of the previous ones, that is, the consequence of the fact that a non-member state of the UN cannot enjoy the membership of the IMF and World Bank. Taken in their entirety, the above decisions have had a direct implication for the FR’s membership in other international organisations and bodies, such as membership of OSCE.9

On 4 July 1992, the Commission produced Opinion No. 10 in which it responded directly to the question posed by Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, as to whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a new state calling for recognition. It was noted that the FRY constituted a new State and not the sole successor to SFRY and that the FRY does not ipso facto enjoy the recognition SFRY did under completely different circumstances. It is therefore for other states, where appropriate, to recognise the new state. Such recognition by member states of the European Community, concluded the Commission, would be subject to its compliance with the
conditions laid down by general international law and by the Joint Statement and the Guidelines of 16 December 1991, concluded the Commission.

After the Dayton Peace Accords were reached in November 1995, the EU took a decision to reward FRY by recommending to its member states and the rest of international community that they individually recognise the state, an event that took place at the beginning of 1996. None of the conditions though, provided for in the above-mentioned Guidelines, were fulfilled and this state of affairs has remained the same ever since, if not further deteriorated. The witness to that is not only the non-compliance of FRY with the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords, but also the very grave and dangerous situation in Kosovo as a result of police brutality against its majority population—the Kosovar Albanians. The recent March-July 1998 statement of the Contact Group on the Kosovo crisis was aimed at avoiding further deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, or, at least, putting it on track so as not to threaten the region’s peace and stability. The very grave and dangerous situation on the ground eventually forced the UN Security Council to impose an arms embargo against FRY, including Kosovo (31 March 1998). In all cases, the international community urged the parties to find a peaceful and political solution to the crisis, based on commonly accepted international standards: the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act.

These documents indicate that state practice has not at all supported the claim by FRY to be the continuation of, or the sole successor to, former Yugoslavia. The claim has also been rejected fervently by other successor states of the former Yugoslavia.11 The stance of the former Yugoslav republics, which is at the same time the stance of international community, has not as yet been changed. The Succession Group on former Yugoslavia, chaired by Arthur Votgs, has recently quitted the work due to the insistence of the FRY that it is the sole successor to former Yugoslavia. The Succession Documents drafted by the Group following the March-May 1998 sessions, which were rejected by the FRY, indicate the unchanged stance of the international community on this topic. The issue now is due to be settled through international arbitration, as provided for by the Dayton Peace Accords to solve all contentious issues among the parties.12

CONTENT OF THE ‘OUTER WALL’ OF SANCTIONS

The ‘outer wall’ of sanctions (FRY’s membership of international organisations; financial and other assistance by the IMF and World Bank; and, normalisation of relations between the US Government and FRY), translated into concrete terms means that FRY should fulfil the same conditions as those the other successor states of former Yugoslavia did on the occasion of their international recognition as independent and sovereign states during 1992. The conditions to be fulfilled, besides those stemming from the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), are laid down in the European Community’s Guidelines of 16 December 1991. Vis-à-vis the topic under discussion, the conditions to be fulfilled for the purpose of lifting the sanctions require that there needs to be “substantial progress towards the solution of the Kosovo issue”. This includes, inter alia, the following steps that FRY should take:

- immediate permission for the OSCE Monitoring Mission to return to Kosovo;
- establishment of all democratic institutions in Kosovo;
- putting an end with concrete effect to ferocious repression all over the country;
- starting concrete negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina for the solution of the political status
As for the latter, there have so far been intensified proposals, especially during 1996 and 1997. The Contact Group and EU’s activities during the first half of 1997 were aimed at solving the issue by proposing a wider autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia. This, it was considered, was a step in the right direction. During the second half of 1997, upon US insistence, the Contact Group held that a wider autonomy within FRY rather than Serbia itself would be more appropriate, although it was not put forward during Dr. _brahim Rugova’s visit to the US State Department in the summer of 1997. Neither would it appear in the statement issued from the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the EU held on 16 September 1997.13

Finally, by the end of 1997, the international community totally changed its views on the topic when it spoke of solving the ‘issues in Kosovo’ rather than the issue itself. This downgrading of Kosovo’s status has had very serious consequences on the situation on the ground for it further radicalised the moderate Kosovar Albanian leadership.

As noted, FRY has been asked to fulfil the same conditions as the other former Yugoslav republics, save the very specific ones stemming from the Dayton Peace Accords (especially the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal on former Yugoslavia). That means that FRY has been asked to ensure the rule of law, democracy and respect for human and minority rights within its borders. The granting of independent statehood on behalf of Kosovo was totally excluded from the very concept. First signs that the independent statehood of Kosovo was totally excluded were shown on the occasion of Van der Stoel’s appointment as a special representative of the OSCE for Kosovo (1997). His mandate as the High Commissioner for Minorities in itself does not permit any undertakings that would not contribute to peace and stability in the region, an argument very often invoked by the international community to deny Kosovo the right to independent statehood. Van der Stoel’s appointment showed at the same time that Kosovo, from the formal standpoint, was being treated as a purely minority issue on par with that of the ethnic Albanians living in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In Macedonia, the OSCE High Commissioner for Minorities had been acting long before his appointment as a special representative for Kosovo. After the dramatic ongoing events in Kosovo that started in February 1998, though, it was obvious that that approach did not correspond to the gravity of the situation on the ground.

The events of February this year set in motion the Contact Group on former Yugoslavia (decisions of 9 and 15 March 1998) which eventually led to the decision of the UN Security Council to impose an arms embargo against FRY on 31 March 1998. In these documents, as well as in those latter adopted by the Contact Group, there were put forward some very specific conditions that FRY should comply with if it were to be fully integrated within the international community of states (the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions). Although the very concept of the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions covers the tiny Republic of Montenegro, in the March decisions of the Contact Group effort was made to spare it from the negative consequences stemming from the sanctions, a fact well confirmed by Robert Gelbard, the USA special envoy for the Balkans, in his interview with the Belgrade based newspaper Nasa-Borba.14

The Contact Group demanded that FRY commit itself to a dialogue with the leaders of the Albanian community of Kosovo. The dialogue was to be undertaken with no preconditions. For this purpose, it offered its services to facilitate talks and stated that it regards “appropriate international involvement as an essential factor to establish confidence between the parties”.15 The UN Security Council later
confirmed this approach. In its Resolution No: 1160/1690/, dated 31 March 1998, the UN Security Council stated that the “participation of an outside representative or representatives is deemed as necessary to solve the issue of Kosovo” (paragraph 16/a). In line with this, the Contact Group demanded that FRY accept a proposal of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe for a new mission by Filipe Gonzalez, the personal representative of the OSCE’s chairman-in-office and representative of the European Union to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Gonzalez’s new mission would include a specific mandate for addressing the problems in Kosovo.16 This request of the international community has been repeated in all statements issued after that, including the last one of July 1998. In the beginning, there were some signs that the new mission would be accepted. In the end, it was refused by the Belgrade regime when Milosevic himself ordered the referendum against any foreign mediation in the Kosovo crisis, which was eventually held on 23 April 1998. As to the role the OSCE has, apart from mediation, in solving the Kosovo issue, it was demanded by the Contact Group that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia allow for the return of the long-term OSCE mission to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, which Belgrade expelled after the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was barred from the OSCE in 1992.17

To sum up, should substantive talks on Kosovo issue begin, with necessary confidence building measures in place and appropriate international involvement, the international community seems ready to promote a clear and achievable path towards Belgrade’s full integration in the international community. In fact, the last statement of the Contact Group (8 July 1998) expressly stated that its “goal continues to be that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should reap the benefits of membership of international financial and political institutions” (paragraph 10).

EFFECTS OF THE ‘OUTER WALL’ OF SANCTIONS

The ‘outer wall’ of sanctions has so far triggered some two-track diplomacy, that is, there have been some unofficial talks between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbian opposition, besides the signature put on the Education Agreement by the then President Milosevic of Serbia and the shadow Kosovar Albanian President Dr. Rugova (1 September 1996). Its implementation has, as yet, not been fully put into effect. The two-track diplomacy resulted in the informal talks held during March and June 1996 in New York (USA) and Ulcinj (Montenegro), respectively.18 In these talks, organised by the New York-based Project for Ethnic Relations, a wide consensus was reached regarding the ways the Kosovo issue should be solved, that is, by peaceful means and through negotiations. They were boycotted, though, by the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, a fact that rendered them highly ineffective. On the other side, these informal talks should not be neglected for they offered a real picture of the parties’ interests and stakes involved, as well as the seriousness and the very complicated nature of the Kosovo issue. In this context, we consider that if the issue is to be solved properly, multi-track diplomacy is more apt rather than the previous one. This fact is noted by the Contact Group is clear from its dealings with the issue.

The mediation process that the Contact Group set in motion for solving the issue of Kosovo has been conditioned by further rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground. FRY’s non-compliance with the Contact Group’s decisions, especially withdrawing of the police and other units from the conflicting areas in Kosovo, did not prevent shuttle diplomacy between 10-13 May 1998 by the US troubleshooter, Richard Holbrooke. His mission led to the Milosevic-Rugova meeting, finally held on 15 May 1998. It was the news of the day. In a statement issued by Milosevic’s cabinet and confirmed in Dr. Rugova’s press conference in Belgrade, the “common will to find a political solution to the Kosovo crisis” was stressed. The setting up of working groups to further discuss the
contentious issues between the parties was eventually agreed. The groups’ meetings were due to be held in Belgrade and Pristina on a rotating schedule. As for Kosovo’s political status, it was noted that the parties still remain in their previous, distant and highly different positions.19

From the diplomatic standpoint, the Milosevic-Rugova talks represent the first real impact of the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions. However, it was clear from the outset that Milosevic would use them to buy time and continue his repressive policy in Kosovo, on the one hand, and continue the settling of old scores with his political rival, President Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro, on the other. The Contact Group’s promise that it would consider steps towards lifting the sanctions if there were substantial progress vis-à-vis the fulfilment of its earlier requirements encouraged Milosevic in this new adventure. Still, the US diplomats were very cautious on FRY’s membership to the OSCE. FRY’s membership of the OSCE would have been opposed by other former Yugoslav republics even had met the Contact Group requirements as discussed above. The grounds for refusal on the side of the former Yugoslav republics remain the same: FRY is not the sole successor to former Yugoslavia and, consequently, it should apply for new membership as the others did on the occasion of their admission.20

Apart from this, it is highly improbable that the situation on the ground will improve and that Milosevic’s behaviour will show signs of fulfilling the normal international standards as described above. The Kosovo issue seems to be a continuous source of irrational behaviour within Serbia’s political and social life. FRY’s non-compliance with these standards clearly indicates that prospects for its democratisation are very pale and that there is no common will for the Kosovo issue to be settled in a peaceful way. Despite the economic situation further deteriorating as a result of Serbia’s wars in former Yugoslavia and its previous long-term international isolation, the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions is not showing any sign of any serious and real impact on FRY’s behaviour towards the rest of the world. What remains as the next step to be undertaken by the international community with a view to stopping Serbia’s irrational behaviour? The ‘outer wall’ of sanctions has certainly turned into a senseless concept. It is as ineffective a means of pressure against the Belgrade regime as were the sanctions imposed on FRY as far back as 1992.

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

The ‘outer wall’ of sanctions is nothing but a system of values and principles the West imposed to avoid the consequences of the former Yugoslavia’s self-destruction. Although stated in public in 1995 and in different terms, the sanctions under discussion represent a means to compel FRY to observe the rules of game when dealing with the rest of the international community. Democracy, the rule of law and respect for human and minority rights are the inner side of the concept. The observance of, and compliance with, these values and principles is a key to FRY’s membership of international organisations and the reaping of the benefits of the international financial institutions.

The above values and principles have since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis been formulated both in legal and political terms, starting from Badinter’s opinions (1991-1993) up to the statements of the Contact Group concerning the ongoing crisis in Kosovo. The scope of application, though, is wider than this for they are meant to put on track new democracies coming into being after the collapse of communism. FRY, it should be noted, remains the last one to come to terms with these Western values and principles.

That recognition of states has a highly political nature and this is nowhere as clear as in the case of
the former Yugoslavia. There, the international community set up criteria to be fulfilled by the new states before they were admitted as fully-fledged members of the community of states. The criteria included a wide range of issues and, in the case of FRY, there were put forth some additional ones stemming from the Dayton Peace Accords (1995). As for the Kosovo issue, the criteria (the observance of which is required) remain the same, that is, FRY should pursue the same path as the other former Yugoslav republics on the occasion of their admission (1992). It should be admitted, nevertheless, that the political context in the case of Kosovo is quite different. The lifting of the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions is possible only if, and when, the above criteria have been met by the FRY.

Although the term under discussion, the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions, sounds very grand, its real effects have so far been negligible. It did yield some informal talks between the parties (1997) and the Education Agreements that were signed on 1 September 1996. In appearance, the most tangible effect of the sanctions was the Milosevic-Rugova meeting of 15 May 1998. It proved elusive and short-lived though, for Milosevic used it to further escalate the violence in Kosovo and to settle old scores with the tiny Republic of Montenegro. With the Kosovo conflict still going on unabated, the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions remains a senseless notion and extremely ineffective in counteracting Serbia’s irrational behaviour. The international community should come to terms with this fact and start thinking of a new and more effective approach to force the Belgrade regime to act in accordance with internationally accepted standards of behaviour. What the international community’s next step should be still remains to be seen! After the unchecked Serbian offensive against the Kosovar Albanian majority that started at the end of July 1998, we believe that the time has come to put into effect the Contact Group’s promise from the last statement, that is, to use force to bring about the compliance of those who block the peace process. On the contrary, piecemeal efforts, such as the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions would only serve the purpose of yet another Bosnia-type human tragedy.


2 Documents provided by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, Tirana.


4 Statement on Kosovo, London Contact Group Meeting, 9 March 1998; statements by the Contact Group of 15 and 25 March 1998; statements by the Contact Group, 29 April 1998 and 9 May 1998; statement on Kosovo, London, June 12, 1998; finally, Contact Group statement, Bonn, July 8, 1998. In line with these documents is as well UN Security Resolution No. 1169, (31 March 1998).


7 For full text of the documents, see: “The UN and the Situation in Former Yugoslavia”, (1993), the UN Department of Public Information, pp. 72-73.


9 Cf. Milinkovic, Branislav (1997), ‘FRY and the OSCE-Inertia of Suspension’, Review of International Affairs, Vol.XLVIII, No. 1056, 15 May, Belgrade, pp. 14-18; after the violence broke out in February 1998, paradoxically though, in an interview with Polish National Television (March 1998), Milosevich stated that if the Kosovo issue is to be settled, the FRY’s (Serbia and Montenegro) membership of the OSCE should first be renewed in the place of that enjoyed by the former Yugoslavia. Cf. Belgrade based newspaper Nasa-Borba (in Serbian only), Monday 30 March 1998. Also available on the Internet: http://www.nasaborba.co.yu/arhiva/Mar98/3003 – 2HTM.


Although the Luxembourg Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the EU (16 September 1997) did not say expressly that “a wider autonomy” should be granted to Kosovo, the statement from this meeting refers to the European Council of ministers’ meeting of April 1997, wherein the same proposal had been inserted. Cf. ‘Rilindja’, 17 September 1997, pp. 1 & 5. Another meeting of the

Lastly, the foreign ministers of the Contact Group meetings in New York (24 September 1997) and Washington (8 January 1998) supported an “enhanced status for Kosovo within the Federal republic of Yugoslavia”. Cf. Pristina-based Albanian newspaper Koha Ditore, 9 January 1998. In the follow up to the New York meeting, the German and French foreign ministers, Kinkel and Vedrine, respectively, launched a joint proposal for solving the issue (19 November 1997). The proposal provided for the special status for Kosovo, although as one of the possible solutions to the crisis. Cf. Nasa-Borba, 22 November 1997. Also available on the Internet: http://www.yurope.com/zines/nasa-borba.

At the Bonn Implementation Council (9-10 December 1997), note was taken with increasing concern of the escalating tensions in Kosovo. Yet, the Council made no proposal as to the future status of Kosovo. Cf. Koha Ditore, 9 January 1998. After the violence broke out in February, the “wider autonomy proposals within Serbia” have almost been abandoned entirely. FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is being focused on as a reference point and the framework within which to solve the issue of Kosovo future status, rather than within Serbia itself.


15 Statement on Kosovo, London Contact Group Meeting, 9 March 1998, paragraph 7 d; statement by the Contact Group Meeting, 9 March 1998, paragraph 7d; statement by the Contact Group, 29 April 1998, paragraphs 5,6, 6a.


17 Statement on Kosovo, London Contact Group Meeting, 9 March 1998, paragraphs 6 and 7d, statement by the Contact Group, 29 April 1998; Contact Group statement, Bonn, 8 July 1998, paragraph 10.


