COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has revived interest in the concept of collective security. This is not surprising taking into account the fact that the end of earlier international rivalries, such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and Word War II, witnessed similar efforts to devise institutional barriers to war, be it actual or potential, through measures of collective security.

The paper will focus on the evolution of collective security efforts in Europe in the post-Cold War era. In doing so, special emphasis will be given to the European integration process and thus the European Union (EU), in view of their encompassing influence in the dynamics of Europe and all European countries in general.

The main thrust of the paper will be around the following pre-supposition: In state formation and preservation, security was an indispensable component of states in Europe as was the case in the rest of the world. In this process, collective security efforts were instrumental in preserving the security of states better. History bears witness to this fact. Against this background, it was only natural that European states in the European integration process, which is, in essence, aimed at institutionalising collective efforts of EU members for their common benefit in all possible domains of life, should also adopt a similar policy for their collective security.

Hence, the question of whether and how the evolution of collective security efforts has taken place in Europe within the framework of the European integration process will be discussed from a historical perspective.

The study will develop as a survey of such collective security efforts in the history of Europe, within an empirical framework. Yet, the study will be guided by a basic theoretical discussion on the concept of collective security in particular and on that of security in general.

The paper is by no means intended to be exhaustive of all related sources on its topic. Nevertheless, it rather aims to provide food for thought in this regard.

The study will begin with what is understood by the concept of collective security both in theory and in practice. Yet, as this concept is related to the general concept of security, the latter will also be looked upon in the same manner. Following this general debate on these concepts, the paper will focus, in a comparative manner on events that have taken place in European history in regard to collective security efforts.

In this review, the Cold War and the post-Cold war era, where the European integration process was initiated and has continued to progress, will be comparatively examined with a view to ascertaining how collective security efforts have evolved in Europe.
CONCEPTS OF SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

In simple terms, collective security is related to efforts of a group of states to act together in order to better preserve their own security. Thus, it is part of security studies and of the security concept in general. For that reason, it seems to be of practical value to touch upon the concept of security itself first before discussing the collective security concept.

Security is primarily an issue of a nation’s relations with other states or a group of states. It is generally argued that security of nations cannot be defined in general terms, nor can it be determined objectively. Definitions depend on states’ perception about threats and safety. Therefore, different definitions of the security concept have arisen over time. On security no precise definition has ever been achieved and probably will never be achieved. There appears almost a studied vagueness about the precise definition of terms such as security.

This complexity is also related to the problematic of those areas of life that are the subject matter of security. In this regard, theoretical debate occurs between two views of security studies, i.e., the ‘narrow’ versus ‘wide’ debate. For the followers of the narrow approach to security, the traditionalists, it is argued that identifying security issues is easy as they equate security with military issues and the use of force. Stephen Walt, as a proponent of the traditionalist approach, gives perhaps the strongest statement on the traditionalist position, according to Barry Buzan, who is one of the advocates of the wider approach to security. As Buzan indicates, Walt argued in one of his articles that security studies are about the phenomenon of war and that it can be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force. Walt also strongly opposed the widening of security studies, as, he argued, by such logic, issues like pollution, disease, child abuse or economic recessions could be viewed as threats to security. This would destroy the intellectual coherence in security studies making it more difficult to focus on real matters of security affecting the lives of states. Here we see that the traditionalist view take only military and political subjects as the sole focus of studies in the security field.

Yet, this approach has gone into an impasse of dissatisfaction in explaining the events taking place in the international arena later on. As Buzan points out the dissatisfaction was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and the 1980s and later by the rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s. Today it is obvious that this narrow definition does not fully cover the parameters of the new security environment evolving in the Euro-Atlantic region in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the political and intellectual climate has changed. Studies in this regard have articulated very different views about how to define the concept of security.

The narrow definition of security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use of military force by states. This however contrasts with the distinctions among military, political, economic, social, and environmental security threats. Thus, with this transforming understanding of what security means today, the advocates of the wider approach concentrate on discussing the dynamics of security in five sectors, that is, military, political, economic, environmental and societal. This methodological framework also seems to serve distinguishing security issues better as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’.

In such a complexity, it is evident that disagreements on the definition of security are probably unavoidable given the different analytical perspectives on the issue. Yet, in view of
the presence of security risks of different natures, it is at least from the practical point of view
that security at present should not be regarded as merely, or even mainly, a matter of military
policy, but of broader economic and political policies. Since threats to security are not
necessarily of a military nature, but that they might derive from various other reasons.

In view of the above one can draw two common points. Irrespective of which subjects are to
be taken up in dealing with security concept, it seems evident that security is about the
preservation of the existence of states. And, in this preservation effort, military component is
always present even if as the last resort to be taken. Similarly, the threat perception and the
nature of threats perceived are important in determining whether and how the perceived
should be taken as a matter of security. Here, one can see that any phenomenon can become
an issue of security when they are ‘securitised’. Securitisation, in the words of Buzan, means
a process by which “the issue in question is presented as an existential threat, requiring
emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bonds of political
procedure”.11 Thus, it is evident that the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not
something, which can be defined analytically or philosophically.12 So, it goes without saying
that in the history of Europe, the concept of security, too, has been shaped by the attributes
attached by European states according to their threat perceptions.

It is commonly accepted that ‘security, whether defined narrowly or widely, is a scare
commodity’.13 In fact, collective security efforts witnessed throughout the history of Europe
are testimony to this scarcity. History shows that in the face of security threat perceptions,
states feel the necessity to combine their efforts to strengthen their own security together.

This brings us to the concept of collective security. Here, similar to the conceptual
problematic in defining security, a precise definition of collective security remains elusive. As
it is bound to happen in public debate and scholarly discourse, not only do definitions differ,
but also some contradict each other directly.14

The term has been used to describe everything from loose alliance systems to any period of
history in which wars do not take place. This wide spectrum is also due to the nature of
security threats. States ally to increase their security against perceived threats.15 In any
particular balance of power system, there are usually groups of states that share an assessment
of those threats to some extent. States face two kinds of threats in general.16 The first is
usually the reason for which states join their forces in the first place, i.e. an external threat
from a potential aggressor who is not part of the group. The second threat is of a nature more
insidious but often just as dangerous, namely, an internal threat from a member of the group
itself, which betrays its friends and use force against them. The former form of collective
security is best illustrated by the alliance system. An alliance functions as a collective body to
defend its members from security threats directed from the outside. Thus it consists of the
concept of collective defence as well. Moreover, although an alliance is focused on external
threats, the security is collective for its members.

On the other hand, the best illustration of security arrangements countering internal threats
coming from members of a collective security body is the ‘security community’. Karl Deutch
elaborated this concept that was first introduced by Van Wagenen, in 1957.17 The
goals of a security community are different and in some sense broader. States in a security
community engage each other in high levels of economic, social and political
interdependence. Their willingness to do so rests on a set of promises not to use force among
themselves. This willingness is expressed either by the merger of states into a common body
(amalgamated security community) or by the co-operation among states without any formal institutionalisation (pluralistic security community). Later, Adler, adding common values as the foundation of such a community, has developed the concept of security community. For Adler, ‘security community is formed by a group of democratic sovereign states that, agreeing on the unbearable destructiveness of modern war and on political, economic, social and moral values consistent with democracy, the rule of law and economic reform, have transferred their domestic practices to the international arena and allowed their civil societies as well as their institutions to become integrated to the point that the idea of using force loses any practical meaning and even becomes unthinkable’.18

Collective security rests on the notion of one for all and all for one. While states retain considerable autonomy over the conduct of their foreign policy, participation in a collective security organisation entails a commitment by each member to join a coalition to confront any aggressor with opposing preponderant strength. In this sense, collective security refers to a self-arrangement among great powers to refrain from aggression, in contrast to balance-of-power diplomacy.

The underlying logic of collective security is two-fold. First, the balancing mechanisms that operate under collective security should prevent war and stop aggression far more effectively than the balancing mechanisms that operate in an anarchic setting: At least in theory, collective security makes for more robust deterrence by ensuring that aggressors will be met with an opposing coalition that has preponderant rather than merely equivalent power. Second, a collective security organisation, by institutionalising the notion of all against one, contributes to the creation of an international setting in which stability emerges through co-operation rather than through competition. Because states believe that they will be met with overwhelming force if they show aggression, and because they believe that other states will co-operate with them in resisting aggression, collective security mitigates the rivalry and hostility of a self-help world.19 Collective security is of a struggle to avoid or minimise two important paradoxes that are inherent in the concept. These are ‘security dilemma’20 and ‘free rider’21 phenomena.

Yet, collective security has always been an issue heavily exposed to criticisms of lacking efficiency. It is argued that collective security is feasible only when it is unnecessary.22 Similarly, critics say it works when it is not needed.23 Realists even argue that the whole concept of collective security is crippled by a fundamental paradox: “a collective security system can only be successful in a world that is already so peaceful if does not need one.”24

**HISTORY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORTS IN EUROPE**

The theoretical debate on the concepts of both security and collective security that is addressed in the previous chapter has no doubt been influenced by what has happened as to the factual collective security efforts of states throughout history. Needs of states in face of perceived threats and the circumstances in which they lived have been determining factors in their choices for collective security. In other words, in order to better evaluate the evolution of collective security efforts of European states, it seems of particular use to examine the events in the history of Europe concerning collective security.
Importance of Security for State-Formation and State-Preservation

It is argued that coercion has been one of the indispensable stimulants in state building in Europe. Tilly, in his book on the development of European states throughout a millennium, defines states as ‘coercion-wielding organisations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organisations within substantial territories’.\(^{25}\) It is evident that anything, which is gained by someone with coercion, is exposed to threat and thus implicit vulnerability, as it is not achieved with the free will of others. Corollary to this logic, it can be said that as states are the product of coercion, they are exposed to threats against their security. Naturally, the essential minimum activities of a state have also been related to the use of coercion. As Tilly states, out of three essential activities, war making and protection are directly related to coercion.\(^{26}\) The former means ‘attacking rivals outside the territory of the state’.\(^{27}\)

This also shows the importance of wars in the history of states. It is even argued that state structures appeared chiefly as a by-product of ruler’s efforts to acquire the means of war that has affected the entire process of state formation.\(^{28}\) On the other hand, ‘protection’, the other state activity of essential nature, is related to ‘attacking and checking rivals of the rulers’ principal allies, whether inside or outside the state’s claimed territory’.\(^{29}\) In the light of these, one can judge first that security has always been a matter of life for states as their creation is coercion-based. Second, due to the preceding state of affairs, states have deployed both activities, i.e. war making and protection as necessary. In this course of life it was only natural that wars became the principal means by which the realignments of the participants and their boundaries occurred. Additionally, it was also evident that in this course of coercion-based international affairs, states also resorted to collective security efforts in various forms ranging from collations to even pacts and alliances that would in turn help their own security.

Collective Security: Historical Perspective

The idea of collective security is argued to be as old as the Amphictyonic League, by which Greek city-states assumed the obligation not to destroy any city of the Amphictyons nor cut off their streams, in war or peace and if any should do so, they would march against the aggressor.\(^{30}\)

While the emphasis in this system was on protecting a common religious area bordered by all, the core of the plan required that a group of states punish any member that violated an important security norm collectively. This collective commitment of a group to hold members accountable for the maintenance of an internal security norm is seen as the essence of collective security.\(^{31}\)

Since the aforementioned early example of collective security arrangements, for more than three thousand years there have been countless proposals for collective security systems and dozens of attempts to put specific plans into effect. In this regard, it is mentioned that the power and philosophy of the Catholic Church made the Middle Ages a particularly fertile period for both. In Germany and especially France, religious councils passed laws obligating princes and clerics to oppose war by forceful means and placed combined forces under religious leadership. On a more abstract level, scholars of the time debated the relative merits of a universal monarchy and a congress of princes to keep the peace in Europe.\(^{32}\)
Later, the Era of Enlightenment brought numerous secular collective security plans, which argued that the great powers should enforce a peace in Europe by assisting the weak and oppressed or otherwise keep to themselves. The treaties ending the Thirty Years War obligated the signatories to defend and protect each other as well as the laws or conditions of peace. In 1693 William Penn outlined a peace plan for Europe that was based on an international tribunal and diet of European sovereigns whose decisions would be enforced collectively.

In this period, later the Abbé de Saint-Pierre published his Project for Perpetual Peace, which called for a Union of States that would work along the same lines. Any state that attempted to use force outside the same lines, any state that attempted to use force outside the union or refused to execute a regulation of the council would be declared an enemy until it either disarmed or complied.

In this context, the evaluation of Rousseau on Saint-Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace is held as note-worthy as it anticipated many of the critiques of collective security that would be raised over the course of the next three centuries. While acknowledging that Saint-Pierre’s project would benefit the people of Europe, he argued that their desires were basically irrelevant. Monarchs were interested in extending their power, not in providing what would now be called public goods or collective benefits.

In the aftermaths of these early attempts with the concept of collective security, the concept became widely known starting with the Concert of Europe in 1815, the first collective security arrangement of its kind.

The first, longest lasting, and most successful attempt at collective security was the Concert of Europe, which helped prevent great-power war from 1815 to 1854. Although enforcement was decentralised, its members supported Europe’s great-power equilibrium, shared a strong distaste for war after the costly Napoleonic Wars, and agreed to consult and take joint action in response to threats to peace. From 1815 through 1822 and to a lesser extent until 1854, they also shared a longer and broader conception of self-interest than is usual in international relations, although the shared stakes did not extend beyond the inner club of great powers. These commitments weakened when the more liberal British and French regimes opposed domestic interventions favoured by Austria and Russia.

Like the Concert, the League of Nations that was founded at the end of World War I assumed great-power co-operation. Its founders drew on numerous experiences in addition to the European Concert, including The Hague Conferences and inter-allied planning during World War I, but it could not overcome identification with the Versailles Treaty’s punitive settlement of the war. It lacked a concert of interests, as Germany, Japan, and Italy opposed the post-war status quo. It even lacked a quorum of great powers, since the Soviets joined only in 1934 and were expelled five years later for attacking Finland, while the United States stayed out from the start. The democracies supported the status quo, but would not take responsibility for enforcing it. Britain and France would not isolate Italy after its invasion of Ethiopia for fear of pushing it toward Germany, and they then failed to resist German aggression against Austria and Czechoslovakia.
POST-WAR ERA

World War II was a catastrophe that discredited the previous international order and, for many Europeans, the basic element in that order, the absolutely sovereign nation-state. In the Europe of such states, autarky and protection and fragmenting Europe’s economy had caused economic malaise and political antagonism. In this process, ‘fascist glorification of the nation-state had been revealed as a monstrosity’.

On the global scale, the victors of the war centralized enforcement of collective security in their own hands on the United Nations Security Council (SC) in the belief that post-war peace required continuation of the wartime concert. But with the former common enemy Germany weak and partitioned, Soviet-American co-operation broke down over conflicting ideologies and security concerns, and the resultant bipolar bloc system undermined the entire mechanism.

The disappointment after the founding of the United Nations became higher. Rival blocs arose swiftly in the late 1940s, less than four years after the signing of the UN Charter. As a result, the new UN soon became another forum for factional struggle and not a vehicle to transcend it. The fundamental opposition of the United States and Soviet Union, and the ability of either to veto Security Council resolutions, made the UN irrelevant to important decisions. In other words, it could not prevent the Soviet expansionism to which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and thus lost its potential role to play as a security community.

Post-war era was initially shaped by two important concerns that arose at the end of the war: how to prevent Germany’s revival as a war machine as it did after the World War I and how to resist the Soviet threat and expansion. Western Europeans became faced with the two big challenges for their security. These two security concerns seem to have played an important role in the integration process among Western Europeans for the first time in the history of the continent. This integration process was heavily exposed to all versions of integration theories ranging from modest ones like inter-governmentalism to even most farfetched ones such as supranationalism.

International Ruhr Authority was set up in 1948 to exert control over the Germans depriving them of the control of their steel and coal mines because they were the most needed raw material for the war effort. In a similar vein, Britain and France together with the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty in the same year, thereby setting up a collective defence mechanism among them. This treaty in fact played a bridging role to form a full-fledged alliance a year later with the participation of the USA and Canada. This was NATO that ensured the US commitment to the defence of democratic West against the Soviet expansion.

However, the first security concern, that is the control of Germany was still pending. Here, Europeans sought another form of institutionalisation by forming a European Defence Community (EDC) in 1950 that would also embrace their former enemies Germany as well as Italy. This proposal had many far reaching features both in the sense of European integration in general and collective security efforts. It envisaged a supranational body to govern the defence policies of the Brussels Treaty countries together with Germany and Italy, and a European army. Its federalist feature was obvious. Even the founder father of the European integration, French statesman Monet, said: ‘now, the federation of Europe would have to become an immediate objective’. As argued, it was a visible attempt of the concept of third force that concerned being an independent Europe with equal status to the Super Powers.
Yet it also was obvious that it touched the core of national sovereignty. At the end it became clear that no country even France, which proposed the EDC, was ready to give up their defence and security power, the most vital characteristics of preserving their national sovereignty at least seen that time, in an organisation of supranational nature, for the sake of putting their old enemies under ultimate control. Thus, the EDC did not materialise as the French parliament voted against its ratification in 1954. Hence, the solution that was brought to the integration of Germany and Italy in Western security structures came in inter-governmentalism, with the extending of the Brussels Treaty to Germany and Italy under the name of the Western European Union (WEU) 1954. Once again, the remedy for minimising the second security concern of Western European, i.e. controlling Germany, was brought within an inter-governmental body. In fact, this time, the WEU seemed to have been created to enable these two countries to join NATO in 1955. And soon after this was achieved, the WEU became dormant for decades. In this sense, it was obvious that the WEU was designed as a stopgap measure to fill the void let by the EDC and to allow German accession together with Italy to NATO.

The failure of the EDC initiative was a milestone in the history of collective security efforts as the European integration process then moved to the economic field where national sovereignty of states seemed less directly threatened. This process was started with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) among the countries of the WEU to replace the International Ruhr Authority.

On the other hand, security concerns of Western Europeans were taken care of in NATO. It was clear that Western Europeans took collective security matters outside the European integration, as NATO was the perfect choice that time with the strong presence and commitment of one the Super Powers, the USA. The conjuncture was also not helping for otherwise. The various international crises which sporadically erupted in East-West relations and which raised the spectre of transforming the Cold War even into a ‘hot’ war. The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the invasion of Hungary in 1956, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the Czech crisis of 1968 were all spectacular developments in which the West had no other alternative but NATO for their own security and defence.43

Here, one can see that beside these external dynamics of fear, concerns of EC members over their national security, in which they saw defence and security issues as their national prerogative, coupled with different foreign policy goals among themselves and were determinant in the shape of collective security posture in the European integration process.

Western Europeans deeply focused on their integration process in the European Communities (EC) in the areas of low politics like economics. Under the US nuclear guarantee in NATO for their security, EC members comfortably concentrated on widening and deepening of their integration in areas outside military matters. Even France, which left the military structure of NATO in 1962 in an attempt to avoid being a potential target of the Soviet nuclear retaliation being a state possessing nuclear weapons, still continued to enjoy the collective defence guarantee of the Alliance.

Yet with the advent of the 1970s, the chilliest years of the Cold War came to an end with détente politics between the two military blocs. The principle of peaceful coexistence replaced the balance of terror in East-West relations. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was set up as the only European body to co-ordinate contacts between the two blocs on matters relating to mainly soft security issues.
This era of rapprochement between the rival blocs also had influence on the EC. This was the formation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC), which was a result of an attempt to co-ordinate and harmonise foreign policy views of EC members so as to assume an efficient voice as an international bloc, perhaps as the third force, on world affairs. Yet, this co-operation was to be kept outside the EC and thus the European integration process although it was a co-operation among the EC members and about the political interests of these members deriving from the EC and the European integration.

Similarly, the involvement of EPC into security matters appeared to be a problematic process. Even, defence and security matters were strictly excluded in the beginning. As argued, there was no formal exclusion of security and defence affairs from the EC agenda at least legalistically speaking. However, there was no such political will to do so among its members.

The civilian power stance adopted by the EC members mainly impeded the inclusion of security issues to the EPC throughout the détente years. However, the breakdown of détente in the early 1980s through the Super Power confrontation revealed once again the vulnerability of the EC states and arose the need for co-operation on security matters. In this direction, the EPC saw a gradual involvement into the security field. Yet, as in the previous times of the integration process, some, if not all the EC members (footnote states) were still concerned not to discuss such issues directly related to national sovereignty as security in the EPC.

On the other hand, it was the time that the US policies under President Reagan such as the SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) were creating the fear of US isolation and de-coupling from Europe. Particularly, the SDI, which meant that the strategic missile theatre of the US would only cover the American territory, was a great blow to EC members, particularly Germany. They had to co-ordinate their efforts on such immediate security concerns as the members of the EC. Yet, EPC was not the right venue due to the aforementioned reservations of state.

Thus, the solution was again found with the use of the reactivation the long dormant WEU. Here, it helped to serve as a venue for the EC members willing to discuss their own security matters. It also helped the EC members, which were NATO allies, to talk in harmony in NATO before the US.

This period of time seemed to have marked the beginning of a shift in the mindset of EC states towards their own security and thus towards their collective security efforts. In NATO they were long relaxed with the US guarantee, but this was not a never-ending guarantee. In fact, the relations between the US and particularly the EC members of Europe in NATO were not an easy marriage. The US had long criticised the Europeans for not being committed enough to their own security and defence in terms of money and manpower and this criticism was growing as the EC was developing as a world power in economic terms. On the other hand, the EC members of the Alliance blamed the US administration for being dominant, if not hegemonic, in the Alliance and for threatening them with de-coupling whenever questioned by the Europeans.

This dichotomy of ‘entrapment/abandonment’ was growing in the mid-1980s. Under such circumstances came the first major revision of the Community Treaties with the signature of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985. This Act was a breakthrough for the EC members in many aspects. It set an important goal before the European integration as the creation of
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that could be seen as the first step to political union that time. It brought up the ‘subsidiary principle’ by which it enabled the integration process to progress smoothly without creating tensions stemming from concerns of national sovereignty.

The SEA also gave the EPC a mandate in political and economic aspects of security. Yet, the EPC was kept still outside the EC as a separate international instrument closely linked to the EC. Moreover, military aspects of security were excluded in the mandate of the EPC. However, it is argued that the stage for all sorts of fundamental changes in the future was shaped with the SEA. Ever since the EC began to discuss security and foreign policy objectives.

As can be judged from the above, the Cold War era witnessed the resurgence of the Western Europe as an important economic and political international actor that stemmed from the rapidity by which economic, political and other ways of integration was pursued after the SEA. In this process, the post-war European security co-operation, as argued, seems not to have emerged from a blueprint, but as a corollary of many other converging factors such as US policies causing fears of entrapment and abandonment while providing a common security atmosphere, the Soviet threat and the fear of nuclear confrontation and the problem of curbing future German aggression in keeping it in European integration.

POST-COLD WAR ERA

The end of the Cold War, which had been the symbol of division in Europe for almost half a century, is commonly associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall on 3 October 1989. The fall of the Berlin wall meant also the collapse of the ideological walls dividing Europe for so many years. Yet, the end of the Cold War was not of a static nature but the result of a process that can be traced back to the coming power of Gorbacev as the last president of the USSR in 1985. The historic policies of Gorbacev as the ‘Prestrokia’ and ‘Glasnost’, as argued, propelled the USSR into a ‘deconstructivist’ overhaul of its social, political and economic system, allowing it to eliminate the bureaucratic, oppressive and immobilising forces of the Stalinist past. His aim was, most likely, to relocate resources to the welfare of the population from the defence expenditures with a view to strengthening the loyalty of the peoples in the republics forming the USSR and thus preventing the disintegration. Yet, arms cuts and even unilateral arms reduction initiated by the Gorbacev leadership was perceived outside as the weakening of the state. This was enough to flare up the popular movements in the satellite states against the Soviet regime that turned out to be irreversible. Furthermore, the Gulf war showed clearly the might of the other Super Power, the USA. Thus, by 1989 for the USSR it was already impossible to alter the current of the historical changes.

Within a short span of time in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, one-party Communist states disappeared throughout the Central and Eastern Europe, new independent states were established in the break-up republics of the former Soviet Union that then ceased to exist and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. Gorbacev, nevertheless, managed to secure his new country the Russian Federation, through a series of bargaining and multilateral instruments signed in the course of this historical transformation, regarding mainly arms control and reduction both conventional and nuclear weapons.

By the end of 1991 it was clear that coupled with all these historic changes, the demise of the ideological divide yielded an unprecedented transformation in the strategic security
environment not only in Europe, but also in the whole Euro-Atlantic region. That would be named as ‘the post-Cold War’.

Throughout the Cold War era NATO ensured the freedom of its members and also prevented war in Europe, standing as the cornerstone of the defence and security of the Trans-Atlantic world. In this process, two key variables were instrumental in its success. The Alliance, on the one hand, promoted co-operation with the Soviet Bloc, which later led to détente, while, on the other, remained fully committed to collective defence with necessary military deterrence. With these two factors, NATO played an indispensable role in bringing the East-West confrontation to a peaceful end.

The advent of this era was marked by two significant facts inter alia for the security of Europe. First, the ‘common enemy’, against which the western security system was directed, ceased to exist. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact became extinct. Second, Germany, which was the former enemy before the Soviet threat, became unified again after a long time since the end of World War II.

There was need for rapprochement with post-communist states as well as for ensuring that the unified Germany would not change its policies. These two concerns have no doubt proved further impetus for collective security efforts of the EC countries along with their non-EC NATO allies. Similarly, these two concerns have found reflection also in the European integration process in general.

In 1990, a Franco-German initiative for developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was tabled before the EC. In this context, the Gulf War of 1990 became imperative in exposing the weakness of the lack of an integrated European approach to foreign and security policy. These efforts materialised with the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 that brought the three Communities under the roof of a Union, i.e. the European Union (EU). This Treaty formally made it possible for the EC members to take up security issues in the Union through the CFSP.

The end of the Cold War that was brought about by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the dissolution of the USSR unavoidably raised questions on the necessity of NATO as military alliances normally dissolve once their common enemy has been defeated. However, time attested to the contrary as NATO assumed perhaps a more demanding task in the face of the emergence of newly democratic countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the former USSR territories, including the Russian Federation.

Under this process of transformation came the concept of security partnership into being in NATO that symbolised the external adaptation of the Alliance to the strategic changes in the Euro-Atlantic region. This was moulded with the Strategic Concept of the Alliance 1991.

As to the possible reasons for this inclusive approach of the Alliance towards its former adversaries, two main motives can be mentioned. The first is to avoid the risk that these newly democratic countries might pose security threats to NATO, if they were left alone. The second is to expand the security zone that surrounds the Alliance. Thus, it can be argued that it was to the benefit of the Alliance to work for the integration of these countries under a common security umbrella to enhance its strength and survival. This umbrella was the policy of Partnership for Peace (PfP) that marked the beginning of the external adaptation of the
Alliance to the new security environment in the Euro-Atlantic region. This policy was also extended to EU members that are not NATO members.52

Apart from NATO, the CSCE has also gone through transformation turning into an organisation changing its name (OSCE) and structure to embrace all post-communist countries for matters relating to soft security issues such as conflict prevention and crisis management in the true sense of the Euro-Atlantic region.

The EU on the other hand has extended co-operation to these countries with a view to their membership on the basis of accession negotiations.

All these brought up an interlocking system of security in the early years of the post-Cold War era.53 Yet, later, in addition to this re-mapping of the Euro-Atlantic area, the new security environment became increasingly faced with the emergence of different security risks threatening the Euro-Atlantic community. In this regard, it is argued that the end of the Cold War has put new national security issues beside the long-standing fear of a nuclear war between the two Super Powers and their preparations for large-scale conventional wars: ethnic conflicts leading to civil wars that expose civilian populations to large-scale state violence; an increasing relevance of economic competitiveness and, relatively, of the “spin-on” of civilian high technology for possible military use; increasing numbers of migrants and refugees testing the political capacities of states; threats of environmental degradation affecting national well-being; and perceived increases in the relevance of issues of cultural identity in international politics, including human rights and religion.54 As it can clearly be seen from the above sentence, all these non-conventional security threats consist of a wide range of risks varying from ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism and international terrorism through organised crime, drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to mass migrations, environmental disasters, poverty etc.

In this context, ethnic conflicts, which led to violent ultra nationalism, as witnessed in the disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia, can be argued as a testimony to the fact that ethnic divergences that are suppressed in the name of ideological unity can easily unfold once this ideological dictum is dissolved. Similarly, international terrorism, sabotage, organised crime, drug trafficking can be attributed to the fact that those failed states as well as armed groups, which were heavily sponsored by the Super Powers during the Cold War as pawns in their power politics, found themselves totally cut off from their vital sources at the end of the ideological divide. Thus, they had no chance but to resort to such ways as stated above, simply for the survival of their regimes.

On the other hand, increasing imbalances in the world welfare and in its distribution also seem to have heavily affected the feeling of resentment among these peoples living in absolute poverty and famine. This fact has impacts not only on mass migration from these countries to better developed areas, but also on the increase of widespread crimes among the population therein, both of which eventually pose severe implications on global security.

It was evident that most of these non-conventional security challenges were associated to be directly or indirectly related to the surrounding regions of Europe in the eyes of the Europeans. Particularly, the Mediterranean basin has been the area of strategic importance as its southern and southeastern parts are exposed to instability, be it potential or actual. In this context, both NATO and the EU have developed their own security frameworks—the Mediterranean Dialogue of the Alliance and Barcelona Process (Euro Med) of the Union— for
furthering co-operation with the non-European parts of the Mediterranean basin with a view to strengthening the security environment.

These threats to international security are not purely new phenomena. However, what is new in this sense is the effect of globalisation on these perils. Today, in a world where things have increasingly become more transboundary and interdependent, owing to the effects of globalisation, as in the domino theory, any incidents in a country or in a region, be it a terrorist act or an ethnic conflict, pose threats on other areas. Corollary to this, such threats that transcend borders happen to affect security more rapidly, more severely in an ever-expanding magnitude with spill over effects.

In this regard, the break-up of Former Yugoslavia and the local wars among the ethnic groups that once lived together under Tito, were clear signs for a broader approach to collective security efforts in Europe. These hot conflicts also showed that the EU countries were not prepared to take initiative without the USA even in such fights happening in their vicinity.

In light of the transboundary effects of globalisation that make things heavily interdependent, sufficiency of natural security in tackling such security risks and threats of global character has also been questioned. In this regard, it is argued that conceptions of global peace and security based primarily on national security are no longer sufficient.55 Katzenstein, too, recognises that with the end of the Cold War, the combination of factors affecting national security is changing.56 Given these arguments, one can rightly assert that national security and collective security are interrelated. Thus, it has become clear that under the conditions of the globalised world, in order to manage the security risks at present, national security needs strongly complemented with collective security. This seem to have helped further change the minds of the European states, particularly the major ones and the importance of collective security efforts among themselves in the EU, which has become a target of anti-globalist world.

It is evident that in the course of this rapidly transforming security environment that has evolved in the first half of the 1990s, the Western Europe and the EU countries in particular have found a conducive atmosphere for concentrating further on collective security.

The possibility of massive military conflicts as perceived during the years of the Cold War has diminished to a considerable extent with the collapse of the rival bloc and the consequent integration efforts of these post-communist states in the Euro-Atlantic security structures. In other words, the Europeans felt more comfortable to talk security and defence issues outside the Alliance. Furthermore, the emergence of non-conventional security risks and threats have further made them focus on security issues to tackle them.

In fact, this ‘motivation’ was even encouraged by the US as a promising step for better burden sharing for the security of the Continent. What came out of this was the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) that was formulated in NATO in 1994.57

The relations between the Americans and the Europeans for the security of the Continent as mentioned earlier, be it in NATO or in any other foray, were not an easy one. Yet, even in the years passed under the entrapment-abandonment dichotomy, a common understanding has prevailed that the European allies should do more for their own security and defence in Europe. In other words, it was evident that Europeans should form together the European
pillar of the Alliance. In this context, the ESDI was in fact the result of such efforts for a better balance of burden sharing in the security of Europe.

In this process the WEU was entrusted with the task of the ESDI, thereby forming the European pillar of the Alliance. And, as the non-EU allies of NATO such as Turkey were already granted equal status in the WEU, this organisation that was generally seen as a body playing second fiddle to NATO, seemed to be the perfect choice at that time. It was also in line with the continuing understanding of the EU as to its reserve position to handling such hard security issues as defence outside the Union albeit in close co-ordination with it.58

However, the external and internal dynamics that have emerged in the aftermath of this initiative seem to have changed the course of developments. The first was the inefficient cooperation and solidarity in the WEU in responding to the local conflicts particularly in the Former Yugoslavia. It was obvious in the eyes of the EU countries that even the WEU did not help balance the US dominance in the Alliance and that when the US was not willing it was impossible to take actions in the Alliance to intervene in such conflicts affecting the European security as was the case during the Albanian crisis in 1997. Thus, there was growing understanding to incorporate the WEU in the EU structures and thus assume the hard-core security roles like military tasks within the Union.

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 was the first sign in this regard but could not yet solve the problematic whether the EU in its institutional capacity should also deal with hard security issues as defence and how this would pose ramification the European integration process.59 Yet, this dilemma later was overcome by the Franco-British Summit in St. Malo in December 1998. It was a breakthrough in the sense that these two countries representing the two opposing sides of the above problematic came to an understanding to form a common security and defence policy (CESDP) inside the EU. This policy would be carried out for primarily fulfilling the Petersberg tasks of the Union. Petersberg tasks are defined in general as crisis management and rescue-type operations. However, they also include, inter alia, EU military operations for the restoration of law and order in any country at the request of that country’s authorities.60

This process further gained momentum at the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999 where the EU members took a decision to incorporate the WEU in the Union thereby assuming the tasks of the said organisation. The Summit set a ‘headline goal’ to form a EU brigade to be deployable by 2003. It was envisaged to be deployed for Petersberg tasks. In other words, the first steps of setting up a joint European army were taken.

This decision of incorporation of the WEU in the Union also meant that the role of European pillar of the WEU would be now carried out by the EU in the Alliance. Inevitably this required close co-ordination between the ESDI of the Alliance and the ESDP of the Union. The issue became even more problematic when the EU expressed its desire to use NATO assets and capabilities for its operations within the framework of the ESDP. Yet, this amalgamation of the WEU into the Union and the relations between the ESDI and the ESDP created many crucial problems in the relations with the Alliance. In this context, how the vested rights of the non-EU allies in the WEU would be preserved in the ESDP was the most painstaking. Naturally, these allies among which particularly Turkey was not willing to share NATO assets and capabilities with the EU for ESDP purposes unless given appropriate status by the EU to commensurate with their right in the WEU. Nevertheless, the details of this problematic issue fall outside the scope of this study.
As can be seen in light of the developments as to collective security efforts that have taken place in the history of the Western Europeans from the Cold War years up to present, the EU countries have finally agreed on including hard security issues including military ones in their Union portfolio with a view to formulating common policies on these parameters. This simply shows the extent of the evolution of the collective security efforts of the EU countries. Such issues have long been kept outside the European integration process as they have been considered as touching the core of national sovereignty.

In this shift, the experiences in the Alliance vis-à-vis handling such issues of national sovereignty seem to have been influential. In this context, it is argued that NATO’s integrated military structure has contributed, although with varying degrees among member states, to the denationalisation of defence and security concepts in Europe. Similarly, it is also argued that NATO experience in this process have created a highly integrated, consensus-driven military and political security elite.61

In this process, one should also mention the Kosovo crisis that took place in 1999 and its ramifications on the collective security efforts in Europe.

The Kosovo operation underpinned the fact that NATO can, albeit as a last resort, have recourse to military options in face of such security risks threatening peace and stability in its surrounding.

This operation was conducted without a UN Security Council (UNSC) decision authorising the use of force. The then Secretary General of NATO said after the launch of this air campaign that the use of force was the only way to prevent more human sufferings and more repression and violence against civilians.62 This operation invoked, among others, also a great deal of controversy as to the necessity of having a UN approval in such cases.

In this context, it was noteworthy that the UN Secretary General stated in the early days of the Kosovo operation “the UN Charter should never be the source of comfort or justification for those guilty of gross and shocking violations of human rights”.63

Today, notwithstanding the argument whether or not such military action without UNSC approval is legal according to the international law, there already exists an example, if not a precedent, which a regional organisation as stated in the UN Charter, can resort to military action, in the form of a peace support operation, against a sovereign country without UNSC’s approval. However, it seems that such an operation can only be invoked under the following conditions:64

- Inaction of the UNSC due to the practice of veto power;
- Failure of all peaceful and diplomatic measures to stop these violations;
- Gross and massive human rights violations leading to killing of non-combatants in the country in question, which create a situation that would endanger international peace and security if not intervened.

In this context, what seems more noteworthy is that the NATO’s role as a military organisation in the preservation of collective security has been clearly manifested with the Kosovo operation, despite the paradox of legality versus legitimacy in NATO’s actions.
therein. With the Kosovo operation, questions have arisen whether these kinds of peace support operations in the name of collective security are within the remit of NATO. However, as argued by some scholars, this question appears to be too late to be raised, since NATO has really been doing this sort of thing since the Bosnian war.65 In fact, during that war, NATO-led air forces launched attacks on Serbian military units in 1994 and 1995.66

The only deviation of the Kosovo operation was the fact that NATO acted in this case without a clear UNSC mandate for the use of force.67 In the post-Cold War era, NATO has deployed forces for peace support operations under UN mandates in accordance with the spirit of Article 52 of the UN Charter which tasks regional arrangements to take appropriate actions, including military ones, for collective security.

In view of the above, it seems clear that the Kosovo operation led to certain conclusions for collective security studies. It confirmed the UN’s failure to act as a security community for the collective security of the world. Thus, the Europeans should take their own measures as necessary although this raises the problem of legitimacy and has the potential to lead to anarchy at the very end. Yet, even the Europeans remained elusive on how to formulate a new security community.

The world that embarked on a new millennium with these important shifts in international affairs in general and in the collective security field in particular, could not escape from another unprecedented development on September 11.

There is no doubt that September 11, 2001 is a day to remember in the years ahead in many aspects. That date the US was exposed to very severe, if not the most, terrorist attacks not only in its history but also in that of the entire world. Terrorists hit the Pentagon and the twin towers of the Word Trade Centre with hijacked civilian passenger airliners.

These attacks seem to have changed many, if not all, things in the world affairs, leading to important repercussions on various matters. In this regard, approach of the Europeans both in NATO and the to collective security is no exception in this transformation.

In the wake of these terrorist attacks, NATO allies lined up behind the US and in an unprecedented display of support and solidarity they invoked, on 12 September 2001, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of the Alliance, the core clause of collective defence, which states that an armed attack against an ally shall be considered an attack against all allies and thus the Alliance itself, while providing for measures to counter such an attack.68

This decision seems to have constituted a dramatic shift in the conceptualisation of what forms hard and soft security issues. First, it was bitterly confirmed that terrorism is one of the most dangerous non-conventional security threats of asymmetric nature. Similarly, it was also confirmed that terrorists can easily use weapons of mass destructions such as biological, chemical and even nuclear ones as was seen in the threat of anthrax contamination after the terrorist attacks. Yet, fight against terrorism has always been a matter of soft security that would not need hard security measures including military ones. But, the invocation of Article 5 and the military operation directed against Al Qaeda terrorist network and its sanctuary the Taleban regime clearly show that such non-conventional security threats would likely require military measures.
The September 11 terrorist attacks were followed by another shift in the parameters of the post-Cold War era. This was the close co-operation of the Russian Federation with the USA as well as with the Allies in the fight against terrorism. Although the relations between Russia and the Alliance were formalised in 1997 with the signing of the Founding Act that was the confirmation of the end of the Cold War transforming former adversaries to partners for common security. However, relations remained always problematic due the residual feelings of mutual mistrust between the parties. September 11 in this regard has provided for both sides to turn the relations into a new quality in the fight against commonly perceived threat of terrorism. This momentum has recently culminated in the signature of a new institutional mechanism, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), on 28 May 2002 in Rome, which will work on the basis of the present Founding Act.

Almost at the same time, 26 May 2002, Europe has also witnessed another important event, the US-Russia Agreement on the mutual reduction of strategic warheads. This agreement coupled with the new institutional mechanism between NATO and Russia seem no doubt to further facilitate the overcoming of the residual signs of the former Cold War adversaries and thus concentrate on new security threats of asymmetric nature such as terrorism. This remains the primary task before the EU particularly and the whole Europeans in general in their collective security efforts.

CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War era is generally compared with that of Cold War in two different ways. One view is that the Cold War was a terrible and dangerous period in European history, and that ending it has enormously improved the prospects for European security. The second view, equally crude but at the opposite end of the spectrum, is that the Cold War was good for European security and that ending it has opened a Pandora’s box of new dangers. In view of the aforementioned discussions in the preceding chapters, both arguments seem to be relevant today.

At present, the review of the history of Europe since the end of World War II clearly attests to the fact that both the internal and external concerns stimulating the collective security efforts in Europe have been satisfactorily addressed. Germany has become an indispensable component of the European integration. In an era where the EU members are united under a common single currency, it would be only an ‘academic’ matter to think about German revival threatening the collective security in Europe and in the whole world.

Similarly, the former adversary ‘the Russians’ has been meticulously engaged in the Euro-Atlantic security structures. The recently established NRC is in fact the reconfirmation of the end of the East-West confrontation.

Furthermore, as it was evident in the comments and the speeches of the heads of State and Governments in Rome at the signing ceremony of the NRC, the West and the East have come together this time to preserve their common security against the new enemy, terrorism and other related non-conventional security threats. This is indeed a confirmation of the fact that as long as coercion remains the basis of state formation and preservation, security needs of states would continue although their threat perceptions might change as is the case at present. Thus, collective security remains as important as before.
In this process it is clear that collective security efforts in Europe and among the EU members in particular have gone through a clearly visible evolution in which these efforts have become gradually strengthened in ever-developing institutionalisation.

Here as to the question whether these collective security efforts have led to a ‘security community’, the following can be mentioned. The UN, supposedly the only global security framework to assume the role of such a security community, has failed to do so due to its working mechanisms. The UN has acted as a security community in the sense that it prevented and punished acts of its members against the security of the whole UN family, only on occasions when the foreign policy interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council coincided. It could not create common values to avoid acts of coercion to the detriment of the global security.

The OSCE on the other hand has played an instrumental role in soft security issues. Yet it has lacked the military component that appears to be essential to counter security threats of all nature ranging from wars to terrorist attacks.

NATO has covered this part. In fact the Alliance has acted as a security community among its members while also deterring and countering security threats coming from outside as well. In fact, the Alliance has been a peculiar mixture of an alliance and security community. It has provided security for its members against the outside threat, the Soviet expansion with its collective defence mechanism. It has also served as a security community by eroding former adversaries of its members such as the Franco-German security dilemma and also the potential tension between Turkey and Greece.

In this interlocking security framework, it can be argued that the EU was comfortable enough. Yet, it has also developed its security posture as the integration process has continued. The ESDP represents the present level of the evolution of the collective security efforts of the EU members. In fact, the policy deals with all stages of countering security threats in the general understanding of crisis management that range from preventive diplomacy to conflict prevention and even to military operations in the form of peace enforcement. In this sense, it is better equipped than the OSCE.

The ESDP is also compatible with the wider approach of security that includes not only political and military concerns but also economic as well environmental. This is actually in line with the needs of today’s security environment affected by non-conventional security threats.

In view of the discussions in the preceding chapters, it can be argued that the EU has become a security community in the sense of preventing security threats coming from its own members. The interlocking values and interests that have emerged among the EU members in the European integration process have indeed contributed to this end. Yet, the EU remains still vulnerable to outside threats. Despite the ESDP, the premature nature of its military posture and the dependency of such a posture on NATO’s assets and capabilities are the main impediments in the further development of the EU as a security community that is able to deter outside threats as well. Throughout the years since the end of World War II, NATO has filled that gap for most of the EU members, which are members of NATO. The non-NATO allies of the EU have also benefited form the security framework of the Alliance in one way or another, as all of them enjoy enhanced military co-operation and interoperability with NATO military structures within the framework of NATO’s PfP.
Under these circumstances, the main question that seems to be determining the future of collective security efforts of the EU countries is linked to whether these efforts and the ESDP in particular would follow a separate path from the Alliance and develop its own defence posture. In fact, there are arguments supporting such a development. The European integration is argued to be a product of the neo-functionalist view that envisages a gradual approach in integration through spillover effects to be generated by the dynamics of integration. And, as it is also commonly accepted, ‘the story of European integration began with defence’. In fact, the European integration process can be defined with the following formula: integration because of security needs and security through integration. Yet, as explained in the previous chapters, hard security issues including military co-operation and defence have been kept outside the integration process. NATO continues to be the bedrock of collective defence and security for the Europeans. Yet not all the members of the EU are in the Alliance. Nor all European allies of NATO are members of the EU. Under this asymmetric membership, the ESDP needs to be carefully handled in its relations with NATO.

In this context, the status of non-EU allies such as Turkey in the ESDP is of particular importance for the future of security and defence posture of the European Union. On the other hand, the issue of asymmetric membership, in fact, is an inherent problem in security co-operation among these organisations in this famous term ‘interlocking security structure’. So it is a delicate issue to co-ordinate collective security efforts in Europe through this system that suffers also from overlapping mandates among the organisations.

In view of all these, it can be argued at least from a theoretical standpoint that creating its own collective security mechanism with an autonomous military posture would be the optimal solution for the EU. This is particularly important given the increasing economic rivalry between the USA and the EU in international economic affairs that might turn out to be a political rivalry one day. The long experience of the fearful years of this entrapment/abandonment dilemma can be an incentive for the EU countries to work further to be self-sufficient in all walks of life including military and defence issues.

Yet, on the other hand, the following two factors seem to suggest the unfeasibility of such divorce between the EU and the US. Today, all EU members, with the exception of Greece, continue to reduce their defence spending. Their percentage of defence expenditure share in the GDP are even less than the level –two per cent– that they in NATO require from the candidate countries for membership. Similarly, the US technological development is almost one generation ahead of that of the EU members. Under such circumstances it seems unlikely to expect the EU countries to take steps that might be to the detriment of the US security interest and at the expense of risking the collective defence mechanism of the Alliance.

Furthermore, it is also not clear whether the evolution of the collective security efforts among the EU members would lead to a creation of full-fledged defence posture. This evolution so far has been possible in a very delicate balance with the national sovereignty concerns of the countries. Where would be the limit in terms of national sovereignty? The history of the European integration is a process of compromise between national sovereignty concerns of EU members, notably those of the pivotal members, and common benefits stemming from integration. That is why the CFSP and also the ESDP are conducted in the spirit of inter-governmentalism. In this it is true that in the face of perceived common threats to their security, EU members have formulated their collective security both in policy and in practice also to the extent that the integration process has eroded their national sovereignty concerns and converged their national foreign policy goals.
Thus, in view of all these factors, it would be farfetched to speculate about an autonomous EU defence and military mechanism at least in the foreseeable future. The ESDP will likely seek to exploit as much as possible the assets and capabilities of the Alliance in a dynamic process, the end of which seems hard to be reckon.

Collective security efforts in the history of Europe particularly since the end of World War II have been shaped by rationalism. If the Cold War was defined as neither peace nor war, the post-Cold War period is both peace and war. In this rationale, future directions for collective security inside the European integration process will continue to be shaped by both external and internal dynamics.

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NATO, EU, WEU, UN Official Web Sites.


5. Ibid.


9. See the introduction in Buzan, op.cit, pp. 1-21.

10. Generally speaking, security issues requiring military options and relating to defense are considered ‘hard’ ones whereas others that require non-military measures such as conflict prevention are regarded as ‘soft’. But this distinction today appears to be less relevant in view of events and experience in world affairs. See for details M. T. Klare and D. C. Thomas (ed), World Security, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.


The Security dilemma refers to the notion that a state’s efforts to increase its security by threatening another state, which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state’s security. See C. A. Kupchan, ‘The Case for Collective Security’, in G. W. Downs (ed), Collective Security beyond the Cold War, USA: University of Michigan Press, 1994, pp. 41-69.

The free-rider problem refers to the temptation of states to let other states assume the costs of eliminating a threat while they share in the greater security—a public good from which they cannot easily be excluded—that results. In its most simplified form, this can be formalized as an N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma where each state is left with a dominant strategy of not cooperating in the security system. If other states choose to act, the free-riding state gains all of the benefits that the others do and pays none of the cost; if other states hang back, it avoids the costs of being exploited”. See G. W. Downs and K. Iida, ‘Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security’ in G. W. Downs (ed), Collective Security beyond the Cold War, USA: University of Michigan Press, 1994, pp. 17-41.


Downs and Iida, op. cit., in note 21, p. 32.


Ibid., p.96.

Ibid.

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Tilly, op.cit., in note 25, p. 96.


Ibid.

Ibid. p. 3.

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41 Pinder, p. 9.


43 Aybet, op.cit., p. 58.

44 Article 224 of the Rome Treaty was argued to be interpreted to permit the EC as a body in which members would consult, concern with defense in cases the EC’s operation might be under threat as a result of civil or international disorder. See T. Taylor, European Defense Cooperation, (London: RIIA, 1984), p. 18.

45 Schulze, op.cit., p. 327.

46 Ibid. p. 334.

47 Aybet, op.cit., p. 162.

48 Schulze, p. 331.


53 Ibid.

54 Katzenstein, op.cit., p. 7.


56 Katzenstein, p. 8.


59 Ibid.

60 See Howorth, op.cit.

61 Schulze, op.cit., p. 348.


63 See B. Ove, ‘Should NATO to be the Lead in Formulating a Doctrine on Humanitarian Intervention?’, NATO Review, No. 3, autumn 1999, p. 25.
Ibid., p. 27.


Terrorism in fact has long been perceived by the NATO people as the number one security threat of an asymmetric nature. In a survey made at the NATO Defence College in summer 2000 among senior officials of both NATO and Partner countries who worked on NATO policies, they clearly indicated that terrorism would be the most dangerous security threat facing the Alliance in the age of globalisation. See H. Ulusoy, ‘A Survey on Current Major NATO Issues’, Perceptions, Vol. VI, No.1, March-May 2001.

Howorth, op.cit., p. 1.