FORMALISING THE PARTITION OF CYPRUS: LESSONS FROM THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

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Cyprus has been divided between Turks and Greeks since the UN-supervised Green Line partitioning Nicosia, the capital city, was drawn in 1963 after the Greek onslaught against the Turks and the collapse of the now-defunct Republic of Cyprus. Over a decade later, in July 1974, the Turkish intervention only extended the scope of this division to the entire island. The existence of two separate administrations in Cyprus since 1964, when the UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFCYP) were deployed in the buffer zone, and two separate states since 1983, when the Turks declared independence, means a de facto partition of Cyprus is already well in place. A broader dimension of this division encompassing distinctions of national history, culture, ethnicity and religion dates back to the day the first Ottoman Turk landed on the island in 1571. Neither during the long Ottoman rule, nor in the British period or the brief era of the Republic was the civilisational gap between the two nations bridged. Considering these historical realities, equally reflected in the situation today, the creation of two separate states in Cyprus offers the hope of a long-lasting political settlement of Cyprus within Europe. The division of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947 can be a precedent for formalising the partition of Cyprus: the two cases of partition seem to be a replica of each other in a number of ways.

PARTITION, A FACT OF LIFE IN CYPRUS

The Turkish Cypriots have made their participation in the UN proximity talks conditional on international acknowledgement of their statehood. Meanwhile, the European Union is vigorously pursuing the Cyprus accession process with the Greek Cypriots, which could materialise by 2003, if all the EU member-states remain committed to the December 1999 Helsinki European Council summit conclusion of accepting Cyprus as a full EU member without its political settlement. Such an eventuality could only further sharpen the territorial and civilisational division of the island. By accommodating only the Greek Cypriot aspirations for Europe and altogether ignoring those of the Turks, Brussels has already sharpened this division. The proximity talks may resume only if the office of the UN Secretary-General starts treating the Turkish side as a state-party to the Cyprus dispute, rather than just as a community. Even if the talks resume due to yet another show of flexibility by the Turkish side, it is highly unlikely that they will make any headway. The only lesson from the past five rounds of the most recent phase of these talks, beginning in December 1999 and collapsing in December 2000, is that as long as the right to statehood of Turkish Cypriots remains unacknowledged, any international bid to supervise peace on the island through negotiations will fail.

However, since states are created by nations, and nations are made of peoples, they cannot be static entities. Some time the march of history springs surprises. India and Pakistan have been traditional
rivals, fighting wars over Kashmir and testing nuclear arms until recently. Twice since the early 1999, their leaders have engaged in summit diplomacy, with a commitment to continue it, to resolve disputed matters between them, including Kashmir. For this purpose, they also realise the urgency of adopting the necessary confidence-building measures, in addition to the ones already existing. Over time, the two nations of Cyprus could experience a similar transformation in their respective outlook towards each other, and mutual relationship. Of course, the growing détente in Turkish-Greek ties would help in the process. However, for now, the best we can hope is that, like other historical rivals, the Turkish and Greek nations of Cyprus, while living in their separate states, foster in near future a friendship deep enough to pave the way for a common political future within Europe in the long run. Just as India and Pakistan will remain two separate states no matter how friendly their ties become, the Turkish and Greek states of Cyprus should be expected to follow the same course until, of course, the state itself becomes irrelevant in a fully globalised international system of the future.

As things now stand, the multi-layered division between the two Cypriot nations remains the foremost basic reality. There has never been a Cypriot nation on the island even when Greeks and Turks were living under a single administration. The international community may continue to treat the Greek administration as the legitimate government of Cyprus, but how can it hide the reality of the existence of a separate state, society, government and politics in Northern Cyprus? More importantly, the qualitative change in the socio-political milieu of Cyprus caused by the decades-long physical separation between the two nations cannot be ignored. A whole generation of Turks and Greeks has grown under separate and different political structures, economic systems and social climates. Yoking them, and especially those who have been through the dark days of 1963-74, as perpetrators or sufferers, together in a single state will be counter-productive.

PARALLELS WITH THE PARTITION OF INDIA

“The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literatures. They belong to two different civilisations, which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes. Very often, the hero of one is the foe of the other, and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a nation,” said Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, at the annual session of the Indian Muslim League in Lahore on 23 March 1940. These words of Jinnah formed the Two-Nation Theory on the basis of which Pakistan was created. Just replace the words ‘Hindus’ and ‘Muslims’ with ‘Greeks’ and ‘Turks’, respectively, in Jinnah’s speech, and we have a Two-Nation Theory for Cyprus!

While the civilisational gap between Hindus and Muslims in India, and between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, denotes by far the most fundamental parallel between the long history of the Indian Subcontinent and the centuries-old Cypriot past, there are other amazing similarities between the events leading to the de jure partition of India and de facto partition of Cyprus. To start with, both cases have an element of uniqueness. In each case, British colonial rule was preceded by centuries of Muslim rule. In India, the first Muslim conquest took place in the 8th century. Then, from the 11th century to the early 16th century, successive Muslim Sultans of Arabian, Afghan and Persian descent ruled much of the Subcontinent. However, it was the Muslim Moguls from Central Asia who established in 1526 the first consolidated Muslim empire in the entire Subcontinent. The Moguls
ruled for over three centuries, and were succeeded by the British in 1858. Cyprus also saw three centuries of Ottoman Turkish rule before its lease in 1878 and subsequent annexation in 1923 by the British.

In both cases, despite being a minority the Muslims ruled over the non-Muslim majority for hundreds of years, not as such by the sheer use of force but by accommodating the political, economic, cultural and religious aspirations of the latter in a benevolent way. In each case, the British, after taking over the administration, considered the former subjects, Hindus in India and Greeks in Cyprus, as their natural allies. That made sense, as the Cypriot Turks and Indian Muslims represented the only potential threat to British interests because of their past glory and power. Since the British blamed the Indian Muslims for staging the ‘mutiny’ of 1857, the heavy hand of the British fell upon Muslims: they suffered setbacks in the social, economic and political fields, which came under Hindu domination. Hindu revivalism and nationalism, which started soon after the British took over, further contributed to creating domineering tendencies among the Hindus. The British pursued a similar approach in Cyprus, where the Greeks received undue favours from them in colonial administration. It was also during the British period that Greek nationalism flourished on the island. The British encouraged and instigated the former subjects of the Muslim rulers in both cases to such an extent that they became revengeful of the Muslims, forgetting all the benevolence and kindness of most Mogul and Ottoman rulers.

Thus, under the British colonial rule, Turkish Cypriots and Indian Muslims faced a similar circumstantial reality: the dominating political outlook of their ex-subjects, carrying serious consequences for the numerical minority in post-colonial future. While the Hindu leadership dreamt of Hinduisising India after the British withdrawal from the Subcontinent, Greek Cypriot leaders dreamt of the realisation of enosis, union with Greece, after the departure of the British from the island. How could Turkish Cypriots and Indian Muslims accept such an eventuality, especially being the former rulers of the two respective regions for hundreds of years? That is why in all the pre-partition constitutional formulas offered and enforced by the British for representative provincial and national governmental structures in India, the Muslim leadership continued to insist on separate electorates and representation for Muslims and complete autonomy for the Muslim majority provinces. It was only after the consistent refusal by the Hindu leadership to accept the Muslim demand for due political representation in India that the Muslim leadership was left with no option but to demand a separate state.

The same has been in the case in Cyprus, except that the British did not exercise the option of partition while de-colonising the island, nor were they asked to do so by either of the two nations. However, the British did accommodate the uniqueness of the Cyprus situation by giving the Turks equal political and constitutional rights vis-à-vis the Greeks in the Republic of Cyprus. The Zurich and London accords, which established the Republic in 1960, were deliberately structured to avoid the possibility of the Greeks dominating the Turks and to establish and maintain “a delicate but immutable equilibrium between the rights and interests” of the two nations. The international agreements of Alliance and Guarantee helped accommodate another unique aspect of the Cyprus situation, which was absent in India’s case: that of the existence of two motherlands for the two Cypriot nations, Turkey and Greece, and their influence in Cyprus. In addition to Britain, which was to retain two sovereign military bases on the island under the Treaty of Establishment, Turkey and Greece became the security guarantors of Cyprus. However, despite all of these extensive political and security arrangements, the Republic could not run smoothly and eventually collapsed within three years of its establishment, in December 1963, because the Greeks never intended to share
political power with the Turks on equal terms. The 13 amendments to the Constitution proposed by Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios in November 1963 aimed to create a unitary state in Cyprus as a forerunner to enosis.8

Another parallel between the path to India’s partition and the road to Cypriot division can be drawn from the fact that, despite being on the receiving end during colonial rule, both Turks and Indian Muslims showed an extraordinary spirit of accommodation and compromise. Despite witnessing the militancy of the terrorist outfit EOKA in the 1950s, which was aided and abetted by Greece, the Turkish Cypriots supported the establishment of a Republic which offered them political equality, constitutional safeguards and security guarantees under an internationally agreed Constitution of the Republic and international agreements on Cyprus. That Turks did not destroy the Republic of Cyprus is a fact. That, until recently, they were the ones sincerely desiring the Republic’s revival in its original form is also a fact. On the contrary, in the UN negotiating process on Cyprus, the Greeks continued to evade for decades the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation when the Turks were ready for it. This was despite the fact that a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation formed, and still does, the core of the UN proposed settlement of Cyprus; and that the same was agreed upon in high level talks between the leaders of the two nations in the late 1970s. It is only after the Turks announced in August 1998 the confederation proposal that the newfound love for such a federation has started to denote the official Greek standpoint.

The Greek vision for Cyprus is that of a single state where the majority Greeks should be sovereign, just as the Indian National Congress’s vision for India during the British time was that of creating a single state where sovereignty would belong to the majority Hindu population. That is why the Greeks always try to portray the Cyprus problem as an issue of majority versus minority, which it is not. Had it been so, then the 1960 Republic would not have created all those balances between the political aspirations, rights and interests of the two nations, as well as their security concerns and those of their respective motherland. In a way, the proposal for a Cypriot confederation does reflect flexibility on the part of the Turks. If we go back in Indian history, we see the British making similar moves and the Indian Muslim League, the political party representing Indian Muslims, going all out of its way to co-operate.

For instance, in 1942, the British sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India with an offer of independence. The offer, however, provided the provinces an opportunity to secede from federation either separately or in groups. The Indian National Congress, the party representing mainly Hindu population, rejected the Cripps offer and launched the Quit India movement. Then, in 1946, a mission of the British Cabinet visited India, and proposed what is called the Cabinet Mission Plan. The Plan sought to preserve a united India and to allay Muslim fears of Hindu domination through the proposal of a loose federation between two federated states, sharing foreign, defence and communication affairs at the centre. One of the federated states consisted of Muslim majority provinces in northeastern and northwestern India, and the other consisted of the Hindu majority provinces in the rest of India. The Muslim League accepted the Plan, while the Congress rejected it. Both British offers contained features of a confederation, and the Muslim leadership was flexibly enough to accept them despite the fact that the Lahore session of the Muslim League in 1940 had resolved to create Pakistan.9

For decades, Jinnah remained an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. For the purpose, he retained the dual membership of the Muslim League and the Congress party for many years. He left the Congress, created in 1885 as a representative body of all Indian people, only after realising that it had virtually become a Hindu organisation. Jinnah was instrumental in bringing the two parties to a
single platform in 1916 and conclude the Lucknow Pact, in which the Congress accepted the Muslim demand for separate electorates. In 1928, the Muslim League under Jinnah’s leadership participated alongside Congress in an All-Parties Conference to prepare the Constitution for an independent India - only to find Congress leader Motilal Nehru issuing what is called the Nehru Report, which rejected the Muslim demand for separate electorates and other constitutional safeguards. Jinnah responded by announcing the Fourteen Points, which demanded constitutional arrangements guaranteeing electoral majorities in the five provinces with Muslim-majority populations, a weak federal system in which the central government would have little power over the provinces, as well as one-third of the seats in the central legislature and a 75 percent majority requirement for action by the legislature. But, in 1929, the Congress declared sawaraj or independence as a goal. Still Jinnah did not lose hope. The League participated in the 1937 elections for provincial ministries held under the Constitutional Act of India, 1935. The Congress swept the provincial elections for Hindu seats and formed ministries in seven of the 11 provinces. Jinnah offered to form coalition ministries with the Congress in each province, but the Congress refused to recognise the League as representative of India’s 90 million Muslims. “There are,” Nehru remarked, “only two forces in India today, British imperialism and Indian nationalism.” History, however, bore out Jinnah’s response: “No, there is a third party, the Mussulmans.”

Just as the Greek Cypriots were not ready to accept separate representation of Turkish Cypriots in governance, along with other constitutional safeguards, the Hindu leadership consistently refused to accept separate representation and other constitutional safeguards for the Indian Muslims in the government of a united India after the British withdrawal. The former led to the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus and the subsequent failure of the UN proximity talks on the issue and the current de facto partition of the island. The latter created a mass Muslim movement for independence and eventually partitioned the Subcontinent. In other words, it was the fear among Indian Muslims of Hindu domination and subjugation that created Pakistan. And it is the fear among Turkish Cypriots of Greek domination and subjugation that has led to the de facto partition of Cyprus. Perhaps the biggest rationale for the Muslim fear in India and the Turkish fear in Cyprus is that both have practically experienced how domineering and revengeful their former subjects with a numerical majority can be. During the two years of Congress ministries in the Hindu-majority provinces, in 1937-39, the Hindu nationalists spared no effort in creating such a fear among the Muslims. Hindu norms and values were forcibly imposed upon them. For example, the Muslims were forbidden from cow slaughtering. Bande Mataram, an essentially anti-Muslim Hindu song, was made a national anthem, which Muslim children at schools were forced to sing. Consequently, when the Congress rule in Hindu majority provinces ended in 1939, the Muslim League celebrated the event as the Day of Deliverance from the tyranny, oppression and injustice of Congress rule, which was the practical manifestation of what was in store for the Indian Muslims in a post-British united India.

In Cyprus also, what happened to the Turkish Cypriots during over a decade between 1963 and 1974 was a practical manifestation of Greek domination and subjugation. The reason why Turkish Cypriots now demand international acknowledgement of their separate right to statehood is because they have experienced the Greek bid to dominate and subjugate them. The amendments to the Republic’s Constitution, the Greek militancy against the Turks - all in accordance with the Akritas Plan - were moves meant to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus in predetermined stages and methods, and to bring about enosis. The Plan provided for the creation of an underground army which would suppress any resistance by the Turks, most forcibly and in the shortest possible time, and make the Greek Cypriots masters of the situation “within a day or two, before outside intervention would be possible, probable or justifiable.” Until the Turkish intervention of July 1974, the Turkish Cypriots
were made refugees on their own land. Nearly one-third of their population was pushed to take refuge in enclaves constituting just three percent of the territory. Had Turkey not intervened, Nicos Sampson, the coup leader, would have gone far beyond mere domination or subjugation of the Turkish Cypriots: the Genocide Files,13 carrying orders issued by the high command of the Greek Cypriot National Guard in order to instantly realise enosis, were meant to exterminate the entire Turkish Cypriot population either by killing or through their forced migration from the island.

WHY THE CRITICS OF PARTITION ARE WRONG

As compared to the Subcontinent, the situation in Cyprus is more conducive for partition due to two reasons. First, ever since the Turkish intervention consolidated the de facto partition of Cyprus, there has been peace on the island. On the other hand, since partition, India and Pakistan have fought three wars. Kashmir, the unfinished agenda of partition, caused two of these wars. Even if it was not the partition per se which caused armed conflicts between India and Pakistan, the relatively prolonged peaceful situation in Cyprus is credible support for the legalisation of partition on the island.

Second, in the Subcontinent’s case, even after partition, the number of Muslims residing in India is almost equal to that living in Pakistan. This is not the situation in Cyprus, where the internationally supervised migration of Greeks from northern parts of the island and Turks from its southern parts after 1974 has effectively solved the demographic problem. In the Subcontinent, for logistical and other reasons, all the Indian Muslims could not migrate to territories constituting the eastern and western wings of Pakistan, nor was it possible for all the non-Muslims from these two wings to migrate to present Indian territories. Although the number of non-Muslims, including Hindus, is far less in Pakistan than the number of Muslims in India, each country is required to tackle the demographic fallout of partition by providing safeguards to its respective minorities. Sometime, the failure in doing so results in Hindu-Muslim riots in India or minority rights violations in Pakistan. However, mostly, the religious nationalist forces on the two sides are deterred by the fact that a violent act by one will result in an equally, or more, violent reaction by the other. For instance, when Hindu nationalists destroyed the Babari Mosque in India in December 1992, the chauvinistic Muslims reacted by destroying more than 20 Hindu temples across Pakistan. The Muslim critics of Indian partition also raise the question that by creating Pakistan, the Muslim League under Jinnah not only left behind in India an equal number of Muslims but also the most important architectural monuments of the Mogul empire, particularly Taj Mahal. This is not the situation in Cyprus.

In an article in Survival, Elizabeth H. Prodromou,14 criticises the idea of partitioning Cyprus, arguing this will “institutionalize the premise that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are incapable of peaceful coexistence within a united state, thus diminishing the likelihood of long-term peace in regions with intra-and inter-state conflict along ethnic lines.” She also writes, “By recasting relations between the two states in terms of hostile ethnic entities, partition would undermine the possibilities for Cyprus to become the key to broader Greek-Turkish rapprochement.” Both arguments are fundamentally flawed. After the tragic events in Cyprus during 1963-1974, the very notion of “peaceful coexistence within a united state” is not appealing at all. As far as “broader Greek-Turkish rapprochement” is concerned, it depends upon many factors, of which Cyprus is only one. This rapprochement is already under way, ironically as a result of the August 1999 earthquake in Turkey - and any future regression or progression in this long-awaited process should be seen in the context of broader regional or international co-relation and competition of forces, rather than linking it with the situation in Cyprus, as Prodromou does.
Another criticism of partition comes from Radha Kumar. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Radha opines that the island’s “partition can only be described as a partition by default that the UN presence inadvertently aided. While casualties have been restricted since 1974, the division of Cyprus is little more than a long stand-off that remains volatile and continues to require the presence of UN troops. Nor can the conflict be confined to Cyprus. Over the years since partition, its short fuse is evident. A violent demonstration of [Greek] Cypriots in August 1996 resulted in Greece and Turkey threatening war. The cost of containment, therefore, includes permanent vigilance on the part of NATO and the Atlantic allies.” Contrary to Radha’s opinion, the fact is that Cyprus has seen stable peace since 1974, and just one or two violent incidents occurring during this long period should not be construed as an indicator of a volatile situation on the divided island.

Perhaps the most important recent work in support of partition is by Chaim Kaufmann. In an article in International Security, Chaim rejects critics’ arguments such as that partitions cause violence rather than dampening it and that they generate new conflicts, often by transforming civil conflicts into international ones. According to him, violence results not because of partition and accompanying population transfers, but due to irresolvable security dilemmas between the rival ethnic communities - between the Turks and Greeks in the case of Cyprus; and, in India’s case, between the Muslim and Hindus, and especially between the Muslim and Sikh communities of Punjab. These security dilemmas were generated by the removal of the imperial power that had previously guaranteed the security of all groups. As for the critics’ charge that partitions in the long-run generate new conflicts between the states carved out of a single territory, Chaim says that this happens not because of partition but its incomplete nature. In this context, Cyprus is an exception, as the situation has remained remarkably stable since its de facto partition in 1974. There have been only twelve deaths in ethnic-strife on the island in twenty-four years. This has not been the case in the Subcontinent. The conflict over Kashmir occurred not because India was partitioned but because Kashmir, whose population was about two-third Muslim, was not. Over time, the situation in the Indian-administered Kashmir has become volatile because of prolonged alienation of Kashmiri Muslims, the atrocities committed by Indian troops, Pakistan’s support to Kashmiri militancy and its emergence as the focus of Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests since May 1982. However, despite the fact the July 2001 India-Pakistan summit failed to produce an agreement on Kashmir, it seems the final solution to the Kashmir question will be the one based on partition: the valley of Kashmir, inhabited by Muslims, may become an autonomous region, with India retaining the Hindu-majority regions of Jammu and Laddakh and Pakistan retaining its current portion of Kashmir, home to Kashmiri Muslims.

While the issues of Kashmir and Cyprus are all about a people’s right to self-determination, they essentially differ in one respect: the conduct of the UN. On Kashmir, the UN Security Council resolved judiciously to hold a plebiscite to determine Kashmiri people’s wishes. On Cyprus, however, the UN has acted in a discriminatory manner by giving only the Greek side the right to represent the government of the former Republic of Cyprus. If in the days to come, Kashmir is settled in accordance with the ‘Third Option’, or its variant, through talks involving India, Pakistan and Kashmiri organisations, this should obviously act as an additional precedent for the formal partition of Cyprus.

TRYING THE ‘CZECH MODEL’ & ‘BALTIC OPTION’ FOR CYPRUS

As for the applicability of the much-debated ‘Czech model’ to the Cyprus situation, an exact parallel between the two cannot be created because the “Czech Republic and Slovakia were relatively
homogenous and the dissolution of the federation did not require an alteration of internal borders or a substantial displacement of people.”18 In January 1993, Czechoslovakia was divided between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia. Since it happened peacefully, the division is termed a ‘velvet divorce’. However, even if the two communities voluntarily parted ways, the fact remains that minority Slovaks were pushed towards separate statehood by a deep sense of alienation within Czechoslovakia where the majority Czechs dominated politics, the economy and the state apparatus. This feeling of alienation among the Slovaks, in fact, had started as soon as the idea of Czechoslovakia was institutionalised in the shape of the First Republic, which was established in 1918. During the period of the Dual Monarchy, or Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czechs were under the German-dominated Austria and the Slovaks were under the Hungarians-dominated Hungary. The former was democratic and tolerant of the minorities but the latter was vice versa. Consequently, the Czechs were equipped with the political experience and economic skills to dominate the fellow Slovaks in the First Republic, which collapsed in 1939 as the Slovaks declared independence. The Slovak Republic (1939-45) was the culmination of Slovak discontentment with Czech hegemony. The same happened to the Third Republic of Czechoslovakia (1949-93). Even though the 1968 amendments to the 1960 Constitution created a federal system in the country, the Slovak quest for autonomy and weak central government and the Czech insistence on maintaining a highly centralised federation, eventually forced the former towards independence three years after the ‘velvet revolution’ that ended communism and Soviet influence in Czechoslovakia.19

A more pertinent lesson that can be learned from the ‘Czech model’ for Cyprus is within the context of European enlargement. In less than a year after their independence, Brussels granted the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia the status of Associate Member. In June 1995, it accepted the Slovak application for EU membership and, in January 1996, the Czech Republic was granted the accession status. Both are well on their way to enter Europe as separate states. The same principle can apply to the two states of Cyprus, after an international acknowledgement of Turkish Cypriot statehood. The only problem in the Cypriot context can be the deep economic disparity visible on the two sides. The per capita income in the Turkish Cypriot Republic is officially estimated to be one-fifth of the Greek Cypriot Republic (over $4,000 and over $11,000, respectively).20 But this problem can be solved with the transfer of a relatively higher amount of EU credits to the former as part of the accession process. Additionally, the Greek side is obliged to compensate the Turkish Cypriots for all the losses in aid and trade they have suffered since 1963, which must be far higher than the property losses Greek Cypriots claim to have suffered as a consequence of the Turkish intervention of 1974.21

Of course, per capita income is just one criterion to judge whether a country can qualify for EU membership or not. But it is an important indicator of the health of an economy and the extent of human development in a country. Since the Czechs and the Slovaks have a far higher level of per capita income than that of northern Cyprus, it is better to compare it with the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. All of them were part of the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991. Now all of them are separately negotiating EU accession with Brussels. And all three of these Baltic republics have more or less the same per capita income as that of northern Cyprus.22 Soon after the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the Turkish Cypriots sought a Cyprus settlement within the EU provided it recognised their state as a separate entity.23 Instead of meeting their demand, Brussels has continued upping the ante over Cyprus by undertaking moves provoking Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. In recent years, the consistency with which the European Court of Human Rights has issued mostly anti-Turkish verdicts24 and the continued refusal by the EU to let Turkey participate fully in the operations of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI),25 raise important questions
about Brussels’ future intentions regarding Turkish interests in Cyprus and the Aegean.

The continued European embargo against northern Cyprus has virtually ruined the Turkish Cypriot economy, making it dependent upon Turkey. Given that, the economic crisis in Turkey since February 2001 is duly reflected in the Turkish Cypriot economy - the decline in the per capita income of Turkish Cypriots may be one of the consequences. But this does not make the analogies of the ‘Czech model’ and the ‘Baltic’ option’ for a separate EU accession process with northern Cyprus, irrelevant. Had the world community acknowledged Turkish Cypriot statehood, and had the Europeans not imposed an embargo on their state, there is no reason why the Turks would be less prosperous today than their Greek counterparts on the island. In other words, the current Turkish Cypriot plight is a direct outcome of unjust and inhuman international moves to politically and economically isolate their state. However, even if we leave aside the single criteria of per capita income for comparing the Turkish Cypriot case for EU membership with those of the Baltic republics, and the Czechs and Slovaks, North Cyprus has some other unique domestic attributes, which strengthen its case for entry into the EU as a separate state. Among others, these include a deeply ingrained secularism, an almost zero crime rate, a politics based upon pluralism and a reasonably sound infrastructure.

By acting rationally and urgently, the UN and EU can reverse the deplorable course of history in Cyprus, whereby the decades-long Greek attempts to dominate, subjugate and coerce the Turks are being further cemented through illegal and conspiratorial international bids such as the 1994 economic embargo imposed by the European Court of Justice against the Turkish Cypriots. Although most of the Turkish Cypriots do not have any objection to entering the EU, as most citizens of the EU candidate-states do, a considerable number of them would surely like to retain their state.26 Even on the Greek side, business circles have reportedly expressed their support to the partition option in Cyprus in private conversations with American and British diplomats.27 In the now stalled proximity talks as well, the Greek side seemed to be more interested in securing the so-called three freedoms of movement, property and settlement28 than discussing the larger issues of political equality and security guarantees. Given that, and in the light of other crucial facts discussed earlier, a UN formalisation of the partition of Cyprus and an EU willingness to negotiate accession separately with the two Cypriot states could remove the Cyprus conflict from the pages of history. Let the Turkish Cypriots develop and flourish freely, without any fear and coercion. Let them achieve power and glory as other states born out of partition have. Pakistan’s achievements as a nation-state are no doubt less than significant, but it continues to survive as a great nation in the world and as a power to be reckoned with in the region. What else does a nation needs? It is about time the UN gave international legitimacy to the right to statehood of the Turkish Cypriots and stopped a rogue state from sabotaging the peace process in Cyprus. Once that is done, and the EU could undertake the accession process separately with the Turkish Cypriots, the ensuing European integration’s affect on the two Cypriot nations might produce miracles. But that is a different story.
The Agra Summit between India’s Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Pakistan’s President, General Pervez Musharraf, on 14-16 July 2001, was important even if the two countries failed to bridge their differences over Kashmir. A joint summit statement could not be issued because Pakistan refused to include in it a reference to cross-border terrorism and India refused to agree to a reference to Kashmiri self-determination. A dispute that has marred ties between the two nations for over half a century would obviously take time to resolve. The Summit’s significance should therefore be seen in the context of its contribution to a sustained high-level bilateral diplomacy between India and Pakistan, which had started in February 1999 with Mr Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore as part of what was called ‘bus diplomacy.’ See The Times of India, 17 July 2001. For details regarding the fast emerging détente in Turkish-Greek ties, including at the military level, and their likely impact on the Cyprus issue, see Jonathan Stevenson, ‘Solomon’s Baby’, Wall Street Journal Europe, 11 April 2001. It is quite unfortunate that Greek Cypriots dislike the growing friendship between Turkey and Greece. “Smiles, embraces, lunch by the sea, tree planting, dancing under the stars. It’s not surprising that many in [south] Cyprus were disturbed by the weekend Aegean love-in between Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers George Papandreou and Ismail Cem,” commented the Cyprus Mail of 26 June 2001.

In fact, if we look at history and even present times, the Greeks seem to share a common vision with the Hindus of India. Archbishop Makarios, the President of the former Republic of Cyprus was a compatriot of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in the Non-Alignment Movement. No surprise that the First Lady of the Greek Cypriots, the wife of President Glafcos Clerides, has Indian origin. For the full text of Jinnah’s speech, see Jamil-u-din Ahmad (ed.), Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah, Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1952, p. 177.


Mogul Emperor Akbar, for instance, married a Hindu woman and started a new religion based on the fusion of Islam and Hinduism. In Cyprus, the Ottoman Turks liberated the Orthodox Christian Greeks from the tutelage of the Catholic Venetians. During the Ottoman reign, the Greek Cypriot priests were given the power to collect taxes, not just from the Greek subjects but also from Turks living in Greek majority localities. As far as the anti-British nationalist movements in Cyprus and India were concerned, these were a direct outcome of the notorious British policy of ‘divide and rule’ under which the colonial power unduly favoured the former subjects of the Muslim rule. Interestingly, these very people became a Frankenstein Monster for the British.

The Hindu nationalist organisation, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, declared Muslims as foreigners, giving them two options: “They must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country wholly sub-subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less preferential treatment, not even citizens’ rights.” See M.S. Golwalker, We, or Our Nationhood Defined, Nagpur, Bharat Publications, 1939, p. 35.


See ibid., pp. 59-76. The sole reason why the Greek Cypriot leadership demolished the system and
structure of the International State of the Republic of Cyprus, writes Metin, was to reach their goal of enosis. The amendments to the Constitution proposed by Makarios meant to eliminate those provisions of the Constitution that granted to the Turkish Cypriots immutable partnership status in the affairs of state. For instance, under these amendments, the right of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President to veto any parliamentary legislation and decisions of the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence and security was abolished. The separate electorates for the Turks to elect their 30 percent Turkish members and Vice-President of the House of Representatives were also to be abolished. The list goes on.


10 Muslims made up 22 percent of the population of India and Hindus 68 percent, meaning that under pure majoritarian rule the Muslims would be absolutely insecure in the event that the government should be captured by Hindu supremacists such as the Hindu Mahasbha movement. Although the Congress Party was formally committed to secular India, in practice it never represented all Indian communities. Members of the Mahasbha movement and other Hindu nationalists, such as B. S. Moonje, were welcome in Congress, while members of Muslim parties were excluded as ‘communalists’. See ibid., p. 48; Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 33-75; and H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1985, p. 59. The Indian Muslim demands mentioned in Jinnah’s Fourteen Points show a remarkable resemblance with the constitutional safeguards for 20 percent Turks as against 80 percent Greeks provided in the 1960 Republic, for instance, the 70:30 ratio in the parliamentary representation and employment in civil service and security forces, respectively. See Metin, op. cit., p. 62 & 71. Also see Nancy Cranshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: an Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978, pp. 42-50 & 62-67.


12 Necatigil, op. cit.

13 See Harry Scott Gibbons, The Genocide Files, London, Charles Bravos, 1997, pp. 408-415. The genie of Nicos Sampson continues to haunt Cyprus in 2001 in the same month Nicos Sampson died, May, his son, Sotiris Sampson, was elected in the parliamentary elections, swept in by the communist Greek Cypriot party, AKEL.


17 A variant of the ‘Third Option’ on Kashmir -that of independence- the idea of partitioning the rest of Kashmir between India and Pakistan while keeping the valley of Kashmir as an autonomous region was proposed first in the early 1990s by US experts on South Asia in response to growing Muslim militancy in the Indian-administered Kashmir since 1989. It reflects a compromise between two extreme standpoints on Kashmir traditionally maintained by the two countries, with Pakistan demanding the holding of a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir in accordance with UN resolutions and India considering Kashmir as an integral part of its territory on the basis of an accession document it claims to have signed with the last ruler of the princely state of Kashmir. If the summit diplomacy between India and Pakistan continues, the leaders of the two countries may agree to exercise the ‘Third Option’ on Kashmir, for which there already exists sufficient support in Pakistani media and political circles, although India remains more or less intransigent.

18 Radha, op. cit., p. 25. Also see Mehmet Ali Birand, ‘We have Made a Solution on Cyprus Harder to Reach Again!’, Turkish Daily News, 1 June 2001. He writes, “The Czechoslovakia model is not the kind that can be applied to Cyprus. Czechoslovakia took the decision based on the internationally accepted principle that it can ‘redefine its borders peaceably.’ According to international principles and public opinion, what is wanted on Cyprus is a redrawing of the borders as a result of war. And this is unacceptable.” In the case of Cyprus, Mr Birand’s opinion is questionable. First, the redrawing of the borders as a result of war is not the demand of international principles and public opinion. Second, it was not only the Turkish intervention of 1974 which re-drew Cypriot borders, the British and then the UN have also been instrumental in doing so peacefully, by drawing the Green Line across Nicosia and stationing peace-keepers in the 180-kilometer-long UN buffer zone, respectively. Toeing Mr Birand’s line, the Greek Cypriot government and media also criticised the applicability of the ‘Czech model’ to Cyprus after Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, referred to it in an interview with Hürriyet newspaper in May 2001. See Cyprus Mail, 31 May 2001.

19 In 1987, the demographic composition of Czechoslovakia was 63 percent Czechs and 31 percent Slovaks. Even though the Slovaks made significant economic progress from the 1960s onwards, their per capita income six years after independence in 1999 was still $8,500 as against the Czech Republic’s $11,700. The important point is that, despite having a common heritage and ethno-religious stock with the Czechs, the Slovaks have parted ways with them twice since 1939. It is good that they separated relatively peacefully in 1993, but if their alienation and frustration with Czech-dominated rule had continued for long, the path to partition could have been violent - even if not as horrific as the one occurred recently in the Balkans, where the Serbs tried to exterminate the minority Croats and the Muslim communities of Bosnia and Kosovo. By separating the warring communities through international supervision on the ground, NATO has maintained peace, no matter how unstable it is. The idea of partition, in fact, has a universal application, linked closely to the issue of self-determination. The Palestinians versus Israelis in the Middle East, the Protestants versus Catholics in Northern Ireland, East Timurese versus Indonesians in South-East Asia - all of these and many other conflict situations, history tells us, can be better resolved through separating the conflicting parties, well in time, before the situation becomes violent. The main challenge is to determine, what Chaim calls, the “threshold” of ethno-nationalistic strife on the basis of which a partition could be justified. In Cyprus, that threshold was reached as soon as the Sampson coup took place on 15 July 1974. For details, see Chaim, op. cit. The above statistical data was taken from the ‘Country Study’ on Czechoslovakia by the Library of Congress. For more details, see


21 For details, see Ishtiaq Ahmad, The Divided Island: a Pakistani Perspective on Cyprus, Islamabad, Pan-Graphic Publishers, 1999, pp. 154-155.


24 In 1995, the European Court of Human Rights ordered Turkey to pay a Greek Cypriot, Titina Loizidou, $900,000 as compensation for denying her access to her land in northern Cyprus since 1974. Since then, the Council of Europe has thrice resolved to force Turkey to comply with the verdict, ignoring the latter’s plea that not Turkey but the Turkish Cypriots should be treated as a counterpart in the case, which makes sense. In May 2001, the Court issued another verdict against Turkey finding it guilty of human rights violations arising out of its 1974 intervention in Cyprus, despite the fact that this intervention occurred in accordance with the international Treaty of Guarantee on Cyprus. See Jean Christou, ‘Loizidou: Europe Puts the Pressure on Turkey’, Cyprus Mail, 28 June, 2001; Jennie Matthew & Martin Hellicar, ‘Turkey Slammed Over Rights Abuse’, Cyprus Mail, 11 May, 2001; and Turkish Daily News, 28 June 2001.


26 See ‘Solomon’s Baby’, op. cit.; and ‘The Cyprus Conundrum’, op. cit.

27 Martin Hellicar, ‘Two-State Suggestion Sparks Political Storm’, Cyprus Mail, 13 February 2001. The report cited Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Yiannakis Cassoulides admitting that there does exist a tendency among certain (Greek) Cypriots for “them [Turkish Cypriots] over there and us over here.” See also Yusuf Kanlõ, ‘Who Would Like a Solution in Cyprus?’, Turkish Daily News, 6 June 2000. “Greek Cypriot businessmen are even publicly acknowledging that it would be absurd for Greek Cypriots to give up their claim to the title of being the ‘sole legitimate government’ of the island, reach a deal with Turkish Cypriots and sacrifice their wealth to develop the northern half of the island,” wrote Mr Kanlõ.

28 Tocci, op. cit., p. 32.

29 The Greek Cypriot Republic has been a hub of money-laundering. Since the Soviet collapse, it has been a safe heaven for the Russian mafia. Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, now in the custody of the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague, reportedly used the island to launder tens of millions of dollars. In April, the Greek Cypriot authorities sent bundles of essential documents at the request of Carla del Ponte, the Chief Prosecutor of the Tribunal, who is trying to trace the money trail left by Mr Milosevic and other Serbian war criminals. Moreover, in April 2001, a UN special report identified two Cypriot-registered firms as central to the supply of illicit arms to rebels of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). There were also allegations, appearing in the Greek Cypriot press, that the President of a Mediterranean state who was cited by an Italian doctor in early 2001 to have shown interest in providing state facilities for
human cloning was none other than Greek Cypriot leader Clerides. See Cyprus Mail, 7 and 24 April, and 27 June.