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CERTAIN ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES

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INTRODUCTION OR OUR LOCATION IN CATEGORIES

In my opinion, a brief theoretical introduction is necessary for the purpose of defining the apparatus of categories that will be used for analysis of the situation of inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia, as well as for locating Macedonia in the wider discourse of democracies in transition.

Societies where democracy is in transition present, by definition, a difficult problem in terms of conceptual determination and of scrupulous analysis. One may commence from a sociological and collective psychological fact: from the value break (ideologically and politically) with the collective and individual matrices of identity through which people and social groups, in one way or another, functioned for generations. Entering 'the terrible value-vacuum of post-communism', as some call it, distorts democratic institutions (which were designed in constitutions and desired in political programmes of parties) into a new practice of collectivist identification. This value-vacuum creates an authentic situation that is only seemingly similar to the post-modern situation of radical fragmentation where fragments of different values float freely from old and new systems in a permissive equilibrium.¹

This equilibrium of floating values and practices in post-communist societies is neither stable, nor balanced. Nor is it, finally, a result of the experience produced by 'modernism' and individualism. It is a magma of confused identities, created and dying without their natural environment of maturation-civil society. A new, intensified role is played by fear of the future, which acquires collective paranoid attributes and is subjected to populist manipulations and nationalist communitarism. This gives a new role to the state and political élites. (On communitarism, see Walter, Sandel, Zakaria, F., ABC of Communitarism.)

Noteworthy, are the appearance and the new political role of two 'meta-values'-ethnic and religious value identifications. Both of them play the role of compensating for and satisfying the identity crisis in politics. However, ethnic groups perform this in a collectivist manner by creating a new collectivist horizon of mythical certainty in belonging to and confronting the challenges of the new. The historic energies and resentments of the myths of ethnicity are features of the political vocabulary and social practice of this discourse. Ethnic groups are formed and maintained by constantly 'refilling' them from the deposits and ever again reproduced image about history. They draw upon the mythical complex, where historic events 'are entangled' and mutually connected 'exactly as it should be', in glory of the ethnicity.² Ethnic identity, if imposed on the front lines of politics, is imperative and tries to become absolute. It cannot, however, be easily ignored (at least for some time) in order for some other factors of the situation are taken into account. The coercion on

the actors introduced by ethnic identity reproduces itself in views on any situation, whereas the methodology of political action it suggests during crisis and transition is most often based on the exclusion of 'others' and is fierce in an archaic way.³

Ethnic identity, or belief in the common origin and culture of a particular group, is built on the grounds of differences, not on a positive enumeration of specific features. Yet, continuity between ethnicity and kinship renders ethnic struggles different from other political clashes and the ethnic group less fluid. Mobility between them is much smaller than that of other social groupings.

Hence, the concept of 'boundary' is of essential significance for the definition of ethnicity. This concept determines the procedure by which ethnic belonging may be determined only in relation to a line of demarcation with the 'other'. Also, ethnic identities are brought into action and political dynamism only in relation to the 'otherness' (we and they) and only in this way do they base (their own) legitimacy on political action. Their *homo nationalis* comes out from this, as opposed to the establishment of a nation as a political community of civil consociation, that is the basis of and is based on *homo civilis*.⁴ This global counter-tendency of civil democracy, that is ethnic nationalism, is, of course, more easily subdued in ethnically homogenous societies because it has no significant internal targets of the conflict in the image of other significant ethnic groups. Besides, in the general scheme of the international community in which the state is incorporated, the rules are strict enough to prevent serious international conflicts inspired by the pathology of ethnic nationalism. In such cases, the duration of transition will depend on the layers of civil culture and traditions of the community that were preserved under communism, and on the pace of international integration and assistance, especially in economic reforms (at the same time the state is supposed to have adopted a liberal-democratic constitution and fundamental legislation).

However, the most complicated and most difficult case of transition is definitely that in multiethnic societies (with or without a dominant national group).

The cases of societies in transition toward democracy are often also complicated by the lack of more significant democratic experiences and of traditional institutions and habits determined by such experience. Due to the aforementioned, the project of successful transition toward democracy has its essential test in such cases, while the responsibility of the international community in assisting such projects is a major one.

From a theoretical point of view, the development and stabilisation of democracy in multiethnic societies have become the core issue of the modern theory of democracy. This touches the knotty question of every democracy: the individuality of the sovereign citizen and his relation toward the collective spirit of the group to which he ethnically belongs, and further, to the state institutions. Namely, is democracy possible if composed of groups that are organised on the basis of different organisational principles and value principles (some of which may be even radically undemocratic and anti-individualistic)?⁵

Or, as Fareed Zakaria put it: are we speaking here of 'illiberal democracy' in societies in transition and is such democracy possible on the long run?⁶

The new situation in radically segmented societies is different from what was elaborated by the pluralistic theories of democracy in the 1950s.

Namely, these theories (R. Dahl, Berelson, Truman, Lazarfield, etc.) assumed that the whole social

'organism' was divided into numerous small sub-systems that form their micro-élites and that may have different internal organisational principles. Further, the 'parity' of such micro-élites creates a balance at the global political decision-making place. But even in such a scheme, there are key 'value and procedural vertical lines' and direct links between the citizens and the central institutions of the system.

Interest organising does not substitute the production of global collective identity. On the contrary, it underpins the individualism and autonomy of its participants. At the same time, global harmonisation of micro-élites is based on the 'minimum' consensus of the constitutional-legal democratic framework that also secures the procedures of direct political action of the citizens with the state.⁷ As opposed to this model, the direct link between the citizen and the state has been almost completely eliminated in the practice of radically segmented societies. This link is utterly mediated through the group interest that is placed on a wider basis than the interest (lobby) group-namely, in the centre of production of collective identity.

Democracy gradually slides toward 'democracy of groups', thus progressively opening the crisis of the liberal-democratic idea generally.

Let us again emphasise the line of crisis opened by the moving of loyalties along the horizontal line in the ethnic groups: first, the principle of the sovereignty of the citizen, as an individual who can rationally grasp his interests and determine policy in respect of them, is violated. In that manner, 'democracy' is reduced to reaching agreements between the élites of the groups (collectivist principle of organisation of politics). Second, there is a real possibility that a critical number of segments (groups) do not accept the basic rules of the game at all. This means rejection of even the collectivist consensus that leads not only to suspension of democracy, but also to the dissolution of the state.

This second situation is, in effect, frequent in countries that are confronted with so-called multiethnic democracy because the fundamental individualistic procedures do not have support; that is, they do not reproduce themselves either ideologically or culturally, from the internal structure of the segments.

The result of the functioning of such models is some kind of internal confederate structure that definitely renders the individualistic and liberal discourse marginal.⁸ MULTIETHNIC DEMOCRACY?

What is understood in theory by the concepts: 'multiethnic society' and 'multiethnic democracy'?

A multiethnic society is one in which there are two or more ethnic groups that are different in an ethnic, linguistic, religious or racial sense. People who belong to a group view themselves as different cultural communities, think of this difference as important and try to preserve and develop it. In some cases, that struggle to preserve the particularity becomes negatively determined as hostility or bad feelings toward persons belonging to other ethnic groups.⁹

Multiethnic societies, as a rule, need not and most often do not develop into multiethnic democracies.¹⁰ Most multiethnic societies develop civil democracy, with a dominant legal position held by the sovereign citizen, where ethnic differences are located in the sphere of culture, education and civil society. Integration is carried out along the legal-political axis, while diversities are maintained in the civil sphere of culture. The second kind of practice is an attempt, through so-called 'nation-building'-to assimilate fully different ethnic groups into a dominant nation. This second

practice has failed in most cases.

Multiethnic democracy means lifting socio-cultural and ethnic diversity to the level of the collective bearer of divided sovereignty. If we wish to define it more precisely, it would be as follows: a sovereign political system that features institutions and procedures of political decision-making placed in such a way that they reflect the collectively expressed will of two or more ethnic groups, organised as political subjects, and that protects them from being out voted by the majority. The difficulties and challenge of democracy functioning in ethnically plural societies (segmented, plural or divided) were well known from the very onset of formulating the theory of democracy.¹¹ John Steward Mill expressed it through a thesis that "democracy is almost impossible in societies having different linguistic, ethnic groups and divisions ...".¹²

The central problem of democracy in multiethnic societies is the distribution of loyalties or centres where the basic identity of a man in the given society is acquired. Since the start of debates about the conditions of democracy, it has been clear that democracy does not need a fully homogenous society or population. Still, as Mill puts it, in the beginning, some minimum of social harmony in sharing the basic values and consensus is necessary. According to the common assessment of observers, the multiethnic societies that appeared after the fall of communism are below that conceived minimum.

The problem appears when the fundamental links and loyalties of the citizens vis-à-vis the state institutions are questioned because the basic, cultural, legal and political status of the citizen is neither formed, nor supported by experience, nor is planted in the awareness as being necessary. At the same time, the democratic institutions do not have a tradition of their own that they can use to promote democratic practice. The result is a frequent change of the place where the basic collective identity in the 'horizontal' links of ethnic and linguistic groups and communities is acquired. This is how the segmented, divided or 'plural' (as opposed to 'pluralistic') society we have already spoken about is created.

Four ways to eliminate political conflicts and their consequences in multiethnic societies are usually given as a solution to the 'absence' of the tradition of individualism, liberalism, democracy and to the presence of tension and conflict of interests and myths. They are:

- o Division of power-in the sense of consociational democracy

- The so-called control theory of division of power (possible 'internal self-determination')
- Clear majority control
- The so-called 'spill-over' of votes and division of power through various forms of decentralisation ('internal self-determination').

For the objective of this text, I shall not dwell on a detailed description of the functioning and possible weaknesses of each of these individual types. I intend, however, to make a detailed comment on the second model, analysing the case of Macedonia.

At a global level, the given options may be fitted into three types of political behaviour of countries toward their own multi-ethnicity, which are useful to mention:

- Assimilation of differences (minorities)
- Integration (that, in the long-run, implies the risk of assimilation too)
- Integration without assimilation (or co-habitation), where the differences are kept in the civil

society-consociation, culture and education.

In this context, I would like to underscore theoretical divisions concerning types of cultural rights, and requests of ethnic communities and groups and appropriate accommodation policies adequate to them.

The following group rights are usually mentioned:

- o Rights of exemption from legal restrictions on a particular ethnic-cultural practice

- The right to assistance in the realisation of some cultural practice
- The right to self-government of a certain ethnic community (functional or territorial)
- The right to representation of persons belonging to specific ethnic community in state bodies and so on
- The right to recognition of the traditional legal or moral codes within the overall legislation of the country
- Rights to restrictions on the interference of outside persons in the practice of cultural and other facets of life of ethnic communities, the aim of which is to protect a small minority against interference of a larger group and to prevent colonisation of their cultural space that may lead to gradual assimilation
- Rights to so-called symbol-related demands, significant for the cultural identity of the ethnic communities.¹³

At the end of this part, I will present three summary definitions of the concepts I have referred to and on which the largest part of the discussion further in the text will be focused, namely: ethnic group, ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict management.

- 'Ethnic group' is a group of citizens of one country having common ethnic (cultural, religious or linguistic) features, who express their will to preserve these features as different (vis-à-vis the rest of the population and groups) and whose focus of political mobilisation is the group itself (ethnicity) in defending or promoting the group interest¹⁴
- 'Ethnic conflict' is a non-institutional action in which groups that define themselves through ethnic features confront their interests with the state or between themselves. Here the degree of confrontation is such that instruments of non-institutional violence are used¹⁵
- 'Ethnic conflict management' is a capacity of institutional procedures that process the ethnic conflict, absorbing its violent energy and proposing conflict solutions.¹⁶

At the same time, I will present in brief all the factors that influence ethnic conflict management:

1. The relationship between centralisation and decentralisation, in pluralising the levels where conflicts are taking place: reasonable decentralisation multiplies ethnic conflicts along levels, but their intensity is abated

2. Reasonable pluralisation (in the sense of various issue groups instead of one movement for ethnic rights) of parties and other political associations: socialisation of the conflict prevents the use of extreme measures for its solution.

3. Larger coherence and subordination in ethnic groups: greater probability of conflict 4. Larger geographic coherence of an ethnic group: greater probability of conflict

5. Larger ethnic group: greater probability of conflict
6. Larger country: greater probability of inter-ethnic conflict
7. Longer tradition of existence of ethnic groups: greater probability of conflict
8. Political system in transition: greater probability of inter-ethnic conflict.

WHAT DID WE INHERIT IN MACEDONIA?

The main trauma of the dissolution of countries after the fall of communism happened along the internal borders of the so-called socialist federations (the USSR, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). Even, in the case of the civil war in Bosnia, the integrity of the international personality of the creation that emerged at the end of the war under the Dayton Agreement was formally preserved.

Transition toward democracy, however, took nationalist acceleration. In chiefly homogenous states, the critical point was the corpus of minority rights, whereas in multiethnic countries, the mentioned issues of identity and endemic crisis of the political system were opened.

If I schematically focus the analysis for the needs of this text and eliminate the ideological programmes of the communist party (parties), the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had two basic axes for resolving the national programmes of the nations it organised. First, the emancipation of national states (republics) along with the maintenance of a balance between the larger nations and smaller ones through an intricate system of federal competencies and division of power. This was coupled with the appropriate internal-republic mechanisms for the promotion of ethnic groups-autonomies, decentralisation and division of power, a complex though vague system of balance that could survive only because of a centralised party-police power and the army. The second axis or (hidden) premise was the need to maintain the compactness of living in one, even though complex state, of Serbs and Croats.

Following the fall of communism and the break-up of the single political party, the SFRY was unable to maintain a balance between the two projects. The project for the organisation of national emancipation and the mechanisms for balancing first cracked on its sidelines. The rigidity and the collective fear, fed by nationalist populism of the Serbian national programme, which responded to the democratic and centrifugal forces in the republics with a militant nationalism, represented a key disintegrating force. This crypto-nationalist 'socialism' was internally consolidated by abolishing the autonomies and then it directed itself toward nationalist expansion through the greater state programme, above all, along the western line of the 'Serbian question': Bosnia, Croatia, and to a certain degree in Montenegro.

This degenerated into probably the most aggressive atavistic and dirty war in Europe since World War II. It involved the region and Europe too, in a long, regressive procession of compensating for and rehabilitating of the vague and unstable creations that resulted from the imposed peace or, more precisely, the absence of war, as well as a permanent encounter with tides of instability and post-war consequences of crime and crisis exportation. What I would like to emphasise is the political outcome of probably the most powerful militant nationalist project on the territory of southeast Europe and the Balkans, the Serbian national project. This project had disastrous results. Under the

leadership of the populist regime, the Serbian people encountered with probably the greatest defeat in their history. With the 'assistance' of the Serbian regime, the Serbs have been practically wiped out in Croatia (after living for centuries there, in what was not accomplished even by the fascist regime of Pavelic), while in Bosnia one state and legal monstrosity was born, which holds that it should "unite Serbia to itself", and not possibly the other way around, and which shall not be able to function as a normal state for a longer period.

This defeat, however, is not over yet, if one takes into account its consequences inside Serbia.¹⁷ This regime also managed to celebrate all its defeats in the incredibly perverted practice of national romance of jubilee and glory.

The outcome of the events, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the creation of five successor states, left another ethnic project ajar, primarily owing to the Kosovo problem-the Albanian one. Several general remarks ought to be presented about this issue, because it concerns directly the subject matter of this work.

My thesis is that the substance-the basic message of the so-called 'Albanian Greater State' or of the 'Albanian question'-does not differ from the Serbian. It is identical to the Serbian project in terms of:

- Priority setting: first ethnic territories, then democracy
- There is an obvious similarity in the populist, nationalist romantic-political rhetoric and leadership (in the Albanian case, this relates to the radical political formations in the region) expressed in ethnic intolerance, construction of (the Karl Schmidt's) scheme of enemies and friends o There is an underestimation of any procedure and result achieved in the institutions (insofar as they function)
- Finally, there is a characteristic glorification of the national identification and semantics, as well an attempt to interpret every political defeat as a new step toward liberation, celebration and 'maturation' of the national idiom and identity.

The differences of the two projects relate to several significant points. First, there is the difference in the functioning of the so-called 'kin' states in relation to the incitement of nationalism. Namely, in the case of the Albanians, the Republic of Albania is not in the position of a 'piedmont' of national gathering, due to both the absence of critical mass of nationalism in the country and to the inadequate economic and political situation in relation to close and more distant emigration. The absence of a traditional nationalist charge in Albania is reflected in the impossibility of organising in the country a national feeling toward the institutions of the state that, together with the lack of traditional education in that direction, makes the traditional nationalist romance float over reality that is not an adequate root for the former. Hence, there is a bizarre competition between Pristina and Tirana about which is to be the centre of the nationalist programme, and also a significantly stronger nationalist charge in the Albanian minorities in the surrounding countries and the emigration itself, than in Albania.

Second, there is, indeed, a different methodology of political action and this depends on the different political position, economic strength and historical background of the collective identity of the Albanians in the region. In any case, this practice of radical nationalist pathos produces a similar political idolatry and leadership that in all essential syntagma are oriented to the nationalist past full of ideology, and strangely reproduce the same populist form of the so-called 'main enemy', from the Slav matrix of the Serbs. The frustrations of the political tactics and strategy placed in such a way

arise also from an additional theoretical difficulty. Namely, it is a problem to defend the existence of three Albanian state entities and, accordingly, of three Albanian nations-the first one in Albania, the second one in Kosovo (in case of its independence) and the third one in Macedonia (in case of its federalisation). Should one insist on uniting these three entities into a single state of the Albanians in the region (at once or gradually)-then it is difficult to deny the existence of the Greater Albania project as such, that is, the fact that it is identical to the Serbian one.

This implies a double-face policy-one for the situation concerning human rights of the Albanians in countries where they represent a minority, and the second one for the political project concerning the solution of the Albanian question by constitutional means (Dayton-2, or something alike). These two projects are neither the same, nor concurrent, nor are they supplementary. These are simply two different projects. One may imagine for example: creation of three Albanian states, completely autocratic, with no democracy; or, one may also conceive democratic solutions to the overwhelming number of issues in the area of human and minority rights, by maintaining their minority status in countries where they are now.

Where the political situation is normal or relatively normal (as in Macedonia), such a situation brings about a division of the political parties organising the Albanians between these two options. This is a normal process because the entire methodology and the human resources necessary for organising any of the options are different for each one and are mainly incompatible. They may keep the points of a joint declaration or a joint action. However, the projects are necessarily separate and there is competition and political struggle between them. The mentioned levels of political action may even overlap in one political subject, as a type of 'moderate' version that, under the pressure of the greater state idea, makes instrumental the debates on human rights and acts that are typically 'confused', divided or inconsistent in regard to continual interpretation of human rights standards before foreign mediators and organisations and before the political public.

The maximalist plan of the pan-Albanian project for a super-national state in the Balkans consists of a two-stage scenario: in the first stage, an independent Kosovo and the federalisation of Macedonia while, in the second stage, using quasi-European rhetoric for transparency of borders-a de facto connecting of these entities into a single community of the Albanians. Some political parties even speak openly of this, considering it a 'natural' right of the Albanians-at least to put it forward as a demand.

It is indispensable to treat the given elements of collective identification and political programme thematically so that the discourse that is being analysed can be understood and for which I intend to suggest some solutions and ideas . Namely, we should clarify what is actually the point in question and of our discussion: are we dealing here with human rights standards and practice across their full spectrum, or with projects of super-national states and the political methodology implied by them?

For this purpose and context, I intend to break down into several points of reference the policy of neo-romantic nationalist populism and the methods it uses in the political mobilisation of ethnic groups and of ethnic nationalism. The first feature of this ethnic nationalism is:

1. Stimulation of all types of collectivist political coherence and neurosis. Special utilitarian reading of the cultural past and differentiating the differences with other cultural and ethnic collectivities through: intensified projection of historic 'friends' and 'enemies', the missions of the former and the latter and paranoid over-emphasis of the identity and the particularity flavoured with a

quasi-philosophic vocabulary; permanent psychosis of plotting and conspiracy against the movement and lack of criticism toward one's own mistakes, what in the extreme options ends up in the perverted tendency of celebrating own mistakes.¹⁸

2. Anti-individualistic, and, therefore, essentially anti-liberal determination, where the freedom of the individual is substituted, in a historic moment, for 'freedom of the nation' and is put off for the future, for the 'day after'. This results in the mentioned 'conquering' of ethnic territories first and then in the possible development of democracy. An inevitable consequence of the latter is the ethnicisation of citizens, building an 'organic' community and a specific fundamentalism of political demands, which should veil the loss of stable social identification. "Democracy" is possible only as illiberal, while liberalism is feigned and 'postponed'.¹⁹

3. Methodology of political mobilisation and organisation in such a case are populist leadership and attempts at 'uniting' the several possible parties in which the ethnic group is organised into a single party that acquires the attributes of a movement. There is a tendency to formulate a 'centre' of co-ordination of all segments of such a movement in the region (namely, to formulate a classical matrix of the national and liberation movement of the nineteenth century or of the de-colonisation period).

4. The rhetoric of the post-modern discourse about the so-called radical segmentation and the appearance of the so-called 'new autochthonous' minorities and struggle for a new tide of democracy are completely incompatible with the rhetoric and methods of the political discourse of ethnic nationalism.²⁰

5. Underestimation and manipulation of the results of participation in all processes of compromise through the institutions of the political system and the results in the field of minority rights. This point is similar with the old communist creed (1919), "The worse it becomes, the better for us".

Participation in government is 'good' provided it is only on the level of agreement of élites of the ethnic communities, that is, a consociational, consensual or balancing and blocking inter-ethnic status, and of course, provided that it ultimately fulfils its own programme.

1 Here we speak about that known theme of post-modernism, about the crisis of modernism and appearance of new ethnicities, not so much based on the renewal of the old ethnic groups, but on the transformation of the ethnicity into symbolic cultural groups (symbolic ethnicity) as a response to the overall identity crisis. These groups create for their 'beneficiaries' a net of informal relations, symbols and organisations for status and cultural solidarity and identity. That process of distinctive 'de-socialisation' or discharge of ethnic groups and meanings of their cultural contents is followed by their transformation into symbolic status groups that M. Gordon calls "liberal expectancy" in *Assimilation in American Life*, Oxford University Press, 1964, or Novak, Greeny and Gambino call "new pluralism". [Interpreter's note: all the quotations and references were translated from Macedonian.]

2 Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. in *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, 1983, outlines that tradition and the history of groups are often invented, creatively refilled and glorified. This does not mean that ethnic groups are not authentic. The perverted trait to glorify all tragedies and failures of collective actions of groups and to incorporate them into 'heroic tradition' stems from the above, as well.

3 Filip Putnja and Zoslin Stref-Fenar, *Teorije o etnicitetu*, XX-vek, Belgrade, 1977: the authors define the ethnicity similarly on pp. 41, 51 and 172.

4 Classic definitions of ethnic group may be found in: a *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, 1967: an ethnic group is a group of persons of one nationality or race who share common distinctive culture (p. 489); b *The International Relation Dictionary*, 1969: a social group that shares common ideology, institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity; c *The Modern Dictionary of Sociology*, 1969: a group that has common cultural tradition and sense of identity, and exists as a subgroup within a wider society; d The same also in M. A. Tumin, *Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, N.Y. Free Press, 1964; e Frederic Barth, in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries...*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, George Allen 1969, says that: "an ethnic group is a group that maintains itself biologically; has common cultural values; represents a space for communication and interaction and identifies itself as different from the others". On the other hand, the concept of 'ethnicity' is defined in that book as: "The concept of social organisation that enables the social groups and their relations to be described in terms of highly selected cultural contrasts, that are used in an emblematic way with the aim of organising identities and interactions".

5 Michael T. Graven says that when "there is absence of 'an external' notion of reason, ... various internal logic and rationality prevail in the area of the internal consensus ..., the internal autonomy of the segments is enlarged ..., the cultural segments are operationally closed ... and auto-poetic ... and society becomes a heterarhic-polycentric system of sub-systems", pp. 6 and 7. *The Pluralization of Political Societies: Can Democracy Persist*, 1993, Ljubljana, Conference on Civil Society, Political Society, Democracy.

6 See Fareed Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6, 1997.

7 The plural is used for analytical description of the inclusively new heterogeneity of modern society as opposed to the concept of "pluralism", that became a normative concept in Western societies after World War II, explaining the selective political institutionalisation in social plurality. The institutional political pluralism ensuing from it, depended on acceptance of 'the rules of the game', that included many pre-political normative aspects of consensus, such as ideas about equality and freedom, tolerance, etc. See Michael T. Graven, *Ibid.*, pp. 11 and 12. Also in Fraenkel E., *Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien*, Stuttgart, 1968.

8 See particularly: Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley University of California Press, 1985; Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton University Press, 1993; Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, Oxford University Press, 1989; Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, *Ethnicity and Group Rights*, New York University Press, 1997; Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford University Press, 1995; Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: a Global View at Ethnopolitical Conflict*, Washington, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993.

9 See *Encyclopaedia of Democracy*, II, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 853.

10 See: 'Minorities and Self-determination' by Lj. D. Frckoski in *Balkan Forum*, No. 1996; John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993; Vernon van Dyke, 'The

Individual, the State and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory', *World Politics* 29-3, 1977.

11 See Arent Liphad, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, Yale University, 1977.

12 G.S. Mill, *Considerations of Representative Government*, first published in 1861, in the part on operationalisation of democratic institutions.

13 Will Kymlicka divides those rights into right to self-administration, representation and prohibition of external interference. Robert Gurr divides them into rights to "exit" (exception), autonomy, and access and control of some procedure or practice, with many sub-divisions. Jacob Levy further adds to the above divisions the so-called rights of internal prohibitions in the ethnic community. See Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, *Ethnicity and Group Rights*, N.Y. University Press, pp. 25 and 49.

14 Gurr T.R., *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, US Institute of Peace, Washington, 1993. This author calls the ethnic group "minority under stress" due to the domination of the political principle of Mobilisation through the group.

15 By definition, a conflict is a situation when one social and political subject is engaged in deliberate opposition to another such subject, because the former has goals incompatible with those of the latter. Here it is not so important if the incompatibility of the goals is real or imagined. The conflict is that part of the dispute in which there is a danger of using non-institutional violence between subjects having opposing interests. See *International Public Law*, Lj. D. Frckoski and others, *Tabernakul*, 1995, Skopje.

16 See similar division in: Frank S. Cohen, 'Proportional versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 5, 1997 (pp. 607-630).

17 This is particularly true, if one follows the present developments in Kosovo, the decisions of the Contact Group, the escalation of war incidents and the political manoeuvres of the Belgrade regime.

18 The roots of the fear from the 'others' do not arise from their so-called psychological significance, but rather from their assumed main and hidden intentions and motives, which remain fully hidden, yet dangerous to us. See Slavoj Zizek, *Enjoy Your Nation as Yourself*, p.236.

19 Deleuze and the 'modern Spinoza followers' describe this process as disappearance of the subject, that is changed into a 'site' or passive matter through which operate given relations, in this case the cultural stereotypes of the ethnicity, as such. On the other hand, communication is changed into such condition among affects, and not among subjects.

20 Lacan describes this situation as a new powerful cycle of the freed super-ego of the individuals (the ethnicity). He also calls it dynamics of the "discourse of a master" or a controller. The previous communist system had that function by suppressing the super-ego of the ethnicity. After the fall of communism, the said new circle of freeing the suppressed ethnicity values in all their basic relations, particularly that toward-the others, the 'enemy', was opened. Jacques Lacan, *Le seminaire*, book 17 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991).

