RE-EMERGENCE OF TRADITIONAL THREATS

PATRICK McCARTHY

Patrick McCarthy is professor of European Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s Bologna Center, Bologna, Italy.

1. INTRODUCTION

History does not repeat itself, not even as farce. Yet the history and geography, the political structures, and the economy of a region, a nation or a continent make up what one might call its situation, which usually contains security problems. Thus, France and Germany went to war three times in seventy years, and although they were very different wars, they were all rooted in the countries’ situation. The new German state wished to expand across Europe and the older French state sought to block it. Both thought they should rule Alsace-Lorraine. That is not to say that any of these wars was inevitable. Indeed, the third one might have been avoided, or so at least one French spokesman felt, if France had been as generous towards the democratic German governments as it was towards Adolf Hitler who had exploited their failures in order to come to power.2 The situation comprises elements that change as well as others that are lasting, although not of course eternal. Outside forces exert an influence, while actors in a country make choices within a range of options. For example, as from the Risorgimento, Italy felt the lack of an empire and it was Benito Mussolini who was prepared to use greater force and make more enemies in order to acquire one.

In the context of situation, ‘traditional threats’ mean security risks which result from lasting elements but which have been blocked or diminished by recent events. The title of this study indicates firstly the threat directed at Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact nations, which appears to have been resolved by the disappearance of the Pact. This modifies the situation of Europe and exposes it to new risks although the traditional threats are neither so easily banished nor so separate from the new ones. For example, the former Soviet Union, the core of the ex-Warsaw Pact, might be seen as one manifestation of what Charles de Gaulle liked to call la Russie éternelle that had for centuries envied, despised, and feared the West. Russia remains but it has become weak and isolated, which could make it more rather than less dangerous.

Another potential old-new threat is the reawakening of remote enmities, on which the Cold War had imposed a brutal order, so that the Moslem countries can no longer be divided into ‘Moscow’s allies’ and ‘friends of the Free World’. Instead, these very different countries tend to be lumped together into a ‘Moslem world’ and described as Europe’s next enemy.3 There are old reasons why Europe should fear Islam—the Arab invasion and the occupation of Sicily, Malta, and parts of Spain as well as the Ottoman empire that extended almost to the palace gates of the Habsburgs—but there are also new reasons which include the spread of ‘fundamentalism’, Arab dissatisfaction with the way the international oil market is run, the existence of the state of Israel, which many Arabs see as a Western Trojan Horse, and the large, often poor Moslem communities scattered across Western Europe. Similarly, there are old reasons why many Moslem countries should fear Europe, such as the Crusades, and excellent new reasons like the non-democratic governments that Europe supports in the Middle East and the prejudice shown towards the Moslem communities in Western Europe.

In addition, there are other nations or groups of nations that could conceivably attack a Europe that has long feared them; one of these is China, a nuclear power with a vast population, an uncertain political system, and a growing but strained economy. However, the term ‘threat’ cannot be reduced to the possibility of being attacked. Taking the concept of security in a broad sense, one must include all forms of violence or coercion which weaken Europe or parts of Europe in their tasks of remaining democratic, offering a reasonable standard of living and social services to their populations, and avoiding internal strife.4 This seems such a broad definition as to cover all the ills of the human condition. Yet it would make a distinction between a recession, the causes and remedies of which we do not grasp, and a trade war launched by one nation against another or the withholding of a vital resource from a neighbouring nation or even a refusal to co-operate, if such a refusal causes avoidable damage to the neighbour.
Likewise, the term security cannot be limited to threats from outside. The Cold War helped bring to an end the cycle of Franco-German wars, with Stalin doing his part by co-operating in the division of Germany, and the United States determination to revive the German economy played a role in France’s decision to gain some control over the Ruhr industry via the Coal and Steel Pool. While fifty years of co-operation may have made a fourth Franco-German war unthinkable, the removal of the Soviet menace makes it easier for the two countries to go their own way. This could lead to the decline of the European Union (EU) and a return to the precarious, centuries-long balance of power arrangements.

One can imagine the old-new forms the balance of power might take, all of which presuppose that the US would be unable or unwilling to prod the Europeans towards unity. This is, however, quite plausible. The United States situation has changed and it has less reason to play a leading role in European security and more reason to see Europe as an economic rival. Trade disputes over agriculture and over entertainment or cultural products were smoothed over rather than resolved at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) Uruguay Round and arguments over patents and subsidies to industry seem likely to recur, while the impact of a common European currency on the dollar is a great unknown.5 Indeed, far from fostering a united Europe, the US might be tempted to wage economic war against it or to take sides in a divided Europe. A return to the interwar pattern of aloofness and arbitrary intervention would prevail, perhaps spiced with greater hostility. Another way of putting it is that Charles de Gaulle’s fear of a Europe allowing itself to be dominated by the US would be realised.

This is a sample of the traditional threat that may re-emerge. This study offers a worst-case scenario because security systems must be ready for the worst. The language is simple so that the threats are not banished by the magic of jargon. Many of them cannot be dealt with by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alone which, even more than in the past, will be working with many other actors. The threats stem from varying traditions but they have in common the fact that they have survived both the Cold War and its end. All may be kept at bay by efficient action and all will be more dangerous if Europe grows weaker.

2. NOBODY’S EUROPE

This borrowed subtitle6 indicates one of the three major weaknesses that plague Europe. Ten years ago the question of who was in charge of Europe would probably have been fairly easily answered. There was an Eastern Europe dominated by the USSR and a Western Europe that was closely allied with, and in military terms dependent on, the US but which in political and economic matters was organised around the Franco-German relationship. While this answer may well be too simplistic, the description does contain a crude element of truth.

Today, Russia itself belongs to no one, while Eastern Europe seems to wish only to be Western, although Western Europe shows a mere formal, sporadic interest in the former East.7 The EU is obsessed by monetary union which is a mysterious Holy Grail to be reached by the roughest of roads. The mystery stems from the differing perceptions of the Holy Grail, which the Bundesbank perceives as imposing a pre-Reunification Modell Deutschland on the EU and the French government sees as a way of getting some control over the Bundesbank. Meanwhile, the road takes the EU countries through a desert of deflation precisely when their economies are in recession, little progress has been made towards reforming EU institutions in the Intergovernmental Conference, and France and Germany are still ostentatiously co-operating but they are not leading. The EU should be introducing policies that enrich the lives of ordinary people, and although its greatest recent success, the Erasmus programme, has won it the sympathy of university students, no equivalent has been devised for the working class. And, while complicated schemes for improved information and consultation of workers or for international wage bargaining are worthy, they do not make people dream.

The second weakness is unemployment. It stands at around 12 per cent in France and Italy, dropping only to 10 per cent in Germany and 7.5 per cent in Britain, but rising to 22 per cent in Spain.8 More importantly, it seems to be structural and fear is rampant that Europe is developing an under class that is badly educated, stranded in the outskirts of its big cities, prone to violence, and culturally ‘excluded’. In the 1995 French presidential elections, Jacques Chirac campaigned on the theme of
integrating the excluded but as yet he has achieved little. In Germany the task of transforming the former German Democratic Republic is proving more difficult than anticipated, while in Italy the unemployment problem is subsumed into the country’s north-south division which has taken a new turn with the exasperated protest and the (probably feigned) demand for secession that find an outlet in the Northern League.

The third weakness is cultural. It was personified by Massimo Cacciari, philosopher and mayor of Venice, in the figure of homo democraticus who has rights but no duties. Convinced of his own goodness, unwilling to accept any limits on his freedom but constantly calling on his supposed rulers to protect him, ‘democratic man’ makes government very difficult. Long-term goals, the reallocation of financial resources, and the needs of the next generation have to be set aside so that the immediate desires and level of consumption of this supposed citizen may be satisfied.

In addition, elections in Western Europe are too frequent and are won or lost by narrow margins. This makes it difficult for competing parties to ignore any interest group. And the breakdown of large, organised social and ideological blocs encourages the dispersion of votes and the rise of protest or single-issue movements. The radical right, represented in France by Jean-Marie Le Pen and in Austria by Jörg Haider, is a reaction against this disintegration which it fosters, however, by aggravating social tensions and annexing a bloc of votes that might otherwise go to a party of government. The excluded cannot or do not vote or, when they do, they disperse their votes.

So in nobody’s Europe democratic man reigns. He is not very interested in security issues and applauds cuts in defence spending. He may feel a vague guilt about Poland, but are NATO leaders certain that he is ready to go to war to save Warsaw? He is untroubled by Europe’s technological deficit with the US, provided it does not reduce the number of television channels available to him.

All three of the weaknesses discussed here leave Europe more vulnerable to the re-emergence of traditional threats because they work against historical thinking. One of the reasons why Winston, the hero of George Orwell’s novel, 1984, is unable to combat the totalitarian order is that he cannot discover how it came into being. We must now review the first of these threats by looking at its past.

3. THE COMMISSAR AND THE BEAR

The Russians have every reason to distrust the West Europeans. The Teutonic Knights made war against them, the French philosophers lectured to them, Napoleon occupied their capital, the British kept them out of the Mediterranean, and the Kaiser helped the Bolsheviks to rule over them. Immediately, however, Western Europe changed its mind and decided it disliked the commissar even more than the bear. It helped the Poles defeat the new Soviet regime, which it treated like a pariah, and when Pierre Laval did sign a treaty with the USSR, successive French governments ignored it. The commissar fought back by threatening world revolution and backing the fledgling communist parties in Western Europe. This created a fresh outburst of anti-communism. At Munich the Western nations sought to avert the risk to themselves by appeasing Hitler. To escape isolation the commissar formed the Nazi-Soviet pact but Hitler tore it up and in the ensuing war 27 million Soviet citizens died. Although the Soviet Union won the war and for a few short years enjoyed good relations with Western Europe and the US, the commissar feared that his society could not survive if it were opened to the more dynamic Western societies. So he closed off his boundaries, which allowed the West to surround them with a powerful military alliance called NATO and to make anti-communism the cement of the new forms of capitalism it was building.

This unequal struggle lasted for forty years until the exhausted commissar gave up. He abandoned both the territories he had gained during the war against Hitler and those conquered earlier and allowed the bear to return. But the West did not like the bear either. It consulted him on international issues but it made clear to him that the financial aid he so badly needed would be cut off if he indulged in dissent. For the rest the West treated him like a teddy bear, tossed casually into a corner.
The bear knew that the former East European countries had good reason to dislike him. The commissar had behaved badly towards them, seeing them only as his first line of defence. But although they loathed the commissar, they considered him a bear in disguise. So when the bear re-emerged without red flags and no longer speaking Marxism, the former East Europeans went on castigating him. Moreover, they did not believe that he had now become a teddy bear. He is still militarily strong and he is still aggressive, the ex-Eastern countries kept repeating. Bears do not and cannot change. We want protection.

In fact, NATO had designed a Partnership for Peace (PfP) which was working well. But it was not enough for countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that wanted to join NATO and obtain the automatic help in case of attack that is guaranteed by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. To the bear this was just the latest piece of Western treachery: he would still be confronted by NATO forces but they would be much closer to his capital. He had agreed that a reunited Germany should be part of NATO in return, so he thought that there should be no further expansion to the east. Now, it seemed there was no end to the countries that would join. On 24 October 1996, President Clinton offered NATO membership not merely to Slovenia and to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic but also to the Baltic states and the successor states.

NATO had planned to work out a special relationship with Russia but many Russian groups, such as the nationalists, the communists, and the various mixtures of both, thought it was hopeless. They remembered that when the commissar was in power Westerners disliked but respected Russia. The bear tore up the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) Treaty, began to rearm, and told the population that they must make sacrifices for Mother Russia. NATO, which had planned to install no new weapons in ex-Central Europe, decided it must do so. In the Baltic states the large Russian communities brought the economy to a standstill with protest marches and industrial sabotage.

A re-elected President Clinton spoke of the need to reassert American hegemony and the West Europeans whose plans for a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU and for a European pillar of NATO had been derailed by cuts in defence spending and the inability to unite, fell into line behind Washington. However, they made a joint declaration declaring they could do nothing to help Poland. This gave heart to the bear who studied President Clinton’s 1996 skirmish with Saddam Hussein and wondered whether the Americans would be equally fickle towards him. The bear’s generals pressed for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Western Europe . . .

4. LEARNING TO LIVE WITH ISLAM

At present one can learn much about ‘living with Islam’ from discussions with Turkish politicians, civil servants, and journalists. One group is worried that the lay tradition, associated with Kemal Atatürk but in fact much older, is being challenged by a Moslem revival, pointing out that the religious party, Refah, is in the government and has made overtures to Colonel Gaddafi. A second group close to Refah argues that the government is pursuing healthy, nationalist policies and a third group does not support Refah but considers it just that the religious party was allowed to enter the government after its good showing in the elections. All groups express disappointment with Western Europe and the US. Their list of grievances is long but the one that is most pertinent to this study is their view that their country faces security problems which are being ignored.

One can only agree that the region surrounding Turkey is unstable. Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq, Iran is living out its fundamentalist revolution, and Syria is ruled by a dictator who has probably played a role in fomenting international terrorism. A further complication is provided by the successor, heavily Moslem states to the north. But this is only one fragment of the larger Middle East region where the conflict between Israel and Palestine has grown sharper, where the West props up authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and where the Lebanon periodically turns into a battlefield. Moving across to North Africa, we encounter perhaps the most tragic of Moslem countries, Algeria. Here the disparity in the birthrate on the two sides of the Mediterranean is the greatest across any border in the world. A civil war is being waged in this country between what remains of the Front de Liberation Nationale and a Moslem movement which, in a country where Islam was historically weak, won the 1991 elections but was not allowed to form a government. Algeria’s troubles reverberate around France which is home to over two million Moslems.
This thumbnail sketch allows us to list the various new forms which the traditional threat poses. One is the ‘Saddam Hussein leap’, the rapid invasion of a small neighbouring state rich in resources, undertaken to strengthen one’s position in the global economy. Another is that a state could acquire nuclear weapons or chemical and biological weapons and in a mood of desperation launch a suicide attack on Europe itself. More likely is a war between neighbouring countries, not over oil but over a resource such as water. Increasingly likely is a prolonged terrorist campaign launched by fundamentalist groups against a European country, which might trigger clashes within that country between immigrants and natives. A further possibility is persistent border skirmishes between would-be immigrants and the armed forces of the reluctant host country.

The second of these scenarios would involve NATO or WEU (Western European Union) forces that would attempt to remove the nuclear weapons surgically and the first would require a major effort along the lines of the Gulf War and one should not assume that the next opponent will be as inept as Saddam Hussein. The third scenario might call for a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) followed by a peacekeeping mission and the fifth should be left to specialised units, such as coastguards, with army or navy forces ready to help out. It is the fourth scenario which is the most complex as it would entail sophisticated police work with several countries co-operating together, combined with CJTF strikes against terrorist bases.

None of these military operations would remove the cause of the threat, which lies in the situation of the Middle East region, in the unstable mixture of wealth and poverty, of modernity and tradition. European security lies in a series of initiatives designed to change that situation, which entails changing the relationship between Europe and the Moslem nations. This is a case of an economic, political, and cultural response to a security threat or even, to turn the question round, a case where refusal by the European countries to help could be construed as an act of aggression against the Moslem countries.

Lack of space as well as lack of knowledge prevent me from spelling out what forms of action might be required and I shall limit myself to a few suggestions. In the first place, Europe should strengthen its ties with countries that can serve as examples of democracy, even if imperfect (European democracy is far from perfect as Northern Ireland demonstrates), and of a separation between the lay state and religious organisation. Turkey is a better candidate for this role than Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, and Greece should not be allowed to obstruct the EU’s dialogue with Ankara. Meanwhile, investment in Moslem countries that send illegal immigrants to Europe may produce few jobs, but even so it is a better way of using money than building prisons where the immigrants are kept while they wait to be sent home on charter flights.

Finally, a major effort should be made to teach European children the basic tenets of Islam and the world view it inspires. The achievements of Moslem peoples should be stressed: young Italian children are already taught that the compass was invented by Arabs who also irrigated Sicily and governed the island well.16 At a more advanced level, the study of ‘fundamentalism’ might reveal that it is caused in part by a frustrated attempt to modernise which Europe could help make successful. Meanwhile, the EU could fund the teaching of the languages of the Moslem countries, perhaps Arabic in France and Turkish in Germany.17

5. BACK TO THE BALANCE OF POWER

The long march towards European unity has not done away with competition and conflict among nation states. One might argue that each country has its own vision of Europe which it tries to impose on all other visions. For example, Britain’s Europe is a vast free trade area, closely tied to the US and devoid of political institutions, whereas Germany’s Europe is—or was—federalist, with Germany pursuing a tight monetary policy and an Atlanticist foreign policy and a system of labour relations based on co-determination. Yet, although countries compete and also form closer ties with some members than with others—the Benelux countries are a community within the community—the process of bargaining favours co-operation rather than separation.18

This is highly untraditional. Until 1914 the European nations carved up their own continent and any others that could not resist them. In the interwar years, after the US withdrew into isolationism and
the USSR concentrated on socialism in one country, the European states made what seemed like a last attempt to achieve a balance of power and they failed dramatically. Once more the US and the USSR were drawn in and the big West European states were coaxed by the Americans and bullied by the Soviets into uniting. It appeared until 1989 to be an irreversible process and it may still be. But with Russia unable to bully and the US weary and perhaps repentant of coaxing, the European states are left to their own devices. Moreover, their continent has grown because the former communist states want to join them, as do countries on the other side of the Mediterranean from Turkey to Morocco.

There remain solid reasons to unite: much of the EU members’ trade is done with other members and in a global economy countries need the EU to bargain for them. But the old temptations have returned in new seductive forms. Germany is most sorely tempted, and despite Jacques Chirac’s trip to Warsaw, Germany remains the dominant power in ex-Central Europe. It is also Russia’s most plausible interlocutor. Will this prospect not revive dreams of Mitteleuropa? It is true that at present the countries to Germany’s east seem more of a burden than an asset but then the EU is also full of needy nations—Portugal, Greece, and Ireland come to mind.

France wants to pull Germany westward but the method France has chosen is monetary union. Helmut Kohl has agreed, but a coalition that extends from the élite Bundesbank to the populist supporters of the mark is more dubious. Germany wonders whether Italy, having made the effort to participate in monetary union, will continue down the difficult road members must follow afterwards, and it knows that France wants to gain control over German monetary policy. If the opponents of monetary union succeed in gaining a delay, the frustration of public opinion in countries that have tolerated years of austerity (democratic man has remained obstinately Keynesian and sees no value in austerity) and the scepticism of financial markets could make postponement permanent.

Would France be heartbroken? Certainly, it would be a bitter blow for political élites, whether of the left or the right, who have gambled on ‘Europe’. But the French government would have more freedom to deal with unemployment, while a large section of the Gaullist Party would be delighted. Philippe Séguin might become prime minister and Jacques Chirac, never troubled by inconsistency, could revert to the discourse of exclusion. France might turn to the Mediterranean, initially to Spain rather than Italy, and then to the mission of bringing together all the countries of the Mediterranean basin. These represent an even less promising group than Germany’s Mitteleuropa but France has another card to play. Britain, delighted by the breakdown of monetary union and surely ready at last to bury the special relationship, could cooperate with France on an intergovernmental basis. So a new form of the old balance of power arrangements would emerge. Certainly, it is hard to imagine that John Major’s sadly divided Conservative government could play even this role, but surely the long-awaited Tony Blair, the leader of the Labour Party, would find it child’s play.

There is no reason to suppose that an east-south division would precipitate a fourth Franco-German war. The EU framework would remain, and if Italy’s semi-reformed political system survived the blow to a Europe which the Italians want to join because they see nothing Italian in it, it could find a role as a mediator between the Mediterranean and Mitteleuropa. But in the long run the old shortcomings of the balance of power arrangements would return. One country would start to dominate and it could only be Germany. Romania and Slovakia would be unhappy members of the Eastern bloc.

However, it is quite likely that Italy’s system would not survive; the North might split off. But then its own traditional threats might re-emerge as Alto Adige broke away to rejoin Austria, Piedmont remembered its French heritage, and the industrialists in the Venice region returned—as they have done already—to re-conquer their sixteenth-century markets in ex-Central Europe. Meanwhile Sicily might either seek its independence or become the 51st state. Indeed, divisions in Europe would exacerbate the long-standing divisions within all nation states. Belgium’s balancing act might finally collapse.

Ireland would be stranded in the Southern bloc; it would once more be isolated in a one-on-one with Britain and its government would lose the legitimacy it had gained from EU membership. As
Northern Ireland festered, it is easy to imagine the Protestant Loyalists striking at Dublin and drawing the Republic into the conflict. With all hope of a political settlement happily gone, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) could intensify its bombing campaign in Britain and goad the Westminster government into a massive military intervention in the North. Ireland would be united—by the ravages of war. The poetry of Seamus Heaney would be banned in Ireland and Britain.19

In general this Europe would be vulnerable to internal splits and external pressure. The Common Foreign and Security Policy would not survive the breakdown of Franco-German co-operation. The solution, which is less easy than it sounds, is to continue the march towards unity. But monetary union may be the longest as well as the hardest road.

6. UNRELIABLE AMERICANS AND IRRESPONSIBLE EUROPEANS

The close involvement of the US in European affairs is not traditional. Rather it is the product of the perceived Soviet threat and of a striking contrast between American power and Western European weakness. With the disappearance of the threat and the blurring of the contrast, there is less reason for US involvement. On the whole this is a good thing. The Americans, Charles de Gaulle maintained, were unreliable; they had arrived late in two world wars.20 He also felt that, when the Americans were present, they were so overwhelmingly present that they encouraged the Europeans to be irresponsible.

Since 1989, successive administrations have dealt differently with the end of the Cold War. George Bush perceived the US as the lone superpower, a view that seemed to be corroborated by the Gulf War. He was suspicious of European defence initiatives and he succeeded in keeping them within the framework of an American-led NATO. He made this clear in the Rome Declaration of Autumn 1991, which helps explain why the clauses of the Maastricht Treaty that deal with the WEU are ambiguous. The WEU is to be both an integral part of NATO and the military expression of the EU. Bill Clinton’s view was different. Elected to turn the government inward to economic and social problems, he initially paid less attention to foreign policy. He had little interest in the special relationship. This left the Western Europeans free to take initiatives, and after their parliamentary victory of 1993, the Gaullists talked of a French return to a reorganised NATO. After Jacques Chirac’s presidential triumph, bargaining began about how much power the US would cede in NATO in return for a greater European effort and France’s return to NATO’s integrated military structure.

To reduce the US presence and hence the impact of its potential unreliability and to increase Europe’s presence and hence its sense of responsibility is the goal. It would represent a break with all traditions and it would best serve the cause of European security. Conversely, a failure to reach agreement could provoke European apathy or an ever greater US withdrawal. The two would probably go together since it is unlikely that Europe could organise its own security system without American prompting and military resources.21 However, a weak Europe and a strong, omnipresent US could be almost as dangerous.

If the EU’s discussions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy continue at their snail’s pace and if the reorganisation of NATO fails, the most likely result is once more a divided, vulnerable Europe. France might retreat into the national sanctuary of its nuclear deterrent, while Britain might try to resurrect the special relationship. And, unless the present attempt to strengthen the state succeeds, Italy too would cling to the shadow of US protection.22

Although Bill Clinton was drawn more into foreign and security policy towards the end of his first term, the results were not always inspiring—Northern Ireland—and unreliability—Iraq—was manifest. If a new US-European security deal is not struck, it is unlikely that Congress will be willing to pay for European defence so NATO’s role would become problematic and US-European relations would deteriorate. If such a disagreement were combined with the east-south split in the EU discussed above, the US would have to choose between Britain and Germany as well as between Italy and Poland.

Meanwhile US and European leaders should be preparing to dampen the economic conflicts that almost certainly lie ahead. The so-called global economy (‘global’ is another magic world that
banishes the hardships of the vast areas—most of Africa—that are excluded from this economy) is unlikely to break down into trading blocs. Unlike the blocs of the 1930s, the EU, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and their smaller siblings do not raise their external tariffs above world level: they lower their internal tariffs beneath it. Still conflicts are emerging between the US and Europe over agricultural exports to third-country markets and over patents in areas where research is expensive, such as the AIDS vaccine. there is also the tendency of European governments to help out their own industries and the tendency of the US government to pass laws penalising foreign industries. The Helms-Burton venture, while absurd, will probably not be the last attempt of its kind. US-EU negotiations will grow all the more difficult as both have to compete with an Asia that will include Japan, the ‘little tigers’, China, and a developing India. The prospect of a united Asian bloc is remote but not unthinkable.

Behind trade disputes lies the possibility of more dangerous clashes over money. How will the euro fare against the dollar? Jacques Chirac makes little secret of his preference for a weak euro to help exports. This would damage US exports but, conversely, a strong euro could cut into the dollar’s role as the dominant currency of world trade. In turn the US would lose the freedom to (mis)manage the dollar as it now does.

Does this mean that the US would respond by nuking Brussels? Probably not. It does, however, imply economic guerrilla war across the globe. One can imagine actual wars being fought by proxy, as may be the case today in West Africa. In the Middle East, the US might support Israel and the Europeans, Palestine. Jacques Chirac’s attempt to play a role in the conflict takes on a broader significance when it is placed in the context of his journey to Lebanon.

Unless US-EU economic friction can be smoothed out either in international fora like GATT and its annex, the World Trade Organisation, or else via bilateral negotiations, political co-operation will probably wither. An alternative scenario is a combination of European political and economic weakness and a renewed American bid for world hegemony. Bill Clinton has had successes in his recent foreign policy ventures and the progress made towards a Bosnian peace settlement could not, despite the French role, have been made without US leadership. As yet the US is demonstrating reluctance to relinquish power within the NATO military command, but Bill Clinton and his successors could revert to George Bush’s policy of a US-dominated NATO that could also exert indirect economic pressure on the Europeans.

One can imagine that, in the name of helping the ex-Central Europeans, the US would break the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and open Western Europe to American agricultural goods. France’s attempt to defend the European cultural and entertainment sector would fail and America’s hold on the collective imagination would grow even stronger. Since the US was contributing to Europe’s defence, it could legitimately demand that its NATO partners buy American armaments. The European defence industry would collapse. Meanwhile the technology deficit would increase, weakening the competitive position of companies like British and German Telecom as they try to move into the advanced information business. The European currencies, which would in this scenario have failed to unite, would be marginalized against the dollar and the yen.

Engaged in economic and perhaps military struggles in Asia, the US might call the Europeans to help by giving preference to US goods over Japanese, which could be justified by citing Japan’s protection of its domestic market, or by going to war to help defend Taiwan against China. If the US encountered serious difficulties in Asia, its demands on Europe would increase. The threat of more measures like the Helms-Burton initiative, a ban on the transfer of US technology or US military withdrawal would be enough to keep the divided Europeans in line.

7. ONE KIND OF FUTURE

Whether dominated or abandoned by a triumphant, indifferent US, Europe’s decline would be inexorable. At first, democratic man would not be much worried and when at last he came to realise that his living standards were dropping, he would have lost the will to struggle. Charles de
Gaulle's Mémoires would lie unread in bookstores; they would, however, be carefully studied in Washington and Beijing.

All Europe's weaknesses would be exacerbated. With youth unemployment running at 50 per cent, schools in big cities would be placed under the control of the Ministries of Defence. Soldiers have already been used to keep pupils in order in France: one can imagine the Foreign Legion’s crack parachute regiments engaged in full-scale war against the graduating class of a Marseilles lycée that had rebelled against the total lack of employment. An élite group of Europeans, employed by US- and Japan-based MNCs (Major NATO Commands) or by NATO, would live in the well-protected centres of capital cities. Outside most people would work in their homes in front of their computers and rarely venture onto the streets where the exclus robbed and pillaged.

Autism and schizophrenia, traditionally considered illnesses, were now normal. As George Orwell had feared, history was nowhere studied but then neither was Orwell. ‘Christian fundamentalism’ was rampant and cults sprang up around charismatic popular music singers and footballers who promised to deliver Europe from evil. There was a posthumous cult of Dwight Eisenhower who was held to have been a European general who drove the Americans out of Germany.

The only ‘civilised’ parts of Europe were the Moslem communities which lived peacefully and industriously following Mohammed’s teachings which had been updated by Turkish thinkers in Frankfurt. Elsewhere, in a Europe ravaged by illnesses spread by bacteria which mutated so rapidly that they fed on the antibiotics used against them, all languages other than English had died out and English itself was pidgin: no future tense because Europe had no future, no subordinate clauses, which imply a complexity of thought of which democratic man was no longer capable, and a vocabulary of 600 words.

8. CONCLUSION

For much of its history Europe has stood, alone and divided, looking out at larger continents. The change in its situation, if any of these old-new threats is realised, is that it would no longer look with confidence. It would confront both countries with superior technology and industry and countries driven to desperation by overpopulation and want. Traditional threats do not die or fade away; they merely change shape and grow worse.

There is, however, no reason why they should not be overcome. To return to the first and, in NATO’s eyes, the most important threat, Russia need not remain an enemy. To offer NATO membership to the Visegrad Four (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) without defining a special relationship between NATO and Russia may retrospectively be seen as an error. While it is probably too late to correct the error, it is still possible to come to an agreement with Russia, viewed as a past and perhaps future military superpower. Such an agreement might take many forms that cannot be spelled out here, but it should recognise the humiliation that many Russians have undergone over the last decade as well as their view that the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) rather than NATO should have become the leading organisation of European security in the 1990s. Patience, modesty, and a willingness to listen rather than to pronounce should become the principles on which all Western organisations deal with Russia. An untraditional response to a traditional threat.

1 This article was presented in December 1996 at the NATO Defense College in Rome at the International Research Seminar on Euro-Atlantic Security, which is held every year. Together with other papers presented at this IRS, this article by Patrick McCarthy will be published by the German Publishing House “Peter Lang” in a monograph entitled “Cooperative Security Arrangements in Europe” in early summer 1997.


4 The extension of the notion of security to non-military issues is a well-established phenomenon. For a discussion of how broadly the term may be used, see Waever, Ole (1994), ‘Insecurity and Identity Unlimited’, paper presented at CERI conference, The European Disorder, September.

5 The Economist, 19 October 1996, p. 87.


7 Judd, Tony (1965), A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe, New York: Hall and Wong, p. 81. The very term ‘Eastern Europe’ has become taboo, as if avoiding the name will Westernise the countries.

8 The Economist, 19 October 1996, p. 126.


11 Needless to say, this is not a balanced account of Russia’s historical relationship with the West but rather a deliberately exaggerated description of Russian fears.

12 See La Repubblica, 23 October 1996. The offer was made two weeks before the US presidential election in Detroit which has a large number of immigrants from Central Europe. Alas, the bear did not grasp the subtleties of US domestic politics and thought that President Clinton meant what he said.

13 George Orwell also considered language important in avoiding violence and coercion. Clear, precise terms work against the invention of threats. An example to avoid is the expression ‘the Moslem world,’ which implies a vast, homogeneous region dominated by its religion. In fact, there are many different kinds of Moslem countries, in some of which religion is weak. We do not speak of the ‘Christian world.’

14 This is my synthesis of speeches made by Turkish delegates at the Seventh Antalya Conference, October 1996. It also takes into account my informal conversations with them. I take responsibility for any misunderstandings and errors.


17 The money and time needed to introduce these languages into the curriculum could be founded by cutting back on the teaching of English.


19 Once again I am exaggerating to make my point but Northern Ireland is the place where Europe’s nightmares come true. Seamus Heaney’s poetry represents the most ‘rational’ attempt to analyse and exorcise the nightmare.


22 For the view that Italy will rely on the US for as long as or even longer than possible, see Harper, John L., ‘Italy’s American Connection: Past, Present, Future,’ The International Spectator, Vol. 31, No. 2, April/June, 1996, p. 85. John L. Harper also feels that a US withdrawal is increasingly unlikely.

23 For a recent opinion, see Quirico, Domenico, ‘La guerra dei burattinai’, La Stampa, 29 October 1996.

24 I wish to thank John L. Harper for reading this paper and suggesting improvements.