Is the Nuclear Cascade Story in the Middle East Real?

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Abstract

In the highly intricate conditions of current global security, the determination and assessment of where the international community is standing at the end of the NPT Review Conference related to the Middle East’s nuclear realities gains importance. For this reason, this paper aims to focus on two important questions. The first is related to the highly debated issue of whether there is any chance of a nuclear cascade becoming a reality in the Middle East assuming that the Iranian nuclear crisis is not been solved and remains in stalemate. The second question tries asks whether some members of the P-5’s new counter-proliferation attempts that are introduced to the Middle East region have any chance of working at all.

Key Words

Ballistic Missile, Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Proliferation, Security Guarantee, NPT, CTBT, FMCT, START, IAEA.

Introduction

In the last decade, two important issues, namely the deadlock in the Iranian nuclear crisis and the increasing demands for nuclear power reactors in the Middle East, have caused the most concern among the members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Western powers have come to the conclusion that unless the international community finds an appropriate means of dealing with these two issues there will be a high probability of having a new wave of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. For this reason, Western capitals, so as to overcome their general non-proliferation concerns related to both the continuing Iranian crisis and the nuclear power plants demands all over the Middle East, have rapidly been trying to find ways of substituting indigenous procurement methods of the nuclear fuel that will be required for the new reactors. However, the international communities’ search for finding a way of formulating a regional or international nuclear fuel bank is a contentious issue from the perspective of the non-nuclear states of the NPT. This highly controversial situation has actually come to the fore as Western
All of the US efforts in nuclear disarmament that have been initiated so far have not dealt with the important unresolved issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
The Obama Administration has given serious thought about the changing dynamics of regional security since these new nuclear aspirant states have come about. While Washington assesses the new dynamics, it has to take into account its new urgent task of extended deterrence in the post-Cold War era where it has deter the enemy as well as assure US allies as well as friends and partners. References to this challenging mission can be found in most of the important US security and defense documents, where an emphasis is placed both on attaining the conditions of a safe, secure and credible US nuclear deterrence capability as well as on strengthening the regional security architectures through available means. In this regard, the government in Washington has in particular devoted the most attention to the regions where there are new and old security concerns, including the Middle East. The main reason for the initiatives mentioned in American national security documents is actually associated with the current government’s perceived security concerns related to the changing dynamics of the 21st century. These new American security concerns, which are very clearly detailed in the “Nuclear Posture Review” of 2010, have also helped in determining the future road map of the US’s nuclear stance. Hence, it would be very beneficial at this point to highlight the Obama Administration’s four basic concerns related to regional security structures, including the Middle East, as evaluated from the perspective of the US’s nuclear posture in 2010: (i)
the first concern is regional and global nuclear proliferation and disarmament anxieties; (ii) the second concern is associated the US’s aim of realizing the deterrence of potential and future nuclear rivalries at global and regional levels; (iii) the third concern is related to assuring Washington’s allies, friends and partners of the US’s role in extended deterrence in different regional security issues; (iv) and, finally, the last concern is related to Washington’s new objective of reviving and if possibly strengthening the traditional non-proliferation regimes. Washington, so as accomplish these ambitious nuclear objectives, has highlighted the importance of attaining and maintaining different capabilities and strategies as options. Under current conditions, it has been stated that the new US nuclear posture would involve situations, such as in the Middle East, in which the US might felt obliged to use all available means of extended deterrence, while in other places there may not be such a need. The introduction of ballistic missile defense and other American non-nuclear capabilities as other countermeasures as part of the US’s extended deterrence in certain regions has surely accelerated the already heated debates about the current credibility of the American security guarantees in such places as the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and Europe.

Under the current global security environment, the determination and assessment of where the international community was standing at the end of the NPT Review Conference of May 2010, which was related to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, becomes important. For this reason, this paper focuses on two very important questions. The first question is related to the highly debated issue of whether there is any chance of the so-called nuclear cascade becoming a reality within the current conditions of the Middle East assuming that the Iranian nuclear crisis is not solved or remains in stalemate. The second question looks at whether some of the P5’s new counter-proliferation measures in the Middle East region have any chance of success in the light of US President Obama’s “zero nuclear weapons” policy. This is why this paper focuses on the general Western concerns of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

**Ballistic Missile Defense: Is It the Best US Instrument for the Realization of “Extended Deterrence” and “Reassurance” in the Middle East?**

In the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2010, ballistic missile defense is mentioned as an important countermeasure against present and future ballistic missile threats facing both American troops in the Middle East and also friends’ and partners’ territories in the region. At the moment it is being introduced as one of the best available instrument to strengthen the US’s extended deterrence in the Middle East.
Actually, the importance given to ballistic missile defense is a bit exaggerated as it is seen as a way of achieving extended deterrence and to create stable and secure regional security complexes around the world, including the Middle East. There is a large amount of academic and technical literature that proves the contrary. However, one should also be careful not to underestimate the increasing importance of ballistic missile defense when it is introduced together with other means of extended deterrence during the process of creating effective and credible conditions for stability in the Middle East. If ballistic missile defense were introduced to Middle East today as part of an effective extended deterrence policy, it could actually accomplish three main aims. First of all, countries in the Middle East that have the capacity for developing nuclear weapons as well as those that already possess ballistic missiles would be deterred from going nuclear or developing more capable missiles. When one focuses on the Iranian situation and raises the question of whether ballistic missile defense could be an effective deterrent against them, the answer is rather debatable. Yet, most experts on this issue agree that missile defense systems could not be expected to be 100% effective in defending against all Iranian missiles. According to this view, there is always going to be the possibility that at least one or more of these Iranian missiles when launched could reach their targets. Considering the current technical deficiencies ballistic missile defense in terms of providing defense, other means of extended deterrence capabilities are likely to be needed to attain credible deterrent against a potential attack in the Middle East. Today, Iran, and to a certain extent Syria, are the main actors in Washington's calculations in the determination of the parameters of the new US extended deterrence for the Middle East. The second aim of providing ballistic missiles defenses to some states in the Middle East is directly related to Washington's determination to provide the best available means of security assurance for its allies and friends there. The basic idea that lies behind this initiative is to prove that American extended deterrence is still valid and credible. Hence, Washington, while trying to give the message that it is serious about its allies' and friends' security concerns in the new Middle East, is actually aiming to ensure that the states of this region will not attempt to acquire nuclear capability on their own, something true even for Iran. All in all, when the US administration decided to introduce the new means of extended deterrence in the Middle East it actually hoped to both attain nuclear disarmament and to strengthen measures of non-proliferation in the region. Thirdly, when the Obama Administration decided to introduce ballistic missile defense to friendly states in the Middle East, it also hoped to dissuade potential nuclear aspirant states in this region both from procurement of improved ballistic capabilities and a nuclear capability. Accordingly, the nuclear aspirant states in the Middle East
are expected to believe that a nuclear capability will not provide them with deterrence. This belief is directly related with the international communities’ efforts at stopping Tehran from acquiring nuclear capability. It is true that the Tehran regime might not be expected to be comfortable with an encirclement of missile defenses against its own missiles. However, due to Iran’s current deficiencies in the realm of conventional weapons inventory, it is unlikely that it will be dissuaded from acquiring more advanced missiles at a time when these missiles are one of the only available means of retaliation left for the Iranian regime. Also, since the Iranian regime continues to lack the means of attaining ballistic missile capabilities on its own, the other alternative means for retaliation left for Iran for countering the growing missile defense encirclement would be to improve its chemical arsenal. So the US expectation that missile defense will stop Iran from procuring missiles is not correct and on the contrary it could trigger the Iranian regime’s drive for accelerating both the means of acquiring better missiles capabilities and developing its chemical weapons arsenal.

These measures on the part of Iran would certainly be in contradiction with the May 2010 NPT Review Conference’s aim of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.

Can the New Nuclear Disarmament Initiatives Be Effective in Getting the States of the Middle East to Accept the New Non-proliferation Measures?

According to the common wisdom in the West, the deadlock between Washington and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear program has had the effect of triggering states in the Middle East to start to develop nuclear power. In some Western circles it is believed that unless this new growing interest in nuclear energy is somehow regulated at the beginning it is likely that nuclear proliferation will become a reality in the region. Therefore, the international community, due to the Iranian nuclear program, has become more concentrated in its efforts to introduce new and strengthened measures to the states of the Middle East with the hope that these non-proliferation rules can in time become applicable to the whole region or at least to certain sub-regions, such as the Gulf. The US administration, so as to realize these non-proliferation objectives in the sub-regions in the Middle East, and then hopefully in the whole region,
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has preferred to pursue a political strategy that involves both global and regional initiatives. This was due to the necessity of overcoming the deteriorated credibility of the NPT’s three pillars: disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the right for the civilian use of nuclear energy. It is true that since the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the international community has started to question the validity of the NPT. So the US administration under President Barack Obama has declared its new “zero nuclear policy” in order to revitalize the NPT’s credibility and to keep the Middle East free from nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Certain important efforts in this regard have already been realized since Obama’s Prague address last year. In this regard, the new START, the declarations at the “New York Security Summit” in 2010 as well as the May 2010 “NPT Review Conference” declarations are important milestones showing that the five nuclear states are now determined and serious in meeting their obligations in nuclear disarmament. As was known, since the 2005 NPT Review conference, the non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT have been rightfully accusing the five nuclear-armed states of not meeting their obligations under Article 6 of the NPT.

All in all, the disarmament initiatives that have been taken both by the US and other members of the P-5 on the global stage have the objective of assuring the nuclear have-nots of the merits of accepting and implementing strengthened nuclear non-proliferation measures at the regional level, in this case the Middle East. According to the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review, the American government wants to prevent the rise of new nuclear states anywhere in the world. Washington has sped up all its efforts in this regard and has tried with every means to reassure friendly regimes in the Middle East to remain non-nuclear. That is why after the new START agreement was signed, the Obama Administration has put major emphasis on its ratification. In this way the Obama Administration has hoped to guarantee that Washington's newly gained record in disarmament would continue for some time in the future. With this determination, the US has decided to take the lead of the P-5 in both reassuring the nuclear have-nots of the NPT that they are not only taking initiatives launched at the global stage related to the field of nuclear disarmament but also strengthening US security guarantees to the states of the Middle East, including the Gulf. All in all, Washington feels obliged to give assurance to friends and partners in the region as the current Iranian nuclear crisis remains in impasse and as the Middle East still lacks the means for a comprehensive regional security system. In this regard, the US government has taken every opportunity to prove its sincerity in both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Despite this, Washington seems to fall short in assuring most of the non-nuclear states in the Middle East about its current
initiatives. In this regard, among the Gulf States, the UAE continues to be the only exception, as shown by Dubai’s acceptance of the new non-proliferation measures stated in the 123 Agreement.

New Nuclear Power Reactors in the Middle East and Current Western Non-proliferation Concerns: How Serious is the Problem at Hand?

Actually, both the US’s and European’s anxiety over Middle Eastern states’ renewed interest in civilian nuclear power has been evident since 2006 and stems from the West’s previous negative experiences with non-proliferation in this region and elsewhere. The first incidence of this was the IAEA’s discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program in 1991, continued with North Korea going nuclear in 2006, and includes the current unresolved Iranian nuclear crisis. The current situation in the Middle East, where most states lack nuclear (uranium) enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities, creates a suitable environment for the P5 states to construct new and strengthened non-proliferation norms applicable to the region. The nuclear states seem to prefer to achieve this aim either within the NPT or outside it. In this regard some European states, such as France, and the US have already put forward new non-proliferation initiatives in the hope that these will convince the nuclear-aspirant states not to have indigenous nuclear fuel cycle development. Since most of the states in the Middle East are at the initial stages of attaining nuclear power, the US authorities believe that the implementation of new non-proliferation measures has greater chance in some of the sub-regions, like Gulf, than in other regions that have political and security problems. The main expectation of the West is based on the idea that since the UAE has voluntarily accepted new non-proliferation measures it will act as precedent in the Gulf and lead the way in the Middle East region and ensure that the whole region is free of uranium enrichment and processing. Western powers hope to overcome the current nuclear proliferation problem of the Middle East in the future, but till then they hope at best to manage this situation.

In general, some Western capitals and P5 countries have chosen two related methods to achieve the new strengthened non-proliferation objectives. Firstly, Western actors have tried to gain the assurance of the non-nuclear countries’ agreement to not indigenously produce nuclear fuel, which is allowed according to Article 4 of the NPT, through the signing of nuclear energy cooperation treaties with them. Secondly, the West in general and some of the members of P5 in particular have already signed or hope to sign agreements to establish a secure, safe and constant supply of the fuel
through the establishment of fuel banks. However, the debate over the various fuel bank schemes between the two sides of the NPT Treaty—namely among the nuclear-haves and have-nots—has become contentious. As can be assumed, there remains important concerns behind these debates: (i) first of all, some of these non-nuclear countries are opposed to a fuel bank as they are concerned that it might somehow undermine their right of acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, though this has already been denied by the IAEA; (ii) moreover, some of these non-nuclear countries are starting to worry about the possibility that some P5 countries may attempt to use the political and economic power that will result from their grip on the control of the supply of fuel for their own future political purposes; and (iii) most important of all, some of these non-nuclear states are convinced that in the case of them choosing the fuel bank option there would always be the possibility of risks. For instance, by accepting the use of a nuclear fuel bank, these countries are actually accepting becoming dependent on others for their supply nuclear fuel. This opens them to certain risks related to fluctuating market prices together with other negative effects. Consequently, some of the non-nuclear states have come to the conclusion that unless the conditions related to the proposed fuel banks remain unchanged, their efforts of overcoming the negative effects of being an petroleum and natural gas dependent country through nuclear energy will not work.

In reality, some of the P5 countries hope to realize three aims by finding an acceptable solution to the current fuel cycle problem of the states in the Middle East region: (i) first, the nuclear-have states hope to strengthen the already weakened credibility of the non-proliferation regime by proposing this new nuclear fuel bank option, which aims to ensure a reliable and secure supply of fuel; (ii) secondly, some members of the P5 are also hoping to become one of the main nuclear fuel suppliers to the Middle East through the regional nuclear fuel banks; (iii) and lastly, the nuclear-haves are again hoping to bring forth a legitimate alternative way of acquiring nuclear fuel with the creation of these fuel banks, in contrast to the current illegitimate Iranian option.

**The Role of the US Extended Deterrence Strategy in the Current American Non-proliferation Policy in the Middle East**

Western powers are in fact trying to persuade the countries in the Middle East to accept the terms of a new deal that involves strengthening the non-proliferation measures in the 1970s-era NPT by offering the non-nuclear Middle Eastern powers reasons to not take advantage of their right to indigenously produce the nuclear fuel cycle. This is why the US administration
has tried to present more incentive-based strengthened non-proliferation measures in the Middle East region in general and the Gulf region in particular. In this regard, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks in her Bangkok speech is a good example of this new US policy. In this speech, Clinton, when talking about the trustworthiness about the US’s deterrence and security commitments in the Middle East region, gave two important messages. First, she warned potential adversaries of the US in the Middle East about acquiring nuclear capability. The American administration made it clear that these nuclear aspirant states will never be allowed to acquire regional dominance. Secondly, US wanted to assure its allies and friends in the Middle East that the US will continue with its security commitments in the region and not allow them to become subject to potential coercive influence from regional adversaries. Actually, the US administration, by re-announcing the continuing credibility of its security commitments to the states in the Middle East, also aimed to prevent these states’ preferences to quickly go nuclear. Moreover, when the new Nuclear Posture Review was declared in 2010, the US accordingly declared that it will not resort to the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are parties to the NPT. But an important exception was made for those states that have violated or breached the NPT, namely Iran and North Korea. What is strikingly important is that the US, while deciding to give new negative security assurances to states that signed the NPT, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture simultaneously issued a “warning” that included the threat of force against potential nuclear aspirant states.

If one summarizes the US’s objective for its extended deterrence and assurance policy in the Middle East, on the one hand the US has intended to send a clear message to potential adversarial states that Washington will never allow conditions to develop in which benefits would be expected to be gained by potential nuclear-aspirant states. In this regard, another important message for the states in the Middle East is that there is no rational reason for them to develop their own nuclear deterrent capability against Iran as they would be well protected by the US security umbrella. So far, these messages do not seem to have been accepted by the states in the Middle East region, with the exception of some states in the Gulf region. In this regard, the recently signed 123 Agreement with the UAE, for instance, can be seen as a sign of success for the Western nuclear non-proliferation policies in the Gulf sub-
region. But, on the other hand, some states in the Middle East like Egypt have stood against these kinds of deals, although the UAE voluntarily signed it, stating that they are in violation of the nuclear have-nots inalienable rights under Article 4 of the NPT.

Despite some criticism about the new non-proliferation initiatives in the Middle East in general, some countries have already preferred to sign nuclear cooperation agreements with different members of the P5 countries under the condition that their rights under Article 4 of the NPT remain. Moreover, some of these non-nuclear states have brought up a new proposal that aims to avoid the likely negative proliferation side effect of the plans to build new nuclear power plants around the world, including the Middle East. According to this new proposal, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) members would place requirements on states before the transfer of nuclear technology. The main prerequisite would be that the non-nuclear states of the NPT would be expected to implement the Additional Protocol. In this way, the possibility of these non-nuclear states using their civilian nuclear energy programs to develop nuclear weapons capability would be constrained if not totally prevented.

All in all, with all these new preemptive precaution strategies, the international community is hoping to avoid one of the basic problems of the NPT that has been resulting from the “loophole” present under Article 4 of the treaty. The P5 countries especially want to ensure some means of control over the highly problematic issue of compliance. Yet, all of these measures so far do not seem to be enough to overcome the important problem of non-compliance with the NPT.

Conclusion

Today the already deteriorated trust relationship that was embodied in the 1970 bargain in the NPT is affecting the current and changing dynamics of the nuclear situation in the Middle East. Since the 1990s, the NPT has come under heavy strain. Since its inception, the main problem with the NPT has been related to the question of whether the treaty’s ultimate goal was disarmament or not. Once again this important and contentious issue has gained importance due to new arguments related to the future of both the NPT and the entire non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the new Western concern over the unregulated spread of civilian nuclear fuel cycle programs in the Middle East and the existing weaponization risks that are associated with them has naturally hastened the deteriorating trust between the two different status states in the NPT. What is more important is that within this context, the free-riding status of some of the non-signatories states of the NPT has created problems for the current fragile situation in the Middle East.

Before the NPT May 2010 Review Conference, all of these developments led
the international community to further question the credibility of the NPT in terms of whether it would be a reliable non-proliferation tool in the future. That is why the Americans, knowing the difficulty of persuading non-nuclear states to accept strengthened non-proliferation measures without building trust between the two sides, has decided to accelerate the implementation of President Obama’s “zero nuclear policy”. In this regard, the new START, the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in New York, as well as the decision to convene a conference in 2012 on a “Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone” and a call for Israel to become a party to the NPT were all efforts to give the image that the West is now taking serious its Article 6 responsibilities under the NPT.³⁰ It is true that following the May 2010 “NPT Review Conference”, there was a growing awareness of the need to maintain the deal made in the 1970s among the nuclear and non-nuclear states in relation to Articles 4 and 6 of the NPT. However, developments in other important areas related to creating a stable and secure nuclear situation in the Middle East are lagging, such as in universalizing the Additional Protocol, improving the IAEA safeguards agreement, creating binding enforcement rules for the violations of the NPT, meeting the demand for fuel supply clarifying the terms under which a state may withdraw from the NPT,³¹ and, most important of all, creating conditions suitable for the development of regional arms-control mechanisms.

Today, the nuclear states of the NPT, and especially the US through its ambitious “zero nuclear policy”, is actually aiming to send an important message to the states of the Middle East that Washington and some of its allies are now ready and in favor of cooperating with them in the area of nuclear energy as long as it is based on transparency and verification, which is in direct contrast with the current Iranian example. So today, the international community, having recognized the NPT’s loss of credibility, is trying to revitalize the treaty in the face of newly rising nuclear security threats both in the Middle East and beyond. As a result, it is clear that today the international community is once again about to go through a bargaining process to create new norms of behavior, a process similar to that in the 1970s when the NPT was agreed. In this new norm re-building process, the states of the Middle East, in addition to states in Asia as well as those that did not sign the NPT, will be involved. During this new bargaining process, the two sides should be very careful when they are dealing with the delicate balance that was once built into the NPT under Articles 4 and 6.

Since its inception, the main problem with the NPT has been related to the question of whether the treaty’s ultimate goal was disarmament or not.
Since the inception of the NPT, the main argument has been about whether the non-nuclear states of the NPT are equal with the five nuclear-armed states. Hence, in this new norm-building process in the NPT, a great deal of attention should first of all be given to the issue of the nuclear fuel cycle. During this process, the nuclear armed states should be careful to take the other states’ legitimate concerns into account so that they will not feel inferior. Another issue that is related with how nuclear fuel will be supplied, an issue that directly affects all the states of the Middle East region.

Additionally, if one tries to assess the nuclear disarmament steps that have been accomplished so far by the nuclear-armed states under the NPT, it is clear that these steps are still at the preliminary stage. In view of the fact that all of the five nuclear-armed countries still continue to rely on nuclear deterrence as part of their national security doctrines, the new disarmament initiatives that have been launched both at the sub-regional level as well as at the global level do not seem to be enough to persuade the non-nuclear states to accept further strengthened non-proliferation measures. For this reason, the future of both the CTBT and FMCT agreements are important not only from a psychological stand point, as it could help mend the deteriorated trust relationship between the two sides of the NPT, but also in laying out the most suitable conditions for furthering nuclear cooperation between the two sides.
Endnotes


9 The currently proposed new strengthened nuclear non-proliferation measures by the western members of P-5 are more or less the same. These newly introduced measures on the one hand emphasize the need for taking precautions against the proliferation risks involved with the new for nuclear power reactors in the Middle East. And the western powers in general, while trying to take these preventive measures with the aim of stopping likely proliferation risks around the world, including Middle East, don’t seem to be much concerned about the delicate issue that is related with the non-nuclear members’ of the NPT unalienable Article 4 right to develop nuclear energy for civilian purposes. On the other hand, in China’s National Defense 2010 Document, while the effectiveness and universality of the international non-proliferation regime is encouraged to be upheld and enhanced, simultaneously it stated that the international community should ensure fairness and prevent discrimination in international non-proliferation efforts, and hence strike a balance between non-proliferation and the peaceful use of science and technology and abandon double standards. In the pursuit of these aims, China has stressed the use of political and diplomatic means. See, “China’s National Defense 2010 Document”, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm, [last visited 3 August 11]. When one assesses the
Russian Federation’s attitude, despite Russia’s some divergent opinions in the fields of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation with the west in general, Moscow’s recent behavior in the last couple of years, particularly its acceptance of the 2009 US-initiated swap agreement as well as its acceptance of the 4th round of UN sanctions against Iran, it can be regarded as changed. That is why Moscow’s recent stand can be understood as being of a more of a cooperative one which is more in conformity with the westerns’ new non-proliferation attitudes. See, Joseph Ciricione, “Strategic Turn: New US and Russian Views on Nuclear Weapons”, New America Foundation, at http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/strategic_turn, [last visited 3 August 2011].


14 “The Arms-Dynamic Peace Maker: Ballistic Missile”.

15 Ibid.


17 However, most of the states of the Middle East have explained their new demand for nuclear power as for diversifying their energy sources. These states have said that they want to overcome their continuing and increasing dependence on oil and gas.


22 Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Programmes”, pp.5-165.

23 Ibid.


26 The linked concepts of extended deterrence and security guarantees are nothing new to American security strategy. During the Cold War, the United States’ commitment to defend Europe was operationalized through a serious of extended deterrent commitments that included the basing of nuclear weapons in Europe that could be used in the event of a Soviet attack. In Europe, the United States and its NATO allies eventually constructed a “seamless” web of conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat a Soviet invasion. See, Jamea A. Russel, “Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf”, International Analyst Network, at http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=329 [last visited 22 January 2011].

27 The United States, European Union, Turkey, Australia, South Korea, and other states have proposed that the providers of nuclear technology and material in the 45 member Nuclear Suppliers Group should be requiring that any state receiving this kind of cooperation implement the Additional Protocol. See, George Perkovich, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead”, Endowment for International Peace, at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22297 [last visited 10 September 2010].

28 The United States and other states and entities do care about realizing non-proliferation in our time, and hence that is why International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) major programs aims to reduce nuclear proliferation risks all over the world. As it is known, the IAEA is charged with ensuring that nuclear materials and related activities are used for exclusively peaceful purposes. However, after the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons efforts in the early 1990s, the institution has compelled the 40-plus states on the IAEA’s board of governors to acknowledge that its safeguards system needed to be strengthened. Finally, after years of negotiations the 1977 the Additional Protocol was accepted, which required states to notify the IAEA of plans to build new nuclear facilities, to provide blue prints in advance, to declare nuclear fuel-cycle-related research and development activities, and to inform the IAEA of all trade in sensitive nuclear technology and material. Moreover, the Additional Protocol also grants IAEA inspectors greater access to nuclear facilities on short notice and allows them to take environmental samples to better detect possible violations. Unfortunately, 104 (of the 194) states still have not implemented this protocol. Among them are Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United States, Venezuela, and Vietnam. However, these states, as all others, are entitled to nuclear cooperation as long as they remain compliant with safeguards and
general non-proliferation obligations. See, Perkovich, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead”.


30 Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, “Nükleer Silahların Geleceği Ne Olacak?”, *Görüş*, No. 64 (October 2010), pp. 74-76.

31 Article X of the NPT permits a state to withdraw “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country”. See, “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Powers (NPT)”, at http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/npt [last visited 01 September 2010]. When it was negotiated back in 1968, the authors of the treaty did not specify what sort of events and interests would justify withdrawal or how the treaty’s ultimate enforcement body, the United Nations Security Council, should treat a bid to withdraw. In 2003 North Korea exercised this option and is the only state that has done so far. See Darly Kimball, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at a Glance”, *Arms Control Today*, at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact [last visited 6 August 2010].