WAS CYPRUS EVER REALLY UNITED?

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INTRODUCTION

It is easy to take the stance that “Partition is right” or “Partition is wrong” without carefully considering the reasons leading to such division.

The Cyprus problem could be examined as a test case, which has been resolved by dividing the island and its two main communities. To understand how the formula of division worked in Cyprus, it is necessary first to look at the situation there, both pre- and post-Independence.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND PARTITION

Prior to the 1960 Agreements and Independence, partition of the island between Turkey and Greece was a British proposition, based on the right of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities to separate self-determination. Having deported Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader who was involved in terrorism, to the Seychelles on 9 March 1956, Britain prepared the Radcliffe Plan for self-rule for Cyprus, which was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. During the introduction of this new plan in Parliament on 19 December 1956, the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, underlined the fact that “for Turkey, Cyprus is an offshore island covering the approach to its southern ports”.

Earlier in the same debate, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, had been more precise and stated openly that both communities would be given freedom to decide their own future which could lead to partition. He stated the following:
“When the time comes for this review, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty’s Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.”

This statement caused consternation in Athens, and Evangelos Averoff, the Greek Foreign Minister, admitted that the opposition leaders of the British Labour party had also endorsed this policy of separate self-determination. Referring to a private talk between George Seferiades, the Greek Ambassador in London, and Aneurin Bevan, one of the Labour Party’s most forceful and influential members who had consistently given the Greeks strong support over the Cyprus question, Averoff revealed that Bevan told Seferiades that “the Macmillan Government might suddenly withdraw the British troops, limit itself to two bases and call on Turkey to take over the whole area north of 35th parallel [which passes through and divides Nicosia] and Greece to take the area south of that line.”

British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, introduced his partnership plan based on condominium in 1958 and declared “Greeks of Greece and Greeks of Cyprus either accept my plan or I will partition the island”. Evaluating Macmillan’s closing speech in Parliament, Averoff concludes the British Government was quite prepared to revert, if necessary, to its policy of partition, announced in December 1956.

Meanwhile inter-communal clashes during the summer of 1958 resulted in Turkish Cypriot migration to safer areas in order to save their lives, thus abandoning their houses and properties to Greek Cypriot hands.

TURKISH POLICY OF COMPROMISE

Even at that stage, in August 1958 when the prospect of partition was so visible, the Turkish Government accepted the Macmillan Plan, stating that they were convinced that the idea of partition and the idea of partnership, put forward by the British Government, were not incompatible, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, told the British Ambassador that “his conception of partition was not to draw a line across the island but to group the Turkish urban and rural populations into cantons with their separate administration.”
Zorlu also assured the British Ambassador, Sir James Bowker, that the British plan for tridominium, which meant administrative rather than geographical partition, was fully accepted by Turkey. This attitude from Turkey, at a time when physical partition was seriously considered, manifestly expressed how flexible and compromising was Turkish policy for a partnership agreement which would improve Greco-Turkish relations and maintain peace and cooperation between the two peoples of Cyprus.

The Macmillan Plan, the implementation of which started smoothly on 1 October 1958, had alarmed the Greek side because this plan was the beginning of an experiment in sharing the sovereignty of Cyprus with Turkey and Greece, on condition that Britain should retain its military bases and facilities. According to Averoff, if that experiment failed, the idea of separate self-determination leading to partition would be realised.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION: RESTRICTED INDEPENDENCE

This was the turning point in efforts to reach a settlement, and seeing that partition was clearly not far away, Makarios and the Greek Government decided to accept instead a bi-communal, co-founder partnership republic, sharing power and sovereignty with the Turkish Cypriot side, within a restricted independence, under the guarantorship of Britain, Turkey and Greece.

It was hoped that with the achievement of independence and with the provisions of the Agreements and the Constitution establishing both a carefully devised balance between the two motherlands vis-à-vis Cyprus and full cooperation in partnership for the two Cypriot communities, the Cyprus problem would be settled for good and would no longer be a headache or cause for concern within the Western Alliance and between the two motherlands.

The Zürich and London Agreements, worked out between Ankara, Athens and London and accepted and signed by the leaders of both Cypriot peoples and by the three Guarantor Powers, provided that the state of Cyprus should be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and Vice-President Turkish, elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively. Executive authority was to be vested in the President and Vice-President, who would have the right of final veto and the right to return the decisions of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.

These and other clauses of the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus laid down the principles of political equality of both communities in a partnership state of functional
That was the Cyprus Republic which emerged in 1960 but, alas, it was not to last.

A STEP FORWARD FOR ENOSIS

The Greek Cypriot side had struggled for more than a century not for independence but for enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece. Their efforts were fuelled by the Megali Idea, a dream cherished by Greece that some day all foreign-dominated Greek lands would be redeemed and be part of a Greater Greece. As a matter of fact, the island of Cyprus had never been part of Greece or ruled by Hellenic Greece, but because the Greeks of Cyprus had absorbed this Pan-Hellenic ideology, considered themselves Greek, historically and culturally, and wanted to be Greeks in some much wider sense (Hellenes) than that merely of Greek-speaking Cypriots, the Megali Idea had immense appeal.

The campaign for enosis started to gather momentum after a revolt against British Colonial rule in 1931. After the Second World War, the Greeks demanded self-determination leading to enosis. Politicians and Church leaders organised an unlawful plebiscite – no secret ballot, you had to sign on the dotted line in full view of everyone, against the declaration saying, ‘I accept enosis’ or ‘I do not accept enosis’. As a result, of those who signed the books, it was claimed 96% were in favour of union with Greece. This was followed by the establishment of the EOKA terrorist organisation, whose campaign of violence was initially aimed against the British but soon spread to include the Turkish Cypriots as well.

But ridding themselves of British Colonial rule was not enough, even independence was not enough, because their ultimate aspiration of enosis was not realised.

Here are a few quotations from Kyriacos C. Markides, a well-known Greek Cypriot academician and Professor of Sociology at the University of Maine in the USA, concerning the attitude of the Greek Cypriot leadership:

“From the very inception of independence, the Greek Cypriots never concealed their unhappiness with the constitutional set-up or their readiness to proceed with amendments in due time. Some of them, both within and outside the government, considered independence not as a terminal stage, but as another step toward the realization of Enosis. Much of the legitimacy accorded to Makarios was based on the assumption that in reality he had never given up the struggle for union with Greece and that the acceptance of independence was nothing more than a tactical move that would eventually lead towards the incorporation of Cyprus within the Greek nation.”
“The Turks, fully aware of this state of affairs…remained suspicious…which tended to divide them even further from their Greek compatriots.”

“The prolongation of the conflict set the two ethnic groups, the two communities further apart, socially, culturally, politically and economically.”

Markides also underlines the fact that there had been a substantial section of the Turkish Cypriots who hoped and wanted to co-exist and even integrate with the Greek Cypriot Community within the partnership state; whereas within the Greek Cypriot side, no such group ever existed, extending their hand to the Turkish Cypriot community to wage a joint struggle against the colonialists, with the sole aim of establishing a bi-communal independent state. On the contrary, the Church, Greek Cypriot leaders, and organizations, both left- and right-wing, persistently advocated and demanded the union of the island with Greece, ignoring the very existence of their Turkish compatriots and their feelings towards a movement based on Greek expansionism.

TURKS INSISTED ON FULL APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Markides states in several parts of his book that within the Greek community there was a high degree of fragmentation that prevented successful accommodation with the Turkish Cypriot side. However, during the 3 years’ duration of the co-founder partnership state of the Cyprus Republic, there were no politically motivated groups among the Turkish Cypriot community asking for the dissolution of independence in favour of union with Turkey or for partition of the island; not a single statement was made by Turkish Cypriot leaders, political parties or other organisations demanding anything other than the full application of the Cyprus Agreements and the Constitution, which provided a single, united, bi-communal Republic.

In 1960-61, the first Turkish Ambassador, Emin Dyrvana, a former army colonel, had been regularly and insistently instructed by Ankara to urge and, if necessary, even press the Turkish Cypriot leaders not to create any problem in the smooth functioning of the Constitution; but of course, at the same time, he urged the Greek leaders, and Makarios himself when he paid an official visit to Ankara in 1962, not to create obstacles for the full application of the Agreements and the Constitution. Ankara stated firmly that Turkey had no intentions over Cyprus other than seeing the co-partnership independent Cyprus Republic become a success, a peaceful country and a bridge of friendship between the two motherlands.

British Official Documents, now released under the 30 Years Restriction Rule, confirm Turkish support for the bi-communal Cyprus Republic.
On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot side never accepted the Turkish Cypriots as equals and co-partners in the bi-communal state and tried both politically and militarily to destroy the state of affairs created by the Agreements, international treaties and the Constitution. During the years 1964-1974, when they enjoyed all powers of the state, having attacked the Turkish Cypriots and forced them out of all organs of the state, usurping Turkish Cypriot constitutional rights based on international law, they had nothing to fear from an agreement by which the Turkish Community would be given autonomy in a state run by the Greeks. Even so, Makarios rejected a solution reached after 5 years of negotiations between Rauf Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, and Glafcos Clerides, the President of the House of Representatives, who were conducting inter-communal talks on behalf of their communities.9

EVEN AUTONOMY FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS WAS REJECTED

The Greek Cypriot side not only rejected autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots within their enclaves, reduced to a mere 3% of the island following the Greek onslaught in 1963-64, but also took a firm stand against any kind of federation, even when the Junta in Athens and EOKA B threatened to demolish the independence of the island by force of arms. However, if agreement had been reached on giving autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots or if a federation with a strong central government, as envisaged and offered by Ecevit’s Turkish Government a few months before the 1974 coup, had been agreed by the Greeks, the island would have been saved from the consequences of the coup and the ensuing tragedies which led to its current division.

In his memoirs, Cyprus: My Deposition, Clerides states openly that the decision by Makarios not to accept autonomy for Turkish Cypriots even after the concessions made by the Turkish side, “sealed his fate and that of Cyprus. The die was cast and the worst followed.”

“The most important and fatal meeting I had with Makarios occurred on 12th December 1972. It was fatal because had I succeeded in convincing Makarios to accept my point of view, events in Cyprus would have taken an entirely different course. The coup would have been avoided, the invasion of Cyprus would not have taken place, and Cyprus would have been spared its devastating effects, the thousands killed and wounded, the refugees, the hundreds of missing persons and the destruction of its economy. It is a fact of history, which cannot be denied, that the uncompromising attitude of Makarios on the issue of local government prevented a solution of the Cyprus problem in December 1972.”10
Markides, the Greek Cypriot sociologist, having witnessed both EOKA terrorism in the 1950s and the military violence of 1974, concluded that it was the Greek Cypriot leaders, particularly “the charismatic leadership of Makarios who prevented the growth of viable governmental structures that could have offered effective resistance to the attempts to destroy the Republic by EOKA B and the Greek military government.”

He states that when Ecevit proposed federation for a settlement Clerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiator, withdrew from the negotiating table until further explanations were given by Turkey.11

THE LACK OF A COMMON CAUSE

Markides states that, in order to be strongly conducive to the establishment and maintenance of cooperation among elites in a fragmented political system, first there should be a “multiple balance of power among the subcultures” to the extent that no one group could ever have a chance of becoming the dominant power centre. In dual systems, for example, as was the case in Cyprus, the leaders of both subcultures (Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities) may hope to attain their aims by domination rather than cooperation.

A second factor, which might maintain cooperation, is the existence of external threats. But in the case of Cyprus, far from uniting the two subcultures, this split them further apart. The most striking example was the 15 July 1974 Enosis Coup and subsequent Turkish military intervention in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee.

An outside threat unites people only when all the parties share a common cause and commit themselves to the maintenance of society, the Constitution and the established order.

THE WHOLE AND ONLY OBJECTIVE

Having destroyed the bi-communal partnership, the only objective of the Greek Cypriot side has been to establish a Greek state, dominated by them. The partnership did not work for the reasons explained above and, in accordance with the Akritas Plan, the bi-communal Republic was destroyed, the Turkish Cypriot partners were forced out of all organs of the state, one quarter of them had to evacuate their homes, abandon their villages and all their belongings and take refuge in safer Turkish areas, living in tents for more than 10 years. The Greek Cypriot embargoes imposed on Turkish quarters and the violation of their basic human rights destroyed all hopes of a new settlement under terms similar to those agreed in 1959-1960.
However, they have not been able to force the Turkish Cypriots to abandon their constitutional and treaty rights and submit to Greek hegemony.

Markides underlines the fact that, following the 1963-64 breakdown of the Republic and after Turkish Cypriot constitutional rights were usurped, “Greek Cypriots enjoyed complete control of the Cyprus Republic … and this only helped the Hellenization of the state.”

Cyprus had become a totally Greek state in which the previous partner was forced to accept minority rights, by dint of isolation from the outside world, by economic embargoes, searches at check-points, abductions, denial of communications, restrictions on freedom of travel even between the Turkish sectors, and other violations of basic human rights.

The Greek Cypriot side thus openly violated and defied not only the Constitution and international law, but also the European Human Rights Convention.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots themselves enjoyed all the economic and political benefits provided by misinterpreting the UN Security Council’s 4 March 1964 (186) Resolution and, as such, made use of every advantage of being recognised as the “Cyprus Government”, albeit illegally according to the rule of law and the Agreements. Consequently, the Greek Cypriot economy developed to the level of Israel and, while the enclaved Turkish Cypriot community suffered all kinds of poverty due to Greek oppression, the Greek Cypriots enjoyed a western European level of per capita income, more than twice that of Greece. Thus, the conflict, the breakdown of the Republic and the disruption of the state order created by the 1960 Agreements, favoured the Greek Cypriots both politically and economically.

**FRICTION AMONG THE GREEKS**

The paradox here was that this situation, together with the economic and political superiority of the Greek Cypriot people, instead of strengthening the façade of being a unitary, independent state created more animosity and rivalry between those sections demanding immediate enosis and those who wanted to wait for an opportune moment. This friction among the Greeks caused political division and civil war, when Grivas himself founded EOKA-B and started a new wave of terrorism aimed at immediate enosis by destroying the Cyprus Republic.
It was a terrible dilemma and there was no consensus among the opposing groups of Greek Cypriots on how to solve the Cyprus problem itself. Enosists started to oppose the long-running inter-communal talks, questioning the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Glafcos Clerides. Both the Socialists, headed by Dr. Lyssarides, and right-wing, pro-enosis groups denounced the talks between Denktas and Clerides “for to them any agreement would have spelled the final burial of union with Greece. Greek terrorist organisations emerged in fact to frustrate any attempts at a compromise.”

REVELATIONS BY CLERIDES

Clerides says the following:

“Finally … I wish to explain why I have referred to the Republic of Cyprus as the reluctant republic. It is because neither the Greek Cypriots, nor the Turkish Cypriots wanted or fought for the independence of their country. The Greek Cypriots wanted and fought to unite Cyprus with Greece and the Turkish Cypriots to unite it with Turkey, or at least to divide it between Greece and Turkey.”

… It [the Cyprus Republic] was born and remained without a national anthem and with a flag … which neither the Greeks nor the Turks considered to be their own flag and for the glory of which no one wanted to die.

In the same preface, Glafcos Clerides states that he belongs to the Greek Cypriot community (not to the Cypriot nation, which had never existed) whose age-long aspirations for union with Greece led it into an armed struggle, in which he admits to having participated, initially against the British and then on to violent conflict with the Turkish Cypriot community before the birth of the reluctant Republic of Cyprus.

Among his revelations are the following:

“The objective analyst of the early independence period will not find it difficult to discover convincing evidence that the Greek Cypriots in their overwhelming majority remained faithful to the Enosis ideal as before independence.”
“Thus, through frequent public statements on the part of the Greek Cypriots, the impression was created that independence was only a stepping stone towards the ultimate goal of Enosis. Such a pattern of behaviour by the Greek Cypriots had a devastating effect both internationally and internally.”15

Clerides adds this:

“… Makarios … as the Archbishop of Cyprus, brought up in the tradition of the Greek Orthodox Church, and the Ethnarch, upholding the role of the guardian of Hellenism entrusted to him by 400 years of history, … was the most unlikely candidate to exchange the role of national leader for that of a statesman President of a bi-communal state and thus gain the trust of the … island’s Turkish population which was badly needed if the experiment was to have a chance of success.”

“ … he used (prematurely) his newly acquired power of President of the Republic to press for constitutional reforms, which entailed abolishing some of the excessive rights granted by the treaties [to the Turkish Cypriots], … overstating the case of the unworkability of the constitution.”16

It is distressing to see that even Clerides has not learned a lesson from those mistakes he rightly criticised and now, as the leader of the Greek Cypriots, he follows a similarly misguided policy by insisting on acting against international law, by promoting “Cyprus’s” application to join the EU, and spending a substantial sum of money on sophisticated offensive weapons, including MIL MI-35 attack helicopters.

DOUBLE ENOSIS

After the 1963-64 onslaught against the Turkish Cypriot people, the Anglo-American alliance first tried to convince Turkey to accept enosis in exchange for a small rocky Greek island in the Aegean. When this was rejected by the Turkish Government, who insisted on the continuation of independence and implementation of the Cyprus Agreements, Dean Acheson, the former US Secretary of State, was appointed to mediate and resolve the problem on the basis of “Double Enosis” which envisaged a large military base for Turkey covering the whole of the Karpas peninsula and the eastern part of the Mesaoria Plain.

This Anglo-American sponsored plan to settle the situation caused by the 1963-64 Greek Cypriot attacks, by giving one part of the island to Turkey under the guise of a Base, undeniably proposed a kind of partition, without actually referring to it as such.
“CYPRUS” DIDN’T STAND A CHANCE OF SURVIVING

Many neutral academicians worldwide have said that they have no option but to conclude that the new State had no chance of surviving as a partnership Republic, in view of the fact that the Greek Cypriot side prepared themselves, both politically and militarily, to dissolve the Republic right from the moment independence was declared.

Professor Thomas Ehrlich stated that, “the evident desire of the Archbishop by 1963, and no doubt even before, was to terminate the entire 1960 settlement and to devise a new arrangement that would eliminate both the Turkish Cypriot power and all authority of the Guarantor Powers over the island’s destiny.”17

The secret Greek Cypriot army, which initially was formed by a triumvirate of Makarios’s most active aides, Glafkos Clerides, Tassos Papadopoulos and Polycarpos Yorgadjis, and which was trained by Greek Army officers stationed in Cyprus, together with the private armies of Dr. Vassos Lyssarides and Nicos Sampson, and hundreds of Greeks who were enrolled as special constables and given guns at police stations, started their onslaught in December 1963 in accordance with the Akritas Plan. This inexorably started the effective ethnic division of the island; within a week, main towns, particularly the capital city of Nicosia, were divided into Turkish and Greek sectors.

The British Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, who rushed to Cyprus to stop Greek atrocities, headed a joint Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot delegation to work out a ceasefire agreement. He was present when Major General Peter Young, commander of the British troops on the island, drew the line on the map of Nicosia, which would divide the city, still known today as the Green Line because he used a green Army map marker.

At a seminar in London a few years ago, Britain’s Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon commented as follows:

“No one who lived as I did in Cyprus in the 1960s will forget what was happening then. To my mind it was an attempt at the systematic elimination of one part of the community. It was ethnic cleansing before that phrase came into vogue in the Western Media.”18
And Professor Pierre Oberling of Hunter College, New York observed that,

“The attempts to carry out the Akritas Plan almost completed the physical separation between the two communities.

…the Turkish Cypriots needed no prompting to desert their burning homes or abandon villages where they lived in constant fear of being massacred. It must be added that it was in the interest of the Greek Cypriot villagers to force their Turkish Cypriot neighbours to move since they could then seize their homes, fields and orchards, and that consequently many of them did their best to encourage the exodus.”19

UNDERESTIMATING TURKISH RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

In an article which appeared in the Athens newspaper, Eleftherotipia, on 13 August 1999, Peter Loizou, Professor of Anthropology at the London School of Economics, whose father was a Greek Cypriot, stated:

“Even if the preconditions for a multicultural, multinational attempt are prepared in advance, chances of its success are non-existent, because the problem of the co-existence of the two communities in Cyprus is not a technical one. The final solution of this problem is related to the acceptance of the right of the other to exist. … It is evident that on many occasions the feeling of insecurity felt by the Turkish Cypriots against their neighbours is considered to be unimportant or is utterly disregarded in political speeches delivered in Greece as well as in the Greek Cypriot part of Cyprus.”

“The biggest shortcoming of the Greek Cypriots is the fact that the members of EOKA-B who have committed crimes and aggression against civilian Turkish Cypriots have not been brought before justice.”

“In the final analysis, everyone knows that they [EOKA-B] are responsible for the catastrophe of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot Government, on the other hand, has, up to the present day, avoided and continues to avoid a confrontation, in a real and fundamental basis, with EOKA-B.”

To pick up on Loizou’s point, the Greek Cypriot Government avoids quite a lot, if they consider it confrontational. Other things they now conveniently ignore include:
The Geneva Declaration of 30th July 1974, issued by the Foreign Ministers of the three Guarantor Powers, Greece, Turkey and the UK, clause 5 of which states:

“The Ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot Community and that of the Turkish Cypriot Community.”

The Exchange of Population Agreement of 1975, implemented under the auspices of the United Nations, by which there was a movement on a purely voluntary basis of Turkish Cypriots to the North and Greek Cypriots to the South.

BERLIN AND NICOSIA

From time to time the Greek propaganda machine and certain Greek lobbies argue that there is a parallel between the division of Germany and Cyprus; just as Germany managed to be re-united, so should Cyprus.

This is pure rhetoric, because such an argument seems to ignore the fact that Germany was not divided as a result of civil war between the two German peoples. Germany was not divided due to an ethnic cleansing campaign by one section of the German people against another. The whole German people belong to a single German nation and they are not divided by race, language, culture and political aspirations. They were one – until Germany was divided by the Allies after the Second World War, as the spoils of war. And they were re-united not so much by the politicians as by the will of the people, who had eagerly awaited the day.

In short, at no time in its history has the German experience ever existed in Cyprus. There has never been a Cypriot nation and the two main peoples in the Cypriot population have always had completely opposing national objectives. Never in Cyprus has there been a common national cause pursued by both communities, working hand in hand to achieve a common goal. As the renowned American statesman, Henry Kissinger, put it,

“Once an ethnic conflict breaks out, its outcome is much more apt to be either a massacre of the minority or the forcible separation of the ethnic groups than the restoration of political unity.”20
DON’T BE SCARED OF PARTITION

Many of the world’s divided islands or regions have been partitioned by major colonialist powers for reasons of realpolitik, to keep a balance in certain parts of the world, while also serving their own national interests. When the Ottoman Empire was carved up after the First World War, under the Treaty of Sèvres, the Arab Provinces were divided as Protectorates under the patronage of the victorious Great Powers. Anatolia, the mainland of Turkey, itself was split up and only reunited as the Republic of Turkey after the War of Independence led by Atatürk.

Over and over again, the division of territories has been legitimised by UN Security Council Resolutions, such as the one sanctioning the partition of Palestine in 1947 to establish a Jewish state, i.e. Israel.

Although the present division of Cyprus has not yet been recognised as an acceptable solution, there are many considerations under discussion favouring the present status of two separate states as a basis for a just and lasting settlement.

The division of Palestine may have been sanctioned by UN Resolution, but we have to face the fact that the latest peace process in the Middle East, which recently completely collapsed, was based on the understanding that Jerusalem would be divided between the Palestinians and Israel; equally so the West Bank and other occupied Arab territories. And please bear in mind that division of the island of Timor was sanctioned by the UN Security Council, in order to protect the Christian minority against the Moslem majority.

It is therefore an irrefutable fact that Partition has been used as a device to achieve peace and stability in certain troubled areas. Cyprus is a good example of that. Since 1974, there has been no inter-communal fighting, massacres or serious bloodshed on the scale of what went before. On the other hand, current concepts of division of multi-communal states, such as Belgium, have provided separate regions or states, which have full sovereignty over their territories.

Why should we disturb the existing peace for the sake of hypocrisy and illusion?

Let us be realistic, and for the sake of the people of Cyprus, the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean and good relations between Greece and Turkey, let us admit that two separate democracies and independent sovereign states exist on the island. To allow outside
interference to disturb the existing status quo is to court further disaster, even if it purports to “help” towards a settlement.

CONCLUSION

When a partnership state is destroyed by force of arms, in violation of international law and in defiance of every provision contained in the Agreements upon which that State was established, there can be no remedy other than separation. A new partnership can only be established if and when the parties who are to form it agree to respect each other’s equal sovereignty within the frontiers of their territories.

It is most unfortunate that the Greek Cypriot side has made very clear its intention not to accept a new partnership as proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General on 12 September 2000. The UN Secretary-General’s statement was made in public in order to provide a basis and common ground for settlement of the problem. The Greek Cypriot House of Representatives immediately discussed this statement and unanimously passed a resolution rejecting it outright. This indicates that the preference of the Greek side is to extend their rule and control the Turkish side as well, once they have been accepted as a full member of the EU, thus achieving, as Clerides openly stated, “the final victory of Hellenism in Cyprus”.

But let’s look on the bright side – by all accounts, we may not be sharing the Greek South’s prosperity, but at least we are not sharing their dubious international money laundering and terrorist sheltering operations either! Let us keep peace and stability by keeping the status quo – a division – and not turn the island into a new Kosova or Palestine for the sake of forced unity!

2 Averoff, Evangelos, Lost Opportunities, p. 243.
4 Averoff, op.cit. 237.
7 Ibid, p. 31.
8 See for instance FO 371/136414-152864.
9 Clerides, Glafcos, Cyprus: My Deposition Vol. 1.
10 Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition Vol. III, pp. 204 & 206.
11 Markides, op.cit, p. 154.
13 Ibid, p. 147.
18 Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, KCB, in his Introduction to a seminar held in London on Two Peoples and Two States in Cyprus, 16 February 2001.
19 Oberling, Pierre, The Road to Bellapais, p. 121.
20 Kissinger, Henry, Cyprus, a Case Study in Ethnic Conflict, p. 237.