

## **EU'S NEW POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: FROM REGIONAL TO GLOBAL POWER?\***

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### **Abstract**

During the 1990s there was a heavy discussion about what would come next after the end of the bipolar world order. At the time the role of the European Union (EU) in the new world order came to the agenda concerning how it would define its international role in the new circumstances. However, the conflicts taking place in ex-Yugoslavian territories challenged EU policies in many ways. The war on Iraq created a rift among the EU member states. This paper will deal with the issue of what kind of a role the EU plays in the present global world order. This study argues that the EU began to enjoy more self-confidence because of its increasing political integration since the early 1990s. It is argued that Washington's naming of old and new Europe before the invasion of Iraq was an indication of the increasing status of the Union.

### **Keywords**

European Union, Global Order, Superpower, Post-Cold War Era, Auxiliary Power, September 11.

### **Introduction**

The European Union (EU) changed in many ways after the end of the Cold War. It was enlarged three times in 1995, 2004 and 2007. Hence the number of the member states increased from 12 to 25 in about two decades. This led to the spread of the EU geography to new areas like Central, Eastern, Southeastern Europe and to the Eastern Mediterranean.

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\* This study was presented at the international symposium "Civilizations and World Orders" that took place in İstanbul between May 12-14, 2006. The author would like to thank anonymous referees for their valuable contributions.

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This development also meant that the EU has become neighbor to Middle East and became closer to Caucasus. The second enlargement after the end of the bipolar era made some of the former socialist countries on the European continent full members. At the same time the Union also carried out important reforms in order to deepen its integration. While it created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), it also established European Monetary Union (EMU). The creation of the CFSP and the ESDP was a turning point for the European integration in foreign policy matters. Meanwhile, the establishment of the EMU and a common currency symbolized a great step forward in the European financial integration.

The historical changes carried out by the EU since the beginning of the 1990s were also followed with great interest by other international actors. The dissolution of one of the superpowers in 1991 resulted in a heavy discussion concerning what kind of a new world order would emerge thereafter. There were different arguments: Some put forward the idea that the US would remain the sole superpower, at the same time others contended that new superpowers would emerge and the international system would be a multipolar one.<sup>1</sup> Others mentioned that Russia would regain its former power and reemerge as a superpower. At the time the EU was mentioned as one of the would-be-superpowers.

In many other respects the EU deserves to be analysed whether it has the potential to be a superpower. Its surface area is 3.9 million square kilometres. Although it has a greater surface area than India, it is about one third of the US.<sup>2</sup> In terms of population EU is the third largest after China and India. After the last enlargement at the beginning of this year its population reached approximately to 486,5 million, whereas the population of the US is approximately 302 million people.<sup>3</sup>

This study analyses the EU's capability of becoming a superpower in the future. In other words it examines what kind of a role the EU will play in global politics. The EU is a different kind of actor; it is not a state, nor is it a typical regional organization. Its structure is called *sui generis*.

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<sup>1</sup> John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1990), pp. 5-56.

<sup>2</sup> For a more detailed statistical data please see the European Union web page: [http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/index_en.htm)

<sup>3</sup> Please see the European Union web page [http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/index_en.htm); U.S. Census Bureau <http://www.census.gov/population/www/>

Hence examination of its role will also give some idea about the possible shape of international politics in the coming decades.

The article will mainly use two basic categories in order to evaluate EU's possible role; its will and its capacity. First of all it will look at how the EU perceives itself and what kind of a role it tries to play. Secondly it will look at its capacity under three headings: its economic capability, foreign and security policy and military capacity. In other words, it will evaluate EU's economic policy, foreign and security policy and also its soft power after the end of the Cold War period. In sum, this article will try to understand EU's intentions and perceived roles and also it will look at its power dimensions.

The article begins with a conceptual framework explaining basic approaches to the concept of "superpower". In the following part it will make a brief review of the literature on the subject. It, then, analyses the will and intention of the EU concerning its role in world politics by examining some of the primary sources and speeches of the several founding fathers of the European integration. In the fourth part it will look at EU's basic capabilities and policies in various areas ranging from economics to foreign and security policy to military and soft power.

### **Conceptual Framework**

George Modelski, in his article, entitled "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", defined world powers or global powers<sup>4</sup> the following way: "...world (or) global powers control (or substantially control) the global political system and hence also have the capacity to regulate other global processes (such as long-distance travel)".<sup>5</sup> Modelski, in his work, explained that each world power experiences two phases that are called ascending phase and descending phase. In his view each ascending phase consists of some elements that will lead to its destruction. At some point some international problems come into being that the existing world power can not solve or conflicts may appear. Some other actors could try to solve these problems. He argues that these developments will lead to a global conflict that is followed by the emergence of a new

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<sup>4</sup> In this study the concepts of "world power", "global power" and "superpower" are used interchangeably.

<sup>5</sup> George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20 (1978), p. 216. For the Turkish translation of the article see George Modelski, "Küresel Politikanın Uzun Döngüsü ve Ulus Devlet", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 2, No. 7, (2005), pp. 3-30.

global power. Based on his historical analysis he calculates that the life of each world power is about a hundred year. He estimates that the world was about to pass the ascending phase and to enter the descending phase.<sup>6</sup> At the same time he argues that it was only the nation states that could play the role of global power. Only nation states could conduct global operations, he argues. He gives the example of city-states and empires in the past centuries arguing that they could not play global roles.<sup>7</sup>

Christopher Hill, using the framework of William Fox, defines the superpower as the one that has the power to shape the global politics according to its wishes and decisions. Its influence is felt worldwide. It can deploy its forces anywhere in the world. It has a great sphere of influence. That means it has immense economic and military power. At the same time it has enough domestic resources, which provide the necessary basis for its autonomy. It means a superpower does not depend on any other actor economically or militarily. Since the Cold War era the term “superpower” is associated with nuclear weapons as well. Beginning from the 1940s all superpowers are supposed to possess nuclear weapons.<sup>8</sup>

Combining both approaches it can be stated that a superpower or world power has the ability to extend its influence worldwide and also shape how the international system functions. Moreover in our age it is also expected to have nuclear weapons. But first of all it must have the will and intention to play that role. This article tries to analyse whether the EU has intention and potential to shape world politics as a global power. Before analysing the factor of will and intention we will make a brief literature review.

### **EU and Role of Superpower: Analysis of Literature**

The characterization of “economic giant and political dwarf” and “civilian power” approach dominated the literature on the EU’s role in world politics. Especially until the 1990s, that was when the EU could not make any important progress in political integration, it was seen as an important economic power, more clearly one of the three biggest economic powers in the world the other two being the US and Japan. In the political

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<sup>6</sup> Modelski, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State”, p. 235.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 230.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher Hill, “Superstate or Superpower? The future of the European Union in world politics”, July 2002, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/pdfs/EFPU-superpowerorsuperstate.pdf>, pp. 6-7.

realm it was not seen as a united actor, since member states retained their sovereignty in foreign policy and defence matters.

Hanns W. Maull, an important expert of the civilian power approach, defines this concept of civilian power the following way:<sup>9</sup> 1) its basic tool must be cooperation in its relations with other states or actors, 2) in order to realize its interests it must use non-military measures, basically economic ones, 3) it must have the will to cede its sovereignty with the aim of making supranational arrangements. In other words, it must accept “reciprocal dependence”.<sup>10</sup> The civilian power approach was especially popular in the 1970’s which was the period when both superpowers did not refrain from using military tools in their foreign policy. US was fighting its war in Vietnam and USSR was using force in Afghanistan. The European emphasis on civilian power instruments became a shelter in order to avoid their involvement in Vietnam.<sup>11</sup> At the time European youth were heavily interested in politics as seen in the protest movements at the time.

In contrast, there were some scholars who argued that the EU had the potential or were on the way to become a superpower. Johan Galtung, in his book, entitled *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making*, published in 1973, and also in his book *Europe in the Making* published in 1989 argued that the EC would have the potential to be a colonial power once again.<sup>12</sup> He argued that ever since its inception the EU was widening its geographical space by integrating new full and associate members, increasing the range of the subjects it was dealing with and also deepening its level of integration. Since most of the European countries had a colonial past, the possibility of EU turning into a superpower should not be overlooked according to Galtung’s book.<sup>13</sup> There are also some more recent publications stating that the EU had the potential to become a superpower.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 5 (1990), pp. 92-93. In his study, Maull applies the civilian power category to Germany and Japan.

<sup>10</sup> Lily Gardner Feldman, “The EC in the International Arena: A New Activism?”, in Glennon J. Harrison, *Europe and the United States, Competition and Cooperation in the 1990s*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 146.

<sup>11</sup> Panos Tsakaloyannis, “The EC: from civilian power to military integration,” in Juliet Lodge, *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future*, London, Pinter Publishers, 1989, p. 243.

<sup>12</sup> Johan Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making*, Oslo, International Peace Reserach Institute, 1973 quoted in Hill, “Superstate or Superpower? The future of the European Union in world politics”, pp. 5-6.

<sup>13</sup> Johan Galtung, *Europe in the Making*, New York, Crane Russak, 1989, p. 22.

<sup>14</sup> Tsakaloyannis, “The EC: from civilian power to military integration”, pp. 241-255; Rockwell A. Schnabel and Francis X. Rocca, *The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe and Its Challenge to the United States*, Lanham, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

A third group of studies is, however, concentrated on the increasing role of the EU after the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc since the EU achieved more maneuvering space. On the one hand it tried to deepen its integration, on the other hand it enlarged by accepting new members. The successful realization of both processes were perceived as a great achievement on the part of the EU. These studies stress upon the increasing role of the EU in world affairs.<sup>15</sup> Another factor emphasized was the increasing expectations from the Union by other international actors. The United States especially wanted the EU to share more of the burden concerning the conflicts in the neighborhood of the EU. The EU also seemed more confident of itself in the wake of the revolutionary changes as exemplified by the famous statement of the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg and term president of the European Community, Jacques Poos, it was “the hour of Europe”<sup>16</sup> referring to the war in Yugoslavia in 1991. However, the European Union realized that “its hour” was full of challenges and complexities.

In sum, there are three basic views about the position of the EU in world politics: First, there is the civilian power or normative power approach<sup>17</sup>; second, there is the possible superpower approach, third there is the approach of the EU's increasing power and capabilities. It should be emphasized that these do not have to be mutually exclusive categories. There can also be some overlaps between them.

### **EU's Will and Intention**

What kind of a role does the EU intend to play in international politics? The answer of this question depends on what kind of a structure the Union ultimately wants to build for itself. Will it be a federation of European states? Or will it be a confederation? Count Kalergi, one of the founding fathers of the idea of the European Community, stated that the European question must be solved by a pan-European solution that he

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<sup>15</sup> For example see Richard G. Whitman, *From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union*, Hampshire, Palgrave, 1998, p. 108.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in Hill, “Superstate or Superpower? The future of the European Union in world politics”, p. 7.

<sup>17</sup> For an analytical comparison of the phrases “civilian power” and “normative power” please see Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’”, *Millennium*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2005), p. 613-618.

defines as “the creation of a United States of Europe”.<sup>18</sup> In other words, Count Kalergi foresees a federal structure for Europe. He argues that this structure must be based on national equality and European culture.<sup>19</sup> But, he warns that Europe should not try to imitate the American example, since the political basis of the US example was different from Europe. In his opinion, Europe, instead, can take a European example, that is the example of Switzerland. Switzerland offers an example of a European country where a multiplicity of different peoples and languages can be accommodated peacefully.<sup>20</sup> Kalergi also emphasizes the importance of the creation of “a European spirit” that must be created before the political integration.<sup>21</sup>

Similarly, The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, again one of the founding fathers of the EU, argued for the creation of a European Federation, which he sees as necessary for the maintenance of peace in Europe. He contends that France, Germany and other willing states must combine their basic production and a high authority must be responsible for this combined production. He adds that its decisions must be binding on the countries.<sup>22</sup>

The Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community (EEC) on March 25, 1957 mentions “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” as one of the aims of the creation of the EEC. Its emphasis is on social and economic progress of the European countries and safeguarding the ideals of peace and liberty. Although it does not mention United States of Europe or federal Europe, it clearly implies that the EEC would not be just an economic organization. On the contrary, the unity among the European countries must be ever closer.<sup>23</sup>

Similarly, the Single European Act (SEA) mentions the “objective to contribute together to making concrete progress towards European unity”.<sup>24</sup> Although its main aim was to establish an internal market, Title Three of the SEA contains provisions on European cooperation in matters

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<sup>18</sup> Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The Pan-European Union Movement”, in A. G. Harry van and J. Van der Harst, *Documents on European Union*, London, Macmillan, 1997, p. 34.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.36-37.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>22</sup> Robert Schuman, “The Schuman Declaration”, in Harry van and van der Harst, *Documents on European Union*, p. 62.

<sup>23</sup> “The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community”, in Harry van and van der Harst, *Documents on European Union*, p. 104.

<sup>24</sup> “The Single European Act”, in Harry van and van der Harst, *Documents on European Union*, p. 233.

of foreign policy. It states the aim of establishing joint foreign policy actions and the development of a European identity in external policy matters.

The Maastricht Treaty takes a step further and creates the pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) whose objectives are stated as the following:

- “- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”<sup>25</sup>

As seen from the quotation it mentions objectives related either to the EC or to international security, however it does not state anything relating to the position of the EC in world politics. The Maastricht Treaty is, however, a milestone in the history of the EC since it established the CFSP that is regarded an important step in political integration. It is also of historical importance that the Maastricht Treaty mentions “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defense”.<sup>26</sup>

Since the Maastricht Treaty the EU has tried to find a new place for itself in the new international system. In other words it has tried to adapt itself to the changing global conditions. In that process it has been aware of the expectations of other international actors from itself. The legislative programme of 1994 is an important illustration of how the EU perceives itself in the new international system:

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<sup>25</sup> “Treaty on European Union (The Maastricht Treaty), Maastricht, 7 February 1992; Title V: Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy”, in Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith, *European Foreign Policy Key Documents*, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 153.

<sup>26</sup> “Treaty on European Union”, p. 155.

“Strengthening new international responsibilities in the new architecture of Europe in order to contribute to the future equilibrium of the continent and to the harmonious development of international relations, by giving fresh and visible impetus to the process of cooperation at international level by the conclusion and implementation of the results of trade negotiations under the Uruguay Round, and by new initiatives with respect to the countries of Eastern Europe and the Third World; ensuring that the Community’s external activities are based on and backed up by strong and stable common internal policies; so as to affirm the Community’s role as an open and reliable partner in the world, and with a view to strengthening Europe’s trading capacity and its competitive status on world markets”.<sup>27</sup>

The document refers to the changes in the international environment and hence emphasizes the new global role of the Union. It also regards the Union as “an open and reliable partner” in the world.

The European Security Strategy, or the Solana Paper, which was prepared in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, takes a step further and defines the status of the EU in international politics. In that document EU is defined as a global player that has an influence on the functioning of world politics. The justification for calling the EU as a global player in that document is based on several factors like the Union’s demographic and economic power, its instruments and its contributions to international military operations worldwide. It is also stated that the EU should share the responsibility for issues related to global security.<sup>28</sup>

I argue that the definition of the Union as a global player is an important symbol of the belief that the EU plays a greater role in the post-Cold War era. Meanwhile the European Constitution, that was rejected in French and Dutch referendums states in the Article I-3 the EU’s objectives in its relations with the wider world as the following:

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<sup>27</sup> “The Commission’s legislative programme for 1994, Resolution of the European Parliament on the 1994 legislative programme, Council declaration on the 1994 legislative programme, Joint Declaration of the European Parliament and the Commission on the 1994 legislative programme”, *Bulletin of the European Union Supplement* 1/94, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991, p. 21 quoted in Whitman, *From Civilian Power to Superpower?*, p. 58.

<sup>28</sup> European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, The European Union Web Page, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

“...the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”.<sup>29</sup>

The EU is not mentioned as a superpower or global power in any of the founding treaties. The emphasis in these treaties is mostly on increasing cooperation. But even in that respect there is a change over time from the emphasis only on economic affairs to the emphasis on both economic and political realm. At the same time the EU's definition of itself as a “global player” can be considered a milestone. It is inconceivable that EU would have called itself as a “global player” during the Cold War. This new definition can be seen as a reflection of EU's increasing capabilities and deepening integration since the early 1990s.

In brief, the primary documents related to the EU do not provide us with an indication that the EU aims to be a superpower in any respect. However, a change can be noticed with reference to the EU's naming of itself. It seems that the leaders of the EU believe that it has now become an important actor in world politics. This belief can be directly connected with the increasing phase of integration after the dissolution of the USSR. In other words, the change in self-perception of the EU is related to the European response to new international environment. Under the new circumstances of the post-Cold War period the EU gained more self-confidence and began to define itself as a global player more explicitly. This article argues that this attitude was clearly connected with the increasing political integration of the Union. Meanwhile, it is important to note that it seems the EU does refrain from using the word “power” in defining itself. This can stem from the perceived negative connotations of the term.

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<sup>29</sup> “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 310, Vol. 47, 16.12.2004, [http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty\\_Const.htm](http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const.htm)

## Economic Power of the EU

Despite the political aims of its founding fathers the EU achieved its integration first of all in the economic realm. Especially with the conclusion of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 and the introduction of the Euro paper and coins in 2002 the EU achieved to realize its project of economic and monetary integration.<sup>30</sup> The economic policies now mark the most supranational area within the EU.

In order to have an idea about the EU's economic power comparative statistical data are needed. In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the EU is the biggest economic power in the world. It produces goods and services more than at the total value of 10.793 trillion Euros that is ahead of the US by a slight margin. The GDP of the US is 10.035 trillion Euros. The accession of 10 countries in 2004 and two countries in 2007 contributed to the total GDP. In other words, the EU owes its leadership position to the new members. Japan's GDP, meanwhile, is much lower. It is 3.674 trillion Euros.<sup>31</sup>

**Table 1. GDP at current prices (EUR 1000 million)<sup>32</sup>**

	2000	2005
EU-25	9090.5	10 793.8
US	10 629.1	10 035.9
Japan	5037.4	3674.9

The EU, however, could not show the same degree of success in terms of per capita GDP. If we compare the European number with that of the US and Japan, we notice that EU with 25 members has the third rank. The average per capita GDP in the European countries is about 24.000


<sup>30</sup> For a historical analysis of the EMU please see Lionel Barber, "The Euro", in Robert J. Guttman, *Europe in the New Century, Visions of an Emerging Superpower*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 143-144; Madeleine O. Hosli, "The EMU and International Monetary Relations: What to Expect for International Actors", in Carolyn Rhodes, *The European Union in the World Community*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, pp. 166-171. For a different and identity-based analysis of the Euro please see Thomas Risse, *To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union*, Robert Schuman Centre, Working Papers, No. 9, 1998.

<sup>31</sup> The European Union web page, [http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/index_en.htm)

<sup>32</sup> Key figures on Europe Statistical Pocketbook 2006, Luxembourg, European Communities, 2006, [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY\\_OFFPUB/KS-EI-06-001/EN/KS-EI-06-001-EN.PDF](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EI-06-001/EN/KS-EI-06-001-EN.PDF), p. 16.

USD, while it is approximately 38.000 USD for the US. Japan has the second rank with its GDP of 34.000 USD.<sup>33</sup>

**Figure 1. Harmonized long-term unemployment rates, annual averages (% of persons unemployed for 12 months or more)<sup>34</sup>**



In addition, if we look at the unemployment rates, we notice that the EU has the highest rate of unemployed among the three and the trend seems to continue in the following years. Its rate of unemployment is considerably higher than Japan and the US. In order to compete in the global economy the EU has to find out solutions for the problem of unemployment. One of the important economic problems of the EU member countries was their failure not to be able create adequate number of jobs for the young people.

Energy dependence is another problem for the EU economy since the Union has to import about 50 per cent of its energy mainly from Middle East, Russia, Norway and African countries. However, if the current trend continues, its energy dependence will increase even more; according to the EU estimates it will rise to 70 per cent in the next 20-30 years.<sup>35</sup> Although the matter of energy is a big concern for the US as well, the US enjoys the advantage of becoming a big supplier. Although the US imports 58% of its oil demand, it is also the 11<sup>th</sup> biggest oil supplier in the world.<sup>36</sup> From the statistics it is clear that the EU does not enjoy energy security at the

<sup>33</sup> Delegation of the European Commission to the USA web page, "The European Union and the World Trade", <http://www.eurunion.org/profile/EUUSStats.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> Key figures on Europe Statistical Pocketbook 2006, Luxembourg, European Communities, 2006, [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY\\_OFFPUB/KS-EI-06-001/EN/KS-EI-06-001-EN.PDF](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EI-06-001/EN/KS-EI-06-001-EN.PDF), p. 66.

<sup>35</sup> The relevant statistics on EU's energy demand was compiled from the following sources: Green Paper, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 2006; US Energy Information Administration, European Union, [http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/European\\_Union/pdf.pdf](http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/European_Union/pdf.pdf)

<sup>36</sup> US Energy Information Administration, United States, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Usa/pdf.pdf>

moment and this vulnerability affects its international posture. Although it started giving more importance to renewable energy sources than before, there is no evidence its energy dependence will begin to decrease.

In order to analyse EU's economic power comparatively one should also look at the expenditures in research and development (R&D). R&D expenditures are considered important in order to understand its competitive economic power in the globalizing world. The new economy based on information technologies requires countries to invest more in R&D. EU's expenditures in R&D constitutes only 1.84 % percent of GDP which is much lower than both US and Japan (the expenditure of the former 2.76 %, of the latter 3.13%). In addition, while the expenditures of the US and Japan as a percentage of their GDP increase, the EU expenditures shows a trend to decrease.<sup>37</sup> Although the EU has the goal of increasing its R&D expenditures to 3 % by the year 2010, for the moment it does not seem likely it will reach that target. Therefore, in the new global economic structure the EU seems to experience difficulties in its competition with other economic powers.


If we compare the numbers of external trade, we notice that EU has the biggest export numbers among the three. The annual export of the EU is 883 billion Euros, whereas the same number for the US is 765 billion Euros. Japan with the amount of 499 billion Euros has the last rank among the three.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> "Research and Development in the EU: Preliminary Results", Eurostat, 12 January 2007.

<sup>38</sup> The European Union web page, [http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/keyfigures/index_en.htm)

**Figure 2<sup>39</sup>: EU-25 share in world trade, 2004 (%) \***



\* Excluding intra-EU trade.

In analyzing EU's position in global economy its policies toward developing countries should be taken into consideration as well. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the EU stems from its attitude toward the developing countries. The Union and member countries are the biggest suppliers of aid to developing countries with their share being 56 % of the total amount of aid.<sup>40</sup> Many of the developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Pacific, the Caribbean and the Mediterranean has been receiving European aid. Giving aid to the Third World has been a traditional European policy because it has been continuing since the foundation of the European Economic Community. Although the member states at the time decided to keep their bilateral aid programmes, by the time member countries started supplying more and more of their aid through the EU instead of using bilateral ways. In 1990 member states were giving 13% of their aid through the EU, by the end of the decade that proportion reached to 17%.<sup>41</sup> The development policy of the Union has four main objectives: promotion of democracy, improvement in economic and social conditions,

<sup>39</sup> Key figures on Europe Statistical Pocketbook 2006, Luxembourg, European Communities, 2006, [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY\\_OFFPUB/KS-EI-06-001/EN/KS-EI-06-001-EN.PDF](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EI-06-001/EN/KS-EI-06-001-EN.PDF), p. 116.

<sup>40</sup> David Lennon, "The European Union: A Leader in Humanitarian and Development Assistance", in Robert J. Guttman, *Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p. 127.

<sup>41</sup> Lennon, "The European Union: A Leader in Humanitarian and Development Assistance", p. 127.

adaptation to the global economy and reducing poverty.<sup>42</sup> The EU can be called as “development agency” as it gave so much importance to development policies since its creation.<sup>43</sup>

The EU has achieved to become one of the biggest economic powers in the world in its history of about half a century. The historical enemies, France and Germany, in the context of the European integration, became the most important partners of each other. The EU is now the biggest trading bloc in the world. It produces one quarter of the total world production. It provides more aid to developing countries than any other country or organization.<sup>44</sup> It was the field of economics on which the European integration process was founded in the 1950s and it was again the economic cooperation in which the EU became one of the leading powers in the world. In other words, it can be considered as “an economic power bloc”.<sup>45</sup> The supranationalist features of the Union can be detected most clearly in the economic field. Despite its energy dependency, low R&D expenditures, high unemployment rates, its relative success in the economic realm increased the expectations from the EU to play a role in global affairs and at the same time that success encouraged the members of the Union to increase cooperation in other areas, like foreign and security policy.

### **Foreign and Security Policy**

The first attempts to establish a common European foreign and security policy failed for several reasons that we do not need to elaborate here. Both European Defence Community (EDC) and European Political Community (EPC) led to great disappointment on the part of those who hoped that the integration would include political cooperation as well. As a result of the failure of the EDC and the EPC the European leaders decided to concentrate all their efforts on economic issues.<sup>46</sup> However the 1970s witnessed revitalization of efforts for political cooperation that could be explained by both internal and external reasons. At the time the EC achieved a remarkable success in economic integration and became one of

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 129.

<sup>43</sup> Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 109.

<sup>44</sup> Delegation of the European Commission to the USA web page, “A World Player – The European Union’s External Relations”, <http://www.eurunion.org/globalplayer/worldplayer.htm>

<sup>45</sup> Christopher Hill, “European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model – or Flop?”, in Reinhardt Rummel, *The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe’s New Assertiveness*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1990, p. 35.

<sup>46</sup> Günter Gehl, *Europa: Vergangenheit-Gegenwart-Zukunft*, Saarbrücken-Scheidt, Dadder, 1989, p. 26-29.

the biggest economic powers in the world. This economic success led to two important developments: First, it encouraged the European leaders to spread the cooperation to other areas. Second, other international actors had more expectations from the EC. These factors culminated in the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970 by the Luxembourg Report.<sup>47</sup> The report mentions the determination of the member countries to establish “a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission”.<sup>48</sup> It also states that Europe was aware of its responsibilities stemming from its level of economic development: “United Europe, conscious of the responsibilities incumbent on it by reason of its economic development, industrial power and standard of living, intends to step up its endeavours on behalf of the developing countries with a view to setting international relations on a basis of trust”.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, it emphasizes that because of “its greater cohesion” and “increasing role” Europe must be ready “to discharge the imperative world duties”.<sup>50</sup> Another aim of the EPC is explained as “to bring nearer the day when Europe can speak with one voice”.<sup>51</sup>

The EPC entailed cooperation in issues of foreign policy among the member states and established regular meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It also founded a Political Committee that was composed of the directors of political affairs of foreign ministries. Furthermore, some working groups were created that would work on specific issues. The first EPC meeting was carried out in Munich in 1970. An important feature of the EPC was that it did not include security issues which were still considered as part of national sovereignty.

Considering that the EPC's agenda was fixed and limited it is not easy to answer the question whether the EPC became successful or not. Keeping the failure of the previous plans for political cooperation in mind the EPC could be considered to have succeeded at least partially. It reached one of its biggest successes during the Conference on Security and

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<sup>47</sup> Ramses A. Wessel, *The European Union's Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective*, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 5.

<sup>48</sup> “EPC – The Luxembourg Report, Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification,” quoted in Panayiotis Ifestos, *European Political Cooperation, Toward a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy?*, Aldershot, Avebury, 1987, p. 591.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 591.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 592.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 592.

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the 1970s. EC member states acted as one bloc in the meetings and contributed to the improvement of relations between the Western and Eastern Blocs.<sup>52</sup> Therefore, they contributed to reduce the tension between the superpowers of the time. The prevailing thaw in world politics and the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act were regarded as great achievements in the attempt for political cooperation of the member states. Hence, the first years of ECP witnessed a great progress on the EU's position in international politics.

Despite this decisive success in the case of the CSCE the EPC experienced many failures in important foreign policy matters. One of them was on the conflict in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab community. It could not bring about any important success in its efforts to find a common ground between the conflicting parties. Its failure could be explained by several factors: First, the US had the primary role in the Middle East affairs. It did not seem possible for any actor to rival the US in this issue. Second, Israel was against the European interference in this conflict, because it favored the maintenance of the US role. Third, it was not easy for member states to reach a consensus on their Middle Eastern policies. It turned out that each member state had its own sensitivities or reservations regarding the complicated Middle Eastern affairs. In spite of the difficulties mentioned member states could issue some declarations on the conflict, however they did not seem to contribute to the solution of the problem substantially.<sup>53</sup>

The hostage crisis in Iran in 1979 was another event in which the member states found it difficult to agree on common policies. Although they all condemned the affair, they could not agree on whether to implement any sanctions or not. In the end it was left to the member states themselves to decide on the issue. The EPC experienced another failure during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the same year. Although the Soviet army occupied Afghanistan in December 1979, until February 1980 no decision could be made within the framework of the EPC.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> For the impact of the EPC on the CSCE please see Simon Nuttall, "Two Decades of EPC Performance", in Elfriede Regelsberger et. al., *Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 23-24

<sup>53</sup> Nuttall, "Two Decades of EPC Performance", pp. 24-27.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

The Copenhagen Report of 1973 and the Single European Act of 1986 provided some improvements in the structure of the EPC, however, the most important milestone in the development of the European political cooperation came with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This Treaty created three pillars that are European Community, CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs. The main stimulus bringing about this radical change in the structure of the Community was external; namely the end of the bipolar world order. The dissolution of the Soviet Union meant the end of the main threat to the Western world. The new world order was to be totally different from the previous one and Europe needed to adapt itself to the new circumstances. The European response was twofold: deepening and widening. Europe would deepen its integration both in economic and political fields and also enlarge mainly toward the Central and Eastern Europe.

The Maastricht Treaty or the Treaty on the European Union must be considered as a turning point in the history of the European Community. It transformed the Community into the European Union. It paved the way for more integration in economic and monetary issues and created a different pillar for the CFSP. Why was there a need to create the CFSP? What are its main differences from the EPC? The structures created for the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty facilitated the formulation of common European positions on foreign policy. First, the CFSP structure allowed not only member states but also the Commission to recommend policies, whereas it had not been possible for the Commission to make proposals under the EPC. Second, in the case of the CFSP it was decided that the funding would be provided by the Community itself, the EPC did not have its own budget. The costs of the policies decided in the framework of the EPC were paid by the member states themselves. Third, CFSP included defence issues too, as it was stated in the Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty: "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defense".<sup>55</sup> The Treaty requested the Western European Union (WEU) "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications".<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> "Treaty on European Union", Article J.4.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, Article J.4.

The reason for the EC's new interest in defence matters stemmed from the fact that the US decided to withdraw a significant portion of its soldiers from the European countries that had been deployed during the Cold War. The deployment of American soldiers on the European continent was regarded as a deterrent to any possible military threat by the Moscow administration. Since there was no Soviet threat anymore, the US did not need to keep so many soldiers in Europe. Under these circumstances European countries felt the need to develop their own defence policies.<sup>57</sup> The withdrawal of US military force was, however, accompanied by the rise of new security challenges facing the Union. The military conflicts taking place in the territories of ex-Yugoslavia were regarded as important test cases for the implementation of the CFSP. Both the EU itself and other international actors had great expectations from the CFSP that was considered to be able to contribute to end the most violent conflict that occurred in Europe after the Second World War. To repeat the sentence of Jacques Pöör, it was "the hour of Europe". The US did not want to involve itself in the Balkan conflict and expected Europe to play the leading role in the solution of the conflict. In contrast with these great hopes even at the beginning of the conflict different interests and policy proposals came from the member states. Each member state had its own perception of the Balkan drama and its own proposals for solution. The early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the newly unified Germany came as a shock to the EC. If there were such divergent foreign policy interests among the member states, how could they then be supposed to develop consensus for common actions? The subsequent war in Bosnia did not lead to a more coherent and effective European approach either. The EU concentrated its efforts on the diplomatic field and tried mainly to use diplomatic tools in order to end the violence which in the end failed to convince the conflicting parties to give up their arms. However, neither the conference diplomacy nor the special representatives appointed for the region could bring about any concrete improvement in the settlement. As a result of this European failure the US became the leading actor to stop the violence and Europeans, in general, supported the role of Washington in this regard. But it must be noted that the EU learnt its lessons from the Balkan debacle and in the aftermath tried to improve its capabilities for common foreign policy.

The Amsterdam Treaty was an example of how the EU acted to better its political integration. The Treaty put forward a new mechanism

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<sup>57</sup> Karen E. Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Cambridge, Polity, 2003, p. 41.

called constructive abstention that would allow the member countries to abstain from voting instead of using their veto. Moreover, the use of qualified majority voting was extended, and the frequency of the cases where the unanimous voting was required was lessened. It also established several new mechanisms, like a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which would follow the developments in the region and try to find out possible flashpoints. Another new feature of the Treaty was that it established the post of High Representative for the CFSP. Javier Solana became the first High Representative. The interesting point was that the EU tried to draw lessons from its failures and to improve its mechanisms and tools. It was not discouraged by the heavy criticisms of the other actors.

Since it is not possible to review the common foreign policy of the EU toward each country or each region within the scope of this study, a rather general outline would be provided in order to evaluate the EU's role in international politics. Karen Smith underlines five foreign policy objectives of the EU: "the promotion of regional cooperation; the promotion of human rights; the promotion of democracy and good governance; the prevention of violent conflict; and the fight against international crime".<sup>58</sup>

In the light of these objectives one could give the following examples for the implementation of the CFSP. In the framework of the regional cooperation the EU developed many programs ranging from Latin America to Asia. If one looks at the implementation of the CFSP for the European neighborhood one could recognize two important regions that are Central and Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe. The EU developed the Pact for Stability for the Central and Eastern European countries with the aim of fostering the cooperation among these countries. It supported many regional groupings as well at the time<sup>59</sup>. Being aware of the dangers inherent in the outbreak any possible conflict for its own security the Union tried to attract these countries into its own orbit. It tried to keep its doors open for them. Especially after the Kosovo War the European Union turned its attention to the countries of the Southeastern Europe by initiating the Stability Pact. After the accession of the most of the Central and Eastern European countries in 2004, and after the full membership of Bulgaria and Romania, at the beginning of 2007, it seems that the next enlargement may

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., pp. 81-82.

include the states of the Southeastern Europe. In fact, it is the European perspective today that prevents emergence of new conflicts in the area.

Another region in which the EU has been interested in is the Middle East. The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 set up the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) between the EU and regional partners, namely Algeria, Cyprus (Greek part), Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. The EMP had three components: cooperation in political issues and security, cooperation in economic and financial matters and cooperation in social, cultural and humanitarian issues. The EU had three main objectives regarding the Mediterranean: energy security, internal peace in the regional countries and ending the conflict between Israel and Arabic countries.<sup>60</sup> However, the regional cooperation envisaged by the EMP did not bring much fruit for several reasons: First, since the Arab-Israeli conflict did not come to an end, the political and security part of the project could not be effectively realized. It is difficult to embark on a cooperative effort in matters of high security when the partners have an important problem among themselves, which they could not solve for decades. Another reason for the stagnation in the EMP was that Israel simply did not want the European countries to take on the leading role in the regional affairs for such a development would place the US to a secondary role.<sup>61</sup>

In 2004 the Union started a new program called the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which covers the Eastern and Southern neighboring regions. The aim of the new programme was explained as sharing “the peace, stability and prosperity” of Europe with the partner countries. In other words, the member states wanted to create “a ring of friends” in the European neighborhood.<sup>62</sup> An important feature of it was its exclusion of full membership from the outset, instead, it puts forward a “privileged relationship”. With the ENP the EU wants to open new areas of cooperation with its close neighborhood to whom it does not give any membership perspective in the foreseeable future. The main reason behind

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<sup>60</sup> For more information about European concerns toward the region and its attempt to “construct” a Mediterranean region please see Pinar Bilgin, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security”, *International Relations*, Vol.18, No. 1 (2004), pp. 34-35.

<sup>61</sup> Sven Biscop, “Opening up the ESDP to the South: A Comprehensive and Security Approach to Euro-Mediterranean Security”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2003), pp. 188-189.

<sup>62</sup> For a more detailed information about the ENP please see its web site [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/index_en.htm); Nathalie Tocci, “Does the ENP Respond to the EU’s Post-Enlargement Challenges?”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. XL, No. 1 (2005), pp. 21-32.

the ENP is the security understanding of the EU. The Union believes that unless the countries around its borders reach a certain level of development and stability, it can not feel secure within its borders. Therefore, a certain level of partnership needs to be established with these countries as well.

The aims of the promotion of human rights; the promotion of democracy and good governance gained prominence since the 1990s. Through various political and economic instruments like providing aid and diplomatic instruments the Union tries to foster promotion of these values and norms in other countries. But the main problem stems from the fact that the EU does not implement these objectives consistently. The different national interests of the member countries come into play and different criteria are applied for different countries.<sup>63</sup> For example in the case of Russia and China strategic interests of the member countries prevail and these countries are treated more sensitively. The effects of the EU's promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance can best be seen in the case of the candidate countries which have a perspective for full membership.

The EU's policy of fighting against international crime acquired a new importance after the attacks of September 11. Although the Community declared the aim of fighting the international crime in the middle of the 1970s, it was not until the attacks in the US in 2001 that this aim gained a new dimension. The European Council discussed the attacks in its extraordinary meeting on September 21, 2001 and decided for an action plan. It also discussed ways to cooperate with the US.<sup>64</sup> In the aftermath of the September 11 the Union prepared a list of the terrorist organizations for the first time in its history. At the same time it agreed on the European Security Strategy defining the global challenges and key threats and EU's objectives and priorities.<sup>65</sup> It was the first time in its history that the EU prepared such an official document on global security.

The war in Iraq led to a division of Europe into two different blocs: On the one hand, there were those countries under the leadership of Germany and France which were against the US invasion of Iraq; on the other, there were some member countries like Italy and Spain and some

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<sup>63</sup> Toby King, "Human Rights in European Foreign Policy: Success or Failure for Post-modern Diplomacy", *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1999), pp. 313-337.

<sup>64</sup> Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy*, pp. 175-176.

<sup>65</sup> European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

candidate countries at the time, such as Poland and Hungary that supported it. The Iraqi debacle was perceived as an important example for the failure of the CFSP. The main concern was that if the member states could not agree on such an important and historic action, what could be expected out of the European common foreign policy. However the aftermath of the war led to more cohesion among the member countries and also more cooperation between the Union and the US. For example, Spain, after the Madrid attacks, decided to pull out its forces from the region. Regarding the dispute over the Iranian nuclear programme there has been much more cooperation between Brussels and Washington. Although the disagreement over Iraq is an important example for the failure of the CFSP one should not judge the whole process of formulation of common foreign policy on the basis of just one case.

Additionally, I argue that the classification of the European countries as old and new by the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, was an indication of how important the position of the EU on Iraq was for the political leadership in Washington. The anger shown by the American leaders toward the French and German partnership was an important sign of how much importance the US was giving to its relations with Europe. It was also a sign that due to its increasing political cooperation the US has now been giving much more importance to foreign policy of the Union and also foreign policies of the member countries.

In brief, the EU improved its cooperation in foreign policy and security issues to a great extent from the 1970s onward. The moderate attempts starting from the EPC evolved into a more cooperative structure of the CFSP. There were internal and external reasons behind the creation of both the EPC and CFSP. The level of economic integration attained by the Community led to more calls for more political integration within the EC. At the same time changes in the external environment also affected the policy for determining a common foreign policy. How can we evaluate the state of the CFSP under the present circumstances? Does it provide the Union with capabilities that would enable it to play the role of a global power? In fact, the present CFSP is full of problems and inconsistencies as it was explained above. The EU is still very far from speaking with one voice, but considering the historical process it is possible to perceive the progress that the Union achieved in that regard.

## Military Power

The Maastricht Treaty marks a decisive step in the history of the EC for it broke the taboo on security issues by including these issues within the European structure.<sup>66</sup> The Balkan wars especially speeded up the process toward more cooperation in matters of security. Since the EU could not play an active role for the solution of a conflict in its own continent member states decided to think over the state of their political integration. After the historical decisions taken by Britain and France in St. Malo concerning the relationship between NATO and the EU, the Helsinki Summit officially started European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). A headline goal was stated that by the year 2003 the EU should develop a military force consisting of 60.000 soldiers that can be deployed within 60 days and can remain on the deployed site for one year. This force was supposed to carry out the Petersberg tasks which are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management tasks, including peacemaking.

After the establishment of the ESDP the Union carried out military missions in Macedonia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Georgia. Currently, it is carrying out operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine and Iraq. It has police missions in Macedonia and the Republic of Congo.<sup>67</sup> Some of the previous NATO operations in the Balkans have been taken over by the EU.<sup>68</sup> Hence the EU started to replace the role of the NATO and the US in this region. Although these EU missions can not be considered as operations of great scale, nevertheless they are still important as they are taking place for the first time in the history of the Community.

Comparative statistical data would help us to understand the position of the EU military. In 2004 the total defence budget of the current 25 member states was 186 billion USD, whereas the defence budget of the US is 460.5 billion USD. In other words, the US spends twice more than 25 European countries combined for defence. If we analyse the defence expenditures as percentage of GDP we notice that in the case of the EU it is about 1.9%, whereas in the US it is almost double with 3.7%.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Richard Whitman, "The Development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy", in Jackie Gower, *The European Union Handbook*, 2nd edition, London, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2002, p. 287.

<sup>67</sup> The European Union web site <http://ue.eu.int/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=268&mode=g&name>

<sup>68</sup> Schnabel and Rocca, *The Next Superpower?*, p. 63.

<sup>69</sup> Burkan Schmidt, "Defence Expenditure," February 2005, Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/11-bsdef.pdf>

An important development for the EU’s military capability was the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) that is responsible for “helping the member states develop their defence capabilities for crisis-management operations under the European Security and Defence Policy”.<sup>70</sup> The EDA helps the member states to exchange views on their defense policies.

An important part of the military power, in the contemporary world, stems from nuclear weapons. The Union does not possess its own nuclear arsenal, however, it includes two members, France and Britain, which are nuclear powers. However, it is clear from the table below that even the total of their nuclear weapons do not come close to either American or Russian nuclear forces. Meanwhile, it is inconceivable that European countries would assign their sovereignty over the nuclear weapons to the EC.

**Table 2 – World nuclear forces: numbers of deployed warhead as of January 2006<sup>71</sup>**

Country	Deployed warheads
USA	5521
Russia	5682
UK	185
France	348
China	c. 130
India	c. 50
Pakistan	c. 60
Israel	100-200

In sum, the EU does not have the military capability to be a superpower. Although it started taking over some NATO operations in its neighborhood it is far from developing a supranational military policy. This area is still in the sovereignty of the member states. In terms of investment and expenditure it does not seem that the Union can rival the US in the short or medium term.

<sup>70</sup> European Defence Agency web site, <http://www.eda.eu.int/>

<sup>71</sup> SIPRI Yearbook 2006, Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security.

## Conclusion

This article tried to analyse the EU's evolving role in the so-called new world order since the early 1990s. First it defined the concept of superpower - or world power - and then looked at through various parameters whether the EU fulfilled the conditions to be called as a super power. The main argument of this paper is that the EU cannot be named as a super power. Although it is one of the biggest economic powers in the world and has a considerable amount of soft power, in other fields it does not have a similar record. In its foreign and security policy it is far from speaking with one voice. There are still many different national interests that hinder the development of a common foreign policy. In the military field it cannot rival the sole superpower, the US. At the same time the EU does not seem to have any intention or will to play the role of superpower. The examination of primary EU sources does not reveal any agenda to rise to the superpower status in the years ahead.

Joseph Nye makes a distinction between hard and soft power. In that definition hard power denotes military and economic power, whereas soft power means the ability to have impact on others by intangible factors like culture and values or to affect others by its attractive features.<sup>72</sup> The soft power approach is on the opposite side of the coercion and force. From its foundation onward the Community enjoys the soft power as seen in the ever increasing number of states, which want to accede. In about half a century it more than quadrupled the number of its members. Perceiving that there are still more countries which aim to be full members the EU developed a neighborhood policy in order to improve its relations with them.

The preference of diplomatic measures over military ones on the one hand, and positive measures over negative measures on the other by the EU led to the increase in its soft power. Basing its policies, in principle, on international law and multilateralism the Union tries to develop peaceful relations with other actors. When some disagreements occur between it and other actors it wants to solve these by peaceful means. Especially in the light of fall in the US soft power after the Iraqi war<sup>73</sup> the EU can enjoy a comparative advantage over the US in that respect.

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<sup>72</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004.

<sup>73</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Decline of America's Soft Power", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 3 (May-June 2004); Richard Rosecrance, "Europa gehört die Zukunft", *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 60, No. 7 (2005), pp. 52-56.

Being aware of emerging literature on the not so softness of the soft power<sup>74</sup> this study is of the opinion that one can make a distinction between hard and soft power by analysing aims and instruments of the foreign policies of the respective actors. In spite of the increasing role of the defence cooperation within the EU framework and external dynamics pushing for it the Union can still be considered as a soft or normative power which tries to reach its foreign policy aims by peaceful means.

The reluctance to play the role of superpower, however, does not automatically decline the status of the EU to the auxiliary power. It does not want to play any auxiliary role to the remaining superpower. What the EU mainly aims is to become “a global player” or “world player” as emphasized in various parts of this study. It wants to be taken into consideration by other actors. That wish is beginning to be fulfilled. It plays this role most effectively in its own neighborhood where it can extend the “carrot” of full membership. This study argues that the EU began to enjoy more self-confidence because of its increasing political integration since the early 1990s despite the fact that it experienced difficulties regarding integration in political realm. It is also one of the arguments of this paper that Washington’s naming of old and new Europe before the invasion of Iraq was an indication of the increasing status of the Union. The EU has neither intention nor relevant power capacities to act as a superpower. But its increasing parameters of power would provide it more opportunities to affect global affairs in the years ahead.

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<sup>74</sup> Janice Bially Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics”, *Millennium*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2005), pp. 583-612.