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**CONFEDERATION: THE LAST CHANCE FOR ESTABLISHING
A NEW PARTNERSHIP IN CYPRUS**

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BACKGROUND

There are two peoples in Cyprus who jealously guard their distinct political, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities and separate existence. They are political equals, each with its established equal status, including its separate right of self-determination. The UK government, in 1956 and 1958, recognised the two peoples separate right of self-determination before independence was granted to the partnership Republic. The political equality of the two parties was enshrined in the Constitution of the partnership Republic, where legitimacy ensued from the joint will of the two parties expressed through their separately elected representatives. As an equal party and as a subject of international law, the Turkish Cypriot party, together with the Greek Cypriot party, was a signatory to all the international treaties of 1960, which created the partnership Republic.

Since its violent usurpation of the 1960 partnership Republic in 1963, the Greek Cypriot partner has been trying to take full control of the island in order to turn it into a Hellenic Republic. The Turkish Cypriot party, for its part, has fought for and successfully defended its rights, never succumbing to the will of the Greek Cypriot party. Turkish Cypriot pleas during the 1963-1974 period to maintain the 1960 constitutional order were ridiculed, and Greek Cypriots went ahead and unilaterally changed even the unchangeable 'equal partnership' provisions of the 1960 Constitution soon after ejecting the Turkish Cypriot partner from all the organs of the state. Left stateless, and declared to be outlaws because they refused to bow to illegal Greek Cypriot rule, the Turkish Cypriot people gathered under the Vice-President of Cyprus and protected their vested rights against great odds for eleven years.

As a result of the Greek Cypriot onslaught of 1963 and the successful self-defence of the Turkish Cypriot party, two sovereign and independent states emerged on the island, each with its fully functioning democratic institutions, territory and distinct political, legal and economic systems, to which their respective peoples attach their allegiance.

In spite of the many years of violence and upheavals, which reached a climax with the 1974 Greek-Greek Cypriot military take-over and the subsequent Turkish intervention sanctioned by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the Greek Cypriots, under the usurped title of the 'government of Cyprus', still continue to claim to represent the whole island in international forums.

The international community's toleration of the Greek Cypriot party's fanatically ethno-nationalistic and unlawful actions and claims has resulted in the destruction of balances established on the island

and between Turkey and Greece through the 1960 Agreements. The destruction of the power equilibrium and the absence of any international effort aimed at restoring this equilibrium are the main reasons for the intractability of the Cyprus Question. It must be borne in mind that Turkey is only 40 miles from the northern shores of the island and thus Turkey has vital security interests linked to Cyprus in addition to its historical connections and Treaty obligations emanating from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.

Since 1963, the Greek side has also been trying to further harm the Turkish Cypriots and increase the imbalance on the island through imposing uncompromising and illegitimate economic and social embargoes to coerce them to succumb to their wishes.

All of these actions are fuelling the mistrust between the two peoples and further undermining a resolution.

The Cyprus conflict is a conflict between two ex-partners and constituents of the 1960 Republic. The purpose of this paper is to compare the international community's handling of the Cyprus Question with their handling of the situation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which was a similar case of conflict between constituent partners. Naturally, no two conflicts are alike. But, there are standards of practice that apply internationally and, when precedents are created, these in turn create new standards.

STANDARDS, PRECEDENTS AND AUTHORITATIVE ADVICE

In this section, a chronological sequence of events and highlights regarding the treatment of the SFRY in the process of its disintegration, and proposals for a confederal arrangement for Cyprus and for Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo will be mentioned in order to prepare the ground for analysis and comparison in the remaining sections.

1. On 16 December 1991, the European Community's Council of Ministers adopted a 'Declaration on Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union' and agreed to extend recognition by 15 January 1992 to those republics that met the conditions of recognition. The Declaration affirmed the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, particularly the principle of self-determination. It then noted that the European Community would "recognise, subject to normal standards of international practice and political realities in each case, those new states which, following the historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations."¹

Serbia objected to the Declaration and charged that it violated international law, set a dangerous precedent for challenging a state's territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders and undermined the international practice that recognition would only occur at the end of a negotiated process.

2. On 4 July 1992, the EC Arbitration Commission found that the federal institutions of the SFRY were incapable of functioning as originally designed in the Yugoslav Constitution and that the SFRY should therefore be considered to have dissolved and ceased to exist. The Arbitration Commission also found that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) could not be considered to be the continuity of the SFRY.

3. In 1994 the Council of Europe, in co-operation with the European Commission for Democracy through Law, put together a seminar to look into the modern concept of confederation as a model for preventing the disintegration of states in the post-Cold War period. In early 1991, Slovenia and Croatia proposed transforming the SFRY into a confederation of sovereign republics to prevent its break up. Later, many saw this proposal, which Serbia, the USA and the EC turned down, as a missed opportunity that could have prevented the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

In the opening statement of the seminar, Constantin Economides, Professor at Pantios University and Director of the Legal Department of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed:

"[T]he modern institution of confederation is of obvious relevance today. In a world profoundly shaken in the past years by radical and indeed revolutionary change, in a world undeniably in crisis and seeking to create a new order and equilibrium, the confederation as an institution has become increasingly topical and, given its flexibility, may in fact play an important regulatory role. In particular, a confederation might halt or at least attenuate the phenomenon of disintegration, by far the predominant trend in countries of Eastern and Central Europe today, most often brought about by the pursuit of fanatical, not to say mindless nationalist policies... A confederation can also accommodate a union, association or assembly of two or more States wishing to co-operate closely without going as far as total fusion in a federal State and to retain their full sovereign national identity."²

In the same seminar, Professor Murray Forsyth of the University of Leicester pointed out:

"[C]onfederations always point in two directions simultaneously: they imply a 'yes' to some form of lasting union, and a 'no' to the complete loss of the statehood of their members. Confederations do not, and cannot, emerge from an unreserved desire for independence, any more than from an unreserved desire for union. They represent an attempt to placate these two demands simultaneously. They are a 'half-way house'... Here I am referring to situations in which there is deep distrust between the units based on their previous unhappy experiences of being joined together in a close - unitary or federal - political incorporation. Usually the root of the distrust is ethnic in the broad sense of the word. There are memories of ethnic discrimination, if not of outright ethnic persecution under the old system."³

4. In 1998, the late Professor Daniel J. Elazar, a prominent scholar on federalism, wrote:

"Today... confederation and confederal arrangements are being revived as the post-modern form of federalism that seems to be particularly useful in connecting... states and peoples that will not require them to merge into new nations but enable them to preserve their national identities and existence, and recognition of the realities of ethnic distinctiveness and, at times, conflict."⁴

Elazar added:

"Today, confederations are often used where the separate ethnic or national loyalties of the constituent states are very strong and their people wish to preserve them, but at the same time see the advantage of long-term or permanent links with other states and peoples."⁵

5. In early 2000, the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) sponsored an independent study to address the Cyprus Question. Nathalie Tocci, who prepared a 55-page report

entitled 'The 'Cyprus Question': Reshaping Community Identities and Elite Interests within a Wider European Framework', stressed:

"[A] unitary inter-communal state along the lines of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus and the UN resolutions since 1974 would be both unviable if one accounts for the matrix of elite positions, and undesirable once one begins to foresee the likely consequences of its implementation. A solution based on a unitary sovereign state failed in 1963 and would be even more likely to do so today. It is therefore crucial to propose a settlement which is both viable in terms of an initial agreement and desirable in terms of its subsequent implementation."⁶

Tocci suggested, as the first step, a confederal arrangement for Cyprus, which would not evolve into two separate states, but would evolve into a tighter federation through growing integration and experience of joint governance. Her conclusion was:

"Such a solution appears to be one of if not the only viable option for the Turkish Cypriots. As stated above the Turkish Cypriot elite, having effectively governed as a de facto state for thirty-two years would not agree to an immediate renunciation of their control over the TRNC and thus agree to anything but a confederation with some form of differentiated citizenship. A confederal arrangement would represent a two-fold gain for the Turkish Cypriots who would not only retain control over their de facto state and gain international recognition, but would also enjoy a significant boost to their economy... A confederal arrangement also offers some attractions to the Greek Cypriot elite. For example, retaining a two-state system would imply lower economic costs to the Greek Cypriot community... A confederation ... would offer the Greek Cypriots the economic gains that can be derived from increased economic contact..."⁷

6. In the spring 2000 issue of Foreign Policy, US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, in an article entitled 'Self-determination in an Interdependent World' wrote:

"Brutal military rule made the local population determined to break free of Jakarta (Indonesia). The people of East Timor made that desire clear in a popular vote... Now, the United Nations, with the support and participation of the United States, is supervising East Timor's peaceful transition to becoming the first new nation of the new millennium."

7. On 15 February 2000, the Brussels-based Centre for the Study of International Relations and Strategic Studies (Universite Libre de Bruxelles) organised a seminar in Brussels where Professor Clement Dodd, from the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, stated:

"The Turkish Cypriots, whose Turkish forbears colonised the island in 1571... have a long established stake in Cyprus and cannot be dismissed as '400 year visitors'. They too claim the right of self-determination, which lies at the heart of liberal democracy and which is very difficult to deny, however politically disruptive it may be in some parts of the world. If Kosovo and East Timor, they ask, why not Northern Cyprus? This is what lies at the heart of the Cyprus conflict, nullifying so far attempts to unite the two sides politically."⁸

8. In a research paper titled 'Cyprus, Which Way? - In Pursuit of a Confederal Solution in Europe', Nanette Neuwahl, Jean Monnet Professor of European Law at the University of Liverpool, noted:

"Neither a unitary state nor a federation is able to offer the Turkish Cypriots the guarantees they require. The latter solution has been sought for years. It is now becoming less and less acceptable to

both sides...History suggests that federated entities with markedly different features from the majority (cultural, religious, linguistic, and so on) tend to want to break loose, as is the case with Quebec in Canada. Stable federations, let alone unitary states, presuppose a strong cohesion between people within the federation, and it is no understatement to say that this is currently absent in the case in Cyprus."⁹

On EU membership and the benefits of a confederal arrangement for the Greek Cypriot party, Neuwahl points out:

"[T]he option of a confederal state, say the Cyprus Confederation (CC), within the European Union would seem an attractive option. The more loosely knit structure of the Confederation adds to its strength, and combined with the supranational framework of the EC it may just about appeal enough to make it attractive for all sides...Even disregarding the security aspects of the problem, and looking only at economic considerations, the Greek side too would stand to gain, through the improvement in the relations with Turkey and the elimination of all the distortions of economic relations concomitant to the dispute. The lifting of sanctions and other obstacles to North-South trade, and also the improvement of relations with Turkey imply new business opportunities for the whole of the Cypriot shipping industry, tourism and other enterprise."¹⁰

Neuwahl also stresses Turkey's key role in Cyprus and adds, "No solution of the Cyprus problem is conceivable without the co-operation of Turkey." Considering Turkey's vital interests vis-à-vis Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot people's security needs linked to Turkey, she suggests:

"[T]he only way forward would therefore seem to be to attempt to synchronise the entry [into the EU] of Turkey and the Cypriot confederation. This may entail some delay of the latter, but nobody should really be too sorry for that, as without Turkey's approval, Cyprus accession may not be 'worth' a lot."¹¹

9. Carl Bildt, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to the Balkans, wrote:

"[T]he present structure of the FRY is unsustainable even after the demise of the Milosevic regime. At a minimum there is a need for a new power-sharing deal between Serbia and Montenegro. Such a deal should move the FRY more towards a confederation of sovereign republics..." (para. 6)

"There is no way in which stability in the region can be built on a continued role for Serbia over Kosovo. There has, therefore, to be a constitutional divorce between the Republic of Serbia and the future Kosovo. In order to be stable over time, such a divorce will have to be codified and accepted by a democratic Serbia. Otherwise there will be no stability." (para. 7)

"It thus seems logical to direct our efforts in Kosovo towards the gradual establishment of a Republic of Kosovo equipped with the same degree of sovereignty that we can foresee for the Republic of Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia in a future arrangement. Such a concept will give Kosovo a more far reaching sovereignty than has ever been envisaged..." (para. 8)

"In the long-term this stable political order can be secured with the membership of these countries in the European Union."(para. 12)¹²

PARALLELS

The two ex-partner peoples of Cyprus are primarily interested in preserving their respective national identities and existence. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was constituted on a

democratic basis following a unanimous vote of the Turkish Cypriot Assembly on 15 November 1983 and a referendum on 5 May 1985 in which the Constitution of the new Republic was adopted. The TRNC possess all the necessary qualifications for statehood as enumerated in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and the EC Arbitration Commission ruling of 29 November 1991: a permanent population, a defined territory, an organised political authority that exercises sovereignty, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. As the EC Arbitration Commission confirmed on 27 April 1992, recognition is not a prerequisite for the foundation of a state and is purely a declaration on its impact.¹³ The TRNC has accepted all appropriate international obligations and has committed itself in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations.

Turkish Cypriots feel a deep mistrust towards the Greek Cypriot people based on their previous traumatic experiences and memories of outright ethnic persecution and discrimination, under the 1960 partnership Republic and during its break-up.

In spite of this deep mistrust, the bitter memories of the past and the continuing conflict with the Greek Cypriot party, Turkish Cypriot political leaders still wish to work and co-operate with the Greek Cypriot people, primarily because they share the same island and prefer to act as a bridge of friendship between the motherlands, Turkey and Greece. The Turkish Cypriots, however, cannot be expected to do this at the expense of a complete loss of statehood and sovereignty.

This is why, on 31 August 1998, the TRNC President, Rauf R. Denktash, proposed the establishment of a Cyprus Confederation between the two sovereign Republics of the island.

This proposal would facilitate close and institutionalised co-operation between the two parties without going as far as total fusion, while providing for a new order, stability and equilibrium on the island, as well as in Turkish-Greek relations and in the Eastern Mediterranean region in general. A confederal arrangement also offers the best formulation for adapting the 1960 'state of affairs' and equilibrium to the needs and realities of today.

Unfortunately, the Greek side and concerned parties, such as the UK, the EU and the USA, have so far failed to appreciate the significance and relevance of this proposal, raising doubts as to their priorities and real intentions. As for the UN, while one representative of the Secretary-General is suggesting a constitutional divorce between Serbia and Kosovo and the establishment of a confederation between the sovereign Republics of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo to prepare the ground for peace and self-sustaining stability in the Balkans, another is doing exactly the opposite in Cyprus by suggesting the formation of a 'common state' with single sovereignty and citizenship. This is in spite of the fact that the UN has the parallel mission of preparing the ground for meaningful negotiations on the island, where, what is at stake is peace and self-sustaining stability in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

This inconsistency, which became evident in the comparison of the international community's handling of the Cyprus Question with that of the SFRY and with authoritative advice on the matter, raises a number of questions:

1. Following the Greek Cypriot party's usurpation in 1963, the partnership Republic of 1960 became incapable of functioning as originally envisaged in the 1960 Agreements and its Constitution. Amendments to the 1960 Constitution, which the Greek Cypriot party made unilaterally, represented

an obvious violation of the Constitution and the 1960 Agreements. As acknowledged in the 10 September 1964 (S/59 50) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (para. 218), the Turkish Cypriot side desperately tried, through the UN, to restore the constitutional order of 1960, but each time was refused and humiliated by the Greek Cypriot side.

In view of what happened and the fact that Greek Cypriot violations were intended to achieve enosis (union with Greece), shouldn't the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus be considered to have dissolved and ceased to exist, as was done in the case of the SFRY? Furthermore, it is clear that the Greek Cypriot party has not since 1963 functioned under a Constitution applicable to the whole island.

2. The international community has recognised and accepted the justified claim of the people of East Timor and Kosovo to break free from their oppressors. While East Timor's independence has been accepted, the UN itself is suggesting a 'constitutional divorce' for Kosovo and, "The gradual establishment of a Republic of Kosovo, equipped with the same degree of sovereignty that we can foresee for the Republic of Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia in a future arrangement."¹⁴ The Turkish Cypriot people, as an equal co-founder of the 1960 partnership Republic, is still oppressed and victimised by its former Greek Cypriot partner, who continues to claim to represent the whole island and to impose embargoes on them. Following 20 years of suffering and struggle (1963-1983), the Turkish Cypriot people, in self-defence and to preserve their existence and separate identity as a political equal, had no option but to establish their own state.

Turkey, under obligation as a Guarantor of the 1960 state of affairs, helped the Turkish Cypriot people to resist persecution and oppression and is standing by in order to facilitate peace and self-sustaining stability - very similar to what NATO has done for years and is continuing to do in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Given the above circumstances, why should not the claim of the Turkish Cypriot people to statehood be accepted, or why should not the de facto 'constitutional divorce' between the Greek Cypriot 'Republic of Cyprus' and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus be recognised, so that, equipped with the same degree of sovereignty, the two parties can work towards a confederal arrangement as suggested for the sovereign republics of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo?

3. Some third parties tell Turkish Cypriot politicians that their equal political status can only be recognised at the end of the negotiations and as part of an agreement. Those who raise such distorting arguments need to answer questions such as the following:

a) On what grounds and on what authority is the equal status of the Turkish Cypriot party being presented as a subject of negotiation? Bearing in mind that the Turkish Cypriot party is not a subject community of the Greek Cypriot party or its government, why should Turkish Cypriots accept to discuss their status with Greek Cypriots? Did Greek Cypriots negotiate and come to an agreement with the Turkish Cypriot side when they unilaterally changed even the unchangeable provisions of the 1960 Constitution? Why should the Turkish Cypriots be expected to accept the Greek Cypriot usurped 'Republic of Cyprus' as the continuity or successor of the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus?

b) Statehood and recognition was extended to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia in spite of

the objections of Serbia, which defended its case on the ground that they were unilateral declarations of independence and were not based on an agreement. The countries that recognised Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia argued that oppression could not be used to maintain the integrity of a federation or partnership.

In the case of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot partner destroyed the 1960 partnership through force of arms. It has attempted, without success, to reduce the Turkish Cypriot partner to a minority within that Republic and, but for the successful resistance of the Turkish Cypriot partner, would have turned the partnership state into a purely Greek Cypriot state. How is it that Greek Cypriots are allowed to oppress the Turkish Cypriot partner in Cyprus under and by virtue of this false representation? Why should not the Turkish Cypriots' right of self-determination and statehood be recognised under such circumstances?

CONCLUSION

Brief reference has to be made here to two of the many relevant points Dr Andrew Mango, former Head of the BBC South European and French Language Services, raised at the Cyprus seminar of the Brussels-based Centre for the Study of International Relations and Strategic Studies (CERIS). One of the points is:

"[T]he absence of bloodshed in Cyprus, achieved since 1974, is a boon to be treasured. There has been no bloodshed because the island's inhabitants are secure in their lives, homes and property, and because men of violence have been kept apart. Any settlement which jeopardises this security would lead to a renewal of intercommunal violence... People say 'apply to Cyprus EU rules on freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, etc.' without thinking what would follow. But the consequences are easy to predict".¹⁵

Very sound advice. Dr Mango is urging us to be proactive and warning us not to resort to self-defeating or unsustainable practices.

The second point is: "[T]here are no examples of the reconstruction of multiethnic societies, after these have broken up into separate ethnic components."¹⁶

The fact that there is no Cypriot nation and that the 1960 partnership Republic has disintegrated into two sovereign Republics has to be accepted. Ignoring the facts on the ground and the perpetual use of double standards with regard to Cyprus are not sustainable. Furthermore, the difficulties of reconstruction have to be appreciated. It has to be understood that a quick fix will not work. The recognition of these facts may open the way for tailoring a loose bond between the two republics of the island. With foresight, leadership and vision, and with the building of trust, mutual interests and respect, such a bond could in time grow into a federation.

But, the Greek and Greek Cypriot obsession of looking upon Cyprus as a Hellenic island and the fanatical pursuance of zero-sum strategies under the influence of this obsession - while leading members of the international community and especially of the EU are following appeasement policies - are destroying the chances of a self-sustaining resolution. The illegitimate and unethical EU membership process initiated by the Greek Cypriot party, which it claims is on behalf of the whole of Cyprus, has further confounded an already complicated problem. The acceptance of the Greek Cypriot application as a valid application for the whole of Cyprus, the treatment of the Greek Cypriot side as the sole interlocutor for the whole island, the conclusion that this unilateral

application meets all the criteria for membership and that the settlement of the Cyprus issue is not a precondition for membership - all these have made the power imbalance on the island worse. Equipped with EU backing, the Greek side is now more convinced than ever in the validity of its zero-sum approaches. The so called 'catalytic effect' that was expected from the EU membership process, obviously based on misinformation and inaccurate assumptions, has, as a result, turned into a time bomb, growing in destructive capacity as the pages of the timetable for enlargement are being turned. The handling of the Cyprus issue and of the Greek Cypriot application for membership proves that the EU does not have a viable and sustainable regional perspective on how to deal with Cyprus.

What are needed now are proactive measures. Cyprus should not have to go through another failed partnership and yet another war before the international community reaches the conclusions it has reached in Kosovo. The price of insistence on 'failure strategies', like admitting Southern Cyprus to the EU before a comprehensive settlement with the Turkish Cypriot party and under the claim that it represents the whole of the island, will surely be very high. Every single party will stand to lose. The primary losses will be in European and Eastern Mediterranean security and stability, as well as Turkish-Greek and Turkish-EU relations. Such a nightmare scenario has to be prevented. This, however, will not happen on its own and third parties - especially those that have a stake in European and Eastern Mediterranean security - have to give the new proactive approach the needed push. The best way of doing this is to start by addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, halting all unilateral initiatives that are seen by the other party as offensive (rearmament programmes, embargoes, EU membership before a settlement, etc.), taking steps to restore political power symmetry, and creating the structural and behavioural grounds on which a new partnership can be built between the two sovereign republics of the island. It is now time to learn from the mistakes of the past and to take lessons from the Cyprus and Balkan experiences for self-sustaining resolution and stability.

A confederal model offers the last chance for the two peoples of Cyprus to establish a new partnership. This chance can only be translated into reality if both parties see that they need each other in equal measure and thus appreciate the virtues and benefits of a partnership based on sovereign equality. If the international community is genuinely interested in a new partnership, it has to take on some responsibility in preparing its ground as discussed above. There cannot be a forced partnership (like a forced marriage) in this time and age. Time is running out and if the needed re-framing and transformation, on all sides, does not come about soon, then formally allowing the two peoples to go their own way would be the only sensible path through which self-sustaining stability and peace can be secured.

1 ICG Balkans Report No. 101, 'Current Legal Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and of Serbia and Montenegro', 19 September 2000, Washington/Brussels, pp. 6 -7.

2 European Commission for Democracy through Law, *The Modern Concept of Confederation*, Santorini, 22-25 September 1994, p. 6.

3 Ibid. (1), p. 60-61.

4 Daniel J. Elazar, *Constitutionalising Globalisation, the Revival of Confederal Arrangements*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998, p. 40.

5 Ibid., p. 111.

6 Nathalie Tocci ; "The 'Cyprus Question': Reshaping Community Identities and Elite Interests within a Wider European Framework"; Centre For European Policy Studies; Brussels; page 23

7 Ibid. (5), p. 25.

8 Andrew Mango, Christian Heinze, Clement Dodd, Ergün Olgun, Geoges Delcoigne, Paul Taylor, The Need For New Perspectives on Cyprus, Centre for the Study of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Brussels, 15 February 2000, p. 16.

9 Nanette Neuwahl, 'Cyprus, Which Way? - In Pursuit of a Confederal Solution in Europe', Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law, University of Liverpool, Harvard Law School Web Site.

10 Ibid. (8).

11 Ibid. (8).

12 UN Report, 'To Prepare for Peace-Towards Self-sustaining Stability in the Balkans', October-November 2000.

13 ICG Balkans Report No: 101, "Current Legal Status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and of Serbia and Montenegro", 19 September 2000, Washington/Brussels, p.17.

14 Ibid., para. 8.

15 Mango, Op. cit., p. 23.

16 Mango, Op. cit., p. 22.
