I. Introduction

Turkey has been an active player in the arena of European security and defence architecture since the beginning of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War changed the rules of the game and Turkey’s status in this new environment was no exception. Turkey evaluated changing conditions, and came up with the conclusion that NATO membership would not suffice anymore, and that the WEU was an important organization for the continuation of Turkey’s relevance in the post-Cold War era. Within this context, Turkey tried to develop its “associate membership” status in the WEU.

Concurrently, the EU member states, for various reasons, have been looking for a stronger military crisis management capability in the post-Cold War era. Accompanied by changing French and UK positions, this has led to the creation of the ESDP and to the de facto transfer of the WEU into a dormant position. Turkish authorities have perceived the whole process as their “exclusion” from the European security and defence architecture. From their perspective, the Nice arrangements, which set up the rules of the game for the ESDP, were not therefore satisfactory. However, after a series of negotiations, Turkey accepted a package deal negotiated by the UK and the US. This time, it was the EU that was not able to give a positive answer: Greece was opposed to the so-called “Ankara” package.

At a time when the whole ESDP issue seems to have reached a satisfactory solution for all, this article tries to shed light on the above-mentioned developments, in more specific terms to explain the reasons for this Turkish attitude regarding the ESDP from the very beginning and, therefore, aims to reach a better understanding of the package deal reached on the ESDP, on 13 and 16 December 2002, in NATO and the EU.

Within this framework, the paper starts with a detailed explanation of the development of the ESDI within NATO, the revival of the WEU, and Turkey’s brief
experience in that organization. Subsequently, reasons for developing a separate European military crisis management capability are studied. The rules established for making use of this capability are also evaluated, together with Turkey’s expectations for a status in this new structure. Finally, a critique of these expectations is set forth. The negotiations leading to a compromise between non-EU European Allies and the EU on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other hand are briefly touched on, together with an evaluation of the package agreement finally reached. This leads the reader to an analysis of the chances for effective cooperation between NATO and the EU, from the perspectives of both the EU and Turkey.

This limited study shows that Turkey should not have been named as an “obstacle” for the ESDP, as its policy has followed logical national security considerations. These considerations finally led Turkey into accepting a compromise package with the aim of becoming a partner of the EU on ESDP issues. Implementation of the NATO-EU strategic cooperation would provide everyone with the possibility to see whether the sole problem in ESDP was the so-called “Turkish obstacle”. The writer is convinced that it was not.

2. Europe’s security architecture after the Cold War

Among other things, the end of the Cold War signalled an end to a very well defined security order in which every player knew its role almost by heart. With the straitjacket of the Cold War being taken off, it was clear that NATO, like other players, would require substantial adaptation if it were to continue to exist as an organisation. NATO was successful in adapting to the new security environment to a very large extent. One major area of NATO’s adaptation was the building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.

2.1 The development of the ESDI within NATO

The elements of the ESDI were defined in the Berlin decisions of the Alliance in 1996. The Final Communiqué of the Berlin NATO ministerial meeting explains the aim of the ESDI in the following words:

An essential part of this adaptation is to build a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, which will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance.
as an expression of our shared responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and reinforce transatlantic partnership;…. (emphasis by the author)

Subsequently, the Strategic Concept of 1999 confirmed that “the European Security and Defence Identity would be developed within NATO” (emphasis by the author.) The text also explains the main aims of the ESDI:

…it will assist the European Allies to act themselves through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case by case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose. (emphasis by the author)

The parts of this paragraph as emphasized by the author were interpreted in different ways by different countries involved in the development of the ESDI, and later that of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). One could conclude that the Cold War restrictions were helpful for all NATO allies to have the same perceptions as to the meaning of these words, whereas the end of these restrictions created an ambiguity in meanings. Although this was at first called, by some, “constructive ambiguity”, in time its “constructive” nature became very dubious.

Finally, NATO’S Washington Communiqué established the basic principles of the ESDI and expressed the Alliance’s readiness to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance was not engaged. The Washington Communiqué established an equilibrium between ready access by the EU to the Alliance’s assets and capabilities on the one hand and the participation of non-EU European allies in the ESDP on the other. Through this equilibrium, the Alliance engaged itself in assisting the EU in four main areas for attaining an autonomous European military capability. These four main areas are later on referred as ‘Berlin plus’. 

Before analysing, in more detail, the Turkish position amidst the evolving European security architecture, the underlying reasons for the Turkish attitude should be clarified. Its roots were embedded in two main parameters: the equilibrium created between the participation issue, and the EU’s access to NATO’s assets and capabilities as explained above; and the so-called “WEU acquis”. The latter is studied below.

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5 Anthony Forster and William Wallace make a similar judgement in stating that “in the 1990s, the disappearance of the original organising threat and the absence of transatlantic consensus on the character and seriousness of potential new threats led to divergent assumptions about the purpose and priorities of the Alliance”. Anthony Forster and William Wallace, ‘What is NATO for?’, Survival 43 Winter 2001-02 :108.
6 Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999, Washington D. C., para. 9 and 10. These paragraphs of the document are provided in annex for ease of reference.
7 ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements include assured access to NATO’s military planning capabilities, European command options including further developing the role of DSACEUR (Seputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe), presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations, permanent arrangements and further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system.
2.2 Revival of the WEU

The WEU was established on 17 March 1948 by the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Defence (Brussels Treaty). It had provided a positive sign of European efforts against the Soviet threat and was vital in the US decision to become engaged in European security. On the other hand, NATO became the main security and defence organisation during the Cold War and the WEU remained in a de facto dormant position.

In the middle of the 1980s, with the revival of debates on European security, the WEU again became instrumental. The reason was that some European countries were looking for a more European role in the security of the continent. Consequently, the WEU was revitalised by the Rome Declaration of Foreign and Defence Ministers on 26-27 October 1984. With the Rome Declaration, the WEU members were also defining the European security identity for the first time.

However, the WEU developed especially strongly after 1991, with the end of the Cold War. It has provided a new definition of the European security architecture in the post-Cold War era by becoming itself a framework for dialogue and cooperation. Within that framework, two main changes could be identified in the character of WEU after the Cold War. The first was the fact that the WEU’s relations with the EU changed dramatically. The WEU became the “defence arm” of the EU. On the other hand, the WEU established close links with NATO, on the understanding that NATO remained the main security and defence organisation of the post-Cold War era as well. The second change in the character of the WEU was that it opened its doors to different categories of states and, therefore, became an all-embracing security and defence organisation. This was a reflection of the euphoric atmosphere that prevailed all over Europe after the end of the Cold War. As a result, the European allies were invited to become “associate members” of the WEU, which will give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities of the WEU.

According to Guido Lenzi, the WEU constituted “the bridge and possibly the conveyor belt between the EU and NATO, providing the EU with a more solid operational underpinning, and NATO with a more coherent European political commitment.” The WEU helped develop the ideas of an increased role for Europeans in European security to become a reality in operational terms, although its operationality remained limited. Its limited character, however, cannot overshadow the fact that it was a start.

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8 The Treaty was later named by the Protocol signed in Paris on 23 October 1954. Two more countries, namely Italy and Germany, joined the first group of WEU Members (Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France and United Kingdom) with this Protocol. Portugal and Spain adhered to the organisation in 1988 and Greece in 1995, therefore forming the ten full members of WEU. Apostolos Tsohatzopoulos, ‘WEU’s Challenge’, NATO Review Summer 1998: 4.
12 European Allies are Norway, Iceland, Turkey and, following their accession to NATO, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary.
The WEU also contributed to institutional development at the military level among the European states, in the absence of the U.S. The Situation Center, the Planning Center, the Military Committee (composed of Chiefs of Staff), the Military Delegates Group (composed of permanent military representatives and with a permanent chairman), the Council meetings at Defence Ministers level were all realised under the roof of the WEU. Although most West European allies were already following similar procedures within similar politico-military bodies in NATO, the difference made by the WEU was substantial: non-NATO EU member states, non-EU European allies, central and eastern European states (candidates for NATO and/or EU accession) and the EU member states were coming together with their military authorities, discussing security and defence issues and conducting operations according to procedures developed together.

In everyday working practices, different statuses of membership were diminished to a minimum, and one of the main characteristics of the WEU working procedures was a sense of unity and equal participation in decision-making towards reaching a common decision at all levels, including military and diplomatic. WEU experience provided one of the essential elements of the future European security architecture for some WEU states, including Turkey.

2.2.1 WEU experience of Turkey

Turkey applied for membership of the WEU in 1988, following its application for membership of the European Community in 1987. No follow-up was given by the WEU at that time. However, the non-EU European allies were invited to join the WEU as Associate Members on 30 June 1992. Turkey’s WEU experience started, therefore, started as of 1992, together with two other associate members, Iceland and Norway, later to be joined by the new European allies, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

The status of associate membership and more specifically the position of Turkey in WEU, improved in an incremental way, from the beginning until 1999, when developments in the EU dominated the agenda and changed the perceptions of the WEU member states about the role of the WEU. According to the document on associate membership of the WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, these three states accepted fully Part III, section A of the Petersberg Declaration. The second paragraph of this section reads as follows:

They [WEU Ministers] also stressed that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the Treaties which bind member states within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg declaration in disputes between member states of either of the two organisations.

The document states further that these three countries will participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council, of its working groups and its subsidiary bodies; will be

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14 Petersberg Declaration of Western European Union Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992. The declaration consisted of three subtitles: “on WEU and European Security”, “on Strengthening the WEU’s Operational Role” and “on Relations between the WEU and the other European Member States of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance”. The section on strengthening the WEU’s operational role set out three tasks other than common defence: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These tasks are later to be referred as the ‘Petersberg tasks’.
associated with the Planning Cell through a permanent liaison arrangement by nominating up to three officers; will take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces; will be connected to member states’ telecommunications system; and will contribute to the organization’s budget. Finally, the associate members were foreseen to participate in space activities of the Satellite Center. Gradually, these participation arrangements were developed even further.

The conclusions to be reached on the WEU experience of Turkey are three-fold. First of all, the arrangements in the WEU have provided Turkey, as an associate member, with de facto full membership. Secondly, they have been based on the primacy of the Alliance. Being an ally has given Turkey a privileged access to decision-making procedures. Finally, compared to the primacy of the Alliance, the EU membership has had a limited effect on the status of members in the WEU. Therefore, it was clear that the relationship WEU would establish with the Alliance, would accentuate the role of the latter and anchor the former closely to NATO. These three conclusions are important in understanding how Turkey perceived the EU’s initiatives on the ESDP.

The joint WEU/NATO exercise CMX/CRISEX 2000, which was designed to test and validate NATO/WEU arrangements, was of key importance as a demonstration of NATO/WEU cooperation in practice. However, the exercise clearly showed that the non-EU European allies and WEU full members (in other words EU members) were not able to work together as harmoniously as the arrangements had foreseen. Ten WEU full members, who are also EU members, had some difficulty in accepting the role that NATO was supposed to play in a European security architecture. The exercise was marked by a division of states along the Atlanticist-Europeanist line. However, it was Turkey that was highly criticised by its allies and other EU members in general during the whole exercise. It seems that Turkey was turned into a “scapegoat” because of a problem of not its own making.

15 Until 1999, Turkey had contributed approximately SUS3,684,221 to the WEU’s budget, according to the Turkish delegation to the WEU.
16 Document on Associate Membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, 20 November 1992, article 3.
17 In the case of commitment of alliance assets and capabilities to WEU operations, associate members will participate on the same basis as full members in these operations as well as in relevant exercises and planning; they will also take part in meetings of the WEU Council and its working groups when they are addressing WEU’s contribution to NATO defence planning process; furthermore, the full participation of associate members in council meetings and its working groups is extended to all discussions regarding WEU operations, including discussions following the issuing of initial planning directive in a crisis situation; associate members will also take part fully and on an equal basis in WEU-led operations involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in all aspects of force planning, operational planning and exercises; associate members will participate to all exercises; if associate members participate in WEU military operations deriving from decisions by members states, the arrangements for the conduct of these operations will be based, on a case-by-case basis by the participant states; associate members that have notified the Council of their intention to contribute to an operation undertaken by WEU by committing military and/or other relevant forces will be entitled to participate fully in the planning, decision-taking and the command structure; associate members will participate in meetings of the Space Group and have access to relevant documents and to dossiers produced by the Satellite Center, task the Center, and contribute to its budget; security interests of associate members will be fully taken into consideration, Turkish parliamentarians as parliamentary representatives of an associate member participated to the WEU Assembly (though with limited rights), Turkish authorities and academicians took part in discussing the transatlantic relations within the framework of Transatlantic Forum activities and accessed to the research activities of the Institute of Strategic Studies. Turkish authorities took part in the activities of the Western European Armaments Group and Western European Armaments Organisation.
2.3 Reasons for developing a separate European military crisis management capability

While NATO was offering an already established structure with efficient procedures, and the WEU was providing an enlarged framework for discussions of European security and defence issues, the question of “why bother?” to establish a new institutional framework should not be surprising. The answer might be two-fold. On the one hand, it was clear that NATO could not be the sole security framework, as security was no longer defined in military terms alone, and as NATO, as a military organisation with limited membership, was not able to provide solutions to these non-military aspects of security. In that respect, although the WEU provided a larger forum for discussing security, it also suffered from being a military institution. Furthermore, the WEU was criticized as being too complex because of different statuses and as having a too soft profile.18

On the other hand, a sense of ‘Europeanness’19 was developing together with the European integration process even during the Cold War years especially in the economic area. It was not limited to the economic area but was absorbing new domains by a “spill-over” effect. Clearly, the search for a stronger common foreign and security policy supported by necessary military capabilities was a logical continuation of the success in economic and monetary union for a “union” that has been looking for a global role to play in international politics. In fact, France and Germany had long argued that a merger between the EU and the WEU would render the CFSP more effective.20 However, some EU members, including Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, but especially the UK, were against such an option, if for different reasons. As long as the opposition of these countries - but especially that of the UK- continued, Turkey enjoyed the inclusive character of the post-Cold War European security architecture.

Although it is true that the 1991 Maastricht Treaty started the process of giving more voice to the EU in international politics, and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty that took it much further21, the declaration made by the UK and France on 3-4 December 1998 in Saint-Malo showed that British opposition to developing an ESDP no longer existed. The acceleration of developments with St-Malo led the way towards the Cologne European Council meeting of 3-4 June 1999. At Cologne, the EU member states declared their intention to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence, and decided to transfer the Petersberg functions of WEU to the EU.

From that time on, the WEU has been left to sleep.22 As Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty was left intact, the WEU was de jure kept alive. The

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20 Kori Schake et al., “a European Defence,” p. 27
21 It was the Amsterdam Treaty that defined the Petersberg tasks and stated the availability of the WEU as a tool for the implementation of these tasks by the EU.
22 The Dutch Presidency of the WEU in the first half of 2001 even described the WEU as “sleeping beauty” in a documentary film produced by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 2001.
consequences of de facto killing WEU were much more important than the fact that it was left to sleep. The most important consequence, in the context of the aim of this paper, is that 28 European states with differing membership statuses were deprived of an opportunity of pan-European cooperation and discussion on European security and defence issues. This loss provoked frustration in most of these countries, although they preferred not to voice this frustration for different reasons: most of them did not do so because of their candidacy for EU membership, which they hoped would bring them membership after a short while. This was not the case for Turkey and her frustration grew with the ESDP arrangements set out by the Nice Summit Presidency Conclusions report of December 2000.

2.3.1 The rules of the game

The Nice summit conclusions have developed the rules of the game in the EU concerning the ESDP. One of the most important aspects of the Nice summit presidency conclusions for Turkey and other non-EU European allies was the fact that these conclusions have also established the arrangements for their involvement in the ESDP process. The presidency report on the ESDP of the Nice summit conclusions gives in its first pages the main principles of the ESDP project vis-à-vis non-EU European NATO members. It states that “the EU project is open”. However, this openness is conditional: “This openness, must, of course, respect the principle of the European Union’s decision-making autonomy”.

Annex VI of the presidency report sets out the principles of these arrangements further in detail, by frequently repeating the expressions of “decision-making autonomy” and “single institutional framework of the Union”. The insistence on this wording clearly puts forward the fact that these arrangements will only be established by the EU. According to the report, during non-crisis periods, a minimum of two meetings each at EU+15 (EU with non-EU European allies and other candidates) and EU+6 (EU with non-EU European allies) formats as well as one ministerial meeting at each format are envisaged. There are also meetings foreseen at military committee level and military experts level. Furthermore, each third country is invited to appoint a representative “from its mission to the EU” to follow the ESDP. These countries were also invited to appoint an officer to the EU military staff as a contact person. Two “information” meetings were foreseen for these contact officers during each presidency, together with specific liaison arrangements for NATO/EU exercises.

According to the arrangements for crisis periods, pre-operational phase foresees intensification of “dialogue” and “consultation” which will enable “the discussion of the concerns raised by the countries affected, particularly when they consider their security interests to be involved.” During the operational phase, the “six” and the “15” are formally invited only after the EU Council approves the operation concept. The “six” will be able to participate in EU-led operations if they so wish, in case of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities. In cases where NATO assets are not used, they may be invited by a council decision of the EU. Finally, the Committee of Contributors (CoC) is

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23 “Killing” might not be the most appropriate word to use as the Assembly of the WEU and armaments cooperation (WEAG and WEAO) continues to exist and the Council of the WEU convenes from time to time.
24 Presidency report, subtitle III.
25 The stage of involvement for associate members in WEU was much earlier: they were able to participate following the decalaration of their intention to participate in the operation. Outline Crisis Management Procedures, CMI(99)43/2/8.
foreseen to play a key role in the day-to-day management of the operations and includes all troop contributing states, both EU and non-EU countries. However, it is the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU “which exercises the political control and strategic direction of the operation”. The PSC only takes account of the views expressed by the CoC.

2.4 Turkish expectations

Turkey fully supported the development of the ESDI in NATO. However, it was traumatised long before the Nice arrangements by the fact that Europeans were preferring to make their own arrangements for military crisis management, therefore reinforcing the view that they intended to leave Turkey “out in the cold”. The main reasons for these concerns were clear: European security and defence were to be dealt with an organisation that Turkey was not a full member of; on the other hand, NATO, which Turkey enjoys equal rights, was faced with the risk of the so-called 3 Ds (discrimination, duplication and decoupling); and the WEU, in which it developed an equal status over time and enjoyed rights close to the EU member, was to be left dormant. Moreover, Turkey’s location in the midst of a region of instability, namely the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, necessitated that Turkey be perceived by other countries in the region to be firmly anchored in the European security architecture. This perception of Turkey has been put at risk by the fact of it being sidelined in the new EU project. Therefore, the so-called “participation question” was above all an issue of national security.

Turkey’s position had been rendered even more complicated because of a series of unresolved problems with one of the EU member countries, namely Greece. Although Greece was not able to make the whole Union to act in a negative way against Turkey, it was still able to block possible positive acts by the EU.

The following words of Simon Duke may summarize very well Turkish expectations and their frustration regarding Nice arrangements:

Turkey’s chances for securing EU membership are slight. Arguably, however, Turkey is the key to Europe’s security, given its location vis-à-vis the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Islamic countries bordering the Russian Federation…. the exclusion of Turkey has left a key player in the cold.26

2.5 Further evaluation of Turkish expectations

The “participation question” put forward by Turkey was criticised widely before and after the Nice arrangements. The main criticism was that Turkey was blocking the development of an effective NATO-EU relationship. Kori Schake gives a very relevant answer to this criticism.27 She states that the Turkish frustration was not the major problem: The major problems were among the allies and the EU members, as they were not

27 Kori Schake, Constructive Duplication, p. 10.
28 In fact, Schake uses the word “veto”, which Turkey did not use, concerning participation, in the exact meaning of the word.
able to agree on the modalities for assured access to NATO planning capabilities, the need for duplication between NATO and the EU, the role of DSACEUR and the widening gap between the US and EU military capabilities. Furthermore, she asserts that Turkey’s potential veto forced NATO and the EU to address the issue of duplication, and therefore it was beneficial in the long-run.

It is also argued that Turkey’s position was not in line with its status as a candidate for EU membership. This could have been a valid argument had the EU been able to show without doubt its sincerity in its offer of membership of the EU, but the EU’s actions in Turkish-EU relations were far from being coherent. Discussions in EU countries about whether Turkey could ever become an EU member were very frustrating for pro-European Turkish public opinion. All these confusing signs from the EU side led Turkish authorities to believe that EU membership might not be realised in the near future, and that Turkey’s security interests should be protected by becoming more closely involved in the security and defence discussions of the EU until that time.

As a continuation of this criticism, some were arguing that while the other non-EU European allies were happy with the Nice arrangements, Turkey was not. This criticism was based on the assumption that the other five non-EU European allies shared the same lot as Turkey vis-à-vis the EU. However, the facts seem to be different: Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland were to become EU members in the near future while Norway and Iceland did not want membership. Furthermore, none of these countries are located in a geography comparable to Turkey’s; and finally, unlike Turkey, their European identity has not been widely questioned.

One final argument of the critics is that Turkey was in fact trying to get one foot inside the EU through the ESDP. This argument must be based on the assumption that the EU is mainly a security (and defence) organisation, so that any country wanting to get into the EU should first try to enter from the back door of the EU’s security and defence policy. As the EU has never been defined as such until today, the validity of such an argument naturally rings hollow.

III. A new European security architecture in the making

3.1 On the way to a solution…

Turkey’s insistence on the further development of the Nice arrangements led to the start of a round of negotiations in May 2001 in Istanbul between Turkey, as a non-EU European NATO member and the UK, as an EU member, through the assistance of the US, and resulted in an agreement -- the so-called Ankara Document -- issued on 2 December 2001. The Ankara package was formed of six sub-titles in line with the Nice conclusions. However, the sections on the NATO obligations of certain EU member states and on the modalities for the participation non-EU European Allies in EU-led operations, in particular, seem to have played an important role in the Turkish acceptance of the whole package. The first section on the NATO obligations of certain EU member states restates Article 17 of
the Treaty on the European Union and adds, accordingly, that in no circumstances will the ESDP be used against any ally. This is, in fact, the so-called “security pledge” that Turkish authorities have been seeking. A similar arrangement existed also in the WEU. The section on the modalities for the participation non-EU European Allies in EU-led operations envisages that non-EU European allies will be invited by a council decision to participate in an EU autonomous operation. The security concerns of these allies will be taken into account in such a decision. Moreover, if an envisaged autonomous EU operation is to be conducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European ally, or may affect its interests, the council will consult with that ally, and on the basis of this consultation, will consider its participation in the operation.

Although the Ankara Document would be the basis of a future agreement, it was not accepted immediately by the EU at the European Council of Laeken, mainly due to the objections raised in the EU. The bottleneck continued during the European Council of Seville. However, together with the start of the Greek Presidency on European security and defence affairs on 1 July 2002, and the need to declare the ESDP fully operational in 2003, the EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, was obliged to take the initiative on the issue in order to reach an agreement. Solana’s efforts bore fruit during the Brussels Summit of 24-25 October 2002, in the agreement of Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States on the Ankara Document, with small amendments on two points. The document was, from that time on, baptised as the Nice Implementation Document.

The initiatives of Javier Solana continued with increasing pace and included, among others, a one day trip to Turkey on 14 November 2002. The trip ended in a very positive tone, and was followed by a declaration by Turkish President Necdet Sezer, during the NATO summit meeting in Prague, in which he expressed Turkey’s readiness to start preparations for a joint NATO-EU crisis management exercise in 2003. This presidential declaration provided a solid indication that a solution was at reach.

The long-awaited solution came during the Copenhagen summit meeting of 12-13 December 2002, as a result of parallel work both in NATO and the EU. While negotiations were carried out in the North Atlantic Council on a draft Council decision on NATO-EU cooperation and ‘Berlin plus’, Javier Solana transmitted formally to NATO the text of the Nice Implementation Document, as agreed by the Heads of State and Government of the EU member states on 13 December 2002. The NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, replied to Solana’s letter by transmitting the final text of the North Atlantic Council decision of the same day. Finally, a joint NATO-EU declaration issued on 16 December 2002, in which the members of the both organisations welcomed

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29 The related sub-paragraph of article 17 of the Treaty on European Union is as follows: “The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.” (Article 17.1)


32 These changes are the inclusion of a mutual security pledge meaning that NATO military crisis management will not be used against the EU or any EU members state and an understanding that no action will be taken that will violate the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
the establishment of an NATO-EU strategic partnership, identified the principles of this partnership and put on paper once again the equilibrium between the participation of non-EU European Allies and NATO’s support to the ESDP.

The EU Heads of State and Government issued a declaration at Copenhagen on the issue as well, although it was not a part of the final package. The declaration stated that EU members states that are also NATO members or partners in the Partnership for Peace programme of NATO, having signed a bilateral security agreement with NATO, could take part in the NATO-EU strategic partnership. This declaration, therefore, made it clear that the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and Malta would be excluded from Berlin plus arrangements and their implementation, although they would continue to enjoy full and equal membership rights in all other aspects of the ESDP and the CFSP. The same understanding was also included in the North Atlantic Council decision although by widening the scope of exclusion to the NATO-EU strategic partnership.

With the intensive work carried out in both organisations, the above-mentioned package deal established the so-called strategic partnership of NATO and the EU. With the necessary detailed arrangements finalized on 17 March 2003, the implementation of the full package became possible by that date. The transfer of the NATO mission in Macedonia to the EU on 30 March 2003 provided the first operational test for the implementation of the package.

3.2 The chances of effective cooperation being established between the EU and NATO

3.2.1 For Turkey

Effective cooperation between the EU and NATO provides Turkey with a chance, first of all, to develop a new perspective in its national security and defence, according to the new European security architecture in the post-Cold War era, and to keep adapting in order to reach the increasing pace of developments after the terrorist attacks of 11 September. Second, it should be accepted that membership of NATO will not be sufficient in the future for Turkey to feel secure against new forms of risks. Third, it is also true that Turkey can benefit from full cooperation with the EU member states only by becoming an EU member. The accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria) are not of a “military” nature. Therefore, until the time that Turkey fulfils the necessary criteria for becoming an EU member, it has more interest in getting a working NATO-EU relationship going and in making sure that the Europeans understand the special role of Turkey, as well as possible mutual benefits of further cooperation.

On the other hand, this should not mean that Turkey should choose between NATO and the EU or the US and the EU member states. The US will always play an

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33 “Risk” is herewith preferred to the word “threat” to underline the difference between the new security risks of the post-Cold War era and the security threats of the Cold War.
34 This special role is especially marked by Turkey’s being a secular country with its population being largely Muslim. It is also marked by Turkey’s identification of itself as a member of several regions (Black Sea, Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, a European as well as an Asian country, a member of the transatlantic “community”). Finally, Turkey is a country which aims at realising the Western principles of democracy, human rights, rule of law and secularism. It is a barrier to the instabilities in these regions, and this barrier is also in the interests of the West.
important role in Turkish security and defence considerations. Once again, regional instabilities and new forms of security risks require increasing stress on multilateral ways of dealing with crises which do not exclude cooperation with the EU/the EU member states or the US/the Allies.

It is true that Turkey’s geopolitical importance remains vital to European security. Because of its location, it needs to maintain good cooperative relations with influential/main organisations concerning both non-military issues and security and defence. NATO provided enough safeguards during the Cold War, even on non-military issues where normally the EU, the OSCE and the United Nations were expected be more effective. Now, however, conditions have changed: NATO is no longer just a collective security organisation: more importantly, it is no longer the sole organisation providing security for a large group of countries against an “enemy”. There are rather several asymmetric risks and several international organisations able to respond to these risks, albeit in different ways. The EU is one of them and is getting more and more serious in acquiring a security and defence-related profile.

3.2.2 For the EU members

The EU is still in the early stages of developing its military crisis management capabilities and the necessary decision-making procedures in order to have an effective security and defence policy. The president of the EU Military Committee, General Hagglund, stated in January 2002 that all depends on the EU and the choices it will make.  

The operational readiness of the EU, as declared initially in Laeken and finally in May 2003 in Brussels, will need to be matched with “deeds”. The EU Police Mission and the operation in Macedonia seem to be giving the first chances for proving its operationality and the credibility of the EU in this new area of EU action. In order to pass this test, the EU will be required to show that it can establish an effective working relationship with NATO. The package deal sealed between the two organisations could allow them to pass over the problems at discursive level and engage together in the theatre at the practical level. This will also constitute a way of engaging the U.S. in European security: if Europeans do not continue to hold NATO as the centrepiece of European security, among other means, by accepting a real partnership with European Allies, the US will be much less inclined to become involved in European security.

Beyond the urgent need for an effective NATO-EU relationship, the EU has an interest in cooperating with Turkey. The frequently used expressions of “Turkey’s geopolitical importance” and “Turkey’s role as a regional stabiliser” might in fact be pointing to an evident situation, but that does not change the fact that the EU should be able to take this fact into consideration within the limits of ESDP.

Turkey’s possible role in fighting against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction after 11 September is important from both the European and American perspectives. Cooperation between Turkey and the EU in the Middle East conflict, as well as the crisis/war in Iraq at the ESDP level, can be given as relevant examples. Turkey is a very useful potential partner, eager and capable of working with the EU for a European security and defence policy. The capacity and the willingness of Turkey have been confirmed by its actual contribution to operations in the Balkans. Turkey provided 752

troops within the overall KFOR of 26,317; 498 in the SFOR of 12,646; eight of the 375-strong EU force stationed in Macedonia under Operation Concordia; 165 of the UNMIK/Police Force of 4481, and finally 12 in the EU police mission force of 518 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{36}\)

Furthermore, as stated by a NATO officer\(^{37}\), an “issue of scale is there and you cannot get rid of it”: the scale of Turkey’s armed forces and the percentage of its defence expenditure is so much bigger than the other EU members that it would not be wise to exclude such a country from a major European security and defence policy. If allowed to be involved in the European Capability Package (ECAP) initiative of the EU, Turkey may contribute concretely to the capability development efforts of the EU in harmony with its national contributions to the Prague Capabilities Commitment of NATO.

At the same time, giving the impression that the EU’s new security and defence role is in fact creating new divisions would not be a good start for European security. Cooperation with Turkey, as much as possible, would be beneficial to the EU from this perspective as well. Such cooperation would be consistent with the EU’s sacred rules, such as transparency, multilateralism and equal burden-sharing in providing security and stability. Finally, EU member states can make a real policy out of the ESDP if they are able to develop the EU, among other characteristics, into an institutional framework for security and stability. One way of doing would be to convince Turkey and Greece that they are able to solve their problems among themselves without adversely affecting Turkish-EU relations. In this case, the EU should show that it is objective and not a party to their problems, while at the same time urging both parties that solutions are needed.

The ESDP project is not just a big issue in itself, but is also a big issue within the framework of Turkish-Greek relations. The reason for this is that while the two countries have taken important steps in ameliorating their relations, they are still in a stage where both of them are checking whether the other one is following its words by deeds, before taking a decision to review their policies \textit{vis-à-vis} each other. The ESDP could be a big test case prior to decisions by both states to revise their policy assumptions.

Looked at from an optimistic perspective, the package deal can bring an opportunity for both sides in such a scenario: it may not be the perfect solution, for Turkey or Greece, but it can provide a chance to move forward. Good neighborly relations between Turkey and Greece, to be supported by an ESDP framework, can help both countries to work in a mutually reinforcing way for stability, peace and prosperity in the region, starting with the Balkans and expanding to other regions. If they want to follow their European partners in all areas of integration Greece and Turkey both have a strong interest in developing and consolidating good relations.

\textbf{IV. Conclusions}

Turkey is aware of the fact that it can play a full role in the European security and defence architecture only if it becomes a member of the EU and that accession to the EU will be conditioned by the Copenhagen criteria. Although Turkey is taking steps in this direction, it will surely take time to realise this goal of EU membership. On the other hand,

\(^{36}\) The numbers are given as of April 2003 and provided by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^{37}\) Speech on the US and NATO by Mr. B. F. Bach, Land Forces Analyst, International Staff, Defence Planning and Organisation Division of NATO, at the College of Europe, Brugge, 7 March, 2002.
security and defence issues cannot be kept waiting, as the risks to the stability and peace of Europe are real and they are all very close to Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey seems to believe that its security and stability will be best protected if it cooperates with the EU and its member states. Charles Grant develops this idea of a “strategic partnership” with Turkey even before Turkey becomes a member of the EU\(^{38}\). It is good that Grant in his book explicitly states that Turkey should become a full member. It is in fact vital that another formula for a Turkey-EU relationship short of full membership be avoided to weaken or deflect attention from Turkey’s final target of EU membership.

The US also seems to have realised the importance of having a secular and democratic Turkey on its side. US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz’s words make this even more clear:

Right here in NATO we have an ally, Turkey, that is a model for the Muslim world’s aspirations for democratic progress and prosperity. Turkey, too, deserves our support. Those who would criticise Turkey for its problems confuse what is problematic with what is fundamental, focus too much on where Turkey is today and ignore where it is going. What is fundamental is Turkey’s democratic character. It changes its leaders at the ballot box, and stood with us during the long struggle of the Cold War. A Turkey that overcomes its present problems and continues the progress that country made over the course of the last century can become an example for the Muslim world-an example of the possibility of reconciling religious belief with modern secular democratic institutions.\(^{39}\)

Finally, Nathalie Tocci comes to the same result and asks for an “additional European Strategy for Turkey”.\(^{40}\)

After suggesting that cooperation on security and defence is in the interest of Turkey and the EU, it should be added that further cooperation is needed if the aim is to manage transatlantic rivalries and work together for peace and stability in and around Europe. In furthering cooperation, the EU should be aware of the fact that it is logical for any country to ask for an increasing role in decision-making when it is committing the lives of its soldiers for a possible EU-led operation.

Finally, the start of real cooperation between the EU and Turkey would have the by-product of Turkey and Greece adapting their risk assessments to and basing their relationship on good neighbourliness. The author believes, on the other hand, that if EU foreign policy would be no more than a policy which follows the interests of one of its members, then the EU has more interest in not getting involved in order to protect its credibility. In such a case, the two sides would be obliged to learn to cooperate bilaterally and as neighbours. The CMX/CRISEX 2000 NATO-WEU joint exercise was supposed to be a test for NATO-WEU cooperation procedures in crisis management three years ago. It

\(^{38}\) Grant, ‘2010', p. 10

\(^{39}\) Paul Wolfowitz, speech at the 38th Munich Conference on security policy, 2 February, 2002

\(^{40}\) Nathalie Tocci, 21st century Kemalism, p. 34
turned out to be a benchmark event, proving that NATO-WEU cooperation no longer worked and that new divisions in European security architecture were close to opening up. Following the finalization of a NATO-EU strategic partnership in December 2002 and the detailed arrangements to be concluded until 1 March, 2003, NATO and the EU are planning to engage in the first NATO-EU joint crisis management exercise, in November 2003 (CMX/CME 2003). This first joint exercise of the two organisations will be a test case to see whether they have been able to establish a working and durable relationship. Finally, possible EU-led operations with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, especially in the Balkans, will prove whether the NATO-EU strategic partnership is to bring more peace and stability to this powder keg of Europe.

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