MIGRATION-SECURITY NEXUS IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS

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Abstract

Securitisation on the issue of the migration in Euro-Mediterranean relations has mainly started in 1990s. Due to this securitisation, the issue has been perceived as a “threatening” factor especially for the public order, cultural identity, and the domestic stability in the EU. Imbalanced securitised approach of the EU and the increasing militarisation of border controls have created a self-reinforcing dynamic rather than limiting the migratory pressure from the southern Mediterranean countries. The tendency of the EU to securitise migration issues both in its internal and external affairs, putting most emphasis on irregular migration and readmission agreements, rather than the other aspects of visa facilitation and legal migration might form an impediment to the success of cooperation with Mediterranean countries. What the EU needs to regulate migration in the Mediterranean is a more cooperative approach rather than the overemphasis of restrictive migration policies.

Key Words

European Union, Migration, Securitisation, Euro-Mediterranean, European Neighbourhood Policy

Introduction

International migration is one of the main issues of the twenty-first century affecting the lives of more people as well as the policies of more states. It is estimated that little more than 2 percent of world’s population were living outside their countries of origin by the late 1990s. In line with the general tendency in the world, the concerns regarding the migratory flows from third countries have moved to an upper place in the European Union (EU) agenda after the 1990s. In this new era, discourses have started increasingly to concentrate on the destabilizing effects of migration on public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability in

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the European countries. Therefore, the issue of migration has been subject to a process of securitisation.

Along with this securitisation process, the issue has also gained political sensitivity in the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1990s. Due to the mounting magnitude of the migration in the Mediterranean, the EU and the member countries have begun to perceive the migratory flows from the third Mediterranean countries as a threat to the stability and welfare of European states and societies especially after the 9/11 bombings. Hence, migration-security nexus has strengthened in the Euro-Mediterranean relations frequently hindering a balanced and comprehensive assessment and leading to the neglect of the humanitarian aspect of the issue. Furthermore, the restrictive policies of the EU have proved to be rather ineffective in reducing the migratory pressure, in particular the pressure of irregular immigration in the Mediterranean. Taking these points into account, this paper aims to question the migration-security nexus in the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Within this context, in the first two sections the paper gives the historical background of migratory flows across the Mediterranean and makes an overview of migration in the Mediterranean. Afterwards, it concentrates on the migration-security nexus in the Euro-Mediterranean relations before making an evaluation of the EU’s migration policies in the region in a future perspective.

**Historical Background of Migration Flows across the Mediterranean**

The Mediterranean region takes its place as a “rapidly-evolving, semi-peripheral region” in the world arena which has a “traditional surplus of labour” creating under-employment in the agricultural sector and other labour-intensive sectors of the economy.\(^1\) Therefore, migration has always played a significant role in the relations between the European Community (EC) and the non-member Mediterranean Countries. Indeed, the history of migration flows from the southern Mediterranean to Europe goes as back as to the 1950s. In the 1950s and 1960s Western Germany, France and Belgium, which faced labour shortages, were actively recruiting temporary migrant workers or “guest workers”. In the beginning, these workers were mostly from southern European countries like Italy, Spain and Greece. But in the 1960s

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as the migration flows from southern Europe declined, the northern countries started to accept immigrants also from eastern and southern Mediterranean.2

Thus, “extra-European” migration flows to Europe were added to the “intra-European” migration. Previous colonial ties had a relevant impact on the structuring of these flows. As expected, France received most of its immigrants from Maghreb countries whereas the UK recruited workers mostly from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other former British colonies in the Caribbean. Additionally, countries such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden widely resorted to guest-worker policies in the post-Second World War era. The conclusion of bilateral recruitment agreements between the EC members and Mediterranean countries provided an additional momentum to the migration across the Mediterranean. For instance, Germany concluded recruitment agreements with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961, 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). As a result, the number of immigrants rose drastically during the 1960s and 1970s.3

Both the sending and receiving countries were satisfied with the increasing immigration trend to Europe in those years. Emigration was assessed by the sending countries as a way of keeping unemployment under control and a source of income due to worker remittances. On the other hand, immigration meant cheap labour and a way of supporting European post-war economic development for the receiving countries. But the enthusiasm of the receiving countries for immigration started to decline after the 1973 oil crisis and the following economic recession which was accompanied by increasing unemployment.4

The worsening socio-economic situation resulted in “a shift from a permissive immigration policy to a control-oriented, restrictive policy” in Europe. However, despite the policies aiming to limit immigration, the immigrant population continued to increase because of family reunifications in the late 1970s and 1980s. Hence, family reunification took its place on the agenda of European countries and the temporary guest workers increasingly turned into “permanent settlers”.5

4 Pierros et al., p. 31.
The 1980s also witnessed an important change in the nature of the migration issue in the southern European countries as the “globalisation of migration” was increasing the number of countries influenced by immigration. The economic development of southern Europe and accession of these countries to the EU turned these countries into emerging destinations for emigration from the southern Mediterranean. The immigration trend into southern Europe gained impetus particularly in the late 1980s and during the 1990s. Southern European countries witnessed an increasing amount of immigration primarily from the southern Mediterranean for the first time in their history. Despite the uncertainty in the numbers, the number of legal migrants in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece tripled between 1981 and 1991. Thus, the “traditional role of southern Europe as a labour reserve” had reversed. Historical emigration countries have become immigrant countries receiving immigrants especially from North Africa. This was in a way a “revolution in the traditional pattern of population flows from Mediterranean to Europe”. This new development played a role in the perception of the immigration issue as a common problem in Europe in the following decade.

By the early 1990s, the concerns in Europe grew further. Numbers of asylum seekers were increasing, whereas tight European immigration laws led to climbs in the amount of irregular migration flows from non-EU Mediterranean countries. Consequently, the rising visibility of immigrants combined with social problems of the “new settlers” resulted in intensifying pressure on the receiving countries. Moreover, the member states, who were taking steps for the development of free movement within the EU and for a degree of harmonization in their immigration and asylum policies, were facing additional difficulties due to the complexity of this process. As a result, these factors altogether started to draw more attention to the issue especially in the media. In this era, political discourses have started increasingly to concentrate on the destabilizing effects of migration on public order and domestic stability in the European countries. Thus, migration has become a highly sensitive political issue in the Euro-Mediterranean relations.

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7 Geddes, p. 17.
10 Bicchi.
12 Huysmans, p. 754.
An Overview of Migration in the Mediterranean

Migration has historically been one of the most important realities in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the Mediterranean is now one of the major regions of emigration in the world. Ten Mediterranean Partner Countries involved in Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) have 10 to 15 million first-generation emigrants in different countries. First-generation emigrants from these countries represented around 4.8% of their total population which reached to 260 million in 2005.15

The destination of migrants from third Mediterranean countries varies according to their origin. Migrants from the Maghreb countries and Turkey mainly tend to go to Europe, whereas the ones from Eastern Arab Mediterranean countries tend to prefer the Arab oil-exporting countries and other parts of the world. As it is illustrated in Figure 1, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are the countries which have the highest amounts of migrants in the EU among the non-member Mediterranean countries. On the other hand, migrants from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and to a certain extent Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority flow mainly to the Gulf States.16

13 Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Palestinian Authority, Israel, and Turkey.

14 The EMP, which is also known as Barcelona Process, was initiated between the EU and non-member Mediterranean Countries at the Barcelona Conference on 27-28 November 1995. The Partnership has been forming the basis of the Euro-Mediterranean relations since 1995.


16 Ibid, pp. 11, 14-15.
Statistical data indicate the presence of approximately 5.8 million immigrants in the EU from third Mediterranean countries, excluding “unrecorded” migrants. As it is shown in Figure 2, Germany and France, two traditional destination countries, jointly have nearly three-quarters of this number, and the other quarter is shared among the other twenty-three EU countries. The Netherlands, Spain and Italy rank as the next three countries after Germany and France. The three largest national origin groups are Turkish (1.9 million), Moroccan (80,000) and Lebanese (48,000) in Germany; Moroccan (726,000), Algerian (686,000) and Tunisian (261,000) in France; and Turkish (196,000), Moroccan (168,000) and Egyptian (11,000) in the Netherlands.

In fact, Spain and Italy recently acted as new magnets for migrant workers from the southern Mediterranean. Since 2003, Spain has received the largest amount of immigrants flowing to the EU. Of the 1.6 million people migrating into the EU in that year, 594,300 flew to Spain. This was more than twice the migration Germany (144,900) and France (55,000) together received. On the other hand, Italy attracted 511,200 migrants in 2003.

17 Ibid., pp.11-12.
On the other hand, irregular migration is also an important reality in the Mediterranean as the sea serves as one of the key gateways for the “unrecorded” immigrants seeking to flow into the EU. The issue has started to be addressed with increasing urgency, especially by the EU states bordering the Mediterranean after the 1990s. Indeed, as irregular migration is a clandestine movement in nature, it is hard to quantify the scale of it. The only available data regarding the issue are the border apprehensions of the would-be immigrants. According to the estimations of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 100,000 to 120,000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean each year, with approximately 35,000 flowing from Sub-Saharan Africa, 55,000 from the south and east Mediterranean and 30,000 from other (mainly Asian and Middle Eastern) countries. The number of irregular migrants in the EU was estimated to be around 2.6 million by the 2000s. The main sea routes for irregular immigrants who generally travel under unsafe conditions in overloaded boats and who are thus named as “Mediterranean boat people” have been:

- from the Maghreb direct to the southern coast of Spain, or via Melilla and Ceuta;
- from Turkey to Greece or Sicily;
- from the south-eastern Adriatic coast to Italy, and especially Puglia;
- from Egypt (or the Maghreb via Tunisia) to Sicily or mainland Italy, sometimes via Malta

Throughout the 1990s the Straits of Otranto (between Italy’s Adriatic coast and Albania) and the Straits of Gibraltar (between Spain and Morocco) have been the two important entry gates along the EU’s southern maritime border. Although being over the most popular routes Greece, Spain and Italy are not always the final destinations as many immigrants subsequently move to Austria, Germany, France, Benelux and other EU countries. But as it is mentioned earlier, southern Europe has become one of the favourite places

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23 Lutterbeck, p. 61.
of residence in the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{24} The majority of immigrants are Moroccan in Italy and Spain, and Albanian in Greece and Italy.\textsuperscript{25}

**Securitisation of Migration in the Euro-Mediterranean Relations**

According to the Eurobarometer, the issue of migration ranks before terrorism among the main concerns of European citizens. A Eurobarometer survey conducted in autumn 2005 indicates that 15\% of the respondents consider immigration one of the two most important issues facing their country, whereas 14\% is concerned with terrorism (in spring 2005 10\% was concerned with terrorism and 14\% was concerned with immigration).\textsuperscript{26} Thus, partly due to its links with the labour market and partly due to its relation with the debates about national identity, immigration is a nexus area which is increasingly perceived as a worrying phenomenon in Europe.\textsuperscript{27}

In the prevailing era, EU states have to cope with a variety of issues challenging their mechanisms of societal integration and political legitimacy. These include economic and financial globalisation, the rise of poverty, the deterioration of living conditions in cities, the revival of racist and xenophobic parties and movements and the rise of multiculturalism. Under these circumstances, migration has been illustrated as “a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability”. Thus, the issue of migration has been subject to a securitisation process.\textsuperscript{28}

As defined by Buzan, Waever and Wilde, security is “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics”. When “normal politics” does not become successful, security politics takes its place and legitimise the “extraordinary measures taken to secure the survival of a political community”. In this context, a state announces an “emergency” situation and thus claims “a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development”.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{24} Pugh, “Mediterranean Boat People: A Case for Cooperation?”, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{28} Huysmans, p. 752.
Beginning in the late 1980s, migration has become a hot topic of policy debates in the EU. A key point of these debates was portraying migration as a danger to domestic society. Thus, security discourses have entered into the Europeanization of migration policy and common regulations on migration in Europe have emphasized more and more the need for restriction of population flows. In the wake of the completion of the internal market, EC policies started to relate the downgrading of internal frontier controls with the need to strengthen external borders controls.30

In consistence with the general trend, the process of securitisation of migration in the Euro-Mediterranean relations has also come to the forefront and has been intensified following the 9/11 terrorist attacks due to the insertion of an ideological aspect to the issue by relating migration with the “perceived Islamic threat”.31 The emergence of security discourses and policies regarding migration issues is generally illustrated as an unavoidable policy reaction to the challenges posed by the growing number of “illegal” immigrants to the “public order and domestic stability”. From this perspective, the security problem leads to a security policy on migration issues. Accordingly, the security policy occurs as an “instrumental reaction” to defend the state, society and the internal market.32

But in reality, security policy usually serves as a particular policy of “mediating belonging”.33 This policy impacts how a community identifies itself and how it acts towards the outsiders. It leads to the perception of others as “a threat or enemy with which there is no shared understanding”.34 In security practices, a community politically and socially identifies itself in response to an existential threat. That is why migration is often constructed as “an invasion metaphor in which the invaders undermine national identity and/or jeopardize a relatively prosperous Western way of life”.35

If we return to the issue of migration in the Euro-Mediterranean relations it also follows the same pattern. The immigrants from the third Mediterranean countries are generally seen as the “outside brought within”, challenging the

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30 Huysmans, pp. 756, 759.
32 Huysmans, p. 757.
33 Ibid.
communal and cultural integrity of the modern European states. Moreover, they are often viewed as “rivals to national citizens in the labour market and competitors in the distribution of social goods”. This approach has caused an expression of “welfare chauvinism” in some circles. From the perspective of “welfare chauvinists”, immigrants are “not only rivals but also illegitimate recipients or claimants of socio-economic rights”. Indeed, even with the relatively high levels of unemployment in the EU, it would not be wrong to argue that immigrants are still needed economically. The demographic decline and the low tendency of young Europeans to accept unskilled jobs and mobility also increase the need for further labour migrants.

There are serious concerns about demographic trends in Europe. Largely due to the considerable ageing of the population, the average dependency ratio (defined as the number of persons aged over 60 years per 100 persons aged 15–59 years) for the EU-15 increased from 26 to 35 between 1960 and 2000. The United Nations Population Division estimates that the dependency ratio in the EU-15 will reach 47 in 2020 and 70 in 2050. According to the estimations of the European Commission, public expenditures are expected to have an increase (related to pensions and health care) of eight points more than GDP between 2000 and 2050 as a consequence of ageing.

By 2050, the “working-age population” (15–64 years) is estimated to be 18% less than the current one, and the population aged over 65 years will have risen by 60%. Consequently, the “average ratio of persons in retirement” compared with the ones of the “present working age” in Europe will double from 24% to approximately 50% in 2050. Hence, the decline in the population of working age will increasingly cause significant labour shortages. Moreover, there will be need for more workers to help, through their taxes, to keep retirement and public health systems viable and production and consumption systems working.

The current allocation of economic sectors where immigrants are recruited differs among the countries. This is mainly related to the diverse

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36 Collinson, Beyond Borders: West European Migration Policy Towards the 21st Century, p. 3.
37 Huysmans, p. 767.
economic structures of the destination countries. If a comparison between Germany and Spain is made, it is observed that the immigrants work primarily in agricultural and tourism sectors in Spain, while the majority of immigrants work in the manufacturing sectors in Germany.42

Actually, certain sectors are “begging governments to increase legal labour immigration”. In southern EU countries there is a need for labour especially in the agricultural sector. However, this need is not generally taken into consideration by the immigration laws. For instance, immigration law in Spain envisaged extensive fines for farmers employing “illegal” workers. However, the demands of farmers for more work permits were not met sufficiently by the allowance of one migrant worker per farm leading the farmers to employ illegal immigrants.43

Therefore, it can be argued that securitisation of migration facilitates misperceptions and hinders balanced assessments of the issue. More specifically, it sets forth migration as a meta-matter which can be considered as the cause of many problems. Strategies of securitisation and overemphasis of restrictive migration policies lead to a wider process of illegitimating the presence of immigrants and impedes the integration of immigrants in the European societies lowering the chances of developing “multicultural policies based on a notion of solidarity”.44

Furthermore, it is hard to say that overemphasis of restrictive policies actually blocks the migratory pressure. On the contrary, it causes an evident increase in irregular migration or “illegal migration” as repeatedly referred to in security discourses. In fact, securitisation of migration in the EU is seen especially in the acquis communautaire that is mostly based on “illegal migration”. With the use of the term “illegal”, the concept of criminality is somehow linked with the concept of immigrant. Thus, “a security continuum connecting border control, terrorism, international crime and migration” is produced.45

In the Euro-Mediterranean case, the southern European countries have accelerated their efforts at managing the Mediterranean borders since the

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43 Baldwin-Edwards, p. 34.
44 Huysmans, pp. 753-762.
beginning of 1990s. They have increased the operation of both “paramilitary and military security forces” along the EU’s Mediterranean borders. However, it could be hardly stated that strengthening of the EU’s borders have had a clear influence in reducing irregular immigration into these countries while it had two important “side-effects”: the “increasing professionalisation of irregular immigration” in the form of an increase in human smuggling and the flow of migration movements through more dangerous routes. Organised crime has particularly benefited from European restraints on migration in the Mediterranean. Presently, irregular migration is now extensively controlled by human smugglers and trafficking organizations. Thus, it is apparent that stricter border controls are directly connected with accelerated activity of human smugglers in the Mediterranean.46

On the other hand, strengthened border controls on particular entry gates in the Mediterranean have led to the “diversion of migratory routes”. For instance, in Italy the “main entry point” during 1990s was the Straits of Otranto. However, strengthening of controls in the Straits of Otranto diverted the irregular migratory flows to Sicily, which is a much more dangerous route. Between 1998 and 2004 the number of irregular migrants intercepted in Sicily rose from 0.02% to more than 98% of all interceptions on Italy’s southern borders. What should be taken into consideration at this point is that such a diversion in the routes occurs at a substantial humanitarian cost. For instance in 2003, more than 400 people died off the coasts of Sicily which is a number more than the numbers recorded in any years for the Straits of Otranto.47

In fact, human tragedy is one of the basic features of migration across the Mediterranean. The number of deaths by drowning, freezing and explosion can only be roughly estimated. It is guessed that at least 10,000 persons died while struggling to cross over the Mediterranean to arrive at Europe’s southern coasts over the last decade.48 Therefore, the question of irregular migration should be considered broader in the sense that it involves the “issue of human welfare”.49 However, this humanitarian aspect is often neglected as immigration is presented and perceived as a threat to stability and welfare of European societies rather than realizing the “humanitarian challenge” with regard to the migration flows in the Mediterranean. This

46 Lutterbeck, pp. 64, 73-76.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid, p. 63.
imbalanced securitised approach does not only aggravate the situation, but also creates a self-feeding dynamic in which stricter migration controls causing an increase in irregular migration, which in turn generate the need for more controls.\textsuperscript{50} And the humanitarian aspect of the issue is lost in the shadow of this vicious circle.

Therefore, it would be reasonable to say that the migration-security nexus in the Euro-Mediterranean relations is not unquestionable. Management of migration in the Mediterranean requires a broader and more “realistic” policy vision. The “realistic” response to migration cannot be the articulation of “policy goals that seek total control or exclude” as such responses do not generally work better than generating unrealistic expectations and increasing intolerance among the society. Neither “zero immigration” policy goals of some European states in the early 1990s nor the goal of overcoming “illegal” immigration solely through “law-and-order responses” seem realistic. As proposed by some scholars, the objective should be to manage international migration through ways out of this “vicious circle” and increase cooperation among source, transit and destination countries in order to “promote the virtuous cycles of disciplined pragmatism and good governance”.\textsuperscript{51}

**Evaluation of EU’s Migration Policies in the Mediterranean in a Future Perspective**

Migration issues have been increasingly placed at the centre of various areas of cooperation between the EU and southern Mediterranean countries. This central role of the issue has emerged as a result of “communitarisation” of migration policies with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, as well as the externalisation of migration policies of the EU. This externalisation results from the efforts of the EU to adopt a “cross-pillar approach” to migration with an emphasis on financial aid for third countries with the aim of fostering development to reduce migration.\textsuperscript{52}

Given the general increase in the migration movements from southern Mediterranean to Europe in the recent decades, there has been a perception in the European countries that the reduction of the vast economic development gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean could lower

\textsuperscript{50} Lutterbeck, p. 77.  
\textsuperscript{51} Papademetriou, pp. 52-58.  
migration pressure. Throughout the world, it is recognized, particularly in the destination countries, that there is a need to use some economic instruments such as trade liberalisation, direct investment and development aid in order to reduce emigration incentives in the sending countries. Among these instruments, trade liberalisation through regional economic integration has been considered to be the most promising instrument.\(^{53}\) This strategy includes four assumptions:\(^{54}\)

- Economic situations determine the tendency to move.
- Development decreases the motivation to migrate by stimulating employment and income.
- A free market economy provides the most efficient environment for development.
- An open economy decreases wage disparities through trade and capital flows.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiated in November 1995 between the 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean countries\(^ {55}\) can be assessed as the reflection of this understanding. Dr. Jean-Pierre Derisbourg, adviser to the European Commission Directorate General responsible for North-South Relations, indicated the “desire to put a brake on immigration to Europe” as one of the basic reasons for the establishment of the Partnership.\(^ {56}\)

The general goal of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is “turning the Mediterranean region into an area of dialogue, stability and prosperity” and as stated in the Barcelona Declaration, this requires sustainable and balanced economic and social development and measures to combat poverty. The migration issue is handled under the third chapter of the EMP on social, cultural and human affairs. It could be expected that the Barcelona Declaration and the Work Programme addressed primarily the anxieties of the EU which are the issues of “illegal immigration” and the readmission of “illegal immigrants” to the sending country.\(^ {57}\)

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\(^{55}\) These twelve countries were Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Malta, Greek Cyprus, and Turkey. Greek Cyprus and Malta, which were previously included in this group of Mediterranean Partner Countries, have become EU members by 1 May 2004.


Apart from the chapter on the social, cultural and human affairs, the economic and financial chapter of the Partnership is also related with the migration issue as it aims to target the root causes of immigration especially by means of establishing a free trade area between the partners by 2010. The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area is to be achieved mainly through Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. These agreements are presented as “catalysts” for accelerating slow growth rates, decreasing the development gap, unemployment and migration. In this regard, the Initiative reflects the “EU’s faith in the virtues of free trade” in tackling north-south disparities.

In the Euro-Mediterranean case, trade liberalisation has been perceived as the most appropriate way among these instruments to address the objective of reducing the development gap and therefore reducing the migration incentives. The liberalisation is intended to accelerate the integration of the Mediterranean countries with the neoliberal global system, as well as to control more easily the impact of soft security issues such as migration. Considering this strategy of the EU, whether trade liberalisation through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements constitutes a substitute or a complement for migration is one of the most questioned topics. In fact, trade liberalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean Area seems to operate neither as a complement nor as a substitute because of the limited context of trade liberalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership just including the trade in industrial goods. However, in the long-run, provided that trade liberalisation is achieved, especially in agriculture which constitutes the comparative advantage of the southern Mediterranean countries, trade might have the effect of a decrease in migration.

Taking into account the strong root causes of migration in the Euro-Mediterranean area, it should be noted that the motto of “trade but not migration” as we see as the rationale in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership seems too “narrow” and does not fit with the reality since migration is, and will be continuing. It is obvious that stagnating economic development and high population increases continue to stimulate migration from southern

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60 Canan Balkır (ed.), *Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklığı Mare Nostrum’dan Birarada Yaşamaya*, İzmir, DEÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2007, p. 19.
Mediterranean to Europe. Hence, it can be said the initiatives in the Partnership to decrease migration could not be successful.

However, further trade liberalisation towards creating a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, including trade in agriculture in which the South has comparative advantage, might move the development frontier further to the south of the Mediterranean leading to a decrease in immigration from southern Mediterranean to the EU in the long-run. Although the migration frontier for Europe took its place in southern Europe twenty or more years ago, the development gap and “migration frontier” shifted to the Mediterranean Sea and this region emerged as “Europe’s Rio Grande”.62 In the future, it can be expected that the frontier might shift south the Mediterranean with the help of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade project by 2010. This expectation is due to the theoretical consideration that, for the countries not included in the free trade area, the external tariff constitutes an inducement for the substitution of migration for products, and thus foster more immigration from these countries.63

On the other hand, recently, another important instrument of the EU’s migration policy in the Mediterranean has been the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),64 which was established with the policy documents in March 2003 (Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours) and in May 2004 (European Neighbourhood Policy-Strategy Paper) aiming to promote “a ring of friends” throughout the EU’s neighbourhood. As the neighbourhood policy has been at the centre of EU foreign and security policy, it could be stated that it is also at the centre of EU migration policies in this region.65 The significance of this initiative for EU’s migration policy is that it gives the signals of countering the argument of “fortress Europe” creating new “dividing lines”, and “inclusion/exclusion” debate with regard to enlargement. This can be inferred from the wording of “a stake in the internal market” and as Romano Prodi said “everything but institutions”. Although these are criticized as

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63 Tapinos, p. 280.
64 The Initiative includes the EU countries, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine.
blurred wordings, it seems to offer free movement and liberal migration policies through visa facilitation throughout the process.\textsuperscript{66}

However, the positive tone of the Commission Communication on Wider Europe in 2003 towards the inclusion of free movement of persons as part of the policy towards the neighbourhood becomes less warm when the details are regulated. Nevertheless, regarding some of the grave concerns in the social policy agenda of the EU, the ageing of the EU population and the need for high skills, the Commission states that “free movement of people and labour remains the long-term objective”. The Communication does not seem to associate the exclusion of movement of persons with intensified securitisation but addresses the opposite of this process which is inclusion.\textsuperscript{67}

The European Neighbourhood Policy adds new objectives and defines new financial instruments for the relations with the Euro-Mediterranean countries intending to deepen cooperation on migration management and border controls, and suggest incentives such as preferential trade relations, improved technical assistance, and improved cooperation in a variety of fields. Besides, the ENP involves an “ad hoc approach” to cooperation on migration management. This “ad hoc approach” has created a “differentiation” principle among the countries. Furthermore, conditionality has a significant role in the ENP. Considering the political and economic situations and the institutional and legal framework in each third country, the EU differentiates its cooperation with these countries and rewards progress in this process.\textsuperscript{68}

However, along with the “differentiation” principle, it should not be ignored that each third country has to meet specified key priorities, otherwise, the EU’s migration policies towards its neighbourhood might not be effective and lose its credibility. These priorities were defined at the June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council as follows:

- participation in the international conventions and resolutions relevant to refugee protection and the protection of human rights;


\textsuperscript{67} Elspeth Guild, “What is a Neighbour? Examining the EU Neighbourhood Policy from the Perspective of Movement of Persons”, 10 June 2005, http://www.libertysecurity.org/article270.html#nb2

\textsuperscript{68} Cassarino, p. 11.
- cooperation on readmission and return of the country’s nationals and of third-country nationals;
- efforts on border controls and prevention of “illegal immigrants”;
- fight against human-trafficking and adoption of related legislative measures;
- cooperation on visa policy and adaptation of their visa systems;
- creation of asylum systems, with an emphasis on access to effective protection;
- efforts on redocumentation of the country’s nationals.\(^{69}\)

The EU neighbourhood can be defined as a multi-coloured area. When the regulations on migration are examined, it is seen that the neighbouring countries are very different among each other although they have common borders. When the neighbourhood policy was established, it included a generous spirit of inclusion of the neighbours in internal market offering free movement of persons as well as the other freedoms. However, the offer with regard to the free movement of persons seems to have changed significantly. There is a modest offer related to short stay visa policy or legal migration. As regards short stay visa policy, only for some countries, visa facilitation is possible. Regarding legal migration, there are very modest offers to the neighbours by the EU. As stated by Guild, there exists an “impression that a bundle of rights and possibilities which have already been accorded in other venues and by other means are being repackaged in the ENP and presented as ‘carrots’ to encourage the neighbours to buy into the repressive measures”.\(^{70}\)

With regard to irregular migration, EU policy in the neighbourhood might seem to create a buffer zone between the EU and other third countries. Exchanges of information, preventing irregular migration flows, readmission agreements are the main points of ENP Action Plans in this field. With the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999, the Community became competent to conclude these visa facilitation agreements, but only a few neighbouring states have signed these agreements.\(^{71}\) This policy of the EU might harm the neighbours’ relations with their neighbours since the neighbours will have to “take coercive action against the nationals of their neighbours”. Instead of strengthening solidarity and create a “ring of friends”

\(^{69}\) Ibid, p. 12.
\(^{70}\) Guild.
\(^{71}\) Ibid.
in the ENP area, this kind of an approach could be expected to cause tensions and instability. Moreover, as the European Commission declares, “from a human rights point of view, [the reinforced border control capabilities] …could mean that more people would be intercepted, refused entry and/or removed to their countries of origin, where they probably face a situation of poverty and lack of freedoms.” On the other hand, the efforts to create incentives and to identify shared commitments, especially in the framework of ENP Action Plans serve as a reflection of an understanding that the participation of neighbouring countries in the joint management of migration flows will be of key importance in the development of an EU migration policy.

In this respect, the future migration policy of the EU tends to be in “a model of concentric circles” rather than a fortress model. In the concentric circle model, as defined by Emerson, the centre tries to regulate the system with the neighbours classified according to their geographic and political distance from the centre.

At this point, it is essential to mention the Strategy Paper prepared by the Austrian Presidency in July 1998, which offered a “model of concentric circles”. The Paper stated that the countries especially placed in the inner circles should progressively be included in the border controls of the EU, readmission policies and the fight against irregular migration. Since 1998, this model has been debated by many scholars such as Lavenex and Ucarer and Thouez. With the inspiration of the Strategy Paper and these two studies, figure 3 presents the model for the future of the migration policy of the EU which is renovated according to the recent developments in the EU. In this model, there are four circles where the EU constitutes the inner circle. Candidate countries to EU membership who are in the process of harmonizing their legislation with acquis communautaire particularly on visa issues, border controls and readmission policies are placed in the second circle which is a temporary place prior to accession.

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72 Ibid.
74 Cassarino, pp. 14-16.
75 Emerson, p. 8.
76 Ibid.
78 Cassarino, p. 5.
The third circle will be consisted of Mediterranean partners and eastern neighbours who are in the context of Neighbourhood Policy of the EU, with whom the EU needs to cooperate intensively in order to manage migration and asylum movements. These countries are expected focus on “transit checks and combating facilitator networks”, thus having a role of “buffer zones” to reroute population movements before their arrival on EU territory.\textsuperscript{81} Hence, these countries will be in close cooperation with the EU on migration policies and enjoy some liberal migration incentives by the EU. The last circle of Middle East, China, Africa, USA and Latin America will be based on policies regarding “illegal” migration and asylum and decreasing push factors in these countries.\textsuperscript{82}

\textbf{Figure 3. Model of Concentric Circles for the Future EU Immigration Policy}


\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
As declared in point 61 of the Strategy paper, a country meeting its obligations would be rewarded. For instance, the second circle must meet Schengen standards as a precondition for EU membership. For the third circle, “a stake in the internal market” might be offered and economic cooperation and development aid might be offered for the last circle. In the light of this model, in case of an attempt to construct a “fortress Europe” behind the new borders of the enlarged EU, the neighbours would not be kept totally outside the process.83

Thus, cooperation with Mediterranean countries is very significant for the EU on migration issues. However, the tendency of the EU to securitise migration issues both in its internal and external affairs, seen as putting most emphasis on irregular migration and readmission agreements rather than the other aspects of visa facilitation and legal migration, might hinder the success of cooperation with Mediterranean countries.

While there is an awareness that the impact of “root causes policies” might be “visible” in the long-run, these causes should be addressed immediately, rather than trying to block immigration into the EU. Mainly focusing on readmission and repatriation in EU Action Plans on Migration does not seem as the most proper way to “build peace and prevent future conflicts” in the region.84

Conclusion

Migration has historically been one of the most important issues in the relations between the EU and the third Mediterranean countries. Statistical data designate the presence of approximately 5.8 million migrants in the EU from the third Mediterranean countries without including “unrecorded migrants”. Furthermore, it is estimated that 100,000 to 120,000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean area every year.

Although the history of migration from the southern Mediterranean to Europe goes as back as to the 1950s, the securitisation of the issue in the EU mainly started in the 1990s. Due to this securitisation, the issue has been ever more perceived as a “threatening” factor, especially for the public order,

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cultural identity, and the domestic and socio-economic stability in the EU. Securitisation of migration leads to a process illegitimating the presence of immigrants and impedes the integration of immigrants in European societies. The securitisation also hinders a balanced and comprehensive assessment on the issue. For instance, some politicians tend to use the migration issue as a meta-matter which can be shown as the cause of many problems. Many people prefer to ignore the fact that immigrants are still and will be necessary economically for Europe considering the demographic decline.

Besides, the imbalanced securitised approach of the EU and the increasing militarization of border controls have created a self-reinforcing dynamic rather than limiting the migratory pressure from the southern Mediterranean countries. Within such a dynamic, stricter migration controls cause an increase in irregular migration, which in turn increases the need for more controls. Therefore, it is hard to state that migration-security nexus in the Euro-Mediterranean relations is unquestionable. So, it is argued in this paper that what the EU needs to regulate migration in the Mediterranean in a more cooperative approach, rather than the overemphasis of restrictive migration policies.

As the future of migration policy of the EU tends to be in the model of concentric circles, cooperation with Mediterranean countries, which might have their place in the third circle, is very significant for the EU’s migration management. In this regard, European Neighbourhood Policy can provide the necessary fresh impetus for intensified cooperation on migration issues in the Euro-Mediterranean relations. However, the tendency of the EU to securitise migration issues both in its internal and external affairs, putting most emphasis on irregular migration and readmission agreements, rather than the other aspects of visa facilitation and legal migration which is in the interest of Mediterranean countries, might form an impediment to the success of cooperation with Mediterranean countries.