GEO-STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CYPRUS: LONG-TERM TRENDS & PROSPECTS

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INTRODUCTION

While concern for the resolution of the Cyprus problem has always been witnessed in the international arena, not all parties involved have necessarily been keen on helping to bring about a climate conducive to this effect. As a matter of fact, there exists a convincing argument that the internationalisation of the Cyprus problem has hindered rather than helped the settlement. It is well taken that the hesitancy of international parties in recognising the equality of the two communities on the island, and their reluctance to disown the Greek Cypriot government's claim to be the sole representative of political sovereignty, are major obstacles to finding a realistic and lasting peaceful settlement, be that “a loosely centralised federal arrangement” or a confederation, or unintentionally, an ultimate partition. There is, however, a new phenomenon in the air, that time is running short. What is meant by ‘time’ is indexed to the accelerating European enlargement process and Turkey’s by no means yet certain full placement in it. The European Union’s extension to the Eastern Mediterranean has already stirred deep waters and is bound to have further seismic effects in a region noted for its international problems and high security risks. Against this background, some segments of public opinion pave the way dangerously towards seeing the Cyprus issue as a mere bargaining chip in determining the course of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union. The major problem with this viewpoint is that it is myopically conjunctural, that is, obsessed with the immediate present, and thereby loses sight of the more structural, that is, long-term aspects of the issue in question. Just as one may win the battle and yet lose the war, as the saying goes, one may also do what seems to be the best from the perspective of the conjuncture, and yet pay a heavy price for it once history moves out of that particular conjuncture and we are once more faced with the long-term structural realities. The purpose here is to put back into the picture the long-term, structural characteristics of Cyprus within the Eastern Mediterranean matrix, and thereby to derive some policy implications for Turkey as well as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

Since the Ottoman conquest in 1571, if not before, Cyprus has remained the strategically most important island in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this paper, I intend to survey what the implications of this continuing strategic importance are for the immediate future by recourse to the patterns and lessons of history. It has long been acknowledged that a long-term perspective on history brings to the foreground structures and conjunctures at the expense of events. Rather than falling prey to events and their implications, I will attempt to identify structural trends that will dominate the first half of the twenty-first century. To do this, however, a return to the ‘long sixteenth century’ pace the eminent French historian of the Mediterranean, Fernand Braudel, is inevitably in order. A survey of how this importance has functioned in different periods is intended here. I have in mind successive periodic structures with distinct organisational logics of their own. First, there is the Mediterranean structure of commercial strategic containment adopted by the French from the Venetians. Second, there exists the geo-strategic structure of the British take over. During this era, the British took over Cyprus because of security concerns for its communication links with India in response to the
French encroachment into Lebanon. The marginalised status of Cyprus as a last resort strategic no-man’s land during the Cold War is an exception that confirms the rule. The last instance of the rule in question is yet in the making. Given the ongoing global restructurings of power, the strategic prospects of Cyprus within the Eastern Mediterranean during the first half of the twenty-first century and their implications for the TRNC need to be explored. For example, with the realisation of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, Cyprus will gain a new strategic importance with respect to the İskenderun Gulf.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS IN RETROSPECT

Before the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, the island was conceived of as a vital outpost in a chain of islands by way of which the Venetian maritime empire could extend its commerce into the Levant. Cyprus was then inscribed in a division of labour where it functioned increasingly as a latifundia type large-scale sugar producer for exportation.6 When the Ottomans turned the Eastern Mediterranean into an inland sea, Cyprus lost its strategic role as well as its export-oriented specialisation for quite sometime to come. Immersed in an Ottoman world that coincided with the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus became host to an exceptional experience of long lasting inter-communal harmony and tolerance.7

Around 1800, however, it became clear once again that the Eastern Mediterranean was no longer an exclusive Ottoman preserve. Whereas the traditional long-distance trade networks remained largely in the hands of the French merchants organised under the chamber of commerce of the port city of Marseilles, with the turmoil brought about by the French Revolution, other European powers attempted to make further inroads into the Eastern Mediterranean. Especially for the French, Cyprus was then seen as a strategic assembly point for maritime commerce in the Eastern Mediterranean.8 Given the explosive increase in local piracy by the Maltese and Greeks in the Levant within the context of Anglo-French rivalry, such assemblage was essential for the protection of the merchant marine. Cyprus made modest contributions by its cotton exports to this maritime commerce. It should be noted that Napoleon’s expedition to the Levant brought to the foreground the importance of the region for controlling British connections with India. During the same period, the Russians also ventured into the Eastern Mediterranean as part of their premature Oriental imperialism. As such, both the Eastern Mediterranean in general and Cyprus in particular made a comeback into the terrain of international history after centuries of neglect.

It was, however, as of the third quarter of the nineteenth century, that Cyprus gained a renewed importance at the crossroads of British and French interests en route to India.9 This is when the British took over Cyprus in 1878, in somewhat a belated response to the growing French influence in the Lebanon, as reflected in the French military intervention of 1861. Otherwise, perhaps a “perfectly useless island” at a first glance, as Joseph A. Schumpeter, the Austrian born prominent social scientist, characterised it,10 Cyprus nevertheless suddenly became worthy of British rule and, in turn, made Britain the leading foreign power in the Eastern Mediterranean. After the Second World War, the British left their first place in the Eastern Mediterranean to their American successors with a lag in comparison with elsewhere in the world. Even so, they chose to retain certain influence and privileges in the region, including their military bases on the island that proved of vital importance during the Suez crisis,12 so much so that Britain has become, in the long-term, “the main benefactor”13 of the mid-century Cyprus problem. Even so, within the context of US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War, Cyprus was put on the shelf as a last resort strategic no-man’s land. Hence, the rivalry was carried out on the mainland Middle East while this Mediterranean island was left
largely intact. However, it was bestowed with a neutral status and sovereignty built upon the dual principles of maintaining a balance between the Turkish and Greek communities from within as well as a balance among the interests of Greece and Turkey from without. Let alone historical antecedents, even under the 1960 Republic, Cyprus was never fully independent. The decline of US hegemony over the international order as well as its regional segment in the Eastern Mediterranean dates from the mid-seventies. In the Eastern Mediterranean, this process coincided with the gradual yet carefully orchestrated encroachment of the European Union. As of the last quarter of the twentieth century, the deliberately created equilibrium between Turkey and Greece with respect to the Cyprus question has been brought under further strain by Greece’s membership of the European Union. This has paved the way for the involvement of the European Union in the regional power equation as a party to Greek and Greek-Cypriot interests.

CYPRUS AMIDST THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD

As is being increasingly better understood, the fall of the Berlin Wall has ushered in a new era in international relations. This new era has reinforced the world economic trends towards the formation of a new international division of labour that has increasingly come to be referred to as ‘globalisation’. This new era has a number of characteristics. First, it entails a tendency towards the deepening of the global division of labour. As such, economic processes become further removed from the potential control of ‘nation-states’. Second, nation-states come under attack from outside, because they are seen as potential obstacles on the way to the realisation of the utopia of a liberal global economy, and from inside, because, given their loss of control over the economy, they can deliver less and less on their promise of better standards of living for the masses. Third, there seem to emerge new geo-cultural units larger than former nation-states yet smaller than the world itself that claim to possess civilisations of their own. Hence, follow the growing crystallisation of the contradictory trends towards globalisation and particularism and the concomitant scenarios of the clash of civilisations. Each of these characteristics has important implications for the Eastern Mediterranean in general and Cyprus in particular.

LESSON OF ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION

The globalisation of the economy underway implies that those who are left outside the circuits of this process will turn out to be losers in terms of access to both technology and higher standards of living. It does not follow from the nature of the premise that those who take part in these circuits will necessarily become winners. Far from being so, very few of the many who will be forced to take part in these economic circuits will have a chance to improve their relative position in the world economy. The differences of wealth between the North and the South will persist if not grow to the further detriment of the South. Furthermore, differentiation within the South will increase to unforeseen proportions. It is in this category that the fiercest competition will take place, and only very few countries will benefit from this. Given this rather unfavourable context, the proposals for the improvement of the economic standards of the Turkish-Cypriot community as a precondition for peaceful bi-zonal unification of the island from within may prove to be little more than sailing against the tide. Time would be on the side of those who, rather than engaging themselves in wishful thinking, face the challenge of a global economy by making courageous strategic choices. They have to measure their expected gains in such an intense competition against their prospects by way of a slightly different role that emphasises the appropriation of the
possibilities of a semi-peripherality. This leads us to the second characteristic referred to above and holds especially true for the TRNC.

THE NATION-STATE PROJECT AND ITS RIVALS

The combined effect of the Industrial Revolution in England and the French Revolution was to pave the way towards a new world order. There seemed to be a few alternatives that contested one another for about a century. On the one side, there was the liberal project of a global economy under pax Britannica. This meant there would be strategic islands of wealth and free trade in an otherwise paralysed world. Hong Kong, Singapore and Kuwait are the remnants of this project. On the other side, there was the nation-state project inspired by the universal principles of the French Revolution. This meant that the entire world should eventually become a world of free nations and their corresponding modern states. The third project was somewhat linked with the first two as a second best choice. It was the renewed quest for empires. Those who could not run the world opted for their exclusive smaller worlds. Only after the Second World War did it become clear that a world of nation-states had gained the contest. Under US hegemony, the world was organised into a system of nation-states. Mutual status and recognition of these states was more important than whether each one of them corresponded to a nation proper. Thanks to the pressures for homogeneity of the international order, Singapore and Kuwait became as much states as Malaysia and Iraq, and no one bothered if Yugoslavia or Lebanon, or for that matter Cyprus, entailed also singular modern nations from within.

The problem of international recognition that the TRNC has faced since its formation is a leftover of this previous era. Whereas the project of a unitary state of Cyprus has failed from within –despite favourable international pressure– long before the global crisis of the nation-state project, the birth of the TRNC came about as the natural culmination of trends but with a delay. With the undoing of a world of nation-states, a new world order in which there are multiple forms of sovereign organisation has already come to display its symptoms. First, the overthrow of the 1960 Constitution by the Greek Cypriots paved the way for the de facto break-up of Cyprus along communal lines with no legitimate government from within, a phenomena that the world chose conveniently to ignore for the decade to come. However, Lebanon's collapse into civil war signalled the practical dismemberment of the nation-states artificially created under the stimulus of the international order. A second phase of the break-up of Cyprus was soon to follow (1974) only to be overshadowed by the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia. On the other side, as early as in 1973, with the recognition of the People’s Republic of China, the world signalled the transition to a new era by simultaneously denying recognition to Taiwan as the Republic of China yet allowing economic relations to continue as if nothing had happened. In short, the world has entered a process of irreversible change. It has been noted that whereas formerly the TRNC stood alone as a pariah state subject to international shunning (it still is), it is now one of nearly a dozen de facto unrecognised states that by their stubborn existence are gradually undermining the rigidities of the territorial integrity principle and the doctrines and practices of international recognition policy.

As of this point, the reduction of the role of nation-state will thus lead to a world where multiple forms of sovereignty will exist side by side and where the TRNC may feel the burden of non-recognition increasingly lifted from her shoulders and acknowledgement eventually granted. Such an intermediary status coincides with a distinct economic role that takes advantage of not becoming an integral part of any larger economic entity, be that the European Union or not, but assuming the role of a transit point at the nexus of a variety of economic linkages. The TRNC ought truly to entertain the advantages she could accrue by not
becoming a part of Europe yet being in the proximity of the European economic space that links with the Middle East.

**A CIVILISATIONAL POLARISATION UNDER WAY?**

The third characteristic of the emerging world order is the potential for a civilisational polarisation and clash, an issue that has come to the top of the agenda since September 11. On the one hand, such a polarisation is bound to overlap with the North-South division of the world economy. As such, it will be intense and lasting in terms of its consequences. First, it will further drive apart the ethnic constituents of artificially created states. The project of a federal or even confederate Cyprus will become much more difficult to sustain in a world under growing pressure towards polarisation along religious and cultural lines. Civilisational distinction and belonging had already been dangerous themes of the enosis project. Given the tensions inherent in a long-term stalemate that were bound to lead to the proclamation of the TRNC, one can but expect further irreversible polarisation. In the light of this fact, the proposals to build a Cypriot identity may well turn out to be increasingly fruitless. As such an identity could not emerge even within the conducive environment of the post-World War II era, it could be little more than dangerous self-deception in an increasingly fragmenting and polarising world.

The European enlargement process that concerns both Turkey and the TRNC is also deeply entrenched in a civilisational imbroglio. One major tenet of the European Union’s approach towards enlargement has been an insistence that the ‘common heritage’ of Europe be shared and protected. However, the meaning of ‘common heritage’ has been shady enough to cover both a common popular culture as well as an adherence to democratic principles. When the emphasis is more on the first element, Europe remains more as a narrowly defined civilisational project, the unspoken assumption of which includes in the minds of many, a common religion as well. This definition is a dangerous tool in the hands of parties interested in excluding Turkey and the TRNC. There is a conscious effort on the part of the European Union to move away from this exclusionary definition towards a new sense of Europe as an all-embracing homeland for prospective participants who confess allegiance to democracy and human rights. However, whether and to what extent this tendency will penetrate into European public opinion cannot be predicted.

As far as the divisive global trend is concerned, both Turkey and the TRNC find themselves in the same boat sailing against the tide. In the immediate future, neither Turkey nor the TRNC –unless she gives up her claim to statehood, agrees to less than political equality and thereby surrenders to the Greek Cypriot offer of a subservient minority status– can be expected to become an integral part of the European project as long as the European Union stubbornly insists on its current uncompromising position. Whether or not the long and winding road from the Luxembourg to the Helsinki Summit will actually deliver the promise of Turkey’s candidacy and turn into accession and full membership remains to be seen in the medium term. As such, at least for some time, they will be left out of the geographical boundary of Europe currently being drawn in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet, both Turkey and the TRNC profess allegiance to Western values and civilisation. Hence, they will have to learn how to survive outside of Europe in a sea of hostility and cultural difference and yet continue by choice in professing similar universal values. First and foremost, they will find themselves caught in a zone of civilisational confrontation, and the ‘call of the wild’ in their ears may well intensify. Furthermore, they will have to resist the temptation to over-react to their exclusion from the European project by becoming a part of Europe’s civilisational
This is not easy to accomplish. But Turkey’s road to modernity by way of the War of Independence and the subsequent Kemalist transformation offer an important precedent as well as a source of moral inspiration. That historic era witnessed a conscious response to the challenge of the West by adopting Western values in spite of the West. If needed, the very same path can be pursued into the twenty-first century. However, both Turkey and the TRNC will need Western, modern and yet non-European allies to pursue this path further. The coincidence of strategic interests of the United States, Israel, Turkey and the TRNC—not to mention further potential allies such as Jordan and even Lebanon—is a promising route to explore.

**SKETCHING A SCENARIO FOR THE FUTURE**

The changing configuration of power in the world will have important implications for the Eastern Mediterranean in general and Cyprus in particular. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union left the United States as the only super power in the world. However, there cannot be a uni-polar world, as the very conception of polarity implies two poles. Hence, this short-term transitional phenomenon will gradually be replaced by a normal state of affairs. Europe is gaining its practical independence from the United States, emerging from under the protective umbrella placed over it during the Cold War. Now with the liquidation of the Soviet threat and the making of European unification, a ‘United States of Europe’ is bound to emerge as a major actor on the global scene. The question remains as to whether or not Europe can capture the leading role in the drama. The rise of the Pacific world was already heralded with the resurgence of Japan during the last quarter of the twentieth century. With the regional pull of Japan, the Pacific world will assume an increasingly important role in the world. Already within the United States and Canada one can observe a reorientation of wealth, influence and political power from the traditional Atlantic coast to the Pacific shoreline. This may mean a further loss of interest on the part of the United States in European affairs. Not only is Europe too far to take part in the spoils of a Pacific world, but also it can be marginalised in the eyes of the other actors in the game. Given these predictions, it is likely that the United States will concentrate its strategic interests in a few localities by recourse to pivotal states with a significant say in trans-regional security issues. A strong posture in the Eastern Mediterranean could serve the United States to contain Europe by less costly means. In response, Europe would not like to leave her gateway open to her rivals. The boundaries of Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean are the most difficult boundaries yet to be drawn. Europe originally opted for drawing these boundaries by relying on its weakest member, Greece. Where the walls were easiest to break, the defence lines seemed also the most irresponsible and weak. In the recent past, Greece has given convincing signals of a serious policy shift under way, indicating her realistic acknowledgement that she is no longer prepared or willing to overburden herself with this heavy role. Even so, Greece would insist on making this shift conditional upon negotiations and thereby extracting further concessions from Turkey concerning the resolution of Cyprus and the Aegean disputes. In spite of this shift, if Europe remains blind to facts and continues to lack the courage to draw her boundaries by way of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, it will be mainly responsible for the increasing instability of the Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, the European Union’s current dangerous policy towards the de facto divided Cyprus' (a policy based on short-sightedness) and the way the pretentious Greek Cypriot application for membership on behalf of the whole island is handled, offer good reason for concern and worry that Europe will not measure up to this task.
Whereas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the control of the strategic Suez Canal was of paramount importance, with the Gulf War we have entered a new era, where the centre of gravity of the Middle East is shifting south-east in tune with the dictates of oil routes. The rise of the Persian Gulf is significant in this respect. Controlling Middle Eastern oil will remain a high priority for both the United States and Europe. This means a continued super power presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the first half of the next century, a significant portion of Central Asian oil is expected to find its way by pipelines to the İskenderun Gulf. As such, a second Gulf is likely to emerge in the north-east of the Eastern Mediterranean where oil and water pipelines will intersect. This new factor will help raise the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean in general and of Cyprus, in particular, as a means of controlling this strategic gulf. It would be absurd to think of the defence of the İskenderun Gulf without reference to Cyprus. For Turkey to improve her standing in the Eastern Mediterranean as a local and regional power, a continued process of mutual containment between the Turkish and Greek sectors of the island of Cyprus is of vital importance. The direction international oil routes will take will also define the kind of economic activities that will concentrate in the Eastern Mediterranean outside of the domain and strict control of the future Europe. Hence, the TRNC can yet discover in these opportunities a plausible alternative to a less-than-imaginative minor partnership in the European Union for which she will have to give up her sovereignty and independence.

CONCLUSION

In the light of the above discussion, the following conclusions are in order:

1. Irrespectively of the particularities of each structure identified above, the strategic role of Cyprus has remained a constant and is likely to remain as such;

2. Cyprus owes its overall importance to its strategic position and not to its modest economic resources. The economic role of Cyprus has always been enhanced by the opportunities that are derivative of its strategic function;

3. In the shifts between the long-term structures identified above, the role of the inhabitants of Cyprus has been of importance only when they coincided and worked with global and regional designs;

4. The shifts between distributions of power between the global and regional powers have always been of great importance in determining the fate of Cyprus. In the future, the consolidation of the role of Turkey as a regional power amidst a new global order could affect positively the prospects of the Turks on this island, who paid a heavy price for upholding their identity, sovereignty and dignity through much of the second half of the twentieth century.

If history does not repeat itself, and we should well know that it does not, then making mistakes cannot be afforded. From the viewpoint of Turkey as well as the TRNC, it would therefore be prompt to safeguard and not to sacrifice long-term interests for the sake of merely conjunctural concerns.


5. Some of the ideas articulated in this paper first occurred to me during a discussion during the First International Congress on Cypriot Studies on the theme of ‘The Effect of Cyprus on the Stability and Security of the Eastern Mediterranean’, see, Eyüp Özveren, ‘Comment’ in Emel Doğramaci, William Haney and Güray König (eds.), Proceedings of the First International Congress on Cypriot Studies, Eastern Mediterranean University, Gazimagusa, 1977, pp. 107-108. I have since then revised my position in two important respects: I now think that the Eastern Mediterranean will play a much more important role during the first half of the twenty-first century than I initially attributed to it, and this will be despite a foreseeable decrease in the role of the Middle East. Furthermore, there will be much greater international involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean than I originally anticipated. However, I suspect that during the second half of the twenty-first century, the role of the Levant will diminish, in part because of the diversion of some Eurasian oil to destinations other than the İskenderun Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean will be left to a greater degree to the initiative of the regional powers.


12. Purcell, op. cit. (fn. 6).


It should be noted that the term ‘new international division of labour’ was first put forward in an attempt to reconcile the motives of European social democracy with the demands of the Third World for an improved system of North-South relations as formulated in the famous Brandt Report. The policy recommendations of the report were trashed by the 1973 crisis. Instead of the implementations of recommended policies, what has emerged is a reverse trend that now characterises the new international order in the making. Furthermore, the wide acceptance of the term ‘globalisation’ has been of dire consequence. It implies that the world consisted of isolated islands of mutual ignorance in the past and there is now something ‘new’ in the air. This image contradicts the essence of modern history. At least since the sixteenth century, there has emerged a ‘world-economy’ with a singular division of labour the space of which coincided with the territorial sovereignty of multiple states. None of these states alone could engulf the entire economy. Hence, the economy was as such global. Of course, both of the terms ‘global’ and the ‘world’ in the previous argument do not refer to the geographical terms we understand them to be nowadays, but to the historically constituted units of integration. The ‘world’ as used in the sixteenth-century world economy meant Europe and the Mediterranean as well as Latin America but excluded elsewhere. In this context, what is now in vogue as the novel phenomenon of ‘globalisation’ becomes just another phase that displays exclusive characteristics of its own as well as continuities with the past. One can at best speak of a further deepening of the long-time processes at work.


I have explored some of these implications with respect to Turkey and the region elsewhere. See Eyüp Özveren, ‘Turkey, the Middle East and the Black Sea World: A Scenario within the Confidence Interval of Future Studies’, New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol. 15, 1996, pp. 25-44.


Even a study of the economic dimensions of the Cyprus dispute identified the need to emphasise the necessity of creating a common identity as a precondition for the success of unification schemes. See L. N. Christofides, ‘Economic Dimensions of the Cyprus Dispute’ in Norma Salem (ed.), Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, p. 195. A civilisational polarisation will provide an increasingly shaky ground for building up cultural identities of the kind envisaged in some recent literature.


The exact nature of the future relationship of the TRNC to Turkey will be determined by a number of factors, mostly external. While it may be preferable to preserve the independence of the TRNC, under external pressure, a form of integration that will bestow the TRNC autonomy under the protective umbrella of Turkey may become a necessity. For a discussion of costs and benefits of the different options in this respect, consult Fatma Güven-Lisaniler and Jonathan Warner, ‘Cyprus: Bridge or Bunker?’, Perceptions, Vol. III, No. 1, 1998, p. 88.