The Evolution of NATO’s Three Phases and Turkey’s Transatlantic Relationship

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Abstract

This article explores the evolution of NATO as a security community in three phases. It argues that during the Cold War and immediate Post-Cold War era, the Alliance had a focused grand strategy. In the third phase which starts after September 11th, the Alliance’s grand strategy is in flux, while it is engaged in various missions that are a mixture of borderless collective defence, humanitarian intervention, and the safeguarding of trade routes and resources. The place of Turkey as a predominantly ‘functional’ ally in the first two phases and then as a ‘strategic partner’ in the last phase is examined and followed by the likely points of continuing cooperation with NATO and likely divergence of interests in the long term.

Key Words


Introduction

When Turkey joined NATO sixty years ago, NATO was a different kind of an Alliance than the one it has evolved into today, and Turkey was a far more different country, compared to the regionally proactive player it has become today.

While some things with respect to the Alliance’s core functions, such as the provision of collective defence for its member states and the promotion and preservation of the main tenets of a liberal Western order, have not changed, it is the new security challenges that both the Alliance and Turkey find themselves facing that profoundly alter this relationship. These new challenges broadly fall under three categories: i) new security challenges and different threat perceptions ii) The use of old tools versus new tools in dealing with stability, whether these involve the use of military hard power or normative soft power iii) the legitimacy of military intervention.

This article explores the evolution of NATO in three phases, first as a security community with a grand strategy in

the first two phases: the Cold War and immediate Post-Cold War era, and then as an Alliance in flux in terms of trying to focus a grand strategy with a mission of borderless collective defence after September 11th. The place of Turkey as a predominantly ‘functional’ ally in the first two phases and then as a ‘strategic partner’ in the last phase is examined and followed by the likely points of continuing cooperation with NATO and likely divergence of interests in the long term.

**Grand Strategies and NATO: The Making of a Security Community**

Turkey has been a component of the transatlantic security community since 1952, when it joined NATO. The concept of a ‘security community’ was coined for the first time by Karl Deutsch in 1957. A security community is more than an alliance. It can be built on a defensive alliance like NATO, but what binds its members together is more than a security guarantee. There are common values, norms and principles centring on a common ‘way of life’ which the security community strives to preserve. Throughout the Cold War, the norms and values of the transatlantic security community were very loosely defined under a ‘western’ identity.1 ‘Loosely defined’ because some of the essential norms of the community such as democratic governance, free market economies and human rights were not even consistently adhered to by many of its member states, including Turkey. However, because these member states firmly belonged to a geographically and ideologically defined ‘western bloc’, their place and identity within the transatlantic security community were unquestionably solid. Therefore this was essentially a western identity which rested upon the legitimacy of collective defence and was constructed within a framework of military security.

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Grand strategy is a policy, which combines military and non-military elements such as national resources, diplomacy, national morale and political culture to preserve and enhance a nation’s long term interests in peace and in war.2 The grand strategy of this ‘security community’ was the preservation of a liberal international order, based on the norms of democracy and free markets. This was a mission to preserve a certain ‘way of life’. The means to achieve this goal were military power projection
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The fact that NATO is more than an Alliance but a security community, also explains why it has surprisingly survived well into the post-Cold War era. An Alliance by definition has to be built against something. When that something in the shape of the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, NATO ought to have collapsed together with the Warsaw Pact. The reason why this did not happen is because what defines NATO is not only what it is against, but also what it is for. That is why the basis of NATO is more than a military alliance, it is a security community built on a basis of shared values and norms. 6

By the time the Second Strategic Concept was announced at the Washington Summit 1999, the second grand strategy of this security community had become apparent: The ‘western security community’ not only expanded its norms to the post-communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but by now it also militarily intervened to ‘put things right’ whenever there was a humanitarian catastrophe.

The wars in the Balkans put NATO center stage in this new grand strategy which heralded the ‘western security community’ as the guardian and implementer of a new international system of collective security. NATO, as the only organization with an integrated military structure became the center piece of that new grand strategy.

According to Paul Kennedy, it was the success of the first phase of this grand strategy which laid the foundation for its continuation in the second phase. Writing in 1991, he observed that “if Truman, Marshall and Acheson, and their advisers had been asked what sort of a world order they hoped would be in place forty years later, the broad outlines might look very close to what exists today”.7 Therefore what made this grand strategy a grand strategy was the fact that it did not end with the defeat communism but rather it rested on the perpetuation of the world order it sought to establish at the end of the Second World War. Yet despite the changes in the international system since 1945, such as the end of American strategic invulnerability, the rise of multi-polarity, the United States’ relative economic decline vis a vis the rise of China, Japan and the growing strength of a United Europe, the 1990s constituted a remarkable continuity of the original western grand strategy. The preservation of international institutions and their promotion to absorb new members became the key western policy decision of the early 1990s, evident from institutional blueprints for a stable Euro-Atlantic region such as NATO’s London Declaration of 1990, the EU’s Maastricht treaty, the OSCE’s Helsinki ‘Challenges of Change’ document. All of these institutional milestones set the agenda for the preservation and promotion of that ‘way of life’ inherited from the Cold War. Democratic governance, stability and free markets would be expanded through the rule of institutions, and their capacity to absorb the post-communist space, through conditionality and acquiescence to its norms. Where conflict broke out to set a ‘bad example’ to these norms that were to be upheld, the west, though reluctantly, and through a piece meal learning process, grasped the necessity and practicality of military intervention for humanitarian purposes, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo.

Thus, the 1990s were the era of benign
intervention. The military missions of the transatlantic partnership in the immediate post-Cold War era are notably straightforward, when there was consensus and when the United States took a lead. Bosnia and Kosovo were good examples of this kind of mission cohesion, and perhaps the most significant mission of the post-Cold War era was the one which kick-started the west's new found role in collective security - Operation Desert Storm of 1991.

It was Bosnia and Kosovo which shaped the Alliance's role within this new global trend of peacebuilding/statebuilding through military intervention. The Soviet Union as the big visible enemy was replaced with instability as the phantom menace. In the original New Strategic Concept, adopted in 1991 at the end of Cold War, the risk of instability was highlighted as the new threat. In this new system of collective security, preserving stability and perpetuating the world order inherited from the end of the Second World War, required a new network of relationships and institutions, one that involved building partnerships. Therefore in the 1990s NATO established new partnerships- an early foray into NATO’s agenda of transformation and building global partnerships today.

NATO’s central task in collective security was further enhanced by the peacebuilding discourse in UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace to the re-making of collective security (without a UN resolution) in Kosovo in 1999. It was Bosnia and Kosovo which shaped the Alliance’s role within this new global trend of peacebuilding/statebuilding through military intervention. NATO had its golden age in the 1990s. Not only was it the only organisation with an integrated military structure which could carry out peace enforcement and peace building missions in the Balkans, with high publicity and considerable success (despite initial hesitations and setbacks), it was also not directly facing any immediate threats of a definable nature itself. If peacebuilding was the fad of the 1990s, NATO certainly found its niche and emerged as the winner.

However, the grand strategy of defending and preserving ‘a way of life’ could no longer be undertaken by keeping the ‘other’ out. In the 1990s and beyond, the mission was altered to ‘absorb’ the ‘other’ (the post-communist space) as opposed to containing it. This is where institutions played a vital role in this project. They became the vehicles of conditionality to bring about that absorption.
In the post-Cold War era, the western alliance could not be seen to be preaching the discourse of democracy, human rights and free markets while helplessly watching yet another humanitarian catastrophe in the Balkans unfold on western Europe’s doorstep. The interest to intervene was no longer solely confined to geostrategic logic or resources, but to the ownership of international norms. That ownership of international norms lies at the very heart of the foundation of a western system of institutions, in which the transatlantic security community constitutes the core. As Dieter Mahncke pointed out in 1993, conflicts such as the break-up of Yugoslavia “may simply serve as bad examples gradually undermining the rules of conduct of the (West) European security community”.

Therefore during the first phase of NATO’s evolution, it served a grand strategy of containment. In the second phase of NATO’s evolution, it served a wider western grand strategy of not only preserving the norms and institutions of this security community but also exporting them to the post-Communist space to Europe’s East. Another tenet of this grand strategy was to militarily intervene and put things right when state’s either fell apart or ill-treated their populations. The precedents the 1990s set for normative military power projection were enormously poignant. And because NATO was centre stage to this development, it was perhaps the burden it shouldered in this respect since the 1990s that led to many disappointments in the third phase of its evolution.

During these two phases, NATO fulfilled its role with two essential attributes:

1) its technocratic know-how of military alliance matters including training and defense reform.
2) its normative power as the core institution of a security community of values.

It was in the third phase of NATO’s evolution, that of a return to collective defence, but this time a borderless definition of it, which entered the Alliance into a problematic decade of muddling through new security challenges.

**Borderless Collective Defence, Alliance Cohesion and Ownership of International Norms**

After September the 11^{th} and the United States’ and then NATO’s subsequent engagement in Afghanistan, the Alliance’s military engagement was no longer confined to a part of a wider western system of collective security. Under the 1990s system of collective security, NATO, through its military
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interventions was also fighting off ‘bad examples’. After September the 11th, NATO was not just fighting off ‘bad examples’ but a new ‘enemy’. One that was not as clear cut as a militarily powerful state.

It also meant that NATO not only had to think about security in a conceptually different way but also had to plan its operations to fit this new thinking. This included stabilization missions far away from the traditional defense perimeter of NATO, which also brings together political, military as well as economic tools. Afghanistan showed that these missions were becoming more complex, more distant and more dangerous. The Balkans were essentially peaceful by the time NATO troops went in. In Afghanistan, by contrast, instead of one mission, there were several missions: peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction combat and counter-insurgency.

These new requirements brought on by the new era of ‘borderless collective defence’ also heralded in a rapid transformation and internal adaptation of the Alliance. Perhaps the most intense period of internal transformation was the period between the Prague Summit of 2002 and the Istanbul Summit 2004.

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Collective defence, as we knew it during the Cold War was tied to a territorial contiguity. It was the territory of the Alliance’s member states that had to be protected. However, Afghanistan is as remote as one can get from Alliance territory. Yet, it did not start as a 1990s ‘benign intervention’ out-of-area operation either. In this sense, Afghanistan was not merely the recipient of ‘benign’ intervention for humanitarian purposes but a downright, straight forward Article 5 type operation to safeguard the security of the Alliance’s member states. After 2001, projecting stability was not only for the greater good but for the defence of the Alliance.

The Prague Summit emphasised the building of capabilities through the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the unveiling of a new command structure and the establishment of the rapidly deployable NATO Response Force. Reaching out to partner states in combating terrorism was another aspect of the Prague template. The Istanbul Summit was more preoccupied with building upon existing partnerships and

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forging new ones in the Gulf region. Therefore between Prague and Istanbul the Alliance in fact had plenty to chew upon with regard to specific missions and operations. This meant that at least during this time with the preoccupation of managing ‘damage limitation’ after the transatlantic fallout over Iraq in 2003, and the day to day implementation of the Prague and Istanbul templates, there was no urgent need to revisit the question of the now elusive grand strategy.  

Somewhere between its ongoing missions and attempts to keep up with a rapidly changing security environment, it has lost the vision.

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In this respect, all eyes were on the New Strategic Concept, revealed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. But the Strategic Concept unveiled at Lisbon was largely a compromise document between an emerging ‘two tier Alliance’, a Missile Defence system that had been painstakingly agreed upon, and a commitment to reconcile borderless and in area collective defence. One thing that emerged from the summit was that NATO could not go it all alone. Partnerships, both global and regional, and the Comprehensive Approach – that is coordination between military and civilian assets of multiple actors in a crisis response operation, were vital for the way forward.

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The way NATO works with partners, as well as economic and political tools alongside military ones and manages to deploy and maintain missions in long distances from its headquarters, has been the main thrust of NATO’s transformation since the Prague Summit of 2002. However it is evident that the new strategic concept is not just designed to answer the question of grand strategy which seems to be lost in the plethora of Alliance missions, but also to address the emerging ‘two tier alliance’ between those who favor a territorial collective defense, and those who favor further support to NATO’s missions beyond the Euro-Atlantic area as essential for both Articles 4 and 5. For transatlantic security the upcoming two main challenges are the engagement of partners and managing widening threat perceptions within the Alliance. As one gets into the finer details of implementing both, there is a serious risk of damaging alliance cohesion. To some extent this was the theme of the
strategic concept: the twin approach of assuring allies and dynamic engagement beyond the territory of the Alliance without damaging Alliance cohesion.\textsuperscript{12}

Also at the Lisbon Summit, NATO agreed to put in place a transatlantic missile defence system, in accordance with the US plan for a European Phased Adaptive Approach. Phase one is already underway with the radar hosted by Turkey and the deployment of \textit{aegis} ballistic missile ships to act as the interceptors. Phase two will see the deployment of ground based interceptors in Romania. A further two phases foresee the deployment of further ground based interceptors, in Poland.\textsuperscript{13} As Sean Kay points out in his article in this volume, while the first two phases are designed to face immediate threats and are based on viable technology, it is the further two phases that will present problems, not just in terms of technology that does not yet exist, but also in terms of alliance cohesion.

But even in the short run, there could be a gap in threat perceptions. While Turkey insists that the missile defence system is intended for generic threats and therefore no specific threats were named at Lisbon, in official US documents one sees the common reference to Iran.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, the Central and Eastern European allies no more fear an imminent threat from Iran, than from Russia. It would seem that allied cooperation at the early stages of transatlantic missile defence is predominantly driven by the host nation European allies’ desire not to ‘lose’ the strategic partnership with the US. The US driver behind new transatlantic security challenges is twofold: deterrence and partnerships with an emphasis on assured access to the global commons.\textsuperscript{15} While alliance cohesion can be found in assured access to the global commons, there seems little ground for consensus on deterrence and less interest among some European allies in widening partnerships.

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Another development was that somewhere between Prague and Lisbon and the unpredictable Arab Spring that was to follow, it was evident that the ownership of international norms no longer remained exclusively in the domain of Western institutions and for the first time, due to this fact, the Alliance’s grand strategy became less clear cut than it had been in the Cold War and early post-Cold War era. To take stock of the third phase of NATO’s evolution is more problematic than the first two phases.
It seems that after demonstrating its capability to adapt swiftly to changing times, and having maintained its value based identity as a security community, in the last decade NATO has found itself facing many more challenges than in the early years of the post-Cold War era. Afghanistan and the foray into borderless collective defence, has opened the question of a two tier Alliance as the need to balance in area and borderless collective defence becomes more problematic as defence cuts are likely to continue in the era of the financial crisis. The European Phased Adaptive Approach as part of NATO’s new collective defence planning, may bring about Alliance cohesion in the early phases but could easily test Alliance cohesion in the latter phases. The Alliance’s military engagement in Libya- Operation Unified Protector saw a return to NATO’s 1990s role as a provider of collective security and implementer of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. But despite the legal blessing of a U.N. Security Council Resolution, and a successful close to military operations, the Libyan intervention has left a dwindling sense of unease, unlike the NATO operations of this kind in the 1990s. The discomfort over the connection of Responsibility to Protect to regime change and the polarisation of the U.N. Security Council will be lingering after effects of the Libyan intervention. In this sense, NATO’s normative role in setting the agenda for state building is not as robust as in the 1990s. In fact, it is expected that whatever role NATO does play in a post conflict Libya, it will be a narrower, technocratic role, working alongside many other institutions and if only invited by the Libyan authorities. It is quite a far cry from the NATO of the 1990s, when it led the way in ownership of international norms and implemented them. It seems the third phase is best described as NATO in flux, alongside a changing global order.

Turkey in the Security Community: From Functional Ally to a Strategic Partner

Where has Turkey stood as an Alliance member in all the three phases of NATO’s evolution? Although Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 it is the discrepancies in the post-Cold War era, regarding its functional and normative roles in NATO that have highlighted Turkey’s unique tangential place in this security community. The evolution of Turkey’s functional role within NATO can be seen in four phases:

In the immediate post war era, as the transatlantic security community was being established, Turkey was seen by the U.S. and leading European states of the time as a strategic asset in the Middle East. This would correspond to
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the early Cold War period with signing of the Baghdad Pact, the strategically defined ‘Northern Tier’ by the U.S. and the overall objective of countering Soviet designs in the Middle East. This first phase of Turkey’s ‘functional’ asset for transatlantic security pre-dates its joining NATO. Once Turkey joined NATO in 1952, for its Allies, it now constituted not just an important asset in the defence of the Middle East, but also an essential component of the defence of Western Europe. In this sense, not only because of its geostrategic location but also because of its armed forces as a flank country, Turkey was seen as an asset in counter-balancing the military imbalance in Europe against the Soviet threat. The third phase, started with the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, and once again, particularly for U.S. policy planners, Turkey’s strategic role in the Middle East grew in prominence. This was followed by the immediate post-Cold War era, where Turkey transformed in strategic importance for the West, from being a flank country to a frontline country during the first Gulf War in 1991. As U.S. policy moved towards ‘globalism to regionalism’, U.S. interests in various regions ‘was still dependent on key allies’. Here, the use of NATO as multilateral tool, and Turkey’s position as a NATO member became all the more important. Therefore, throughout the 1990s, Turkey was no longer only a geographical strategic asset but also an asset in terms of military contribution to NATO out-of-area operations, especially in Balkans. Therefore, as NATO shifted from a predominantly collective defence organisation to a collective security organisation in the 1990s, Turkey’s role within it had stayed more or less the same, as predominantly a ‘functional’ ally. This was an arrangement which suited Turkey as well, but nevertheless it was not part of grand strategic design of a normative western security community.

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As NATO entered its third phase after September the 11th, it has been in an ongoing reorganisation in terms of thinking about the future grand strategy of the transatlantic partnership. The situation is one of NATO in flux, pondering its grand strategy. Where does Turkey figure in this reorganisation? Up until around 2007, Turkey’s role in this reorganisation was relegated to the margins by its Western Allies. Yet, throughout this time Turkey was one of the most active contributors to various ongoing post-Cold War missions, from ISAF in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia.
While Turkey added its list of crucial contributions to NATO operations with its role in Operation Unified Protector in Libya, it has also stepped into a leading role in shaping the evolving transatlantic grand strategy in the region.

Two turning points could be seen in altering Turkey’s transatlantic relationship and its regional role, the first is the 2003 crisis between Turkey and the US, over the invasion of Iraq. During what became the most serious crisis in transatlantic relations, Turkey played a pivotal role. Yet, while the debate over transatlantic relations in Washington included Turkey as the ‘surprising’ ally, the debate in Europe completely dismissed Turkey’s role in transatlantic relations, instead focusing on power politics between the European big three and the United States. Turkey’s position in the crisis affected two crucial developments. First, the rejection by the Turkish Parliament to allow US troops to cross into Northern Iraq over Turkish territory, thus opening a second front in the war. Second, Turkey’s membership of NATO and its border with Iraq, which caused a major crisis within NATO whereby the legitimacy of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was questioned when three European allies initially refused to support the deployment of a preventative measure in Turkey before the war commenced. In the aftermath of the crisis, Turkey emerged centre stage with NATO’s Istanbul summit and the setting of a date for the opening of accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005.

The 2007 crisis between Turkey and its Allies was another turning point, when the deferment by the US of Turkey’s request for support in dealing with the PKK threat in Northern Iraq reached the climax. After the escalation of attacks by the PKK against Turkish armed forces, the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution authorising a major military incursion into Northern Iraq to eradicate the PKK problem from its root. This resulted in a flurry of diplomatic activity, with allies taking Turkey seriously and re-affirming the PKK as a terrorist organisation, a surge of nationalism in Turkey, all finally resulting in a fresh approach between Turkey and the US, including US timely intelligence over PKK positions to Turkey, and a limited largely aerial intervention on the part of Turkey. What is new about this particular crisis was that it forced the issue of re-evaluating Turkey’s strategic partnership with its western allies. It shifted the U.S. position of ‘damage limitation’ in its relations with Turkey since 2003, to a more proactive concern for Turkey’s security interests in the region. It also
indicated that Turkey’s hard power is still a reckoning factor in shifting Western perceptions of Turkey.

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From 2009 onwards, we can really see the fourth phase of Turkey’s transatlantic relationship, when it leaves behind the ambiguous position it occupied in transatlantic relations from 2001 onwards and emerges as a much more regionally assertive power with regional influence. This fourth phase is characterised by Turkey’s soft power, its diplomatic clout and relations with neighbouring states, and at times playing the role of host and mediator in regional disputes. This has been a remarkable transformation that from essentially a ‘functional’ ally reliant on its hard power for much of the Cold War and early post-Cold War era, to a ‘strategic partner’ but one that is more reliant on its soft power. Ironically, this has come about at a time when NATO’s regional influence has become more functional, as it is expected to take on a much more technocratic role in concert with other actors in the region in contrast to its leading role as a normative organisation with hard power in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the Western Balkans in the 1990s. On the other hand, while Turkey added its list of crucial contributions to NATO operations with its role in Operation Unified Protector in Libya, it has also stepped into a leading role in shaping the evolving transatlantic grand strategy in the region.

Turkey and its Allies: Paths of Divergence and Convergence

In the short run, there may well be a discrepancy between the functional and wider strategic aspects of Turkey’s relationship with its NATO Allies. To some extent, this was already observable with the difficulties surrounding the agreement for Turkey to host the radar component of the NATO missile defence system. Turkey was initially reluctant to host the radar component of the system, therefore on one level it resisted the old ‘functional’ role but had a long term strategic interest to the involved in the European Phased Adaptive Approach, if not, for the development of its own missile defence system in the future. In the long run, the EPAA opens up issues with regard to threat perceptions in the Alliance. It is unclear how the development of the EPAA will effect Turkey’s regional relations, especially with Iran.
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However, much of the widening gap in threat perceptions over regional nuclear deterrence is dependent on how one views classical deterrence theory. Turkey has insisted that the missile defence system is against generic threats and has expressly avoided the ‘naming names’ as specific threats. If a country has a religious adherence to classical deterrence theory, it would see the function of a missile shield as part and parcel of a political signal to deter a first strike. In this case, the naming of the threat becomes important. However, for the U.S., despite the naming of Iran as the immediate regional threat in the short run, the U.S. tend to view the missile defence system is a ‘usable’ deployment to be used against any threat as it emerges. In this context, the Turkish and U.S. views are much closer than anticipated. Therefore in the short run, the EPAA could bring about a convergence between some NATO allies, but in the long run, from Turkey’s perspective the provisos of full coverage of Turkey’s territory and Alliance solidarity, that is Turkey’s insistence on ‘fair risk and burden sharing’ among all NATO Allies regarding the EPAA, indicates that any divergence from these agreed principles will also lead to Turkey’s re-evaluation of its position in EPAA.18

While both NATO and Turkey are finding new ground in their usefulness for one another in the region, Turkey has also recently found NATO to be a useful diplomatic tool for military engagement in the region. Turkey’s interest in the EPAA also stems from this. When the Obama administration announced the EPAA, Turkey had an interest in integrating this US plan for a global Missile Defence System with ongoing NATO Missile Defence plans. For Turkey, presenting the transatlantic missile defence as a NATO rather than as a U.S. plan, which had previously been proposed by the Bush administration, seemed to be a more acceptable choice, especially in terms of presenting the plan to Russia, a key energy partner for Turkey. Although potential Russian cooperation with the NATO missile defence system seemed to make some headway after the Lisbon Summit, Russia’s insistence on legal and technical guarantees and the U.S.’s refusal to accommodate these has led to a cooling of relations over a Russian-NATO cooperation in missile defence. A breakdown of relations with Russia over this issue in the future could also impact Turkey’s position within the EPAA.

Turkey is now forging regional and wider partnerships on its own terms, with the Arab world, Russia and China and Central Asia and the Caucusus.
Turkey’s preference of NATO as a regional tool of multilaterism is also evidence on Turkey’s insistence in bringing the Libya intervention under NATO control. While officially, Turkey was initially reluctant to support any intervention in the deteriorating situation in Libya, once France and the United Kingdom with U.S. support, started to launch a military aerial campaign using NATO assets, Turkey made a decision to pursue bringing the whole operation under the control of NATO. It was only after political control of the operation came under the North Atlantic Council, that Turkey became an active participant in Operation Unified Protector, without taking a direct aerial combat role. This way of using NATO as a means of control rather than letting ad hoc coalitions or US led initiatives roam in the region seems to be a Turkish interest that is likely to endure.

While it would seem that Turkey and NATO will have more of a working relationship in regional management, but there may be divergences between Turkey and NATO when looking at some of NATO’s more strategic global priorities in the future. Strategically NATO had two global priorities for the near future: deterrence and partnerships. However, on a regional level it is engaged more as functional, technocratic organisation that takes on roles in Security Sector Reform, Training and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. On the global agenda, NATO’s projections are long term. For NATO, thirty countries around the World are presently developing a missile capability. Not all thirty, even if they acquire the capability, will become a threat to the Alliance. So these are indeed very long term threat perceptions. In the immediate term, Turkey is much more focused on immediate regional threats, such as stability in Syria, the Middle East Peace Process, the Iranian nuclear issue, Palestinian statehood, post conflict reconstruction Libya and the PKK presence in Northern Iraq. For now, emerging missile threats are not on the top of the agenda of security threats for Turkey. Also NATO’s prioritisation of global partnerships may be a likely point of divergence of interests with Turkey. Turkey is now forging regional and wider partnerships on its own terms, with the Arab world, Russia and China and Central Asia and the Caucasus. NATO’s outreach to ‘like- minded democracies’ is less likely to be attractive for Turkey, for example the NATO global outreach to Australia or Japan. Here between Turkey and the

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Alliance there is a shift from ‘normative’ values as the main indicator for whom you do business with to strategic management of regional interests. NATO is still in the first category, prioritising global outreach normatively with like-minded countries. Turkey is far more interested in the strategic management of regional interests with the Arab world, the wider region and with Russia. On the other hand, NATO and Turkish interests are more likely to converge on the preservation of stability on the global commons: air, sea, space and cyber space. The Lisbon Summit document was very clear that international trade routes, energy trade routes, possible water or food shortages due to environmental crises, managing supply routes during such crises seem to top the agenda of common threat perceptions amongst allies and these are beyond the remit of normal alliance defence roles. Here, global partnerships are of course essential and in preserving the global commons Turkey of course has a common interest with NATO.

Conclusion

The transformation of Turkey’s relationship with NATO in the past sixty years has especially been profound in the last decade. The Alliance survived its transition from Cold War to post Cold War era because it kept in sight its original grand strategy of preserving a ‘way of life’, although the means to achieve this were altered with predominance in collective defence to a predominance in collective security. Throughout this time, Turkey acted first as a flank country and then a frontline country as the importance of the Middle East rose after the first Gulf War in 1991, but nevertheless was seen by its NATO allies as a ‘functional ally’. As NATO grappled to come to terms with a new grand strategy for a new era, particularly after the fall out over the military intervention in Iraq in 2003, Turkey continued to be relegated to the sidelines in the larger transatlantic debates, although it played a crucial role in shaping outcomes in that crisis.

From 2009, as Turkey embarked on a far more proactive regional role, this time, dependent on its soft power, NATO by contrast started to become a much more technocratic organisation, seeking to fulfil certain roles, regional or global in partnership with others.

After the threat of Turkey’s hard power in the region, from 2007 onwards, there was a marked difference from Turkey’s NATO allies towards its regional security concerns. From 2009, as Turkey embarked on a far more proactive regional role, this time, dependent on its soft power, NATO by contrast started
to become a much more technocratic organisation, seeking to fulfil certain roles, regional or global in partnership with others. Although NATO eventually took over the Libyan intervention, with a legal backing and regional cooperation, nevertheless, its role was not similar to its leadership as a normative organisation in the Balkans in 1990s. While NATO as an asset of multilaterism in region, in contrast to ad hoc coalitions of U.S. led initiatives may be an attractive alternative for Turkey, there are nevertheless likely divergences between short and long term threat perceptions between Turkey and the Alliance. Despite this, for the foreseeable future, both Turkey and NATO will adjust to a new relationship, one which sees a more functional Alliance and a more strategic driver in Turkey in their regional involvement.
Endnotes


14 Ibid.


16 For the three phases see: Ekavi Athanassopoulou, “American-Turkish Relations since the End of the Cold War”, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (September 2001).

17 Turkey serves in the EU mission in Bosnia but essentially has served in the same mission under NATO when it was SFOR. After the handover to the EU, the mission continued with some of the existing contributions from non-NATO states.