NATO’S NEW MISSIONS

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From its inception in 1949 until the early 1990s, NATO functioned as a classic collective defence organisation, by definition and practice. The collective defence measures of NATO were legally embodied in article five of the Washington Treaty, whereas the implementation of the deterrence value of that collective threat was made effective largely by NATO’s nuclear defence posture, the cornerstone of which was the concept of extended deterrence. Thus, this arrangement of NATO successfully provided for the defence of its members against a potential attack from the then Soviet Union. However, apart from the nuclear defence posture, which was the essence of deterrence, NATO members throughout this time also accumulated valuable expertise in security and defence co-operation through numerous exercises and day to day military co-operation within an integrated military structure. This is not to say that during the Cold War NATO had no political role to play either. The Harmel Report of 1967 saw the establishment of a twin track approach: collective defence against and dialogue with the adversary. After the end of the Cold War, when the adversary became the former adversary, NATO added the function of co-operation alongside those of collective defence and dialogue. In fact, the various forums of co-operation with its former adversaries have indeed become one of NATO’s strongest hallmarks in the post-Cold War era. However, this is not to say that NATO has developed as a purely political organisation since 1990 either. Its once essential defence, nuclear deterrence, may no longer be NATO’s foremost military planning issue, so NATO’s integrated military structure in the post-Cold War era has found a new role for itself, not entirely within the spectrum of collective defence but also including that of collective security. As NATO turns fifty, almost a decade after the end of the Cold War, it has developed politically and militarily through new missions, which essentially are embedded in the Washington Treaty, but which NATO did not perform during the Cold War.

DEFINING NATO’S POST COLD WAR ROLES

The definition of NATO’s post-Cold War missions has been a piecemeal process; it has not stemmed from a grand design drawn out as a blueprint. In fact, NATO’s new missions developed out of practice rather than a pre-conceived plan of agreement by its members. That practice came with the emerging necessity for an organisation in the international system to undertake effective, co-ordinated multinational military operations for collective security missions. That organisation proved to be NATO, and the practice of that function came with NATO’s involvement in the war in Bosnia and in implementing the peace treaty in the aftermath of that war.

However, NATO’s missions did not develop entirely by practice of this nature either, since there
were also some preliminary sketches on the political and military direction of NATO in the post-Cold War era. The first of those was the London Declaration of 1990. The London Declaration started the first Strategy Review Process in NATO since the strategy of Flexible Response was adopted in 1967. By the end of 1991, not only had NATO officially outlined its core functions in the post-Cold War era, but also it had a new Strategic Concept replacing that of Flexible Response. The core functions were emphasised as:

i) providing a “stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes”

ii) maintaining the transatlantic link between the United States, Canada and Europe in issues affecting their ‘vital interests’.

iii) performing the classical NATO function of collective defence by deterring and defending “against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO state”

iv) preserving the strategic balance in Europe.

The last was gradually replaced with the preservation of stability within the Euro-Atlantic area, as the notion of strategic balance became more and more dated with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first outlined function, that of providing a “stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes,” would by 1999 be the basis of NATO’s new missions in the post-Cold War era. The provision and maintenance of stability within NATO and the regions immediately surrounding it became the focal point of NATO’s new raison d’être, practically replacing its paramount function of the provision of collective defence for its members. Back in 1991, at the time of the Copenhagen Summit, which outlined NATO’s core functions, it was still uncertain as to how NATO would provide that stability. One thing was clear though: as outlined in the London Declaration, NATO’s security was now “inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours.” This also stated that NATO’s adversaries had officially now become its former adversaries. This heralded a new wave of co-operation that would have to go beyond dialogue between adversaries. This new kind of co-operation with former adversaries, would also need to maintain and promote stability, which now seemed to become scarce in the regions of transformation from communism. To this end, the absorption of the former communist states into democratic institutions and practices became part of the post-Cold War Western design, and NATO played a very important part in this development. In this sense, NATO’s new co-operative activities with its former adversaries in military issues, commenced officially with the creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in December 1991, a month after the unveiling of the new Strategic Concept. This laid the foundation of NATO’s political mission in the post-Cold War era.

Apart from its political mission of creating forums of co-operation with non-NATO states, the basis of which was the NACC, NATO also defined its new military missions by the end of 1991, particularly by outlining new possible missions for NATO forces. These were outlined in the ‘Guidelines for Defence’ section of the new Strategic Concept. Apart from the classical function of protecting the territory of member states against aggression, the new missions of NATO forces included participation in confidence building measures, enhanced transparency and arms control verification. It also indicated the possibility of Allied forces contributing to UN peacekeeping missions for global stability. Under the new strategy, multinational rapid reaction formations
increased in importance, as did the requirement for light, mobile, flexible formations to replace the old concentration on heavily armed forces in Central Europe in the form of forward defence.2

NATO'S ROLE IN COLLECTIVE SECURITY MISSIONS

Therefore, politically and militarily, the basis of NATO’s new missions was already defined in 1991. These were further enhanced by an official declaration in 1992, which confirmed NATO’s new role in military support operations for collective security missions. This came with the declaration in the final communiqué of the Oslo Summit in June 1992, which states that NATO would support “on a case-by-case basis ... peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE.”3 This statement was further enhanced by declarations also affirming NATO’s readiness to support such activities under the UN as well as the then CSCE. As well as developing NATO’s military readiness for supporting collective security missions under the UN or CSCE, at around the same time, one also observes a parallel development of incorporating the NACC partner states in planning for peacekeeping operations. Therefore the political side of co-operating with former adversaries became merged with the military mission of training and incorporating them to work alongside NATO forces in NATO support missions of a collective security type. For example, the NACC statement of June 1993 states that “we attach particular importance to the development of effective tools for peacekeeping and related tasks. To this end we have launched a programme of co-operation in preparation for joint peacekeeping activities in support of the UN and CSCE”.4 The NACC body, the Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping, also presented for the first time a report outlining the areas of co-operation for NACC states in formulating peacekeeping tasks. But the Oslo declaration of 1992 was the first official acknowledgement of NATO’s preparedness to undertake collective security missions.5

While the Alliance had set forth plans for co-operating with NACC partner states in peacekeeping operations in support of the UN and the CSCE, NATO’s role in collective security tasks was growing (literally) in the field. This growth came through practice (not conceptual design) because, since the outbreak of conflict in former Yugoslavia and its exacerbation with the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO, as the only European organisation with an integrated military structure, has found itself increasingly in demand for implementing and co-ordinating the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions relating to that conflict. A special link between NATO and the UN also developed throughout this period. Gradually, events themselves charted the nature of co-operation in collective security to such an extent that NATO’s possible contribution to CSCE-mandated collective security tasks were hardly mentioned and, by 1994, NATO’s role in supporting the decisions of the UN Security Council were emphasised in official NATO communiqués: “The Alliance has demonstrated its readiness and its capacity to support on a case-by-case basis peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council.”6

Throughout the war in Bosnia, NATO’s involvement included three operations. The first of these, Operation Sharp Guard, was a joint NATO/WEU operation implementing UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. This commenced in the summer of 1992. After November 1992, following a further UN Security Council resolution, NATO and the WEU were tasked with enforcing the embargo and keeping a watch over naval vessels in the Adriatic. In April 1993, NATO commenced Operation Deny Flight, which was the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, again as the implementation of a UN Security Council resolution. The most significant involvement in NATO’s peace enforcement missions came when the North Atlantic Council approved the
execution of air strikes under UN Security Council resolution 836 in August 1993. Although limited air strikes were executed in April 1994, this provision was not fully implemented until Operation Deliberate Force was executed in August 1995, after which, the signing of the Dayton Peace Treaty was possible later on the same year. After the signing of the treaty, NATO’s collective security mission, which had by now been defined by its involvement in the war in Bosnia, was furthered with the establishment of the Implementation Force (IFOR). IFOR enforced the implementation of the treaty provisions and, after the first twelve months of the implementation period, it became the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and still continues today.

Since the involvement in Bosnia, NATO’s operational know-how in this field has been called upon once again in the recent turbulence in Kosovo. In response to the crisis and UN Security Council resolutions over the matter, NATO first issued an ACTWARN, a notice of a high level of military readiness to launch operations, over Kosovo in September 1998. This was followed in October with the issuing of an ACTORD, which is the highest level of military readiness to launch an operation, but it still awaits a political decision for execution. The UN Security Council resolutions, however, did not implicitly authorise the use of force and in fact maintained that the Security Council would “consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region.” But, considering the other measures listed in the resolutions and the humanitarian crisis at hand, the response of the NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, on this matter was as follows: “The Allies believe that in the particular circumstances ... there are legitimate reasons for the Alliance to threaten and if necessary to use force.”

Afterwards, in November 1998, following an agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO and the OSCE, the Kosovo Verification Co-ordination Centre in Macedonia was established. This co-ordinates information from the OSCE ground verification mission in Kosovo, where there are unarmed OSCE observers, and NATO reconnaissance flights, which operate as part of the verification mission. NATO’s ACTORD remains active as a support to the diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group.

Apart from the practice of collective security as such, NATO has also included enhancement of co-ordinated operations, not just within the framework of the NACC, but also in its developing operational co-operation with the WEU. The WEU had already pledged in 1992 to conduct peacekeeping operations under a CSCE or UN mandate. Because this decision had been taken at the Petersberg summit of the WEU, these operations were referred to in WEU circles as ‘Petersberg type operations’. NATO sought to develop its contribution to an emerging European Security and Defence Identity with the joint operational planning for such missions under the aegis of the WEU but with the use of NATO assets. To this end, the Combined Joint Task Forces concept (CJTF) was launched at the NATO summit in January 1994. A CJTF is a “deployable multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for specific contingency operations.” At the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in June 1996, the CJTF’s conceptual phase was completed and the military planning and implementation of the CJTF commenced. Already, the NATO Military Committee has made headway in the implementation of the CJTF. This now includes the establishment of standing ‘nucleus’ CJTF headquarters in existing NATO command headquarters which would be responsible for creating a CJTF headquarter when required at times of crisis. Thus NATO by practice and future planning is capable of undertaking collective security missions by itself and in conjunction with the WEU and non-NATO member states.
NATO’S POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS WITH PARTNER STATES

Another important factor of NATO’s developing role in incorporating non-NATO member states in joint collective security missions is the furthering of the earlier initiatives of peacekeeping co-ordination in the NACC. In January 1994, NATO also launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The difference between PfP and NACC was that while the NACC was open to former Warsaw Pact states and focused on military co-operation between the NACC as a whole and NATO in detailed work plans, the PfP was open to all OSCE states, and each PfP agreement was signed between the individual partner country and NATO. In this sense, it was more of a political venture. However, the Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping continued its efforts, this time with the initiation of PfP/NACC joint peacekeeping exercises, which commenced in Autumn 1994. At the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in May 1997, NATO decided to build on the NACC experience by replacing NACC with a new forum that would serve as an overarching framework for NACC and PfP achievements. This was the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which also, like the NACC, operates on the basis of a work plan, but also unites the political and military consultations that were already underway both in the NACC and PfP frameworks.

This particular period was a very busy time for the furthering of NATO’s relations and working forums with partner states. Around the same time as the initiation of the EAPC, NATO signed with Russia the ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.’ This indicated the special focus on NATO-Russia relations outside the PfP framework, especially in light of Russia’s place in the Contact Group during the war in Bosnia. Furthermore, Russian military co-operation in IFOR and later SFOR was also very significant. The founding act also created a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which provides a mechanism of consultation and co-ordination especially at times of crisis between the North Atlantic Council and Russia. Following the establishment of this body, Russia established a Mission to NATO headed by a representative at the rank of ambassador. A few months later, in July 1997, a ‘Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine’ was signed at the NATO summit in Madrid. At the same summit, NATO extended its invitation to three partner countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, to begin accession talks to become full members of the Alliance.

CONCLUSION

NATO’s new missions have evolved through planning and practice since 1990. Throughout this time NATO has developed capabilities to co-ordinate and implement collective security missions. It has developed a framework of military co-operation with the WEU as its support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity, the most significant aspect of which has been the development of the CJTF capability. It has also developed enhanced political dialogue and military co-operation forums with partner countries under the aegis of the NACC, Partnership for Peace programme and, recently, with the launch of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. It has developed a special political and military consultation mechanism with Russia and Ukraine, the former also comprising a Permanent Joint Council. In the area of collective security implementation, it has planned and executed joint peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations with these partner countries, most notably, the numerous PfP/NACC peacekeeping exercises and training seminars, and also in the field, through successful co-operation with partner countries under NATO integrated command structures in the implementation of IFOR and SFOR. In terms of planning co-ordination with the WEU, the CJTF headquarters are all but operational in terms of military planning, which
has been carried out by NATO’s Military Committee. In all of this, NATO has also enlarged to include as full members three of its former partner countries. And finally all these developments will be incorporated in a new Strategic Concept to be unveiled at the Washington summit in April 1999, marking NATO’s fiftieth anniversary. All these new NATO missions have developed since 1990 and NATO still continues to function as it has since 1949, as essentially a collective defence organisation, providing for the security and defence of its member states. But with the development of its other missions, it also provides for stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

1 NATO’s core functions as outlined in the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Copenhagen, Denmark, 6-7 June 1991, final communiqué, paragraph 6.


3 The OSCE, as it is presently known, was then the CSCE. Shortly after NATO’s Oslo communiqué, the CSCE was officially declared a Chapter VIII ‘regional organisation’ as put forward in the UN Charter at the CSCE Helsinki summit of July 1992. At the same summit, the CSCE states acknowledged their readiness to accept military assistance from other organisations like NATO and the WEU for the implementation of peacekeeping tasks.


6 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, İstanbul, Turkey, 9 June 1994, press communiqué, M-NAC-1 (94) 46, paragraph 20.

7 UN Security Council Resolution 836 was passed on 4 June 1993. The North Atlantic Council decided to be prepared to launch air strikes under that resolution on 2 August 1993.

8 UN Security Council Resolution 1199, 25 September 1998


12 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Sintra, Portugal, final communiqué, May 1997.


14 Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Co-operation, issued by the heads of state and