TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: A QUESTION OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE?

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Cultural differences were increasingly used as an argument against Turkey’s integration into an organised Europe since at least 14 April 1987, when Turkey, already an associate member, applied for full membership of the European Community. In this contribution we will consider, though some brief and sometimes simplified examples, some of the structures of this discussion.

CULTURE AS AN ARGUMENT FOR OR AGAINST INTEGRATION

As long as Europe was moving from the European Community for Coal and Steel to the European Community, the process was one of economic integration in which one of the goals was the balancing out of differences in development. In this context, gross national product, rate of inflation, amount of state debts, etc. could serve as relatively unambiguous data in order to prove that the required minimum development standard for entrance had been reached and to calculate the necessity of compensation measures in the course of integration. Turkey's membership could have been a question of debit and credit: the conditions of membership could have been definable, and their achievement could have been implemented by a corresponding policy from inside and controlled from outside of the country. This became more difficult with the Unified European Act.1 This document led Europe definitively in the direction of a political unit with common democratic decision making, as the new name, the European Union, expressed. Common politics is based on common decisions according to values. Values are essential components of culture. The more heterogeneous cultures there are in an organisation, especially a political one, the more probable it is that there will be either no decision, because one cannot reach a minimal agreement of more than 50 per cent of the members, or that minorities are permanently outvoted by majorities so that conflicts might arise.

Pluralism of values is an unfavourable prerequisite for the functioning of an organisation of the type that the European Union is designed to be.

It's true the Unified European Act mainly aims at common foreign politics. The problems, though, can easily be found in other sectors too. The reluctance to introduce a common currency, for instance, cannot only be explained by the nostalgia that people feel for their own good old money. There is also the precautionary thought, sometimes perhaps more emotional than rational, that inevitably a European financial policy will follow and questions about the principles by which it will be steered. It may not be an important difference for a single citizen that Germany’s cost of living index rose 2.7 per cent from 1989 to 1990 while Greece's rose 20.4 per cent.2 In Greece, Greek financial policy meets Greek tax office practice, and the result may be the same as German finance policy meeting German tax office practice. Greek finance policy with German tax office practice would be a disaster, and the reverse would perhaps eternally be a taxpayer’s utopia.

Therefore, it is not so important how values, norms, goals, etc. are explicitly formulated. What is more important is the functional practice of the institutions dealing with them. In the case of the integration of different social systems it is not only an integration of norms but also an integration of organisations.
THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE

The modern concept of culture takes into account the life world connection of idea and reality by defining culture as, eg., “die Gesamtheit der Verhaltenskonfigurationen einer Gesellschaft ..., die durch Symbole über die Generationen hinweg übermittelt werden, in Werkzeugen und Produkten Gestalt annehmen, in Wertvorstellungen und Ideen bewuß werden”.3 Culture does, therefore, not only comprise the top performances in music, poetry and fine arts, but also the circumstances of everyday life, not only the sublimest ideas, but also profane products. Culture is what is thought and what is made, is Sunday and workday, is the works of a Nobel Prize winner in literature and the street beggars’ behaviour. For our discussion it is, therefore, not a problem of whether Mevlana Djelal ed-Din Rumi is paralleled by European mysticism and the Inquisition with torture or by the bright figure of Frederick II. Rather it is important how culture in both areas looks today and how big possible differences are.

THE PROBLEM OF A CULTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Usually, culture is regarded as an accessory of a society; in the case of subdivisions of a society, eg., a social class or an occupational group, one speaks of subcultures. The European Union is certainly not a society, but an institution of several states that represent different societies. Therefore, one cannot speak of a culture in the strict sense of the concept. One could rather think of a cultural area, perhaps Christian-occidental, which cannot and must not be linked to a particular social system, ie., a society.

With this approach by means of a cultural history, we would create two difficulties. Firstly, we would have to find out which of the allegedly common roots and their continuity are still present. (Was the Nazi regime in Germany a part or an intermission of that tradition?) A great deal of the development in Central European legal systems in our century is most probably a movement away from the Bible. Secondly, a culture of the European Union4 could empirically only be defined as those elements of culture that are common to the societies of all EU member states.5 Would that be very much if we think of the various daily realities and not just some of the Ten Commandments?

If the border-line of a cultural area, even of one single culture, can hardly be unambiguously drawn,6 one could try another approach in order to find out whether a certain culture might fit into a given frame. One could investigate how far Turkish culture has something in common with the culture of a member of the European Union. If there was much congruence with the culture of - let’s dare the almost incredible! Greece then there should be no cultural obstacles for Turkey if there had been none for Greece.

From this point of view, it would not entirely be unlikely from the outset that European Greece has among the EU candidates no other society with greater cultural proximity than Turkey. The life in the villages, the ways of eating and drinking, and many traits of the social structure seem to be very similar. If someone saw two men discussing out of earshot, he would hardly be able to tell whether they are two Greeks or two Turks. If one were Greek and the other one Turk, the observer would not be able to say who was who. If one of them were a Dane or an Englishman one could, most probably, distinguish him as a silhouette from his Mediterranean interlocutor by his gestures. What is being said about Greece in ethnological or sociological studies7 can also be found east of the Aegean Sea.

There would certainly be differences, especially where religious norms and traditions have their impact on everyday life. But these are not always extremely important. The imam is a Muslim, the Greek Orthodox priest is a Christian, yet in his everyday role performance he might much more resemble his Islamic colleague than a Catholic or Protestant clergyman in Germany. Different beverages are the main sources of turnover in the kaffeneion and the çayhane, but the institutions as such are to a great extent interchangeable in function and appearance. Even a civil servant would immediately feel at home in an office of the other state if only the portrait of the president was replaced.
Turkish and Greek culture have most probably more correspondences with each other than with the Dutch or the Irish culture. So it was a Greek Orthodox Christian in Constantinople who said, “Better the turban of the Turk than the tiara of the Pope.”

So, where are the border-lines of European culture now?

WHAT IS TURKISH CULTURE?

If one observes Turkish culture in our century as a developmental process, one must distinguish two very different periods.

TURKISH CULTURE UNTIL 1950

Until recently the question for Turkish culture in this century was, somewhat generalised, essentially a question of class.

The upper and upper middle classes were characterised by a culture, the clearest criterion of which was the intention of change which meant Europeanisation, modernisation, westernisation. There is some dispute about the beginning of this movement. Some think that the “birthday of modern Turkey” was 29 October 1923, while others state already 150 years of modernisation. The tendency of this development, though, is unanimously described by all observers as a movement away from the initially non-European and towards the European. One can perhaps get some notion of the pace at which this cultural change was driven forward by listing some points from twelve years of legislation:

1. November 1922: abolition of the sultanate
2. 29 October 1923: proclamation of the Republic
3. March 1924: abolition of the caliphate
4. 8 April 1924: dissolution of the _eriat courts
5. 30 September 1925: prohibition of religious orders
6. 25 November 1925: prohibition of the fez and of religious costumes in public
7. December 1925: introduction of the West European calendar
8. 17 February 1926: enactment of the civil code according to the Swiss model
9. 1 March 1926: enactment of the penal code according to the Italian model
10. 28 June 1926: enactment of the commercial code according to the German and Italian model
11. 10 April 1928: abolition of Islam as state religion (by changing article 2 of the constitution of 1924)
12. 3 November 1928: introduction of the Latin alphabet
13. 1 January 1924: enactment of a new law on schooling
14. 8 June 1929: enactment of a law on land reform
15. 16 April 1930: women’s right to vote for community councils
16. 20 April 1931: declaration of the principles of Kemalism (which were already in large part the elements of the constitution of 1924)
17. 21 June 1934: introduction of family names
18. 8 December 1934: women’s right to vote for the National Assembly

Can one imagine any such speed of reform in a West European society?

In Turkey, too, this rapid change could not immediately cover the whole area. The one who lived in the east of the country, in a village, or was a member of the lower or the lower middle class had little contact with this development. There, the traditional culture largely prevailed with its orders of values, family structures and patterns of behaviour. One could by all means speak of a segmented society. In everyday life this resulted in a coexistence of different normative principles as long as the authority of the state did not have to enforce modernity in a manifest conflict. So it is, in spite of modern legislation, said about parental law, “Dem türkischen Recht ist die Auffassung fremd, wonach die elterliche Gewalt ein fremdnütziges, funktionelles, treuhänderisches, pflichtgebundenes
Sozialrecht ist, das - vom Staat überwacht - sich schrittweise dem Reifegrad des Kindes anzupassen hat. Das Recht der Eltern, ein ius naturale, ist nach türkischer Rechtsauffassung ein unbegrenztes, absolutes Herrschaftsrecht am Kind als Objekt. Diese Ansicht von der elterlichen Gewalt wird durch das islamische Leitbild untermauert, wonach die väterliche Autorität unantastbar ist und sogar die zwangsweise Verehelichung des Kindes umfaßt.15

It was advantageous for Turkey that the social change had been initiated from inside the society. Whatever one could realise as visible alteration during the last decades could have been bought up, imported, imposed or put on -techno-economical surface cosmetics.

How external and internal change work in combination has gained publicity worldwide in the example of a Turkish village, i.e. in Daniel Lerner’s book The Passing of Traditional Society, a classic of modernisation theory. His introduction to that theory consists of a description of the village of Balgat, close to Ankara, in the years of 1950 and 1954, and his systematisation of the difference is an impressive example for Europeanisation in Turkey.16 This is also true of studies from later years. The State Planning Organisation carried out a village research project in 1962 and repeated it in 1968,17 though not as a panel study. It found a clear change in the ideals of child raising within six years. In 1962, the parents’ goals for the occupation of their children were still determined by traditional prestige: governor or officer, that’s what the kids had to become. In 1968, the occupational goals were comparatively modern and achievement-oriented: lawyer, medical doctor and engineer were the preferred goals. Among the criteria of occupational choice “high prestige” and a “pleasant life” were prevalent in 1962; in 1968 the orientation had turned to “high income” and “learning of new skills”. In a survey in 1974, the sample, which is said to be representative for the whole of Turkey, brought forth more statements that reflected modern, enlightened and active orientations than traditional, religious and fatalistic ones. The interviewees thought that “good planning by the government” and “hard work by the population” were more useful for the future of the Turkish society than “luck” and “Allah’s help”; “good education and much knowledge” and “popularity” were regarded as better qualifications for high office than “descent from a good family” and “submission to tradition”, which would have been mentioned earlier.18

Turks are proud that all this is neither a result of the politics of a colonial power nor pure necessity out of economic dependence, as in many states of the Third World, but that it has been self-determined development: “Cet énorme effort ne lui est pas imposé par l’une ou l’autre puissance étrangère.”19 It has been, though, a change that had been imposed on the society as a whole by the elite. The Turkish state periodically had the character of some sort of development dictatorship, although a very lenient one. To a large extent it was the upper class that determined what was to happen within the state and society.

TURKISH CULTURE SINCE 1950

This gradually turned out to be different in the second half of our century. One might think that this could be due to re-Islamisation, a process the existence of which is not doubted in our times in the specialist literature.20 But it is not as recent as one frequently assumes in Central Europe. The former German ambassador to Turkey wrote already in 1981 that Turkey had already passed thirty years of re-Islamisation.21

That seems to be enough evidence for “re-Islamisation” being an inaccurate label for this type of social change, which has taken place in a very differentiated way since the middle of the century. For 1950 is also the point at which the relatively autocratic regime of the generals, Atatürk and _nönü, was replaced through elections which brought the Democratic Party to power. This made, for the first time, genuine professional politicians a new partial elite. So the lower classes, which had hitherto always formed the vast majority, but nevertheless had been more the object than the subject of politics, became an important quantity, at least at election times. This was not only true for the rural population but for the workers, too, who in Turkish history, in marked difference to Central Europe, had never played an important role: “Turkish workers have not featured much in the Turkish national struggle, so they do not have any special place in the nation’s role of honour
beyond a fairly general conviction that they have not been dealt with very generously in the past.”22 After the admission of workers’ unions, their membership is said to have grown from 300,000 in 1963 to 2.7 million in 1973,23 although such numbers are hard to verify with more than 600 different unions.24 This colourful picture of unions was soon paralleled by a similar one-and a relatively frequently changing one-of political groupings. In such a situation, all kinds and numbers of concessions are the lures in election campaigns.

Until then, religiosity had largely been class-specific25 with clearly different scores on the religiosity-laicism continuum for “elites” and “masses”.26 This became different, then, through the new partial elite of professional politicians. They dedicated a great part of their arguments to the lower middle class in which Islam as a general philosophy of life had always been deeply rooted,27 while the laicism movement was carried by those who had been promoting Europenisation.28 Under these circumstances it was almost compulsory that the influence of religion should grow with the decline in influence of the administrative, military and intellectual elites in the course of democratisation. The rural population felt its traditional values better preserved in the lap of religion, eg., sayg\_\_ the respect which children owe to their parents, the wife to the husband, the younger brother to the elder one; or namus, the family’s honour to be represented by the wife, inter alia, in her fidelity, by the husband in, eg., performing his duty of protecting the family; or \_eref, the prestige that a family enjoys because of its power, wealth, knowledge or generosity.29 This corresponds to the differentiated social structure, and it appears to be almost nothing if the modernists have to offer hardly more than their slogans of equality and individualism. This holds even more as it is not just a number of fairly abstract values, but, on the contrary, normatively transformed ones into rights and duties. So, sayg\_\_ does not just mean the ritual or the symbol that the elder brother addresses his brothers and sisters simply by their first names while they have to add the title abi (elder brother) to his name. Rather it means quite practically that the elder brother has to care for the whole family if the father is no longer able to do so. In this sense, it appears as living religion and not just as a propaganda dodge if Islamist parties do not merely promise (like all the other parties do) that they would make everything better if only the people would put them into office, but if they, already as a party, provide nourishment and health care for the poor.

What appears to be re-Islamisation, if seen from the outside, is in many cases the unearthing of something that has been permanently present and that became visible again only with democratisation, ie., “der Islam erwies sich als eine beharrende Kraft, der zahlreiche Türken nicht nur in ihrem privaten, sondern auch in ihrem gesellschaftlichen Leben verbunden geblieben sind.”30 This countercurrent to Kemalist tendencies of development began to become visible in the fifties.

It was interrupted when the military seized power on 27 May 1960, in 1971 and 1980. These military actions have very much contributed to the distrust of Turkey in the Western world, possibly because they were, out of uninformed shortsightedness, equated with the coups of the Argentine or Chilean military. The Turkish military, though, has a certain traditional legitimacy31 to defend the principles of Kemalism against threats from outside and inside the country. Among these principles is laicism, which is, according to the constitution of 1924, simultaneously a principle of the state.32 The Republican People’s Party felt this principle endangered, too, by the policy of the Democratic Party, and so it supported the military. As in many other cases, political differences had been piled up in such a way that many Turks regarded military intervention as a minor evil in comparison to the continuation of the conflict.33 Consequently, the interventions had ab initio been planned for a definite period of time. According to a Turkish scientist’s judgement, the military intervention had been supported by the economic, social and political ideas of a loose coalition of politicians, intellectuals, civil servants and military officers;34 that is by those groupings which, until 1950, had been the upholders of the state and which now tried to resist change.

These changes, though, were continued under the following civilian governments. But the nationalist, conservative and rightist parties were not the only ones that are usually suspected of making a deal with religious powers. Rather it was, eg. the government of the social democrat Bülent Ecevit which sponsored the founding of Imam-Hatip religious high schools that produced more graduates with preacher qualifications than Turkey needed, allowing the surplus with some success
try to penetrate other institutions. In addition to this, latent Islam in Turkey got a lift from the fact that many people saw the politics of Westernisation definitely wrecked when they found that Turkish workers in Central Europe were not treated as equals and that each attempt by Turkey to join a Western organisation resulted, with the sole exception of NATO, in an insulting hurdles. One of the earliest and hitherto most successful Islamist politicians, the president of the Refah Party, Necmettin Erbakan, is by no means an Anatolian backwoodsman, rather he is a German doctor of engineering.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AS AN OBSTACLE TO INTEGRATION?

Finally, the argument that there are cultural differences between Europe and Turkey and that these can be a permanent hindrance to integration must depend on the direction of cultural development.

If one takes the development of law as a particularly clear empirical model of a change of values, at least one initiated by the political elite, then a policy of Europeanisation can be proven at least since 1923. The criminal law was reformed along Italian lines, the civil law along Swiss ones, the commercial law German and Italian, and the administrative law French. If, according to the Turkish marriage law, the wife is only allowed with the consent of her husband to take up a gainful occupation, then this regulation is exactly the same as that in the Swiss code of civil law of 1912 (in the Federal Republic of Germany, by the way, until 1957, too). Here, as in other instances, Turkey did not always follow further changes after the initial adoption. In other respects, though, Turkey has overtaken Central European developments. If one took the quota of female professors as an indicator of emancipation, Turkey with 20 per cent would be far ahead of Germany with only 5 per cent. If we look at the description of Turkish parental law, under point 4.1, which appears so obscure, we should nevertheless be aware that this is not merely a rough heritage from wild Seljuk times, but still absolutely within the European tradition of law, because “im Hinter-grond erkennt man noch die Spuren der schrankenlosen römischen patria potestas, allenfalls gemildert un das Recht auf Tötung (ius vitae necisque) und Veräußerung (mencipium).”

Turkish communities have only in 1984 received important authorisations for self-administration; the alleviation of French centralism through regionalisation is not much older, though. If organs of the Turkish state proceed so mercilessly against everything that looks like a separatist movement, this may seem almost neurotic to Germans whose state was divided and had been divided for centuries. In Turkey this is, at least in its core, a precept of the constitution (superior to all basic civil rights, see the Preamble and Article 3 of the Constitution) that makes all cession of national territory unconstitutional. This is no Turkish invention; rather it is a reflection of the République indivisible in the constitution of France, which can certainly not be denied a place in the democratic tradition.

This change could be regarded as a catching up on the Central European development. There are, though, some irritating processes, too. What is made a punishable offence by Article 8 of the relatively new anti-terror law is much more than the constitutional ban of separatism would demand, and it is formulated in an extremely woolly way, as several Turkish legal norms are not on the newest level of legislative technique. Several conflicts of norms are resulting from the nature of things. The separation of state and religion, e.g., in Article 24 and 136 of the Constitution and 163 and 241 of the Criminal Code, is stricter than in many European legal systems. The freedom of religious practice, though, is well guaranteed by Article 24 of the constitution (superior to all basic civil rights, see the Preamble and Article 3 of the Constitution) that makes all cession of national territory unconstitutional. This is no Turkish invention; rather it is a reflection of the République indivisible in the constitution of France, which can certainly not be denied a place in the democratic tradition.
Such tendencies grow to the extent to which the restructuring of Turkish elites, outlined under section 4.2, above, is proceeding. This is, as mentioned above, partly a consequence of democratisation, and it is leading away from Europe. If we read that Tansu Çiller as prime minister said, “We want to develop ourselves further in human rights and democracy and do whatever we think would be right. But we will not do anything just because Europe is demanding it from us”, then this perfectly expresses the gap between continuing European tendencies on the one side and a retreat into the Turkish interior on the other side.

What this means for the integration of Turkey into organised Europe is that, with a high probability, it is not advisable to just wait and see until “times are better”. There once was an assumption that there is a worldwide development towards cultural convergence, at least on the northern border of the Mediterranean Sea one believed one would find a “mainstream of common cultural values of the West be it in Turkey, Sicily or Crete”. Obviously, one inferred too rashly the universal diffusion of values and norms from the unlimited propagation of goods and, maybe, some patterns of behaviour. The present reality is the opposite, especially, though not exclusively, in Turkey. One can dredge different beds even for a mainstream.

In the meantime, even political planners at a European level have recognised that initiated social change needs acceptance in order progress from the state of planning to reality. In their project for the promotion of women they say at the end, “Entscheidende Fortschritte bei der praktischen Verwirklichung der Gleichstellung sind nur dann möglich, wenn dieses Ziel von der Allgemeinheit getragen wird.” Before planned change can be accepted, it must be initiated. Kemal Atatürk was one of the most effective initiators of social change in world history. Obviously, he has not yet found society-wide acceptance: “Atatürk” heißt: die Frage stellen nach der kurzfristigen Wandelbarkeit des Menschen, nach dem durch Kulturkontakt entstandenen oder gewollten Kulturkonflikt, nach der Kulturrevolution von oben, der Überstülpung eines westlichen technisch-zivilisatorischen Kulturmodells auf eine muselmanisch-religiöse Landbevölkerung.” Time was still too short for a definite success.

For the last few decades, one must state as a tendency that the influence of Atatürk’s successors on social change is waning while the influence of representatives of the counter-models is growing. Whatever the European Union may decide about the Turkish government’s membership application, it must logically be for one and against the other side in Turkey. With whom the Europeans will side will probably in large part depend on the question as to how capable of life and dissemination they regard their own model of development.

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1 Published in Supplement 2/86 of the Bulletin of the European Community.

2 Statistisches Bundesamt, p. 364.

3 “The totality of the configurations of behaviour in a society ... which are transmitted over generations by symbols, which take shape in instruments and products and which one becomes aware of in value concepts and ideas” (Fuchs in Fuchs et al., p. 437).

4 Compare the considerations about the concept “European interest” in Rhein, pp. 55-56.

5 See Endruweit, p. 103.


8 Quoted in Mango, p. 11.

9 See also Endruweit, pp. 104-5.

10 So Grothusen 1988, p. 3.

11 Kalaycıoğlu, p. 1.

12 See Yücekök, p. 89, Grothusen 1988, pp. 5-12; Kalaycıoğlu, pp. 5-6.


14 Endruweit, p. 105

15 “In Turkish law the view is unusual according to which parental power is a functional, fiduciary, dutiful social right in another person’s interest which has, under the supervision of the state, to be adapted gradually to the degree of maturity of the child. The parents’ right, a ius naturale, is, according to the Turkish view of right, an unlimited, absolute right of power over the child as an object. This view of parental power is backed up by the Islamic model according to which paternal authority is sacrosanct and does even comprise the enforced marriage of the child.” (Serozan, pp. 217-18).

16 Lerner, pp. 19-35.
17 Devlet Planlama Te__kilat_ (1968), Türk Köyünde Modernle_me E__itimleri Ara_t_rmas_, Ankara: DPT.


19 “This enormous effort has not been imposed on her by one or another foreign power” (Akarcal_, p. 3).

20 See, for instance, Rumpf, p. 79; Kalaycioğlu, p. 12; Steinbach, p. 40; Sch¸ler, p. 67.

21 Sonnenhol, p. 118.

22 Dodd, p. 156.


24 See Ekin, p. 599.

25 Kalaycioğlu, p. 12.

26 Mardin, pp. 8-10.

27 Ülgener, p. 78.

28 Yalman, p. 152.

29 See Zentrum für Türkeistudien, pp. 98-9 with further reference.

30 “Islam has proven to be a persisting power to which numerous Turks have remained attached not only in their private but also in their social life.” (Steinbach, p. 40).


32 Rumpf, p. 19. The principle of laicism is also found in art. 19 of the constitution of 1961 and in art. 24 of the constitution of 1982.

33 See also Weiher in Grothusen (1985), pp. 305-315.

34 Dereli, pp. 255-265.

35 Schwelien, p. 3.

36 Grothusen 1985, p. 762.

37 See β 1358 BGB (old version) which was cancelled by the law of equality of 18 June 1957 (BGBl. I, p. 609), although it had previously been anti-constitutional to a large extent.

38 Acar, p. 82, for Turkey in about 1990 (no exact date mentioned); for Germany in 1987: Onnen-Iseman, Corinna/Oßwald, Ursula: Aufstiegsbarrieren für Frauen im Universitätsbereich, Bad Honnef: Book 1991, p. 14.

39 “In the background one can still recognise traces of the unlimited Roman patria potestas, perhaps reduced by the right to kill (ius vitae necisque) and to alienate (mancipium).” (Serozan, p. 218).

40 See in this context Heper, pp. 24-36; Öncü pp. 57-60; Yurtda_ pp. 62-64.

41 See Article 1 of the Constitution of the French Republic. About the chances of federalism see
Rumpf in Grothusen (1965), p. 174 with further quotations.


45 However, one cannot know yet whether this mixture of both tendencies has already reached this representative of the political elite or whether she just tried to pay tribute to different political directions with only one statement. The second part of the quotation, however, was formulated out of a spirit that is not in accordance with article 30, No. 2c, of the Unified European Act.

46 Taşhan, p. 26; see also Kalaycıoğlu, p.11.

47 “A decisive progress in the practical realisation of equality is possible only if this aim is supported by the general public.” (“Mittelfristiges Programm der EG für 1986-1990 zur Chancengleichheit der Frauen”, in Beilage 3/1986 zum Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, p. 19).

48 “‘Atatürk’ means: to ask the question about the short-term changeability of man, about culture conflicts willingly introduced or unwillingly arisen from culture contacts, about cultural revolution from above, about putting a model of Western technological-civilizational culture over a Muslim-religious rural population,” (Sonnenhol, pp. 106-7).