

TURKEY AND EUROPE:A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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The earliest known Neolithic site of Hac_lar and Çatalhöyük, dating back to 7000BC "stands out as an incomparable prehistoric centre of culture. It was here that man created one of his first great works of art" (Prof. Dr. Ekrem Akurgal, *Ancient Civilisations*, p. 3). Agriculture was then practised, as revealed by the excavations. Anatolian civilisation seems to have been retarded and remained at the stage of a village civilisation until 2500BC when the Bronze Age started with the Hatti. The Hatti gave their name to Asia Minor which was then called the Land of the Hatti. Before the Hittites, an Indo-European people, began to arrive from 2200BC, the Hatti had reached a high level of urban civilisation, writing in cuneiform from the beginning of the eighteenth century BC. The Hatti's cultural influence, particularly in religion and state organisation on the Old Hittite Kingdom (1750-1450BC), was paramount. The Hatti language was different from all other Near Eastern languages. In its basic structure it has common characteristics with the Altaic or Turkic language family.

Other known inhabitants of Asia Minor before the Hittites were Luvians, an Indo-European people living in southwest Anatolia. The Hurrians, whose language showed an Altaic structure, occupied the southeast around 2000BC. They came under the strong influence of Babylonian culture. The Hurrians were followed by the Mitanni, an Indo-European people in eastern Anatolia. The newcomers, the 'people of Hatti', to which the Old Testament name Hittite was derived, spoke an Indo-European language called Nesian (Hittites called themselves Nesi or Na_i).

With the invasion of these Indo-European tribes between 2200BC and 2100BC, a new period began in Asia Minor. The Hittites founded the first strong state uniting the whole of Asia Minor under their rule (1450-1200BC), and annexed Aleppo and Babylon. The name Asia comes from the Hittite word Assuwa. In Syria they clashed with the Egyptian empire of Ramses II in 1299BC, leading to the the earliest known peace treaty signing at Qadesh, 1299BC. At the excavations at the Hittite city of Kültepe there came to light the first state archives of mankind.

Scholarship underlines the artistic and cultural influence of the early Asia Minor civilisations on Aegean and Greek culture (Akurgal, *Orient und Okziden*, Baden-Baden, 1966). Archaeological excavations, to which in the 1930's Atatürk gave impetus, delivered solid evidence that before the Aegean culture flourished in Ionia, Anatolia had become the cradle of great civilisations. Atatürk regarded the Hittite state as the prototype of the modern Turkish state in Asia Minor with its territorial boundaries and its capital in the central plateau.

While the central plateau and mountainous east came under the strong influence of the highly developed Mesopotamian civilisations in the early periods, later on Western Anatolian cultures, as uncovered in Troy and the western coastal areas, represented a different cultural tradition coming from the Aegean. In fact, throughout its history Anatolia became the bridge for the transmission and fusion of oriental and Western cultures from the Bronze Age to the present time. The Ionian civilisation in western Anatolia was a product of the coexistence of Greek people with the natives of Asia Minor (Akurgal, *Ancient Civilisations*, p. 17).

Scholarship has established that no fewer than seventy languages have been used in Anatolia up to the present time and that more than twenty different ethnic groups live today in Turkey. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Caucasus, the Crimea, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, who felt themselves to belong to Turkish culture came and were settled by the government in various parts of Anatolia. It is suggested that every third person in Turkey today belongs to one of these refugee groups. The explanation is that under the Turkish states which succeeded each other in Anatolia and the Balkans in the course of the last millennium, all of these indigenous and immigrant peoples acquired a common Turkish identity. Very long coexistence and common historical experience under a unified state structure gave rise to one Turkish culture and a common culture is the solid foundation of the Turkish nation today.

Ideological attempts to break up this unity are against the historically formed, organic existence of the Turkish nation of today.

The Ionian civilisation, which gave to the Graeco-Roman civilisation the principle of national thinking and science, flourished in western Anatolia with Greek colonies on coastal regions and a highly developed trade during Hellenistic and Roman periods, blending Greek civilisation with the Orient's wisdom and mysticism, Anatolia then appeared as the world's richest and most advanced region. The ruins of the magnificent cities from this period witness to this golden age of the peninsula.

In the following period, Asia Minor became the scene of an inconclusive struggle between the Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire, and declined until the time when, under the Seljuk sultanate of Konya, it recovered its past prosperity. With the Seljuks, the Turkish-Islamic period of Asia Minor began. The great Seljuk empire in the east, encompassing central Asia and Iran, vigorously continued the struggle against the Byzantines who lost the final confrontation at the battle of Manzikert in 1071. Then, the whole peninsula to the Aegean was flooded with Turkish tribes.

The first period of the Turkish invasion and settlement under the local Turcoman dynasties ended with the unification of Asia Minor, except for the western regions. Under the Seljuks of Konya, the peninsula rose once again to be one of the most prosperous and advanced areas of the world and at the crossroads of the then flourishing east-west trade (trade privileges, for example, were granted to Venice in 1220). Anatolian cities of the Seljuks can be compared to those of the Graeco-Roman period, with the difference of their oriental characteristics. The Seljuks built on trade highways magnificent caravansaries comparable to Western cathedrals. In the classical period of this refined civilisation, Konya became the most celebrated centre of oriental mysticism with Mawlana Jalaleddin Rumi and other great mystic philosophers of the thirteenth century. Under the Seljuks, Islamic religion and civilisation became prevalent in Asia Minor.

The task of Islamisation was completed under the second period of the Turcoman principalities, which arose on the frontier areas and conquered Byzantine western Anatolia. The Ottoman state in its first stage was one of these Turcoman principalities. The frontier military tradition and the Seljuk cultural heritage made it possible for the Ottomans to create one of the most powerful and enduring empires of the world, replacing the Byzantine Empire in Istanbul and the Balkans.

Although ethnic and cultural identity in Anatolia has been Turkish for the last millennium, it represents in fact a synthesis of various cultural and ethnic heritages which have been juxtaposed and fused in the long history of the peninsula. Archaeological and anthropological research shows that in daily life, beliefs, language, toponymy, arts and anthropological features of the Turkish nation today there are numerous elements from the bygone people and their civilisations. Five main periods in this long evolution can be identified: I. the Hatti and Hittite period, 2500-900BC; II. the Urartian civilisation in eastern Anatolia and Phrygian, Lydian and Carian civilisations in western Anatolia, 900-300BC; III. the Minoan and Ionian-Greek civilisations in Western Anatolia and the Aegean, a Persian interlude (546-334 BC), and Hellenistic civilisation, 900-30BC; IV. the Roman and Byzantine period, 30BC-AD1071; V. Turkish Asia Minor-a. the Seljuks and Turcoman principalities, 1071-1307, b. the Ottomans, 1307-1923, and c. the Turkish Republic, 1923 onwards.

1. The Ottoman Empire's Place in World History

In this synopsis an attempt will be made to review Turkish-European relations in past political, economic and cultural perspectives. The dividing line in these relations is, without doubt, the rise of the modern nation-state of Turkey.

In the period 1250-1500, the Levant, that is the eastern Mediterranean region with its hinterland of economically integrated countries, was the world's most lively region for the exchange of goods and ideas between east and west before the great European discoveries. The Ottomans unified under their rule the entire region conquering first Anatolia and the Balkans from the Euphrates to the Danube and from the Crimea to the Aegean islands in the period 1300-1453. In 1453 they conquered Constantinople/Istanbul despite the threat of a Western crusade, thus creating a compact empire

around the imperial capital and the Straits. In the early sixteenth century they annexed to their Empire the Arab lands of Syria, Egypt, Arabia and the Yemen (1516-1517), thus taking under their control the trade and pilgrimage routes through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, which involved them in a long struggle against the Portuguese. In the east, at various dates they extended their rule as far as Tabriz (1517, 1534, 1585), Georgia (1549) and the Caspian Sea (1585) in an effort to establish their full control of the silk route from Tabriz to Bursa and from Tabriz to Aleppo. Annexing Iraq (1534) and gaining access to the Gulf (1534) they participated, along with the Portuguese and the Iranian Safavids, in the flourishing trade of the Indian Ocean through Hormuz, Basra and Baghdad.

In 1453, the full control of the Straits (the Dardanelles, Marmara Sea and the Bosphorus) gave the Ottomans a strategic position in establishing full control over the trade of the Black Sea and East European countries (for instance the conquest of the Genoese colonies of the Crimea in 1475, and the first commercial agreement with Muscovy in 1497).

The first Ottoman grant of trade privileges, or capitulations, to the Genoese in 1352, and subsequently to Venice and Florence, guaranteed the continuation of the grand commerce of these maritime republics with the Levant, thus securing the economic prosperity of Renaissance Italy. The Ottoman sultans extended the same trade privileges to France in 1569, to England in 1580 and to the Netherlands in 1612. At one time, half of the foreign trade of France was with the Levant, while England's Levant Company, pioneer of such trade companies, established the basis of that country's commercial expansion in the world and of its capitalistic development. In those early centuries when the Ottoman emperors represented a superpower in the East, they granted such privileges only to those nations judged as friendly. Capitulations became a kind of bilateral, binding treaty only when Russia elicited such capitulations in 1783. Extended at each renewal and practically mandatory, the capitulatory privileges with a low rate of three per cent customs dues became a means for the European economic exploitation of the Middle East and were responsible for the collapse of its native handicraft industries in the period 1600-1900. In the 1840s, England's exports to the Middle East jumped to one-third of its whole foreign trade. In brief, it can be said that in the period 1500-1990, the Ottoman Empire, whose territory comprised Asia Minor, the Balkans and the Arab lands of the Middle East, played one of the most crucial roles in the economic development of Europe.¹

2. The European state-system and the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1815

Medieval Europe was supposed to make up one unified *Republica Christina* under the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. This unity began to dissolve with the rise of the national monarchies in the fifteenth century. Then, the crucial issue in the realignment of the rising powers in Europe was, on the one hand, how to keep the balance of power among the rival national monarchies and, on the other hand, how to keep the balance of power between the national monarchies and the Holy Roman Empire under the Habsburgs. In the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire, rising as a superpower in the east, in rivalry with the Habsburgs, played a crucial role in the struggle.

In his struggle against the Emperor Charles V, the French King Francis I (1515-1547) admitted that the only power capable of checking Charles V's domination of Europe was Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566). Francis's successor Henri II (1547-1559) had to borrow, through the Jewish banker family of Mendes, large sums of money from the Ottomans to finance his wars against the emperor. Again, the French prince Henri was able to gain the Polish throne (1573) only with the strong support of the Ottomans who opposed a Habsburg-backed king in Poland. The Ottomans also encouraged and promised aid to the Protestants in Germany as well as to the Dutch in rebellion against the Habsburgs in the Low Countries. Historians today unanimously underline the fact that Protestants obtained significant concessions from the emperor because of the impending Ottoman pressure from the east. Later on, when Elizabeth I (1558-1603) of England was under threat from the Spanish Armada, she tried to stir up Ottoman naval action in the Mediterranean against Spain. Examples can be multiplied to demonstrate how significant a role the Ottoman state played in maintaining the balance of power in Europe in the sixteenth century. In general, the Ottoman state pursued a policy aiming to ensure that none of the European powers became powerful enough to unify Europe under its domination.

In the end, two superpowers, the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, reached a kind of balance in east-central Europe and the Mediterranean, and made a truce in 1547 which stabilised the Ottoman territories in Europe and opened a new period of balance of power in Europe. Following the Catholic reaction and the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) in Europe, the France of Louis XIV (1643-1715) challenged the emperor, which emboldened the Ottomans to resume their expansionist policy against the Habsburgs. The Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 resulted in a coalition around the Habsburgs against the Ottoman Empire (the Holy League of 1684). England and the Netherlands, worried by the French advances in the Rhine valley, were endeavouring to achieve peace between the Ottomans and the emperor. English and Dutch pressure on the Habsburgs during the peace negotiations at Karlowitz in 1699 were duly appreciated by the Porte which subsequently granted to them new commercial privileges. This was the beginning of England's special influence in the Ottoman Empire which would last until 1878. This is also the date at which the Ottomans finally recognised European superiority in military technology and decided to imitate. European experts were invited to modernise Ottoman army.

During the long war of 1683-1699 another very important development took place-the Russian Empire, joined the Holy League and entered the Black Sea region by capturing Azov (Azak) in 1696. Now Istanbul itself was under threat. Equally important was that Russia then was admitted into the European state-system as a result of its joining the Holy League, whereas the Ottoman Empire remained outside the system until 1841.²

3. Russian imperialism the Ottoman Empire and the West and the so-called Eastern Question

In the eighteenth century, Russia, now officially recognised as part of Europe, pursued a plan of replacing the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul, the tsar claiming to be the protector of the Christian populations of the Balkans. Weakened and threatened by Russia and the Habsburgs, the Ottomans, along with the Western powers, now became more than ever an advocate of the balance of power in Europe. This Ottoman policy became particularly apparent in the protest against Poland's partition between Russia, the Habsburgs and Prussia (1772-1795). Once more, the Western powers, France and England, were joining the Porte in this policy. In the wake of the Russians' spectacular military successes against the Ottoman armies during the war of 1768-1774, the Russian annexation in 1783 of the northern Black Sea countries, inhabited mostly by Muslim peoples of Turkic origin, alarmed the whole of Europe. Russia now had an exclusive trade monopoly in the Black Sea and had become an imminent threat to Istanbul and the Straits. The Porte now sought aid and guarantees from Western powers for its territorial integrity. This new situation was labelled in European diplomacy as the Eastern Question, showing Western concern to preserve the Ottoman Empire, considered necessary for the European balance of power. (Incidentally it is a totally misleading mistake in Western literature to call the Ottoman Empire the Turkish Empire; identifying the Ottoman state-a patrimonial, dynastic empire-with the present-day nation-state of Turkey, which came into existence in 1923, is a mistake often responsible for the unjust anachronistic treatment by European states of the issues concerning modern Turkey.) This Western policy, however, did not go so far as to make the Ottoman state a member of the European state-system under the guarantees of international law. It was mainly religious ideology that was responsible for the Europeans denying the fact that the Ottoman state had long become part and parcel of the continental state-system. However, it is to be noted that Protestant countries, particularly England, overriding the Pope's prohibition of the sale of strategic materials to the 'infidel', used to export to the Ottoman Empire high quality powder and steel as early as the sixteenth century. It is also to be remembered that the Ottoman government systematically supported Lutherans and Calvinists throughout Europe. In the Ottoman Empire, too, while pragmatic-minded bureaucrats put the state's interests above everything else, the ulema, representing Islamic ideology, endeavoured to impose, most of the time without success, their influence on state policies.

4. European security systems and the Ottoman state, 1815-1878

One century before the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations, Fürst von Metternich, the Austrian statesman, considered Europe not as a continent in which separate nations and states were in constant struggle against each other, but as one single integrated European republic. This unity, he said, could be achieved only by the "co-operation of the states", not through the control of one dominant state. As a protection for and guarantee of the peace and the existing

monarchical order in Europe, a league of the four leading powers should have the right of supervision over revolutionary movements anywhere in Europe. At the Congress of Vienna the Quadruple Alliance of 1815, in accordance with the Metternich System, took the decision to assemble annually to review the situation in Europe, thus creating a permanent mechanism to maintain the status quo established in Vienna. Regardless of the specific nature and function of the Metternich System, all its arrangements can be considered as the precursor of the international organisations of the twentieth century.³

The Porte was not represented at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Ottoman statesman and historian, Cevdet Pasha, notes⁴ with regret that the Ottoman Porte then failed to seize the opportunity to participate in the Congress of Vienna. Since, he argues, in a later stage of the congress all those European states which were connected with the issues discussed in one way or another sent their delegates, obviously the Ottoman state also had the right to participate in the negotiations, at least on the problems directly concerning the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, he points out, the Porte was deeply engaged in so many urgent problems within the Empire—the struggle against the rebellious provincial notables in particular—that such important external events escaped the government's attention. Charles Talleyrand, the French diplomat, Cevdet adds, raised the issue of an agreement among the European Great Powers about a joint guarantee for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the instructions sent to the French delegation. Ottoman participation in the Congress, Cevdet suggests, might have been useful in checking Russia's ambitious plans. Along with the French and the Austrian governments the English government, too, supported the idea that "the Ottoman Empire should be included in the general treaty guaranteeing the status quo in Europe which [Canning, British statesman] hoped would be a result of the congress."⁵ Upon Russia's rejection, the idea of a general guarantee for the Ottoman Empire was dropped.

It was to isolate the Ottoman Empire from Europe that, in the Holy Alliance of September 1815, Tsar Alexander I insisted on the Christian nature of the Alliance. Let us add here that down to our days, such a policy is the cornerstone of Greek diplomacy against Turkey. Predicting the future, Metternich's overriding concern was that the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the ensuing collapse of the European balance of power, would result in a general war.

Developments during the Egyptian crisis of 1832-1833 fully justified Metternich's apprehensions. The Russian Empire had reached a dominant position in European politics following the fall of Napoleon, hoping to replace the Ottomans in Istanbul. In 1832, in the desperate situation caused by Mehmed Ali of Egypt whose armies had invaded Anatolia, Mahmud II (1809-1839) had to recognise Russia's special status in respect of the Straits with the treaty of Hünkâr-ıskelesi in 1833, virtually making the Ottoman sultan a vassal of the tsar and changing the European balance of power in favour of Russia.⁶ The tsar had profited from the hesitant policy of Western powers during the first phase of the Egyptian crisis. During the second phase of the Egyptian crisis (1837-1839), France's pro-Egyptian attitude obstructed Western co-operation over the problem of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In the critical situation in the wake of the Ottoman defeat at Nizib (June 24, 1839), on the initiative of England and Austria, the Great Powers including Russia, France and Prussia, delivered a unanimous note to the Porte and assumed the responsibility of bringing a solution to the crisis. Thus, the concert of Europe was restored in the face of the dangerous situation in the east seriously threatening the balance of power in Europe, and aimed at neutralising Russia's exclusive position. England, which had obtained vast commercial privileges in the Ottoman dominions through the treaty of 1838, decided to support effectively the integrity of the Empire and the Tanzimat reforms. This was the beginning of the period covering the years 1839-1878 when England's influence in the Ottoman Empire became preponderant in all fields. All the Great Powers, except France, agreed among themselves in London (July 15, 1840) to force Mehmed Ali to abandon his plan of an Arab empire matching the Ottoman sultan's. At this point, although rivalry among the members of the European concert continued, the concern to keep the balance of power in Europe brought them together, the fate of the Ottoman Empire becoming the most important issue in nineteenth century European politics.

Actually, policies or excuses for interference in the internal affairs of secondary states followed by the Great Powers in the period 1815-1878 were not very different in essence from those of our time, except that they are now globalised to control world issues which can lead to a general war.

In 1841, a very important document signed by the five powers with France joining the Alliance re-established the old status concerning the Straits, superseding Russia's privileged position. "The ships of war of the foreign powers" were prohibited to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and the five Great Powers "engage to respect this determination of the sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared." The particular importance of this agreement was that the Great Powers were united in accepting the principle as binding on themselves, which became part of the public law of Europe. It is interpreted as the first step toward the Ottoman Empire's inclusion in the European concert. This became apparent when the tsar attempted to make the sultan recognise his protectorate over the Christian subjects of the sultan in 1853. The British and French governments decided to support the Porte against Russia (the Crimean War, 1854-1856). By the treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856) the Great Powers admitted Turkey into the European concert. Article VII says: "Their majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire".

In return, the Porte promised (The Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856) fundamental reforms to improve the conditions of its subjects. By a special agreement, Britain, France and Austria jointly guaranteed Ottoman sovereignty and territorial integrity and infringement of them was to be a *casus belli*. Historically, this meant the culmination of the long process of integration of Turkey with Western Europe.

5. Ottoman reforms and the emergence of modern Turkey

The westernising reforms of the Tanzimat period (1839-1877) were responsible for the adoption of a series of Western law codes, judicial organisation with secular law courts, introduction of French-style provincial administration (1864), and, for the so-called millet system, which made it possible for the Christian minorities to have their own religious autonomous administration with representative councils. These liberal westernising reforms culminated in the declaration of a constitution and the convocation of a parliament in 1876-1877. However, the disastrous war of 1877-1878 with Russia, during which the Western powers remained neutral, resulted in the loss of large territories in the Balkans. Dismemberment of the Empire created such a deep disillusionment amongst the Turks that, under Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), a strong Islamist reaction against Western influence became state policy. Also, radical changes were happening in European politics and the balance of power in the wake of the Berlin Congress (1878), with the emergence of a unified Germany and the ensuing triple alliance making Russia a partner of the Western powers. Taking advantage of the Ottoman helplessness in the wake of the Russian advances in the Balkans and the Caucasus, England managed to take the lion's share in the partitioning of the Empire by occupying Cyprus (1878) and Egypt (1882) as well as penetrating in the Gulf and the Red Sea. Thus, the security of the British Empire was believed to be guaranteed. These changes also entailed a complete re-orientation in Ottoman foreign policy. Abandoned by the West, faced with Russian imperial ambitions and the Greek Megali Idea of restoring the Byzantine Empire, the Ottomans turned to Germany (Kaiser Wilhelm II's visit to Istanbul in 1899).

The events in the course of World War I, the defeat of the Allied fleet at the Dardanelles in particular, showed the world the key strategic importance of Turkey and the Straits. Another historic importance of the struggle at the Dardanelles was that Turks found, in the person of a young, brilliant soldier named Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) a national hero who was destined to be the deliverer of the homeland of the Turks in Asia Minor and Europe from the Greek invasion in 1919-1922. At the end of World War I the prime minister of Greece, Eleutherios Venizelos, a consummate diplomat, succeeded in obtaining the full support of the Allied powers for the realisation of the Greek dream of reviving the Byzantine Empire. On 15 May 1919, the Greek forces landed at Smyrna under the protection of an Allied fleet, an episode which vividly recalled the Navarino operation of one century earlier. The story of the ensuing events is well known. Dictated by the Allied powers, then occupying the capital of the sultanate, the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 (articles 65-83) granted Greece Smyrna and its hinterland, and distributed large territories in Asia Minor as the shares to the Allied powers. No one then could anticipate that the use of the Greeks for the Allied scheme of partitioning the Turkish homeland would be a fatal mistake, and would arouse the whole Turkish nation in staunch resistance to the Allied verdict. From a three-year struggle (1919-1923) a new nation was born. The point to be stressed is that in his fight against the Greeks and the victors of World War I, as well as against the Caliph's manoeuvres in occupied

_stanbul, Mustafa Kemal always ensured important decisions went through a national Assembly on the principle of the absolute sovereignty of the Turkish nation. Thus, the War of Independence signified a national revolution which asserted the Turkish nation's determination to end the Ottoman dynasty's imperial-patrimonial rule once for all, and to join on equal footing the club of the European nation states. In 1922, Arnold Toynbee, then visiting the Turkish-Greek front, declared that the Turks were fighting there with Western ideals against the West itself. In the peace conference of Lausanne (July 24, 1923), the Turkish delegation's insistence on equality with European states was the recurring theme of every issue discussed. Capitulatory privileges, which had reduced the Ottoman Empire to the conditions of a semi-colony of the Western powers, became the subject of the most heated discussions causing the rupture of the negotiations for three months (the recent attempt to give Turkey secondary status in the European Union is interpreted as another sign of how Europe still regards Turkey as the continuation of the Ottoman Empire). During the period of 1923-1928 the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara, acting as the sole representative of the Turkish nation enacted, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, a series of revolutionary laws all aiming to make Turkey a modern nation state, democratic and secular. Atatürk and his ink_lapç_ group in the GNA, considered the total westernization of the country as the absolute precondition for Turkey's becoming a member of the Western family of nations. Atatürk introduced his revolutionary inkilabs one after another: Declaration of the Republic (October 4, 1923), abolition of the caliphate (March 24, 1924), adoption of the Swiss civil law (October 4, 1926); the law for a unified secular education (March 2, 1926); changes in the constitution to secularise the state (1928); the adoption of the Latin alphabet (October 1, 1928), and finally reforms making the Turkish citizen appear as a European and to give him a national Turkish identity. The last inkilabs about the alphabet or dress may be looked on as symbolic, but in fact they are crucially important for cultural, social and political identity in a traditional society. Seeing stiff resistance from a deeply traditional society, Kemal's attention turned to the education of the youth of the country. The enactment of the law of the 'Unification of Education' of 1926 must be looked on as one of the most prudent inkilabs. His hope was that youth brought up under an absolutely national, secular education system would be the guarantee of the new Turkey. Through educational and cultural institutions, Atatürk hoped to create out of a traditional community a modern nation on the model of the Western nations.

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1 For the Ottoman Empire's economic relations with Europe now see _nalç_k, H. and Quataert, D. (ed.) (1994), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge University Press.

2 For Ottomans and the European state system, see _nalç_k, H. (1993), *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire*, Bloomington; _nalç_k, H. (1973), *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London; Vaughan, D.M. (1954), *Europe and the Turk, A Pattern of Alliances*, Liverpool.

3 von Srbik, H.R. (1925), 'Metternichs Plan der Neuordnung Europe 1815/15', *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung*, 60, pp. 109-126; Schmals, H.W. (1940), *Versuche einer gesarnteuropalischen Organisation, 1815-1820*, Aarau; Tuncer, H. (1996), *Metternich'in Osmanl_ Politikas_ (1815-1848)*, Ankara. This study in Turkish with a complete bibliography has largely been followed in this paper; its version in German is expected to be published in 1997.

4 *Tarih-i Cevdet*, 2nd edition _stanbul, vol.XI, 1309 H., pp. 156-161, 181.

5 Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, pp. 47-8.

6 In the secret article of the Hünkär _skelesi treaty it is specified that in return for Russia's military aid to the sultan, "the Sublime Ottoman Porte shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever."