Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Institutional and Security Challenges

Meltem Müftüler Baç *

Abstract

In a historic moment, the European Council decided in its December 2004 summit to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. Even though Turkey has been on the borders of the European Union since its Association Agreement in 1963, there has always been a degree of ambivalence towards Turkey’s membership. This paper proposes that the following factors will determine, to a large extent, both the nature of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU and whether Turkey will ever accede to the EU as a full member. These factors are: the institutional restructuring in the EU, in other words the changes that the Constitutional Treaty brings to the functioning of the EU and the security challenges for European and western security, particularly important here is the Islam vs. Europe divide.

Introduction

The European Council decided in its December 2004 summit to open accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. This was a historical turning point for the European Union and Turkish relations. In a speech delivered at Leiden University in September 2004, Frits Bolkestein, the European Union Commissioner responsible for the Internal Market, declared that if Turkey accedes to the EU, then this means that the efforts of the German, Austrian and Polish troops that resisted the Ottoman Turks’ siege of Vienna in 1683 would be in vain.1 The speech underlined the growing fears in Europe as to whether Turkish membership in the EU would lead to an Islamisation of Europe. In that sense, it was reminiscent of the Convention president Valerie Giscard d’Estaing’s remarks of November 2002;"Turkey’s membership would spell the end of the European Union". 2

It is now commonly argued that if Turkey ever accedes to the European Union, it would impact the project of European integration in various ways; and it

* Associate Professor of International Relations, Sabanci University, Istanbul. The author gratefully acknowledges the support provided by the Turkish Academy of Sciences, GEBİP program, for this paper’s research.

2 Gareth Harding, "Bordering on the ridiculous; Why Turkey is not a European country", European Voice, vol.8, no.41, 14 November 2002.
will be a new challenge for the EU to absorb a large, culturally different country. Turkey will affect the EU’s institutions, its role as an international actor, the European identity formulations\(^1\) and the future of Europe in a more drastic fashion than the new member states that have acceded to the EU on 1 May 2004. That is why accession negotiations with Turkey will impact the future of the European Union. Even though Turkey has been on the borders of the European Union since its Association Agreement in 1963, there has always been a great degree of ambivalence towards Turkey’s membership. When the European Council decided in its 1999 Helsinki summit to make Turkey a candidate country, it seemed as if the issue was more or less settled. However, as the probability of Turkey’s accession increases, the ambivalence felt in Europe towards Turkey seems to become more pronounced.

This paper proposes that the following factors will, to a large extent, determine both the nature of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU and whether Turkey will ever accede to the EU as a full member. These factors are: the security challenges for European and western security, particularly important here is the Islam vs. Europe divide and the institutional impact of Turkey’s membership, specifically in the light of the changes that the Constitutional Treaty brings to the functioning of the EU. These factors are not completely independent of each other, but are mutually reinforcing. This paper does not focus on the Turkish ability to meet the EU’s accession criteria, namely as to whether Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen Criteria. The paper also does not focus directly on the member states preferences regarding Turkish membership, even though the three factors analysed in the paper play an important role in shaping EU members’ positions towards Turkey’s membership.

The Commission’s Progress Report of October 2004 and its Recommendation to the European Council stated that Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria sufficiently enough for accession negotiations to begin.\(^4\) Thus, a major obstacle to Turkey’s EU membership, which is the claim that it does not fulfil the political criteria, no longer holds true. However, according to the Commission’s recommendation, the negotiations will depend on the sustainability of political reforms. On the Commission’s recommendation, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. The European Commission will present a report to the European Council on Turkey’s  


political reforms in December 2005. In addition, if there is a standstill in Turkish political reforms, then the Commission might recommend the suspension of negotiations, in which case the European Council is to decide by qualified majority, rather than unanimity. According to the European Commission, "the pace of the reforms will determine the progress in negotiations".\(^5\) It seems that the Turkish negotiations will be particularly long and draining, and the European Union has adopted a number of safeguard clauses for these negotiations.

This paper evolves with an analysis of the evolution of Turkey’s relations with the European Union, analyses the possible impact of Turkey’s membership on EU functioning, and proceeds to the possible impact of Turkey’s membership on the 2nd pillar development in the European integration project.

**Turkey’s ambivalent relationship with the European Union**

Turkey has the longest standing association agreement with the European Union. Its special relationship with the EU is best illustrated by the type of Association Turkey has with the EU. In the 1960s, Greece and Turkey were the only countries that became Associate members of the European Economic Community, Greece in 1961 and Turkey in 1963. In these two Associations, the EEC relied on Article 237/238 of the Rome Treaty, that foresees that any European country could apply to become a member of the EEC. The Turkish Association Agreement, the Ankara Treaty, in its Article 28 stated "As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance of Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community". Even though this is not an explicit promise of membership, the Agreement noted that Turkey’s membership would be possible if Turkey fulfilled its obligations. As the then Commission President, Walter Hallstein, declared in 1963 "Turkey is a part of Europe". Despite these positive beginnings, Turkey’s relations with the European Union throughout the 1960s and 1970s were at best rocky.\(^6\)

In 1987, Turkey submitted its application for full membership in the EC, and in 1989, the Commission Opinion on the Turkish application stated that despite its eligibility for membership, neither the EC nor Turkey were ready for Turkey’s membership.\(^7\) The Commission’s recommendation was that instead of full

---


\(^7\) European Commission Opinion on Turkish Application, 14 December 1989, Brussels, Annex 89 (0280).
membership, the EU should realise a Customs Union with Turkey, as foreseen in the 1963 Association Agreement. Consequently, the Customs Union Agreement, signed on 6 March 1995, between Turkey and the EU, increased the Turkish hope that membership was soon to be realised.

However, when the European Commission in July 1997, adopted its Agenda 2000 for enlarging the EU it did not include Turkey among the applicant countries that would be elevated to candidate country status. Accordingly, the European Council left Turkey out of the enlargement process in its Luxembourg summit of December 1997. Two years later, the European Council in its Helsinki summit of December 1999, decided to elevate Turkey’s position from an applicant to a candidate country, thereby officially including Turkey in the EU’s enlargement process, in line with the Commission’s recommendation in its 1999 Regular Progress Report for Turkey. In November 2000, the European Union adopted the Accession Partnership Document for Turkey’s membership and Turkey submitted its first National Programme to the EU in March 2001.

In December 2002, in the Copenhagen summit, the European Council decided to review Turkey’s candidacy two years later, during the December 2004 summit, with an eye towards opening accession negotiations with Turkey. It was during the 2002 Copenhagen summit that the European Union concluded accession negotiations with ten of the candidate countries. In October 2004, the Commission reviewed Turkey’s ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria and recommended accession negotiations with Turkey. Accordingly, the European Council decided in its summit of 17-18 December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. In the meantime, all the Central and Eastern European countries plus Cyprus and Malta became EU members on 1 May 2004. Romania and Bulgaria will most probably accede to the EU in 2006 or 2007. Croatia applied in 2003 and Macedonia applied in 2004 and the negotiations with Croatia will begin on 17 March 2005. Thus, there is a probability that Croatia might become an EU member before Turkey.

The European Union’s enlargement process is highly complicated. However, no other candidate has had such a divisive impact among the members as Turkey has. Turkey’s role in the European order, indeed whether it has a place in Europe at all, has been a particularly important question in the post-Cold War period. Thus, one could argue that Turkey’s problematic relationship with the European Union is a result of Turkey’s own identity crisis, as it grapples with the issue of where

---

Turkey fits. Directly related to the issue as to where Turkey fits, is the international security restructuring which has taken place since 9/11 and the possible impact that Turkey has in the new international order. In addition, Turkey is qualitatively different from other candidates because of its size. The institutional impact that Turkey would have on the functioning of the EU would be far greater than that of other countries, which is addressed in the next section.

The Institutional Challenges of Turkish accession to the EU

Turkey’s possible membership presents the EU with the largest institutional challenge it has ever faced. All previous enlargements have led to institutional restructuring. However, Turkey’s size makes the issue more pressing. The EU institutions were designed with the Rome Treaty, to accommodate a community of six, and every enlargement brought institutional changes that would guarantee the EU’s functioning without major disruptions. The EU enlargement of 2004 brought significant institutional change, first the revisions brought by the 2000 Nice Treaty and then, later on, the Constitutional Treaty. Nevertheless, none of these changes could foresee the inclusion of as large a country as Turkey into the EU. Therefore, this section addresses whether Turkey’s membership would really signal the end of the EU’s decision-making structures.

There are 3 dominant axes in the EU, big states’ interests vs. small states’ interests, federalists vs. intergovernmentalists, and poor members versus rich members - or net contributors to the budget vs. net receivers from the budget. These are the main areas where conflict becomes inevitable when any institutional reform is on the table. These dominant divisions in the EU determine the pace and outcome of negotiations especially on the institutional restructuring attempts. A traditional argument was that the digestion of new members into the EU and the resulting institutional changes would have made it harder for Turkey to join the EU. There are a number of reasons for that, one concerns Turkey’s size. It is highly likely that one of the reasons behind the EU’s reluctance to open accession negotiations with Turkey is the institutional impact of Turkey’s membership. One should note that the institutional challenges faced by the EU, which it would face if Turkish membership went ahead, are beyond Turkey’s control as they are not internal political and economic problems in Turkey within the remit of the Turkish government. The institutional impact of Turkey’s membership in the EU can be approached from two different angles: first, since in the EU institutions, voting and

---

decision making powers were determined according to individual members’ population, Turkey’s incorporation posed serious problems because of its population size. Second, Turkey would be among the poor members of the EU, with most probably an intergovernmental preference. Thus, the core European states, the Original Six, who would like to see integration become deeper, would be concerned about the impact of another state with intergovernmental preferences that is also large enough to block decisions. In other words, if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the fact that the largest member of the EU is not part of the evolutionary process of European integration might have some repercussions for the future of that integration. This is why federalist oriented states such as France, have reservations about Turkey’s accession and why those states with intergovernmental preferences, such as the United Kingdom, view Turkey’s accession more favourably.

This is precisely why it is important to assess Turkey’s impact on EU institutions. One should note that the probable impact of Turkey’s incorporation on EU institutions, increased the hesitancy of certain member states towards Turkey. Turkey was deemed to be too large for accession into the EU. For example, in the European Council’s Nice summit of December 2000, the EU included all the candidate countries in its future forecasting of institutional reforms, however, Turkey was not included in these calculations. According to the EU, Turkey was not included because it had not yet begun its accession negotiations. However, if Turkey were included, finding a formula for institutional reform, with which all member states agreed, would have been impossible.

Turkey’s population and size would be especially important in the following aspects; the European Parliament and voting in the Council of the European Union. The representation of MEPs in the European Parliament is by member state population, the EP is already very crowded and almost at its limits of expansion with 732 members. Finding a formula to integrate a populous Turkey, which would protect the existing member states’ representation, and give adequate places to Turkey, so that democratic balances would be protected, while at the same time keeping the size of the EP at a functioning capacity, would be a major challenge. The second major challenge concerns voting in the Council. According to Article 25 of the Constitutional Treaty, voting in the European Council will be double majority on most issues, replacing the qualified majority voting system of weighted votes, last fixed by the Nice Treaty. Under double majority voting, a proposal would be adopted in the Council if at least 55% of the member states, representing 65% of the EU population, approve. The double majority voting in the Council makes Turkey’s population, and therefore voting weight, more important
The proposed changes would make Turkey a valuable partner to have on one’s side in coalition building and in block formation, in the double majority voting system. Turkey’s population of 71 million is predicted to increase to 82 million by the year 2015. Germany, which is currently the largest member state, however, has declining population rates. Thus, if Turkey accedes to the EU in 2015, it will most probably be the most populous, largest EU member, but also probably among the less wealthy. In the double majority voting system, Turkey would make the formation of blocking minorities harder for large EU members. It is likely that small states will benefit from Turkey’s value as a coalition partner, as it is expected that Turkey would take the side of the small, poor states on Council decisions. In that manner, it would challenge the interests of the Big Three, France, Germany and the UK, in the EU.

Thus, Turkey’s population’s main challenge to the double majority voting system is its impact on the formation of blocking minorities in the Council. Currently, the EU population of its 25 members is 454 million, and a blocking minority is 159 million, when Bulgaria and Romania join in 2007, the EU population of 27 members will be 484 million, and a blocking minority will be 169 million. If Turkey is accepted as a member, then a 28 member EU will have a population of 556 million, which brings the blocking minority to 195 million, based on population figures of 2003. Thus, Turkey’s accession would ease blocking minority formation for smaller states. However, it would make it harder for larger states. In every sense, it would make Turkey a valuable coalition partner. Viewed in that light, the current large member states, France, Germany, UK and Italy would have greater difficulty in either passing a law or blocking a proposal. Interestingly, Giscard D’Estaing claimed, “This is a rule we can’t change. With accession, Turkey would become the most populous country in the EU with the greatest voting power in the Council”, and this is, therefore, the major obstacle to Turkey’s accession.

The Constitutional Treaty still needs to be ratified and several countries have referenda, so there is a possibility that it will not be ratified. This, in turn, will mean that the EU will have to find another solution for voting in the Council, and that might be less problematic for Turkey’s accession. The implications that Turkey’s population would have for the European integration project are, of course, another matter. In that sense, the inclusion of Turkey as a large, poor state would be an institutional challenge in the European Council for the large states, and a valuable partner for the small and poor states. This would alter the institutional

---

*Katrin Bennhold, “Will Turkey join the EU Club?” International Herald Tribune, 13 September 2004.*
balance mentioned above as organised along three axes in the EU. These perceived problems in Turkey’s membership led the French to declare, in September 2004, that they would hold a referendum on Turkey’s accession. This would not be the first time, as the French government, under Georges Pompidou, had a referendum on British accession in 1972. However, the Turkish concern is that it would complete all its negotiations, fulfil membership requirements but still might be left out of the EU. Given the European public’s reluctance to accept Turkey, (around 60% of the French population and 46% of the German population is against Turkish membership), the gates for Turkey’s accession to the EU might very well be left shut with the closure of negotiations and the decision left to the European public referendum.

The Security Challenges of Turkey’s Accession to the EU

With the end of the Cold War in 1990, Turkey’s relations with the European Union entered a turbulent era. Since 1990, there has been an ongoing restructuring of global and regional balances of power, a reformulation of international institutions and a redefinition of security risks. The end of the Cold War provided the European integration project with a new momentum for furthering integration at the political level. It created new challenges to be dealt with, most specifically for the unification of the European continent, divided by the Iron Curtain in the Cold War years. The second major turning point in the post-Cold War era was the 11 September 2001 attacks against the USA, which changed the definition of what constitutes a security risk. Perhaps more importantly, in the post 9/11 period, international politics entered a new era of antagonism, with states faced with unclear targets and non-specific threats. The international restructuring created by these two developments in the post-Cold War era, had a considerable impact on Turkey’s relationship with the European Union.

Turkey’s proposed membership of the European Union took on a new perspective in the post 9/11 era. Particularly important in this new international order, is the emerging risk created by illegal migration, terrorism, religious extremism and porous borders. Turkey’s inclusion as an EU member might provide the EU with new mechanisms to deal with these new risks, and at the same time, provide it with a unique opportunity to become a great power in international politics. In the highly turbulent security environment of post 9/11, Turkey found itself as the only Muslim member of NATO, which had the capacity to act as a bridge between the western world and Islamic countries. The crisis between NATO members, during the Iraq war in 2003, is a good starting point in analysing Turkey’s possible future impact. The war in Iraq in 2003 highlighted the divergence in the Americans’ and Europeans’ perceptions of newly emerging patterns of
cooperation-the Transatlantic Divide - that inevitably has an impact on Turkey’s position in the European Union. One should keep in mind that Europe is not a monolithic entity, and that inside the EU there are serious differences with respect to the Transatlantic Alliance. What is particularly important is that there is now a clear divide in Europe between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists. This divide inside Europe over the new international security environment, also reflects on Turkey’s position in Europe. The Atlanticists, such as the UK for example, are more favourable towards Turkish membership.

Terrorism seems to be the major international threat for the 21st century and the fact that many terrorists turn out to be of Middle Eastern origin, has led to a new demarcation in international politics, as predicted by Samuel Huntington, western civilisation versus Islamic civilisation. This is one of the security challenges that Turkey’s EU membership brings, i.e. will the inclusion of Turke-predominantly a Muslim country - into the EU increase the EU’s security or will it pose a security risk? This is, at the same time, an opportunity for the EU, a Muslim country’s membership into the EU would ease some of the tensions between these seemingly different worlds. The second security challenge is the impact that Turkey would have on the EU’s 2nd pillar development.

As the only secular, Muslim democracy anchored clearly to the west, Turkey represents an antithesis to religious fundamentalism movements in the Middle East. This has two implications, On the one hand, it is presented as a ‘model’ for Islamic countries where one can argue that it is possible to have a functioning democracy, liberal markets, a western outlook, an open civil society, and tolerance for diversity in a country that has a predominantly Muslim population; on the other hand, Turkish secularism and its rejection of fundamentalism also makes it a target. Second, it might be easier to hit European or American targets in Turkey due to its geographical proximity to the troubled areas of the Middle East. This physical accessibility of Turkey to Middle Eastern terrorist groups might make its incorporation into the EU more problematic, given the increased burden of securing the EU’s borders, that Turkey’s incorporation might pose. Paradoxically, these factors might increase Turkey’s prospects of becoming part of the EU. As the EU will in any case have to deal with these security challenges, Turkey’s membership might increase the EU’s success of doing so. Whilst on the one hand, Turkey desires to be a member of the EU in order to finally secure its position in the post 2001 international order, on the other hand its

---

unique character as secular democracy in the Muslim world increases its own value for European security.

Turkey is not a readily accepted member of the European system, as its problematic candidacy with the EU illustrates, but it has been going through turbulent times with respect to its role and position in the global and regional balance of power. It is partly for this reason that Turkey has been adamant in seeking EU membership, as this would finally cement its inclusion as part of Europe. This does not mean, however, that Turkey’s membership prospects in the EU will be governed by security concerns, but rather that the international transformation which has further complicated Turkey’s position in the European order, may now be a factor in solving an ambivalent situation, if Turkey is given membership.13

The new international risks have paradoxically increased Turkey’s potential value to European security for various reasons. Turkey’s EU membership might be the answer to the clash of civilisation arguments, as its unique character among Muslim countries makes it a valuable asset for the European Union as it can act as a bridge between the two different cultures. In terms of the larger picture for international restructuring, it is the contention of this paper that Turkey’s position is essential to consider in an analysis of transatlantic relations. The divergence between the USA and the EU—or at least by some members of the EU-on international security, becomes visible when analysing their different approaches to Turkey; one can argue therefore that Turkey’s role in international security, has the capacity to deepen the transatlantic divide.

It became almost commonplace to argue that American and European views on the definition of risks differed, however an unexpected development in 2003 was that a deep mistrust between the NATO allies developed as a result of the war in Iraq. Interestingly, this mistrust developed not only in terms of the Americans versus the Europeans but within the European pillar of the Alliance and within the 2nd pillar of the European Union. A major crisis erupted between NATO and EU members—at least between what Donald Rumsfeld had described as Old Europe and New Europe—over the Iraqi war, or more precisely over the use of force against Iraq. The first casualty of the military operation against Iraq, before the war had even begun, looked as if it would be NATO and the EU’s ESDP, as EU members were

divided among themselves over this issue. In addition, NATO passed through a particularly difficult time, as ‘coalitions of the willing’ seemed to be the answer to new security risks rather than collective defence.\textsuperscript{14} The war in Iraq seemed to split the EU into two different camps and this had serious consequences for the 2nd pillar development in the EU. The UK, Spain, Italy and Portugal joined the USA in its campaign against Iraq with the EU candidate countries in central Europe, such as Poland and the Czech Republic very clearly on that side as well. In response, the French, German, Belgian and Luxembourg governments formed a bloc that was against the use of force in Iraq. The crisis inside the European pillar of NATO was so strong, that at one point, the French President Jacques Chirac said of the central and eastern European countries which had openly sided with the USA, "they missed a good opportunity to remain silent\textsuperscript{15}" and that these countries jeopardised their EU membership with their open US stance. This, of course, did not mean that these countries would not have become EU members as their accession negotiations then were almost concluded, however, the crisis indicated that after enlargement, the EU’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} pillar integration would become even more problematic. Clearly, the new members of the EU that joined 1 May 2004, were openly Atlanticists and the French tended to perceive them as the Americans’ Trojan horses, inside the EU. It was these tensions in the EU that prompted the French, German, Belgian and Luxembourg governments to devise more European strategies for the future. Interestingly, this camp became instrumental in downplaying the guarantees Turkey had requested from NATO in case of an Iraqi attack against Turkey, and they also formed close relations with the Russians, who were similarly bothered by the unilateral actions of the USA.

In January 2003, for about four weeks, France, Belgium and Germany, as NATO members, blocked the deployment of NATO machinery and surveillance planes to Turkey, using the argument that if NATO did allow this deployment, it would mean that there was a tacit understanding that war was imminent. The issue was resolved in February 2003, with the NATO decision to revoke Article 4 for Turkey. This became possible when the decision was moved from the North Atlantic Council to the Defence Planning Committee, where France does not sit, since France withdrew from NATO’s military command in 1965. This crisis in NATO was "the worst and most serious rift in NATO history".\textsuperscript{16}

During the war in Iraq, Germany lent Turkey four Patriot missile systems and assigned German soldiers for the four NATO AWAC surveillance planes that patrolled Turkish airspace during military activities. The NATO defence

\textsuperscript{14} Elizabeth Pond, Friendly fire: the Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance, Pittsburg, EUSA, 2004.
\textsuperscript{16} Stephen Castles, "NATO reaches deal on Turkey as fears grow of EU split", The Independent, 17 February 2003.
deployment remained in Turkey until late April and ended as Turkey declared that it no longer felt an Iraqi threat. The crisis in NATO over the support to Turkey deepened the transatlantic divide as it was the Americans who sought these guarantees. The reaction from the European allies was not directed towards Turkey but to the USA, who they perceived as using the NATO platform to legitimise their future actions in Iraq. Turkish geographical proximity to Iraq meant that NATO had to become involved, and the nature of NATO’s involvement led to the dispute between the USA and the European allies. In addition, the European states were divided among themselves, as illustrated by the pro-US letter signed by 8 European states, UK, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Denmark, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in February 2003. France and Germany publicly declared that the central and eastern European countries were jeopardising their EU membership chances by backing the US.

On 29 April 2003, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg had a mini summit, where they discussed the creation of a European defence union with a European military headquarters and an armament agency. The Iraqi war also indirectly motivated France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg to initiate a new structure for European security. In May 2003, they set up a new headquarters for Europe-only operations, operations which did not involve any NATO allies that were not also EU member. In the Turkish case, openly backing the US would have been extremely risky, as Turkey waited for a start date for accession negotiations and France and Germany carry great weight in that decision. Thus, the rift between the USA, France and Germany made the Turkish position much harder than that of the central and eastern European countries who had already concluded their accession negotiations. In that sense, systemic developments which were completely beyond Turkey’s control had great impact on Turkey’s future with the EU.

Despite the turmoil of the Iraqi war, it is without doubt that Turkey has great capability in contributing to the EU’s newly evolving security and defence role, the Common European Security and Defence Policy-CESDP. At the December 1999 Helsinki summit, the European Council adopted a number of measures to advance the CESDP - Common European Security and Defence Policy - stating its ‘determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and where, NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct, EU-led military operations in response to international crisis’. The EU members agreed to build a military force of about 50,000-60,000 troops by 2003, through the voluntary contributions of member states. This force would be capable of performing and sustaining the full

---

1) Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki Council, 10-11 December 1999, paragraph 27.
range of WEU’s Petersberg tasks - humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping missions. The EU’s military operability depends on its automatic access to NATO assets and facilities to carry out EU activities, when NATO chooses not to act. Problems arose over these aspects as Turkey, as a member of NATO and an associate member of the WEU, asserted that its incorporation into these EU-led operations should be better spelled out. In the EU’s defence policy, Turkey’s position posed significant problems as it was an important NATO member but its EU membership, despite its candidacy and its Associate membership since 1963, is still dubious and far off.

For Turkey in the EU, one of the major implications of the war in Iraq was probably to illustrate that Turkey is indeed located in a neighbourhood of major instability and that in case Turkey ever accedes to the EU as a full member, the European Union will find itself bordering a region of high unpredictability. Thus, the war paradoxically might have emphasised the possible pitfalls of having Turkey as a member of the EU and make the EU a party to conflicts that might arise in Turkey’s neighbourhood. Given the fact that the Amsterdam Treaty emphasised the territorial integrity of the Union and its defence via the WEU as its defence arm, Turkey’s membership to the EU might alter the EU’s assessment of its future security risks and provide new incentives for deepening integration at the 2nd pillar.

The turning point in Turkey’s relations with the EU in terms of its candidacy came when Turkey was itself a target of terrorist attacks in November 2003. The various European reactions were interesting, in line with Turkish aspirations for EU membership. First, almost all the EU members showed a strong degree of solidarity with Turkey, some have even argued that Turkey’s membership negotiations should begin in 2005, in order for terrorism not to win. For example, Jack Straw, the British Foreign Minister, visited Istanbul immediately after the attacks and claimed that ‘the attacks would increase the determination of all of us to see Turkey a full member of the EU’. It was also possible that the terrorist attacks might have added to worries about perceived security risks, that Turkish membership might pose.

Turkey’s geographical proximity to major areas of instability, the Central Asian Republics, the Middle East and the Caucasus will require the European Union to adopt common positions on these. In that manner, Turkey will give the

---


PERCEPTIONS • Autumn 2004 41
EU new foreign policy concerns, similar to those brought about by the impact which Spain’s membership had on the EU’s foreign policy towards the Latin American and Mediterranean countries. “The European Union’s new security challenge ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ (adopted in December 2003) and the ‘Wider Europe-Neighbourhood’ concept put great emphasis on the importance of the Southern periphery for European security.” Related to the 2nd and 3rd pillar development, the European Union will need to develop further controls to serve its borders, especially in the east. As the European Union is now facing complex demands on its own security in terms of illegal migration, porous borders, terrorism and religious fundamentalism, Turkey could potentially have two roles, as a security risk or a security provider. Its inclusion will take the EU borders to the most volatile region in the world; this in turn will require an increased cooperation on 2nd and 3rd pillar issues. Thus, Turkey’s incorporation might provide further incentive to strengthen the EU’s international role and its CFSP. In the post Cold War era, Turkey’s past contribution to NATO missions, such as those in Afghanistan, and its participation in the EU-led mission in Macedonia, also show that Turkey is a valuable security partner. It is for this reason that the German Foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, claimed “In order for the EU to be powerful and for our children and grandchildren to live in peace, Turkey needs to be a member in the EU”. Inherent in that proposition is that Turkey’s unique character among the Muslim countries will serve as a building bloc for improved ties between Europe and the Middle East, and this will present one of the most important security challenges for the EU. In other words, as the EU will have to confront security risks associated with the war against terrorism, Turkey’s membership will assist the EU in confronting these risks more readily, both in a more abstract sense, and in terms of the military support Turkey would bring. Turkey’s membership will strengthen the EU’s Mediterranean policy and increase its potential role as an international actor.

Conclusion

This paper argued that Turkey’s membership to the European Union is one of the major challenges for the EU for the next decade. Its accession will impact on the EU’s security role, international role and its institutions as well as on the future of Europe. The paper did not dwell on the impact of Turkey’s membership on European identity per se, even though this is going to be one of the major topics for the EU to settle.

Turkey, as a Muslim country that has aspired to become a European state, has
emulated European norms and principles of liberal democracy, and adopted the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. Turkey has undergone an extensive political reform process since 1999, which has increased in speed and intensity since 2002. All in all, major constitutional reforms and packages have been adopted in the last 4 years which could transform Turkey into a liberal democracy. The European Union has been the most powerful catalyst for political change in Turkey and there is a growing swell of opinion among the Turkish public that Turkey should join the EU. The European Union is faced with a tough decision, as its incorporation of Turkey will require some adaptation in the EU as well. This is a unique opportunity for the EU to become a truly great player in international politics, to unite the European continent once and for all and to deal with the challenges of the 21st century. Turkey would not be willing to consider a ‘privileged partnership’ after it has struggled for so long with political and economic reforms. Turkey’s relationship with the EC/EU has roots deep in history, and the European Union included Turkey into its enlargement process with the Helsinki decisions. Turkey is adopting the EU’s accession criteria with determination, and if the EU claims that even if Turkey fulfils the accession criteria, it is still too large or too different to be incorporated into the EU, then this would raise serious questions about the EU. If the European Union can not fulfil its own obligations towards Turkey, it will face institutional credibility problems. This is not to claim that the EU is obliged to accept Turkey as a member, but rather that Turkey’s membership in the EU is advantageous for both Turkey and the EU.