

DEFINITION AND MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRISES

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Abstract

This paper will mainly focus on the conduct of international crises with a particular emphasis on developing strategies for resolving conflicts peacefully. Our study reviewed a number of the prominent theories and hypotheses about how crises can be resolved short of war. In addition, we examined and compared several prominent 20th century international crisis waves in historical context. The basic aims of this study are to present different views on international crises, to gain an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the literature on crisis definitions, and to develop an agenda for future research on international crisis management. This article also investigated the hypotheses that leadership qualities during crises are associated with the outcomes of the crises.

Key Words

International crisis, foreign policy crisis, crisis management, conflict management, decision making, leadership.

Introduction

The concept of crisis is a wide variety of meanings. Indeed, it is used in various fields, such as medicine, economics, management, public administration, communications, history, psychology, political science, and international relations. Originally coming from medicine, crisis is defined by Georges Canguilhem as “change heralded by some symptoms, occurring during an illness, through which the patient’s life will be saved or not.”¹ Such a story of the concept of crisis is not surprising, given the fact that, as

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¹ Georges Canguilhem, “Le Problème des Régulations dans l’organisme et dans la Société”, *Ecrits sur la Médecine*, Sevil, Champ Freudien, 2002, p. 104.

would say Bryan Turner, “the body is the most potent metaphor of society.”² According to Mary Douglas, the formal structure of a set of social relations must be based on an analogy referring to the natural world. Thus, institutions are legitimized by structural analogies with the body.³

In social relations, crises are chaotic situations that might be experienced by people, states, governments, organizations, etc. The word ‘crisis’ means disorder; in other words we can explain that crisis is a situation which is not normal or stable. This term means an urgent situation that suddenly happens and breaks the routine processes of any system.

In terminology, another word, ‘chaos’ is one of the closest terms in meaning to the word, ‘crises. In reality, pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods are called generally chaotic processes. Chaos might cause disorder for a temporary time period. Chaos is a Greek word meaning ‘something causing blanks’. According to Thomas Schelling, chaos is the ‘metaphysical unity of potential forces’.⁴ This situation is able to be seen in active systems, and it reveals that the system is not being developed linear. It expresses a non-linear developing process. Therefore, we say that the systems, whether they are chaotic or not, can meet the expectations of one three conditions: (1) stable case,⁵ (2) start of bifurcation near stability, and (3) increasing bifurcation, which is also called chaos.

It might be possible to say that there is gradual scheme of relationship among those three situations of any system. The beginning level input becomes very important in the case of a chaotic system. It is not possible for this kind of system to meet the function of input forming by itself; on the contrary, the quality or the quantity of the beginning level input is important. Because of that, the structure is affected by even small-scale changes in the input values of the process. As well, it is difficult to predict the future of these systems. The most commonly revealed chaos type for the current

² Bryan S. Turner, *The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 114.

³ Mary Douglas, *Comment Pensent les Institutions*, Paris, La Découverte, 2004, pp. 83-84.

⁴ As cited by Michael Welker, “Alfred North Whitehead’s Basic Philosophical Problem: The Development of Relativistic Cosmology”, at <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2589>

⁵ Balance within the system intends the case of repetition in certain patterns of interaction between system actors.

international system is the destruction or separation of actors. For instance, the break-up of the Eastern Block in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, and the break-up of Yugoslavia beginning in 1992 are all examples. However, the currency of chaos could be a moderator in many cases to move to stability from a higher level of chaos. At this point, it might be appropriate to consider the relationship between the chaos and crisis. As follows, crises can sometimes allow us to normalize the current or the potential chaotic situations. If the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union is considered to be a chaotic situation because of its destructive results for the balance and/or the order of the former system, it must also be correct that the asymmetrically-structured Iraq Crisis in 1991 formed a convenient environment for new ideas on the way towards building the New World Order. However, this idea has not been exactly firmly established in the world. Because of that, the common system in the world has not been exactly saved from being chaotic. In this respect, it must be wondered if another crisis would be able to solve that problem. As the matter of that fact, the 11 September 2001 crisis of the USA, which was caused by the terrorist attacks against the USA that day, allowed the White House administration to reconsider the World Order, which had not been considered to a great extent prior to that time. So, as that example shows us briefly, a situation of crisis can be considered to be a chaotic situation. Because of that, there are close relationships between those two concepts and reality.

In international relations, each crisis can make the state a winner or a loser. But naturally, each state wants to be on the side of winners. In this case, it is possible to consider a crisis situation as an opportunity to gain something. First of all, a well-organized crisis management program is required to be able to take advantage of such a crisis although some conditions are needed for appropriate crisis management. Crisis forecasting is one of the basic steps of successful management. In addition, an international actor should prepare itself for coming crisis conditions; it has to be searching for likely opportunities and also has to be prepared for crisis management. The actor has to be able to deal with the conditions of the crisis and even it has to try to eliminate it. But it must be always remembered that there is no method that has been developed to eradicate the formation

process of a crisis⁶ and the element of uncertainty in crisis requires decision making on the basis of an unclear picture of the crisis at hand.⁷

The main aim of this paper is to look at the different definitions and dimensions of international crises and analyze the various crisis management methods in international politics.

I. Crises in International Politics

The concept of ‘crisis’ has entered international politics as a situation “Jenseits von Krieg und Frieden” in German literature – where there is a crisis, there is no war but there is no peace (‘no war no peace’).⁸ The literature in international relations has two general approaches to crises in international politics: the substantive and procedural approaches. The substantive approach is concerned with the contents of each crisis, problem and/or situation. Therefore, supporters of this approach consider above all the definitions and the effects of a specific instance of crisis. On the other hand, the purpose of the procedural approach is concerned with forming general theories about the crises to find out the procedural definition of general crises and focus on the shared characteristics of all kinds of crises without examining their specific subjects or contents.⁹

Followers of the procedural approach have primarily developed two main theoretical perspectives when defining crises in international politics. First, the users of the decision-making approach, who take the government as the level of primary analysis, are interested in the conditions and the procedures within the actor. Second, the users of the international systems approach are interested in reciprocal changes among the actors.¹⁰

⁶ Arjen Boin and Patrick Lagadec, “Preparing for the Future: Critical Challenges in Crisis Management”, *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, Vol. 8, Issue 4, (December 2000), pp. 185-191.

⁷ Arjen Boin, et.al., “Book Review: The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure”, *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, Vol. 15, Issue 3, (September 2007), p. 168.

⁸ Marc Houben, *International Crisis Management: The Approach of European States*, London and New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 12.

⁹ Warren Phillips and Richard Rimkunas, “The Concept of Crisis in International Politics”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 15, No. 3, (1978), p. 259.

¹⁰ James M. McCormick, “International Crises: A Note on Definition”, *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 3, (September 1978), p. 352.; Zeev Maoz, “Crisis Behavior:

The adherents of the decision-making approach¹¹ tend to be interested in the subjects within the framework of political processes that governments may have perceptions of intentions, acquired information about reciprocal motives, effects of public opinion to the international politics, the psychological management of crises, etc. On the other hand, the adherents of the international systems approach¹² have dealt with subjects such as unexpected changes in a crisis; force, intensity, and importance of periodic activities as outputs of the foreign policies, and the dispersion of these actions.

At this point, it will be necessary to consider those two crisis definitions related to the procedural approach. The main theme of crisis analysis based on the (bottom-up) decision-making approach (subjective approach) is how to define a situation as a crisis. Decision makers do that, and accordingly, the outer environment of the state has been completely changed by the actions of other states.¹³ Decision makers would consider such a situation to be a crisis situation and these conditions force them to take extraordinary actions in response. In other words, the conditions of the situation require the decision-makers to apply crisis management. According to the supporters of this approach¹⁴, e.g., Charles Hermann, a foreign policy crisis is a situation which threatens the most important and the primary aims of the political unit, and limits the time for thinking, planning, and

Theory and Evidence”, *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2, (October 1994), p. 333.

¹¹For example; Margaret and Charles Hermann, Bruce Paige, Piers Robinson, Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Ole Holsti, Zeev Maoz, Mark Granovetter, Gary Goertz, Paul’t Hart, Eric Stern, Bengt Sundelius, Joe Hagan, etc.

¹² For example; Charles McClelland, Graham Allison, Andrew Sullivan, Ned Lebow, Michael Brecher, James L. Richardson, Barbara Farnham, Patrick J. Haney, Thomas Preston, Edward Hallett Carr, and so on.

¹³ Also, Wallace and Suedfeld (1988) have recognized that the threat to important values which often defines a serious crisis, affects changes in the decision making process. Michael D. Wallace and Peter Suedfeld, “Leadership Performance in Crisis: The Longevity-Complexity Link”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, 1988, pp. 439-451.

¹⁴ Methodologically, many of the studies (e.g., Ole Holsti, Robert C. North, and Richard Brady, 1968; Graham Allison, 1971; Michael Brecher, 1980; Zeev Maoz, 1981; Steve Smith, 1984; Patrick J. Haney, 1994) have tended to focus on the output of a decision process, rather than the processing strategies used in making the choice. See Allison Astorino-Courtois, “The Effects of Stakes and Threat on Foreign Policy Decision-Making”, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 21, Issue 3, (2000), p. 490.

responding in order to change the probable outcome. In Hermann's analysis, this is also a kind of situation which is perceived by the units of a government to be a surprise while erupting.¹⁵ As we can see, it is really important how a situation in the context of the foreign policy must be perceived to be as real as possible by the political units. Certainly, the important indicators of foreign policy crises are the extraordinary changes occurring in the decision-making structure, the sudden changes from the routine, and the method of entering the crisis management process but leaving the great extent of responsibility to the centralized *ad hoc* political groups.¹⁶

Based on the decision-making perspective, there are two types of crises to talk about based on the number of people involved: one-sided crises and two-sided crises.¹⁷ As a difference between the two types of crises, an actor amidst a crisis situation may perceive himself surrounded by crisis and threat, while the opponent may not perceive a crisis. For instance, in 1936, Germany with its leader, Hitler, did not perceive itself to be in a crisis situation when the Rhine area had been re-militarized, while Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, France, and England perceived crises. Other examples could be given for one-sided crises. For instance, similarly, Israel also had a crisis in 1976 because of the swift mobilization of the Syrian army. In this framework, the announcement of a no-fly zone in the north of Iraq in 1992 was also perceived by the Baghdad administration as a crisis. Nevertheless, there can also be a crisis situation that is perceived by each actor, which would then be a two-sided crisis (i.e., a 'normal' crisis).

According to the definitions of crises in the light of the (top-down) systems perspective¹⁸ (the objective approach), an international crisis is a

¹⁵ Charles F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit the Viability of Organizations", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (June 1963), p. 64.

¹⁶ Shun'ichi Furukawa, "An Institutional Framework for Japanese Crisis Management", *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, Vol. 8, Nr. 1, (March 2000), p. 12.

¹⁷ For detailed information, see J. Joseph Hewitt and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "One-Sided Crises in the International System", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 3, (May 1999), pp. 309-323.

¹⁸ On this subject, see Ole R. Holsti, "International Systems, System Change and Foreign Policy: Commentary on "Changing International Systems"", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 15, Issue 1, (January 1991), pp. 83-89.

situation in which normal/ordinary patterns of interaction between nations change significantly. For example, it could be possible to talk about a crisis situation that erupted in the international system (at the global, dominant or sub-systems level) related to the cases which may cause highly conflicted interactions, or challenges against domination of one actor in international system. There would be some sudden and extraordinary changes observed in the intensity and/or the capacity (volume) of the interactions that actors have with one another. Then, it would be possible to see a return to the normal levels in the intensity and/or the capacity of the interactions after crises. In this respect, Ikenberry has argued that hegemonic wars ratify shifts in the balance of power and spur the emergence of new systematic arrangements, as “historical junctures . . . [that] come at dramatic moments of upheaval . . . when the old order has been destroyed by war and newly powerful states try to re-establish basic organizing principles.”¹⁹

Especially interactions among the major powers, which exist in the international system, could be considered in the same way, and it is possible to reach some conclusions about the subject. Major international crises are described as powerful changes which form some rigid orientations for parts of the global system. Some analysts such as Charles McClelland and Oran Young have made descriptions of crises from the perspective of the international system. According to McClelland, an international crisis is a ‘change of situation’ that takes place in the actions between the rivals and affects the entire international political system.²⁰ Likewise, extraordinary amounts of system inputs are converted into new outputs to escalate interstate relationships, and those become other inputs again to continue the process in the same way. Thus, it passes beyond a normal point/level in the course of reciprocal actions in international system regarding the intensity and the volume of the relationship. For instance, the significant changes in the international system beginning from the 1990s could be easily thought of in this manner as a period of crisis period. As a matter of that fact, the trembling and the breaking down process on the European side of the

¹⁹ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 3.

²⁰ Charles A. McClelland, “The Anticipation of International Crises: Prospects for Theory and Research”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (March 1977), pp. 15-16.; See also Raymond Tanter, “International System and Foreign Policy Approaches: Implications for Conflict Modelling and Management”, *World Politics*, Vol. 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations, (Spring 1972), pp. 7-39.

Eastern Block in 1989 caused the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991, and this occurrence, as a continuous process, indirectly triggered more local crises such as the 1991 crisis in Iraq and also the 1992 crisis in Yugoslavia. Afterwards, the characteristics of those crises became the reasons for ‘the storm of change’ that could be considered as a cornerstone for the causes of the 11 September 2001 crisis. As we can see, the reasons for crises are related to each other, as in a chain reaction. The whole structure of a particular chain of events could be described as an ‘international crisis’.

After the Cold War, two crisis-related trends appeared. The first one is the changing tendency to observe that most international crises are related to the perception of the ‘so-called’ global power, the USA; therefore, almost all large scale crises had previously been considered to be foreign policy crises for the Washington administration. Now, crises tend to be considered international crises by the rest of the world as well. The second one, related to the first, is that the crises of the Cold War years were generally symmetrical ones, which erupted between the two equal sides and/or blocks, while recently occurred crises are perceived as asymmetrical ones,²¹ meaning that they appear between states which do not have a equal power.

The international crisis description of Oran Young is very close to the one of McClelland. According to McClelland, an international crisis is ‘a range of events’ which consists of suddenly and rapidly changing occurrences. According to Young’s thinking, the range of events causing crises increases the effects of forces which make instabilities in the general system structure. In addition, it activates the same type of factors in sub-systems, and empowers the probability of use of force and damage.²²

Young has dwelt upon the importance of the direction of significant changes in international system, especially regarding potential periods of crisis. According to Young, it is possibly true that the relational forms of the international system can totally break down in crisis situations.²³ However, it

²¹ See Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, “Managing Asymmetrical Crisis: Sweden, the USSR, and U-137”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (June 1992), pp. 213-239.

²² Oran R. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 10. For the article version of this book, see Oran R. Young, “Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third Parties”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (March 1972), pp. 51-65.

²³ O. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*, p. 10.

may bring us to incorrect results if we generalize that hypothesis. For an opposite example, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was really perceived as a watershed for the relationships between the USA and the Soviet Union but it must be appreciated that this crisis also caused a period of moderation and détente in the international system.

The general view of the procedural approach to the definition of crisis in international relations can be summarized in a table as shown below:

Procedural Approach		
Main purpose:	General theories about the formation of crises	
Sub-approaches:	Decision-making approach (subjective approach)	International systems approach (objective approach)
Analysis level:	Bottom-up analysis: government, leadership, etc.	Top-down analysis: systemic level (global, regional systems, etc.)
Quality of crisis:	Foreign policy crisis	International crisis
Crisis types:	One-sided, two-sided; symmetric, asymmetric crises	Global, regional, sub-system, dominant system crises, etc.
Definition of crisis:	Perceived crisis (Hermann)	Reciprocal change of situation (McClelland); range of abnormal events (Young)

Besides, Charles Hermann (1972, 1989) defined another approach besides the objective and subjective points of view: the actor confrontation approach. Actor confrontation studies examine two or more actors as units engaged in conflict communication and crisis bargaining.²⁴

²⁴ For example, Phil Williams, 1976; Richard C. Snyder and Paul Diesing, 1977; Ned Lebow, 1981; Alexander L. George, 1991; James L. Richardson, 1994. To this tripartite division should be added an emerging fourth and to some extent cross-cutting tradition – the political symbolic approach – which focuses attention on the manipulation of symbols, rituals, and power in crisis communication (for example, Murray Edelman, 1988; Paul ‘t Hart, 1993; Tom Bryder, 1998; Jutta Weldes, 1999). See Eric K. Stern, “Crisis Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis: Insights, Synergies, and Challenges”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, Issue 2, (June 2003), p. 186.

One of the serious problems of these approaches (especially the international systems approach) regarding the definition of crisis is that those approaches have not been adequately concerned with the phenomenon of 'crisis management'. It has to be acknowledged that crisis management is only partially referenced in the definitions of crises based on the 'decision-making' perspective.

If the definitions of crises are observed in international politics, five basic shared-components of crises can be discerned:

1) Significant increases in national military activities are observed in critical periods when there are crisis situations in international politics, especially when certain 'crisis management operations' are maintained.

2) Unexpected occurrences at the international or national level are the cause of most crises.

3) The decision maker is supposed to act quickly, and she/he must be able to make a decision urgently in such unexpected events/situations.

4) Crises may harm the real or perceived interests of governments.

5) Crises, as major threats to the interests of governments, are quite difficult to estimate or predict since they are defined as unexpected occurrences.

II. Crisis Waves in International Political System

There were four waves or series of important international crisis in the last century of world political history (from the late 19th century through the 20th century) involving several significant military and diplomatic confrontations between the world actors affected during these international crisis periods.

In 'the first one of those crises periods', there were certain political and military agreements established between the big powers of Europe; thus a sort of period of relatively unbalanced stability started after 1904, which was the last year of a period (1870-1904) of stability and diplomatic balance based on the superiority of Germany in Europe. Because of that, the first

period of crisis was experienced in the years between 1904 and 1914. In this phase, there was a system of contrasting alliances established between the Teutonic (Germanic) and Slavo-Latino blocks. Those alliances tried to intensify their shared interest structures by establishing several secret pacts against each other. In addition to the armament competition between the alliances, the colonial struggle intensified. For instance, Germany-France disagreements in 1904, 1905, 1908 and 1911 because of the Morocco problem, and Austria-Russia crises about the Balkans in 1908, 1912 and 1913 come to mind. During the first crisis, small-scale disagreements occurred between the two opposite blocks as well. As a result of that progress, the unsettled balance broke down suddenly in 1914. There has been a lot of scientific research done relating to the crises period since the end of World War I that found there were two significant conclusions about these crises. Firstly, the pre-observed severe relations of the War, which also signifies excessive alliances, between the Tripartite Alliance and the Tripartite Entente had significant effects on the series of those crisis events, and that situation kept the international system in a condition in the middle between war and peace for a while. Secondly, important politicians of some governments made serious technical mistakes while trying to solve the crisis that occurred in the summer of 1914 and they could not present a good pattern of crisis management.²⁵

‘The second wave of international crises’ occurred between the years of 1935 and 1939. The analytical interpretations of the first crisis period had not yet been determined before the start of the events of the second crisis. Even though there was an increase in the tendency to reach agreements before World War II, the historical background was quite different at that time. There was no crystal shaped-strict alliance structure seen in the 1930s, contrary to the situation before World War I. Even though there was no compromise reached among the alliances, the degree of flexibility in the systems of alliance was clearly high. Excessive alliances (chain-ganging) had not yet appeared. In accordance with the appeasement strategy, France and Britain had been sensibly open to negotiations and agreements. Each aggressive or wide-ranging action of The Third Reich had been perceived as acceptable by the other side in order to keep the peace; in other words, they were trying to resist the outbreak of war. As was seen, the appeasement

²⁵Arthur N. Gilbert and Paul Gordon Lauren, “Crisis Management: An Assessment and Critique”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 24, No. 4, (1980), pp. 649-650.

strategy had been considered at the time as the most appropriate crisis management technique to be able to preserve the peace. But this strategy had not been able to avoid war either. The Hitler experience has been considered by those affected as a reason to learn much more about international crises and their management. Maybe it was the most important ‘gained experience’ that there should not be any concession to the aggressive policies of powerful states, and that kind of attitude must be immediately opposed. Although the Allies had tried to put the new strategy into practice in 1938 just before World War II, the result did not change, and as a matter of the fact, the war started in 1939.²⁶ Both of these series of two crises resulted in a war. The study of international relations, which had become more intensive and systematic after World War II, has made direct connections between major international crises and the wars that follow them.²⁷

‘The third crisis period’ in the international system, that has been called the ‘Cold War’, occurred between the years of 1948 and 1964. During that period, there was never any general war among the nations in the crisis; however, they occasionally stopped smaller war. Therefore, it is possible to say that the crisis managers had gained some experience from previous international crises and that they tried to not make the same mistakes. First of all, they avoided use of the appeasement strategy without any hesitation since the initial phases of the crisis; on the other hand, they attached importance to not making the alliance systems excessively strict, and they always tried to convert the strict structure to a loose bipolar one. Current conditions have gradually made the international system less threatened by these environmental factors, but more complex and relatively more relaxed. The prominent crises such as the Berlin Crisis in 1948 (the Blockade Crisis), Korea in 1950, Suez in 1956, Lebanon and Quemoy in 1958, Congo in 1960, the Berlin Wall Crisis in 1961, and the Cuban Missiles Crisis in 1962 can be given as examples. The Cuba Missile Crisis in 1962 was an important situation which could have caused a nuclear war between the two ‘poles’, but, fortunately, the world avoided that threat by the effective measures taken by the two leaders, Kennedy and Khrushchev. It is certainly true that a lot of crises happened during the Cold War, but many analysts have considered those occurrences to be different from the general paradigms of

²⁶ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (2nd Edition), New York, Longman, 1999, pp. 50-51.

²⁷ E.g., Quincy Wright 1942, Lewis F. Richardson 1960.

the Cold War. Therefore, it could have been possible to approach the crises discussed below in different ways. Naturally, there were some crises that closely fitted the Cold War paradigm; however, those crises are only a very few in number and mostly related to the Arab-Israel problems. For instance, the Arab-Israel War in June 1967, the crisis between the Philistine Liberation Organization and Jordan in 1970, the crisis atmosphere after the Yom Kippur War between Arabs and Israel in October 1973, the Afghanistan Crisis in 1980, etc. All of those crises were caused by some conditions that had the great potential to make the two poles engage each other totally.

The OPEC embargo on oil trade, which was imposed after the Arab-Israel crisis in 1973, has been explained with a variety of different interpretations by analysts, and is regarded as a breaking point. Besides the Cold War calculations of strength in the international system based on nuclear bipolarity, it has been noticed that having an abundance of a valuable natural resource could be an element of strength as well as a source of crisis in international politics.²⁸ It was assumed that the world had turned into a transnational system in which the political economy has gradually become an important concept. It was emphasized that the reality of interdependence had started to dominate the world and affected the era. According to some analysts, a completely different international future started to be shaped from that time. Consequently, one of the most important goals of foreign policy analysts has become to define and explain the system that prevailed in the Cold War period with respect to the actual conditions.

Some crises of the Cold War era were outside of the bipolarity paradigm, but of course they have attracted attention because of their local or interstate character. For instance, the Sino-Soviet Crisis in 1969 (which arose from a border problem), the Tibet Crisis between China and India, the Kashmir Crisis in 1971 between India and Pakistan, the crisis between France and Algeria, many Third World crises, the Cyprus Crisis in 1974, the Portugal Crisis between the years of 1974-1975 (caused by the Portuguese Revolution), the Lebanon Civil War between the years of 1975-1976, the crises in Angola between the years of 1975-1976 (caused by the regime change), the Iran Islamic Revolution and Hostage Crisis in 1979-1980, the

²⁸ Patrick J. Haney, "The Nixon Administration and Middle East Crises: Theory and Evidence of Presidential Management of Foreign Policy Decision Making", *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, (December 1994), pp. 947-949.

Poland Crisis in 1981, etc. Of course, it is possible to give many more examples of those crises. Clearly, they have attracted a lot of international interest; however, they are not exactly appropriate to be considered Cold War crises. At this point, maybe the Afghanistan Crisis of the 1980s appears to be a very important exception because it had been overcome without any problems for the international system. A world-wide liberalism movement became strong immediately after the Cold War period, and even the Soviet Union has been affected by that liberal wave. The newly-elected Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, adopted the policies of glasnost and perestroika. The liberal powers are active all around the world, but that progress has also created the initial conditions for 'the fourth crises wave', with the collapse of one of the two poles.

The initial events of 'the fourth crises wave' in the international system appeared in East Germany first then, followed by Central and Eastern Europe between the years of 1989 and 1990. After those incidents had spread to the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Soviet communist system happened in late 1991, followed by an international crisis. The cumulative effects of the collapse suddenly caused many other micro-crisis in countries around the Soviet Union. The main reason for those crises was mainly local problems that had been postponed during the Cold War. That situation occasioned the following crises: the Iraq Crisis in 1991-1992, the Yugoslavia Crisis in 1992-1996, the Kosovo Crisis in 1999, the crisis of terrorist attacks against the USA on 11 September 2001, etc. The main trigger of some of these crises before 2001 was the absence of the omnipresent Soviet authority, but after the 2001 terrorist attacks, our hypothesis is that to a great extent, the cause was the willingness of the USA to fill the gap with a kind of Pax-Americana. The US government, as a main player in all the crises, has revealed terrorist groups and some governments' support of those groups, which have been labelled as 'rogue states'. After that, the events in the fourth series of crisis have been labelled with the name of the corresponding operations of the USA. For instance, the Afghanistan Operation (Infinite Justice-Enduring Freedom) in 2001 actually did not cause any big problems in the shape of international crises, and the Iraq War in 2003. But nowadays, some similar asymmetrical crises regarding Iran and Syria are gradually taking place on the agenda.

III. General View on Crises and Crisis Management

a. Phases of Crises and Crisis Management

Crises usually follow certain phases of progress. The usual progress consists of four basic phases, which are summarized below. The first one is the pre-crisis phase, which is also called the warning phase. In this phase, the initial warning signs of the crisis are detected, but the main problem for the decision makers is their predisposition to not respond, because in this period, the problems caused by the crisis have not yet influenced the vital interests of the government. Also, the government makes decisions based on habit. However, in this phase, the panic level of the government is increasing while the crisis situation is getting clearer. The second stage is called the crisis phase. From this point on, the crisis has definitely begun. A chain of events starts happening related to the crisis. The government administration usually tries to become a control centre. Additionally, decision makers are scared of the situation, and they panic. The decision-making process is influenced by the situation, and events occur faster and change – even it is out of the routine. The function of the leader expands and the expectations from the leader increase. Essentially, leadership could be tested easily in a crisis.²⁹ The third phase is called crisis abatement. If the government cannot find a solution to eliminate the harmful effects of the crisis, the credibility of the government might be damaged, and also the government could lose its prestige in the political landscape. In addition to this, it may have problems with other governments. If the government is able to deal with the crisis and its bad effects, it is possible for the government to have little actual injury and it is also possible that the government could gain some advantage as a result of the crisis. So the last phase is called the post-crisis.³⁰

²⁹ Peter F. Trumbore and Mark A. Boyer, “International Crisis Decisionmaking as a Two-Level Process”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, Issue 6, (November 2000), pp. 682-683.

³⁰ Ole R. Holsti, “Historians, Social Scientists, and Crisis Management: An Alternative View”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 24, Issue 4, (December 1980), p. 666.

As we can see, well-structured crisis management is required to minimize injuries to a government during crises, and to even gain some advantages if possible. At this point, what are the peculiarities and the phases of a good crisis management? First of all, the prior signals (warning) of an upcoming crisis must be perceived and correctly interpreted. Predicting for the future to defeat likely problems and risks, as well as *a priori* determination of the appropriate reactions (pro-activity) and possible alternative solutions are definitely necessary to prepare for any expected crisis. If a crisis occurs in spite of all preparations, crisis supervision (control) will be required. It is also important for good crisis management to be able to return to normal conditions immediately after the crisis. Indeed, it will be useful for the future to do a self-evaluation and draw conclusions from the experience, in order to learn something from each crisis.³¹

Briefly, a well-qualified crisis manager must have the basic abilities to consider what the critical limit of the situation is, what the probable worst scenarios could be, what the alternative solutions could be, what the main trigger (which could be an event, an actor and/or a government) of the crisis could be, who could take advantage of the crisis, what the situation is going to be after the crisis and so on.³²

b. Governments and Crises

Governments are open systems, which mean they are open for any kind of input, and they also sustain their life in a dynamic environment. Based on the responses to crises, it could be judged whether or not a government is being well-administrated or not. The method to achieve it is to examine a crisis and to consider exactly the restrictions and opportunities provided by the government.

It is certain that governments might be come face-to-face to some sudden or reiterated crises caused from the inside or the outside of the

³¹ Robert A. Young, "Perspectives on International Crisis: Introduction", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 21, Issue 1, (1977), p. 8; Christine M. Pearson and Judith A. Clair, "Reframing Crisis Management", *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 23, Issue 1, (January 1998), p. 66.

³² Warren R. Phillips, "Command and Control Tools for Crisis Management", in John V. Gillespie and Dina A. Zinnes, *Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1977, pp. 16-17.

country. A crisis situation shows that it could be that a difficult period has started for the management functions of the system. Because of that, governments can have big problems about deciding in a crisis.

The case of indefiniteness, the probability of being effected by the crisis, and the increasing probability of taking risks are to be remembered by people in any crisis. However, the background of the crisis depends upon events that had happened before the crisis and the strength of the crisis can affect the appearance of the crisis. In addition, crises could be revealed in small or large amounts.

The basic characteristics of crises, which have always been experienced by governments, might be discussed in the following order: it is not easy to predict what time, how often or how big crises will occur. It means that there is difficulty in prediction; it is possible to say for most of the governments that they usually do not have sufficient mechanisms to prevent or to predict crises; crises might threaten the main purpose, self-interest and even existence of governments; response time to find an appropriate solution to eliminate crises could be limited; and crises require urgent measures – this is why almost all governments in today's world need crisis centres, early warning systems, and urgent retaliation/response forces; and crises create a great amount of stress on the vital deciding centres of governments.

It is possible to talk about the existence of organizational (inner) factors besides several environmental (outer) factors causing crises for governments or other organizations which could be of a transnational, supranational or international character. Any comparison can show us an intuitive result that environmental (outer) factors are more influential than organizational (inner) factors because a dynamic international environment could be more difficult to control than a relatively stable organizational structure which might be easily controlled.

There are some primary causes of the environmental (outer) crisis factors: the ever-changing international economic system, significant technological developments, international social-cultural factors, natural disasters, international political factors, and international legal factors, to name a few.

Organizational (inner) factors causing crises could generally be divided into two sub-groups: constitutional problems and lack of leadership. The likelihood of crises for a government is related to some facts. First of all, if the structure of the government is not able to adapt itself to changes in the environment, or if it is not able to communicate adequately with the outside – in other words, if it is not possible for the government to have a strong information system – it is obvious that the probability of having a crises for the system or the government will be high. On the other hand, the insufficiency of the leaders can cause crises for governments. There could be some indicators of a leadership deficiency which can cause crises or make a crisis more difficult to solve. Lack of some abilities, deficiency in observing environmental changes and collecting needed information about them, lack of experience in explaining and/or considering a crisis could be counted as such indicators of a lack of leadership contributing to or causing a crisis.

c. Leadership and Crisis Management in Foreign Policy

It is an absolutely important matter for crisis management to understand how the government perceives crises. Each leader shows different reactions to crises, but especially in international crises, it is possible to make generalizations about some sort of differences. Some leaders are driven more by disposition; their behaviour is guided by a set of inner beliefs or goals and tends to remain consistent across a range of situations. Other leaders are responsive more to the situation; their behaviour is guided by the nature of the immediate context and may vary dramatically according to the setting. The categorization of leaders as ‘crusaders’ versus ‘pragmatists’³³ is based on this key distinction. Other similar typologies include the ‘ideologue’ versus ‘opportunist’³⁴, ‘directive’ versus

³³ John G. Stoessinger, *Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy*, New York City, Norton Publishers, 1979.

³⁴ Robert C. Ziller, William F. Stone, Robert M. Jackson and Natalie J. Terbovic, “Self-Other Orientations and Political Behavior”, in Margaret G. Hermann, *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*, New York, Free Press, 1977, pp. 179–180.

‘consultative’³⁵, ‘task-oriented’ versus ‘relations-oriented’³⁶, and ‘transformational’ versus ‘transactional’.³⁷

During some crisis situations, it might also be possible to talk about government leaders being able to perceive each other’s activities antagonistically; in this case, their developed strategies towards each other might be antagonistic too. Therefore, as Charles and Margareth Hermann have mentioned, governments might experience some difficulties in cooperation with their counterparts.³⁸ It is not particularly possible to characterize as friendly the relations between the parties to a crisis. According to Hayward Alker and P. G. Bock, elite decision-makers might have a tendency to define all of their encounters on the friend-enemy axis.³⁹ It will possibly be a true proposition if it is inferred that the usual method of defining Turkish foreign policy closely resembles the abovementioned one, because Turkey has been showing signs of faltering in dealing with some interior and exterior crises up until now.

It could be put forward for a likely crisis situation that decision-makers try to behave delicately while they decode the messages coming from other parties. Farnham links the leaders’ perception of a threat to their willingness to undertake foreign policy actions.⁴⁰ On the other hand, the Hermanns tend to think that the authorities firstly consider whether the

³⁵ B.M. Bass and E.R. Valenzi, *Contingent Aspects of Effective Management Styles*, Technical Report, No. 67, Management Research Center, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, 1974.

³⁶ F.E. Fiedler, *A Theory of Leadership Effectives*, New York, McGraw-Hill Company, 1967.

³⁷ James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*, New York, Harper-Row, 1978, p. 21; Jonathan W. Keller, “Constraint Respecters, Constraint Challengers, and Crisis Decision Making in Democracies: A Case Study Analysis of Kennedy versus Reagan”, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 26, Nr. 6, (2005), p. 840.

³⁸ Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, “Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4, (December 1989), p. 376.

³⁹ See Harold Guetzkow and Joseph J. Valadez, “International Relations Theory: Contributions of Simulated International Processes”, in Harold Guetzkow and Joseph J. Valadez, *Simulated International Processes: Theories and Research in Global Modelling*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1981, p. 208.

⁴⁰ As cited by Jonathan W. Keller, “Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace?”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, (2005), p. 209.

negative actions are taken consciously by the opposite side of the crisis in question, and whether those actions taken menace the existence of the nation. But John W. Crow and R. Noel think that the authorities tend to attach importance to the purpose of the actions and they consider whether those actions have imperialistic intentions or not.⁴¹ As collectively essential in character, the Hermanns think that decision-makers' three fundamental perceptions are important indicators and they can also effect the crisis management style. Those indicators are the degree of the surprise (whether it is expected or not), the degree of urgency (regarding the timing in which the appropriate reaction will be produced), the degree of the menace (with respect to national interests, purposes and objectives that are affected by the threat in question).⁴² The grading system for the above-mentioned matters certainly shows considerable differences from state to state, or in the context of decision-makers.

Personal and/or collective peculiarities of decision-makers are important in defining the crisis situation; consequently, those factors are highly significant for the management of the crisis. Especially important is the cognitive context of individual decision-makers.⁴³ M. J. Driver has analyzed the probable effects of the decision-makers' cognitive abstractness-concreteness conditions and advances the theory that leaders illustrating the lower cognitive complexity⁴⁴ can control their own behaviour and that they are able to predict the possible outcomes caused by their attitude; however, they are not particularly successful in perceiving, explaining or adapting themselves to matters related to the outside world. Driver thinks that the above-mentioned type of leader type mostly tends to prefer reacting angrily when feeling insecure. In addition to this, they can resort to violence, provocative armament, and actions directly aimed at war when they face

⁴¹ See Guetzkov and Valadez, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of Simulated International Processes", p. 207.

⁴² Charles F. Hermann, Margaret G. Hermann and Robert A. Cantor, "Counterattack or Delay: Characteristics Influencing Decision Makers' Responses to the Simulation of an Unidentified Attack", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 18, No. 1, (March 1974), pp. 87-88.

⁴³ See Arjen Boin and Paul 't Hart, "Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?" *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 63, Nr. 5, (September/October 2003), p. 545.

⁴⁴ E.g., Peter Suedfeld and Philip E. Tetlock, 1977; Carol Barner-Berry and Robert Rosenwein, 1985; Allison Astorino-Courtois, 1995.

situations making them feel insecure. Nevertheless, for these kinds of leaders, Volkan argues that violence is also idealized to enhance self-esteem and as a defensive response to an individual's sense of entitlement to revenge.⁴⁵ These leaders successfully make the necessary management plans during a war; however, it doesn't mean that they are always good crisis managers. Furthermore, they have the ability to act very quickly without having any problems. In spite of the previously mentioned fact, it can be observed that the leaders illustrating higher cognitive abstractness and the ones who have the ability to think through complicated concepts are mostly of the opinion that both performing detailed analyses and estimating each possible outcome before showing such a violent reaction are indispensable. Hence the existing decision-making mechanisms in which the leaders took part work relatively slow; however, their working processes are more complicated and it is clear that they are more sophisticated. Driver focuses attention on the existence of the two fundamental elements designating a decision-maker's likely reactions to a crisis. Those are the cognitive complexity level of the leader and the dose of feeling secure or insecure (for the leader in question).⁴⁶ Just imagine what sort of cognitive concreteness model was used by Enver Pasha, who was the Commander-in-Chief at the time when the Ottoman Empire went to the war, to cause the destruction of nearly 90,000 Turkish soldiers despite the fact that they did not even face the enemy in the 1915 Sarikamish Operation. Quite similarly, Adolf Hitler failed in his attempt to increase German power by attacking other countries and controlling them during World War II, even though he pursued a plausible policy: he had a large army and he made a perfect plan for the war. However, the point is, he did not notice, or he did not want to notice, that the USA was going to enter into the war. A significant common feature of this type of leader is that they tend to be provoked both positively and negatively because of their usual characteristic of being seized by insecurities. As a result, they can exhibit aggressive behaviour and can escalate a crisis.

On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is considered to be one of the most important leaders in the world because of the success that he

⁴⁵ Vamik Volkan, *Borderlines from Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997, p. 162.

⁴⁶ Michael J. Driver and Siegfried Streufert, "Integrative Complexity: An Approach to Individuals and Groups as Information-Processing Systems", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2, (June 1969), p. 274.

achieved in his higher cognitive abstractness in foreign policy and strategies. This acknowledged trait of Ataturk⁴⁷, as the leader of Turkey, definitely caused him to behave responsibly and rationally in addressing the world's problems as well as regional (local) ones. Ataturk did not drag his nation through any kind of hollow or unrealistic expectations. It is a fact that leaders like Ataturk can consider the issues comprehensively and think about concepts abstractly. In addition to that, they demonstrate a greater ability to make real connections between the information that they receive from the outside world and their own way of thinking. In this context, it could be inferred that leaders with lower level cognitive complexities, and also those suffering from a lack of confidence mostly fail in crisis management; in other words, the possibility for such leaders to be unsuccessful is strong indeed because they tend to show severe reactions to events.

Besides, Michael Shapiro is of the opinion that decision-makers' moral and ethical principles must also be taken into account as well as the level of cognitive complexity; there must be a correlation between those two variables. According to Shapiro, it is quite possible for the leaders displaying lower level of cognitive complexity to consider the crisis situations in moral values (standards); however, this could be a more emotional, and possibly also an irrational way to behave. This type of leader may get caught in up the emotion of the time.⁴⁸ For instance, during the heated atmosphere of the Nagorno Karabakh War, which occurred between Azerbaijan and Armenia (1992-1994), Ozal, who was the President of Turkish Republic at the time,

⁴⁷ Vamik Volkan, Norman Itzkowitz, and Andrew Dod make their argument based on the implicit assumption that narcissistic personality disorders can include aspects that are "split off" from the dominant personality of grandiosity. See Vamik Volkan, Norman Itzkowitz, and Norman Dod, *Richard Nixon: A Psychobiography*, New York, Columbia, 1997. But Volkan (1980, 1982), in his psychobiographic analysis of Ataturk demonstrates the creative potential of narcissism when it is played out on the national scene. Unlike "splitting" of the narcissistic terrorist who seeks to destroy the devalued and projected aspect of himself, Ataturk, through the vehicle of his "reparative leadership" of Turkey, healed the splits within his psyche. Vamik Volkan, "Narcissistic Personality Organization and Reparative Leadership", *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, Vol. 30, (1980), pp. 131-152; Vamik Volkan, "Remarks at Symposium on Ataturk and Narcissistic Leaders", Presented at the *Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology*, Washington D.C., (June 24-27 1982).

⁴⁸ See Michael J. Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham, "Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 2, (June 1973), pp. 149-150.

exhibited more emotion and more concrete behaviour than Demirel, who was the prime minister of Turkey at the time. In this example, Demirel had matured in the environment of politics and diplomacy for years, and had the experience to reach the actual level of his cognitive capacity; on the other hand, Ozal went into politics years after Demirel. Ozal supported the general emotional approach towards the matter, and he tended to think in such a way which had the purpose to bomb the Armenians, and also take Turkey into the war; however, Demirel and his cabinet at the time took great pains to not get involved in the situation and strove to keep the government away from its bad effects.

Many scientists argue that emotion (affect or mood) and its manipulation also help explain policy choices in crises. Affect priming theories generally assert that mood affects memory, judgment, and social behaviour. Depending on the mood, emotion is recorded in memory as being associated with the target event.⁴⁹ In one study when subjects were asked to devise fictional stories, happy people were more likely to come up with success and romance; sad people were more likely to write about failure and loss.⁵⁰ Similarly, community comes together through community archive, or what Volkan would call a “chosen trauma”.⁵¹ Chosen trauma is about how the events of history are changed into a sense of history by a victimized group and remembered in ways that subsequently come to define their cause.⁵² And Volkan explains, the perceptions and fears become magnified over time so that past historical events become an “ethnic marker”. Also, Volkan’s metaphor of “ethnic tents” is important in describing the psychological content of peace-making. This tent is described as a canvas extending from the pole over the people – representing the large-group identity. The large-group activities centre on the maintenance of the group’s

⁴⁹ A.M. Isen, “Toward Understanding the Role of Affect in Cognition”, in R.S. Wyer and T.K. Srull, *Handbook of Social Cognition*, Vol. 3, Hillsdale, N.J., Erlbaum, 1984, pp. 179-236.

⁵⁰ P.M. Lewinsohn and M. Rosenbaum, “Recall of Parental Behaviour by Acute Depressives, Remitted Depressives, and Nondepressives”, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 52, (1987), pp. 611-619.

⁵¹ Vamik Volkan, “Ethnicity and Nationalism: A Psychoanalytic Perspective”, *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, Vol. 47, Issue 1, (1998), pp. 45-57.

⁵² Vamik Volkan, “Ethnonationalistic Rituals: An Introduction”, *Mind and Human Interaction*, Vol. 4, Issue 1, (1992), pp. 3-19.

identity.⁵³ Volkan says that the larger group identities fill the cracks of vulnerability that are revealed from the humiliating experiences they have had. These memories which are transmitted – he calls it “deposited” – with the next generation(s) are the damaged self-images of the parents who have been unable to mourn the damage done to their individual and group identities.⁵⁴ Contrary to much of the literature on collective and historical memory, Volkan does not think that traumatic memories can be handed down intergenerationally. People do not transmit to their progeny their memories of historical experiences, for memories can belong only to the survivors of trauma and cannot be transmitted.⁵⁵

In the past decade, the application of the poliheuristic theory to foreign policy decisions in crisis situations by numerous leaders has demonstrated its theoretical merit⁵⁶ in integrating the divided rational choice and psychological/cognitive approaches.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, Alker and Bock have emphasized the importance of ideological and idiosyncratic elements amongst the factors of identification that a leader must have.⁵⁸ According to Hermann and Kegley (1995), ideologically-driven leaders are more responsive.⁵⁹ These factors might help to determine the leader’s sensitive but irrational reactions. Ozal’s reputation as a technician and his economic bias, as well as his support for American politics, might have been able to help him to do the needed cost-benefit

⁵³ Vamik Volkan, “The Tree Model: A Comprehensive Psychopolitical Approach to Unofficial Diplomacy and the Reduction of Ethnic Tension”, *Mind and Human Interaction*, Vol. 10, Issue 3, (2000), p. 153.

⁵⁴ Vamik Volkan, *Blind Trust: Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror*, Charlottesville, VA, University Press of Virginia, 2004, p. 49.

⁵⁵ Vamik Volkan, Gabrielle Ast, and William F. Greer, Jr., *The Third Reich in the Unconscious: Transgenerational Transmission and Its Consequences*, London-New York, Brunner-Routledge, 2002, p. 43.

⁵⁶ Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva, “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making” in N. Geva and A. Mintz, *Decision Making on War and Peace*, Boulder, Co., Lynn Rienner, 1997, pp. 81-101.

⁵⁷ See Min Ye, “Poliheuristic Theory, Bargaining, and Crisis Decision Making”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 3, Issue 4, (October 2007), p. 317.

⁵⁸ See Guetzkow and Valadez, “International Relations Theory: Contributions of Simulated International Processes”, pp. 204-205.

⁵⁹ As cited by Jonathan W. Keller, “Constraint Respecters, Constraint Challengers, and Crisis Decision Making in Democracies: A Case Study Analysis of Kennedy versus Reagan”, p. 840.

analyses successfully with respect to his own decision-making dynamics on particular subjects concerning Turkish-American relations at the time. However, Ozal's previously-mentioned belief and sense of proportion were not adequate enough for him to have a considerable success in directing 'the one-size-fits-all strategy' to the USA in the Gulf War. Consequently, we can reach a general conclusion that it is an absolute necessity for successful crisis management that the possible effects of individual factors on decision-making must be reduced to a minimum. Thus it would be almost possible to reduce the level of irrationality.

At this point, it will be important to address another aspect that has formative influences on leaders who get involved in crisis management. In this regard, according to Driver, one of the most important elements that may influence the decision-maker's point of view is called the 'nature of situation', which can also cause crises. If the reason why the crisis has erupted is a war, it can be put forward that the decision maker in question will be resorting to violence as a response. In that regard, declaring a war could be considered to be a crisis management technique if there is no other precaution to take. Furthermore, it can be observed in some crisis situations not caused by war that leaders displaying higher cognitive complexities can also have the potential to react in a way which could be severe when the country they lead holds strong military power and when they trust that power.⁶⁰

It could also be expected that developing new information systems will serve useful functions in the context of reducing the irrational results of personality characteristics. This is a reasonable expectation because the entry of additional information into the system and the process of decision-making could generally cause the process of foreign policy to become more rational.⁶¹ On the other hand, Alker and Bock put forward the theory that giving an elite perspective to the decision-making process might be able to lessen the importance of a leader's personal characteristics in the decision-making process. There is actually a unique influence of elites on decision-making mechanisms for the foreign policy of almost every country, and/or

⁶⁰ See Guetzkow and Valadez, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of Simulated International Processes", p. 205.

⁶¹ Robert H. Kupperman, Richard H. Wilcox and Harvey A. Smith, "Crisis Management: Some Opportunities", *Science*, Vol. 187, No. 4175, (7 February 1975), p. 408.

community.⁶² Crow and Noel have developed the approach of elitist perspective, and they found out that there were three main attitude forms reflected by elites in crisis conditions. Those forms are the risk-taking dimension, the nationalism dimension, and the militarism dimension. A direct connection between the nationalism dimension and the militarism one can be established because the elites in some countries that have great military power might be able to show an inclination to take greater risks in crisis situations related to foreign policy.⁶³ Furthermore, it could be more possible for a smaller group of elites to take greater risks and to reach a compromise within the decision-making mechanisms.⁶⁴ For instance, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Government, and even the General Staff took greater risks in the Iraq Crisis in 2003 because of strong political pressure from the US administration, and they approached the choice of moving along with the USA with a positive attitude. However, the majority of the deputies in the Turkish National Assembly, and also the Assembly President both reflected a negative attitude towards the subject. Alker and Bock support the idea that group decision-making and solidarity can sometimes create the decisiveness of taking risks. Because group decision-making technique allows the group members to share the responsibility instead of giving it to only one authorized person, a result of this characteristic of the group decision-making technique is that it is quite possible to observe (especially in foreign policy crises) that decision-makers as a group can easily take courageous and risky decisions.⁶⁵ Accordingly, such a situation indicates that there is a foreign policy with less care for negative alternatives, and it causes risky transformations in external relations.⁶⁶ In Turkey, military bureaucracy generally creates a condition which is opposite to the general rule. Soldiers generally keep away from the military actions occurring beyond the borders of Turkey, except for some special cases. The relevant attitude of the Turkish military forces follows the

⁶² See Richard Ned Lebow, "Is Crisis Management Always Possible?", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 102, No. 2, (Summer 1987), p. 184.

⁶³ Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still *Ex Post* Inefficient?", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, Nr. 3, (July 2004), pp. 604-619.

⁶⁴ See David A. Welch, "Crisis Decision Making Reconsidered", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (September 1989), p. 433.

⁶⁵ See Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink*, London, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.

⁶⁶ See Guetzkow and Valadez, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of Simulated International Processes", p. 207.

principle of “Peace at home, peace in the world” as espoused by Ataturk. On the other hand, the presence of groups and the group pressure can both contribute to the weakening of the influence of psychological factors and personal characteristics; as a result, they can contribute to the development of a rational foreign policy. According to this approach, the positive effects of the group-decision process on psychological factors are to push the individuals to seek a consensus, to remove the unrealistic way of thinking and resulting thoughts, and to standardize some risky behaviour patterns.⁶⁷

Crow and Noel have considered and compared the aggressive-militarist mentality and the direct contradiction to the war; at the same time, they have discussed and examined the authoritarian/nationalist mentality and the egalitarian/internationalist approach among the other personal characteristics of decision makers. They have also compared and contrasted those approaches.⁶⁸ The great skill of internationalists is in presenting their solution to solving a crisis that they have contrived.⁶⁹ On the other hand, according to Alker and Bock, the appearance of a crisis, *ceteris paribus*, automatically causes the aggressive-militarist mentality and its political supporters to become much more powerful.⁷⁰ For instance, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 resulted in President George W. Bush and his team becoming more powerful; the situation was also considered as an occasion to replace some people like Powell and Tenet with Rice and other people who had relatively more hawkish and dominant personalities. It is a fact that President Bush’s cabinet mostly consisted of politicians – for example Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rice – who had the tendency to advance hard-line policies. Similarly, during the 2005 crisis in France caused by the uprising of Muslim immigrants, according to the results of a public survey conducted by the newspaper, *Journal du Dimanche*, French people had mostly supported the leaders like Le Pen, who is the leader of the

⁶⁷ Volkan defines them as progressive groups. See Vamik Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships*, Northvale, NJ, Jason Aronson, 1988, p. 191.

⁶⁸ See Guetzkow and Valadez, “International Relations Theory: Contributions of Simulated International Processes”, pp. 206-207.

⁶⁹ Alexander Kouzmin and Alan M. G. Jarman, “Policy Advice as Crisis: A Political Redefinition of Crisis Management”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, (March 2004), p. 185.

⁷⁰ See Guetzkow and Valadez, “International Relations Theory: Contributions of Simulated International Processes”, p. 207.

National Front, and Sarkozy, the leader of the Populist Movement Union (UMP), who was also the Minister for Internal Affairs at the time. Those two leaders received the people's support because of their tough rhetoric; as a result, they easily beat Villepin and Chirac in the public survey. The majority of the participants in the survey (53%) considered Sarkozy to be a politician whom they could trust to put an end to the violence. In that respect, Chirac lost the trust of people – as a matter of fact the support of the people for him declined to 29% in the survey.⁷¹ The degree of the most leaders' nationalist tendencies might have direct effects on the potential for using military power in a likely crisis. In that case, nationalists can easily form partnerships with people who have the tendency to resort to violence in their reactions to crises.

On the other hand, Alker and Bock underline an important point about elitist groups with isolationist mentalities that they can easily show severe reactions to likely crises. They also point to the fact that those groups and their supporters might be able to show much more severe reactions to a crisis situation if they feel a personal hostility to foreigners (xenophobia), which is simply aroused by their xenophobic mentality.⁷² However, according to Crow and Noel, it could sometimes be possible even for the political elites, who tend towards democratic participation, to show some severe reactions if they have enough military power or if they see that the probability of winning in the crisis situation is high; moreover, if they notice that their potential competitors will to be spread out.⁷³

All in all, the intentions of the parties to a crisis are considerably important in crisis management; likewise, the perceptions about their chance of winning in the crisis (the perspective dimension), their feelings of being secure/insecure, their inclination toward militarism/pacifism, their tendency towards nationalism/internationalism, and some other personal characteristics (the participatory dimension) play an important role in the management of the crisis. Those two dimensions mutually shape the decision-making process in international politics.

⁷¹ "French Interior Minister Vows Tough Action Over Riots", *Free Republic*, (13 November 2005), available at <http://209.157.64.201/focus/f-news/1521118/posts>

⁷² See Guetzkow and Valadez, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of Simulated International Processes", p. 208.

⁷³ See *ibid.*

IV. The Relations between Conflicts and Crises

a. Protracted Conflicts, Crises, and Crisis Management

As considered by the general literature on crisis, there is a direct relationship between international conflicts and international crises. But international crises often focus on specific matters and therefore have a narrow spectrum. On the other hand, international conflicts might not be obliged to be based on a specific matter; on the contrary they may be widely focused. Even though an international crisis may go on for a long time, it can nevertheless be dissociated from deep-protracted conflicts. For instance, the crises in Kashmir erupted between the years of 1947-48 and 1965-66 but these crises can be differentiated from the Kashmir discord, which has not been resolved yet, between India and Pakistan. Similarly, the Cyprus crises in 1963 and 1974 between Turkey and Greece can be differentiated from the on-going Cyprus conflict between the Turkish and Greek communities. At this point, it must be stated that the international crises may appear within the times of protracted discords and/or conflicts. Of course, crises need not erupt as a condition of an *a priori* extended dispute or conflict, or even as a consequence of the heritage of a conflict, within the cycle of violence of a periodic conflict. In this regard, a crisis may be a spill-over effect of cumulative conflicted behaviours of enemies, but it is a fact that international crises are highly correlated to deep or separate conflicts and discords.

According to the analysts Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, protracted conflicts are long-lasting situations that can sometimes turn into wars; this kind of conflict may also follow a sinusoidal course.⁷⁴ Potential danger and risk levels are very high for protracted conflicts; these threats are spread out over a long time period, which means it is not possible to estimate or predict the exact duration. Deep-protracted conflicts are based on chain reactions different from specific occurrences. Some examples of deep-protracted conflicts that are hard-to-solve problems are the Arab-Israel Conflict and the Cyprus Conflict.⁷⁵ As a matter of fact, none of those two conflicts could be

⁷⁴ As cited by Michael Brecher and Patrick James, "Patterns of Crisis Management", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 32, No. 3, (September 1988), p. 429.

⁷⁵ On the Cyprus Conflict, see Vamik Volkan, *Cyprus – War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytical History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1979.

overcome for a long time; they have shown a sine wave-like course for violence interactions. The possibility of this conflict spreading to other regions is still high indeed and it is extremely difficult to make a concrete estimation about the length of those conflicts.

A dual process, which could be consecutive, exists in protracted conflicts. The first component of that dual process is the period of high tension in which it could be possible to observe some violent crises, which could be resulted in a war among the counterparts. The second one is the period of relatively low tension, where a possibility of cooperation is strong, but there are still deep differences during this period to smooth current strained relationships.

In regards to the breaking points or the provocative actions of the crises, first of all, the main elements forming the initial conditions of the crisis are based on a likely action of one of the opposing sides that results in a situational or conditional change; for this reason, importance is attached to messages of the parties to each other, i.e., protestations; accusations; political actions such as hidden provocative activities and alliances with the other side's opponents/enemies; harmful economic activities, i.e. embargoes, nationalization of foreign properties; indirect use of force against the opposing state's allies or client states; military actions not resulting in war such as a demonstration of power or mobilization of forces; or the full scale use of air, ground and/or naval forces.⁷⁶ These deep-protracted conflicts frequently occur because the parties to those crises threaten each other with force, which could be reciprocal, indirectly or directly. As well, the opponents might be expecting violence or distrust; furthermore, it is thought that allegations and confrontations during the crisis may exceed the expectations in that regard during a complicated conflict. As a result, any decision about the use of force may convince the sides of an upcoming war or other violence.⁷⁷

Many states' perceptions about a potential threat are clear and at least one of them faces serious difficulties during an international crisis. The

⁷⁶ See Hemda Ben-Yehuda, "Territoriality and War in International Crises: Theory and Findings, 1918-2001", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, (2004), pp. 85-105.

⁷⁷ Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises, 1929-1985", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 1, (March 1991), pp. 145-146.

potential threats constituted by crises could be in various forms such as the threat as a result of serious damage such as a bombardment or heavy losses caused by a war; threats to the state's international influence and prestige, of which diplomatic isolation or cease of foreign support could be examples; the threat of famine; threats to the economic benefits of the relevant state like trade restrictions; threats to the territorial integrity of the country (such as annexation or partition); threats directed to the political system, which might result in foreign interference in domestic politics or the collapse of the regime. Obviously, it seems highly probable that protracted conflicts contain considerable threats to the most important values of all countries because there are already deep differences concerning the ideology, form of civilization and/or belief systems among the parties to that kind of conflict.

The crises that arise from deep-protracted conflicts can also be differentiated from the other types of crises by certain factors. Those factors are the type, form and contents of the output of the crisis; the type of provocative action that caused the crisis; the values threatened by the crisis; any third party's role and activities for the purpose of mitigating the crisis; global organizations' viewpoints of the crisis; interference by major powers; the use of power in the management of the crisis; and similar aspects.

Some crisis management techniques are used by affected states in order to overcome likely destruction and harmful influences to their basic values and economic or financial interests. There are many methods – ranging from political to military ones – used by states. Violence itself is a big part of those protracted conflicts; therefore, in these kinds of conflicts, crisis management tactics will mainly be based on the use of force and the avoidance of violence unless the hostility between the parties is overcome. Probably we can say that the only way to resolve such conflicts is to adopt a force-based crisis management approach which could be based on the threat of force or the application of a little pressure to influence opponents. Nevertheless, the military use of force would probably not come into question immediately, but might be possible in the long term. The appropriate force-based, crisis management approach also serves to reduce the threat of the use of force, with short but serious fights in between all-out wars. Thus, this approach could be the strongest way to resolve a conflict that cannot be resolved by any other political/diplomatic techniques like negotiations and mediation, or other legal processes like arbitration and jurisdiction.

A natural increase in the intensity of superpowers' activities in international crises could be expected. Furthermore, crises with unstable effects are of great concern to the superpowers because they aim to maintain their positions (*status quo*) in the current international system. Powerful states can engage in crises in many different ways. Nonetheless, particularly in the Cold War years, they might not have desired to manipulate the situation caused by a major crisis, but sometimes they could attempt to make simple changes, i.e. they might use political propaganda.⁷⁸ In addition, they might engage in quasi-military activities; for example they may secretly support one of the opponents by providing military aid, if necessary, or they may send special experts and advisers to assist them. Also, they could have direct access to military activities; for instance they could send ground/air/navy forces. As can be clearly understood, major powers mostly adopt political approaches instead of making military approaches to the crises that arise from deep-protracted conflicts. If the crisis situation or a similar kind of severe situation would be more suitable for the use of reciprocal force, this hypothesis is immensely powerful. Major powers tend to limit the scope, the period of diffusion and the possibility of current violence by using their power to minimize the crisis. Furthermore, it is not technically possible to expect the major powers to ignore that kind of crises, but especially after the Cold War, the use of military force by the major powers as a method of crisis management has increased in light of their 'preventive war' philosophy and the 'clash of civilizations' mentality.⁷⁹

It can also be seen that international organizations' roles and responsibilities have recently grown and widened significantly in the context of crisis management. This development could be observed at three levels of intensity: low, intermediate, and high. During the course of the low-level attempts, some organizations can arrange diplomatic negotiations, lead fact-finding missions, or they can engage in providing good offices activities without offering any judgments about the conflicts and/or crises, as well as carry out some intermediate-level political engagements such as mediation, or they can engage in high-level activities like sending some well-equipped

⁷⁸ Benjamin Miller, "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management", *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 1, (October 1992), pp. 38-39.

⁷⁹ For this subject, see Karl P. Mueller, *Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy*, Washington DC, Rand Corporation, 2007.

observers or military units to the zones of conflict/crisis. The threats directed to the international security system could be caused by crises, and they can directly affect the engagement levels of international organizations.

After a detailed examination of the main outcomes of crises from the angles of form and content, it could be concluded that crises arising from protracted conflicts end with relatively less concrete results like stalemate, and they also may end with more informal agreements because otherwise it could be required for all sides to reciprocally acknowledge their enemies' existence, rights and/or at least interests. In this way, the Israeli political party Kadima's preference for unilateral withdraw from occupied zones and keeping itself away from bargaining with Hamas; the avoidance of the Greek Administration from negotiations in the Cyprus Conflict because of its reluctance to reach a formal agreement that may make it obliged to recognize the independent existence of Northern Cyprus; or similarly, Azerbaijan's rejection of a final peace agreement with the Nagorno-Karabakh may be examples of these outcomes.

b. Crises in the Framework of Conflict Management Process

Under the conditions of the Cold War, analysts who were interested in international relations theory and its practice have suggested some models and hypotheses to better understand the natural evolution of discord and crisis. For instance, Jakob Bercovitch mentions that there could be a model with four phases and it would be applied by the external actors in order to relieve or settle disputes. The phases of that method are various manipulations which may be binding or not; any third party's bargaining position or consultancy; using precautionary compulsion measures which may have some psychological impact; and the use of force.⁸⁰ Of course, these phases can be reversed in exactly the opposite direction, like the USA recently encountered in Iraq.

Another analyst, Christopher Mitchell, underlines the fact that there are four strategies regarding conflict management and they are centred around two main phases. Those strategies and phases are avoidance and

⁸⁰ Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson and Donnette L. Wille, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 1, (February 1991), p. 7.

prevention strategies within the scope of activities before the actual conflict has happened and settlement and resolution strategies used after the conflict.⁸¹

In this context, a follower of Johan Galtung, A. B. Fetherson, uses the concept of ‘negative peace’ in order to describe ‘the settlement of disputes’, and he uses another concept, ‘positive peace’, to describe completely ‘resolution of disputes’. The essential tools to be able to reach the negative peace are consultations/negotiations, good offices, mediation, reconciliation, imposition, and interference.⁸² Everlasting wars could be stopped by using such tools and violence may be overcome; however, continual problems regarding conflicts can cause other crises over the long term that may not be able to be solved completely. In the case of positive peace, which is expected to be beneficial for all sides of the conflict, rivals can find opportunities to discuss the matter and solve the problems by themselves. As a result, a long-term, even a continual, process to keep the peace could be involved as a peaceful solution. The methods offered to solve conflicts cannot be forced. In such a case, it would not be possible for any third party to interfere in the process by using force. Some Western thinkers see this method as a propaganda tool. For example, Mary Clark proposes that ‘resolution’ is mainly a Western tradition, followed in order to overcome difficulties such as discords, disagreements, and conflicts.⁸³

There were two basic models developed from the idea of using positive peace to resolve disagreements and conflicts. These models are very much involved in peaceful resolution; they are the dynamic circulation model and the linear model.

In the dynamic circulation model, which has been outlined by Christopher Mitchell, there is a loop with eleven steps, which could be considered to be consecutive phases: emergence; confrontation; escalation;

⁸¹ Christopher R. Mitchell, “Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution: More Basic Questions About Basic Human Needs Theory”, in John Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 172.

⁸² For detailed information, see A. B. Fetherson, *Toward a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, (Peace Research Report, no. 31), Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 1993.

⁸³ See Alma Abdul-Hadi Jadallah, “Conflict Theory and Cultural Paradigms”, (1999), at <http://www.alhewar.com/Alma-Amr.htm>.

contention (in this phase, opposing sides may accuse each other); impasse; staying calm and smoothing over as a result of the influence of crisis management; prior negotiations, extensive negotiations, settlement, consolidation, and resolution. In the extensive negotiations phase, if the two sides fail to agree, the whole process may move backwards, and it might even be possible for the parties to return to the conditions of pre-crisis contention/dissension, or even to the impasse phase. If negotiations are highly successful, both sides can consider important matters that have been interrupted by the disagreement and find opportunities to resolve them in the settlement phase. Eventually, the opposing sides can reach the consolidation and then the resolution phases.. As can be understood, in this model it is possible to go backwards from the achieved phases and conditions anytime. In that respect, there are two types of feedback: benign and malignant. Which one will be more effective? The answer of this question depends on the quality and the success of the management of the conflict or crisis.⁸⁴

On the other hand, Michael Lund's linear model is perhaps more useful than the previous one with respect to suggesting which strategy could be more effective to use on the conflict management process; however, it involves a pattern that could relatively be identified as less analytical than the previous one. In this model, the process does not have its own internal cycles and it is spread over a long period. The process proposes that the dispute makes linear progress, having eight primary and five secondary stages. Those are: (1) the perpetual peace, (2) the stable peace (main order), (2a) increasing pressure, (3) the unstable peace, (3a) confrontation, (4) crisis, (4a) eruption of violence, (5) the stage of war, (6) mitigation, (6a) cease-fire, (7) peacekeeping operations, (7a) settlement, (8) consensus, peace-building, and resolution.⁸⁵

It has been postulated that each phase within the scope of the linear model has specific techniques for conflict management. It is necessary to look at those techniques in context. Those are peace diplomacy in perpetual

⁸⁴ Christopher R. Mitchell, *Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution: An Enquiry*, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, November 2005, pp. 10-13.

⁸⁵ See Niklas L. P. Swanström and Mikael S. Weissmann, *Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Beyond: A Conceptual Exploration*, Concept Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, Sweden, Uppsala University, Summer 2005, pp. 27-28.

and stable peace; preventive diplomacy in unstable peace; crisis management and crisis diplomacy in the stage of crisis; peace enforcement to reach a ceasefire in the stage of war; various problem-ending techniques (settlement) after a ceasefire; and some other problem-solving techniques (peace-building) in the rapprochement stage. As can be understood, crisis management is one of the specific techniques of conflict management. Therefore, the peace missions seen in this model also serve important functions to crisis management.

In this context, peace enforcement methods are comprised of military operations carried out by any third party; those methods are used to restore the conditions of peace or create special conditions in a zone of tension. After that, peacekeeping operations are carried out with the consent of the opposing sides and they are usually intended to reestablish the peace. Those operations are organized by any neutral third party's intervention, and they aim to prevent outright hostilities between opposing states. These operations could be military or civil actions. In further steps, as a widespread practice of the peace-building method, some actions are taken immediately after the conflict at hand for the purposes of preventing new ones and consolidating the peaceful atmosphere. As can be understood, all of those three methods are applied when conflicts and crises erupt. On the other hand, there is an exceptional situation within the peacemaking method because internationally-recognized explanations of the concept apply systematic and peaceful methods beforehand such as diplomacy, negotiations, good offices and mediation in order to overcome tensions that can turn into conflicts. These methods are intensively used for conflict and crisis management by many international and/or supranational organizations like NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the UN (United Nations), the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), and the EU (European Union).

V. Several Approaches on Crisis Management in International Relations

Crisis management is constituted as a field that includes scholars and practitioners. Thus, crisis management has its experts, debates, and reviews. The notion of field is taken here in the meaning given by Bourdieu: "in analytical terms, a field can be defined as a network, or a configuration of

objective relations between positions.”⁸⁶ A field is a ‘social space’ working like a ‘field of force’ whose necessity is imposed on the agents imbedded in it. This leads to a certain homogeneity illustrated by the same bureaucratic interests and the same knowledge on some issues,⁸⁷ which transcends classical internal/external borders, and national/international for crisis management. Indeed, crisis management has followed the path of post-Cold War discourses at the international level. Threats are described as transnational and multidimensional. Taking various form, they are all part of the same continuum where is it possible to see a great variety of catastrophes such as earthquakes, epidemics, cyberterrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁸⁸

According to the characteristics of crisis management, a crisis is identified and the existential threat it represents to the concerned organization requires the use of extraordinary means to manage the situation. Drawing on the works of Ole Waever on security, it could be said that ‘crisis’ is the very moment of securitization.⁸⁹ Thus, a securitized issue that is presented as an existential threat requires emergency measures and justifies actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.

On the other hand, crisis is very harmful to human and nature, and hence it is very necessary to figure out how to manage it. In general, crisis management is the common language to deal with crises. However, each crisis is very different and has its own characteristics; use of the wrong method to manage the crisis may not cope with problem, but instead generate another one. Therefore, properly identifying a crisis before managing it is very important to the crisis management process.

⁸⁶ Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, “La logique des Champs”, *Réponses, pour une anthropologie réflexive*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1992, p. 4.

⁸⁷ Didier Bigo, “When Two Become One, Internal and External Securisations in Europe”, in Morton Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, New York, Routledge, 2000, pp. 171-204.

⁸⁸ Bruce W. Dayton, “Managing Crises in the Twenty-First Century”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, (March 2004), p. 165.

⁸⁹ Ole Waever, “The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders”, in Morton Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, New York, Routledge, 2000, p. 251.

The question ‘why manage?’ is implicit in much of the crisis management literature. An associated question relates to the interests served by management: is it part of a collective interest shared by participants in the system (or indeed by the world at large) or is it a reflection of partial or sectional interests? It can easily be seen that there are incentives for the powerful (for example) to manage crisis in their own interests, which may or may not coincide with the collective interests of those involved in the system. Equally, there are incentives for others, at least potentially, to abstain from management in the belief that an intensification of tensions and differences is in their interests. This sort of tension is inseparable from the idea of crisis management itself, whether it is conducted between states, within families or elsewhere.

There is a wide range of possible approaches to crisis management, many of which raise important questions about the roles of power, institutions, rules, and negotiation in world politics. Key approaches are those relying on the development of formal or informal rules, the use of negotiation and bargaining, and the deployment of ‘conventions of crisis’ where relations among those involved are relatively stable, and to the emergence of crisis management technologies in order to provide reliable information and a basis for planning. There is clearly in this area an important distinction between bilateral generation of rules, conventions and technologies and the multilateral development of institutions. The distinction is underlined by the coexistence of what might be termed ‘coercive’ and ‘persuasive’ modes of crisis negotiation and bargaining, which clearly raise the issues attached to the uses of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power in crisis situations.

In this manner, there were three schools of thought regarding the explanation of crisis management in Cold War era:

1. The first school regards crisis management as the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and measures its success totally on whether a war can be avoided or not. This school stresses that crisis itself is the real enemy. This school holds that because nuclear weapons have the capability for mass destruction, nuclear powers must avoid high risk; before one side takes new action, it must evaluate whether that action will lead to making war more possible; if yes, it should choose another action with less risk because all parties have common interests in eliminating the danger of war and returning the situation to normal, making them in fact partners.

2. The second school regards crisis management as the process to strive for a win, aiming at pressing the adversary to make concessions, and further advancing its own interests in international politics. This school thinks that crisis presents a country with an opportunity to advance its own interests, and the adversary country is the enemy instead of the crisis itself. The second school holds that before one side takes new action, it must evaluate whether the action can press the adversary to give in or not; the country should not do so if it must take more risky action to realize its expectations; the role of crisis management is how to press its adversary to make the biggest concession and itself only make small concessions.

3. And the third school takes the middle road, regulating the definition of crisis management as ‘to win a crisis, at the same time limit the danger and risk within those both sides can tolerate’.⁹⁰

Crisis management in the post-Cold War era continues to be as important, if not more so, than it was during the Cold War. Whilst certain features of crisis management have remained, others have changed, e.g., ethnic conflict leading to crises was not apparent during the Cold War; intra/inter-boundary conflicts (for example, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Iraq/Kuwait) have increased in frequency, leading to a need for increased crisis management and secondary crisis management. NATO’s role in crisis management has changed from one of deterring conflict to compelling certain behaviours; the crisis threshold is not where it was during the Cold War, and therefore it allows greater use of military force. Gunboat diplomacy is no longer a policy of first resort; there is greater emphasis on encouraging other states to participate via a coalition. Time limits to resolving crises have given way to long-term resolution and containment. Strategic considerations were the sole consideration in Cold War times, but human considerations are high on the agenda in the post-Cold War era.⁹¹ On the other hand, in this new era, to tackle rapid crises, many countries and organizations design rapid reaction mechanisms (RRM) to cope with disasters and so on. RRM is a civilian-oriented, state-supervising crisis

⁹⁰William R. Kintner and David C. Schwarz, *A Study on Crisis Management*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1965, Appendix B, p. 21; see also, Xia Liping, “Crisis Management in the Relationship Between China and the United States”, *International Review*, Vol. 45, (Winter 2006), pp. 64-65.

⁹¹Patricia Youngson, “Coercive Containment: The New Crisis Management”, *International Relations*, Vol. 15, Issue 5, (2001), p. 37.

management tool and procedure. Of course, RRM can also involve military action; RRM competes against time and with huge resources for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Having said that, RRM considers that time is very fertile ground for a crisis, and it makes disaster bigger. In addition, bigger disasters cost more for reconciliation and reconstruction than smaller ones. For this reason, RRM is designed to prevent the worsening of the crisis and get it under control.⁹² So surprise, stress, threat, and limited response time continue to characterize post-Cold War crises.⁹³

To sum up, Alexander George's book gives us a very good overview of the process and conflicting goals of coercive crisis management. He discusses a number of offensive strategies (blackmail, limited and reversible response, controlled pressure, attrition⁹⁴, and fait accompli) and defensive strategies (coercion, limited escalation, tit-for-tat⁹⁵, test of capabilities, drawing a line etc.).⁹⁶ In one opinion, crisis management and coercive diplomacy can be seen as alternative means of dealing with crises. The former is the means adopted if the major emphasis is on the avoidance of war,⁹⁷ the latter is the means adopted if the major objective is the protection or furtherance of vital national interests. It is not that coercive diplomacy is absent in crisis management, it is that the latter consists more of a mixed pattern of threat and the offering of incentives to the opponent for compromise or even for backing down. Coercive diplomacy relies essentially

⁹² Janice Gross Stein, "Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward", *Political Psychology*, Vol. 29, Issue 4, (2008), pp. 553-569.

⁹³ Sally J. Ray, *Strategic Communication in Crisis Management: Lessons from the Airline Industry*, Santa Barbara, CA, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999, p. 160.

⁹⁴ Attrition warfare is the military strategy of wearing down the enemy by continual losses in personnel and material. Also, battle of attrition is a military engagement in which neither side has a definite advantage.

⁹⁵ Based on the English saying meaning 'equivalent retaliation' ("tit-for-tat") an agent using this strategy will initially cooperate, then respond in kind to an opponent's previous action. If the opponent previously was cooperative, the agent is cooperative. If not, the agent is also not.

⁹⁶ See Alexander L. George (ed.), *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, Westview Press, 1991.

⁹⁷ Indeed, crisis management strategies, strategies of deterrence, and coercive/preventive diplomacy are principal strategies of avoiding war. Janice Gross Stein, "Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward", pp. 553-569.

on threat – both direct and indirect – in order to persuade the opponent to back down.⁹⁸

But in crises, of course, there are nonviolent as well as violent management techniques. Nonviolent management includes: (1) military nonviolent behaviour; (2) negotiation; (3) adjudication; (4) mediation; (5) non-military pressure; and (6) multiple nonviolence. Violent management includes: (1) military violence and (2) multiple including violence.⁹⁹

VI. Third Party Interventions in Managing the International Crises

During the Cold War and its harsh conditions, the struggle to solve international crises and conflicts had mostly been conducted with some specific crisis management techniques within the scope of traditional-forcible diplomatic methods. It could be put forward that those techniques, which served the purpose of containment instead of proposing appropriate solutions, were based on unproven hypotheses in general; also, they contradicted each other and the facts remained unclear about likely sustainable solutions. Consequently, the methods of that type gradually made the crises and conflicts much more difficult situations to be resolved.

A number of changes in the international system in the late 1980s revealed some secrets of the subject of examining international, regional and national conflicts. The process by which conflict and crisis management techniques became complicated created a number of conditions for improving new techniques. Later the subject of the methods of intervention of any third party began to be dwelt upon. This approach actually came out in the 1960s, became clear in the 1970s, and was hastened in the 1980s.

Generally, third party interventions differ in several respects. Among those interventions there are partial solution- and total solution-providing techniques with respect to their outcomes. There could be two basic

⁹⁸ Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, New York, Routledge, 1993, p. 107.

⁹⁹ David Carment and Patrick James, "Secession and Irredenta in World Politics: The Neglected Interstate Dimension", in David Carment and Patrick James, *Wars in the Midst of Peace*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997, p. 226.

positions in which third parties can intervene: official platform (track-one diplomacy) and unofficial platform (track-two diplomacy).¹⁰⁰

Recognizing the primacy of crises, scholars and policy makers have been increasingly concerned with developing mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises. On this point, we investigate two of the crisis resolution mechanisms – mediation and facilitation by third parties – to determine whether they are effective means of resolving, or at least mitigating, the all too often turbulent and violent consequences of crises.¹⁰¹

a. Mediation:

In the framework of this technique (method), the parties to the crisis make an effort to reach a conclusion which could be assisted by any third party, and it is important that the conclusion has to be found reasonable by both sides. This technique can be used for each crisis case such as technical crises, inter-person crises, inter-groups crises, organizational/institutional crises, inter-society crises, international crises and so on. The success of the mediation will depend on the existence of three elements: crisis-related elements: the sources of the crisis, the environment in which the crisis has arisen, the type of the crisis, etc.; participatory-related elements: the historical context of the relationships such as trust and/or the hostilities between the parties, their intention to negotiate and reach an agreement; and mediator-related elements: the intention to mediate, as well as the timing and nature of the mediator's proposal.

The primary functions of a mediator are to provide a means of communication between the parties to a crisis, help the parties to develop alternative solutions, convince the parties to change their way of thinking, provide unique solutions for the crisis, think about the ways that could possibly minimize the losses, provide resources for the ways that could solve

¹⁰⁰ Maurice Apprey, "Heuristic Steps for Negotiating Ethno-National Conflicts: Vignettes from Estonia", *New Literary History: Journal of Theory and Interpretation*, Vol. 27, (1996), pp. 199-212.

¹⁰¹ Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen Young, Victor Asal, and David Quinn, "Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 47, Issue 3, (June 2003), pp. 279-280.

a crisis, and etc.¹⁰² According to Oran Young, the four basic functions of mediation are: the informative function, the tactical function (to provide services and sources), the conceptual function (to put forward proposals to end the crisis), and the control-related function (to control the state of the agreement as to whether or not it works).¹⁰³

As Kenneth Waltz has mentioned, the conformation of the international politics is going to affect the nature of the mediation process as well as its standard techniques and outcomes; it will gradually bring the dimension of power politics to the process.¹⁰⁴ By considering that, the mediation technique could be described as an approach which is a result-directed approach. The specific characteristics of the above-mentioned approach has been summarized by J. Bercovitch in this way: the result-directed approach has a narrow scope; its exclusive characteristics could be noticed, mainly because it is not necessarily important to take the both sides' interests into consideration in the approach; mediators can use the power they hold in order to pull all parties into some predetermined consequences; third parties might be able to encourage the major powers by offering some suggestions for them to consider in order to increase the chance of getting some specific outcomes accepted. One of the primary aims of such an approach is to form a cost-benefit matrix that could generally be accepted by both sides. The selected approach can be focused on getting the intensity of a crisis reduced. This approach can be intensified to get the parties to renounce their positions and could be aimed at determining a subject area in which the parties agree. The mediation approach could limit the scope of the crisis-related matters if it is not possible to resolve the crisis.¹⁰⁵ The result-directed approach of the mediation technique is a process which involves direct intervention, and is involved in power interactions. Third parties might be able to advocate a special solution, but their efforts are usually about just one

¹⁰² Amos Perlmutter, "Crisis Management: Kissinger's Middle East Negotiations, (October 1973-June 1974)", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 19, Issue 3, (September 1975), p. 318.

¹⁰³ See Oran Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*.

¹⁰⁴ See Paul R. Hensel, "Power Politics and Contentious Issues: Realism, Issue Salience, and Conflict Management", *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*, Florida State University, Honolulu, (2 March 2005), available at <http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/Research/isa05.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ Jacob Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1984, see Chapters 5 and 6.

part of the crisis. The conclusions supported by the mediation technique will probably strive to change various elements that caused the crisis. Therefore, the appropriate method might possess several characteristics, so it would be possible to say that the method has a narrow scope; likewise, it doesn't generally pay considerable attention to the entire range of the crisis or the conflict, it is not focused on the interests or the problems considered important by the parties, and it seems that it is not an effective way to discover the important matters or the reasons in the background of the crisis.

The use of power politics can play an immensely significant role in mediation. As Saadia Touval and William Zartman have mentioned, there is a direct connection between international mediation activities and power/interest policies.¹⁰⁶ Otherwise, the mediator might not be able to have any control or influence over the parties to the conflict. In that case, if the affected third party did not have some interests, it would not have been possible or rational for them to intervene in disputes in this way. A mediator's main objectives could be to increase his political and/or economic interests; also, it could be possible for the mediator to defend what he has as an interest – maintain the status quo. The mediation mechanism can basically help the parties to renounce less than what they may have been required to with the aim of reaching an appropriate solution. The reason that one side's denial could be directed toward the other side, as well as at the mediator, might make the mediator be able to think that he can wield some influence over the parties, and/or he might think that he can demand absolute obedience from them.

It is mostly not necessary for the mediators to be neutral; accordingly, this attitude might not be required, and might sometimes be impossible. According to Dean Pruitt, mediators with more influence on one or more of the parties to a crisis have the potential to be more successful than others who are neutral.¹⁰⁷ The question is what could be the element to prevent the process from having an unjust or an unequal solution in that sort of situation?" The interests of third parties could be put forward to be able to

¹⁰⁶ Referred by Mark Hoffman, "Third-Party Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War World", in John Baylis and N.J. Rengger, *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 267.

¹⁰⁷ See Josephine M. Zubek, Dean G. Pruitt, et.al., "Disputant and Mediator Behaviors Affecting Short-Term Success in Mediation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, Issue 3, (September 1992), pp. 551-552.

answer this question because third parties will be the most able to develop good relationships for the future from the crisis, and they expect to gain maximum benefit from developing such relationships.

b. Facilitation:

Another possible activity for third parties in the management of crisis and/or conflicts could be facilitative. Facilitation is a technique (method) which has been developed by some academicians as a variation of the mediation technique. This method is based on considering all important matters hidden beneath a crisis situation, and third parties strive to suggest a mutually-acceptable solution. The facilitation technique (method) is also called the interactive problem-solving method, and this method uses basic human needs to be able to define the needed actions for third parties. Accordingly, that method is aimed at satisfying the pressing needs of the parties. The facilitation technique avoids adopting a palliative approach that is not aimed at satisfying the complete needs of parties to the crisis. Consequently, that method has the ability to find good solutions to crises.

According to John Burton, the most basic human needs are security, identity, recognition and development.¹⁰⁸ Those needs could illustrate a convenient starting point for the process of problem-solving because it is a generalization that avoiding those necessities (needs) or stressing them could be considered as a possible cause of a crises or a conflict. Therefore, a rational hypothesis about the crisis resolution approach is that the problems arising from the unsatisfied basic needs cannot easily be noticed or discussed. Burton briefly describes the intervention of third parties with regard to the correlation between the crises and human needs as the “analytical problem-solving approach.”¹⁰⁹ This approach investigates bilateral relations between the countries actively involved in a conflict/crisis. Third parties’ activities, which offer possibilities to all parties, are collaborative but they are not hierarchical activities; furthermore, they do not exert pressure on sides. Therefore, this analytical process is inclusive for the

¹⁰⁸ John W. Burton, *Conflict Resolution as a Political System*, Working Paper, No. 1, Reprinted Edition, (August 1993), p. 12, available at http://icar.gmu.edu/wp_1_burton.pdf#search=%22.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-19.

parties as well as the importance of the matter. This method is not comprised of directly-driven bargains or direct negotiations.

Third parties do not usually offer creative solutions concerning the matters with which they assist. The process mainly serves the purpose of diagnosing the main problems. According to Christopher Mitchell, there are seven main characteristics of such a method:

- completeness, which means that the chosen method supports the idea of eliminating all of the possibilities that are mostly responsible for the crises;
- acceptability, which indicates that the method selected necessitates achieving good results which could be considered satisfactory to both sides;
- self-supporting, which gives the idea that the compromise between the sides has to be sustainable;
- uncompromising, which emphasizes the importance of reaching an agreement which is not based on reciprocal concessions;
- satisfactory, which gives the idea that the result has to be good enough for both sides;
- innovative, which indicates that the chosen method has to provide an opportunity for both sides to be able to establish good relations with each other;
- un-coerced, which points to the fact that each party to a crisis must be able to arrive at a solution of its own free will.

The facilitation technique has also been described by the following academicians: Paul Wehr, Vivienne Jabri and Jacop Bercovitch.¹¹⁰ According to Paul Wehr, this technique is collaborative in comparison to

¹¹⁰ As quoted by Hoffman, "Third-Party Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War World", see footnote 8, pp. 281-282.

competitive and hierarchical mediation;¹¹¹ according to Vivienne Jabri, it acts as a facilitator in comparison to the bargain-based mediation technique;¹¹² according to Jacop Bercovitch, it seems that it is close to the process approach in comparison to the instrumental approach.¹¹³ In many respects the most attractive feature of the facilitative technique is that it serves a transformative function with the aim of changing the essence of conflicts and related matters.

The most convenient platforms on which the facilitative approach could smoothly run are workshops. The meaning of the word ‘workshop’ refers to a meeting at which people can discuss their experiences and they can try to improve their abilities while gaining some practical experiences.¹¹⁴ Those meetings have three phases by nature. During the first phase, all sides espouse their own way of thinking, and they receive detailed information from their counterparts. The purpose of the first phase is to identify and understand the crises and conflicts. The following phase of those meetings is aimed at defining the matters related to the crises and/or conflicts in terms of some facilitators. In the final phase, the essential elements of the matter are discussed. According to Herbert C. Kelman, workshops are great healers as much as they are analytical methods. Furthermore, they are focused on the mutual needs of the conflicting parts. They allow some alternative norms to be established and they provide a spontaneous opportunity for learning.¹¹⁵ The relevant one is also an archaeological approach because each side has the unique opportunity of investigating the causes lying in its own attitude and behaviour.

Conclusions

¹¹¹ As quoted by David Bloomfield, “Towards Complementarity in Conflict Management: Resolution and Settlement in Northern Ireland”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, Issue 2, (May 1995), p. 151.

¹¹² As quoted by Joao Cravinho, “Mediation in Southern Africa”, (Review Article), *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 21, Issue 1, (March 1995), pp. 168-169.

¹¹³ Jacob Bercovitch, “International Mediation”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, Issue 1, (February 1991), p. 3.

¹¹⁴ See *Longman English Dictionary*, 2005.

¹¹⁵ Herbert C. Kelman, “Interactive Problem Solving: An Approach to Conflict Resolution and Its Application in the Middle East”, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 31, Issue 2, (June 1998), p. 190.

Before all else, it needs to be emphasized that the notion of crisis is closely related and pertinent to the concept of chaos. In the present day, the world is clearly in chaotic conditions. Accordingly, crises also, as related with the chaos situation, are effective. Meanwhile, some crises are being anticipated as bringing acceleration to ameliorate the chaotic environment. But in every crisis milieu, some states are winners and some are losers. Naturally, every state wants to be on the side of the winners. Therefore, states try to save their adopted positions in crisis management models. Here appears the importance of crisis management because a wrong choice cannot be successful in crisis solution but on the other hand it will lay the groundwork for the new crises. Then, in our era, according to the crisis definition model which concentrates on the decision-making process in the framework of procedural subjective approach, the personal peculiarities, merits, characters, and qualifications of decision-makers has loomed large. That is to say, in today's world, especially, the personal characteristics of the American presidents or generally all the leaders of major powers, their perceptions of events and their preferences for solutions are more important than ever because these factors are expected to bring an end to the crisis-chaos atmosphere while creating some systemic alterations. Today, it can be seen that the internationalist leaders and/or groups will be the more successful crisis managers. But at this point, the existence of such a vicious circle is drawing attention: crises and the chaotic atmosphere can popularize and support hawkish leaders and elite groups.

Also, it should not be forgotten that in world political system of the 20th century, approximately once in every ten or twenty years (1904-1914, 1933-1939, 1948, 1963, 1979-1980, 1990-1991, 2001-2003) broad international crises occurred within the meaning of large systemic changes. Consequently, in one sense, it was not possible to be saved from those changes. Therefore, what could be done was to collectively prevent the crises from turning into wars or more individually to minimize the possible damage to themselves or their interests. Meanwhile, it can be seen from history that international crises have taken root from interstate conflicts. Long time, unsolved conflicts and their types/degrees let us see the process of crisis management, somewhat as an element of general conflict resolution and as an element of conflict management. In this process, it can be seen that the management of the crisis generally appeared after the confrontation phase between parties. In this sense, many states try to see the peacemaking models before international disputes erupt, or, if they are not well predicted,

they engage the peace enforcement, peace-building, and peacekeeping operations after conflicts came into the picture, under the concept of general crisis management operations.

Academicians have very different opinions about the leading crisis management models and approaches. While a part of these approaches allow the use of military power, the rest of them take advantage of more cooperative methods and restrict the use of military tools. It can also be alluded to as a hierarchic gradation between crisis management techniques. As a matter of fact, it can be asserted that there is a hierarchic view that first all the cooperative measures should be tried, then, and only then, the confrontational approaches should come.