Formative Years: A Key for Understanding Turkey’s Membership Policy towards the EU

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Abstract

This article attempts to evaluate the formative years of Turkey's relations with the European Economic Community (EEC). This period began with Turkey's application to the community in 1959 for an association agreement, and lasted until the end of the approval process of the Ankara Agreement (AA) by national governments in 1964. In the first five years, negotiations for the jAA were successfully concluded in line with Turkey's conventional orientation in foreign affairs. It was indeed a successful agreement, because Ankara was able to persuade Brussels to consider Turkey's eventual membership of the Community, and to sign an agreement documenting it. In addition, this article also aims to identify the essential driving forces behind Turkey's original approach on European integration, through analysing internal and external factors, which were supposed to be important during the formative years. It should be noted here that Turkey's EEC policy in this period is still of indisputable importance in understanding the relationship between Turkey and the EU today.

Introduction

After the Second World War, integration movements in Europe took on a new and fresh start, but it soon became apparent that everyone had a different idea about the future of integration in the continent. Differences in opinion opened different doors for countries willing to come together. As some countries followed the way of ECSC, leading to the establishment of the EEC in 1957 for a common market, others preferred the option of EFTA for a free trade area.

For Turkey, there were now two options. In order to be included in Western Europe, Ankara would participate in either the EEC or EFTA. Turkish decision makers chose the former. This choice was not a result of a sudden decision, because all developments which concluded with the establishment of the European organisations were closely followed by Ankara, too. These developments seemed to be vitally important for Turkish decision makers, because the Democrat Party Government, which seized power in 1950, was particularly interested in the inte-

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Turkey with the West. As a result of this interest, Turkey, which had already become a member of the OEEC and the Council of Europe, also succeeded in obtaining a seat in NATO in 1952. In a sense, through its NATO membership, three strands of Turkish foreign policy were parallel with those of the European countries with which Turkey had close contacts.

In this article, an attempt will be made to evaluate the formative years of Turkey's relations with the European Community. This period began with Turkey's application for an association agreement to the Community in 1959 and lasted until the end of the approval process of the Ankara Agreement by national governments in 1964. In the first five years, negotiations for the Association Agreement were successfully concluded in line with Turkey's conventional orientation in foreign affairs. It was indeed a successful agreement, as Ankara was able to persuade Brussels to consider Turkey's eventual membership of the Community and to sign an agreement documenting it.

Two basic points, which appeared to be important while establishing this relationship during the 1950s and 1960s, have still remained unchanged in the 2000s. First, Turkish foreign policy towards the Community perceived membership as a natural part of Turkey's integration with the Western World. Second, there seemed to be a strong correlation between Turkey's westernisation process and the Turkish application to the Community. Therefore, I have in this article tried to understand how Turkish decision makers evaluated the application in 1959 and the Ankara Agreement (AA) in particular, and what meaning(s) they ascribed to Turkey's relations with the Community in general. Within this context, an attempt has also been made to identify essential driving forces behind Turkey's official approach, through analysing internal and external factors, which were considered to be important, during the formative years. It should be noted here that Turkey's EEC policy, which was shaped during this period, is of indisputable importance in understanding this policy today. In particular, the driving forces behind Turkey's EC policy cannot be confined only to the formative years.
Beginnings

Nobody can deny the fact that the integration movement in Western Europe is mainly a part of the global confrontation taking place between the USA and the Soviet Union. It is in fact plain, that one of the most effective driving forces - and a real sponsor behind pan-Europeanist movements - was the United States. Of course, the foundations and the idea of uniting Europe go back to the Roman Empire, Christianity and Medieval times but the Second World War and developments in international politics during the period following it, encouraged European countries to come together. Therefore the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid and the establishment of NATO cannot be thought of as different subject matter to that of the creation of a united Europe.

But the main point of this paper is not to provide a detailed analysis on the subject of how and why European countries decided to create the Council of Europe, the ECSC and then the European Economic Community. This paper will not explore the real reasons behind Turkey’s tremendous efforts to be included in the Western World from the end of the Second World War to the creation of the Western-European organisations. Nor will it analyse in detail how the Cold War affected the behaviour of Greece and Turkey, for example, as they were making their decision for application to the EEC in 1959. That is mainly because, after becoming a part of NATO and the defence system of Western countries, it was indeed very difficult to argue that there was such a problem as security identity for these countries. From the perspective of security identity, there did not seem to be any difference in being part of the EEC led by France and Germany, or of EFTA, led by the United Kingdom, because they were all already members of the same security club. As a result, we do not say that the Cold War for example, played little role in Turkey’s decision for integration with the EEC, but we say that the Cold War in itself cannot explain, for example, why Turkey preferred to apply to the EEC instead of EFTA. It is however true that the Cold War encouraged and, even more, facilitated Turkey’s acceptance by NATO, as a full member. In the case of Turkey’s integration with the EEC, the role of the Cold War needs to be evaluated carefully before reaching conclusions. Of course, the Cold War and security issues related to it must have been taken into consideration when the time came to reach a decision within the general atmosphere of the Cold War period, but this can be seen sometimes as a matter of unspoken assumption and sometimes as a leitmotiv of all the decisions made by all the parties during the Cold War period.

Information used by the author in this article is based on his personal interviews with Semih Günver, Kamran İnan and Hayrettin Erkmen, unless otherwise indicated. Interviews with Semih Günver and Kamran İnan were conducted in their offices, in Ankara, on 20 August 1993 and August 1993 respectively. Interview with Hayrettin Erkmen took place in his house in Arifi Paşa Korusu, İstanbul, on 2 September 1993. For a fuller account and references see: Şaban H. Çaliş, Türkiye-AB İlişkileri, Kimlik Arayışı, Politik Aktörler ve Değişim, Ankara: Nobel, 2004.
The role of the Cold War is certainly undeniable, but it is another subject which deserves scrutiny elsewhere.

Therefore, the following pages should be read as a contribution to the discussions taking place around Turkey’s decision to make an application to the EEC and the developments following that decision. As we have noted, Turkey had participated in major western organisations including the Council of Europe and NATO after the Cold War started. Economic integration movements, which seemed to be developing outside Turkey, considerably disturbed Turkish authorities. Therefore, negotiations among the Six leading countries to establish a European economic community awoke much interest. There was a simple conviction among Turkish decision makers that Turkey should join all western European organisations, because this would prove Turkey's modern/western identity. However, when the European Coal and Steel Community was founded, Ankara did not consider participating in it, since Turkey’s steel and coal industry was obviously primitive when compared to those of the Six. But Turkish prime minister, Adnan Menderes was personally dealing with such developments, and he was constantly in touch with senior Turkish diplomats in the capitals of western countries, in order to understand what was happening in Europe.2 This special interest and the private relationships developed by Menderes laid the foundations of Turkish foreign policy towards the EEC. One of the most important figures in the making of policy emerged from Menderes' private contacts. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, was then Turkey's permanent representative to NATO but the Turkish premier also employed him as private adviser for foreign affairs, and Zorlu paid many visits to Ankara in order to report developments taking place in Europe.3 According to Zorlu, ‘the ECSC would not only be the beginning of new economic integration, but would also establish the foundations of the European Union in the political field, so Turkey must keep in touch with the Six’.4

Therefore, the relations of ECSC members and developments in Paris were daily and in every detail followed by Turkish diplomats, even though Ankara seemed to have no reason to participate in it.5 The meetings of the OEEC, NATO and the Council of Europe also provided substantial information and gave Turkey

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2 Interviews with Günver and Erkmen.
4 Interview with Günver.
5 Interviews with Günver and Inan. See also: Cihat İren, ‘Muhtarlık Pazar’da Ortaklık Statüsinini İstinat Edeceği Premsip-ler’, Türkiye İktisat Gazetesi, 9 October 1959, particularly pp.1-3.
important opportunities to exchange views with other European countries. Indeed, in the atmosphere of the Cold War, it was a fact that Ankara stayed in touch with European affairs, and ensured that it had tangible information on European politics. Therefore, negotiations among the Six in order establish an economic community, probably evoked much more interest in Turkey than in other countries.

In the meantime, a noticeable change occurred in Turkish domestic politics, after the general election in 1957, Adnan Menderes appointed Fatin Rüşti Zorlu as foreign minister. It was an important change in the Government, because it demonstrated how sensitive Menderes was to developments, taking place in Europe. The Prime Minister must have wanted an active foreign minister, who used his expertise particularly on Turkey’s economic relations and Europe. Turkey then actively participated in the meetings of the OEEC, which aimed to establish a free trade area in Europe, as proposed by Britain. In 1957 and 1958, a Turkish delegation under the chairmanship of Semih Günver, the then general director of economic affairs, travelled eighteen times to Paris to take part in the 23rd working group of the OEEC. The group consisted of Turkey, Greece, Ireland, and Denmark. Turkey’s position in these meetings very much resembled that of Britain, rather than of France, which advocated closer and stronger integration. Because Turkey had a very fragile economy and a very infant industry, Turkish decision makers did not appear to be ready to establish a strong organisation with a supra-national structure. Most of them feared a kind of economic competition arising from integration - such as the customs union. London also favoured a loose concept of integration; however, the main objective of the Turkish delegation was not to blindly follow Britain but rather not to miss the train of Europe. Therefore, Turkey together with Greece, proposed a special trade regime among European countries which would allow weaker states to have a transitory period. According to the proposal, economically less developed countries would be supported financially and they would be granted some trade privileges during the transitory period. Unfortunately, when the efforts of the OEEC failed to reach a compromise between France and Britain, the proposals of Turkey were also shelved. With the start of negotiations in order to establish EFTA, Europe was de jure and de facto divided in three as the Six, the Outer Seven and others.

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6 Kuneralp notes that in 1955 after the Six decided to start negotiations for EEC at the Messina Conference, a British diplomat who worked in NATO said to Kuneralp, by pointing out the result of Messina, that ‘that is a dangerous development for the west, because such an arrangement might dissolve existing solidarity among the western countries... We should act together to stop this perilous development’. However, Kuneralp thought just the reverse and found Britain’s policy unbalanced in this matter. Zeki Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat, ‹stanbul: Istanbul Kitabevi, 1981, p.172.


10 Interview with Günver. See also: Dağıtv-Aktürk, Hükümetler ve Programları I, p.222.
Greece and Turkey stayed within the group of ‘other states’ which did not have organic ties among themselves. For them, there were two options: either joining one of the groups of the states or staying completely outside European integration. The second option was an unthinkable one for both Ankara and Athens, because they had already participated in many western organisations and depended financially on European countries. Europe was at the same time the biggest trade partner of the two neighbours.

Under these circumstances, they felt the necessity to board one of the carriages of the European trains on the move. But at a time when the future of the Outer Seven appeared not to be so bright, the Six appeared to be determined to make the dream of economic integration a reality, and they had proved it with the works of the ECSC. In addition, the economic and political relations of Turkey and Greece with the Six, were traditionally stronger than the Outer Seven. Perhaps Britain was one of the countries with the most influence on Ankara and Athens, but the total weight of Germany and France against this British power, in addition to the loose policy of London in the meetings of the OEEC, created an appealing counter force in favour of the Six.

Nevertheless, the Turkish Government could not make a decision as to what sort of relationship with the Six was suitable for Turkey, because there was no example set for them. Perhaps the Treaty of Rome was studied in terms of accession, association and trade agreements, but for practical reasons, it was decided ‘to wait and see’ as regards developments in the EEC, at least for a short while. In the meantime, Greece applied to the Community for an association agreement, on 8 June 1959. This application stimulated Turkey to take a similar position, and about a month later, on 31 July 1959, Ankara also addressed a request for an association agreement to community headquarters in Brussels.

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15Interview with Günver.
Reasons behind Turkey's Application in 1959

It is apparent that political reasons played one of the most important roles in Turkey's decision to make an application to the Community in 1959. In the same way, this bid was explained by a Turkish Foreign Minister's source as follows: explained as follows: ‘the Republic of Turkey, who has regarded itself as an indispensable part of western society since its establishment, joined many western organisations which were based on economic and political principles very similar to those of Turkey after the Second World War. Therefore, it was unthinkable that Turkey would not participate in the Common Market that aimed to establish first of all an economic community, and then a political union in Europe.’ Perhaps Turkey had also economic, practical and technical reasons, but political considerations were given priority and this policy became a national policy that was sincerely adopted and defended by all political parties.\(^{18}\)

Nevertheless, these political/ideological reasons were naturally stimulated by several catalysts which affected decision makers in Ankara. Of them, the application of Greece was of exceptional importance. In a sense, Greece pushed the Turkish Government to make a decision concerning the EEC.\(^{19}\) But the Turkish application to the Community should not be seen only as a reaction to the Greek action because, at the same time, Turkey's relationship with Greece was friendlier than it had been since Atatürk. Indeed, there seemed to be close cooperation between the two, particularly in foreign affairs. Perhaps Athens did not give notify Ankara as to the exact nature of the Greek application until it became a reality, but the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, visited Menderes in May 1959, and one of the chief subjects on which they spoke was economic integration in Europe.\(^{20}\) It was declared in a communiqué published after the visit of Karamanlis that the Prime Ministers ‘decided to follow closely developments taking place around\(^{21}\) the Common Market in order to determine a common policy when necessary.’ Therefore, the fact that the Greek Government informed Turkey as soon as they lodged their application to the Presidents of the Council and of the EEC Commission in Brussels in June 1959 should not be a surprise.\(^{22}\)

When the news of the Greek application reached Ankara, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu instructed his staff to prepare an application letter, ‘without any delay’.\(^{23}\) According

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\(^{20}\)The Economist, 16 May 1959.

\(^{21}\)Zafer, 10 May 1959.


to the then Turkish Foreign Minister, this application ought to be made, because, ‘This is a political matter for us. Should Turkey let Greece enter into such an arrangement alone, Turkey will be out in the cold. That is, Turkey's chance to be accepted by such a western organisation is to a great extent dependent on Greece, the golden child of Europe, the cradle of western civilisation. When Greeks begin to move, you should run alongside them, without considering anything else. If they dive into a pool, you do same thing, even though there is no water in the pool.’

Undoubtedly, he spoke from experience. Since the beginning of the Marshall Aid Plan, he had occupied key positions in the administrations conducting Turkey's relations with western countries. He saw how difficult it was for Turks to be accepted into western organisations. That Turkey joined the OEEC, NATO, and the Council of Europe, was, to some extent, because Greece and Turkey could not be separated geographically and historically from the west. However, whenever possible, Turkey was treated as a state that was of secondary importance, in comparison to Greece, as in the case of the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the Council of Europe. He had worked together with Greek diplomats for a long time in NATO, and observed their behaviour towards Turkey.

According to one of his close associates, Hasan Esat İşık, who was then in charge of the Secretariat of Economic Affairs General Directory of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Zorlu had a sort of ‘Greek phobia’ but this phobia did not spring only from a fear which he felt from the existence of Greece, but from the existence of the discrimination of western countries against Turkey when they had to deal with these two. Zorlu always wanted western countries to treat the two neighbours on an equal basis. For him, this concept of equality was much more important than how much aid would be granted to Turkey or what kind of agreement was on the agendas of the west.

After Zorlu’s called for the application to be made, preparations in the Ministry were finished within a few weeks. On 30 July 1959, the decision for the application brought Zorlu, for the first and the last time, to the meeting of the Council of Ministers convened under the chairmanship of the President, Celal Bayar, to discuss this very crucial subject matter.

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24 Interview with Günver.
26 Günver, F.R.Zorlu, pp.50-51.
27 Ibid., p.100.
28 Birand, Ortak Pazar, pp.72-73.

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Samet Ağaoğlu, and Hayrettin Erkmen, among others were also present there. Zorlu gave a briefing as to the reasons that ‘justified and necessitated’ the application. According to Zorlu, ‘Turkey aimed to establish an association with the Community which would be based on the customs union, but would also envisage Turkey’s eventual accession to it.’ The Foreign Minister particularly dwelt on political reasons: ideologically, such a decision should be regarded as ‘the logical end of Turkey’s aspiration’ to be counted among European countries. This country had already participated in all western organisations, but the establishment of the EEC posed, before Ankara, another ‘historical chance to confirm Turkey’s place in Europe’. On the other hand, ‘it was necessary’, he said, because the Greek Government officially expressed their desire for an association with the Community, and that request was favourably received by the EEC Council, just five days ago. At the same time, Zorlu explained the meaning of the ‘Greek effect’ in detail, and concluded that Turkey should show its determination to stay within the community of European states, and should ‘hook Greek track’ in order to reach to ‘same destination, the destination of the civilised world’, before it is too late.29

Other ministers at the cabinet meeting cabinet agreed with the foreign minister, but only one, Samet Ağaoğlu, who was then the minister of state, tried to convey his concerns as to the likely consequences of such a partnership on the Turkish economy and trade balance.30 According to him, none exactly knew what would happen to the Community in future. However, what was certain was the fact that there must be some burdens of the projected association as well. These might have a negative impact on Turkish industry, which needed protection. To him, it was simply because the association establishing a customs union eventually meant the lifting reciprocally of all restrictions and barriers on trade between partners. Actually, Ağaoğlu did not favour shelving the plan completely, but he thought that ‘all these dimensions of the proposed application should properly be analysed before taking action’. Behind this rhetoric, Ağaoğlu implicitly suggested delaying the application letter, at least for a while. But, prime minister Menderes, who could not refrain from showing his dissatisfaction with the ideas of Ağaoğlu, replied with ‘an angry voice’, that Turkey would never be ‘just an onlooker’ to Greece’s entrance to the European Union. To him, the reasons explained by the foreign minister, were enough to make the application. But more importantly with regard to the economic weakness of Turkey, according to Menderes, ‘there was nothing that Greeks could overcome that Turks would not carry out successfully.’ It was thus decided to make the application to the Council and the Commission of the EEC in Brussels, on the day after the meeting of the Council of Ministers.31

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29 Interview with Erkmen.
30 Birand, Ortak Pazar, p.74.
31 Interview with Erkmen. See also: Birand, Ortak Pazar, p.74.
Starting from this point, many asserted that the Greek application, more than anything else, influenced Ankara’s reasoning in its decision to apply to the EC. Turkey’s foreign policy in regards to the EC was essentially based on the premise that any western organisation which Greece joined should also be joined by Turkey. According to critics, this was because there was deadly competition and to some extent antagonism between the two neighbours and Turkey cautiously watched Greece’s overtures in foreign affairs, since Turkey feared that its neighbour might act against Turkish interests. However, as the author noted at the outset of the section, when Greece made its application in June 1959, relations between the two countries had already entered into a period of amity, despite the Cyprus crisis.

In addition, the influence of Greece in Turkish foreign affairs was not related to Greece itself, but was based on the fear that Greece would somehow hinder Turkey in realising its historical aspiration, i.e. becoming a European country. The importance of the Greek effect did not originate from an antagonism towards Greece that Turks felt or from economic competition between the two countries, as argued. If there was a fear, it was a fear that Turkey would be left out in the cold, if she did not act together with Greece, as clearly indicated by Zorlu himself. But the role of Greece can be best described as a catalyst for the Turkish application, which helped the Menderes government to decide what sort of relationship to establish with the Community. Therefore, the Greek effect was not in itself an independent factor.

To a great extent, some contradictions on the matter of establishing the real intention behind Turkey's application to the community emerged from confusing events with each other. Should Turkey's relations with Greece and the Community be analysed chronologically, it is not impossible to distinguish the real reasons from reasons manufactured later on. At about the time when the Turkish application was presented in Brussels, the overwhelming weight of these political reasons was also known by a number of people, including representatives of the Turkish private sector. In this context, Dr. Cihad İren, who was the secretary general of the Turkish Chambers of Commerce in 1959, is an example of the scope of this knowledge. When asked why Turkey should join the Community, he replied: 'For a hundred years we have been trying to be Europeans. That reason is enough!' In an article published in the Economist, Turkey’s application was analysed in the light of İren's words as follows:

‘Keen Europeans, the Turks possibly outdo the Dutch and Germans in their

32 For example see Birand, 'Turkey and the European Community', pp.52-53. Tekeli-İlkin, Türkiye ve AT-1, pp.126-127.
33 Saraçoğlu, Anlaşmalar, pp.4-8.
zeal to unify the continent... They are among the most assiduous supporters of the Council of Europe. As for the common market, even those Turks who have no idea what it really is are ardent to be in...[The statement of İren] goes to the root of the matter. The Turks have been marching westwards, literally and metaphorically, since they first left Central Asia. In the common market, perhaps they may find their spiritual home.34

At this point, a question might be asked, why, if the Turks were so enthusiastic for the unification of Europe in general and the EEC in particular, did Turkey not apply before Greece? The answer to the question lies in the organisational structures of the two countries' foreign ministries in the 1950s, among other socio-cultural factors linking Greece to Europe. Whereas Greece had a more developed and modernised foreign ministry equipped with much better qualified personnel who could take a pro-active stance in foreign policy making, the conditions of the Turkish Foreign Ministry were such that it was limited to follow international events and then to be reactive, often taking its lead from the actions of Greece.35

Economic reasons for Turkey's desire for a closer relationship with the Community were of 'secondary importance', in terms of both timing and value, if compared to the political reasons which were paramount when the application was made in July 1959. As far as has been understood from available sources, and particularly the author's interviews regarding the prevailing conditions during the period of about two months when Turkey decided to apply, economic reasons were consciously or unconsciously manufactured in order to underpin the arguments for application emerging from political reasons; in other words, the existence of economic factors, to which many attribute great significance, were merely created by decision makers well after the decision to apply was implemented.

However, this is certainly not to say that this application did not suit Turkey's prevailing economic conditions, or that it could not be justified by economic and trade figures as well. If the economic policies of the Democrat Party (DP) since 1950 are briefly reiterated here, the appropriateness of Zorlu's decision could be understood in terms of economic conditions. However, this should not be presented as 'the most important reason for the application' in July 1959. Indeed, it was not a secret, that the DP as a political party, favoured a capitalist economic system at the expense of the statist of Kemalist Turkey,36 and made radical changes

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34 The Economist, 7 November 1959, p.547.
35 Interview with Günver.
for the liberalisation of Turkish economic and trade regimes, as soon as they seized power in 1950. On the one hand, one of the first things they did was to put into practice the provisions of the European Payment Union Agreement, which envisaged 60 per cent liberalisation of trade between member states. On the other, they introduced a set of regulations in order to encourage the flow of foreign capital to Turkey.

During the first four years of this liberal economic policy, Turkey enjoyed a general and substantial economic revival. However, there was another dimension to the economic boom and the liberalisation of foreign trade which the DP governments virtually ignored. With the expansion of the economy, unplanned investments and a policy of subsidising agriculture and some sectors of industry, the stock of money increased annually by around 20 per cent. In the long run, this brought about inflationary pressure on the economy. In parallel with domestic pressure, the structure of foreign trade also changed at the expense of Turkey. Unfortunately, Turks had to import agricultural products particularly wheat in 1955. At about the same time, the liberalisation of external trade did not help the situation to recover but aggravated it, due to the increase of imports of industrial and consumer goods which had a negative impact on the balance of payments. It was not only the balance of payments that worsened, but the very fragile balance of the Turkish economy in general also suffered.

At the time, Turkish decision makers hoped that if asked, western countries would come to the aid of Ankara. However, the western countries made it clear that they would not render any economic assistance unless Turkey ‘first put their economic house in order’. According to western lenders, Ankara had first to change its economic policies under the control of international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Payments Union.

Initially, Menderes governments turned a deaf ear to these suggestions, but they were not able to stop the decline of the economy, with a foreign debt over one billion dollars in 1959, for the first time in Turkish history. Therefore, it increasingly became apparent that they had no choice other than ‘to swallow the bitter pill’ of the IMF and the OEEC, forcing Turkey to introduce a new foreign

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38 İlkin-Tekeli, Türkiye ve AT-I, p.122.
41 Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development, p.43.
trade regime and to implement a policy of belt tightening in public spending. In August 1958, the new economic measures, including the devaluation of the Turkish lira by around 140 per cent were taken, and the OEEC countries then agreed to reschedule repayment of $442 million of consolidated debt. In addition, Ankara invited European experts to offer advice on the formulation of a long term development plan, which was expected to restore the internal economy and external confidence. All of the measures must have satisfied western countries, because Turkey subsequently received a package of $359 million in fresh credits, mainly from the United States, Germany and the other OEEC countries, in addition to the consolidation of debts.

Against this background, it is hardly reasonable to attribute Turkey's application in July 1959 only to the country's economic condition and its need for financial help from western states, simply because Turkey's then political and economic ties with western states and such organisations as the OEEC, IMF, GATT and EPU enabled Ankara to establish the necessary framework of economic and financial relations, as long as Turkish governments accepted the terms of the other side. That is, when the Turkish application was presented to the Community, Turkey had already succeeded in obtaining western countries' financial support to recover from a worsening balance of payments.

Therefore, to argue that the idea of finding new credits was behind the application does not match historical reality. It is also a logical paradox to assert that Turkish decision makers automatically saw the EEC in July 1959 as a source of credits by establishing an association agreement simply, since there was neither such an example before them-Greece was the first, but none knew the prospects of a would-be agreement, nor a clear-cut reference in the Treaty of Rome with regard to association agreements in a way that the Community would render financial assistance to those states which would be an associate member of the Community.

Likewise, the assertion that Turkey's fear regarding Greece was based on the grounds that the two countries' exports to the Community consisted of very similar goods requires some examination before reaching a conclusion. It is, however, true that the Six was the biggest trade partner of Turkey and Greece. For such traditional agricultural products of the countries as raisins, tobacco, fruit and vegetables, cotton, fish and olives, the Community created a huge market. In fact, approximately a third of Turkish foreign trade was with the Six. According to the figures of foreign trade in 1959, as total export was $353.8 million, Turkey's export

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43 The Economist, 16 April 1960, p.330.
44 For such assertions see Birand, Ortak Pazar, p.75. See also: The Economist, 7 November 1959.
45 Saraçoğlu also dismiss the possibility of such assertions. See: Saraçoğlu, Anlaşmalar, pp.4, 8.

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to the Community was realised as $139.9 million, i.e., 39.5 per cent of the total export. $157 million out of $470 million total imports of Turkey (33.4 per cent) came from the Community. For that reason, Turkey could not obviously ignore such a market nor could it afford to let Greece or the overseas territories associated with the Community ‘steal a march on them’. However, when the Turkish Government decided to apply, it was not clear whether the association would have a positive impact on the Turkish market stake in the Community. Indeed, neither the foreign ministry nor other governmental agencies had any detailed analysis on the subject of the likely positive consequences of the projected association on Turkey’s trade with the Community in particular, or the economy and balance of payments in general. On the contrary, it is a fact that the General Director, Semih Günver, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Samet Ağaoğlu, for example, initially thought that Turkey's economic conditions could not bear such an agreement as the one which the Greek Government intended to establish, as the author has already indicated. Had economic or trade considerations come first, the preparatory stage of the application should have taken much more time, since it was really difficult to gather detailed information on Turkey’s external trade.

To sum up, when Turkey officially expressed its desire for an association with the Community in July 1959, it was mainly as a result of political considerations. However, nobody denies the fact that it was also an important decision in terms of the economy and Turkey's foreign trade composition with the Community. In addition, Turkey’s position in the Western security system and its NATO membership played an important role in this application. But, during the period of about two months, from 8 June to 31 July, all these factors played just a background role in order to justify Ankara's decision for application. Ironically, the importance of the economy, security and geopolitics would only be understood when Turkish decision makers came to face with the terms of negotiations.

Having presented the application letter to the headquarters of the EEC and the capitals of the Six, Ankara entered a period of anxiety as to the EEC Council's opinion, even though Turkish decision makers anticipated a favourable reply. This was mainly because; Turkey wanted to get an immediate decision in order to catch up with Greece's negotiations with the Community, which were scheduled to start on 10 September. However, Turkey had to wait at least for a while, for the decision of the authorities of the Community, who went as usual on holiday in August. At its session of 11 September 1959, on a proposal of the Commission, the Council of Ministers at last took note of the Turkish request and instructed the

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47 The Economist, 7 November 1959, p.547.
48 Interview with Semih Günver.
Commission to hold exploratory talks with the Turkish Government forthwith.\textsuperscript{49}

The Community’s Initial Reaction and Negotiations

Initially, the Community enthusiastically welcomed the Turkish request for several reasons. Above all, the Turkish application, as in the case of the Greek, signified that the EEC was an important body which was worth joining. Therefore, this gave a sense of confidence to the Community.\textsuperscript{50} This was most important because, at the time, particularly after the breakdown of the negotiations of the free trade area, the Community was psychologically anxious in regard to its image and appeal in the world. In this respect, these applications also changed the balance of a secret competition between the Six under the leadership of France and other states following Britain, in favour of the EEC. Practically, the case of the two countries would create a real laboratory for the Community in order to test how the structure of the Rome Treaty would work, and to demonstrate its actual power to execute its external relations concerning economy and trade. At the same time, the Community must have also felt that it was necessary to reply to these requests favourably, simply due to the fact that both countries were members of western military and political organisations such as NATO and the Council of Europe.\textsuperscript{51} At the time, such an action from the Community was seen as natural in a world divided into two as East and West. For the EEC, both of these countries could not simply be put aside within the atmosphere of the Cold War politics. When it comes to the reasons exclusive only to Turkey, the Community did not want discriminate between Greece and Turkey and therefore felt it necessary to reply to the Turkish request in terms similar to those addressed to the Greek government on 25 July.\textsuperscript{52} In addition to these factors, certain members of the Community had already helped Turkey financially, either through bilateral agreements or through the OEEC and NATO.\textsuperscript{53}

It is apparent that the Commission and the Council considered political reasons when they decided to start negotiations with Turkey for concluding an association agreement. To this end, the first meeting between the delegations of the two sides took place on 28 September 1959 in Brussels.\textsuperscript{54} Whereas the process of negotiation with Greece ended with an agreement in September 1961, the Turkish

\textsuperscript{52}Birand, Ortak Pazar, p.79. ‘The Association with Turkey’, p.160.
\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., p.160. For examples, Italy and Germany extended bilateral credits of $60 and $50 million to Turkey, respectively in 1959. The Economist, 24 January 1959, p.331.
\textsuperscript{54}TCDB, Müflterek Pazar ve Turkiye, p.60.
case took about four years, to the chagrin of those Turkish decision makers who wished to conclude it at once, in parallel with that of Greece.\(^{55}\) There were several reasons for the delay emerging from both sides. Without going into details, it is worth mentioning two major ones in order to give a general idea before evaluating this period. First, as the negotiations were in progress, Turkey experienced one of the worst political and economic periods in its history since the Second World War.\(^{56}\) The growing polarisation and antagonism, particularly between the Menderes government and the opposition party of İnönü led to the coup d'état of the Turkish Military in May 1960. Secondly, although for political reasons, the Community first welcomed Turkey's bid and seemed to ignore economic aspects of the would-be relations, when the negotiations started it became apparent that there was a huge gap between the realities and aspirations held by the both sides.\(^{57}\) Nevertheless, the negotiations started, and on 25 June 1963 the parties at last reached to an agreement, this was signed on 12 September 1963. This agreement which was known as the Ankara Agreement entered into force on 1 December 1964.

To analyse the negotiation process in detail and from all sides, requires more time and space. Until the Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963, ten negotiating sessions between the representatives of Turkey and the Community were held to conclude the agreement. With the meeting which was held in July 1963, the final stage of conversations began, and they were concluded on 25 June 1963, with the initalling of an accord.\(^{58}\)

On 12 September 1963, the final text of the agreement was signed in Ankara.\(^{59}\) With this document, which is called the Ankara Agreement (AA), the legal foundations of Turkey's association with the Community were laid down. It was concluded under the terms of article 238 of the Rome Treaty, as in the case of the Athens Agreement with Greece. According to EC law, the association was less significant than accession as a member of the Community but was more binding than a simple trade agreement.\(^{60}\) Under EC Law, there were two kinds of association, which should be treated separately for analysis. One of them was provided under part IV of the Treaty; for ex-colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific of members of the Community, (who still had strong ties in these areas

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\(^{55}\) Interview with Günver.
\(^{56}\) Ramazani, The Middle East and the European Common Market, pp.77-78.
\(^{57}\) Birand, ‘Turkey and the European Community’ p.53.
\(^{59}\) Saraçoğlu, Anlaşmalar, p.9. TCDB, Müşterek Pazar ve Türkiye, p.60. Çalış, Türkiye-AB İlişkileri, pp.61-96.
\(^{60}\) For the Ankara Agreement see: Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ), (Special Edition), No.C113/2. 24.12.1973

The Younede and the Lome conventions were also based on part IV in particular, and article 238 in general. However, none of these states chose to use the term ‘association’. For the first time, the term association was used in the texts of the Ankara and Athens agreements. Although these did not technically differ from the ACP agreements, their content actually deserved to use this concept. That is why, whilst the primary object of an association, according to the Rome Treaty, was to establish a custom union with associate states, the association formula of article 238 was employed in the cases of the Athens and Ankara agreements as a form of ‘pre-accession’, rather than aiming to create a custom union only.

In addition to the above mentioned-legal foundations, there were many similarities between the Athens and Ankara agreements. However, while the former consisted of more definite provisions in 72 articles with a preamble, the latter was a shorter document with thirty three articles. But, more importantly, the Athens Agreement envisaged the establishment of a customs union with a single transitory period, which would start as soon as it entered into effect. On the other hand, the association period with Turkey was divided into three successive parts. The establishment of a customs union would begin, after the first stage elapsed and if the Council of Association (between Turkey and the Community) decided accordingly. The last, but not the least substantial difference between these Associations was concerned with tariff preferences, which Turkey would enjoy during the first stage of the Ankara Agreement. According to the Agreement, Turkey was granted preferential tariff quotas in the markets of EEC countries for raw tobacco, raisins, dried figs and nuts. These quotas were one of the hottest points of negotiation, which also alarmed the Greek Government. However, the advantages given to Turkey were in essence much smaller than those accorded to Greece. That is because both in the number of products covered, and in scope, traditional Greek agricultural products such as raisins and tobacco were granted unlimited preferential access to the same markets, whilst the quotas for four Turkish products were quantitatively limited.

Legally, the Ankara Agreement (AA) determined general rules as a framework agreement (Accord de Cadre). But, for Turkey, the AA was more than...
that, because it emerged from political desires and choices since Ankara's first decision to apply for it, as we have demonstrated. According to article 2, however, the aim of the AA was stated as being ‘to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the living conditions of Turkish people.’ If we look at only the article we can conclude that the AA was essentially based on economic considerations. In the short term, it is true that it aimed to reduce the disparity between the economy of Turkey and the economies of members of the Community. However, it was an objective that was justified only by political considerations in the long run. Indeed, a closer look at the AA as a whole reveals the fact that the most important feature of the agreement was to envisage Turkey's eventual accession to the Community, but not automatically. Indeed, this point of accession was carefully written down in the AA. In the preamble, it was declared that the support given by the EEC to the efforts of the Turkish people would ‘facilitate the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date’. Article 28 seemed to underpin the objective as follows: ‘As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out the Treaty establishing the Community, the contracting parties shall examine the possibility of accession of Turkey to the Community.’ It was indeed a carefully worded document, because there was nothing in the document that could be interpreted as Turkey's automatic acceptance by the Community as a full member. What was certain in the Treaty was Turkey's eventual customs union with the Community. However, as we will see in the following pages, Turkish decision makers interpreted these words as indicating Turkey's automatic entry into the EEC after the establishment of the customs union.

According to the AA, a customs union would be progressively established, in accordance with the agreement's provisions, in three stages, namely, preparatory, transitional and final. Each stage contained certain rights and obligations which the contracting parties had agreed to fulfil. During the preparatory stage, which was to last at least five years, Turkey would not assume any obligation. What was expected from Turkey was that it would strengthen its economy in order to shoulder the responsibilities which would arise from the implementation of the next stages. The immediate opening by the Community of tariff quotas in favour of Turkish export for certain agricultural products, and financial aid, were also set out in the Protocols annexed to the AA.

The change-over to the second (transitional) stage would be affected in accordance with article 1 of the Provisional Protocol. The Article provided that four years after the entry into force of this agreement, the Council of Association would examine the economic situation of Turkey, ‘it is able to lay down, in the form of an
Additional Protocol, the provisions relating to the conditions, detailed rules and timetables for the implementation of the transitional stage’. In this stage, the Parties were progressively to establish a customs union on the basis of reciprocal and balanced obligations. Therefore, Turkey would gradually abolish its tariff protection vis a vis the Six and enter into the union, with the necessary alignment of economic policies. It was also agreed that this stage was to last not more than twelve years, subject to exceptions as might be made by mutual agreement. However, the exceptions must not impede the final stage of integration.

In summary, the AA was in fact an international agreement that created great expectations, but little action. It was in part a result of compromise, consolidating Turkey's demands and the Community's conditions. When we look at it in general and compare it with the Athens Agreement, it is possible to conclude that the AA was nothing more than a show of good will. As put elsewhere, it was a bare outline of a dream, ‘a rather hybrid structure: nominally an association agreement, but little more than a limited and one sided trade agreement.’ However, this does not suggest that the AA had no power at all to fulfil the obligations and objectives which were set out in the document. That is why, as plainly put by Lasok, the chance of the fulfilment of plans and expectations depends primarily upon the will to succeed. Certainly, Turkey appeared to have that will during the formative years.

The Historical Meaning of Turkey’s Association

It was the above analysed document, which was signed on 12 September 1963 by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun Cemal Erkin and the President of the Council and Foreign Ministers of the Members States. Although it was mainly a contract for future relations between Turkey and the Community, as we have just demonstrated, most Turks, as also pointed out in a leading article in The Times, regarded it more as a symbol of their country's ‘final attachment to Europe, which was always Kemal Atatürk's major objective’. Therefore, its ceremony, which was held in the precincts of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, was of great importance and was attended by a large gathering of leading figures such as İnönü, the Members of the Cabinet, senior diplomats and bureaucrats. Virtually the entire Turkish Press had also shown great interest and devoted many columns to the ceremony and the statements of those people from Turkey and the Community who were present at the gathering.
Feridun Cemal Erkin, who opened the proceedings, made a lengthy speech giving a detailed analysis of how the AA was born. According to him, the agreement opened a new era in Turkey's relations with the Community. But, he went on to say that 'this agreement does not essentially change the relationship, since Turkey never felt itself to be outside the Community; Turkish people spiritually took the side of the community, they share the ideals which make up the foundations of the Rome Treaty; and they always follow the establishment movements of the Community with interest, in order to participate in it when suitable. Nonetheless, he described the AA as 'a turning point in the life of the Turkish people'. To him, it was a result of Turkey's long march towards Europe, which had begun during the time of Süleyman the Magnificent in the Sixteenth century. Turkey's aspiration to become a part of Europe was 'an aim, an ideal which has been constantly pursued and repeatedly proclaimed by Turkish governments for centuries'. Even Atatürk's own conviction, as proved by his revolutions, was that Turkey's future and prosperity entirely depended on the country's full integration with Europe and Western civilisation. In this context, Erkin declared that the AA certainly confirmed Turkey's European vocation.

Premier İnönü declared that Turkey's policy towards the Community was a national policy, not the policy of the existing government only. But he also stressed the last point of Erkin's speech as follows: 'We have now signed an agreement that will bind Turkey to Europe, forever. This is a logical and natural conclusion of our relations with the western world. This Agreement is such a valuable inheritance that future generations would be proud of it.' In a statement to Akşam, another member of the Cabinet, Turhan Feyzioglu, said:

'What is important in our participation in the Common Market, more than its short term benefits, is that with the realisation of this Agreement, Turkey's longstanding efforts to be counted a European country have reached a new victory. Turkey's aspiration to take part in the EEC has been never based on simple and short-sighted trade calculations, since Turkey cannot be indifferent to the integration of Western Europe with which we have been bound through politics, economics and cultural relations. For years, we have followed the old world's movements to come together... [But], particularly our government has paid special interest to Turkey's relations with the Community since 1961 and succeeded in obtaining this Agreement. Turkey's determination in this matter means to confirm...
once again our unity of fate with the western world more than anything else... Turkey has already participated in the OEEC and then the OECD, and is a member of the Council of Europe. One of the founding stones of its foreign policy is the North Atlantic Treaty. Now, with a new knot, Turkey has joined one of the most noteworthy organisations of the twentieth century. Certainly, the decision we have taken is a continuation of the way that was already drawn by the Great Atatürk for the Turkish Republic. By this Agreement, it is registered that the frontiers of Europe end with our Eastern and Southern borders.\footnote{Akşam, 15 September 1963.}

As is apparent from these quotations, nobody paid noticeable interest to the content and prospects of the AA. Even Joseph M. A. H. Luns, the President of the EEC Council and Walter Hallestein, the President of the Commission, who made speeches at the ceremony of the Agreement, preferred to dwell on the symbolic meaning of this Agreement, as the Turks did.\footnote{For the speeches see: Huitième Apercu, pp.133-142.} Both, Hallestein and Luns, pointed out that Turkey was an indispensable part of Europe and this agreement was an obvious result of modern changes realised by Atatürk. But they also stated that Turkey had serious economic problems and this association would provide little help to solve Turkey’s problems. They too warned that the AA should be considered to be only the beginning of a new period for economic development.\footnote{Milliyet, 13 September 1963.} In a press conference, Luns stressed that the AA was a politically important document, and this meant more than its economic content, for both sides. For the Community, it showed the world that the integration speed of the Community had not decreased. On the other hand, for Turkey, this association opened the way to full membership, even though that would be sometime in the future.\footnote{Hürriyet, 14 September 1963.} When asked if Turkey was a European country geographically, he replied that ‘yes, here is Asia. But, political and economic agreements transcend, and even redraw geographical frontiers accordingly.’\footnote{Cumhuriyet, 13 September 1963.} In this sense, Turkey which has been a member of the Atlantic Alliance for years, certainly is a part of Europe.\footnote{Akşam, 12 September 1963.} In fact, Luns’ declaration was nothing more than an oral explanation, which was denied legally, in order to save face in Turkey and to please Turkish decision makers, who needed such declarations.

Political parties, except for the Labour Party of Turkey (LPT) generally agreed with those views expressed by İnönü, Erkin and Feyzioğlu. In a parliamentary debate in January 1963, all of them had already given their support to the existing coalition government for obtaining such an agreement on the condition that members of Parliament should be informed about the stages of
negotiation with the EEC. In fact, the coalition government’s policy towards the EEC was not essentially challenged by other parties. But this should not be surprising because most Turks were accustomed to criticising what was presented as ‘national’. As far as foreign policy issues were concerned, there were at the time no disagreements among those parties which had seats in the Assembly, including the opposition. That was because, the dominant understanding in Turkey, had for years been that foreign policy should be ‘national’ and ‘bipartisan’ policy. In the debate in January 1963, all speakers pointed out that Turkish foreign policy was a national policy which should be supported, since foreign policy involved the country's national/high interests.

In addition to the westernisation/modernisation aspect, one of the main and common points, in the opinion of the leaders of political parties, pressure groups and leading columnists, was the conviction that this association would bring about ‘discipline’, ‘stability’, and ‘the improvement of legal regulations’ in every aspect of life, from economy to democratisation of institutions. Indeed, when we look at the documents as a whole, we can see that everyone interested in the subject knew only too well the positive dimensions of such an agreement, but they were also aware of the likely negative impacts and the short and long term economic burdens of it. But, partly due to the historical meaning of this association for Turkey, and partly due to the above mentioned conviction, they generally seemed to be content with the AA and optimistic for Turkey's association with the Community. As such, it was probably this situation which also affected the conclusion of very few analyses. All analyses, as studied by the author, indicated first the likely negative impacts, at least in the short term, of the association on their subject matters, but they then preferred to speak in favour of it. That is because, according to the analysts, what the association demanded was essential changes which should be made by Turkey eventually, if it wanted to develop economically and create a more democratic country.

**Conclusion**

Towards the end of 1963, there were only two problems facing Turkey: first to form a new government, because the second coalition of İnönü ceased to exist in December 1963; and second to put into practice the AA in order to launch the preparatory stage at once. Fortunately, İnönü once again managed to form a new government in January 1964, and soon took the AA issue to the National Assembly. Constitutionally, the ratification of international treaties is subject to adaptation by the

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87 Dağlı-Aktürk, Hükümetler ve Programları-II, p.69.
Assembly through a law approving the ratification. To this end the government presented a motion of law to the Parliament to discuss it ‘immediately and urgently’, on 14 January. This motion was accepted unanimously and the session of discussions was completed on the same day. All speakers in the Parliament repeated more or less the same things as in 1963 and their speeches revolved by and large around slogans and concepts with which students of Turkey's integration policies with the western world are very familiar, such as ‘a turning point in Turkish history’, ‘the historical moment’, ‘civilisation’, ‘westernisation’, ‘Europeanisation’, ‘the unity of Europe’, ‘Turkey as being European’, ‘Kemalism - the revolutions of Atatürk’, ‘development’, ‘democracy’, ‘the unity of destiny and faith with democratic world’, and so on. Not surprisingly, MPs at the end voted in favour of the draft law, ‘within a festival-like atmosphere among cheers and applause’. Similarly, the Senate also accepted the draft law of the government, on 4 February. Thus, the approval process was concluded, and then the AA was ratified by the Turkish Cabinet in October. But putting it into force only became possible in December 1964 after having been approved by member states of the Community as well.

Despite the fact that all the negotiations between Turkey and the EEC were conducted and the agreement was made in the atmosphere of the Cold War, all parties scarcely made reference to the global confrontation within the context of membership. When they did so, all parties tried to use it as an excuse to force the other side to reach agreement. Of course, none denied its importance, but none made their decision just on the base of the Cold War. In our survey of documents and interviews, I have also scarcely found a direct reference to the Cold War during the time when Turkey decided to apply to the Community in 1959. But as a general external factor, the Cold War helped Turkey to defend its application case before the members of the EEC, because all were a part of the same security system and organisation.

Since then a lot of internal and external factors have changed, but the reasoning, mentality and even discussions over membership have however remained the same as they were forty-five years ago, if we speak on the side of Turkey. That is simply because Turkey's integration with the West is not ‘the result of temporary convenience or opportunism’, as stated elsewhere. It was then, as it is today, a result of long term plans. It was, as it is today, not an easy process for all parties, since the Turks and Europeans had different opinions about each other and they perceived the international environment from different perspectives. The Turkish state wanted to be

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88TBMM, MMTD, Per.1, Vol.XXV, p.87. The AA was approved by the National Assembly with 267 out of 269 votes. There was just one vote against, and one abstaining.
89TBMM, Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi, Per.1, Vol.V, pp.422-423. 100 votes were used in favour of approving in the Senate, with three against and one abstaining.
90Law no. 397 in Resmi Gazette (RG), 12 February 1964, RG No.11631.
91RG, 11 November 1964, RG No.11858.
92RG 27 November 1964, RG No.11867.
a part of the system, mainly because it saw itself as a European state. Indeed, the Turks thought that they deserved this after a long period of Westernisation/Europeanisation. Therefore, for most of the Turks, Turkey’s membership in Western organisations was, as it is today, a matter of identity, a confirmation of the Kemalist world outlook. On the other hand, for the West to accept Turkey as an equal partner was, as it is today, in the last resort a matter of reason, or as pointed out by Kuniholm, a sense of reciprocity.94 After forty-five years, while Turkey has been waiting for membership at the gates of the European Union, all of this seems to remain unchanged, despite the fact that much water has passed under the bridge.

Before concluding the subject, one more point needs to be highlighted: as the EEC has been evolving and changing its nature from an economic organisation to more and more a politically structured union, some people and countries in Europe have also changed their understanding about integration and its membership conditions. Although it seems to be impossible to say that the economic and security sides of integration are no longer a subject of importance for the Community, membership criteria have been becoming increasingly normative. In essence with the rise of, for example, democratic concerns and human rights issues on the agenda. Even more, the issue of security, with all its aspects, has been treated by many, including countries such as France, within societal and ideational contexts. Therefore, the Community cannot escape from identity politics in its relations with the external world. In this respect, the case of Turkey is of special importance. In this article, I have not given a detailed analysis of how the EEC institutions and members reacted to Turkey’s application in terms of identity. It was indeed an interesting subject. However, the Cold War conditions did not only provide a framework valid for security, but also for identity, including the definitions of the West and the Europeans. And this identity definition covered Turkey, as much as Greece, as the Europeans from the perspective of security identity. During the period of the Cold War in general and in the 1950s in particular, the issue of security together with geopolitics had an upper-hand over the issue of societal identity. As the Cold War was fading away with the passage of time, the latter issue became more important within integration. This situation has enormously affected Turkey’s relations with the European Union, but it is indeed another subject that deserves another article from a longer term perspective.95