MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY IN EU'S NEIGHBORHOOD: UNION’S TACTICS REVISITED

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The latest round of enlargement of the European Union has profoundly altered the number, identity and the nature of neighbors that form Union's external frontier. Inevitably, the EU has been confronted with a new set of security challenges - such as violent conflicts, cross-border crimes, economic instabilities, terrorist movements, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnicity and minority problems etc.- in its current neighborhood stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic and from the Aegean to the Mediterranean. Extending the zone of security around the EU's periphery by addressing the above-mentioned problems, and thereby dealing with the security challenges of the 21st century, has become one of the Union's strategic objectives declared by Javier Solana at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003: “Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.”

Moreover, Solana's forward thinking has become the strategy of the day with Article I-56 of the draft Constitutional Treaty of the EU by stipulating that the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighboring states in order to create an area of security and prosperity founded on the values of the Union.

Today, EU's neighborhood is comprised of old neighbors such as Turkey, Western Balkans and many Mediterranean states, as well as the new ones that border the Union after the big-bang enlargement of 2004. Exporting the neighbors security which necessarily involves prosperity and stability rather than importing insecurity from them has always been the motto of the Union. Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyze how the EU

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aims to export security to its current neighborhood, by looking at the existing tactics of the Union and question whether these have reached their limits. To this end, it will identify the military and civilian instruments at the Union's disposal for providing security in and outside Europe; and consider in detail the employment of these instruments in securing the wider European environment. After assessing the EU's role as a security provider in the western Balkans, Turkey, eastern Europe -Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus- and the Mediterranean; this paper will argue that the policies conducted in the cases of Turkey and western Balkans have been successful for exporting security to those regions/countries, since they incorporated enlargement to trigger reform, stability and security; whereas in the case of eastern neighbors and Mediterranean partners, the existing tactics have reached their limits since not only their EU membership has not been a realistic option on the Union's agenda but also the EU has not formulated sound and long-lasting policies towards them. Therefore, it is the contention of this paper that the EU has mainly initiated the project on “European Neighborhood Policy” (ENP) towards the eastern European and the Mediterranean countries because of its failure to export security to these regions. The ENP is tasked with developing a policy that “stabilizes the neighborhood and draws it into a virtual circle of development and democracy without offering the prospect of accession”. This paper will also question the viability of the ENP as a tool for security in Europe.

EU's Role as a Regional Security Provider

During the Cold War, the main threats to European security emanated from the East-West rivalry and nuclear confrontations between the blocs. Accordingly, military security defined by Buzan et.al. as “the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states' perceptions of each other's intentions” played a dominant role in understanding the security dynamics of Europe. This did not exclude the existence of threats such as environmental hazards, terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration, but the military issues overshadowed their very importance and granted them a second-class status. It was with the last

ten years after the end of the Cold War that these problems became articulated as main sources of concern for Europe.

With the end of the Cold War and the arrival of a *modus vivendi* in the Balkans, Europe is no longer experiencing major wars. The newly emerged security status of the post-Cold War Europe is best illustrated in Wæver's words: “Yes, there are conflicts in Europe, but no, they are neither driven by nor have they triggered balance of power behavior, competitive interventions and rivaling alliances among the powers of Europe.” In contrast to the ebbing of the “old” style conflicts and in addition to the particular type of regional conflicts that mainly sprang from ethnic problems, several new elements are added - or their overriding importance is recognized- to the European security agenda: Environmental hazards, organized crime, terrorism, economic instabilities, illegal immigration and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

These challenges are now clearly recognized and reflected in the recently published *European Security Strategy* or the so-called *Solana Paper*. At the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, Javier Solana, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, was entrusted with the task of formulating an overall strategy in security affairs, by defining the threats to European security as well as the tactics for tackling them in shaping the Union as a genuine global actor. According to the new European Security Strategy paper which was endorsed by the European leaders in Brussels on December 12, 2003, the threats that the EU faces in the post-Cold War security environment are “diverse, less visible and less predictable” in nature and can be divided into five categories: Terrorism, proliferation of WMD's, regional conflicts, state failure emanating from bad-governance, corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, lack of accountability and civil conflict as well as organized crime in the shape of “cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons”.

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All these threats are intertwined, in so far as state failure is associated with obvious threats such as organized crime or terrorism; where regional conflicts may lead to state failure, terrorism and can fuel the demand for WMDs.

The means of managing these security challenges at the EU’s disposal are two-fold: Firstly, despite all the doom and gloom over its role as a military power, the EU wields a traditional security instrument which is designed for and capable of undertaking humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. Even though EU’s military functions are very limited due to some technical and institutional problems, it is inconceivable to ignore EU’s military presence which is reflected in its completed and ongoing operations mainly in the Balkans. Secondly, the EU as a civilian or a soft-power can manage security through a long list of means: development co-operation and external assistance, trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments and political dialogue, co-operation with international partners and NGOs, etc.

**EU’s Evolving Military Might: ESDP as a Traditional Security Instrument**

The idea of creating a “military power Europe” can be traced back to the Paris Treaty of May 1952, which established the European Defense Community (EDC). The Pleven Plan of October 1950, calling for “German remilitarization under the aegis of supranational defense community having a common army” as a response to US demands for German rearmament following the Korean War, constituted the basis of the EDC. However, after the rejection of the EDC Treaty by the French Assembly in 1954, owing to French obsessions about supranationality, discussion of military issues became a taboo within the integration process. Nevertheless, US demands for German rearmament and French fears about constraining German military power had to be reconciled; thus, in 1954, Anthony Eden took the
lead in the creation of the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU, which is an intergovernmental actor without any supranational features, remained dormant during the long years of the Cold War owing to the fact that the territorial guarantees of the treaty were made operational only through NATO, and it possessed no integrated military structures. As a result, “transatlanticism became the overarching framework for military issues” during the Cold War and European integration was channeled almost exclusively to the economic sphere.11 None of the worthy attempts in this period to create a defense identity for the EC or shape the Community as a military power12 was successful because of the anticipated negative effects of the emergence of a separate European identity on transatlantic relations and on NATO’s dominant role in military matters.13 Thus, until the end of the Cold War, acting as a civilian power, the EC had the ability to promote European security by economic and political means, rather than by military instruments.

The end of the Cold War however created favorable conditions for forging a new defense identity for the EU. In the words of Sjursen, “although the idea of a European security and defense identity was not invented by the end of the Cold War, it was given a new life with the breakdown of bipolarity in Europe”.14 The emergence of a broader security agenda; that included the issues of economic and political instability, ethnic unrest, border problems, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration, terrorism, environmental hazards, organized crime and trafficking in various issues fostered the establishment of a defense identity for the EU. In this new security architecture, the EU, also well aware of the fact that having military capabilities would increase its international credibility, injected this view into the 1990-1991 Intergovernmental Conferences that produced the Maastricht Treaty.

12. It should be noted here that the concepts of “military power” and “defense identity” should be considered as synonymous; since, the concept of defense refers to the “use or threatened use of organized military force” and defense can only be ensured by the projection of military power. For the definitions see Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 143-144.
13. These attempts can be summarized as follows: 1981 London Report, which included discussions of the political aspects of security, such as arms control, terrorism and armaments within the European Political Cooperation (EPC) that was informally launched in 1970s; Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart in 1983 which led to the inclusion of the economic aspects of security alongside the political ones within the EPC framework; and finally the Single European Act of 1987 that formalized the EPC.
The Maastricht Treaty, under the second pillar, title V and Article J, “proudly proclaimed” the creation of the CFSP, which was to cover all the areas of foreign and security policy. The Treaty also contained the aspiration to include defense on the Union's agenda, with the quoted formulation of the “eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense”. Despite the fact that the EU members did not designate a likely timetable, defense was now within the scope of European integration. In the meantime, the task of elaborating and implementing decisions that had defense implications was given to the WEU, which would be the defense arm of the EU. As a result of the Maastricht provisions, the EU did not become a military power, but the taboo over discussing defense matters was finally broken. Although defense appeared linguistically on the Union's agenda, the EU's progress in the achievement of a “common defense policy” in the post-Cold War era was overshadowed by the institutional primacy of NATO, and by the concept of “European Security and Defense Identity” (ESDI) developing within the Atlantic Alliance as a rival concept to the would-be European Defense Policy in the same period.

The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 marked no significant progress either in forging a military role for the EU, except for some modest improvements. The most important innovation of the new Treaty was the inclusion of so-called Petersberg tasks within the scope of the CFSP. In order to carry out these tasks, the EU would avail itself of the WEU. In other words, the WEU would provide the Union with access to an operational capability, notably for the Petersberg tasks. Nevertheless, Article 17 of the said Treaty reinforced the institutional primacy of NATO in the defense field by

17. At its 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO launched a new project called “ESDI” which involved both NATO and the WEU, and marked the creation of the military instrument underpinning this project - The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The concepts of ESDI and CJTF's were further elaborated at the Berlin ministerial meeting in 1996. According to the Brussels and Berlin arrangements, ESDI within NATO is based on the idea of “separable but not separate capabilities” from the Alliance. In other words, NATO's assets and capabilities would be made available to the WEU - the agent of ESDI - in operations that do not involve the US, on a case by case basis. For details see, Peter Schmidt, “ESDI: Separable but not Separate,” *NATO Review*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Summer 2000), p. 12; Lluís Maria de Puig, “The European Security and Defense Identity within NATO,” *NATO Review*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 6; Paul Cornish, “European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 761-762.
18. At the Petersberg ministerial meeting of 1992 in Germany, members of the WEU tasked the institution with operational missions, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making; which are categorized as Petersberg tasks.
stipulating that “any decisions on defense must respect the obligations of member states, which see their common defense realized in NATO”. Consequently, even though in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the EU had the opportunity to develop its own defense policy and to forge a role for itself as the key military power in Europe, it “missed that opportunity” by the mid-1990s because of the re-emergence of NATO in a way that was unforeseen five years earlier.  

However, by the end of 1998, even before the Amsterdam Treaty was ratified, the possibility of developing a common defense policy reappeared on the European agenda. The removal of British veto on security and defense issues through St. Malo arrangements, the US support for an autonomous European defense policy and the evidence of the impotence of the Europeans in Kosovo “let the genie out of the bottle” and paved the way for ambitious plans such as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The period starting with the Franco-British Summit in St. Malo in December 1998 witnessed the most significant challenge to the EU’s vision as a civilian power. Successive European Councils, various new plans and the military operations that the EU has undertaken has been registering a clear progress towards forging a role for the EU in the military realm.

The bilateral meeting between France and Britain in the northern French port of St. Malo on December 3-4, 1998 was the departure point for the European military adventure. Both Blair and Chirac advocated an autonomous political and military capability for the EU, by agreeing that the “Union must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises”. With the 1999 Cologne Summit, which borrowed much of the language of the St. Malo agreement, the ESDP project begun to take on a life of its own. In Cologne, a detailed framework for the progressive framing of a common defense policy was established, and the EU bestowed upon itself the institutional framework necessary to take political decisions concerning security and defense matters. With the

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21. Political and Security Committee, European Military Committee and European Military Staff were the new institutions that were set out at the Cologne Summit. These innovations were put in place in the six months between October 1999 and March 2000.
recognition that the European defense initiative would remain a paper exercise as long as it is not backed up by necessary military capabilities, the leaders established the “Headline Goal” at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. In the context of the Helsinki Headline Goal, EU leaders have agreed that “cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able by 2003, to deploy within sixty days and to sustain for at least one year military forces up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks”. However, the member states also declared that “this process did not imply the creation of a European Army”, since any emphasis of a separate army from NATO, not only would aggravate the tension between the supporters of looser and deeper integration in Europe, but also would offend the US. At the Feira Summit of June 1999, important decisions have been taken with regard to the ESDP. Firstly, civilian aspects of crisis management were strengthened through pledges to make up to 5000 police officers available for deployment to crisis regions. Secondly, the necessary arrangements for the involvement of non-EU European members of NATO (Turkey, Norway, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) in the EU-led operations were made. Thirdly, the principles on the basis of which consultation and cooperation with NATO should be developed were identified. At the Nice European Council of December 2000, the inclusion problem was analyzed in depth; alongside the issues of the improvement of EU’s operational capabilities, the elaboration of the ESDP’s institutional framework and the planning phase of military operations. Finally, European leaders at the Laeken Summit of December 2001 announced that the European military force was then operational, without making any clarifications about what this actually meant. It was obvious that the declaration of operability, without having solved the issue of the use by the EU of NATO’s military assets, would be no more than a political intention that the EU wanted to move ahead with its defense, as the EU force would

22. For the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions see Bulletin of the European Communities, No.12/1999 (2000), paragraph 28. In the annex of the Presidency Conclusions, it is stated that these forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate air and naval elements (Annex IV).
23. Thus, instead of an “army”, the forces that were mentioned under the concept of the Headline Goal quickly gained the popular name of “Rapid Reaction Force” (RRF).
not have the teeth to launch military operations without logistical backing from the Atlantic Alliance. The Nice decision of the EU leaders in 2000 to have automatic access to NATO assets in order to prevent unnecessary duplication of NATO's military capabilities was to be followed by an EU-NATO agreement, which were reflected in the EU-NATO Declaration of December 16, 2002 and the Berlin-plus agreements of March 17, 2003. As a consequence of these arrangements, which created a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, thereby securing EU access to NATO's assets and capabilities, the EU began its journey of military operations. After completing Operation Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU has currently been in charge of Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina by replacing the NATO's SFOR mission in accordance with the conclusions of NATO's Istanbul Summit.27

Consequently, the ESDP project is well on track and showing signs of progress. The European leaders have even inserted a mutual defense clause -such as the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty- into the failed Constitutional Treaty.28 However, it is too early yet to argue that the EU is a fully-fledged military power, when compared to NATO's or individual member states' military capabilities. The EU's military-power projection capacity is still surrounded by institutional, operational and budgetary limitations. At the institutional level, the ESDP operates through intergovernmental lines, which creates problems of efficiency in an area where quick and effective decision-making procedures are vital. At the operational level, problems of deployability, sustainability and capability are major constraints on the efficacy of the ESDP. In terms of deployability, the Rapid Reaction Force was to be capable of operations up to corps level (50,000-60,000 persons), supported by air and naval elements, deployable within 60 days and sustainable at the operation theatre for at least one year. In response, the member States committed themselves, on a voluntary basis,

27. Alongside these military operations, the EU also conducts civilian missions under the ESDP framework. Currently, the EU has been engaged in civilian operations in Iraq, "Palestinian Territories", Darfur, Aceh, Congo, Kinshasa, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. For a detailed account of the EU's military and civilian operations see <http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=s> and Giovanni Grevi, Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, ESDP Operations, available at: <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf>
to making national contributions that constituted a pool of more than 100,000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels.\textsuperscript{29} However, only 10 percent of the forces committed are currently deployable for combat missions abroad. Moreover, the international standard for sustainability requirement is three years with troop rotation after six months, while the Helsinki agreement is for one year only. Thus, the Union needs to enhance its ability to sustain about 60,000 combat troops for three years.\textsuperscript{30} Apart from these, Europe also lacks “assets for expeditionary warfare including specialized forces trained and equipped for missions in complex terrain” as well as the necessary sea and air-lift capabilities for transportation and logistical support.\textsuperscript{31} Having all these shortfalls in mind, European leaders have set the stage for reforming the operational aspects of ESDP through subsequent projects and new formations; namely the \textit{European Capabilities Action Plan} (ECPA) and \textit{Headline Goal 2010} including the establishment of \textit{EU Battlegroups}.\textsuperscript{32} In terms of budgetary challenges, the creation of an effective force projection capability, combined with a satellite intelligence system ending the traditional dependence on the US military might, requires national military restructuring programs, increase in defense expenditures and the consolidation of defense industries. Since, most EU members face severe budgetary problems, they are unlikely to increase their defense expenditures, excluding UK, France and Portugal.\textsuperscript{33} In response to this problems, the EU has established the \textit{European Defense Agency} (EDA) in 2004 to “encourage members states to spend defense budgets for better military capabilities and stronger defense industries”.\textsuperscript{34} Consequently, the EU is well aware of its military shortfalls and since the establishment of ESDP it has been trying to redress these deficiencies. Time will show whether the EU will be successful in transforming this rhetoric into action. However, unless and until these problems are completely solved, the EU will only be an \textit{evolving military actor}, rather than a \textit{fully-fledged military power}.  

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  \item \textsuperscript{33} Wijk, “The Reform of the ESDP and EU-NATO Cooperation,” p. 75.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} See EDA’s website at <http://www.eda.eu.int/>.
\end{itemize}
EU’s Soft-Power Projection Role: Security Instruments of a Civilian Power

Acting as a civilian power, the EU has a recourse to a wide range of political/diplomatic and economic instruments for managing security in and outside Europe. Among those instruments, enlargement, having both political and economic repercussions, is the most effective one. As described by Wæver, “enlargement is the big calling of the EU which can thereby realize its continental security mission.”

By linking enlargement to a conditionality clause, in other words offering membership to a state or a group of states as a carrot in return for their compliance with the EU’s standards, the Union has the ability to trigger political and economic reforms in those countries that desire membership, thereby reducing any risk of insecurities emanating from those states to the EU. Put bluntly, “extending the Union's norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to successive applicants has made instability and conflict on the Continent decreasing likely.”

The latest round of enlargement comprising the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) can be considered as a test-case for the effectiveness of enlargement in managing European security. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the EU has applied the policy of direct integration towards the CEECs. The benefits of the First Stability Pact known as the Balladur Plan, the allocation of PHARE funds and the implementation of Europe Agreements were all linked to the transformation of these countries in the EU model. Furthermore, the conditionality clause as articulated in the so-called Copenhagen criteria set a series of benchmarks from the opening to the successful completion of accession negotiations.

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38. The Balladur Plan was adopted as a joint action by the Council on 20 December 1993 to encourage countries of Central and Eastern Europe to consolidate their frontiers and settle the problems of national minorities which they may face. In the joint action EU used the aspiration of CEECs to join the EU as leverage to ensure their compliance with EU’s norms and values.
39. The so-called Copenhagen criteria are as follows: the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
Apart from enlargement as a “golden-carrot”, the EU has a variety of instruments at its disposal, some of which are also reflected in the “European Security Strategy” Paper:

Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post-conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government.

The EU has also recourse to a wide-variety of political/diplomatic instruments in providing regional/global security ranging from diplomatic sanctions -such as withdrawing ambassadors, expelling military personnel in third country representations and suspending high-level contacts- to political dialogue at bilateral and/or regional levels; from making peace proposals, sending special envoys, sponsoring peace conferences to administering foreign cities such as Mostar. Although its resources are limited, the EU can also wield a variety of economic instruments in its notion as a security provider; such as concluding, suspending or renouncing trade, cooperation and association agreements; reducing or increasing tariffs and quotas; providing, reducing or suspending aid and loans as well as implementing embargos and boycotts.

It is beyond any doubt that these instruments, whether economic or political in nature, can be used as carrots or sticks, in other words coercively or convincingly to persuade the actors causing instabilities and insecurities, to stop what they are doing or to do what they don't. Therefore, Solana, as the author of the European Security Strategy document, was right to declare that “the European Union is particularly well-equipped to respond to the multi-faceted situations” threatening European security.

40. See Missiroli, “The EU and its Changing Neighborhoods,” p. 21 for portrayal of membership as the golden-carrot.
EU's Management of Security in its Neighborhood

Before analyzing in depth how the EU recourse to the above-mentioned instruments in providing security in its neighborhood and questioning whether the EU’s existing tactics are successful or not, we have to spell out the borderlands of Europe and clarify with whom the EU is dancing with.\textsuperscript{44} On the eastern borders, the accession of Finland in 1995 had given the EU long borders with Russia. The May 2004 enlargement brought another 2400 km. borders with Ukraine and Belarus to which Romanian would-be membership in 2007 will add 450 km.\textsuperscript{45} Given the fact that Bulgaria and Romania will accede to the Union in 2007, the future eastern border of the EU with the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) will be between four neighboring countries (Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) and eight member states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania), running “from the Barents Sea in the North to the Black Sea in the South, stretching over 5000 km.”\textsuperscript{46} South-Eastern borders of the EU have two dimensions: Firstly, after the last round of enlargement EU members now have borders with five Western Balkan countries (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia-FYROM- and Albania). With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania these five neighboring countries will border Italy by sea, Slovenia, Hungary, Greece as well as the new entrants. Secondly, in the South-East, the EU has been a neighbor of Turkey since 1981 after the accession of Greece. However, since Turkey is also an accession country, the EU will border the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) as well as Iran, Iraq and Syria in the foreseeable future. Georgia’s special position as a Black Sea country should also be mentioned since it will also have maritime borders in nature with Bulgaria and Romania. The southern border between the EU and the Mediterranean countries is almost exclusively maritime in nature and is between Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Malta, Cyprus and the ten Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, Palestine, Syria, Sinem Akgül Açıklmeşe

\textsuperscript{44} For an interesting geographical account of the borderlands of Wider Europe see Tour d'Europe in Michael Emerson, The Wider Europe as the European Union's Friendly Monroe Doctrine (Brussels: CEPS Policy Brief No. 27, 2002), pp. 3-13
Jordan, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon) that covers the length of 5500 km. To sum up, today, the EU is located in a new neighborhood stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic and from the Aegean to the Mediterranean, which comprises old neighbors—such as Turkey or some of the Western Balkans as well as Russia—and new ones after the big-bang enlargement of May 2004. In other words, it should be kept in mind that the EU’s neighborhood is not solely the region that is described by the Commission’s Communication of March 11, 2003\textsuperscript{47} which set the stage for the “New Neighborhood Initiative” and by the follow-up documents\textsuperscript{48} from which Western Balkans and Turkey were excluded since they were given another/upgraded political status. It is beyond any doubt that, until accession, these countries will remain in EU’s neighborhood area.

It is clear that none of these neighbors can be regarded as a military threat to the EU territories. However, as stated by Aliboni, “domestic and inter-state conflicts in the adjacent regions” as well as “illegal trafficking of various kinds, organized crime, terrorism and abuse of the environment” are new sources of concern for the Union.\textsuperscript{49} The EU, in its paper charting out a security strategy for the Union in the new millennium, describes those threats that would possibly be emanating from the adjoining states in a very dramatic manner: “Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.”\textsuperscript{50}

Instead of bad news, the EU wants constructive partners on its borders,\textsuperscript{51} and to achieve this, the Union has been applying two different tactics towards its environment from where risks of insecurity would


\textsuperscript{50} A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{51} Heather Grabbe, How the EU Should Help its Neighbors (London: Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, 2004); also available at <www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_eu_neighbors.pdf>
emanate: Firstly, the EU has been trying to manage security by offering its neighbors the so-called “golden-carrot” of membership, where appropriate. Indeed, this policy has created miracles in the case of CEECs. The current targets of this policy are Turkey and the western Balkan countries. Secondly, for providing security in its immediate periphery, the EU has been employing the policy of “stabilization/cooperation/partnership” formula, embracing a mixture of some of the political and economic security instruments at the disposal of the Union. Moreover, the EU has been engaged in civilian operations under the ESDP umbrella diverging from police missions to border assistance ones, in Western Balkans, Iraq, Palestinian territories and Georgia. Apart from these instruments having civilian connotations, the European Union's military presence in Western Balkans is intensively felt. To reiterate Solana's words, the EU is well-equipped to respond to the new security challenges of wider Europe. The question is: Does the EU stand where it wishes to be? To put it differently, what accounts for the gap between the capabilities of the EU and its ambitious goal to resolve rising security concerns in its new neighborhood? Has the old policies of the EU failed for managing security in its new neighborhood, thereby making the formulation of a novel tactic indispensable? The answers to these questions necessitate an approach on case-by-case basis.

**Western Balkans**

The Balkan quagmire has always been a source of concern for the EU. No comprehensive policy towards the region surrounded by ethnic conflicts and failed states was formulated between 1991-95; despite a number of modest, punitive initiatives including the withdrawal of trade preferences and the suspension of cooperation agreements with Former Republic of Yugoslavia. In December 1995, the EU initiated the *Royamount Process for Stability and Good Neighborliness* for the western Balkans, through which the EU had the opportunity to offer financial assistance, unilateral trade preferences and contractual relations in the form of bilateral cooperation agreements. As the Kosovo crisis broke-out, the EU

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52. The Western Balkan countries are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (which is now Serbia and Montenegro).
54. It was a joint initiative involving EU member states, South Eastern European countries -see footnote 46-, regional neighboring countries, USA, Russian Federation, OSCE and Council of Europe.
leaders came to the view that previous attempts were not enough to bring peace and stability to the EU’s own backyard that would only be achieved by an additional prospect of membership to the Union.\textsuperscript{56} As a response to this need, an EU project has been set in motion since 2000, dubbed as the \textit{Stability and Association Process}, which aims to assist five western Balkan countries in meeting membership criteria through enhanced trade liberalization, financial and economic assistance, political dialogue and finally \textit{Stabilization and Association Agreements}.\textsuperscript{57} In other words, Stabilization and Association Process that carries all the characteristics of both types of the EU tactics has granted these countries the status of a “potential future member of the Union”, but in the meantime, western Balkans were to be stabilized through other security means.

Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 “reiterated its determination to fully and effectively support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the established criteria”.\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, the EU made its choice in the western Balkans: Future integration based on strict conditionality. As stated by Solana, “events in the Balkans directly affect Europe's security as a whole….Our approach depends on long-term commitment, political, military, economic and financial.”\textsuperscript{59} Therefore, the EU’s policy towards the western Balkan countries whose “social and economic development are lagging and marred by criminal networks, democratic credentials are unproven and administrative practices are pre-modern”\textsuperscript{60} and who are surrounded by uncertainties of ethnic rivalries, combines the elements of EU's two-fold tactics: Showing the end of the tunnel but in the meantime doing everything to stabilize them. Moreover, the EU’s evolving military might has been tested on the territories of FYROM and Bosnia-Herzegovina for the accomplishment of Petersberg tasks. Consequently, it can be argued that the EU has the will and the necessary instruments to transform its will into action, with regard to its security-provider role in the Balkans. Therefore, at the moment, the EU does not need any novel tactics to apply in

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\textsuperscript{56} Pippan, “The Rocky Road to Europe,” p. 221.
\textsuperscript{57} The Stabilization and Association Agreements were only concluded with FYROM and Croatia in 2001 and they came into force in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
\textsuperscript{58} Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council, June 19-20, 2003, paragraph 40.
\textsuperscript{59} For Solana’s speech see, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, “The Balkans between Stabilization and Membership,” in Batt et.al., \textit{Partners and Neighbors}, pp. 72-73.
\textsuperscript{60} Missiroli, “The EU and its Changing Neighborhoods,” p.25.
\end{flushleft}
the western Balkans; instead the Union has to “wait and see” the accomplishments of its current tactics.

**Turkey**

The policy of conditionality, that is the use of the prospect of membership as a carrot to encourage economic and political reforms that would undoubtedly have security repercussions has in the Turkish case produced pressures and resulted in clear improvements. By the time of accession, as a country committed to fulfilling all the Copenhagen criteria and implementing the Acquis Communautaire effectively, Turkey will have modernized, stabilized and restructured its political, economic and legal systems, exactly in the EU model.

As meeting the political criteria is a precondition for starting accession talks, since October 2001 Turkey has embarked upon a radical process of reforms in the form of harmonization packages to redress its shortcomings vis-à-vis the Copenhagen political criteria. So far, eight harmonization packages have been passed by the Turkish Parliament which have included improving freedom of thought, expression, association and peaceful assembly, eliminating the death penalty, abolishing torture and ill-treatment, allowing for broadcasting and education in mother tongues other than Turkish, increasing civilian control over the military including the National Security Council, reforming the judiciary, establishing minority and cultural rights, and abolishing the State Security Courts. Clearly, in Turkish case, the prospect of opening of the negotiations has served as a leverage to trigger political reforms.

Prospects of EU membership will also mark a sea change in the context of Turkish foreign policy, mostly in its relations with neighboring countries. Although not explicitly stated as a precondition for enlargement, the EU attaches utmost importance to settlement of the outstanding border disputes of its would-be members (even though this did not prevent Cyprus from becoming a member). In this context, it would be logical for Turkey

61. For a detailed account of the harmonization packages, see Political Reforms in Turkey (Ankara: Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2004).
62. Paragraph 4 of the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions on settlement of border disputes of prospective members prior to their membership.
to play a constructive role in resolving its conflicts with nearby states. Thus, Turkey's outstanding problems especially with Greece and with Armenia will have to be settled before accession.\footnote{This part on Turkey has been extracted from Mustafa Aydin and Sinem A. Açıklmaş, “Waiting for December 2004: Turkish Blues for the EU,” *The International Spectator*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (July-September 2004), pp. 121-124.}

In conclusion, it is beyond any doubt that the EU conditionality has registered success for Turkey in its reform process and potentially for the EU by alleviating the dangers of border conflicts. However, the risks of illegal immigration or various types of trafficking crossing the borders between Turkey and the EU still remain since Turkey's eventual membership would give the EU long and unmanageable borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria where threats of all types to European security co-exist. This is a puzzle for the EU to solve with not Turkey, but the problematic ones in the Middle East.

**Euro-Mediterranean Partners**

Until the “European Neighborhood Initiative” was launched in 2003, the EU's Mediterranean policy had two dimensions: the *Barcelona Process* which formulated the contours of the *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*\footnote{At a conference in Barcelona on 28 November 1995, EU and 12 neighboring Mediterranean countries (Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria) initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which seeks to promote security and sustainable development in the region, through the conclusion of Association Agreements, the Mediterranean partners pledged to establish Mediterranean Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2010.} -a typical example of stabilization/partnership/cooperation approach- and the *Middle East Peace Process*. The objectives of this policy as reflected in the Barcelona Declaration and the Common Strategy adopted at the Feira Summit of June 2000 are as follows:

The promotion of economic development, trade, socio-economic reforms, EU financial aid; establishment of a regional dialogue on political, security, economic, social and cultural issues; a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestine conflict based on a two-state model, peaceful solutions to other disputes in Western Sahara and disputes between Israel and Syria; and finally conflict resolution and dialogue with a view to regional rapprochement in all fields.\footnote{Martin Ortega, “A New EU Policy on the Mediterranean,” in Batt et.al., *Partners and Neighbors*, p. 88.}

Despite these ambitious objectives, most observers argue that the EU's Mediterranean policy did not live up to the expectations. First of all, the EU's engagement in the Middle East Peace Process has rather been modest,
limited to nothing more than the personal attempts of Javier Solana or the special peace envoy and the role that the EU plays in the Quartet. This modesty coupled with the enduring crisis in Middle East as well as the internal dynamics and the unrealistic principles of the Barcelona Process, has hampered the success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The internal deficiencies of the Barcelona Process are three-fold: Firstly, Euro-Med partnership is based on the principle of regionalism, in other words dealing with all of the partners simultaneously without attaching any importance to their peculiarities. With this one-size-fits-all policy, the most advanced partners had to wait for progress among their neighbors. To put bluntly, this principle made the leading up to the 2010 Free Trade Area excruciatingly slow. Secondly, determined measures, i.e. opening up agricultural exports to those countries’ productions, were the missing pieces of the Barcelona puzzle. Thirdly, even though the Euro-Med Association Agreements contained the clause that the agreements may be suspended if the partners violate the human rights, the EU has been unable to transform its rhetoric into action. For example, it did not take any measures when the Egyptian authorities imprisoned the sociology professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim who was conducting a MEDA-sponsored human rights project.

In the case of Mediterranean, the EU’s capabilities reached its limitations to provide security within the region. Neither the Barcelona Process, nor the desperate attempts of resolving the ongoing dispute in the Middle East have contributed to the security of the region. It is obvious that the EU needs to change its tactics in managing the security of the Mediterranean, without having recourse to enlargement as its most effective tool for providing security. This was the main intention of the EU to formulate ENP and direct this new tactic to the Mediterranean partners.

67. The EU’s weak record in promoting human rights in Mediterranean is a direct result of its choice of using conditionality coercively, through negative means. In other words, if the EU used conditionality positively and made the conclusion of Association Agreements dependent on progress in human rights; it would have been more successful.
68. Sarto and Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP,” p. 22.
The EU’s eastern periphery surrounded by Ukraine, Russian Federation, Moldova and Belarus as well as the Southern Caucasus has hardly been a zone of stability. The conflicts in Moldova between Chisinau central authorities and the separatist region of Transnistria, the Chechen War as well as the Transcaucasian disputes in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Osetia are the major ones to be cited. Moreover, the soft-security threats emanating from Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) are no less than the other regions.

The EU has tried to respond to these security threats with the conclusion of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with all of the eastern neighbors throughout the 90s, which had the components of a stabilization/partnership/cooperation approach. PCAs served as instruments for conducting political dialogue, promoting trade and investment, supporting transition and democratic consolidation. However, the EU could not succeed in transforming these countries into the EU model under the PCA framework due to two reasons: Firstly, PCAs did not offer much, such as market access or preferential treatment in trade, in return for transition. Moreover, these agreements offered little indication of progression in mutual relations, let alone the possibility of eventual membership for especially Ukraine and Moldova who covet for it. Apart from these, there was the problem of Russia, who insisted on having bilateral relations with the EU, rather than a regional, “all in one basket” model. Thus, “by 2002, the PCA method was approaching a dead-end.”

The General Affairs Council of 15 September 1997 had decided to impose sanctions on Belarus because of Lukashenko’s authoritarian policies; after which the relations between the EU and Belarus were frozen. Furthermore, all of its eastern neighbors witnessed “deep impoverishment of their societies, de-industrialization and the rise of oligarchic power structures overlapping opaquely with the public sphere”. Moreover, the EU did
almost nothing to engage in neither the Transnistrian crisis of Moldova nor the conflicts in Chechnya and South Caucasus. Therefore, the EU needs a new policy for transforming these countries similar to EU-type where no serious internal conflicts exist, without offering them the “golden-carrot”, at least in the short run. It is true that the EU does not exclude any membership prospect, especially for the countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, however it has neither the will, nor the capability at the moment to offer a clear-cut membership prospect with a definite timetable.

European Neighborhood Policy: Panacea Or “Placebo”\textsuperscript{73} for Security in Wider Europe?

Despite the existence of various patterns of relationships -PCAs and Association Agreements- described above, the EU’s tactics that were not offering membership in the foreseeable were mostly unsuccessful in managing security in the EU’s neighborhood stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. Conversely, its tactics including the prospects of membership have been registering success, mostly in the case of Turkey and in the western Balkans. Security threats emanating from the countries that have concluded association agreements -Croatia and FYROM- are less probable than the ones who can not see the end of the tunnel at the moment. Moreover, one should not assume that the failure of the initiatives that did not include the offer of membership derived from the absence of the “golden-carrot”. Some of those countries aspiring EU membership -such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia- are well aware of the fact that the EU can not grant them the status of a potential candidate at the moment due to its “big-bang enlargement fatigue” as well as their domestic instabilities. By the same token, some countries aspiring EU membership -such as Morocco- know that the EU will never ever enlarge to the South-eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, we should not put the blame on the non-existence of a membership prospect or its inclusion only as a very distant target in those unsuccessful tactics of the EU. The problem is that the EU did not transform its rhetoric of engaging in the security problems of these countries into concrete action. However, it was when the EU got more closer to those


regions with the latest round of enlargement that the Union realized the extent that the existing tactics of PCA’s or Association Agreements or any other policies have reached their limits in exporting security to the Mediterranean region and the eastern neighborhood. It was this reason that forced the EU to revise its tactics if it wanted to manage security on its Eastern borders as well as in the Mediterranean region which produced the “European Neighborhood Policy”. The ENP document confirms that the EU has been surrounded by “the root causes of political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies, conflicts, poverty and social exclusion” in its new neighborhood. Several examples of new sources of concern for the EU are mentioned; such as “poor records of nearly all countries of the Mediterranean, the WNIS and Russia that have a history of autocratic and non-democratic governance in protecting human rights and freedom of the individual”; “the sharp increase in poverty and social exclusion especially in Russia and WNIS”; “conflict and political division in the Mediterranean as well as unrecognized situations such as Transdniestria”.

It was these security challenges that triggered the Union to formulate a comprehensive policy towards its neighborhood. According to the Commission's Communication of 11 March 2003, the so-called “European Neighborhood Policy” (ENP) was devised in order to “avoid new dividing lines in Europe and promote stability, security and development in the new neighborhood”. In other words, the ENP’s ultimate objectives can be interpreted as follows:

- Preventing conflicts in the EU's neighborhood and acts of aggression against the EU itself;
- settling ongoing disputes and conflicts
- establishing close economic and political partnerships based on shared values, prosperity and security;

76. Ibid., p. 4.
- controlling migration and all forms of illegal trafficking into the EU;
- protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad.77

The Commission's proposal of “forming a ring of well-governed friends with whom the Union enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations articulated both in this document and its follow-ups pointed at Southern neighbors - Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya- and Eastern neighbors - Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan78 as the targets of this new policy. Being targets does not mean that those countries are fully-integrated in ENP, which necessitates the acceptance of the target country since it’s a bilateral process in implementation and the very existence of contractual relations with the countries concerned. In this sense, Russia can not be considered as a part of the ENP, since in its claim as a regional power, it prefers to establish bilateral relations. As a means to this end, the EU-Russia strategic partnership was formed in St. Petersburg in May 2003.79 Moreover, the EU does not have contractual relations with Libya and Belarus. When Tripoli accepts to participate in the Barcelona process as well as Minsk in the framework of PCAs, EU would be able to offer them a stake in the ENP.

Against those threats emanating from the target states and/or partners, the EU can have recourse to a long-list of instruments in implementing the ENP ranging from the offer of a stake in the Union's internal market to further integration to promote a free movement including people; from granting perspectives of lawful migration to greater involvement in conflict-prevention and crisis management.80 Prodi describes these benefits as “everything, but institutions”.81 However, most experts argue that all these are nothing more than a slight shift in or the linear development of the EU’s existing PCA or Euro-Med frameworks. So, the ENP can be labeled as “continuity rather than novelty” or “placebo instead of panacea” in six

81. Speech given by Romano Prodi on “A Wider Europe-A Proximity Policy as the key to Stability”, at the sixth ECSA-World Conference in Brussels on December 5-6, 2002; also available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp02_619.htm>
respects: First, some of the promises of the ENP are unrealistic, such as the plea of free movement of people at a time when the Europeans are firmly against the idea. Second, even though the ENP promises to the neighbors everything but institutions, it does not give them what they really want. For some countries, such as Morocco or Tunisia, access to the EU’s agricultural markets would create a valuable economic opportunity. However, the ENP does not tell us anything about these forms of trade concessions. Third, the EU is vague in defining the modalities of the so-called stake in the internal market, which is seen as the most innovative dimension of the ENP. Fourth, “the financial perspective offered for the ENP in the next budgetary cycle is still far from certain”; and if there is no money there will be no concrete action. Fifth, the ENP does not live up to the expectations of some countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and even Armenia who want a prospect of accession that the EU is unwilling to offer. Finally, not all of the neighbors are interested in deeper ties with the EU as offered by the ENP; namely Russia and Belarus. The non-involvement of these countries under the ENP framework will undoubtedly undermine the credibility, coherence and efficiency of the new mechanism.

**Conclusion**

One of the most important functions of the EU for European security has been directly related with its “silent disciplining power on the near abroad”.

It is beyond any doubt that the EU is well-equipped to discipline its neighborhood with its old/new sets of tactics. In Eastern Europe, the EU manages security through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, common strategies formulated towards Ukraine and Russia as well as with recourse to the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership of May 2003. In the Mediterranean, Barcelona Process, common strategy adopted in 2000, “Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East” which was presented by the Irish EU Presidency in early 2004, so as to counterbalance Greater Middle East Initiative of US work hand in hand to provide security.

82. Grabbe, How the EU Should Help its Neighbors, p. 2.
In March 2003, the adoption of the ENP has contributed to this diversity of tactics. As stated by the Commission in its Communication of March 11, 2003, “ENP will not replace the existing contractual relations, PCAs or Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements; instead ENP would supplement and build on existing policies and arrangements”.\(^{85}\) Clearly, but this blurred contours between the existing policies of the EU -such as the Barcelona process or the PCA Framework- and the ENP, in other words the multiplicity of tactics, will cause inertia, thereby leading to insecurity of the EU’s new neighborhood. In order to avoid this, EU has to decouple ENP from the existing tactics, remedy its above-mentioned shortfalls without the offer of the “golden-carrot” and convert all the will about this policy into concrete action following a definite timetable. This will by no means create a ring of well-governed friends surrounding the Union.

\(^{85}\) COM(2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 17.