50 Years of Emigration from Turkey to Germany - A Success Story?
Şule TOKTAŞ

50 Years after the Labour Recruitment Agreement with Germany: The Consequences of Emigration for Turkey
Ahmet İÇDUYGU

Politics, Symbolics and Facts: Migration Policies and Family Migration from Turkey to Germany
Can M. AYBEK

Trends in Student Mobility from Turkey to Germany
Başak Bilecen SÜOĞLU

Integration and/or Transnationalism? The Case of Turkish-German Transnational Space
Deniz SERT

50 Years and Beyond - The ‘Mirror’ of Migration: German Citizens in Turkey
Bianca KAIser

Turkey-EU Migration: The Road Ahead
Philip MARTIN

Book Reviews

Summer 2012
Volume XVII - Number 2
ISSN 1300-8641
The Center for Strategic Research (Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi-SAM) conducts research on Turkish foreign policy, regional studies and international relations, and makes scholarly and scientific assessments of relevant issues. It is a consultative body of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs providing strategic insights, independent data and analysis to decision makers in government. As a nonprofit organization, SAM is chartered by law and has been active since May 1995.

SAM publishes Perceptions, an English language journal on foreign affairs. The content of the journal ranges from security and democracy to conflict resolutions, and international challenges and opportunities. Perceptions is a quarterly journal prepared by a large network of affiliated scholars.

PERCEPTIONS is a refereed journal and is included in the International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), Index Islamicus, PAIS Index and the CSA Index.

To subscribe, write to the Center for Strategic Research, Dr. Sadık Ahmet Cadessi No: 8, Balgat / 06100 Ankara - TURKEY
Phone: (+90 312) 292 40 76 - 292 22 30
Fax: (+90 312) 253 42 03
e-mail: perceptions@mfa.gov.tr
Printed in Ankara by: AFŞAROĞLU MATBAASI

ISSN 1300-8641
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Guest Editor: Şule TOKTAŞ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Introduction: 50 Years of Emigration from Turkey to Germany - A Success Story?</td>
<td>Şule TOKTAŞ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>50 Years after the Labour Recruitment Agreement with Germany: The Consequences of Emigration for Turkey</td>
<td>Ahmet İÇDUYGU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Politics, Symbolics and Facts: Migration Policies and Family Migration from Turkey to Germany</td>
<td>Can M. AYBEK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Trends in Student Mobility from Turkey to Germany</td>
<td>Başak Bilecen SÜOĞLU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Integration and/or Transnationalism? The Case of Turkish-German Transnational Space</td>
<td>Deniz SERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>50 Years and Beyond - The 'Mirror' of Migration: German Citizens in Turkey</td>
<td>Bianca KAISER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Turkey-EU Migration: The Road Ahead</td>
<td>Philip MARTIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>Book Reviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perceptions continues to publish special issues, and this one examines 50 years of migration from Turkey to Germany. The emigration process is a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted one and needs to be studied from different perspectives and through an interdisciplinary approach. As migration from Turkey to Germany has been happening for half a century, it is time to evaluate the past, raise questions about current issues, and think about the future. Turkey’s new foreign policy puts a renewed emphasis on the Turkish population abroad and Turkish migrants in Germany are of major interest in the new policy. The Center for Strategic Research (SAM) will continue to organize academic events on this issue with a particular focus on its relevance for policy making.

This special issue is published in cooperation with the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities. SAM coordinates its activities with related state institutions and it has a growing network of think-tanks and universities. For example, we have published a paper by Mehmet Görmez, President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, in SAM Papers and will continue to publish reports and papers on institutions with a role in the foreign policy-making process in Turkey. Our cooperation with the relatively new institution of the Prime Ministry, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, will continue with specific projects on issues of joint interest. Also Perceptions’s book review editor Şule Toktaş edited this special issue and I would like to thank her for her efforts in bringing this collection together.

The first article in this issue, entitled ‘50 Years after the Labour Recruitment Agreement with Germany: The Consequences of Emigration for Turkey’, is by Ahmet İçduygu. The author provides the facts and figures that outline the process of emigration from Turkey to Germany and demarcates its fundamental aspects. After providing a historical synopsis, he examines the push and pull factors behind the movements of people across borders, the waves of migration over the years, and the change in the content and context of these waves. Additionally, he explores the similarities and differences between migration to Germany and migration to other regions in the world, including Australia, the Middle East, and other areas of Europe. Dr. İçduygu also provides insights regarding the impact of emigration on the Turkish social, economic and
political life, and gives an assessment of labour emigration from Turkey in the last 50 years.

Migration from Turkey to Germany, however, did not consist solely of labour migration and also included movements of people to reunite with families, as well as to study, as the two following articles discuss. In his article, ‘Politics, Symbolics and Facts: Migration Policies and Family Migration from Turkey to Germany’, Can M. Aybek examines family migration with a focus on German immigration policies. He provides demographic figures and substantial data concerning family reunions after the initial wave of guest workers emigrated from Turkey to Germany. Basing his argument on a theory of symbolic politics, he analyzes the political discussions that emerged concerning Germany’s policies regarding family migration from the 1960s to the early 2000s, and concludes that the German policy was underpinned by anti-immigration sentiment. Although the last decade has witnessed a partial reversal, this process has been accompanied by measures that limit migration and integration.

As regards student migration from Turkey to Germany, Başak Bilecen-Süoğlu examines the brain drain/brain gain/brain circulation arguments in her article ‘Trends in Student Mobility from Turkey to Germany’. The movement of highly skilled workers across national borders is a pressing subject in migration studies and development studies. In this article, the author examines the results obtained from qualitative research that was carried out with doctorate students in Germany, and reflects on the fact that the experiences of international students are indicative of the opportunities and the infrastructure both in the sending and receiving countries. Dr. Bilecen-Süoğlu argues that decisions by highly skilled immigrants concerning their future are shaped by policies on immigration and education, along with visa and labour market regulations.

Deniz Sert, in the article ‘Integration and/or Transnationalism? The Case of Turkish-German Transnational Space’, carries the discussion to transnational spaces, another crucial aspect of immigration in a globalized world. By using empirical research conducted using semi-structured and life-course qualitative interviews with Turkish-German immigrants and their significant others, the study reveals a wide variety of transnational contacts, activities, and orientations. The article shows that cross-border activities and orientations undergirded by transnational practices are frequent in the German-Turkish case. One finding of the research indicates that there is a positive correlation between cross-border activities and orientations, and inter-cultural and integration-related practices. The author, after analyzing these varieties in light of the theory on transnationalism and integration,
concludes that transnationalism and integration are mutually supportive processes and that there is a positive, concurrent and mutually beneficial relationship between them, rather than a mere co-existence.

Taking up the issues of transnational spaces and the globalized nature of international migration, Bianca Kaiser, in ‘50 Years and Beyond - The Mirror of Migration: German Citizens in Turkey’, provides a detailed analysis of the heterogeneity of German migrants to Turkey. Her analysis of the German community living in Turkey, the population of which is estimated to be between 90,000 and 120,000, reveals that there are different categories of immigrants. Appointed personnel members and their families are a form of expatriate migration, and the German spouses of Turkish citizens and the descendants of German spouses of Turkish citizens represent a type of family migration. Additionally, there are German citizens who have migrated to Turkey to retire, and there is education-based migration as well through Erasmus and other exchange programmes. Refugees who fled the Nazi regime in the Second World War and settled in Turkey represent yet another form of migration. Kaiser examines in detail the characteristics of each migrant group, reconfirming the existence of a transnational space between Germany and Turkey.

In the last article of this special issue on migration from Turkey to Germany, Philip Martin draws a comparative analysis of Turkey as a migrant sending and receiving country. The author makes an overall assessment of migration from Turkey to the EU, and reviews the general trends of migration out of and into Turkey while providing insights about guest worker recruitment and integration in Western Europe. Martin also highlights the recent changes in Turkey’s country profile as regards the outward and inward movement of migrants. This article critically analyses the relationship between the economy and labour migration in Turkey, which borders and has close ties with one of the most developed regions in the world, and draws a comparison with the situation in Mexico, which, due to its proximity to the USA, offers fertile ground for such a comparative approach.

*Perceptions* is the flagship publication of SAM. In addition to *Perceptions*, SAM publishes SAM Papers and Vision Papers. SAM has also redesigned its web page and you may follow SAM activities and publications at http://www.sam.gov.tr. Soon, we will have new special issues, looking at, among other topics, the foreign policy-making process, Turkish-Armenian relations, and the Balkans. Stay tuned for more.

*Bülent ARAS*
Editor-in-Chief
It has been fifty years since the guest worker agreement was signed between Turkey and Germany on 30 October 1961. In subsequent years, although Turkey has signed similar agreements with such countries as Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Sweden, and Australia, in terms of scope and volume, emigration to Germany has been the hallmark of contemporary Turkish immigration in contemporary Europe, and it has constituted the backbone of the ‘Euro-Turk’ phenomenon. The first group of workers needed by Germany for the reconstruction efforts following World War II landed in Munich from a train which departed from the Sirkeci station in Istanbul. Since then, several other waves have followed. The guestworker agreement allowed for temporary migration, which included work permits valid for one year; however, as migration theory tells us, temporary migration can easily be transformed into permanent settlement, which is what happened in the Turko-German case. Today, as a result of the waves of migration which have encompassed a wide range of types, from labour migration and family re-unions to refugee and asylum seeking, immigrants in Germany from Turkey demographically represent a community of over 2.5 million individuals. The influence of these mass influxes expanded to include social, cultural, political and economic life, with diverse and pervasive impacts on the transnational communities of Germany and Turkey, as well as on Euro-Turks themselves.

Several events have been held in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Turkish-German migrant worker agreement, including film festivals, cultural activities, a train voyage from Sirkeci to Munich, concerts, art exhibitions, conferences,
competitions, media appearances, and theatre and dance performances. At the state level, official delegates from Germany and Turkey also gathered to celebrate this special anniversary as well. All of these events, naturally, reveal a desire to evaluate the past fifty years and to raise the critical question of whether the migration from Turkey to Germany has been a success or a failure.

Today, the second, third, and even fourth generation of immigrants represent a unique profile of immigration which has contributed to the cosmopolitan multiculturalism of Germany.

From an optimistic perspective, this history of migration could be considered to be quite unique and successful. The movement from Turkey to Germany of immigrants included the initial guest workers who migrated under the auspices of the agreement made between Turkey and Germany as well as those that followed with the aim of re-joining families, and this number was expanded upon by influxes of Turkish expatriates, students, refugees and asylum seekers; this large immigrant community came to be known as Euro-Turks. Despite their differences in ethnic background, language, faith, gender, age, or town of origin, the members of this Euro-Turkish community have experienced integration and reception in their host countries to varying degrees. Today, the second, third, and even fourth generation of immigrants represent a unique profile of immigration which has contributed to the cosmopolitan multiculturalism of Germany. As a consequence of these migrations from Turkey to Germany, it is possible to not only talk about the emergence of a transnational society but also to take into consideration the resultant amalgamations of German culture and society. In terms of internationalization, this movement contributed to a series of transformations which are an asset for society in both the host and home countries.

Turkey has gained from emigration primarily in economic terms. The remittances that workers sent to their families in Turkey were a major source of foreign exchange that offset economic deficiencies and trade imbalances, especially in the 1970s when an import substitution economic model was in place. Relatives working in Germany brought to their families in Turkey such gifts as radios, colour TVs, cameras and instant coffee, items which previously had been difficult to obtain. Also, as an effect of migration to Germany, unemployment rates in Turkey remained at tolerable levels. Over time, the amount of remittances decreased as immigrants in Germany started
to become naturalized and as family members in Turkey to whom they were sending remittances began moving to Germany, and consequently investments in Germany increased. Fewer and fewer individuals moved back to Turkey, and the economic processes associated with migration continued.

Germany, just like Turkey, benefitted from this state of affairs. The reconstruction of Germany in the post-WW II era owed much to the contributions of guest workers who came not only from Turkey but from other countries as well. Most of the migrants from Turkey worked in the automotive, construction, and technical industry sectors, but over time worker distribution diversified to include such sectors as tourism and services. In the process of the transformation of ‘Gastarbeiter’ (guest worker) to ‘Euro-Turk’, Germany became one of the largest, most competitive and dynamic economies in the world and has come to hold a place at the top of the list of most developed countries. It was through the contribution of the labour of migrants from Turkey that Germany was able to achieve this status. In terms of the immigrant society itself, it could also be possible to invoke a success story in light of the fact that some immigrants from Turkey settled in Germany, acquired dual citizenship (if they didn’t become German citizens altogether), learned German, integrated into the host society, and achieved higher standards of living. Additionally, some migrants settled and became entrepreneurs who moved up the social ladder. In literature, cinema, the arts, politics, and sports, there has been an increasing presence of Germans of Turkish descent and Turkish nationals living in Germany. In fact, discussions have emerged in literary circles about whether writers who migrated from Turkey, but write in German and live in Germany and write on the issue of immigration in Germany and Turkish society, should be considered to be in the domain of Turkish or German literature.

The reconstruction of Germany in the post-WW II era owed much to the contributions of guest workers who came not only from Turkey but from other countries as well.

From a pessimistic perspective, however, one could also raise questions about the ‘success’ of the story of emigration from Turkey to Germany. First, the integration and naturalization of immigrants in Germany has been slow and limited in scope. In 2010, Turkish citizens represented the largest group of non-nationals living in the EU; it should also be pointed out that approximately 1.5 million Turks living in Germany retained their Turkish citizenship, and by 2011 the number of
immigrants who acquired German citizenship (around 1 million) was not even half of the total community. Additionally, German naturalization laws have become increasingly strict over the years, and, compounding the problem, some members of the Turkish community in Germany have actively resisted full naturalization. In terms of economic success, Turkish immigrants are predominantly in the lower strata of German society and poverty levels are higher among members of the Turkish community. Although there has been greater integration among subsequent generations of immigrants, younger groups have nonetheless experienced difficulty adapting to the host society, an issue which has frequently been taken up in films and novels. Low levels of education, unemployment, drug use, and crime are just a few of the problems Turkish immigrant families face in Germany.

Political unrest among members of the Turkish community in Germany has also materialized alongside the rise of political Islam, Kurdish ethnic revivalism, and Alevi-Sunni sectarian divisions. But these issues are not just one-sided; in Germany, incidents of discrimination, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism have raised questions about societal tolerance. Although immigration from Turkey to Germany has not resulted in mass ethnic conflict at the inter-societal level, there have been occasional bouts of violence, such as the burning of houses occupied by Turks, and this has led to a sense of insecurity for the Turkish community. Turkish migrants to Germany have even encountered discrimination and degradation back in their home country; the label ‘Almancı’ (meaning a Turk from Germany) is just one example of this. It should be noted, however, that the key players in Turkish domestic politics have developed a close relationship with the political communities in Germany, and many civil society associations in Turkey have branches in Germany, or vice versa. A large number of the political parties active in the Turkish political arena have a constituency in Germany which votes in Turkish general elections. What is more, the Turkish community in Germany is able to raise its voice, and it has lobbied for Turkey’s membership in the EU. Yet, despite the societal connections between political life in Germany and Turkey, migrants have often not received their fair share of recognition in terms of their contributions to Turkey’s economic and
political life. Needless to say, tourism is a major source of revenue for the Turkish economy, and each year Germans represent the largest number of tourists visiting Turkey. Yet, the large amount of trade between Germany and Turkey, which to a certain extent is carried out by members of the immigrant community in Germany, has not been properly acknowledged.

Despite the societal connections between political life in Germany and Turkey, migrants have often not received their fair share of recognition in terms of their contributions to Turkey’s economic and political life.

It is my hope that the discussions raised in these articles will contribute to an opening of further dialogue concerning migration and integration in Turkey and Germany, as well as for other countries which have undergone similar processes of labour migration. As a result of fifty years of migratory trans-border exchange between Turkey and Germany, these two countries have been drawn into a relationship that is marked by complex cultural, economic, and political interchanges. As the articles in this special edition of Perceptions suggest, the impacts of migration are far-reaching, and it is only through further dialogue that the ‘success’ of the story told here can unfold. At this point I would like to thank our contributors for their interest and expertise which made this special issue possible, and we are also indebted to the journal’s editorial board for their supporting efforts. Last but not least, all of the articles have been peer reviewed by referees who are experts in their field of specialization. I would like to thank anonymous readers who have contributed to the articles published at this special issue with their valuable comments and feedback.

Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs has prepared this special issue titled ‘50 Years of Migration from Turkey to Germany: Current Perspectives and Historical Backgrounds’ to commemorate this process of emigration from Turkey to Germany. This issue contains studies written by distinguished scholars of migration, and it is a great pleasure for Perceptions to present these articles, all of which deal with the particularities of this migration and examine its fundamental characteristics through an analysis of empirical research and new facts and data. Since the Turkish community in Germany has been analysed extensively via multivariate social-scientific studies, the articles in this special issue were selected on the basis of their contributions to current discussions highlighting contemporary dynamics. However, the state of affairs today cannot be viewed independently of the past; subsequently, all of the articles in this issue provide a historical perspective to ensure relevance and a sense of continuity.
50 Years After the Labour Recruitment Agreement with Germany: The Consequences of Emigration for Turkey

Ahmet İÇDUYGU*

Abstract

Turkey is a country with relatively recent and ongoing experience of labour emigration. Starting with the signing of the bilateral Turkish-West German labour recruitment agreement in October 1961, it has been a country of emigration, a trend that significantly influenced part of its economic, social, and political history. This essay elaborates the last fifty-year history of labour emigration from Turkey, and its consequences for the country in the economic, social and political spheres. It aims to sketch briefly the trends and patterns of emigration flows with reference mainly to the changing nature of these flows over time. More specifically, the essay offers an overview of the main impacts of labour migration for the country. It concludes that neither the positive nor the negative consequences of emigratory flows for the country should be overestimated.

Keywords

Turkey, Germany, emigration, labour migration, labour recruitment agreement, remittances.

Introduction

It has been exactly 50 years since the start of large-scale emigration from Turkey to other parts of the world. Throughout that time many changes have taken place in Turkey, and the country is now quite different from what it was 30 or 40 years ago. There is no doubt that some of these changes have been associated with the dynamics and mechanisms of these emigration flows. Although the country had experienced a series of outflows of people since the late 19th century, these flows were mostly limited to persons with non-Turkish or non-Islamic background. Therefore, Turkish emigration, in its ethnic or national sense, is a relatively new phenomenon. Unlike the British, Germans, Italians, Greeks, Chinese, or Indians, for example, the Turks had no particular history of large-scale

* Ahmet İçduygu is a professor of international relations at the College of Administrative Sciences and Economics and the director of the Migration Research Centre at Koç University, Istanbul. His main research interests include migration and population movements. In addition to his several articles in journals such as International Migration, International Social Science Journal, Global Governance, Middle Eastern Studies, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Population and Environment, Human Rights Quarterly, Citizenship Studies and the Journal of Scientific Studies of Religion, has a co-edited book entitled Land of Diverse Migrations: Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey.
emigration in modern times up until
the signing of the bilateral Turkish-
West German agreement (30 October
1961), which initially permitted Turkish
individuals to enter West Germany
on temporary one- or two-year work
contracts, and was later expanded to
permit the entry of families. In the
half century since, Turkish men and
women have emigrated in hundreds of
thousands. The great majority of these
emigrants went to Western Europe; some
also went to Australia and, later, in larger
numbers to the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), and more recently to
the countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS).1

The evolution of this movement was
impressive. Starting with the outflow of a
few Turkish migrants in late 1961, there
were by 2011, when the population of
Turkey itself was over 73 million, more
than 3.5 million Turkish migrants in
Europe, some 100 thousand Turkish
workers in the MENA region, some 60
thousand settlers in Australia, and over 75
thousand workers in the CIS countries.
There were also more than a quarter
million Turkish migrants in Canada and
the United States. Thus, at any one time
during these years, some six per cent
of the Turkish population was abroad.2
And when we consider that some 40-50
per cent of the early emigrants returned
permanently to Turkey,3 it would appear
that a sizeable minority of the present
Turkish population has had a direct
experience of emigration, and an even
larger proportion has had - through the
emigration of a close relative or friend -
an indirect experience.

There is no doubt that the potential
impact of this movement on Turkey is
more than a function of numbers; it is also
a function of contacts and transnational
ties. From the beginning,
Turkish emigrants have appeared to keep
in touch with family and friends in the
homeland. Many of them have visited
Turkey from time to time on holidays,
to attend weddings, or in response to
the sickness or death of a relative. They
have sent remittances, bought homes
and lands, and made investments. Some
of them have returned for good. At the
very least, it would seem likely that this
combination of massive emigration and
the maintenance of a high level of contact
with those left behind in a transnational
space would serve as an important
stimulus for changing Turkey’s economic
and social life.

There exists a great deal of research
on the various aspects of Turkish
emigration, but relatively little is

A sizeable minority of the
present Turkish population
has had a direct experience of
emigration, and an even larger
proportion has had an indirect
experience.
known about its consequences for the country. This essay provides a broad overview of the literature on some of the consequences of international migration for Turkey. The focus therefore is diverse; highlighting similarities and differences within economic and social spheres, and emphasizing mixed research findings given the fact that what is found for one area is often counterbalanced by an opposite finding in another area. As a way of providing exploratory background, the following section provides a brief history of Turkish migration to Europe since the early 1960s. The second section analyses the main characteristics of the consequences of emigration for the country. The final section outlines what has been learned from the previous studies with regard to the general implications of Turkish emigration for the country.

**Turkish Emigration since 1960s: A Historical Synopsis**

With the exception of the mass outflow of its non-Muslim population since the early 1920s, which was part of the nation-building process in the country, emigration from Turkey remained limited until the early 1960s. Although Turkey began to export labour only after the negotiation of an official agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961, by 1970 it became one of the largest suppliers of workers in various labour importing countries. Preceding the agreement with Germany, the Western European labour market had already started to draw a number of workers from the labour pool in Turkey. However, the size of this frontier movement was small, and it was sporadic and relatively unknown, because workers often migrated illegally, due to the difficulties in obtaining passports, visas, and residence and work permits. Turkey began to export labour only after the negotiation of an official agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961.

Within the context of European migratory regimes of the 1960s, a structurally organised emigration from Turkey was not possible without the negotiation of an official agreement between governments. The post-war reconstruction of Europe was still in process, and the economies of many Western European countries were in need of labour. After the making of the 1961 constitution, the First Five-year Development Plan (1962-1967) in Turkey delineated the ‘export of surplus labour power’ as an ingredient of development policy concerning the prospective flows of remittances and reduction in unemployment. To promote this policy, Turkey first signed a bilateral
labor recruitment agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961. Similar bilateral agreements, specifying the general conditions of recruitment, employment and wages, were signed with other governments. These agreements shaped the initial stages of migratory flows to a great extent, even if they did not have any considerable impact on the later stages of the flows. In other words, starting with the early 1970s, migratory flows from Turkey gained their own dynamics and mechanisms, which were quite independent from the previously structured measures of the bilateral migration agreements.

While Australian immigration policy was based upon the expectation of permanent settlement of immigrants, Turkish emigration policy was guestworker-oriented. The emergence of mass emigration from Turkey in the early 1960s was prompted in large measure by economic factors. The movement of migrant workers over the period of 1961-1975 fluctuated as a consequence of changes in the European migration market. The number of workers going to Europe increased immediately after 1961, and peaked at 66,000 departures in 1964. Then, the recession of 1966-67 caused a rapid decline in these numbers. In 1967, only 9,000 workers were sent by the Turkish Employment Service (TES), while over 900,000 were on the waiting list to go abroad. In the aftermath of the recession, the number of emigrants increased sharply. This was a period of mass emigration; more than 100,000 workers left Turkey annually. In 1974, however, the Western European governments stopped the entry of workers because of economic stagnation. This resulted in a dramatic decline of the number of labour emigrants, making a total of only 17,000 departees. The year 1975 marked the end of large-scale Turkish labour migration to Europe. According to the official records in Turkey, a total of nearly 800,000 workers went to Europe through the TES between 1961 and 1974. Of these workers, 649,000 (81 %) went to Germany, 56,000 (7 %) to France, 37,000 (5 %) to Austria, 25,000 (3 %) to the Netherlands. As noted by Abadan-Unat, during the early phases of migratory movements from Turkey to Europe, female participation was extremely low; but over time it had increased, mainly due to two factors: the voluntary and imposed demands of potential women migrants and the migratory policies of the host countries towards family reunification. For instance, while only nine per cent of the emigrants to Germany were females in 1962, this proportion had increased to more than a quarter of all emigrants in 1974.
From the early 1970s to the early 1980s, a transitional period of emigration occurred in which the direction of Turkish emigration shifted to other labour markets: Australia and the oil exporting countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Considering the migratory flows to Western Europe, one should note that, although the labour movement from Turkey ceased in the early 1970s, migration did not end, but subsequently took such other forms as family reunion, refugee movement, and clandestine labour migration.11

In the late 1960s, the Turkish government, under the pressure of the unemployment problem, quickly went into a search for a new market to sustain the labour exporting process at a time when the doors of Europe were being closed to immigrant workers. Indeed, the Turkish emigration to Australia, as well as that to the Arab countries, started in these circumstances. The timing of the bilateral labour recruitment agreement with Australia in 1967 reflected the efforts of the Turkish emigration strategy of “falling back on another country if one showed signs of saturation and diminished absorption ability.”12 There was, of course, a significant contrast between the migration policies of Turkey and Australia at that time. While Australian immigration policy was based upon the expectation of permanent settlement of immigrants, Turkish emigration policy was guestworker-oriented. The signing of a migration agreement with Australia was a new step undertaken to maintain the continuity of emigration. In the period of 1968-1974, more than 5,000 Turkish workers arrived in Australia. The level of emigration to Australia shifted by around two hundred to five hundred settlers each year after 1975. Overall, there were nearly 12,000 Turkish workers and their dependants who arrived in the country between 1967 and 1975.13 Today, in addition to a few hundred new emigrants arriving each year, there are more than a couple of hundred people from Turkey annually migrating to Australia based on family reunification and marriage migration flows. However, it should be noted that the number of Turkish migrants going to Australia represents only a very small fraction (approximately one per cent) of all emigrants from Turkey.

In the 1980s, Turkey maintained a high level of male labour emigration to Arab countries, mainly to Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iraq.14 Turkey’s search for new receiving countries corresponded with the demand for labour force in these countries. As stated by Appleyard, the dramatic upsurge of oil prices after 1973, and the accompanying increase in the income levels of the oil-exporting Arab states with very small populations, boosted demand for labour.15 The result was a large influx of contract workers from other developing countries. Migration from Turkey to Arab countries
occurred within this broader context. More than 75,000 workers had gone to the oil-exporting countries in the period of 1975-1980. In the 1980, this number reached almost half a million. The total number of migrant workers who had an experience of selling their labour in the Arab countries was over 700,000 from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. However, by the mid-1990s, partly due to the completion of large scale infrastructural big projects in the oil-exporting countries, and partly due to the unfavourable circumstances caused by the Gulf crisis, the number of Turkish workers in Arab countries began to decline. Indeed, it fell by more than 100,000 from a figure of 250,000 in the late 1980s to 140,000 in the early 1990s, and to 100,000 in the early 2000s. Currently, this figure is well below 80,000.

The last phase of Turkish emigration started with the flows of relatively small groups of workers to the CIS countries. As emphasized by Gökdere, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, some of the newly emerging states in the region launched reconstruction programs. The active involvement of various Turkish firms in these programs attracted a crucial level of project-tied and job-specific migration, particularly to the Russian Federation and to the Central Asian republics. The importance of the emigration to the CIS countries was overwhelmingly clear in terms of its impact on the continuity of emigration from Turkey; in a period when a downturn of migratory flows to the labour-receiving Arab countries occurred following the Gulf Crisis, the migratory movement to the CIS countries came to signify a remedy for the emigration pressure in Turkey. The level of Turkish labour migration to these states started to increase steadily: from 8,000 workers in 1992 to over 20,000 in 1993, and later to over 40,000 in 1994. It declined over to 26,000 in 1996. In 2005, there were more than 70,000 Turkish workers employed in the CIS countries. Overall, in the period of 1990-2005 there were over 150,000 workers who left Turkey for the CIS countries.

As already noted, the suspension of organized labour immigration to Western Europe in the mid-1970s did not curtail the overall emigration from Turkey. Not only did new destination areas begin to draw thousands of emigrants from the country, but also Europe remained a long-standing receiving area for an
increasing number of newcomers from Turkey. The number of people in Europe from Turkey increased continuously from 600,000 in 1972 to almost 2,000,000 in the early 1980s and to 2,900,000 in the mid-1990s. In 2010, the total number was over 3,500,000.20

Indeed, during the 1980s and 1990s, migration from Turkey to Western European countries reached unexpected levels. In this period, some 1,800,000 people from Turkey entered Western Europe, almost doubling the Turkish immigrant population of 1980 in the region. Apart from the continuing family reunification flows, many of the immigrants arrived in the receiving countries by way of marrying someone (often from Turkey) who had already lived there: marriage migration became a new form of family reunification. In the last two decades, more than two-fifths of the people moving from Turkey to Europe (nearly 700,000) were those who came with the claim of seeking asylum.21

As noted elsewhere, in the case of the asylum seekers it has been tempting to look for further evidence to determine who is a genuine refugee and who is an economic migrant.22 Indeed, these asylum seekers were often viewed with suspicion by the receiving countries, and were often considered as part of a mass attempt by Turks to illegally enter their societies in search of employment and social benefits. However, as realized by many European countries, the outbreak of the ‘Kurdish question’ in Turkey provided an obvious environment in which most asylum claims could be considered genuine and to require quite serious assessment, and consequently, some assistance and protection.23 There were around 400,000 asylum seekers coming from Turkey to Western Europe in the period of 1980-1995. In addition to the rocketing increase in the year of the military coup, 1980, in the late 1980s and early 1990s in particular the increase in the number of asylum seekers was quite sharp: the annual average number of Turkish citizens who were officially registered as asylum seekers in the Western European countries increased from about 15,000 in the early 1980s to nearly 45,000 in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite a considerable decline, the number of asylum seekers from Turkey still stood at high levels, with an annual figure of 25,000 in the late 1990s. However, there was a considerable decline in the early 2000s, giving the annual figure of around 15,000. In 2010, this figure was less than 8,000.24 In addition to the flows of people on asylum and family grounds, there existed a clandestine movement from Turkey in which a migrant might be undocumented in terms of not having a valid passport before leaving the country, having entered the receiving country illegally, or having entered legally on a visitor’s visa and overstayed. Estimation on the volume and conditions of
clandestine migration is difficult and the existing figures should better be viewed with some scepticism.

Many Turkish emigrants who previously settled in various European countries are returning to Turkey, but not all of them permanently.

In the last two decades the vast majority (more than 95%) of Turkish citizens immigrating to Europe arrived in ten countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Among these ten countries, Norway and the United Kingdom were the new immigration countries for the Turkish migrants, mostly for the asylum seekers, while the remaining eight countries were the old ones that had received migrant workers since the early 1960s. Within the first half of this period, the increase in the annual average population flow was huge, rising from an annual figure of 50,000 in the early 1980s to 100,000 in the early 1990s. Despite a relatively steady decline in the last half of this period, Turkey was still producing some 50,000 emigrants in the second half of the 1990s for Europe. In addition to some asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, the majority of these migrants were spouses or future spouses, arriving through family formation migration. There were also people migrating under the conventional family reunification schemes. Those who might be considered as ‘new labour migrants’ and ‘student migrants’ did not constitute a sizeable flow in the recent period. It appeared that the 2000s characterised a new era in which emigration and asylum flows from Turkey to Europe slowed down considerably. These years also represented the period of return migration for many of the early migrants to Europe who migrated in the 1960 and 1970s.

In summary, from the early 1960s to mid-1990s, three main reasons were central to the growing population size of Turkish communities in Europe. First, Turkish workers were staying for longer periods than originally planned, and were bringing in their spouses and children. Second, as experienced since the early 1980s, there was an increasing flow of asylum seekers from Turkey. Third, as more spouses were reunited, the birth rate of the Turkish population rose as large numbers of Turkish children were born in Europe. In fact, there was evidence that, while the actual number of Turkish workers in Europe showed a relatively small increase in the period of 1985-2000, there was a considerable increase in the number of their dependants.

Since the mid-1990s, the volume of emigration from Turkey to Europe
has been declining, while it manifests some rising trends in the cases of other destination areas, such as the Arab and CIS countries. The restrictive immigration policies of the European receiving countries have continued to exist, but in addition to that they have, to a certain extent, led to a lessening of pro-emigration attitudes within certain segments of the society, due to positive economic, social and political developments, mostly as consequences of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership and the start of accession negotiations with the EU. While this happens, what is also observed is the increasing diversification of destination countries for the Turkish emigrants. As noted earlier, besides the flows of sub-contracted labour to the Arab and CIS countries, the already established sporadic migratory movements of thousands of Turkish citizens, which have carried thousands to more than 30 countries around the world, have grown.

Our knowledge of the return migration of Turkish citizens is for the most part very limited due to the lack of data. Since the emigration from Turkey started mainly under the so-called ‘guestworker’ scheme, return migration was an inevitable result of the whole process. Indeed many early migrants stayed abroad to be a ‘guest’, just worked for a limited term of contract work (usually for two to four years), and then returned home. The others stayed. Return migration increased after the oil price shock of 1973, when many West European countries stopped recruiting migrant workers and began to encourage return migration. According to Gitmez, some 190,000 returned between the years 1974 and 1977, and another 200,000 returned between 1978 and 1983. Gitmez also provided some estimates of annual return figures: between 1967 and 1974, there were some 30,000, during 1975 and 1976 this number ranged between 55,000 and 60,000, and from 1976 onwards to the 1980 it is estimated that the annual number of returnees revolved around 15,000 to 20,000. The return movement had, however, gained new momentum in the early 1980s, exceeding 70,000 persons annually. Another study indicates that about 1,000,000 Turkish emigrants returned home in the period of 1960-1990.

Children of migrants who were born in Europe or grew up there also sometimes return to Turkey because they wish to connect with their roots.

Starting with the 1980s, although the patterns of migration and settlement of Turkish immigrants in Western European countries have changed from a temporary stay to unintended settlement, return migration has often been a dynamic element of the whole
migration picture. It seems that in the early 1980s, the ‘Return Acts and Bonuses’ of the host governments encouraged substantial return migration to Turkey. For instance, there were some 310,000 returnees from Germany in the period of 1983-85, and some 10,000 returnees from the Netherlands in the period of 1985-86. However, in the late 1980s, the levels of return migration from Germany declined sharply to 37,000 persons annually and from the Netherlands to 3,000 persons. Figures from Germany and the Netherlands suggest that there has been a steady level of returning migrants over the last ten years. For instance, in the first half of the 1990s, there were annually 40,000 to 45,000 returnees from Germany, and again annually around 2,000 returnees from the Netherlands. The estimated annual number of returnees was around 100,000 in the early 1980s, while it has stabilized at around 40,000-50,000 in recent years. However, the return migration of the 1990s and 2000s is quite different from the return migration of the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, it is mostly a movement of a floating population of emigrants between the host countries and their home country. Many Turkish emigrants who previously settled in various European countries are returning to Turkey, but not all of them permanently. Many of the first generation migrants who migrated in the 1960s and 1970s and later retired have started living six months in Turkey and six months in Europe. They prefer to keep in contact with, for example, the health services and pension systems, and they often do not wish to give up their houses, and try to keep in contact with their relatives, who live both in Turkey and abroad. Meanwhile, children of migrants who were born in Europe or grew up there also sometimes return to Turkey because they wish to connect with their roots.

Economic, Social, and Political Consequences of Emigration for Turkey: A Re-assessment

In examining the consequences of international migration for Turkey, three questions appear to be pivotal: first, what are the main consequences of emigration; second, how do these manifest themselves; and third, by what means were they brought about? These are not easily known. Most research into these consequences has addressed the economic aspects - as could be anticipated from both the unquestioned importance of these conditions and the relative ease with which they can be measured. However, both the results of this research and the conclusions to be drawn from them are extremely variable. For instance, whether economies of the various regions in Turkey are
better, stronger, or more efficient as a consequence of emigration is an issue on which research still offers complicated answers. Research findings on the social consequences of migration for the country display a similar variety.

Some of this variety and inconclusiveness of research results owes its origin to the actors of the migratory movements being considered, the needs and perspectives of individual and family members of migrants, their communities, and the countries of origin and destination, which can hardly be expected always to coincide with one another. Some is occasioned by differences in the theorizing used: “equilibrium” model versus “conflict” model. Theorizing specifically as to the consequences has mostly been in terms of the equilibrium model which, for instance, presupposes that the relief of pressure on the job market involves no loss of production, as it is partially or entirely unemployed workers who leave, or assumes that social harmony is maintained through the emigration of possibly disruptive elements, such as political or religious dissenters. But there has also been theorizing concerning the conflict model; for instance, it is emphasized that emigration includes the loss of labour supply in which substantial amounts of human capital have been invested; or it implies depopulation of the rural areas.

Similar to the cases in other migrant-sending countries, emigration in Turkey has been seen as resulting in a mixture of benefits and costs. Most of these can be related in one way or another to economic or social consequences that migratory flows generate in the country. Accordingly, drawing on evidence from Turkish emigration to Europe, this part of the essay investigates the economic or social consequences of emigration for Turkey.

**Economic Consequences**

There are two basic approaches to the economic consequences of emigration: the “balanced growth” and “asymmetric growth” models. The balanced growth approach assumes a positive impact upon the national balance of trade, an increase in domestic investment, and consequently an accelerated economic growth. For instance, Martin asserts that the notion that exporting labour can reduce economic differences among areas is termed balanced growth, because the transfer of labour helps the emigration area to catch up economically with the immigration area. The main assumptions behind this optimistic model include the relief of pressure on the job market without any loss of production since it is supposedly the case that unemployed workers migrate, and the contribution to the development of the homeland through the returned
migrants’ industrial training and experience acquired abroad. The asymmetric growth model presupposes that emigration from developing countries results in a widening gap between underdevelopment in the sending country and development in the receiving one. Within this pessimistic model it is thought that not only the displacement of labour from underdeveloped to industrialized countries, but also the transfer of human capital from agriculture to industry, contribute to inescapable results of domination relationships between the migrant-receiving core regions and the migrant-sending peripheries. In short, asymmetric studies look at emigration with disfavour, because it allegedly distorts and perhaps slows down the development in the migrants’ areas of origin.33

Much of the incoming money goes directly into the family or local community of the migrant, often to maintain dependants left in Turkey.

Taking these two approaches into consideration, one can directly refer to the pros and cons of the economic consequences of emigration from Turkey. Among the main consequences of labour emigration for sending countries are, firstly, the beneficial effects of incoming workers’ remittances. As noted by Martin, Turkey, as a developing country, faced perennial shortages of foreign funds to pay for imported goods and services and often needed external capital to support development projects.34 From this perspective, workers’ remittances greatly contribute to the country’s economy. Although it is argued that the amount of emigrant remittances Turkey has been receiving is somehow insignificant in comparison with the total saving potential of these migrants, the scale of remittances attributable to labour migration to Europe is large enough, and has been the most important source of foreign exchange earnings.35 Over $US 75 billion has been remitted in Turkey since the early 1960s, giving the average annual figure of $US 1.9 billion.36 Workers’ remittances increased from a modest $US 93,000,000 in 1967 to a peak of $US 1.4 billion in 1974, and then declined to $US 893,000,000 in 1978. Turkey had a more or less consistent level of annual remittance receipts of around $US1.5-2 billion between 1979 and 1988. In this period, almost a quarter of Turkey’s annual total import bill was financed by the remittance receipts. During the late 1980 and early 1990s, the country had annual remittance receipts of about $US 3 billion which increased to $US 3.4 billion in 1995, and then peaked to over $US 5 billion in 1998. In the 1990s, remittances were equivalent to more than one third of the
50 Years After the Labour Recruitment Agreement with Germany

trade deficit. The percentage declined in the late 1990s, but still averaged close to 20% in the early 2000s. Then, it rapidly dropped, for instance, making only 2% of the trade deficit in 2004. While the declining trend of remittances to Turkey since 1999 is very obvious, they have been falling particularly since 2002, but the nature of this recent decline is not so clear, partly due to the rising tendency towards permanent settlement in the host countries, partly because of increasing informal channels of remittances, and partly due to the changing calculations of remittances in the accounting of the national budget.37

Another aspect of the workers’ remittances was the type of investments made by the migrants; money coming from abroad often finds its way into the maintenance of the family left behind or is spent as an investment in equipment, building, car, or possibly as part of the migrant’s attempt to set himself up in a trade or other new enterprise.38 Certainly much of the incoming money goes directly into the family or local community of the migrant, often to maintain dependants left in Turkey. In the many cases, where migrants abroad do not return to their point of origin in Turkey, much of the remitted money is spent on consumables for the new home. It seems that remittances do not help to reduce imbalances between regions in the country, though there clearly are specific improvements made possibly by remittances.39 Indeed, even though the remittances of the workers have played an important role in coping with the perennial foreign-exchange crisis of the Turkish economy40 the contribution of emigration to the investment processes has been rather limited.41 According to Koç and Onan, remittances have a positive impact on household welfare, as shown by the fact that households receiving remittance are found to be better off than non-receiving households.42 Although a considerable amount of the related literature argues that remittances are not mostly spent on “productive investments” that would contribute to long term development, it is possible to claim that improvements in the living conditions of migrants, such as access to better nutrition or allocation of more resources to education, are also forms of productive investments.

The Turkish government often has primarily expected the emigratory flows to contribute to the reduction of unemployment levels, though it is noted that skilled workers should be encouraged to remain at home.

The other economic benefits resulting from emigration include: (a) the lessening of tension arising from unemployment and underemployment; and (b) the acquisition of skills in the
foreign countries by the returning migrants. Indeed, since the very early period of the emigration, the Turkish government often has primarily expected the emigratory flows to contribute to the reduction of unemployment levels, though it is noted that skilled workers should be encouraged to remain at home. For instance, Turkey’s first Five-Year Plan in 1963 reported that “the export of excess, unskilled labour to Western Europe represents one of the possibilities for alleviating unemployment.” It is generally agreed that since the early 1960s, around 10% of the workforce in Turkey has been unemployed and another 15% underemployed. These figures persist over the whole period of the last 45 years. Thus reduction in unemployment and underemployment is of paramount importance. Emigration has obviously helped to reduce unemployment pressures in Turkey, but it is not easy to quantify the effects of emigration on unemployment since both are difficult to measure precisely. On the other hand, several studies point out the potential growth-slowing effects of Turkish emigration because of the emigration of skilled workers.

The second expectation from emigratory flows was that the emigrants would acquire new skills and training from their working experience abroad. It was believed that migration would have a favourable impact on the migrants’ local community in the form of new investments, transfer of technology and machinery, and new enterprises when the emigrants returned. Therefore, another way to identify the likely impact of international migration is to look at the process of return migration. Based on a very rough estimate, one can assume that more than 1,500,000 Turkish workers and their family members have returned home since the beginning of migratory flows in 1961. One of the most obvious implications of the return migration is for the Turkish labour market. Some of the return migrants may directly become employment-seekers, but since they return with skills and work experience for which the labour market in Turkey has limited demand, the overall outcome of this process for Turkey has been frustrating on two counts. For the state, there has been the realization that skills acquired abroad have often failed to make an impact on Turkey’s need for human resources. For the individual, the same mismatch engenders personal disillusionment.

If emigrants from Turkey, who returned in the 1970s, were young male migrants who had been alone abroad, motivated to return by their expired work contacts, the migrants who returned during the 1980s and early 1990s were more likely to be aging workers and their families pushed to return by mostly socio-psychological reasons such as long established homesickness. Therefore,
in the period of the former group, although there was a question of how to incorporate them into the workforce in the country again, in the case of latter group the main question was their permanent investments in Turkey. What is often observed is that return workers of various periods often do not return to the sending area or do return but use remittances non-productively; there is a widespread assumption in the literature that most returned Turkish workers buy a taxi or delivery truck, build rental housing, or set up a small business and become part of the service economy; and that such service sector investments have few employment multipliers. It is hard to determine where exactly the migrants settle after they return, but it is generally agreed that they often prefer urban centres rather than their rural homes, many preferring to settle in the metropolitan areas.⁴⁶ One hypothesis is that this process contributes to rural-urban imbalances and regional disparities. The other side of the same process is the direction of workers’ investments: funds transferred by the migrants are often invested in urban areas that are already developed to a certain extent.

The Turkish officials in the 1970s tried to channel remittance savings into employment-generating activities in order to maximize economic growth. Actually, there were three unique development programs linked to emigration.⁴⁷ First, in order to channel the funds to the less developed areas rather than developed ones, starting from the early period of emigration, the Turkish authorities supported the establishment of workers’ joint stock companies that would invest in the less developed regions of the country. It was believed that investments of these companies would provide job opportunities to returning migrants, and at the same time they would serve as a device for the economical use of their savings. This was regarded as an efficient way of industrializing the regions of origin. More than 600 workers’ companies have thus been created, with varying capital and numbers of shareholders. Although the workers’ companies aim at achieving a certain social goal by developing the backward regions in general, they are unable to get away from the economic considerations that matter considerably as far as the productive operation of the enterprises is concerned. Workers’ companies have run into various problems such as project identification, financial and technical planning and management, and inadequacy of communications.⁴⁸ Hence, their role in fostering the development of less developed regions has been rather minimal.
Another aspect of the official policy of reintegrating the return migrants’ savings into the local economies was to support the creation of Village Development Cooperatives. However, because many of them sought to secure jobs for their members rather than to realize productive investments in the villages through remittances, most of the co-operatives were really used as vehicles to facilitate more migration. A third method for attracting the savings of the migrants was the establishment of the State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank in 1975. The bank advocated mixed enterprises organized by the state and private capital, including workers’ remittances. However, this effort has not been successful either for overall enterprises or for channelling the investment resources into the less developed regions. Here one must note that in the 1960s and 1970s there was no stock exchange market in Turkey, so that stock exchange became an option of investment only after 1980s, when some Turkish migrant workers in Europe started putting in their savings.49

Social and Political Consequences

As noted by Manderson and Inglis, “migration is a process which is frequently seen as having considerable potential for producing social change because of the disruption it produces into the established patterns of social life.”50 In other words, migration can have a powerful effect on social change. Although there are some mixed conclusions drawn from the previous studies on the role played by international migration in fostering or retarding social change in societies of origin, it is generally agreed that emigration from developing to developed countries often results in moving the countries of origin from a more to a less “traditional” plane. From this perspective, migration to Western Europe has indeed become an important source for social change in Turkey. Settlement and employment abroad has exposed large numbers of Turks to modern economic, social, and political processes. Certainly, migrants’ own lives have been deeply influenced by the migratory movements. By the same token, this movement has had precise repercussions on their family members, relatives, friends, and their local communities in Turkey.

The most important changes are related to the changing status of women and the rising value of children.

What has clearly been observed is that Turkish workers often return home with changed attitudes and behaviours; in fact, the label of “Almanca or Almanyali”, which literally implies “Turk from Germany”, as the local non-migrant people call the Turkish migrants, is a product of
these perceived changed attitudes and behaviours. Within the migrants’ more immediate personal-social environment there are changes in generation and gender relationships. Perhaps the most important changes are related to the changing status of women and the rising value of children. Women’s role has changed via emigration in several ways: urbanization, the adoption of a nuclear family pattern, entry into the labour market, and brought about by increasing media exposure changes in life styles and emancipation. Many rural women, in particular, joined their husbands abroad and found jobs there. For thousands of women from Turkey, emigration has been a real cause behind their growing labour force participation. It seems that upon their return to Turkey many migrant women have wanted to settle in urban areas, and they have often tended to acquire more authority within the family. For the men, traditional status symbols based more directly on age, kinship, devoutness or ownership of land were replaced by modern indicators such as income, qualifications and skills, and perhaps knowledge of a Western European language. It is felt that the roles and relationships of parents and children had also changed as a result of migration experience: parents, fathers in particular, have had negative opinions about the changing roles and relationships between parents and children. This may be due to the fact that parents have started to lose their traditional authority over children. In short, the demise of the extended family and traditional familial relationships has been widely observed as emigration sped up these processes.

A notable aspect of migration-induced social change is the attainment of upward social mobility by the migrants in their home society.

Emigration also contributed to the improvement of the migrants’ quality of life. This improvement was based on greater wealth, as well as on living in more modern environments which enabled the migrants to acquire greater knowledge about the world and provide advanced education for children. It is within this context that a notable aspect of migration-induced social change is the attainment of upward social mobility by the migrants in their home society. While in Europe, Turkish workers are generally accorded a very low social status, their social standing in Turkey improves markedly. The signs of their upward social mobility are visible in both rural and urban Turkish society. The literature confirmed that emigration afforded individual migrants and their families upward mobility; returnees were usually among the wealthiest people in their villages of origin, or emigration facilitated return migrants’
relocating in urban areas. Another aspect of the improvement of the migrants’ quality of life, as noted earlier, was that remittances were most often spent on building a modern house, buying land and farm machinery, and purchasing urban apartments, cars and trucks, or electrical appliances. The examples of motor vehicles and appliances suggest that in many ways emigration provided the remittances and perhaps the desire for goods which speeded up changes that would have occurred in any event. Indeed, return migrants in villages with cars and appliances noted frequently that their non-migrant neighbours also made such purchases during the 1970s and 1980s, but the returned migrants were often among the first with new consumer goods and usually had more of them. Abadan-Unat emphasizes the conspicuous consumption of returnees, noting that some displayed electrical appliances as a symbol of their affluence even before their village had received electricity.\textsuperscript{55}

There are some socio-political consequences of emigration; for instance, as emphasized in some studies, returned migrants talked about socio-political changes such as more respect for human rights and democracy.\textsuperscript{56} Having been granted dual citizenship rights, many Turkish citizens could enjoy citizenship rights in their host countries.\textsuperscript{57} Another issue is the changing status of military service for emigrants; although one cannot imagine any attempt to shorten the nearly two-years military duty in Turkey, now as a consequence of emigration there is a programme which permits Turks residing abroad to shorten their compulsory military service by paying a fee in foreign currency.

Emigration from Turkey has also had numerous unintended and unanticipated consequences for the country. These include the emergence of cultural-revivalist tendencies among the Turkish migrants abroad, and problems related to return migration and second-generation returnees.\textsuperscript{58} The cultural-revivalist trends are somehow associated with the growth of religion-based fundamentalism, as well as the troubles with Kurdish nationalism. Once abroad, many Turkish emigrants tend to adopt a discernibly more Islamic orientation, or many Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin reinforce their ethnic allegiance. Alevi emigrant communities originating from Turkey have gone through a similar process of revivalism.\textsuperscript{59} This phenomenon is mainly based on two factors: the defence mechanisms of emigrants in a foreign environment, and the social, political and cultural climates of the host countries which encourage these religious and ethnic revivals. As a consequence of emigration, extreme ethno-politics based on ethnic or religious identity, particularly in the case of complex migratory networks, prepares the ground for radical political actions, such as the movement toward
establishing a Federal Islamic Republic in Turkey or the realization of Kurdish separatist demands.60

Another area of unforeseen social consequences of emigration is the reintegration of return migrants and their families in Turkey. For those who returned in the 1960s and 1970s, the return and integration question was not critical, since they were engaged in temporary labour migration and most anticipated their eventual return to Turkey and acted accordingly. If these early returned migrants were mainly men who had been alone abroad, returning migrants in the 1980s and 1990s were more likely to be families with adolescent children. Fearing that they might not be able to come back to Europe at a later time, many of these returning left a younger member of their family behind in Europe to retain a link with that country. They were in state of ambivalence about deciding on permanent settlement in the host country and resettlement in Turkey. These difficulties in migrants’ decision-making on return migration together with the adjustment difficulties of their children who had already spent their early socialization period abroad, made the reintegration process of these returned migrants a difficult one. In particular, the children of returnees had serious problems in adapting to the very different social and educational environment of Turkey.

Various other social consequences of emigration can be observed in the area of demography. Since the early 1960s emigration from Turkey has almost invariably exceeded immigration; this fact in itself has had a certain impact. The population has grown more slowly than it otherwise would have done. On the other hand, emigration can often be seen as a means of slowing down the rush to the cities in Turkey from the rural areas. But at the same time emigration together with the construction of a modern infrastructure accelerated east-to-west and rural-to-urban migration.

On the whole, whatever its consequences for those in the receiving society, for both migrants and those of their kin and friends who remain in Turkey emigration holds out the possibility of encountering a variety of social-change-producing forces:61 the separation of spouses and of parents and children, the loss of friends, extensive contact with another culture, the absence of reinforcements for one’s prior heritage as well as encounters with constraints on behaviour associated with that heritage, notable increases in wealth and income, more material possessions, the experience of coping with the unfamiliar and of doing so in the absence of prior social support, and the formation of competing social networks and emotional ties. The experience of emigration holds out, in short - especially for the migrant, but also
for those of the migrant’s close network which remains behind - the possibility of simultaneously coming into contact with new ways and losing supports for old ways; of undertaking new roles and abandoning old roles; of acquiring new skills, new interests, and new aspirations. One can only expect the social changes associated with such experiences to be augmented by marked differences between the migrant and those in the receiving area in income, status, culture, race, or religion.

Conclusion

Although the migratory flows from the country have been declining for the last two decades, Turkey is among the world’s leading migrant-sending countries, with about six per cent of its population abroad. While the issues of emigration and its impact on economic and social developments are regaining their importance on the international agendas, the Turkish case provides us with a unique setting mainly due to the three principal reasons: first, Turkey, as a country of both some relatively “old” and some relatively “new” emigration, keeps its significant position in the ongoing regimes of international migration in Europe; second, the country has its own way of dealing with various social and economic consequences of emigration in the last five decades; and third, although Turkey seems to be losing its own official concerns on the emigration-related issues, only recently it has again started becoming very conscious about it, mostly because of its EU affairs.

Today it is very clear that neither emigration itself nor remittances as its by-product are seen by the officials in Turkey as a way to overcome economic difficulties and promote development in various parts of the country, “a reversal of 1960s hopes that emigration would lead to development.” Although the country is still experiencing difficulties in creating jobs for its citizens, the option of emigration does not seem to be a feasible one, as the possibilities of finding new destination areas are not so great. On the other hand, as the country has experienced rising economic development since the early 2000s, it is hoped that new windows of opportunities will be opened, as the expected flows of foreign direct investment and new job creations.

Based on a review of published literature, this essay has addressed some of the economic and social consequences of emigration for the country. Despite the plethora of studies on Turkish international migration, few take a specific focus on the effect of this migratory movement on the country. The challenge is to extract and synthesize into a coherent body of knowledge the generalizable consequences of emigration for the country.
Consequences? As could be anticipated on the basis of modernization theory, findings from many related studies show that emigration results in moving the country from a more to a less “traditional” plane.

Emigration has been one of the most powerful vehicles of social change in Turkey, but a lack of foresight and adequate planning have to a certain extent led to a waste of human and financial resources.

So far, on the economic and social consequences of emigration from Turkey for the country itself, we can be certain only about the conclusions at a high level of generality. We can safely conclude that the consequences of emigration for Turkey fall unequally upon different sectors within the sending population, and upon different persons and families within these sectors. We can be certain that, against various criteria of ethics and value, the consequences of emigration are mixed: neither altogether good nor altogether bad. For instance, if remittances have reduced inequalities of wealth in this region of the country, they have increased them in another region; if emigration has apparently weakened kinship ties here, it has apparently strengthened them there; if economic
development has been advanced in this region, it has been retarded in another one; and so on. Some aspects of this paradoxical picture are attributable to the complex nature of the migratory process - to difficulties of measurement, or to the reliance, because of these difficulties, on proxy measures of possibly doubtful suitability. Some are simply attributable to the fact that so little specific research is done. Some may be attributable to inadequate research designs.

The one thing that can be said with certainty from the research findings, so far, on the consequences of emigration for Turkey is that, as emphasized by Abadan-Unat, emigration has been one of the most powerful vehicles of social change in Turkey, but a lack of foresight and adequate planning have to a certain extent led to a waste of human and financial resources. Official attempts to convert the economic inputs of the emigratory flows into the country’s real economy were not organized enough to obtain sustainable positive impact over time. However, one should not underestimate the ongoing importance, and probably the positive contribution, of emigration for the country; one can only imagine what would have happened to Turkey if remittances had not financed two thirds of the country's trade deficit in the 1990s, what would happen to the unemployment problem in the country if the three million expatriate Turkish citizens were suddenly to return home, or even what would happen to the relationship between the European countries and Turkey, if the bridging role of the Turkish transnational communities there did not exist.
Endnotes


2 İçduygu, “International Migration and Turkey”.


7 In 1964 with Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium, in 1965 with France, and in 1967 with Sweden and Australia. Less comprehensive agreements were signed with the United Kingdom in 1961, with Switzerland in 1971, with Denmark in 1973 and with Norway in 1981. For a detailed elaboration of these agreements, see Erhard Franz, Population Policy in Turkey, Hamburg, Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1994, pp. 5-16.

8 İçduygu, Migrant as a Transitional Category.

9 Ibid.; Akgündüz, Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe-1960-1974.


13 İçduygu, Migrant as a Transitional Category: Turkish Migrants in Melbourne, Australia.

14 The labour movement to the Middle East and North Africa was very much different from the migratory movements to Western European countries. It was always exclusively a temporary movement of male workers. Their duration of stay was determined by the completion period of the work, where these workers were usually employed for a period of two years. The return rate of these workers was very high, because only a small proportion of them could be hired by the same firm for a new project by a new firm, see Ahmet İçduygu and İbrahim Sirkeci, “Changing Dynamics of the Migratory Regime Between Turkey and Arab Countries”, Turkish Journal of Population Studies, Vol. 20 (1998), pp.3-16.
Ahmet İçduygu


17 Ibid.


20 İçduygu, “International Migration and Turkey”.


22 Ahmet İçduygu, “A North-to-South Migration”.

23 Over the last decades, while nearly 700,000 asylum seekers from Turkey arrived in Europe only approximately 17% of them were able to get refugee status, so that almost 600,000 were supposed to be sent back to Turkey. In practice, however, it was most likely that only some portions of those rejected asylum seekers returned to Turkey, while most managed to stay in Europe as irregular migrants.


25 Ibid.


29 İçduygu, “International Migration and Turkey”.


32 Martin, *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Europe*.

34 Martin, *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Europe*.


37 İşçüyngu, “International Migration and Turkey”.


39 Keleş, “The Effects of External Migration on Regional Development in Turkey”.


41 Gökdere, *Yabancı Ülkelere İşgücü Akımı*.


44 Pennix, “A Critical Review of Theory and Practice: The Case of Turkey”.

45 Keleş, “The Effects of External Migration on Regional Development in Turkey”; Martin, *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Europe*; Atalık and Beeley, “What Mass Migration has Meant for Turkey”.


47 Keleş, “The Effects of External Migration on Regional Development in Turkey”; Martin, *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Europe*.

48 As noted by Abadan-Unat, “Turkish Migration to Europe and the Middle East”, almost all of these worker companies failed, leaving only 80 (out of 600) with an employment of 11,000 in the early 1980s.

49 For instance, in recent years, there have been some special offers of selling some shares of the Turkish Airlines to the emigrants in the context of the privatization process of this airline company.


51 Atalık and Beeley, “What Mass Migration Has Meant for Turkey”.


54 Sayarı, “Migration Policies of Sending Countries”, pp.87-97.

55 Abadan-Unat, “Turkish Migration to Europe and the Middle East”.

56 Martin, *The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Europe*.


58 Sayarı, “Migration Policies of Sending Countries”, pp.87-97.


62 As far as the Turkey-originated emigration regimes are concerned, one can distinguish the relatively old emigration flows that mostly occurred in the period of the 1960s and 1970s, from the relatively new emigration movement that emerged since the 1980s. While the former contained mainly labour movement, the latter was mostly based on asylum flows and family reunification. The latter movement also contributed to the formation of emigrant communities in new destinations such as the United Kingdom and Norway.


65 Day and İçduygű, “The Consequences of International Migration for the Status of Women”.

66 Abadan-Unat, “Turkish Migration to Europe and the Middle East”.
Politics, Symbolics and Facts: Migration Policies and Family Migration from Turkey to Germany

Can M. AYBEK*

Abstract

This paper aims to combine an overview of how in the last five decades immigration policies developed in Germany with illustrations of how regulations for family migration changed in the same period. The demographic figures presented indicate that, although many political attempts have been made to restrict family migration from Turkey to Germany, the inflow of spouses and children has continued as a normal part of migration dynamics between both countries. Based on these observations, the main argument of this paper is that the political debate concerning regulating and restricting (family) migration to Germany that took place from the 1960s until the early 2000s contained important elements of symbolic politics that were predominantly used to highlight and preserve the idea that Germany was not an immigration country. After the adoption of the Immigration Act in 2005, this idea was replaced by a perspective that acknowledged the fact of immigration, but at the same time sought to steer and limit migration and facilitate integration processes.

Keywords

Germany, Turkey, migration, Turkish immigrants, immigration policy, policy goals, family, unification, spousal migration.

Introduction1

The immigration of close family members of both legally resident foreigners and German citizens to Germany is regulated by law. Rights concerning family life are not only protected by international human rights conventions, but in the case of Germany are contained in the codified basic rights. According to article 6.1 of the German constitution, the Grundgesetz, marriage and the family enjoy the special protection of the state. This rights-based perspective, however, has been contested by political initiatives taken since the

* Dr. Can M. Aybek is with the German Federal Institute for Population Research, Wiesbaden, Germany. Can Aybek was a research associate at the Universities of Bremen and Siegen and a fellow of the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences. His research interests include integration processes of second/third generation descendants of immigrants in Western Europe and North America. Dr. Aybek is an associate member of IMISCOE (European Network of Excellence of International Migration, Integration & Social Cohesion).
beginning of the labour recruitment in the 1950s, and regulations subsequently introduced to restrict family migration.2

This paper aims to combine an overview of how in the last five decades immigration policies developed in Germany with illustrations of how regulations for family migration changed in the same period. The demographic figures presented indicate that, although many political attempts have been made to restrict family migration from Turkey to Germany, the inflow of spouses and children has continued as a normal part of migration dynamics between both countries. Based on these observations, the main argument of this paper is that the political debate concerning regulating and restricting (family) migration to Germany that took place from the 1960s until the early 2000s contained important elements of symbolic politics that were predominantly used to highlight and preserve the idea that Germany was not an immigration country. After the adoption of the Immigration Act in 2005, this idea was replaced by a perspective that acknowledged the fact of immigration, but at the same time sought to steer and limit migration and facilitate integration processes.

The paper starts off with some remarks on the nature and functions of symbolic politics. These theoretical considerations are followed by the main parts of the paper that outline major developments in German immigration policy-making since the 1960s, with a special focus on the debate concerning how to regulate the immigration of family members of already resident immigrants. The analyses of these political and legal developments are complemented by statistical figures that shed light on how the demographic characteristics of the Turkish immigrant community in Germany changed during this period. In the last part of the paper certain findings are recapitulated and discussed with respect to the question of whether the political debates about (family) migration to Germany contained symbolic elements and, if so, how these can be described.

Defining Symbolic Politics

The concept of ‘symbolic politics’ was introduced to political science literature by Murray J. Edelman as early as the 1960s.3 Edelman was a follower of the interpretative/interactionist school of social sciences.4 His work focuses on the social and psychological processes that drive the behaviour of political actors who want to influence and shape public opinion. Edelman argues that political behaviour entails adopting certain roles and communicating certain ideas through the usage of rhetorical or gestural symbols. A typical example of symbolic politics is the rhetoric developed by Barack Obama and his advisors around the phrase “yes, we can” during the 2008 presidential campaign.
in the U.S. Another prime example, in gestural terms, is the genuflection of the German Chancellor Willy Brandt during his visit to Poland in 1970 in remembrance of the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto during the period of Nazi occupation.

Political actors use symbols in order to condense and simplify certain messages they want to communicate. According to Edelman, most political issues are too complex for the majority of the people, i.e., a full comprehension of the matters would require expert knowledge that an average person does not possess and cannot acquire. From this viewpoint democratic elections constitute rituals during which an intense use of symbolic language is made. Elections at the same time endow political actors with the legitimacy needed for their subsequent actions. Symbolic elements in politics are hence a part of the struggle for political power.

For Edelman there is a dualism in political life that consists of a theater-like stage on which political actors perform their symbolic acts and a backstage where the ‘real’ bargaining processes take place. Other authors contend, however, that symbolic politics is not, as Edelman implies, about deceiving the public, but is a natural part of political communication.5

In this paper the latter approach is adopted and a broader definition of symbolic politics will be preferred that refers to the strategic use of a symbolic repertoire in political communication that may fulfill different functions:6

- Symbols may be used in order to attract attention to a specific issue by employing certain metaphors and gestures in political interaction, hence making it worthwhile for media to report about it.

- Symbols can be important in order to reduce complexity by using a certain rhetorical figure to condense and outline the most important features of a topic.

- Symbolic politics is not just about naming a certain issue and thus place them on a political agenda, but it is also about competing with other political actors on how to frame a certain issue and define its content.

- Symbolic politics addresses issues not necessarily on a rational level, but often appeals to emotions.

In the context of migration research the term ‘symbolic politics’ has previously been employed by Thomas Faist in his analyses on developments of the citizenship acquisition regime in Germany.7 He denotes that “symbolic politics can be defined as the shift of a problem from substantive policies to argumentative strategies and symbolic performances” and adds that this type of politics “is not directly concerned with
the problems to be solved, but rather often consists of simplistic arguments and vague allusions to means-end relationships in the proposed policies”.

The aim in this paper is to broaden this perspective from the issue of citizenship acquisition to the political debate in Germany on immigration policy in general and the debate about the immigration of close family members – spouses and children in particular. In the following parts, therefore, the major developments in German policy-making and political debates in the area of immigration will be outlined in chronological succession.

**1960-1989: Dominance of the “No-Immigration-Country” Paradigm**

Labour migration to West Germany began after the mid 1950s when agreements were signed with Mediterranean countries that aimed for the import of workers to Germany. On 30 October 1961 the embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Bonn acknowledged having received the verbal note 505 – 83 SZV/3 – 92 42 issued by the Foreign Office of the German Federal Republic, in which the German side declared its interest in concluding an agreement that would regulate labour recruitment from Turkey. Responsible for coordinating the recruitment programs on the German side were primarily the Ministry of Labour and, in a secondary sense, the Ministry of Trade. Responsible for accomplishing operative duties, i.e., the selection of workers and recruitment processes, was the German Office for Labour that opened up branches in the countries of origin of the workers and cooperated with the national institutions there.

In the 1960s policies concerning accommodating the arriving workers in Germany were inconsistent and even contradictory. Initially, the overall goal was to facilitate foreign labour circulation, and no alternative perspectives existed on how to regulate immigration and integration. From the beginning, German immigration policy was characterized by a strong utilitarian perspective: labour from abroad was expected to contribute to the economy and had to be disposable if necessary.

The recruitment agreement between Turkey and Germany did not contain any regulation of family unification, as the maximum residence of hired workers was limited to two years. The only possibility for couples to immigrate and live together in Germany was when both of the partners were invited personally as potential employees or had both signed a contract with an employer in Germany. In accordance with the idea of labour circulation, knowing German was not a necessary precondition for going to Germany as a ‘guestworker’, but being
physically in good shape and having vocational skills was. Between 1961 and 1973 the share of skilled persons within the recruited workforce from Turkey amounted to 30.9%.

In 1960, the German Ministry of Interior began to work on a draft of an Aliens’ Act, intended to replace the existing regulations, which had been adapted from laws dating back to the Third Reich, the government being eager to present a new and modern legislation. The Act was passed in 1965 in the Bundestag, the lower parliamentary chamber in West Germany. The final version of the law incorporated some liberal notions, but at the same time left ample room for interpretation by the administrative units in charge. As a consequence, the main responsibility for determining the basic conditions for foreign workers, such as issuing work and residence permits, remained on the administrative level.

Soon after the bill was passed, the ministers of interior on the Länder (federal states) came together and agreed upon the standards to be set in several areas, including the issue of family reunification. It became possible for spouses to join their partners in Germany, if this partner had been legally residing in Germany for already three years, his/her employment contract was of long-term nature and he/she could provide for an appropriate accommodation.

The Oil Crisis in 1973 led to a rise in unemployment in Germany and, subsequently, to a halt of all recruitment programs. During the 1970s, the attention of the government actors shifted mainly to the integration related problems of immigration. At the same time, several committees and coordination groups were established with the aim of ‘consolidating’ the number of foreigners in the country, a euphemistic term for avoiding new immigration. Even though the recruitment of new workers had been stopped, from 1973 to 1975, the number of family migrants, i.e., spouses and children, increased considerably and made up 31% of the total immigration in this period.

In 1978, for the first time in West Germany, the position of a Commissioner for the Integration of Foreign Employees and Their Family Members was created. This Commissioner, Hans Kühn, was expected to gather information on immigration and integration related issues and formulate recommendations for the government. Kühn fulfilled this duty, but maybe not quite in the way many had expected; in a memorandum

---

The overall goal was to facilitate foreign labour circulation, and no alternative perspectives existed on how to regulate immigration and integration.
he published in 1979 he invited the decision-makers to say farewell to the idea that foreigners were living temporarily in the country and were going to return to their countries of origin soon. Based on this idea of permanency, he urged the decision-makers to take integration policies more seriously and made several suggestions for improving them, especially in the area of education and vocational training for immigrant youth. His recommendations were on the federal level, however, and were not taken into account, as they had no backing in government circles. Nevertheless, on the state and local levels, immigrant families and children were clearly an issue, therefore authorities on the sub-national level adopted pragmatic approaches and, for instance, introduced educational programs in the mother tongues of immigrant children as well as counselling services in various languages.

Figure 1: In- and Outflow of Turkish Citizens to Germany (1960-2007)

Source: Official data; Federal Statistical Office; illustration: own
The annual entry and exit figures of Turkish citizens to Germany between 1960 and 2007 (cf. figure 1) illustrate the simultaneity of movement in both directions as an important feature of migration dynamics between the two countries. It thereby underscores the fact that for some immigrants and their families immigration to Germany has been a temporary project; for others it turned out to be a permanent one. At the same time the chart illustrates that, after the recruitment program had been stopped, the migration of family members to Germany continued – at least until the end of the 1970s – on a high level. This led, among other things, to changes in the demographic structure of the Turkish immigrant community.

Figure 2: Age and Sex Distribution of Turkish Citizen Population Living in Germany (1973, 1983, 1993, 2003)

Source: Microcensus data (weighted), Federal Statistical Office; illustration: BIB
Looking at the composition of Turkish citizens living in Germany in 1973 along the dimensions of age and sex (cf. figure 2) it becomes clear that the Turkish community consisted then mainly of individuals aged between 25 and 45. Two thirds of the population (66.4 %) was male. At this time the share of children below 15 was 17.7 %, whereas already ten years later, in 1983, this share had risen to 33.7 %. Also, the share of females gradually changed from 33.6 % in 1973, to 41.8 in 1983, 44.9 in 1993 and 46.2 % in 2003. In addition to the in- and outflow statistics, these figures indicate that already in the early 1980s a big part of the Turkish immigrant population had established their family life in Germany. The increased family migration during the 1970s has been seen by some experts as an unintended consequence of the halting of recruitment that had been declared in 1974, as it prevented a re-entry once individuals had returned to their home country. In addition to that, changes in social policy might have triggered an increase, as in 1975 the federal government drastically decreased the benefits for children of immigrants who live in the country of origin in comparison with the benefits received by children resident in Germany.

The political atmosphere from the beginning of the 1980s was clearly not a liberal one, but public life was marked by incidents of latent and open racism. The election of a new government in 1982 led by the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) did not ease the situation for actors who were lobbying for regulations favourable to the resident immigrant population. In November 1981, i.e., already before the conservatives, took over government responsibility, a CDU politician, Heinrich Lummer, had started as Senator of Interior Affairs in West-Berlin to implement limitation of the number of additional immigrants and, among other things, had introduced more restrictive regulations for spousal migration to the state of Berlin. Before a foreigner had the right to bring his/her spouse along – he demanded – this person had to have been legally residing in Germany for at least eight years. If such a person married a foreign citizen, the couple had to wait for one year before the spouse living abroad was able to join. Even though the ‘waiting period’ regulation was not adopted, the other suggestions Lummer had put forward soon were adopted also by other Länder.

In 1983 the new federal government introduced policies that officially pursued the goal of making a return to ‘home’ more attractive to immigrants through creating financial incentives. As illustrated in figure 1, the return program resulted in a clear rise in numbers of Turkish citizens who left Germany. Throughout the 1980s the role of the courts as a corrective power has to
be emphasized as well, as sometimes the government was successfully hindered by the courts from introducing restrictions. Courts even established new rights for immigrants through applying equal treatment criteria.25

Empirical analyses have shown that the return programs affected only the timing of a move, not the intention.

Symbolic politics in this time period was characterized by politicians upholding the rhetoric that Germany is not an immigration country and that therefore policies should be directed towards preventing immigration. The return program initiated in the same period added an additional dimension to the official doctrine that, beyond avoiding new immigration, a further goal was to reduce the number of resident immigrants. In terms of symbolic messages the return incentives may be interpreted from two perspectives: from the perspective of the immigrants the impression might have been created that they were basically obsolete. From the viewpoint of parts of the German population the (false) impression was created that tax money was being spent on immigrants in order to persuade them to return. In fact, only the contributions that migrants themselves had made to the pension fund were paid out, not the employers’ contributions that had been made as part of the wage. Empirical analyses have shown that the return programs affected only the timing of a move, not the intention25 - in other words, those who were planning anyway to return did that earlier than envisaged.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the main political parties, the conservatives as well as the social democrats, preferred to adopt a defensive position instead of developing proactively integration programs to deal with the actual situation. As the figures presented above should have made it clear, the demographic composition of, for instance, the Turkish immigrant community had changed; family migration had taken place which ideally should have made it necessary to develop and implement policies in such areas as housing, education, vocational training and the labour market. Nevertheless, already during this period a political landscape had gradually developed in which different actors, representatives of political associations as well as welfare organizations, churches and NGOs, propagated views that challenged government policy.

1990-1997: The Accumulation of Anomalies and Strategies of Adaptation

Due to the criticism received in connection with public and political
pressures, a new law in 1990 replaced the Aliens Act of 1965. Important civil society representatives had been consulted before the bill was finalized, but all in all the debate and voting in parliament did not attract much attention, as it coincided with the turbulent period of German reunification. The Aliens Act of 1990 aimed to install, in contrast to its predecessor, a legal regime that provided more clarity in migration matters and more security for the immigrant population. A right to naturalization was established, for instance, and the rules for family migration had to be applied throughout the republic in a more standardized manner. The new Aliens Act referred explicitly to the initially mentioned constitutional article 6, putting marriage and family under state protection, but required at the same time “the sponsor [i.e., the spouse who regularly resided in Germany; C.M.A.] to fulfil certain economic conditions to have resided lawfully for eight years in the Federal territory and to be an adult”. The law, however, was still named “Aliens” and not “Immigration Law”, which implicitly made clear the undesirable nature of immigration for German policy-makers.

In the first half of the 1990s, the breakdown of regimes in eastern and south-eastern Europe, and the fundamental social and political changes that followed, led to increased migration from those areas. For historical reasons Germany’s asylum regulations until the end of 1992 had been more generous than the standards formulated on the European level. Due to this, the number of refugees entering Germany sharply increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, evoking not only political debates on the federal level, but also creating serious financial burdens for authorities on both state and local levels.

Within the same period, in addition to refugees and asylum seekers, a second strand of immigration grew in importance: ethnic Germans who had been living in Eastern Europe, partially since the time of Catherine the Great in the 18th century, sought to resettle in Germany. With rising xenophobic attitudes in the regions they inhabited, the practical opportunity to travel, and the possibility of legal immigration, between 1988 and 1993 about 1.6 million of them decided to emigrate to Germany.

German politics reacted to these developments very quickly. In December 1992 the asylum regulations
Migration Policies and Family Migration from Turkey to Germany

were reformulated to conform to the stricter European-level standards. As a constitutional change was required to accomplish this, heavy political debates and bargaining between the ruling conservative government and the Social Democrat opposition took place before a compromise between the parties could be reached. In addition, some of the rights that had been accorded to ethnic Germans upon their arrival were restricted. Their numbers were increasing so abruptly that in 1990 quotas were introduced that “limited [their immigration] to maximum 220,000 per year”. In the meantime parliamentary debates about the moral obligations the German state had with respect to the Jewish Diaspora led to the introduction of a separate quota for the immigration of Jews who had been living in the Former Soviet Republics.

For historical reasons Germany’s asylum regulations until the end of 1992 had been more generous than the standards formulated on the European level.

In the second half of the 1990s again the issue of limiting the number of foreign workers became part of the agenda in political debates. One appropriate way of doing this seemed to be the tightening of obligations concerning family unification. The then Federal Minister of Internal Affairs, Manfred Kanther, introduced at the end of 1996/beginning of 1997 a new rule which stipulated that immigrant children below the age 16 from countries such Turkey, Yugoslavia, Morocco and Tunisia could enter the country only with visas. In order to obtain a visa, in turn, the inviting person in Germany had to provide the German authorities with a tenancy and health agreement as well as payslips.

On the level of symbolic repertoires the political debates in this period were marked by slogans such as ‘the boat is full’, ‘Germany is flooded by refugees’ and other terms implying the country had reached its capacities to accommodate immigrants and that immigrants were a social and economic burden. Analyzing these developments some experts conclude that the heavy politicization of immigration during this period led to inconsistent outcomes: on the one hand, with the aim of preserving the idea of being a “non-immigration” country, limitations were introduced. On the other hand, immigration regimes for specific groups were created. During the 1990s the fear of uncontrolled and unwanted immigration led to a reluctance to open the labour market even to highly skilled immigrants or workers who would serve seasonal economic purposes. In terms of acknowledging immigration realities and developing adequate policies, the period under the conservative rule of Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-1998) was marked
by contradictive developments such as increased international mobility as a result of political and social upheavals, and at the same time resistance on behalf of the ruling political elites and a preference for restrictive solutions.  


In the general elections of 1998 the conservatives lost and a coalition of the Social Democratic Party, SPD, and the Green Party was formed. This red-green coalition under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was eager to reform the outdated legal framework for naturalization, still based on the 1913 imperial citizenship law (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz). Earlier, in 1993, the SPD’s parliamentary group had proposed a bill for such a reform and this issue was again highlighted in the coalition agreement with the Green Party. The proposed law was intended to introduce three substantial novelties: first, a ius soli (naturalization through birthplace) mode of citizenship acquisition; second, full acknowledgment of dual or multiple citizenship; and third, a reduced period of legal residence –from 15 to 8 years – required for immigrants to be eligible for naturalization.

Naturalization was regarded as an important step toward full integration of immigrants into German society.

The issue most contested and criticized by the conservative side in this proposal was the toleration of dual/multiple citizenship. Nevertheless, the political conditions to carry through these reforms at first seemed to be favourable, as the coalition government held a majority in both chambers of the German parliament. However, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party CSU had in the meantime initiated political campaigns against dual citizenship and were successful in the February 1999 elections that took place in the state of Hesse. As a consequence, the coalition government lost its majority in the Bundesrat, the upper chamber, and had to search for compromises. This led to the regulation that a dual/multiple citizenship status through naturalization was only accepted in exceptional situations. The reform of citizenship law nevertheless brought about changes that clearly transmitted the message that Germany welcomed the naturalization of immigrants who had been living in the country for a long time. Naturalization was regarded as an important step toward full integration of immigrants into German society.
Some of the immigrants originating from Turkey who were eligible for the acquisition of the German citizenship since the adoption of the new law applied for and received the German citizenship. As can be seen in the population pyramid (cf. figure 3), Turkish citizens represent meanwhile only a part of this immigrant community. In addition to that, many of the children born to parents of Turkish origin fulfill the requirements for German citizenship based on the *ius soli* regulations mentioned earlier. The above figures from the German microcensus (2010) indicate that in the age groups from 20 to 55 the naturalization rate is around 30%. This obviously has connotations to political circumstances and the perception and strategies of political actors as well, if one keeps in mind that the total population above the age of 20 with German citizenship makes up approx. 560,000 and possesses passive and active voting rights.

A different topic of political controversy in this time period was the
immigration of highly skilled persons to Germany. On the occasion of opening the IT fair CEBIT in 2000, Chancellor Schröder announced that a “Green Card Program” was going to be launched by the government with the aim of attracting specialists from all over the world, and specifically from India, to work in the expanding German IT sector. The Green Card Initiative marked a turning point in terms of moving from a generalized anti-immigration policy in favour of a more differentiated position.

Such a position also better reflected public opinion, as the re-election campaign of the CDU Prime Minister Jürgen Rüttgers in North-Rhine Westphalia made clear. Rüttgers, as a central strategy in his campaign, criticized the federal programs introduced by the red-green government that favoured controlled immigration of highly skilled IT specialists. This counter position was condensed for campaign purposes to the formula “Kinder statt Inder” (Children instead of Indians) implying that it is better to invest in the education of the children living in the country than to import foreign labour. The employers’ associations criticized the CDU for opposing the Green Card Initiative and hence failing to act according to the needs of the economy. The CDU lost the elections in North-Rhine Westphalia, partly due to the positions its representatives had formulated in matters of immigration.

The CDU revised its position soon afterward, but the party’s image in terms of competence in economic matters had been harmed. To correct for this damage, in June 2001 the CDU developed a policy paper that for the first time shifted to a more moderate motto of “Steering and Limiting Immigration”. The joint federal committee of the CDU argued in this paper for a more coherent immigration policy that balances protecting national interests including allowing selective immigration of highly skilled workers for economic purposes, fulfilling humanitarian obligations with regard to refugees and asylum seekers, and integrating immigrants into mainstream German society.

The red-green government, in turn, signalled its wish to further solidify its expertise in the area of immigration when in September 2000 the Minister of Interior, Otto Schily, established an Independent Migration Commission chaired by the former president of the parliament
and CDU politician Rita Süßmuth. The commission members represented a wide range of domains, including politics, employers’ associations, trade unions, religious organizations, NGOs, etc., and had the task of formulating recommendations on new policies. In July 2001 it fulfilled its mission and published a report entitled ‘Facilitating Migration, Fostering Integration’. In this report the commission appealed to all parties to acknowledge that Germany was an immigration country and needed not only for economic but also for demographic reasons a modern immigration framework.

The commission suggested four principal ways to satisfy the need for skilled labour: first, a points system should be installed based on qualifications and other characteristics of immigrants, as is the case in New Zealand and Canada. Long-term residence permits would then be granted to those who met the standards, that is, who had enough points. Second, permits in specific business branches for a period of up to five years could be issued, with the option to transform the temporary status into a long-term permit through applying the criteria of the points system. Third, the commission proposed to offer students from abroad who had completed their studies in Germany the opportunity to remain in the country to start a job career. In addition to these paths for labour immigration, the Süßmuth-Commission also set out suggestions for how to improve legal regulations by, for example, combining the employment and residence permits and reducing them to two main titles – temporary and permanent ones.

The government adopted many of these suggestions in the draft for the new Immigration Act, which was intended to be the first comprehensive law encompassing a variety of issues related to the entrance, residence, work, and integration of foreigners. The Minister of Interior, Otto Schily, had been very careful to establish a broad political support for this bill early on, when he appointed the chair and the members of the commission. Preserving this cautiousness, the government refrained from incorporating a points-based immigration scheme into the bill.

Minister Schily was trying to balance the demands formulated by the junior partner of the government coalition, the Green Party, and the conservative opposition. The CDU/CSU, however, maintained its critical stance toward the proposed law and urged the government to be more restrictive in the areas of asylum, family migration, and integration policies. Taking into account developments after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Schily had introduced already security measures and tried to separate this area from immigration.
The government made concessions to reach a consensus across the political parties and in March 2002 the bill passed with a majority of just one vote in the upper chamber, but as this vote was not cast unanimously by the representatives of the state of Brandenburg the opposing parties took the matter to court.\textsuperscript{46} The work on the Immigration Act came to a halt during the general elections in the autumn of 2002. Only after the Constitutional Court had annulled the law in January 2003 for procedural reasons did the newly formed red-green government decide to re-initiate the legislation process for the immigration bill. After a lengthy and complicated bargaining process took place mainly in working groups and high-level meetings among key politicians from the parties in government and opposition, at the end of June 2004 a compromise was reached. The compromise bill included a further tightening of asylum rules and was passed into law.\textsuperscript{47}

A new government, a grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, was formed in November 2005, and the immigration law was amended again in July 2007 – this time coordinated by the conservative Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble – in order to incorporate EU directives into domestic legislation and introduce more restrictive rules in domains such as family reunification. New rules were put into practices that were binding on all third country nationals\textsuperscript{48} who wanted to apply for family unification with their partners in Germany. The most important of the newly introduced provisions required that both of the spouses be at least of the age of 18, have sufficient income and that living space be provided by the resident spouse (in the case of third country nationals residing in Germany), and as a rule that evidence be provided that the immigrating partner knows German at least at the A1 level of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages. In the parliamentary debates before these amendments to the existing legislation were passed, the politicians in favour of these rules argued that these conditions were (also) formulated in order to prevent forced marriages. In-depth analyses conducted on this topic lead to the conclusion that

"[t]he striking discursive focus of the government on forced marriages when legitimizing these restrictive instruments is, just as the new income requirement, […] exemplary of a strong preoccupation with spousal migration among (Muslim) ethnic minorities, as this is the societal group commonly associated with the practice of forced marriages."\textsuperscript{49}

The new government did not, however, rely only on regulation by law with respect to steering immigration and integration processes, but initiated under the guidance of Chancellor Angela Merkel a series of dialogues that were deemed to be necessary in a post-9/11 world. In 2006, for the first time, representatives of immigrant organizations were invited
to participate alongside mainstream German institutions in discussions of immigration regulations. They took part in an Integration Summit organized by Chancellor Merkel and the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners, Refugees and Integration, Maria Böhmer. Following the Summit, six working groups worked out a “National Integration Plan (NIP)” that was presented to the public in 2007 on the occasion of a second summit. Similarly, the Ministry of Interior organized two “German Islam conferences”, in September 2006 and in May 2007, with representatives of all federal levels and of Muslim organizations present. The principal aims were to create a dialogue between the government and Muslim organizations and to establish a single representation for the various Islamic organizations and Muslim confessional groups in Germany. The possibility to enhance the steering capacity of the government remained limited in both of the initiatives: The Integration Summits led to no binding policy goals, and in the German Islam conferences it turned out to be very difficult to create a positive dialogue because of the different interests of the government and the various participating organizations.

Through the Immigration Act of 2005 the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees (BAFl) was changed to the Federal Office for Immigration and Refugees (BAMF) with the function of coordinating the implementation of the new law. Among its main responsibilities are to administer the integration programs throughout the country and to inform the public about immigration- and integration- related processes.

To sum up, beginning with the government under the leadership of Chancellor Schröder the once so powerful symbolic reference condensed in the formula that “Germany is not a country of immigration” started to crumble. The red-green coalition government through the green card initiative could claim to have foresight and innovative talent. Indeed, the name ‘green card’ itself can be considered to be an example of symbolic politics, as in reality the card did not carry the generous status of a green card in the U.S., from which the term is borrowed. Instead, the German ‘green card’ differed little from the working permits already available if the demand for an expert could not be satisfied in the national labour market. The political campaign of introducing a ‘green card’ is a prime example for ‘issue relabeling,’ serving the purpose of altering the view on what a certain policy is about – in this case creating the image of a progressive government that is aware of the dynamics of the global competition for the ‘best and brightest’ and acts in favour of the national economy.
Conclusion

The main conclusion drawn from the above discussion of the political developments since the 1960s is that the debate on immigration can be divided basically into two major time periods: The first one, lasting from the 1960s until the early 2000s, on restricting migration to Germany, including temporary initiatives to decrease the number of immigrants. In terms of symbolic politics, this period is marked by a political communication that served the purpose of highlighting and preserving the idea that Germany was not a country of immigration. The second era, beginning already in 2000 with the green card initiative and the amendment of citizenship law and clearly being established through the adoption of the Immigration Act in 2005, is marked by different symbolic figures; whether or not Germany is an immigration country is not an issue anymore and this debate is replaced by a political language that acknowledges the fact of immigration, but at the same time urges effective steering and limiting of migration and integration processes. This is attempted mainly through the re-distribution of institutional responsibilities, first and foremost by a strengthened role for the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

By installing such a bureaucracy, a new kind of state centralism has been established that in its integration policies focuses especially on the acquisition of German language knowledge. This is combined with an eagerness by political actors to collect data, as this is perceived to be the precondition for evidence-based policy-formulation, and is presented as one of the important issues highlighted in the recent debate on integration policy-making in Germany. The Commissioner for Migration, Böhmer, for instance, declared in June 2008 that “the federal government aims for the scientific measurement of integration achievements” and presented the concept of ‘Promoting Integration - Measuring Successes - Designing Futures’ to the government, in which she announced that data in 14 different domains along 100 indicators were going to be collected to allow for better policy-making.

The above developments should not (yet) be interpreted as clear signs for a major change in policy orientation, but more as change of the discursive frame. The shift in frames, however, will not lead necessarily to policies that are characterized by a more liberal spirit, as has been illustrated by the new regulations concerning spousal migration, but are characterized, as indicated above, by a more centralized structure and a stronger wish of governmental actors to steer and control immigration and integration processes.

These trends - at least in terms of the debate in politics and media - seem
also to be related to the concerns about the societal integration of the second/third generation of Turkish/Muslim immigrants. The public discourse on this issue focuses regularly on specific issues, such as violent/criminal behaviour, a lack of will to perform in the educational system and labour market. Also, the marriage behaviour of the second generation is critically commented upon, pointing out the low number of interethnic marriages that are concluded within this group. Transnational marriages and family unification, in this sense, represent an immigration channel that should be controlled sufficiently by state authorities in order to prevent also the immigration of low skilled individuals and the reproduction of social structures that are detrimental to the societal integration of immigrants.\textsuperscript{55}

Looking at immigration policies in general from a more critical viewpoint some observers contend that, although there were some changes in how governmental bodies perceive the challenges related to the integration of immigrants, the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens was not able to introduce a substantial change in matters of immigration, as there has been only a marginal opening for labour immigration.\textsuperscript{56} The above-mentioned federal integration program with the language and civic education courses can be seen plainly as “tasks that beforehand had been delegated to non-governmental organisations [and] were suddenly considered as core businesses of the state”.\textsuperscript{57} If, however, a broader time frame is taken for analysis, as has been done above, the sequence of events indicates that Germany has been indeed moving on a track towards a new framework that can be characterized by its preference for skilled labour migration and higher benchmarks for entry and mandatory integration programs in the post-migration period.

Germany has been indeed moving on a track towards a new framework that can be characterized by its preference for skilled labour migration and higher benchmarks for entry and mandatory integration programs in the post-migration period.
Endnotes

1 I would like to heartily thank Sigrid Baringhorst from the Siegen University for her many helpful remarks on the earlier versions of this paper. Furthermore, my thanks go to the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg - Institute for Advanced Studies for providing me with a fellowship in the spring of 2012 during which I revised this manuscript.


6 Ibid., p. 140.


8 Ibid., p. 38.


18 Heinz Kühn, Stand und Weiterentwicklung der Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn, 1979.


22 Green, The Politics of Exclusion.


27 Axel Kreienbrink and Stefan Rühl, Familiennachzug in Deutschland, Nürnberg, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2007, p. 15.


33 Meier-Braun, Deutschland, Einwanderungsland, p. 87.

34 See, cover story of Der Spiegel, Nr. 15, 1992.


39 Schneider, Modernes Regieren und Konsens, p. 170.

40 The population in the age groups below 20 and above 60 have been left out from this chart for methodical reasons.


43 Ibid.

44 Thränhardt, “Migrations- und Integrationspolitik”, pp. 165-166.

45 Christina Boswell, European Migration Policies in Flux, London, John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2003, p. 44.

46 Schneider, Modernes Regieren und Konsens, pp. 299-302.
47 Ibid., pp. 302-308.

48 Exempted are citizens of the following countries: member states of the European Economic Area, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the US.

49 Laura Block, “The Legislative Framework of Spousal Migration and the Political Debate”, in Can Aybek (ed.), *Marriage Migration from Turkey to Germany – A Qualitative Longitudinal and Dyadic Perspective*, Siegen, University of Siegen, 2011, pp. 22-23.


55 For examples of this public debate see Speigel Online - Panorama - 18.07.2003; *Spiegel* No. 47 (2004); *Spiegel*, No. 5 (2009); *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 11 April 2005.


Introduction

We live today in a world characterized by migration phenomenon. International migration has become a continuing aspect of the political, social and economic landscape in every country in one way or another. Nowadays, it is much more difficult to find individuals who do not have some sort of migration experience either themselves or in their extended families and friendship circles. In Turkey, when migration is discussed, be it in everyday life, in academia or in media, the first country that comes into almost everyone’s mind is Germany, based on 50 years of migration experience. In comparison to other overseas countries where Turkish emigration takes place, such as the U.S. and Australia, immigrants from Turkey and those of Turkish ancestry are much more populous in Europe and particularly in Germany, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Germany has the highest numbers with around 2.5 million individuals with migration background from Turkey in 2009, which makes them the biggest migrant group in

Abstract

This article investigates the literature of highly skilled migration framed within the concepts of brain drain, brain gain or brain circulation. It argues that students are a subset of highly skilled migrants with semi-finished human and social capital. Considering the lack of studies about students from Turkey in Germany, despite 50 years of migration experience, this article is designed to fill this gap in the literature. First, it explores the German higher education context: international students in Germany and particularly those from Turkey. Next, it concentrates on students leaving Turkey to be educated abroad, and subsequently it focuses on the stay or return intentions of international PhD students from Turkey enrolled at two graduate schools in Germany.

Keywords

International student mobility, Germany, Turkey, higher education, highly skilled migration.

Trends in Student Mobility from Turkey to Germany

Başak Bilecen SÜOĞLU*

* Başak Bilecen Süoğlu is currently working as a researcher at Bielefeld University. She recently earned her PhD from the same university in Sociology. Her dissertation is entitled, Social Support Networks of International PhD Students: Transnational Connections and Cosmopolitan Imaginations.
Industrialized countries have decided to embrace students with the purpose of gaining the ‘best brains’ in this global competition.

There is an abundance of studies in the literature concerning migration from Turkey to Germany. Origins, reasons and consequences of labour migration and the guest-worker scheme are among the most popular issues in the literature. In her latest book Abadan-Unat gives a comprehensive overview of Turkish migration to various destinations from different and critical angles such as debates of citizenship, educational dilemmas of the second generation in the receiving country, experiences of the migrants, their exploitation and frequent encounters with racism. Lastly, she introduces discussion of transnationalism and the interconnectedness of migrants.

Still another interlinked topic of interest is social integration, which has been a much discussed topic in the literature. Integration covers broadly cultural, social and economic aspects of the relationship between the migrants and the receiving society. In the German context, Turkish migrants were frequently analysed. For instance, after his analysis of labour market integration of migrants from Turkey, Özcan looks at the determinants of economic and socio-cultural integration of first and second generations. In conclusion, he argues that migrants from Turkey illustrate positive developments over time in many respects, such as in the socio-cultural area, which incorporates the issues of language and identity. However, in comparison to the host society and some of the other immigrant groups, lower levels of schooling qualifications of second generation Turkish migrants result in difficulties in entering the labour market. The debate over integration is a huge topic and goes beyond the scope of this article. Another important area of investigation in the literature concerns migrants’ organizations. For instance, Amelina and Faist study religious, political and business organizations whose members were migrants from Turkey. They look at the political practices of those associations and at the interplay of transnational networks and integration pressure of the host country. Although there is a vast literature on the mobility experiences of individuals from Turkey in Germany from different aspects, student mobility has not been deeply investigated.

Contributing to migration literature, this article concentrates on mobility the country, constituting approximately 3% of the whole population of Germany. Therefore this article concentrates on the migration experience of Turkish persons in Germany, although with a different focus.
Trends in Student Mobility from Turkey to Germany

Conceptual Framework

International migration of highly skilled persons has grown in significance lately, indicating the effects of globalization, namely development in the information and transportation technologies along with the growth in the world economy. A certain number of developed countries relaxed their entry policies for the admittance of highly skilled migrant labour to meet the demands of their growing economies. However, the issue becomes problematic when this demand is mainly satisfied by developing countries, causing flight of their professionals and technicians with intellectual and technical resources, which is termed “brain drain”. According to Kwok and Leland, brain drain “refers to skilled professionals who leave their native lands in order to seek more promising opportunities elsewhere.”

In the 1960s the term “brain drain” was used in order to describe the movements of highly skilled persons from Turkey to Germany. The research conducted by Baláž and Williams emphasizes the neglect in migration theory of student mobility which provides the “seeds” for future international skilled labour migration. In other words, it is significant to study the movements of degree-seeking university students who, as semi-finished social and human capital, have an exceptional value which should not be allowed to be ignored, since they are considered likely to stay and take positions in the highly skilled labour market of the country of education upon their graduation. Given the contemporary trends of increased employment and change in the residence permit for international students based on their abilities in language, educational and socio-cultural issues, in addition to the time spent in the country of education, they would seem to be the perfect candidates for integration into the receiving society. Against this backdrop, industrialized countries have decided to embrace students with the purpose of gaining the ‘best brains’ in this global competition. Furthermore, if science has served as a kind of bridge between nations and a means of communication that can transcend boundaries, then, exchange of students among countries is thought to be a form of international relations at the individual and organizational levels, and even a foreign policy component. First, this article examines the conceptual framework used in the literature to analyse such mobility, namely the debates of brain drain, gain and circulation. Second, it describes the context of German higher education with reference to students from Turkey. Third, it focuses on the experiences of Turkish PhD students in Germany and their subsequent migration intentions. Lastly, it concludes by discussing the major findings.
immigration patterns of first-ranked scientists, professionals or highly skilled individuals from Europe, particularly the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada and the Soviet Union, to the United States. There are numerous terms in the literature other than “brain drain”, such as “brain migration”, “brain emigration”, “brain export”, “exodus of talent” or “brain exodus”, and “brain export” which all mainly address the flight of “brain power” or “loss of human capital.”

The early international debate about the causes and consequences of brain drain highlighted the sending (poorer) countries’ losses when highly skilled persons emigrate to developed countries or remain there after completion of their studies. Therefore, the term implied a one-way, definitive and permanent migration with a negative meaning due to loss of essential assets in the developing countries. Serious discussions led by the concerns include return policies for students by sending countries or immigrant taxes on developed receiving countries and/or tax on the incomes of professional emigrants from developing countries.

Particularly in the beginning of the 1970s, studies of highly skilled or professional migration or “brain drain” from developing countries to the United States focused on the dichotomy between the loss of developing sending countries on the one hand and the corresponding profits of receiving developed countries on the other. In other words, brain drain at that time was governed by political and economic asymmetries in the world. In the early literature, the U.S. was the main developed receiving country and it is sometimes “accused of deliberately draining other countries of their professionals. Professionals are expensive to produce and the United States saves vast amounts of money by not training these people themselves.” However, another argument was avoiding the “brain waste” which would occur if the highly skilled had not migrated and could not use their skills properly.

During the 1980s, even though the movement of highly skilled persons from developing to developed countries continued, the initial concerns disappeared and were rarely heard until the late 1990s. The concern in the developed countries was about low skilled migration and family reunification, whereas developing countries’ considerations were related to economic developmental challenges, such as the change from import substitution to free market economy, infrastructure improvement, strengthening the financial sphere and institution building. During those years there was some debate on admittance of medical personnel and nurses; however little specific attention was paid to highly qualified persons by the policy makers. The primary conclusions of the early literature on brain drain were
the contribution of highly qualified migration to augmented international inequality, with “the rich countries getting even richer at the expense of the poorer ones.”

Contemporarily, the debate over whether the “brain drain” is really a negative phenomenon for the sending countries as stated in the early research has gone through some alterations. While scholars of brain drain argue that migration of highly skilled persons is a zero-sum game, where sending countries lose their best and the brightest to the developed world, there is a general acknowledgement that this type of migration may not be all that detrimental for the sending developing countries, and the term “brain gain” has been coined. To put it differently, “more recently, however, the idea has been gaining momentum among scholars, decision makers and journalists that policy makers should characterise the issue in terms of a “circulation” of skills and manpower.” Such a change in paradigms has significant implications for public and migration policies, namely that the mobility of the highly skilled should not be decreased, but rather has to seen as a normal process.

Recent debates highlighted the gains for developing countries from this type of migration, which might be in the form of remittances and technology transfers together with raised awareness for non-migrants in developing countries, as in the form of continuing their education and investing in their human capital. When the case of India is considered, it is clear that an increasing number of professional emigrants overseas might contribute to their homeland institutions through resources, ideas and investments. Similarly, China could also reverse the negative effects of brain drain into a gain through knowledge networks or transnational communities promoting transfers of technology and skill. Likewise, economic ties of emigrants from South Korea and Taiwan and their home countries go beyond their economic remittances and can be found in the form of entrepreneurship and upgrading. It has been argued that those highly-skilled emigrants either return to their countries of origin or join knowledge networks which sustain essential ties between the sending and the receiving countries.

Nowadays, this concept is referred as “brain circulation” which implies a potential return to the home country after a cycle of study and work abroad and enjoyment of the promising
employment possibilities. However, it is a matter of not only the physical return of emigrants but also the return of skills, technology, ideas and resources through transnational networks. It is considered as having multi-directions rather than being a permanent move and a win-win situation where all parties involved have some sort of a gain in the long run due to the circulation of highly skilled individuals and their skills. The underlying idea in this paradigm shift is that migration of the highly-skilled “should not be seen as a loss to the country but as an asset that can be mobilized.”

All these debates have mostly economic perspectives at the macro level. The literature concerning especially the earlier debates on brain drain was heavily influenced by scholars with backgrounds in economics, who tried to put many variables into equations to calculate the results of such mobility at a macro level with merely economic determinants. Some of the variables included individualistic cost and benefit analysis with neo-classical economy theories. Nevertheless, many of the economic theories were contradicted by the evidence that migrants are not from the poorest countries, but rather belong to the middle class of developing countries, and that not everyone with the same means migrates. Moreover, there are also differences both in motivations and probability of migration within those countries. This situation displays the shortcomings of only taking into account economic theories. In other words, those studies fail to include social, cultural and political aspects of migration over and above economic reasons.

Second, in this line of literature there is no consensus among scholars and countries as to who is a skilled and who is a highly skilled migrant, although the attention paid to this type of migration is great. Most of the time skills are related to education and/or position in the labour market. Some efforts have been made to standardize the categories by OECD through the 1995 OECD Canberra Manual on the Measurement of Human Resources Devoted to Science and Technology and the 2002 Frascati Manual on Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Experimental Development. Both manuals identify four ways of classification of science and technology workers: by qualification, by activity, by sector and by occupation.

“While educational and activity-based classifications have long been in use, these are now joined by efforts to systematically collect and analyse data on where science and technology personnel are employed by occupation or sector.”

Moreover, when students are considered as a subset of highly skilled persons, then there are also other institutional drivers of student mobility next to explanations of economics, such as universities’ concerns and policies of internationalization that eventually contribute both to the
demand and supply of international students. As higher education became much more international in many European countries, student populations at universities are becoming much more diversified. Meanwhile foreign students have transformed into immigrants or have the motivation to be immigrants.\(^3\)\(^4\) To put it differently, many students perceive having an international education as providing possibilities for better careers and life chances in addition to “their ticket to migration”.\(^3\)\(^5\)

Germany is the first country after English-speaking countries to be able to attract high numbers of international students.

While the recent literature takes into account the developmental acts of migrants themselves and their networks, it often overemphasizes the “developmental effects”. Moreover, while the literature concerning the developmental effects of highly skilled migrants concentrates on their networks, those networks are usually meant metaphorically and not methodologically, since they do not conduct any social network analysis. Against this backdrop, discussions from the perspectives of economic and human resources analyses in combination with developmental issues are very common in studying highly skilled migration. The contribution of this article, however, will be rather on social aspects from a sociological point of view. Social aspects of highly skilled migration are significant to study, since they enable us to understand better this particular population and their migration intentions. Thus, the focus of this article is on international students’ experiences, enriched with empirical field research in Germany.

The case of Germany is interesting and chosen for a number of reasons. First, Germany ranks quite high as a destination for international students world-wide. But, more importantly, it is the first country after English-speaking countries to be able to attract such high numbers of international students. This fact actually makes the country, its policies and reforms very interesting to study. Second, since the literature is dominated by research about attraction of the best and brightest by the English-speaking world, it is significant to look at other powerful newcomers. Germany is seen as a newcomer since its policies and their implementation in internationalisation of higher education have been taking place only fairly recently. Germany shows that, although introduction of English programs is important in terms of internationalisation, it is not the only reason for students to choose a country of education. Among other reasons, having two different languages as the medium of instruction adds to the diversity of incoming students, and this diverse environment makes the country even more interesting to study. Thus, the next
section will shed light on the dynamics of Germany's higher education.

**German Higher Education Context**

German higher education institutions function in the same dynamic international context and they come across similar matters. Institutions in different sectors respond to the challenges and opportunities posed by the changing world context in various ways through different levels of policies, and higher education is not an exception. The response to increasing internationalization and globalization has mainly been driven by the government and federal states rather than only by higher education institutions themselves in Germany. Nevertheless, the duty of universities to be proactive in recruiting international students and developing international opportunities according to their own strategies, economic position and priorities, is in the process of being established.

Higher education policies on internationalization in Germany are characterized by attaining economic profits.

For many decades, internationalization of German higher education institutions was substantially portrayed by free interchange of knowledge within the scientific community. After the Second World War, the main point of internationalization changed by incorporating students into the scientific exchange (e.g. the American Fulbright program to fund German students’ studies abroad), Moreover, profound educational courses at German universities in order to assist developing countries in the 1970s were introduced. Educational aid was framed to upgrade the university systems of less developed countries. The main political aims were avoiding brain drain, together with encouraging the reintegration of returnees. However, those objectives have been in transformation, particularly during the last decades. The humanitarian objectives of mobility schemes had to occupy an inferior position during the intense discussions on the economic competitiveness of Germany in the globalizing world. The need for intensification of the function of Germany as a scientific research centre is perceived to be the major mechanism for boosting its economy. Therefore, higher education policies on internationalization in Germany are characterized by attaining economic profits. While brain gain is thought of as a benefit for Germany, entailing brain drain for other countries is perceived as an unavoidable repercussion of the competition.36
In Germany, holding foreign citizenship is the main criterion for identifying foreign students. In other words, those who were born and educated in Germany without German citizenship are considered as foreign students, as well as those international students coming only for education purposes, who are put in the category of ‘international student’. This situation is also reflected in the statistics of Germany after 1997 as indicated in Figure 1 below. This distinction is significant for the purposes of this study, since it only takes into account those students who entered into the country in order to be educated. Thus, the students who were born or previously educated in Germany are not in the scope of the study. The term Bildungsinländer (non-mobile foreign students) refers to those foreign students who have grown up and been educated in the country of study, while the term Bildungsausländer (mobile foreign students) means international students who hold another country’s citizenship, and have a visa for Germany in relation to their studies. In the relevant data sources, this dichotomy is used after 1997; prior to 1997 there was no such indication, and all students were put into one category of foreign students.

Figure 1: Total foreign students in Germany from 1975 to 2009

Source: Adapted from Wissenschaft Weltoffen, available at: http://www.wissenschaft-weltoffen.de/daten/1/1/2?lang=en, [last visited 20 May 2012].
A steady increase in the numbers of mobile foreign students continued from 1975 until 2004 in Germany and a stagnation period is observed between 2004 and 2007 with a considerable decrease in 2008, which is illustrated in Figure 1 above. After 2004, fluctuations were observed which led to a considerable decrease of both mobile and non-mobile foreign students’ numbers. In 2008, the percentage of this total decrease was 6%, whereas the number of non-mobile foreign students decreased only by 4%. If one looks at the numbers of foreign graduates, they are still on the rise in 2009; however, the absolute numbers are still lower than in 2004. In 2009 there were a total of 239,143 foreign students enrolled at German higher education institutions, 5,537 more than the previous year. Despite the fluctuations the total number of foreign students exceeds the number in 2000 by 33%. In 2008, for instance, foreign students accounted for 12% of all students enrolled at German higher education institutions.

The decrease in the number of foreign students is valid for both mobile and non-mobile foreign students. While the number of mobile foreign students dropped by 6% in 2007, the numbers of non-mobile foreign students decreased by 4%. In 2008, the proportion of non-mobile foreign students remained constant at 2.9%, whereas the proportion of mobile foreign students decreased by 0.3% points to 9.2%.

In 2009, according to the same statistical data, two-thirds of all foreign students were enrolled at universities. Over the past four years, the trend of enrolment in universities of applied sciences has been seen to make up one fourth of total foreign student enrolments. The top subjects of studies at universities are German studies and other European language and cultural studies, social sciences (economics, law and political science), and mathematics and natural sciences (computer science, biology and chemistry). The most popular fields of study at universities of applied sciences are engineering, economics and computer science.

In the winter semester of 2009/10, a total of 245,000 students were enrolled at German higher education institutions holding foreign citizenship, those being mobile students. Non-mobile foreign students constitute only 3% of the total of university students in Germany, which is a relatively low number when it is taken into account that 19% of the German population has a migration background. Furthermore, it is not possible to capture those students with migration background but who have German citizenship, such as most of the second generation migrants from Turkey.
The biggest group of non-mobile students comes from Turkey, far more than from other countries, followed by Croatia. The above figure illustrates that those non-mobile foreign students are mostly those from Europe, and China is listed as the only Asian country. The third country of origin is Italy, whose numbers are almost identical to those of Croatia.
In the winter semester of 2009/10 around 189,500 mobile foreign students were enrolled at German higher education institutions. They represent around 9% of all tertiary level students. As the above figure on mobile students indicate, most of those mobile foreign students come from China, around 22,800, followed by Russia, Poland, Bulgaria and Turkey. Mobile foreign students from Turkey make up less than half of those non-mobile foreign students from Turkey. Therefore, students from Turkey enrolled at higher education institutions in Germany predominantly belong to the second generation of immigrants; however, the existence of those coming from Turkey to Germany only for study reasons cannot be ignored. The next section will illustrate the experiences and motivations of Turkish PhD students in Germany.

Experiences of Turkish PhD Students at German Universities

By the second half of the 1950s, migration of highly skilled personnel from Turkey began to be observed. According to the few available research studies during the first half of the 1960s, the numbers of highly skilled emigrants originating from Turkey was quite high. Migration of medical doctors and engineers paved the way later on for scientists and academics, mostly to Europe and the U.S. The statistics for such movements are not easy to get, and the data is far from being perfect. However, according to the secondary data available, in the early 1960s, 830 highly qualified persons migrated from Turkey to the U.S., Canada and France. There are several studies concerning Turkish doctoral students overseas, particularly in the U.S. The first one was conducted by Oğuzkan in 1975, when the total of 217 PhD students abroad made up 18% of the total number of PhDs earned in Turkey between 1933 and 1968. The study was based on 150 questionnaires analyzing the direction, nature and causes of student mobility, with the goal of understanding the features and motivations of those student migrants and of using the information in order to regulate the brain drain from Turkey. The respondents were residing in the U.S. (71%), Canada (10%) and Germany (8%) and in other countries such as England and France. Another study was conducted by Tansel and Güngör focusing on return intentions of Turkish students studying in the United States. In the same study, it was indicated that there were 21,570 students studying abroad with their own financial means in mid-2001, where two-thirds had chosen to be educated in Western Europe and North America. Moreover, 90% of government financed students from Turkey were studying in the United States and Great Britain.
Highly skilled persons with Turkish migration background in Germany leave the country and return to Turkey.

According to the report of Yüksekgözetim Kurulu (the Council of Higher Education in Turkey), there is no statistical data available about the students from Turkey who go abroad to pursue their education, particularly at the graduate level. This report shows an overall trend of students abroad from Turkey based on data from the Ministry of Education and TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey). In other words, students who were only sponsored by those institutions were taken into account, leaving out students who either went by their own means or were financed by the country of education. This report also found exposure in the media by highlighting that there were 19,209 students studying abroad, composed of 13,489 at BA level, 3,617 at MA level and 2,103 at PhD level. It has been stated that the U.S. and Germany are the most popular countries for students from Turkey. Although those two countries are the leading ones, in terms of attracting Turkish students, most of the studies are only taking into account the U.S.

Another related study is conducted by Aydin where he argues that highly skilled persons with Turkish migration background in Germany leave the country and return to Turkey. The study mentions that in 2006, 10% of the total 1.74 million migrants living in Germany and holding Turkish citizenship had academic degrees. The study conducted in the framework of European Migrationnetwork identified 23,908 highly qualified Turkish citizens living in Germany, who constitute around 5% of all working Turkish migrants. Another study worth mentioning here is the TASD study, which identified the numbers of Turkish academics and students in Germany as between 45,000 and 70,000. The online study focuses on whether they identify themselves with Germany or Turkey. The main conclusion of the study is that the majority of academics would like to leave Germany due to unsatisfactory situations they are experiencing in Germany, such as unfavourable job prospects, missing home country, and feelings of being disadvantaged and discriminated against. Aydin adds to the TASD study by also incorporating social cultural networks of Turkish academics and students and the high economic growth that Turkey has been recently achieving as the pull factors of Turkey.

Design of the Study

The empirical component of this article is composed of extensive semi-
structured interviews with international doctoral students at two universities in Germany. Thirty-five PhD students studying at two graduate schools funded under the ‘Initiative of Excellence’ were interviewed between January and July in 2009. This government-led initiative aims “to promote top-level research and to improve the quality of German universities and research institutions in general, thus making Germany a more attractive research location, making it more internationally competitive and focusing attention on the outstanding achievements of German universities and the German scientific community.”

Since the reason of this initiative is to create an Ivy League in Germany and to attract the best brains in the global competition for knowledge, those international students enrolled in those excellent programs are the potential highly skilled migrants for Germany.

My first step in accessing the field was contacting some of the students from graduate school B and I used a snowballing technique. I thought it was a good idea to go directly to students. However, later I realized that I might be missing some potential participants. Therefore, at the same time, I contacted the administration of graduate school A, who were incredibly helpful and sent me a list of all their international doctoral and post-doctoral students. The administrator also wrote an e-mail about me and my project to all who are on the list. After I contacted all of them I was able to do interviews with all except one student who was living in another city and did not have time for an interview. In contrast, graduate school B refused to give such a list since, according to their opinion, it would be a violation of personal rights. Therefore, I continuously checked their students’ website and had to use the snowball method. In the end, I was able to find all international doctoral students enrolled at graduate school B and interview all of them. The interviews were recorded and most of them took around an hour, but I usually had an opportunity to talk informally both before and after the interview, sometimes for hours. I had the chance to go out, socialize and talk deeper with those students. In some cases I continued to discuss issues relevant to my study by e-mail, Skype, or phone, enabling me to clarify some points and acquire additional and subsequent details.

In terms of their demographic distribution in the total of 35 interviews, 21 were female and 14 were male. They represent a whole range of ethnic and religious backgrounds. The respondents were from Belarus (1), Benin (1), Bulgaria (1), China (4), India (2), Israel (1), Jamaica (1), Japan (1), Kazakhstan (1), Kyrgyzstan (2), Macedonia (2), Malawi (1), Mexico (4), the Netherlands (2), Nigeria (1), the Philippines (1), Russia (3), Taiwan (2), Turkey (3) and Ukraine (1). So, it is a highly diverse
group in terms of nationality. The sample is made up of a total of twenty different nationalities. In terms of national category, the biggest groups are from China and Mexico, followed by Russia and Turkey. The third biggest groups are from India, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, the Netherlands and Taiwan. Furthermore, other dimensions of heterogeneity of the sample included educational background of their previous study, age, marital status, religious conviction and the amount of semesters attended, therefore the length of stay in Germany. Even though no individual can display a whole culture, culture obviously has a characterizing impact on the individual’s configuration. 48 By the same token, three of the interviewees from Turkey, one male and two female completed their master degrees in Turkey. The number of interviews used in this study is low because this is a qualitative exploratory article and does not necessarily represent the entire international doctoral student original population in Germany. The purposeful selection of respondents in this qualitative study does not aim for statistical generalizations about populations and does not claim representativeness; rather it has a goal of analytical generalization to theory, and it will serve as a starting point for making this type of mobility visible and understanding its dynamics.

The respondents were usually quite open about their experiences in Germany, as well as their previous experiences (abroad in most cases for a master’s degree), career goals and life plans, and their social networks, providing me incredibly rich narratives. The experiences of international doctoral students underline their advancement as a result of having an international education, which provides an understanding of global interconnectedness and aids in developing transnational friendship networks that could enable them to imagine, create and maintain more productive professional and cultural lives, helping them to become successful actors in a globally networked economy and society. Each interview produced, on average, twenty pages of single spaced text. Accordingly, around 700 pages of raw transcripts were coded and analysed for this study. The goal of both data collection and analysis were to understand international doctoral students’ experiences, their perceptions of the country of education, future career plans and their intentions of migration in as accurate as possible a manner, to produce a rich and valid interpretation of their experiences. By coding each sentence, the major ideas were developed and a further detailed analysis of the meaning units facilitated the emergence or strengthening of the applications. 49 The next section will illustrate the migration intentions of the international students coming from Turkey.
Contradictions: Settlement in Germany or Return to Turkey?

During the interviews the issue of permanent settlement repeatedly came up. According to several studies, there are strong links between initial temporary and eventual permanent settlement. Even though the policy implications of this transition are great, there are not many extensive studies about the issue. Some studies found by analyzing the migration behaviour of former international students that those having an international experience during their studies are more likely to find employment in a foreign country. Understanding the behaviour of international students is significant if one wants to both attract and retain them in a specific country or institution. The question of what international doctoral students do after they finish their studies remains unclear. In the statistics, there is so far an overall trend of increasing numbers of international students over the last decades. Numbers of students from some particular sending countries have grown in a consistent manner; some are stable, some are not. We can analyse gender differences and which subjects are studied. Even so, it would be great to have some data about what happens upon their graduation; what per cent actually stays and enters into the German labour force remains still a big question mark. From an immigration and state perspective, this is of course an essential question, yet its importance is not well recognized.

The model proposed by Ajzen and Fisbein to predict social behaviour is one of the most intact ones in understanding the relation between intentions and behaviour. According to their theory of reasoned action, “intention is the immediate determinant of behaviour, and when an appropriate measure of intention is obtained it will provide the most accurate prediction of behaviour.” In other words, if one wants to predict behaviour, s/he has to know the intentions of the related person. Thus, this present article is based on the intentions for subsequent migration behaviour found in the narratives of international doctoral students from Turkey while bearing in mind that the actual forms and rates of mobility patterns cannot be fully foreseen only by causal models. Nevertheless, they would allow us to have insights into those factors students examine critically for their judgments and acts. Moreover, this article also incorporates the actual behaviour of the students, since they are also asked about their future plans at the end phase of their studies, and actually give a more concrete picture about what happens when they graduate.

In light of the interviews, three main intentions were identified: to stay in Germany, to return Turkey and to
move on to another country. Those intentions were shaped by the time spent in Germany along with social, cultural, personal, familial, economic and occupational reasons. However, those three types cannot be separated, and there were no such clear cut choices as in a survey study. For instance, Ali [pseudonym], who had been in Germany for one and a half years when we had the interview, was quite puzzled about what to do when he graduated. In his own words:

My ideas change day by day. Well, it is like that now: first, my return depends on the position I will find there [Turkey]. I would like to return, if there is a good opportunity I would like to return; for example I do not want to return to a university with a Turkish medium of instruction. Why? It has really nothing to do with the Turkish language, but because of the quality of education. I have been educated in XX University [public university with Turkish as its medium of instruction] and YY University [public university with English as its medium of instruction]. From my perspective YY University is also not the best but when it is compared it has an international outlook, a bridge, a door, and of course when I come from there to here I saw and understood how science should be conducted. I do not want to go back there in the academic sense because here the circumstances are much better, society is richer, not only economically but also culturally, I mean the academic culture.

His words actually confirm prior studies conducted in the U.S. mentioned above that job opportunities are heavily influencing the decisions of PhD students in addition to factors in Turkey, such as ‘the quality of education’, especially at the private universities, seen as a good place to return and take up employment as indicated by the respondent. As is also indicated by other studies, “development of private universities in the country serves as an interesting case of return of highly skilled Turkish emigrants: since the mid-1980s, private universities in the country with their very competitive facilities have attracted many Turkish scholars, scientists, and university graduates living abroad back to the country.”54 Thus, the decision to return to the country of origin is dependent on the employment prospects there.

The decision to return to the country of origin is dependent on the employment prospects there.

Moreover, there are also factors such as personal relations and their importance in an individual’s life. As Ali further indicates, social life and opportunities of creating friendships in Germany are seen to be crucial, indicated through making comparisons of their social life both in the country of education and origin. He also mentions employment prospects after his graduation as an important decision factor.

But there are other reasons that make me consider to go back, for example I don’t know how I can live talking a foreign language until the end of my life. Here, life is different than in Turkey, in Turkey I
have friends and more compared to here and I can talk my native language. Here, life is very individualistic, I am alone most of the time, it can be a bit problematic.[...]

It also depends on the job opportunities I can get, if I can find in England or in the Netherlands, I might go and settle there. I might also get married soon, but I can stay in Germany. I am in a contradictory position.

Another example is Ayşe [pseudonym] who was quite determined to return to Turkey after her graduation during our interview. Her initial reasons to come to Germany were not only career aspirations but also to learn the German way to conduct research, and after gaining experience she was planning to return. In her own words:

Why I wanted to come to Germany? Because I really wanted to learn how to conduct research, I wanted to learn the academic culture here, it is not only about the job related issues but also how to be a good academic, this tradition of research, this tradition of strong methodology. [...] In addition to my career, I have a husband, my personal life, when put all the positive and negative things in my mind, Germany was the best choice for me where it is closer to Turkey [...] Once I learn, become experienced and publish articles here, I want to return to Turkey to a university with a good position where I can apply what I learn here.

One year later we met again when her husband came to Germany and lived with her almost one year, although he had a job in Turkey and no prior language ability. Later on in early 2011, I had another chance to talk to her when I was informed that she returned to Turkey due to familial reasons at the end phase of her doctoral studies. Family issue can be a factor in staying for those who form families during their studies, but also a factor of return. Among all respondents there is a strong sense of family—both their spouses and parents—connections. However, for some of them having family still living in their home countries and satisfying them are the main reasons for return. As she intended she returned to Turkey, and proved that intentions can actually signal the reality. However, we do not know fully if she returned due to the reasons she gave in the first interview, or whether something got into the way. Further studies should have a more encompassing longitudinal analysis which would result in more concrete findings.

Lastly, Fatma [pseudonym] was very sceptical during the interview about what to do next and often mentioned that her legal status as a student entails temporariness. She often responded that she has to concentrate on finishing her thesis at that point of time rather than speculating about what would happen afterwards. Nevertheless, she indicated that she would like to stay either in Germany or somewhere else in Europe when she finds a job since the physical proximity to Turkey and her family was important for her. Moreover, she indicated that her qualifications would fit the need of the European labour markets and she would not go through a lot of bureaucracy such as degree
The numbers of students with migration background from Turkey is quite high in Germany, which is not surprising given the migration history between those two countries. Although the number of mobile foreign students from Turkey is less than half of those non-mobile foreign students from Turkey, they are still in the top five of incoming student populations. Moreover, their perspectives are significant to be studied since they are classified under the targeted category of ‘the best and the brightest’. Moreover, this study had a qualitative methodology in order to reach the students’ personal histories with the expectation to illustrate their case and be an inspiration for further policy preparations. Although it did not have an aim to generalize as to population and representativeness of those interviewed, further research can take off from those points.

Conclusion

Highly skilled mobility is a reality of today’s world and it is a complex phenomenon including various actors and systems at different levels, and international student mobility is a subset of such mobility. This article is an explanatory one giving an overall idea about the concepts and terminology evolved in the literature. It then focused on the Germany-Turkey case in terms of international student mobility. After describing general trends and statistics of foreign students in Germany, it concentrated on those international students from Turkey. Next, it concentrated on Turkey in reference to prior studies. After looking at the relevant literature, it illustrated experiences and migration intentions of mobile foreign students from Turkey in Germany after their graduation.

Immigration and education policies along with visa and labour market regulations will have an ever increasing role in the process of students’ decision making for their future.

The emphasis of the article is on the need to rework ideas on highly skilled migration and the long-lasting debate about brain drain. Research illustrates changing patterns of labelling certain
phenomena over time among various disciplines, and this article has a sociological point of view. It is important to include not only the perspectives of governments, universities and international administrative agencies, but also migrants’ experiences, their communities and networks, in order to understand their subsequent intentions and therefore (re)formulate the policies accordingly. Experiences of international students during their studies in Germany are conducive of their decisions about the place of future settlement. The experiences of international students particularly pinpoint the opportunities and structures both in the sending country and in the receiving country. When opportunities and structures change in a positive way in the country of origin, be it employment contingencies or political or social ones, then students would return while they are still at the age of labour force participation. Another pre-conditions are the opportunities and structures in the receiving country, Germany in that case.

The findings presented in this article provide some suggestive and indicative evidence of how the mobility intentions of international doctoral students can vary and therefore lead to different results. Even though further research is necessary in order to understand better how these motivations actually realize, preferably by longitudinal data, the findings raise important questions about the extent to which migration intentions can serve as a proxy for migration behaviour, and they demonstrate very clearly that along with state policies, effects of language, occupational motivations, personal reasons and family issues in both sending and receiving contexts are critical aspects of mobility decisions of international doctoral students upon graduation. It further shows the relationship between global change of labour markets, opportunity structures, migration and personal aspirations. It sheds light on the complexity and diversity of migration decision and mobility experience. In addition, research indicates that immigration and education policies along with visa and labour market regulations will have an ever increasing role in the process of students’ decision making for their future. Thus, those countries which have conducive education and immigration policies as well as lucrative employment initiatives will be likely to benefit from this type of mobility and have a competitive edge.

Experiences of international students during their studies in Germany are conducive of their decisions about the place of future settlement.
Endnotes


10 Brigitte Suter and Michael Jandl, “Comparative Study on Policies towards Foreign Graduates: Study on Admission and Retention Policies towards Foreign Students in Industrialized


46 Aydın, *Der Diskurs um die Abwanderung Hochqualifizierer türkischer Herkunft in die Türkei*.


53 Ibid, p.41.

Integration and/or Transnationalism? The Case of Turkish-German Transnational Space

Deniz SERT*

Abstract

This article is derived from the findings of an empirical study based on semi-structured and life course qualitative interviews conducted with Turkish-German migrants and their significant others in both countries.1 As the interviews involved different migrant categories, migrants’ life courses and different areas of action, the findings show a large variety of transnational contacts, activities and orientations. After explaining the methodology and the data, the article introduces a typology of transnationalism reflecting these varieties, which is followed by the argument that there is a positive, concurrent and mutually beneficial, relationship between transnationalism and integration.

Keywords

Turkey, Germany, migration, transnationalism, integration.

Introduction

Writing in 2003, Morawska2 argued that transnational activities of immigrants and their children and their integration into the host society could typically coexist where different collections of macro- and micro-level conditions produce different varieties of transnationalism-integration combinations. Along these lines, Morawska put forward a three-stage scheme for modelling the relationship between transnationalism and integration. In the first phase, she envisions an active research agenda for gathering empirical information on different features of transnationalism-integration coexistence. This stage has already been passed by the increasing number of publications on the subject. The second stage involves discovering patterns in the various relevant empirical contexts. The data used here were the result of a three-year research project with

* Dr. Deniz Ş. Sert is a senior research associate at the Migration Research Centre at Koç University. Her areas of interest include international migration, transnationalism, internal displacement, civil society, and citizenship. She has been actively involved in the TRANSNET project as the field researcher in Turkey. Besides her articles in journals such as International Migration, ILWCH, Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Critique, Journal of Mediterranean Studies, and Journal of Refugee Studies, her PhD dissertation has been published as a book, entitled “Property Rights of Internally Displaced Persons: Ideals and Realities”, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2009.
the objective of clarifying and comparing the complex processes of transnationalism in different spaces, the focus being on the transnational networks and political, economic, and socio-cultural activities. Great importance was attributed to considerations of sending and receiving country contexts, distinctions between external and intra-group conditions, individual migrants’ characteristics, and factors specific to the so-called second generation. All of these were essential parts of Morawska’s basis for a typology of the factors affecting transnationalism-integration interactions, constituting a useful tool in comparing different contexts. Thus, this contribution is an attempt to accomplish the third stage of Morawska’s strategy: the construction of theoretical models of the engendering, maintaining, and changing apparatus of the transnationalism-integration phenomenon, which is yet to be achieved in the literature regarding the subject.

This contribution is derived from the findings of an empirical study based on semi-structured and life course qualitative interviews conducted with Turkish-German migrants and their significant others in both countries. As the interviews involved different migrant categories, migrants’ life courses and different areas of action, the findings show a large variety of transnational contacts, activities and orientations. Thus, the paper introduces a typology of transnationalism where these varieties are reflected. An important finding of the research is that the more cross-border activities and orientations that the migrants had, termed here as transnational practices, the stronger the intercultural and integration-related practices they maintained towards their respective resident states, i.e., they were better integrated into their host societies. The article shows a positive relationship between transnationalism and integration where these are not only concurrent, but are seen as mutually supportive processes.

The paper is divided into three main parts. The first part presents the empirical discussion within the context of Turkish-German transnational space. Here the methodology followed during the research as well as the main findings will be presented along with the typology of transnationalism where the great variety of transnational contacts, activities and orientations with respect to different migrant categories, migrants’ life courses and different areas of action are evaluated. Second, there is a theoretical discussion looking at the relationship between

The more cross-border activities and orientations that the migrants had, the stronger the intercultural and integration-related practices they maintained towards their respective resident states.
transnationalism and integration as presented in the literature on the subject. This part is largely inspired by Oeppen's typology, which presents not only the interdisciplinary debate developed around the subject, but also encompasses the gap in the literature.4 The final part is the conclusion, which is also suggesting avenues for further research.

Empirical Discussion: The Case of Turkish-German Transnational Space

One would see a Turk on every step in Germany. One person went, became a family of eleven. (Returned migrant, Male, 77)

The empirical research that inspired this contribution entailed a total of 173 semi-structure and life course interviews, conducted in the Turkish-German context between 2008 and 2011. During the semi-structured interviews, we addressed experiences and views of transnational activities on an individual level, where the main topics and the main questions for the country-specific interviews were largely the same, but the selection of the respondents varied. In the case of Turkey, the respondents were selected through snowball sampling, but due to the changing nature of migration in Turkey (from being a country of emigration to becoming a country of transit and immigration), we chose to focus on three distinct groups of respondents:

(1) Return migrants: those who worked, studied, and/or lived in Germany for more than a year but are currently residing in Turkey. This category also included those who were born in Germany but are currently living in Turkey, i.e., the so-called second-generation migrants.

(2) Relatives and friends: this includes relatives and/or friends in Turkey of those migrants still residing in Germany. The intention here was to collect information on the migrants and observe whether and how they were maintaining their ties with the home country.

(3) Ethnic Germans: Germans living, working, and/or studying in Turkey. In the case of Germany, interviews were conducted with:

(1) Turkish citizens living in Germany,

(2) German citizens who were once Turkish citizens, and

(3) German citizens with at least one (former) Turkish citizen as parent.

Overall, the investigation in Germany included people with a ‘Turkish migration background’, who make up the largest group of immigrants in Germany.

The interviewees were engaged through gatekeepers, such as associations (operating especially in the political, economic, socio-cultural and educational domains), internet platforms, but also
through the social networks of the interviewers. After the first interviews, snowball sampling was also used to recruit additional respondents.

For the life-course interviews, which were also conducted using the abovementioned methodology and again in the categories stated above for the two countries, the original aim was to choose interesting cases from the semi-structured interviews for follow-up interviews. This methodology was unsuccessful, as many of the respondents for the semi-structured interviews rejected our requests for a second interview, based on the claim that they did not have any further information to provide. Thus, we had to recruit new respondents for the life-course interviews.

As the subject, both in Turkey and Germany, is very diverse, a pre-defined sampling plan was not suitable. As proposed by Seipel and Rieker, we chose to select rather different cases with a wide variation. Thus, we looked for interviewees who were diverse concerning their personal characteristics, such as gender, age, education, marital status, or place of residence. We also considered diversity concerning the type of migration. Both in Germany and Turkey the cases include former ‘guest-workers,’ labour migrants, international students, refugees, marriage migrants and family reunification migrants. The diversity of interviewees ensured the contemplation of combinations of characteristics, but also of contrasts, despite the commonalities of migration and transnationality. The gender distribution of our interviews was balanced, with 34 female and 39 male respondents in Germany, and 56 female and 47 males in Turkey (Please see Table 1 for details on the data). In the German context, 60% of the interviewees were between 30 and 50 years old; 18% were younger than 30, and 22% were older than 50. In Turkey, 52% of the interviewees were between 30 and 50 years old, 17% were younger than 30, and 31% were older than 50. In both cases, more than half of the interviewees were married. Migrants’ education levels varied from primary school to PhD degrees. As for their current occupations, 55 interviewees in Germany and 53 in Turkey indicated they were employed; the number of retirees and housewives was much higher in Turkey. In Germany the place of birth of 51 out of 73 interviewees was Turkey; 19 were born in Germany and three in other countries. In Turkey, the place of birth of 60 out of 103 interviewees was Turkey; 40 were born in Germany and three in other countries. While 97 out of a total of 176 interviewees had Turkish citizenship, 46 had German and 32 had dual citizenship with one person in Turkey not willing to share this information.
## Table 1: Description of data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of interviews</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1929</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1939</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-1949</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1959</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (last graduation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School $^1$</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is important to note that on the whole the interviews are not representative either of Turkish migrants and children of Turkish migrants living in Germany, or of return migrants, relatives of migrants, and ethnic Germans in Turkey. The most obvious reason is that we did not have any access to closed communities of Islamic groups in either country. Thus, the findings of this research only reveal the social reality of the 176 respondents in Turkey and Germany in order to provide a better understanding of typical patterns in people’s transnational activities, relationships and orientations in the political, socio-cultural, economic, and educational domains of life.

The depth and diversity of the data received from these interviews have necessitated adding a new axis to these diverse domains of life, based on the extent and intensity of the transnational practices of migrants, combining the distinctions of four domains with variations at different levels of strength of transnational activities (Please see Table 2 for the details of our typology). As our typology and the overall findings of the research are extensively elaborated elsewhere, only an overview of the general findings is presented here, to be followed by a theoretical discussion of the transnationalism and integration linkage empirically supported by the research described.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Employment</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>55</th>
<th>53</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Citizenship</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In the German case, this includes both Secondary General School (Hauptschule) and Intermediate School (Realschule).
### Table 2: Typology of transnational activities in the Turkish-German context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>MULTICULTURAL ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>membership and/</td>
<td>communication and/or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or participation in</td>
<td>cooperation with parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-resident state or</td>
<td>and organisations abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transnational political</td>
<td>as a member of resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>associations or</td>
<td>state based political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisations;</td>
<td>actors or organizations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occasional or regular</td>
<td>participation in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voting in another</td>
<td>migrant organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country</td>
<td>regularly discussing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>political events in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transnational</td>
<td>incidental occupational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entrepreneurship or</td>
<td>involvement with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupational functions</td>
<td>import/export of goods,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>based on cross-border</td>
<td>capital, services,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchange of goods,</td>
<td>know-how or cross-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital, services,</td>
<td>border deployment of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know-how or cross-</td>
<td>workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>border deployment of</td>
<td>concrete plans to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workforce</td>
<td>establish a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circular migration</td>
<td>transnational enterprise,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to take a related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>employment, or to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>migrate for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>work-related reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIO-CULTURAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regular and intensive</td>
<td>less intensive but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private cross-border</td>
<td>continuous private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contacts (communication</td>
<td>cross-border contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and visits), because</td>
<td>(communication and visits),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>several significant</td>
<td>because few significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others live abroad</td>
<td>others live abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIO-CULTURAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social engagement</strong></td>
<td>membership and participation in a non-resident state or transnational associations, organisations or networks continuous participation in organised forms of cross-border help and support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SOCIO-CULTURAL</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td>self-description of a bi-national Turkish-German identity, or of a European or cosmopolitan belonging, or of one beyond ethnic and national identifications (e.g., class, political ideology, bi-regional, bi-local)</td>
<td>discrepancy between self-description of identity and long-term residence or future migration (or return) plans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EDUCATIONAL</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong transnational impacts on educational careers:</strong> correspondence or contradiction of migration-related socialisation processes, attendance at educational institutions in different countries, and educational ambitions</td>
<td>attendance at educational institutions in different countries without corresponding explicit educational ambitions targeted acquirement or successive unlearning of particular transnational competencies as a consequence of migration-related socialisation experiences</td>
<td>maintenance and transmission of knowledge and competencies suitable for border-crossing contacts, communication and activities without explicit educational ambitions and primarily without actual use outside family relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, within the political domain of transnationalism, we came across scant transnational orientations on the Turkish side, and mainly weak ones on the German side. Transnationally active migrants were usually better-educated and often so-called second generation. Despite the conventional wisdom, we saw no direct correlation between citizenship and/or residence status and the extent of political participation. Usually, strong transnational political activities coincided with participation in the resident state’s politics, and in Germany they were often a by-product of political engagement with immigration and integration policies. A return migrant explains his indifference to politics:

I wasn’t interested in politics, I didn’t vote in Germany, because I did not become a citizen, I didn’t vote in Turkey in years, because I missed the elections. (Returned migrant, Male, 77)

Within our economic domain of transnationalism, we observed rather weak or more multicultural orientations on the Turkish side, and generally strong transnational economic activities on the German side. Better-educated migrants usually had more cross-border economic activities. They were often self-employed or working free-lance. However, transnationally active migrants had a clear residential focal point in one country. Here, we saw no generational difference, as transnational economic activities were performed by both first and second generation migrants. On the German side, transnational and multicultural activities were simultaneously taking place.

Transnationally active migrants were usually better-educated and often so-called second generation.

The main findings of the socio-cultural domain of transnationalism revealed the area where nearly all respondents maintained private cross-border contacts. While we came across only a few mobile livelihoods, we saw a great number of transnational relations and practices. Although there were no cases of strong transnationalism, many respondents showed moderate to weak transnationalism in social engagement and security practices. Many respondents showed strong bi-national and transnational orientations, but also made different and ambivalent statements concerning their sense of belonging. It was interesting to see that the more educated the respondent, the more undecided they were about their identity.

The research results in the educational domain were more or less as expected: The second generation was more engaged in educational transnationalism than the first-generation “guest-worker” migrants, and highly skilled migrants had strong transnational orientations. However, we heard of many cases where parental return orientations had adverse consequences on children’s educational careers. Maybe
the most policy-related outcome of our research was that almost all respondents underlined the importance of knowing different languages as a resource of social and spatial mobility. When the respondents were asked what skills were needed to live in more than one country, language was among the first responses.

Overall, our findings showed that there are considerable variations of transnationalism in different life domains, among individual migrants, and in life courses. We also saw that the more durable state border-crossing activities and orientations, i.e., transnational practices that the migrants had, the stronger the intercultural and integration-related practices they maintained towards their respective resident states. Thus, the research findings show that there is a positive relationship between transnationalism and integration. As stated above, the empirical findings were a result of three years of research, which had left us with extensive data to elaborate on for theoretical discussion. The next section will specifically look at this relationship between transnationalism and integration, presenting a theoretical debate that is embedded in empirical findings of this research.

Theoretical Discussion: Transnationalism and/or Integration?

Oeppen describes four hypotheses regarding the theoretical discussion of the linkage between transnationalism and integration (Please see Figure 1).

The second generation was more engaged in educational transnationalism than the first-generation “guest-worker” migrants, and highly skilled migrants had strong transnational orientations.

The first hypothesis, while mostly discredited by migration scholars of the time, is still present in some popular media claiming that transnationalism and integration are mutually exclusive processes and that migrants cannot both maintain ties to their old country and become part of their new society.

The second hypothesis takes into consideration empirical research showing that migrants can both keep transnational ties and be incorporated into the destination country’s society, as long as the level of discrimination and racism allows that integration. However, as this condition is rarely met, migrants are marginalised and pushed towards transnational activities and ties due to a lack of alternatives. This hypothesis evokes the ideas about ethnic enclaves and ghettoisation.

The third scenario is that migrants can be carrying out both transnational activities and transnational ties at the same time as being part of a process of...
Integration and/or Transnationalism? The Case of Turkish-German Transnational Space

integration, stating in short that the two are not mutually exclusive.

The fourth hypothesis further develops this approach by suggesting that the two processes may be mutually supportive. To illustrate, while transnational activities that provide an income may assist economic integration, naturalisation and the related travel documents may assist transnational activities by easing travel restrictions.

**Figure 1: Transnationalism and integration-four approaches**

1) Transnationalism and assimilation are mutually exclusive processes

2) Transnationalism is a dominant process due to marginalisation

3) Transnationalism and assimilation are occurring concurrently, but at different rates

4) Transnationalism and assimilation are occurring concurrently, and can be mutually beneficial-supporting each other

**Key**

- Transnational processes
- Assimilation processes

While hypothesis two and three are most commonly accepted within literature on migrant integration, hypothesis four has only been highlighted by some. The fourth hypothesis, which implies some form of interactive relationship between transnationalism and integration, is the theoretical model that would be prescribed here by utilizing the findings of an empirical research. While some empirical studies indicate a positive quantitative relationship between transnational engagement and integration, not much is known about the nature of the interaction between the two.

Both, Vertovec and Kivisto, theorize that any positive relationships might be related to a person’s level of confidence, i.e., that increased confidence associated with strong social capital, whether local or transnational, facilitates integration. While building this theory, Kivisto overtly builds on Lal’s idea of the “Ethnicity Paradox”, which suggests that the support of local ethnic communities facilitates immigrants’ adaptation to host societies and that confidence and social capital can be built through the support of transnational communities and networks, as well as by local ones. Still, the transnational theorists have rarely seen transnationalism and integration as mutually accommodating practices.

Oeppen proposes three reasons why transnational theorists appear to have missed the potential for transnationalism and integration to be seen as mutually supportive processes.

First, as human geographers have indicated, there is a residual predisposition among social scientists to see a dichotomy between the everyday experiences of migrants that occur at the local level, such as integration, and those that occur at the global or international level, such as transnational activities.

Second, as Gielis puts forward, those studying migrant transnationalism have tended to focus on the “internal complexity” of particular migrant social networks, rather than studying their “external complexity”, which would take into account ways in which migrants’ multiple social networks “both cross-border and within the new country of residence” operate and impact each other in migrants’ lives.

Third, Oeppen argues, there are the practical issues associated with researching a topic that takes in multiple scales and places, as well as differing understandings of both transnationalism and integration. Following her research of the Afghan elite in the Bay Area, she shows that there is an important difference between the way in which integration affects transnationalism, which were largely a result of structural integration, and the way in which transnationalism affects integration, which were more symbolic or emotional and more related to socio-cultural integration; making it hard to test the relationships between
such differing types of examples, and requiring a further study that is arguably relying on additional in-depth, ideally long-term, research.\textsuperscript{17}

How can the findings of our empirical research be embedded into this theoretical discussion? Following Oeppen’s framework, our research provides data for an impact analysis that shows transnationalism and integration as mutually supportive processes (Please see Table 3). To begin with, what we see in the Turkish-German transnational migration space is that while citizenship acquisition does not materialize into a strong transnational political activism, it is at least acting as a means for easier travel arrangements. Many respondents in the Turkish sample mentioned having German citizenship or permanent residency in Germany as a tool for entering and re-entering that country. Thus, many of these people were physically spending at least two or three months of the year in Germany, despite the fact that they considered themselves as return migrants to Turkey. Moreover, many of such migrants were economically better integrated into the German market, thus could afford such physical travel.

Table 3: Impact analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impacts of integration on transnational activities</th>
<th>Impacts of transnational activities on integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship acquisition or acquiring permanent residence means ease of travel between Germany and Turkey</td>
<td>Renting of property in Turkey serves as a means to be spent in Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic integration allows greater resources available for transnational activities</td>
<td>Returning to Turkey for a temporary time allows migrants to appreciate their niche cross-cultural skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language knowledge becomes a valuable social capital enhancing mobility (e.g., among exchange students), as well as for transnational economic activities</td>
<td>Return (especially, “root search” returns of second generation) encourages them to reassess their life and solve their identity crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with non-Turkish people serves as a resource for transnationally oriented businesses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niche cross-cultural skills learned in Germany serves as a means for employment in Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On a different level, we see not only that people considered language skills to be an important resource to live in more than one country, but that language knowledge really acts as a valuable social capital enhancing mobility. The importance of language is stated by a respondent as:

Living conditions were not good for the Turks, but our standards of living were better than others. I think language was the most important factor for such an improvement. We still have children in Germany. And friends. We decided to come back after retirement. I was missing Turkey. I want to live in Turkey, but my husband prefers Germany. Therefore we spend a lot of time in Germany -6 months here, 6 months there. (Returned migrant, female, 69)

Besides transnational educational activities, language was also important for transnational economic activities. Many return migrants, especially the better educated and the second generation, presumably better integrated into German society, were using their language skills as an important asset in their businesses and/or employment. As a return migrant states:

One social capital that I gained in Germany is language. I used it to become a translator later on. (Returned migrant, male, 74)

Similarly, for such people their interaction with non-Turkish people in Germany helped them to acquire niche cross-cultural skills, which served as a resource for setting transnationally oriented businesses. As a successful entrepreneur who is also a return migrant states:

My entire business model is ninety percent German; for example, order! Also, my multi-national orientation is an advantage in business. I feel more comfortable with foreigners: the ‘us and them’ difference is avoided. (Male, 57)

Another respondent states:

I think living in Turkey as a German is an advantage because people think my educational background is stronger and trust my professional skills more. (Returned migrant, Male, 42)

Yet the evidence so far shows only the impacts of integration on transnational activities. What about the reverse action? Do transnational activities impact integration? The answer is positive. For example, the renting of property in Turkey serves as a means of income to be
transnationalism and integration are mutually supportive processes, suggesting an interactive relationship rather than a mere co-existence. As presented earlier, there is a range of empirical studies that have shown transnationalism and integration to be concurrent, but following Oeppen, findings from our research suggest that there is not only a connection between the two but a mutually supportive relationship. What differentiates this empirical study from previous research on transnationalism is that it takes into account multiple scales of activity and connections from local to international and recognizes the ability of these activities and connections to change between scales during the life course of migrants. Moreover, it underlines different types of transnationalism, i.e., both transnational activities and transnational consciousness, while allowing for comparisons across different contexts.

As underlined by Oeppen, in order to move forward with Morawska’s strategy towards theorising relationships between transnationalism and integration, further work is still needed. Research would also have to consider the impact of different types of integration, i.e., both structural and socio-cultural, which was not explicitly done in the earlier research. Furthermore, research on the subject should also take into consideration the societies and places that migrations

Conclusion

The examples that are drawn from the empirical research show how
are taking place, and needs to address what kinds of transnational activities at what stage in migrants’ lives reinforce their adaptation to their country of residence. It is also important to see if this relationship alters within other cases of transnational spaces in different parts of the world, especially in the South and the East; and analyse transnational networks on a more general level.

This research does not examine transnationalism, nor integration to a certain extent, as natural outcomes of globalization where everybody, not only the migrants, is becoming more transnational, which might be the case. However, what is attempted here is to analyse how different kinds of transnational activities at different stages in people’s lives emphasize their adaptation to their host countries. The research is also important in the sense that it is not only tackling the issue from a North and West perspective, but uses a comparative and very much linked context of a country of the South and the East, i.e., Turkey, with that of the West, i.e., Germany. Moreover, despite the fact that transnational networks are analyzed here within a detailed typology, the study makes the argument that transnational networks on a general level not only do not impede migrants’ integration in the host country, but reinforce it.
Endnotes

1 The empirical research was conducted within the framework of the European Commission FP 7 Project entitled “Transnationalisation, Migration and Transformation: Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism”, TRANS-NET, at http://www.uta.fi/projects/transnet/ [last visited 28 April 2012].


3 “Transnationalisation, Migration and Transformation: Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism”.


7 Ceri Oeppen, A Stranger at Home.


9 Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism, Abingdon, Routledge, 2009.

10 Ibid.


13 Ceri Oeppen, “Can We Build on Empirical Examples to Develop a Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Interactions between Transnationalism and Integration?”, conference paper presented as part of the workshop: Integration and Transnationalism: How are the Two Connected?, at the IMISCOE 8th Annual Conference, Warsaw, 7-9 September 2011.


16 Ceri Oeppen, “Can We Build on Empirical Examples”.

17 Ceri Oeppen, *A Stranger at Home*. 
50 Years and Beyond: The ‘Mirror’ of Migration - German Citizens in Turkey

Bianca KAISER*

Abstract

There are an estimated 90,000 – 120,000 German citizens living in Turkey. While laws and regulations pertaining to Turkey’s immigration regime mainly stem from the early years of the Republic, they have increasingly come under scrutiny. In an effort to keep up with the transformation of Turkey from a country of emigration into a country of immigration and at the same time, to align Turkish laws with the EU’s acquis communautaire, a reform process started in the late 1990s and is still going on today. This paper provides an overview of the heterogeneity of German citizens in Turkey, the general parameters shaping their transnational life-worlds and participation strategies, as well as citizenship issues and networking activities. The main conclusion is that there are heterogeneous groups of German citizens in Turkey with respect to their length of stay, civil and employment status etc., who have developed unique patterns of integration corresponding to their particular transnational life-worlds.

* Bianca Kaiser is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of International Relations at Istanbul Kemerburgaz University. She held the Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Integration from 2005-2011 at Istanbul Kültür University. Her main research areas are Germany’s foreign and European policies, migration in Turkey and Europe, and the external relations of the European Union.

Keywords

German citizens, Turkey, participation strategies, citizenship, European integration.

Introduction

This paper strives to celebrate the 50th anniversary of migration movements from Turkey to Germany by highlighting the fact that migration does not only occur in one direction but can and has taken place from Germany to Turkey as well. The term ‘German citizens/migrants’ encompasses all persons holding German citizenship, irrespective of double citizenship and/or ethnic background. The findings of this paper are based on the field research of a project on European Union citizens in Turkey in 2000-2001,¹ research conducted for the German-Turkish Summer Institute (2001-2002),² as well as individual research and interviews conducted between 2004 and 2010.

Based on the above-mentioned previous research and regular consultations with officials, today there are an estimated 90,000 – 120,000 German citizens...
living in Turkey although there are no official sources for these. Some of them are residing in Turkey permanently, while others split their time equally between Turkey and Germany (or even a third country), and some are leaving and re-entering Turkey every three months due to the requirements of the Turkish visa regime. Due to these differences in residence status and the absence of encompassing statistics, figures provided here can only be estimates. Among the group of EU citizens living in Turkey—a group estimated at 180,000-200,000, more than half are from Germany, underlining the closeness of relations in human terms between these two countries.

This article will outline the heterogeneity of German citizens living in Turkey, the particularities and commonalities of their transnational life worlds, and the participation strategies that they have developed accordingly by studying the legal situation, citizenship conditions and networking activities. The article will conclude that the scope of participation in political life and influence on decision-making regarding the immigration regime is limited.

Turkey: From Peripheral to Mainstream Migration Destiny

Migration of German citizens into Turkey has particularly increased since the 1980s, and has experienced new highs since 1999. There are the following major reasons for the perception of migratory flows between Turkey and Germany to have changed from a ‘centre-to-periphery’ (i.e. from Turkey to Germany) pattern to a ‘core centre’-to-‘outer centre’ (Germany to Turkey) pattern, thus shifting the perception of Turkey’s location from ‘periphery’ to ‘centre’:

Turkey’s increasing political and economic liberalization during the 1980s turned it into an increasingly attractive destination for migrants.

First, Turkey’s increasing political and economic liberalization during the 1980s turned it into an increasingly attractive destination for migrants. Turkey’s economic boom of the last decade has further strengthened this effect. Second, due to increased liberalization, Turkey has also started to become an attractive tourist destination since the mid-1980s. For many German citizens, a touristic visit has been the starting point for the decision to migrate. Third, Turkey’s ongoing – albeit halting – bid for full membership in the European Union has been a major force. In 1987, the formal application for full membership was submitted to
participation. As a consequence, German companies are sending managerial staff and their families to Turkey for limited periods of time. Furthermore, there has been a steady increase in Turkish-German marriages, amounting to several thousand each year; whereas in 1996 they amounted to 6,000 marriages, numbers had already risen to some 90,000 by 2001 and to an estimated 100,000 by 2007. Many of these bi-national families have decided to set up home in Turkey. Lastly, increasing numbers of Germans who visited Turkey initially as tourists decided to migrate to Turkey on a permanent basis.

Research on German citizens in Turkey is still limited. Many studies have concentrated on the long-established group of German citizens, the Bosporus Germans, whose roots of immigration go back to the Ottoman Empire. Few studies have analysed the dynamics of contemporary migration from Germany to Turkey. Some, however, have looked into the legal situation of EU migrants and other foreigners in Turkey as well as their integration into Turkish society. This article aims at providing a general comprehensive – if not exhaustive - overview of important aspects of the social and transnational life-worlds, participation strategies and citizenship issues of German citizens in Turkey. It is divided

Germany continues to be the most important trading partner of Turkey in the European Union.

the European Commission. In 1996, the Customs Union between Turkey and the European Union was established. At the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey was declared a formal candidate for full EU membership and started the accession process on 3 October 2005. This process has put Turkey literally on the political map for many Europeans. Fourth, rising Islamophobia and difficulties in finding adequate access to the labour market in Germany have resulted in the migration of Turkish-German binational families and, especially, young and qualified German-Turks to Turkey. And finally, Germany has, de facto, become a country of emigration since 2008, that is to say more people are leaving the country than entering it. As a multitude of reports and TV programs on emigration are revealing, many young people and families, and elder and retired people have opted to emigrate to, among other places, Turkey.

All of these factors have contributed significantly to an intensification of ties between Turkey and Germany. Germany continues to be the most important trading partner of Turkey in the European Union. German investments rank at the top among foreign investors in Turkey; today, more than 1,700 firms operate in Turkey with German financial
into the following parts: groups of German citizens in Turkey; the Turkish immigration regime affecting German citizens; citizenship issues; and networking activities and participation strategies.

Heterogeneity of German Citizens in Turkey

This section aims to demonstrate that German citizens in Turkey are quite heterogeneous when it comes to their reasons and purposes in migrating, as well as with respect to their legal situation (residence status and access to labour market), patterns of mobility and participation strategies. Depending on their personal circumstances and individual lengths of stay in Turkey they are affected by the Turkish immigration regime and citizenship issues to varying degrees. In order to identify these differences, German citizens are categorized into the following eight groups:

1. Posted personnel and their families:
   These are managerial staff in German businesses or Turkish-German joint ventures, teachers at foreign-language schools or universities, personnel of cultural institutions, research centres, and diplomatic and economic missions. Many of them are male; accompanying spouses are predominantly female. Usually, these migrants come to Turkey on limited work contracts (2-3 years, renewable once or twice) and residence permits. This system resembles a “guest-worker-system”, albeit one for white-collar workers. Accompanying spouses often do not have access to the labour market. This problem is gender-related and often restricts women to the role of homemaker.

2. German spouses of Turkish citizens:
   Most of these spouses are women; yet the numbers of male German spouses is also rising as more and more Turkish women study and work abroad and then get married. A large proportion of this group has established their official place of residence in Turkey and is affected by the legal constraints on foreigners with respect to access to the labour market. Problems, again, are gender-related. On the one hand, German women are largely confined to the role of homemaker and are therefore financially dependent on their Turkish spouses. In the case of divorce or death of the Turkish spouse, problems may increase if the German wife intends to stay in Turkey but is denied access to the labour market and, possibly, even residence. Extension of a residence permit is no legal right in this case (especially before 1998 hardship cases were reported), but the current bureaucratic practice is often to grant an extension if the migrant has lived in Turkey for a long time, the marriage has lasted at least three years, and the
presence of under-age children is documented. Male German spouses of Turkish citizens may equally experience difficulties, especially if they are trying to fulfil the traditional role of family breadwinner but are denied access to the labour market.

3. Descendants of German spouses of Turkish citizens: Most persons in this category have dual citizenship and therefore do not face the same legal problems as other migrants. However, dual citizenship may turn into an obstacle if a career in law-enforcement, the military or politics is envisaged. There is now a second and third generation, and even an emerging fourth generation of German migrants.

4. Retired German citizens: Increasing numbers of retired German citizens are buying property and settling along the Turkish sunbelt-coast, mostly in Antalya and Alanya but also in Bodrum and Marmaris. They have reported problems with regard to obtaining long-term residence permits. Many of them leave and re-enter the country every three months without the need to obtain a visa. The most recent reform of 1 February 2012, however, is limiting a stay without visa 90 days. It also foresees that shorter stays are added up so that upon departure the days spent in Turkey should not exceed 90 within the past 180 days.

5. Alternative life-style seekers: Members of this group tend to settle along the Turkish sunbelt-coast, or in large urban areas, especially in Istanbul. They often aim to make a new start in life, and generally belong to the age group of 40 to 50 year-olds. Many of them set up or are employed in small businesses in the tourist sector, or pursue free-lance artistic occupations. Most of them leave and re-enter the country every three months. This group is also affected by the changes in the visa regime as outlined in section 4 above.

6. German citizens of Turkish origin: Many of these are pink card holders. Pink cards (pembe kağıt) allow them basically the same rights as Turkish citizens with respect to residence, access to the labour market, inheritance etc. They are, however, exempted from political rights, that is to say they cannot stand for election or vote. The numbers of German citizens of Turkish origin migrating to Turkey due to a variety of reasons has lately increased significantly.

7. Erasmus and other exchange students: Since 2003/04 Turkey has been participating in the Erasmus Programme of the European Commission’s Life Long Learning Programme. This programme has so far enabled thousands of EU students, a large part of them from Germany,
structures of this community. Generally, all foreigners in Turkey are subject to the Turkish Law on Foreigners (Law No. 5683 of 15 July 1950). In some cases, however, bilateral agreements between Turkey and other individual states accord a special status to citizens of these states with regard to visa regulations on entering Turkey and their duration of residence in Turkey, in which case no permit is required. In general, the Turkish immigration regime distinguishes between foreigners (yabancı) and immigrants (göçmen); the latter category is determined by descent through ethnic origin.

8. **Bosporus Germans**: These are descendants of trades people, military personnel and academics who came to Turkey during the Ottoman Empire.14

9. **Refugees fleeing the Nazi Regime (1933-1942/3)**: During World War II, several thousand refugees (Jews and political activists) fled to Turkey from Germany. Many of those who stayed on after the war later adopted Turkish citizenship. Yet, some are reported to have dwelled in Turkey for generations as migrants without formal citizenship, experiencing the same constraints as other migrants.

**The Turkish Immigration Regime and German Migrants in Turkey**

The legal situation of German citizens in Turkey is a useful starting point for determining the scope and nature of transnational ties and organisational links to the community. Generally, all German citizens and all other EU citizens, are considered foreigners in Turkey and are subject to the renewable residence system.

German citizens, and all other EU citizens, are considered foreigners in Turkey and are subject to the renewable residence system. They may enter the country with a valid passport; they do not need to obtain a visa prior to entry, and they may stay in Turkey for up to three months without a residence permit. Regulations regarding the acquisition of property, for instance, depend on bilateral agreements.17 Known exceptions to the usual provisions relating to access to the labour market and residence
permits concern immigrants (as outlined above) from countries with ethnic Turkish minorities (like Northern Cyprus, Bulgaria, the Turkic Central Asian republics), and so-called blue-card holders (*mavi kağıdı*). These groups enjoy preferential treatment over other migrant groups. The following gives an overview of the main legal provisions applying to all, including German, migrants who are considered as “foreigners”.

**Residence Permit**

One of the most prominent characteristics of the Turkish Law on Foreigners is that it does not recognise the right to residence for migrants, i.e. for foreigners. Independent of the amount of time that a migrant has spent in Turkey, or of their purpose of stay (for instance, marriage to a Turkish citizen); s/he is never entitled to unlimited residence. Residence permits can be issued for periods of between six months and five years. Up until 1998, the maximum duration was two years only; unrestricted residence is still unknown. The decision to grant permission to reside in Turkey lies with the Foreigners’ Department of the Security Forces. Since September 2009, applications are no longer made to the Foreigners’ Office at the Headquarters of the Security Forces but to the individual district police departments in accordance with the foreigner’s place of residence. The new system has also introduced an e-appointment system designed to further facilitate a smoother bureaucratic procedure.\(^{19}\)

Since 2008, there are no more administrative fees required from German citizens (except for a small nominal fee to cover the expenses of the document itself). However, in the past administrative fees for a residence permit were relatively high and often changed due to high inflation in Turkey. In January 2001, it amounted to Turkish Liras 250,000,000 for a five-year permit. At that time, this was the equivalent of about 400 Euro, or about 1.5 times the average minimum monthly salary in Turkey.\(^{20}\) Slow administrative practice – although this is said to have improved in the large cities – used to cause hardships sometimes. Since 2005 though – after the decision of December 2004 to start negotiations for full EU-membership with Turkey on 3 October 2005 – both bureaucratic hurdles as well as, in the case of German migrants, administrative fees have been notably lowered and amounted to almost zero in the spring of 2009.

**Access to Labour Market**

Under Turkish law work permits for foreigners are issued independently of the residence permit. Regardless of duration of residence in Turkey, free access to the
labour market has not existed under any circumstance until 2003. Furthermore, a work permit was not given to the migrant who applied for it, but rather to the institution or firm s/he works for. This left the migrant in a conceivably weak and vulnerable position vis-à-vis the employer. Foreigners were denied access to a large number of – in fact most – professions. The Law on Activities and Professions in Turkey Reserved for Turkish Citizens of 16 June 1932 (Law No. 2007) provided a long list of professions that are exclusively reserved for Turkish citizens, among them almost all activities in the services sector. These included professions such as photography, tourist guiding, transporting persons, acting, singing, waitressing, interpreting, and all other employment in the production sector.21

There are also several other laws concerning different professions such as the medical professions, employment in television and broadcasting, the veterinarian profession, judges, public prosecutors and public notaries, engineers and the like, which also exclude foreigners in principle. Some stipulations, however, allow for exemption if a foreign citizen is able to pass a state examination in the field in question. Yet, reportedly, this seemed to be very difficult.

Meanwhile, a new law for foreigners was drafted and approved by the Turkish Parliament in 2003.22 In a statement by the Turkish Labour Minister in April 2001 on the occasion of a visit by the German Employment Minister to Turkey, it was announced that the new law would be passed by the end of 2001; yet, that did not happen. An attempt to include the law in the historic reform package of 3 August 2002, was also unsuccessful.23 The new law provides that under certain circumstances (five years of legal work in Turkey) an unlimited work permit may be issued.24 The issue of unlimited residence permits is not included, nor does a draft law concerning residence permits yet exist to this date.

The issue of free movement of persons in Turkey has received little political attention from the European Union, although, since the first Regular Report on Turkey of 1998,25 this issue has been brought up every year in subsequent regular reports, always concluding that “no progress” has been made. Whereas Turkish residents in member states of the European Union have been able to improve their legal situation by taking legal recourse to national courts within the EU or at the European Court of Justice, this has not been the case with German citizens in Turkey. There have been some 16 cases before the European Court of Justice involving Turkish-origin citizens in the European Union. Turkish law professors have argued that EU residents in Turkey, including Germans, have not been able to take their cases to
the European Court of Justice because they live outside the scope of jurisdiction of that Court, that is to say outside the territory of the European Union.  

German citizens in Turkey have mostly refrained from taking cases to the courts. An exception to this was a case concerning the prohibition of foreign educators at Turkish pre-school institutions. The Turkish Court of Appeal ruled on 25 August 2002 that this prohibition was introduced by decree. This contravenes the law, which does not provide for discretionary powers regarding the enlargement of the list of professions from which foreigners are excluded. Exclusion from certain professions can only be determined by law. Although the reformed labour law guarantees equal access of foreigners to the Turkish labour market, several individual acts of law will still be necessary to abolish the restrictions applying to various professions (doctors, lawyers, pilots, engineers, etc.).

**Insurance coverage**

Apart from the above-mentioned obstacles regarding access to the Turkish labour market, German citizens faced further difficulties with respect to insurance coverage. Before the health insurance reform of 2007, the Turkish state insurance system was divided into three categories:

1. **Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu (SSK)** - Social Insurances Institution for employees in the state sectors: This insurance also covers foreigners. There have, however, been reports of problems concerning pension rights and unemployment benefits – the latter only having been introduced in October 2001 in Turkey. This insurance covers only the most basic social benefits at the state hospitals (excluding university hospitals), which is usually of rather a low standard. Improvements could be observed for instance when in May 2006 the Turkish SSK together with its German counterpart first started to organize regular annual informational meetings about the conditions for retirement (emeklilik) in Turkey (Istanbul and Ankara) in Turkish and German.

2. **Emekli Sandığı** - General Directorate of Retirement Fund for civil servants: This insurance is much more comprehensive than the SSK insurance, but excludes foreigners as they cannot become civil servants. They may only benefit from this insurance as the spouse of a Turkish civil servant, but not in their own right. Problems were reported regarding old-age pensions from this insurance for surviving foreign spouses.

3. **Bağ-Kur** - Social Insurance Institution for Tradesmen and Craftsmen and
Increased international migration brought about by globalisation processes including increasing mobility systems have forced Germany and other countries to reconsider the definition of ‘citizenship’.

Citizenship

The definition of ‘citizen’ varies among different national contexts. The condition for citizenship can be based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* (parentage and blood relations) or on the principle of *jus soli* (birthplace); there are also hybrid cases which combine elements of both systems. Examples of all three systems can be found within the European Union. For instance, both Turkey and Germany basically apply the *jus sanguinis* principle. However, elements of the *jus soli* principle were incorporated into the new German citizenship law which came into effect in 2000. At the heart of this
change was the long-overdue political recognition that Germany is *de facto* a country of immigration. Increased international migration brought about by globalisation processes including increasing mobility systems, in which increasing numbers of people live today, have forced Germany and other countries to reconsider the definition of ‘citizenship’. An extension of political, social and cultural rights has also been observed. This is increasingly applied to foreign nationals residing within the boundaries of nation-states whose formal membership – citizenship through naturalisation – they have not (yet) obtained. The elimination of certain obstacles to obtaining formal membership is a further measure.

This development represents a rapprochement between two seemingly opposed basic political principles. One is the democratic idea of representative government, based on the principle of general suffrage. The other is the principle of the nation-state, which proclaims that only formal members can participate in political affairs. The reality of migrants being bound by obligations (e.g., abiding by the law, paying taxes) in the receiving countries without having any rights (e.g. the right to vote for political representatives who decide upon the obligations they have to fulfil) has led to a shift in attitudes. Increasing globalisation and expanding transnational spaces will warrant further changes in the future.

The normative category of ‘denizen’, first coined by Thomas Hammar in the field of migration research, designates a foreign national residing in another country, who has obtained a secure position within the receiving society without being a formal member of it (OECD: foreigner admitted to residence and certain rights). This category, however, does not exist in Turkey. For German citizens in Turkey access to the labour market is limited and restricted to areas of employment where there is a shortage (usually in education and at managerial level) of Turkish employees. Such provisions can also be found in other European societies, but not to the extent of excluding foreign nationals from as many professions as was the case in Turkey before the reform of 2003.

The issue of citizenship in the Turkish-German context documents the similarities between the Turkish and German legal systems: Both systems have based the right to obtain citizenship almost exclusively on the *jus sanguinis principle* (parentage and blood relations). Whereas the German legal system started to introduce elements of the *jus soli principle* (birthplace) into its new citizenship law of 2000, the Turkish legal system and all laws and regulations pertaining to foreigners and migrants are mainly bound by the *İskan Kanunu* (Settlement Law), Law No. 2510, of 1934. That law provides that only migrants of Turkish culture, with an objective of settling in Tur-
key, can obtain immigrant status (Art. 3), and that those of non-Turkish origin will not be accepted as immigrants in Turkey (Art. 4). This Law was reformed in 2006 but its main understanding of who can be an immigrant has not been substantially altered. A further complication for German citizens is posed by the fact that, due to the new German citizenship law of 2000, they need to first obtain the permission to apply for Turkish citizenship from the German authorities (Beibehaltungsgenehmigung). This permission is given only if the applicant can document ongoing close ties with Germany; it is valid for only two years.

A particularity with Turkish citizenship, seldom noticed, is that foreign women married to a Turkish citizen were entitled to obtain Turkish citizenship upon marriage. This option was not available for foreign males marrying Turkish women. This provision has been amended by the new citizenship law of 12 June 2003. It stipulates that foreign women will be subject to the same procedure as foreign males (i.e. legal residence of at least five years or a three-year marriage with a Turkish husband, a health certificate, knowledge of Turkish language, “good” moral behaviour etc.). In fact, the increased barrier to formal Turkish citizenship for foreign female spouses is due to an increase of, and alleged misuse by, women from central and eastern Europe.

On the other hand, in contrast to the numerous difficulties foreign nationals face in obtaining residence and work permits. Until the reform of Turkish citizenship law in 2002 formal citizenship could be obtained with relative ease when marrying a Turkish citizen. Here the threshold was much lower than in Germany and other EU countries. Citizenship could be applied for directly during the formal marriage procedure or within 45 days if the marriage took place outside Turkey. However, such an option was open only to foreign women. Foreign male spouses were, in this context, subject to discrimination. To them such an option was not available. Yet in the process of modifying the Turkish Law on Foreigners, a new bill was passed in 2002 to the effect that foreign female spouses no longer have an automatic right to obtain Turkish citizenship upon marriage. Just like male foreign spouses, they shall gain this right only after three years of marriage to a Turkish citizen. Until 1979, a foreign woman marrying a Turkish citizen automatically received Turkish citizenship. This is why, in the case of German women, dual citizenship was accepted by the German state. However, when the adoption of Turkish citizenship became an option in 1979, German women lost their German citizenship if they adopted Turkish citizenship.

As mentioned above, the acquisition of citizenship in Turkey is mostly based
upon the *jus sanguinis* principle. The Constitution provides for the *jus solis* principle only in exceptional cases, for instance, if a child born to foreign parents on Turkish soil would otherwise be stateless, if a foreign child is adopted by Turkish parents or, as mentioned above, in the case of marriage (for female foreign spouses only). The conditions for naturalisation are: a minimum of five years of uninterrupted residence in Turkey, an indication of the intention to live in Turkey (marriage to a Turkish citizen or the acquisition of property, for instance), good conduct and a sufficient knowledge of the Turkish language.  

### Networking Activities

The number of networking activities among international migrants in Turkey has been increasing commensurately with their increasing numbers. Yet among the various formal and informal cultural associations, German migrants in Turkey represent arguably the best organized example of networking activities. EU migrants in Turkey multiplied throughout the 1980s and, especially, in the 1990s. Likewise, an increase in networking and cultural activities has been observed in the large cities, along the Turkish sunbelt-coast and to a lesser degree along the Black Sea coast. These increased activities are basically due to the synergizing effect of the following factors:

- Rising numbers of migrants, especially throughout the 1990s as well as in the new millennium.
- In the case of German migrants, increased activities of the German Protestant and Catholic church in the large cities (particularly in Istanbul), the *Goethe Institute*, the German Embassy and its Consulates, the political foundations (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Heinrich Böll Foundation), trade delegations and other research institutions,
- Foundation of the interest group *Die Brücke e.V. – Deutscher Kultur- und Wohltätigkeitsverein* (‘Bridge – German Cultural and Charity Association’), which has association (*dernek*) status under Turkish law.
- A new association was founded in 2010: *Netzwerk Türkei* (Network Turkey), a transnational research platform for young academics working on Turkey in several countries, mainly in Turkey, Germany and England. The network is operating in three languages and thus expresses the transnational nature of mobility and the cosmopolitan outlook of primarily its young members.
- The municipality of Alanya has established a “Foreigners’ Council” to represent the interests of the large number of foreigners who have settled
in the area. The spokeswoman of the Foreigners’ Council is a German citizen, reflecting again the large number of German migrants in that area.

**Die Brücke**

*Die Brücke*\(^{39}\) has succeeded in establishing a network for the exchange of information and active lobbyism, not only among German and German-speaking residents (including Turkish returnees from Germany as well as Austrian and Swiss citizens) in Istanbul, but also among various German migrant groups that have formed in other areas of Turkey (Ankara, Izmir, Alanya, Antalya, Marmaris and Zonguldak), as well as among German returnees in Germany (Munich, Hamburg and Berlin). There are contact partners in all of these cities. Members of the association number around 800 and are contacted through a monthly newsletter. Most German residents in Istanbul and other urban areas appear to be aware of the existence of this association, even though they may not be members. An increasing number of German citizens had already made contact with it before migrating to Turkey, thus receiving practical information on how to get settled in Turkey. Yet as the use of the internet has become more prevalent among German migrants, the influence and importance of the network and its newsletter appear to be decreasing.

*Die Brücke* was formed at its constitutive meeting on 23 January 1990, with 90 persons present. The first newsletter was immediately published at the end of that month. By February 1990 there were already 300 members. In May 1992, *Die Brücke* gained status as a registered Turkish association. The overall goal of the association, in the words of its founding president Uschi Akin, is “to help improve and lobby for a better legal situation for German residents in Turkey.”\(^{40}\) Other goals include:

- bringing together German-speaking people;
- formation of a Turkish-German lobby;
- promotion of bi-lingual education for children from bi-national families;
- providing help for the acculturation process in Turkey;
- planning of cultural events;
- planning of social and charity projects.

During the formative years of the association, close cooperation between the Consulate General in Istanbul and *Die Brücke* played an important role. The Consulate General, for instance, helped to inform all German citizens registered at the Consulate in Istanbul of the formation of this association.
Furthermore, many events organised by Die Brücke have been carried out under the patronage of the General Consulate. The original idea of forming an association actually stemmed from former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl when, during an official visit to Turkey, he was approached by the president-to-be of Die Brücke for help in improving the legal situation of German residents in Turkey.41

When it comes to membership, women outnumber men by far; this fact is also reflected by the predominantly female organizers, many of whom have binational families and have therefore a long-term interest in improving their legal situation. Yet other groups of migrants are also represented: male spouses of Turkish citizens, posted employees and their families, German-speaking Turkish citizens with and without German citizenship, single German residents in Turkey, as well as German and Turkish citizens living in Germany. Altogether, membership of Die Brücke reflects the different groups of German-speaking residents in Turkey, with proportionate over-representation of female German spouses of Turkish residents.

The list of activities of Die Brücke is a long one. It ranges from coffee mornings to children’s play groups, from family outings to Christmas and Easter events, from extensive help in the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes in 1999 to supporting individuals (of both Turkish and German nationality) in need of medical, social or financial support, from monthly dinners for working women to bowling events, weekly discussion rounds and football matches for men, and other cultural events.

One of the major achievements of the association has been the founding of Avrupa Koleji – Europa Kolleg (European College) in Istanbul in September 1998. Born out of the long-acknowledged lack of adequate schooling for Turkish-German bi-lingual and bi-cultural children, this was the first school in Turkey to offer bi-lingual education in Turkish and German from pre-school to high school. It is a private Turkish school under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Education Ministry. Until 2006, when new legislation prohibited associations from being officially involved in educational facilities, Die Brücke had official advisory status in this school, especially with respect to methodological approaches in education, the development of curricula for German language instruction and the selection of teachers. Building upon the experience of Avrupa Koleji – Europa Kolleg, a similar school was opened in Izmir by the local branch office of Die Brücke in September 2001.

Another, albeit less spectacular, achievement of Die Brücke was achieved with regard to citizenship, already briefly mentioned above. While on the one hand Turkish laws have determined the
situation of German migrants, German laws on the other did not allow these migrants to adopt a second – that is to say Turkish – citizenship and have equally restricted it. *Die Brücke*'s lobbying efforts produced some results towards improving this situation in 2000. Prior to that date, the adoption of a second citizenship resulted in most cases in the loss of German citizenship for German citizens living abroad (this did not apply to their children).42 In the autumn of 1993 *Die Brücke* started a petitioning campaign for dual citizenship. In 1994 a petition was handed over to the German *Bundestag* in Bonn demanding dual citizenship for German women living in Turkey. This led to an enquiry by the oppositional Social Democrat Party (*Kleine Anfrage der SPD*) of the coalition government of CDU/CSU and FDP in 1995. Intensive lobbying continued, including talks with the former Vice-President of the German *Bundestag*, Dr. Burckhard Hirsch, and later with several Members of Parliament of the Green and Social Democrat Parties.

The coalition government of Social Democrats and Greens of 1998 introduced a new law on citizenship, which came into effect in January 2000. A new stipulation regarding permission to maintain German citizenship while adopting a new one was introduced specifically as a result of the lobbying efforts of *Die Brücke*. The law explicitly refers to German “women living in Muslim countries”. *Die Brücke* was not quite happy with this formulation, as Turkey is a secular country and this formulation reflects the usual bias. Parallel to lobbying German lawmakers, *Die Brücke* also intensified its efforts to bring about changes in the *Turkish Law on Foreigners*, which did not yield immediate results.

**Conclusions**

The situation of German citizens in Turkey outlined above presents only a small fragment of their social life-worlds, which is often characterized by its transnational character. Depending on the individuality of these migrants’ life-worlds, participation strategies are shaped. The most engaged form of lobbying for an improved legal situation can be observed within group 2 – spouses of Turkish citizens. The association *Die Brücke* has been evaluated at length and it has been found that its main agenda – and at the same time its motivation for action and activities – was born out of the restrictive legal space to which German migrants had been confined in Turkey. This legal space, on the other hand, is a transnational space in itself, determined as it is by Turkish laws (residence, access to labour market, citizenship) and by German laws (citizenship). In this context, another dimension has become increasingly important, i.e., the European dimension. During its negotiations for
full EU-membership, Turkey has started to place increasing emphasis on adopting the EU’s *acquis communautaire* (i.e., the whole set of common norms, values, rules and procedures applied throughout the EU).\(^43\) Repeatedly, the need for reform in order to comply with the EU *acquis* has been outlined in the European Commission’s annual progress reports on Turkey with respect to the application of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community of 1963 (commonly known as the Ankara Agreement), and subsequent decisions by the Association Council.\(^44\)

In Turkey, throughout the reform process of the new century, a new discussion has started centring on the different sets of rights for citizens (civil, political, social, cultural and economic). Next to the importance and dynamics of the domestic debates, this can also in part be attributed to the dynamics during the EU membership negotiation process, although – as is commonly acknowledged – the EU’s leverage has been considerably lessened since 2008/09.

Due to the acknowledgement that Turkey has *de facto* become a country of immigration, three modifications had already been made in 1998 to the Law on Foreigners, facilitating the issue of residence permits. Despite the reform of the Settlement Law, it is still not possible for a migrant without “Turkic roots” to obtain unlimited residence in Turkey and thereby achieve *denizen* status. Under certain circumstances, however, unlimited work permits can be issued. Restrictions on the access of foreigners to the Turkish labour market are also slowly being eliminated.

Lobbying activities to improve the legal situation of migrants as carried out by *Die Brücke* take place predominantly in Turkey, but also to a minor degree in Germany. This is true of political lobbying work in Ankara and Berlin, as well as interviews and contributions on radio and television programmes both in Turkey and Germany.\(^45\) Cultural activities, on the other hand, take place almost exclusively in Turkey, yet sometimes with participants from Germany who are invited to Turkey especially for that purpose. As outlined above, activities cover all aspects of life, including education, religion, politics, economics and law. The spatial compression of time has gradually intensified, both in terms of volume and speed of transactions due to the forces of globalisation, including increased and faster travel, as well as the increased speed with which information can be distributed through the internet. This is manifested in increased communication among members of the community, as well as by the appearance of *Die Brücke’s* website.

As for transnational linkage patterns, German citizens in Turkey have built up dense information structures. *Die Brücke*
alone has a widespread network of contact partners all over Turkey, as well as in Germany. The same actually holds true for the German-speaking Protestant and Catholic religious communities in Turkey, which are co-operating closely with each other on an ecumenical basis to reach as many members of their congregations as possible. They achieve this through newsletters, internet sites, telephone hotlines and, more traditionally, by organised visits to more remote parts of Turkey. All this presents efficient organisation and an increasing degree of institutionalisation. Yet it can also be observed that Die Brücke in its original form has a limited lifespan, as a generational change is taking place among first-time migrants in Turkey, and information structures and participation strategies are subject to change that will become more pronounced in the future.

A prominent example of the impact of transnational ties is the effect of lobbying on citizenship outlined above. Die Brücke has in fact brought about a change in, or rather an addendum to, the new German citizenship law, facilitating access to formal membership in Turkey for German citizens. Another important area of influence is the educational sector. Here a factual synthesis of the German and Turkish educational systems and philosophies had been attempted. In fact, the Avrupa Koleji – Europa Kolleg was a genuinely transnational idea. It sought to adapt the German integration model in the field of education to the Turkish experience. The Avrupa Koleji – Europa Kolleg itself is modelled and named after a group of German schools bearing the same name and educational philosophy in Kassel and Berlin. In fact, a partnership was established with the Europa-Kolleg in Kassel. It is to be noted with interest that, as with the legal space, the German-Turkish transnational space is enlarged by the notion of “Europe”. This demonstrates Turkey’s and Germany’s Europeanization as well as the Europeanization of the Turkish-German transnational space.
Endnotes


5 “Turkish-German Marriages on the Rise”, Turkish Daily News, 28 February 2002; It must be taken into account, however, that this figure does not even yet include Turkish-German marriages made outside Germany.


9 USAK (International Strategic Research Organization), Yerleşik Yabancıların Türk Toplumuna Entegrasyonu, USAK Report No. 08-04 (with the support of TÜBİTAK), September 2008.

10 The findings of this part are based on a series of semi-structured interviews conducted for an earlier study in Kaiser et al., “The Concept of Free Movement of Persons an Turkey’s Full Membership in the European Union”. For a detailed list of interview partners see Erlinhagen
et al., “Deutschland ein Auswanderungsland?”, p. 47; Interview partners included representatives from groups 1-5 on pp.106-107 of this article.

11 This classification is a modified and expanded version of Suzan Erbaş’ classification. For a very good overview of different life-worlds of German women in Turkey see the catalogue of the Turkish-German bi-lingual exhibition, _Berlin – Istanbul: Erinnerungen an eine neue Heimat_ by KulturForum TürkietDeutschland (ed.), within the framework of the Ernst-Reuter Initiative (a Turkish-German governmental intercultural initiative for dialogue and understanding).

12 Interview with the Head of the Foreigners’ Department at the Headquarters of the Turkish National Security Forces (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü) in Istanbul on 23 November 2001.


14 One of the main symbols of this immigration group is the foundation of the German society _Teutonia_ in 1847 in Istanbul, which continues to exist today. In 1897 the society moved to a building that is still called _Teutonia_ today and which celebrated its 155th anniversary in November 2002 in its newly renovated facilities. The building continues to serve cultural exchange activities, mainly by the _Goethe Institute_.


16 For more information see the new website for foreigners constructed by the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, at http://www.egm.gov.tr/yabancilar/birincisf.htm [last visited 7 January 2012].

17 For further information on acquisition of property, inheritance rights, burial etc. see, Bianca Kaiser et al., “The Concept of Free Movement of Persons and Turkey’s Full Membership in the European Union”.

18 Turkish citizens are usually required to relinquish their Turkish citizenship when they adopt German citizenship. ‘Blue cards’ (formerly ‘pink cards’) are a form of compensation for this group, abolishing restrictions for them which apply to other foreigners in Turkey. These include work and residence permits, inheritance rights, acquisition of property rights etc.

19 For more details see the official website of the Foreigners’ Office in Istanbul, at http://yabancilar.iem.gov.tr/ [last visited 1 January 2012].

20 For comparison: around the same time, administrative fees for residence permits in Germany amounted to DM 80,- for the first permit, DM 40,- for each renewal, and around DM 100,- for an unlimited residence permit.
For further information on this issue, see Tekinalp, “Aspekte des Niederlassungs- und Dienstleistungsverkehrs”.


Interview with Can Ünver, Director-General, Turkish Labour and Social Affairs Ministry, 6 September 2002.


As outlined in an interview by Prof. Dr. Aslan Gündüz, Professor of International Law at Istanbul Kültür University and former Director of the European Union Institute at Marmara University, on 5 October 2003.

Dr. Mehmet Köksal, a former long-standing board member and legal advisor of Die Brücke and trusted lawyer of the German Consulate Germany in Istanbul, was the legal representative for this case.

Recently, due to health care shortages, there have been reported efforts to liberalize the access to the labour market for foreign doctors, especially those from the Turkic Republics who have obtained their medical degrees in Turkey.

See the Regular Progress Reports on Turkey by the European Commission as quoted above.


See also Bianca Kaiser, “German Migrants in Turkey: The ‘Other Side’ of the Turkish-German Transnational Space”, in Thomas Faist and Eyüp Özveren (eds.), Transnational Social Spaces, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004, pp. 91-110.

The former pastor of the Protestant parish in Istanbul, Holger Neumann, has been awarded the German Bundesverdienstkreuz (Federal Cross of Merit) by the German President in October 2011. The parish continues to enjoy high publicity through the German state TV

35 For more information see the official website of Die Brücke, at http://www.bruecke-istanbul.org [last visited 01 December 2011].

36 Dernek means “association” or “eingetragener Verein – e.V.”.

37 See the official website at http://www.netzwerk-tuerkei.org/netzwerk-turkei [last visited 05 January 2012].

38 See the official website, at http://www.alanya.bel.tr/translationen/actual.asp?fID=1949 [last visited 06 January 2012].

39 Detailed information on Die Brücke can be obtained from http://www.bruecke-istanbul.org/ [last visited 9 May 2012].

40 Several interviews were conducted with Uschi Akın during the years 2000 and 2001 in the initial stage of the author’s research on German and EU migrants in Turkey.


42 The option of obtaining a special permission for obtaining a second citizenship was available at that time already. Yet, lengthy administrative procedures were discouraging, and results were mostly negative.

43 One indication is the above-mentioned court decision on banning foreign pre-school teachers from Turkish institutions. In its decision, the court has for the first time recognized the European Agreement on Settlement as part of Turkish national law. Turkey had ratified the Agreement in 1989.

44 Notably decision 2/76 of 20 December 1976 (esp. Arts. 2 and 3); decision 1/80 of 19 September 1980 (esp. Art. 6); decision 3/80 of September 1980 (esp. Art. 4). The full text of all is reprinted in Bülent Çiçekli, The Legal Position of Turkish Immigrants in the European Union, Ankara, Karmap, 1998. For further evaluation see also Harun Gümrükçü, “EU-Bürger in der Türkei: Die noch ausstehende Auseinandersetzung um ihren Assoziationsstatus”.

45 An example of the transnational nature of these activities is my own contribution on that subject in a TV program (Çözüme Doğru) on 14 April 2001, with Turkish and German participants of a conference on Turkish-German relations held in Istanbul on 11-13 April 2001. TRT International broadcasted the TV program both in Turkey and Germany. The Goethe Institute in Istanbul provided for simultaneous translation facilities during the course of the program.
Turkey-EU Migration: The Road Ahead

Philip MARTIN*

Abstract

About five percent of persons born in Turkey, or born to Turkish parents outside Turkey, some four million people, are in the EU-15 countries. Migration was the major relationship between Turkey and Western Europe for most of the past half century. Recent trade and development policies seem to have substituted trade for migration between Turkey and the EU. Turkey is a net immigration country, and net migration between Turkey and Germany has been negative in recent years, meaning that more German residents move to Turkey than Turkish residents to Germany.

Keywords

International migration, Turkey-EU migration, Mexico-US migration, migration and development.

Introduction

For most of the past half century, migration has been the major relationship between Turkey and most western European countries. Turkish workers were recruited to fill construction and manufacturing jobs in Germany, and other EU countries. The now EU-15 countries admitted a peak 150,000 Turkish guest workers in 1971, and most halted the recruitment of Turkish guest workers in 1973-74 (Austria continued to recruit Turks, Yugoslavs, and guest workers from other countries until the late 1980s).

After recruitment was stopped, unemployment rates in western European countries that had been very low during the late 1960s and early 1970s jumped as economies underwent structural changes in response to higher oil prices. Turks and other guest workers in Western Europe changed from being associated with employment to being associated with unemployment, as unemployment rates for guest workers were often double the rates of natives.

* Philip Martin is a professor of agricultural economics at the University of California, Davis where he also chairs the UC Comparative Immigration and Integration Program. He is the author of numerous studies and reports on immigration, including Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture (1993) and The Unfinished Story: Turkish Labour Migration to Western Europe (1991). He is the editor of Migration News and Rural Migration.
Newly arrived guest workers who lost their jobs had to leave, but those who had been in Germany and other western European countries a year or more were generally not required to leave even if unemployed. Most stayed and hoped for a quick economic recovery, since economies in Turkey and other migrant-sending countries were also reeling from oil-price hikes. However, many of the jobs for which guest workers were recruited did not reappear after economic restructuring, but many migrants nonetheless stayed, making family formation and unification more common than returns.

The result was a sharp change in the dependency ratio between the early 1970s and the early 1980s. Two-thirds of foreigners in Germany were employed in 1973, but only a third were employed in the early 1980s. Foreigner went from being associated with employment to unemployment and welfare dependency. This shifted the focus of migration discussions in migrant-receiving countries from labour and employment to discouraging immigration and promoting integration, policies that were often contradictory.

Before Turkey-EU accession negotiations began on 3 October 2005, there were several estimates of potential Turkish migration to the EU. Erzan et al estimated that one to two million more Turks may migrate to the EU-15 countries between 2004 and 2030 with high Turkish growth rates and free movement after 2015; if Turkish growth is slower, they estimated up to three million additional Turkish migrants. However, the model used by Erzan et al. was based on that used by researchers to estimate potential migration from central Europe to EU-15 countries, that is, migration flows were believed to be a function of income levels and employment rates at home and abroad and lagged migrant stocks to account for networking, so that some migration promotes more.

The Turkish government in the 1960s saw labour migration to western Europe as a window to faster economic development.

Elitok and Straubhaar reviewed the range of estimates of Turkey-EU migration after freedom of movement, noting that estimates ranged from 500,000 to 4.4 million additional Turks in Europe. However, they emphasize that Turkish migration pressure may be higher if Turkey remains outside the EU, which may slow Turkey’s economic growth and job creation.

Such models proved wrong in estimating how many Central Europeans would migrate. Fewer than 15,000 so-called A8 migrant workers were projected to move to the UK after 1 May 2004, but over a million arrived between 2004 and 2010. A Migration Advisory Committee
and economic development assumptions undergirded the Ankara Association Agreement of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1973 that promised Turkey a steady reciprocal lowering of tariff and migration barriers that were to culminate in Turks having “free access” to the then-EC labour market by December 1986.

Turks did not gain free access to EC labour markets in 1986, but Turkey applied for membership in the then-EC in 1987. Turkey switched from an inward-looking and statist-oriented economic model to an outward- and market- oriented model in the early 1980s, which increased foreign investment in Turkey and Turkish trade with EU countries. Turkey’s 1987 EC application was rebuffed, as was another Turkish accession bid in 1997. However, EU leaders put Turkey on a list of countries eligible for future EU entry in December 1999. Turkey reapplied, and Turkish-EU accession negotiations began in 2005.

Turkey-EU accession negotiations have been slow. Between 2005 and 2010, most of the 35 chapters of the EU acquis remain in negotiation.5 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says that Turkey’s “goal is full membership” in the EU, but the leaders of France, Germany, and some other EU member states argue that there should be some form of “special relationship” with Turkey rather than full Turkish membership in the EU.

---

Turkey-EU Migration

Guest Worker Recruitment

Organized Turkish labour migration to western European countries began with an October 1961 agreement between Turkey and Germany that allowed German employers to recruit Turkish guest workers. Turkey subsequently signed labour-recruitment agreements with Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

European labour-recruiting governments and the Turkish government made assumptions about this labour migration that were not fulfilled. Germany and other migrant-receiving governments assumed that Turkish and other guest workers would rotate in and out of their labour markets, and Turkey assumed that remittances and the return of workers with newly acquired skills would speed economic and job growth. These rotation
One reason some EU leaders fear Turkey’s full EU membership is the potential for more Turkish out-migration. The Turkish government in the 1960s saw labour migration to western Europe as a window to faster economic development. Otherwise unemployed or underemployed workers could go abroad to earn wages and learn skills, and their remittances would be invested to speed economic and job growth in Turkey after they returned. Expectations were high, and there was disappointment when labour migration did not turn out to be a panacea in a Turkey still largely closed to trade and investment and suffering from periodic economic and political crises.

Instead of using their newly-acquired skills in Turkish factories, most returning Turkish workers built or improved housing, bought land, and created small service businesses for themselves and their families. Migrating abroad helped individuals to improve their economic status, but did not lead to stay-at-home development in emigration areas; in some areas, emigration pressures may have risen rather than fallen.

Remittances helped to cover Turkey’s chronic balance of payments deficits, but did not generate job-creating investment. Just after the 1973-74 recruitment stops, the ILO echoed pessimism in Turkey about the development effects of out-migration by concluding: “the main economic benefits of emigration are far less certain than has been maintained hitherto. They may possibly be negative in the aggregate … sending countries need to keep their policies under close examination… The worst but not the most unlikely effect is that emigration breeds the emigrating sub proletariat of tomorrow.”

Between 1961 and 1973, a million Turkish workers went to Western European nations. Many stayed more than a year, so the stock of Turkish workers in Western Europe reached 1.3 million in 1973, including three-fourths in Germany. In 1973, when Turkey’s labour force was 15 million, including 10 million employed in agriculture, a sixth of Turks with nonfarm jobs were in Western Europe, and their remittances were five percent of Turkish GDP. There were over 1.5 million Turkish workers on waiting lists to go abroad in 1973.

The peak years of Turkish labour migration were between 1968 and 1973, when the Turkish Employment Service (TES) handled the exit of about 525,000 workers, 80% of whom went to Germany. Other Turks went on their own to Western Europe, found jobs, and received work permits. Especially at the beginning of Turkish-EU migration, most guest workers were from the western and more modernized parts of Turkey rather than the more rural east, and at least a third were classified as skilled by the TES, even though most filled unskilled jobs in Western Europe.
About 80% of Turkish migrants were men between the ages of 20 and 40.

In November 1973, the German government halted the recruitment of low-skilled foreign workers expected to be employed 90 days or more. When jobless guest workers began to unify families rather than return in the mid-1970s, the German government discouraged family unification, including making spouses wait several years before they could get work permits and designating German cities with more than six percent foreigners “overburdened” and off-limits to new foreigners seeking residence permits. In 1982, the newly elected CDU-CSU-FDP government, whose motto was “Germany is not a country of immigration,” offered return bonuses to jobless guest workers who gave up their work and residence permits, reducing the number of foreign residents by about 250,000.

Fears of an evolving underclass prompted the German government in 2000 to introduce birthright citizenship to children born to legal parents in Germany.

Turks were the largest group of foreigners in Germany in the 1980s, and family unification and births added to their number. After a 1980 coup in Turkey, some Turks applied for asylum in Germany and other European countries, producing an “asylum crisis” that was largely solved by requiring Turks to obtain visas. There was another asylum “crisis” in Europe in the early 1990s that included Turks but was dominated by nationals of the ex-Yugoslavia, and it was defused by first-safe country and safe-third country rules that limited access to the asylum system.

**Integration**

Turkish-EU labour migration has been on a declining trajectory over the past two decades. Turkey has been a net immigration country since the mid-1990s. Migrants from Turkish-speaking CIS countries and those transiting Turkey from North Africa and the Middle East far outnumber Turks emigrating to join relatives or seek asylum in EU-15 countries. There is still some labour out-migration from Turkey, as up to 100,000 Turks a year leave to work primarily in Middle Eastern countries or in the CIS countries, often as employees of Turkish construction companies.

The major migration-related issues involving Turks in Western European nations is integration and future migration. Turks, who were associated with employment in the early 1970s, are today more often associated with
non-work, as exemplified by low labour force participation rates and high unemployment rates. Fears of an evolving underclass prompted the German government in 2000 to introduce birthright citizenship to children born to legal parents in Germany; they must choose German citizenship by age 23 or lose it.15

In 2005, Germany implemented its first-ever regulated immigration system aimed at attracting highly skilled foreigners and investors, but also added requirements that foreigners seeking to renew their residence permits must participate in German language and culture classes. Since 2007, there are similar tests for foreigners seeking to join settled family members in Germany. Such _jus solis_ policies and “integration contracts” and language tests are becoming more common in European countries that recruited Turkish guest workers and worry about the integration of second and third generations.

**Turks in the EU**

There were 32.5 million foreigners in the EU-27 nations in 2010, including 31 million in the EU-15 countries. Over 20 million of these foreigners were not citizens of EU member states, that is, about 12 million foreigners in the EU-27 nations were EU citizens, such as Poles in the UK. An estimated two to four million of these foreigners are unauthorized.16

A larger number of EU residents, some 47 million, are foreign-born, meaning they were born outside the country in which they are now living, that is, there were about 15 million naturalized foreigners in EU countries. Most foreign-born residents are in four countries: Germany 9.5 million; France 7.1 million; UK, 6.8 million; and Spain, 6.3 million. As with all foreigners, over 90 % of naturalized citizens are in EU-15 member states.

The leading sources of intra-EU migrants are Romania, 2.2 million; Poland, one million; and Italy, almost a million. The leading sources of non-EU migrants are Turkey, about 2.5 million; Morocco, 2 million; and Albania, 1 million. Each nationality is concentrated in one or two EU countries, as with Turks in Germany, Moroccans in Spain and France, and Albanians in Greece and Italy.

Turkish data suggest 3.8 million Turkish citizens abroad in 2009, including 1.7 million in Germany, down from a peak 2.2 million in the late 1990s (many Turks are also citizens of the countries in which they reside). Germany had about three-fourths of Turkish citizens abroad in the early 1980s; today, less than half of Turks abroad are in Germany. Turkey had 1.3 million foreign-born residents in 2000, including almost a million who were Turkish citizens born outside Turkey.
Turkey-EU Migration: The Road Ahead

Unlike the declining trajectory of Turkish-EU migration in the past decade, Mexico-US migration increased after guest worker recruitment was stopped.

Turkey is doing well economically today, but has a very uneven economic growth record. To sustain its economic growth, most studies suggest that Turkey should invest more in the education of its workers, especially youth and women, in order to raise labour force participation rates, productivity, and wages. If the relatively large number of low-skilled Turks cannot be absorbed in a growing Turkish economy, some may consider migration to countries that have established Turkish communities abroad. However, EU economies have evolved in ways that reduce their demand for the low-skilled Turks who may be most likely to emigrate, highlighting the need to invest in the human capital of Turkish workers at home and abroad.

Mexico-US Migration

Unlike the declining trajectory of Turkish-EU migration in the past decade, Mexico-US migration increased after guest worker recruitment was stopped. The US admitted a peak 455,000 Mexican Braceros in 1956, and halted Bracero recruitment in 1964. There was not a sudden uptick in Mexico-US migration in the mid-1960s, and the US government maintained an attitude of benign neglect toward Mexico-US migration during the 1970s, as unauthorized migration began to rise in response to a debt crisis that led to sharp devaluations of the peso and made working in the US more attractive.\(^{17}\)

During the 1970s, Congressional representatives allied with unions several times tried to enact legislation that would impose federal sanctions or fines on US employers who knowingly hired unauthorized foreign workers. Their goal was, in the words of then Rep. Peter Rodino (D-NJ), to “close the labour market door to unauthorized workers.” However, conservative southerners such as Senator James Eastland (D-MS) blocked employer sanctions in the Senate on behalf of farmers and other employers who admitted that they hired unauthorized Mexican workers.

President Ronald Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) into law in 1986, when a record 1.8 million unauthorized foreigners were appended just inside the US border with Mexico. IRCA represented a grand bargain between restrictionists who believed that the top priority should be to deter the entry and employment of unauthorized foreigners and admissionists who believed that the first priority should be to legalize unauthorized foreigners. Some Hispanic
groups opposed IRCA because they feared that employer sanctions would prompt US employers to avoid hiring Hispanics to avoid fines.

The major feature of IRCA that shaped Mexico-US migration flows over the past quarter century were two legalization programs. One granted legal status to unauthorized foreigners in the US before 1982, and the other program legalized unauthorized farm workers who did at least 90 days of farm work in 1985-86. The two programs legalized 2.7 million people, 85% Mexicans, and especially the farm worker program set the stage for more Mexico-US migration. A sixth of the adult men in rural Mexico in the mid-1980s became legal immigrants under the so-called Special Agricultural Worker program. The families of SAWs were not legalized, under the theory that newly legalized Mexican farm workers wanted to maximize the value of their US earnings by keeping their families in lower-cost Mexico. This theory proved false.

Illegal Mexico-US migration rose in the 1990s due to SAW family unification and because there was little effective enforcement of employer sanctions laws. In a bid to curb discrimination against minorities, IRCA required employers to check the identity and right to work of each new worker hired, but employers did not have to verify the authenticity of the documents presented by workers. This check-but-do-not-verify policy allowed unauthorized workers to present false documents or documents belonging to legal workers to get hired. Employers faced little risk of fines, since they could say they did not know the worker’s documents were false. Employers could still lose unauthorized workers and production in the event of workplace raids, but there were relatively few enforcement raids.18

A combination of legalization, ineffective enforcement, and a US economic boom in the late 1990s spread unauthorized workers, primarily Mexicans, throughout the country. Many newly arrived unauthorized Mexicans bypassed farm jobs, their traditional port of entry into the US labour market, and went directly into US construction, manufacturing, and service jobs.

There was a brief slowdown in illegal Mexico-US migration in 2001-02 in the wake of the recession and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, but unauthorized entries rose sharply during the 2003-07 US economic boom. Both Mexican President Vincente Fox (2000-06) and US President George W Bush (2000-2008) endorsed proposals to legalize unauthorized Mexicans in the US and create new guest worker programs. However, restrictionists and admissionists in Congress disagreed on the key elements of immigration reform. The House in December 2005 approved an enforcement-only bill aimed at reducing unauthorized entries...
and employment, while the Senate approved a comprehensive bill in 2006 that included more enforcement as well as legalization and new guest worker programs. Unlike with IRCA in 1986, restrictionists and admissionists were unable to compromise, and immigration reform died in the Senate in 2007.

The number of unauthorized foreigners, almost 60% Mexicans, peaked in 2008 at 12 million. Since then, the number of unauthorized foreigners has fallen by a million, reflecting the impacts of the 2008-09 recession, which more than doubled the US unemployment rate from less than five percent to almost 10%. Unauthorized workers were concentrated in some of the industries that lost many jobs in 2008-09, including construction, but relatively few appear to have returned to their countries of origin. Instead, most of the unauthorized remained in the US. The declining stock was due to fewer new entries and some unauthorized becoming legal immigrants (about 60% of legal immigrants are in the US when they obtain immigrant visas).19

As the US economy rebounds, unauthorized migration will provide a test of regulations versus markets.

An estimated 40% of Mexican residents had at least one US relative in 2010, and the share of Mexicans with US relatives is even higher in the major areas of origin for US-bound migrants, west-central and southern Mexico. As the US economy rebounds, unauthorized migration will provide a test of regulations versus markets. Will Mexicans try to enter the US and find jobs despite 21,000 Border Patrol agents and 700 miles of fencing on the Mexico-US border? Will more audits of the I-9 forms that US employers are required to complete for each new hire deter unauthorized workers from seeking entry or simply circulate them from one employer to another?

The federal government remains deadlocked on immigration reform, but many state and local governments are trying to discourage unauthorized foreigners from living and working in their jurisdictions with laws that require employers to use the federal government’s voluntary E-Verify system to check the legal status of new hires, require police to determine the legal status of those they encounter or arrest, and require landlords to check the legal status of renters. These attrition-through-enforcement laws, symbolized by Arizona’s SB 1070 law enacted in April 2010, have not yet been implemented because of court injunctions; nonetheless, five other states enacted similar attrition-through-enforcement laws in 2011. If the authority of state and local governments
to enact restrictive immigration laws is upheld, the US could develop a patchwork of laws aimed at reducing unauthorized migration.

**Perspective: Turkey-EU and Mexico-US Migration**

Turkey’s economy expanded by almost 4% a year between 2000 and 2009, making Turkey an “economic star” among the world’s middle-income developing countries. Despite rapid economic growth and Turkey acting as a net immigration country, there are still fears of “mass migration” from Turkey if Turks had freedom of movement rights after Turkey became a full member of the EU.

The key challenge for both Mexico and Turkey is creating good jobs that keep potential migrants at home.

Turkey has opened its economy to foreign investment and trade, shrunk the role of state-owned enterprises, and undergone a political transformation, raising the question of whether these changes are sufficient to believe that the era of mass out-migration is unlikely to resume in Turkey. Comparing Turkey with Mexico may help to shed light on potential Turkey-EU migration.

Mexico had 111 million and Turkey 74 million residents in 2010 (PRB). Although fertility rates have dropped substantially, the Mexican fertility rate of 2.2 in 2010 and the Turkish rate of 2.1 are higher than rates in the major (potential) destinations for their migrants, the US (2) and Germany (1.3). The demographic issue is not so much migration pressure after 2025, when the Mexican and Turkish populations are projected to be 123 and 85 million, respectively, but how to manage migration and integration until demographic and other inequalities narrow.

The key challenge for both Mexico and Turkey is creating good jobs that keep potential migrants at home. In most OECD countries, half of the population is in the labour force. For example, the US population was 310 million and the labour force was 154 million in 2010. The share of the population that is in the labour force is lower in Mexico, about 42%, and even lower Turkey, about 31%.

Labour force participation rates (LFPRs), the share of work-eligible persons employed or looking for work, are also lower in Mexico and Turkey. LFPRs are typically about 65% (64% in the US in 2010) in OECD countries, but only 60% in Mexico and 50% in Turkey. Women are half of the labour force in most OECD countries, but the
female share of the labour force is only 37% in Mexico and 31% in Turkey.

Among those in the labour force, un- and under-employment is more prevalent in Mexico and Turkey than in other OECD countries, and a higher share of workers in Mexico and Turkey are employed in agriculture. Workers in informal jobs and employed in agriculture may include potential migrants. In both Mexico and Turkey, unemployment rates are similar to those in the major destination countries, but under-employment rates are much higher. In Mexico, for example, the number of full-time, private-sector jobs covered by the Social Security system (IMSS) has been stable at about 12 million for the past decade, even though the labour force rose by seven million. In Turkey, a third of workers in urban areas and three-fourths in rural areas were not registered with the social security system (SGK) that provides health insurance and pensions in 2005.

Many of the underemployed Mexicans and Turks are in agriculture, which included eight million Mexicans and 8.5 million Turks in 2008 according to World Bank Indicators. The value added by those employed full-time in agriculture is relatively low, about $3,300 in both Mexico and Turkey in 2008, suggesting that many farmers and farm workers would move to higher wage nonfarm jobs if they could. Agriculture in both countries is shrinking. The share of employment in agriculture fell sharply in Mexico over the past two decades, from a quarter to an eighth of workers, and in Turkey from almost half to a quarter of workers. However, the roughly eight million workers still employed in agriculture in each country include, with family members, 25 to 30 million people.

Few people with formal wage and salary jobs migrate, so the keys to reducing migration pressure are reducing underemployment in agriculture and creating wage and salary jobs. The labour forces of Mexico and Turkey are a smaller share of residents than the OECD average, where half of the population is in the labour force. In Mexico, only 42% of residents are in the labour force and in Turkey only a third. In most OECD countries, over 80% of those in the labour force are wage and salary employees, but only 63% of workers in the Mexican labour force are wage and salary employees and 54% in Turkey. If half of the residents of Mexico and Turkey were in the labour force, and if 82% of workers were wage and salary employees, Mexico would have 16 million more wage and salary employees and Turkey 17 million more.
Table 1: Mexico and Turkey, Population and Labour Force, 2005-09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (Mils)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour Force (Mils)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour Force/Population (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employee Share of Labour Force (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W&amp;S Employees (mils)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>If LF/Pop Shares were 50 %, LF (mils)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>If 82 percent of persons in LF were W&amp;S employees (mils)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference: Potential W&amp;S employees minus actual (mils)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Mexico and Turkey have had roller-coaster economic growth trajectories over the past quarter century. In some years they had the fastest-growing economies in the OECD, while in other years they suffered severe recessions and currency devaluations. Throughout these economic fluctuations, both Mexico and Turkey have been marked by high ratios of economic to labour force growth and even higher ratios of economic to wage and salary growth, indicators of so-called jobless growth.
Economic growth can be associated with employment growth, productivity growth, or both. Mexico and many Latin American countries have relatively high ratios of economic to employment growth that some attribute to slow productivity growth, while Korea is often cited as an example of an economy that achieved a triple play, that is, high economic, employment, and productivity growth.

Sustained economic growth and formal sector job creation are the keys to stay-at-home development. Between 2005 and 2009, Mexico’s economy expanded an average 1.3% a year and Turkey’s 3.2% a year. Mexico’s labour force expanded faster, an average 1.7% a year, while Turkey’s labour force was stable at about 25 million. Wage and salary employee growth was strong in both Mexico and Turkey, but creating an average 600,000 wage and salary jobs a year in Mexico, and 420,000 a year in Turkey, is not sufficient to absorb new job seekers and workers who have informal jobs, including unpaid family workers on farms and in small businesses.

### Table 2: Mexico and Turkey, Economic and Job Growth, 2005-09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force growth (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio: Economic growth to W&amp;S employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W&amp;S Employees Growth (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio: Economic growth to W&amp;S employees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Economic growth, World Bank; W&S employees, OECD

Economic growth is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
Both Mexico and Turkey need sustained economic and formal-sector job growth to reduce out-migration and reassure the US and Western European countries that there will not be significant out-migration. The issue is how to achieve faster economic and wage and salary job growth. The usual recommendation is to adopt the Scandinavian flexicurity approach to labour markets that protects workers rather than jobs, that is, makes it easy for employers to hire and fire and provide generous unemployment and retraining benefits to laid-off workers.

This is the opposite of the practice in Mexico and Turkey, which rank among the most restrictive OECD countries in employment protections (along with Portugal). Labour market restrictions are one reason cited frequently to explain slow formal sector job growth despite economic growth, and why the number of formal jobs does not fall significantly in recessions. Such employment behaviour is typically of insider-outsider labour markets, where workers employed by government and in private jobs subject to effective government regulation, such as large firms and multinationals, have extensive work-related benefits and protections.

There have been many analyses of labour market inflexibilities in Mexico and Turkey. The World Bank\(^{30}\) emphasized Turkey’s high severance pay,\(^{31}\) restrictions on temporary employment,\(^{32}\) and high UI premiums as examples of policies that protect insiders with jobs but discourage formal-sector job creation. One result is that hours worked in Turkish manufacturing averaged 52 a week in 2004,\(^{33}\) more than the 45 a week in Mexico and the 38 a week in the EU-15 countries,\(^{34}\) suggesting that manufacturers would rather pay overtime than hire more workers. Three groups of workers were singled out as hurt by Turkish policies that protect insiders: women who migrate from rural-to-urban areas and drop out of the labour force (they were considered employed in agriculture), young university graduates who have trouble finding jobs, and men 55 and older.

Mexico and Turkey share several similarities. Mexico is the third most populous country in the Western Hemisphere, after the US and Brazil; Turkey is the third most populous country in Europe, after Russia and Germany. Economic crises in the 1980s prompted both Mexico and Turkey to change from inward-looking and state-centred economic policies to favour trade and seek foreign investment to create jobs and stimulate exports.
The US attitude toward Mexican migration encapsulated in NAFTA was to promote trade and investment, but not provide aid and or promise the free movement of labour. The EU attitude toward Turkey has been to promote economic integration in a bid to speed development while delaying free movement of workers for fear of “too many” Turkish migrants. The US government spends far more to control the Mexico-US border than aid for Mexico, while Turkish-EU accession negotiations appear frozen even as Turkey-EU economic integration deepens.

There are also outlook differences. Mexico, whose economy grew 5.5% in 2010, is sometimes portrayed in the US media as a country in the midst of drug wars that resulted in about 35,000 deaths between 2006 and 2010. There is a danger that drug violence could reduce foreign investment and tourism just as government revenue from Pemex begins falling, which would restrict the ability of the government to finance the education and infrastructure needed for sustained economic growth. Mexican observers emphasize that political changes and reforms have increased democracy and made the Mexican president and federal government weaker at a time when the government must confront tough choices, including opening the oil sector to foreign investment, reforming the labour market to speed formal-sector job creation, and dealing with poor people and lagging regions.

Over 75% of Mexicans live in urban areas, but most of Mexico’s poor people,
Turkey has had five financial crises and recessions in the past three decades, beginning with a foreign debt crisis in 1979 followed by economic reforms in the early 1980s, another crisis in 1994, another in 1998-99 in the wake of the Russian financial crisis, and another in 2001. Most of these crises were resolved with IMF support that was to be accompanied by structural reforms that emphasized privatization of state enterprises and reductions in government activities, and during the 2002-07 period, Turkey attracted significant FDI that generated rapid economic growth.40 The 2008-09 global economic crisis affected Turkey, but Turkey's economy bounced back quickly, so that by 2011 Turkey was expected to have the fastest-growing economy in the OECD.

Political gridlock slows labour market and business reforms that could speed up formal sector job growth. Presidential elections in July 2012 may result in a continuation of political gridlock.

Political gridlock slows labour market and business reforms that could speed up formal sector job growth.

Turkish voters re-elected the ruling AKP party in June 2011, giving Turkey its third consecutive single-party government. There is tension between the AKP and the secular-nationalists in the military and judiciary, but constitutional reforms approved by voters in September 2010 are likely to reduce the influence of the military and

and most Mexicans who migrate to the US, are from rural areas. NAFTA opened Mexico to trade in farm commodities, but Mexican government subsidies for agriculture (Procampo) do not help many poor farmers to change crops, make the transition to larger farms, or move to nonfarm jobs.38 Instead, the Mexican government is trying to break the cycle of poverty by making cash payments to poor mothers whose children attend school and receive regular health checks. Some urge further expansion of this conditional-cash transfer Opportunidades program, while others argue that Opportunidades payments “buy off” the poor and reduce the urgency of the fundamental reforms needed to ensure faster economic growth.39

Political gridlock slows labour market and business reforms that could speed up formal sector job growth. Mexico has internationally competitive multinationals ranging from Bimbo (bread) to Cemex (cement) that face little competition at home, so that prices for the products produced by Mexican multinationals may be higher in Mexico than abroad. If there were more competition in Mexico, prices for Mexican consumers may drop, reducing the cost of living and providing an opening for smaller firms to compete, which could spur job creation. Presidential elections in July 2012 may result in a continuation of political gridlock.
reform the judiciary over time. There is a significant backlog of economic reforms, including tax and labour market reform. Turkey runs a current account deficit that is financed by capital inflows, which can accentuate inflation and, if foreign capital leaves quickly, lead to a sharp devaluation. Turkey has a particular problem generating enough good jobs for urban women and for youth, including youth with education.41

Conclusions

Turkey is an upper middle income developing country poised to grow faster as a result of globalization and closer economic integration than richer countries such as Germany that have been destinations for Turkish workers. Turkey, a dynamic society with a fast-changing economy, had large-scale emigration before economic policies changed from inward-looking and import-substitution efforts to outward-oriented and export-promotion policies.

The fact that migration came before trade, and that many EU countries fear more hard-to-integrate Turks if Turkey joins the EU and Turks gain freedom-of-movement rights, complicates closer economic integration. A large share of Turkish workers is employed in agriculture and in the informal sector. Few workers with formal sector jobs migrate, suggesting that the challenge facing the Turkish government is how to speed up stay-at-home development, that is, steady economic growth that creates enough good jobs to employ new labour force entrants, those leaving agriculture, and those employed in the informal sector and not now in the labour force.42

Turkey has some of the strongest employment protection laws and lowest levels of formal sector jobs among OECD countries, which may help to explain relatively low levels of labour force participation and the paucity of wage and salary jobs. If Turkey had levels of labour force participation and wage and salary jobs equivalent to the average for OECD countries, Turkey would have 17 million more wage and salary employees. The policy challenge is to move from the current insider-outsider labour market to a labour market that offers formal sector jobs, perhaps with fewer protections, to more workers. Without such reforms, Turkey may find efforts to liberalize migration blocked by fears of actual or potential migrants. The goal is a world of few migration barriers and little unwanted migration, which can be achieved most easily if fears of mass migration ease.
Endnotes

1 Philip Martin, “Germany: Managing Migration in the 21st Century”, in Wayne A. Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield (eds.), Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004. Some of the increase in the number of Turks in the early 1980s reflected the arrival of asylum seekers. Germany and some other European countries did not require visas of Turks until a military coup in Turkey in 1980 sent over 50,000 Turkish asylum seekers to Germany. Germany imposed visa requirements on Turks, and the number of Turkish asylum seekers dropped.


5 The Economist in March 2011 reported that only the acquis chapter dealing with science had been concluded, and that there were no negotiations on 18 chapters.

6 Elitok and Straubhaar, “Turkey, Migration and the EU”, p. 11.


11 The TES registered Turks wanting to work abroad, and German or other foreign employers selected the workers they wanted to hire from TES recruitment lists. Over time, foreign employers were more likely to specify the Turkish workers they wanted to hire by name.


13 Martin, “Germany: Managing Migration in the 21st Century”.

14 Foreigners seeking asylum were required to apply in the first-safe country they reached, and its decision was binding on other countries, and foreigners from “safe-countries” were deemed generally not in need of protection.

20 The OECD puts the 2009 population of Mexico at 108 million and of Turkey at 71 million; PRB (www.prb.org) puts the 2010 population of Mexico at 111 million, and increasing by 1.5 million a year, and the population of Turkey at 74 million and increasing by 890,000 a year. About 29% of Mexicans are under 15, and 26% of Turks are under 15.
21 Most Mexicans migrate to the US, which had 310 million residents in 2010, a population growing by 1.9 million a year, and 20% of residents under 15. Germany, the EU country with the most Turkish and Turkish-origin residents, had a 2010 population of 82 million shrinking by 160,000 a year; 14% of residents are under 15. Austria had a stable 8.4 million residents, and 15% were under 15.
22 In all OECD countries including Mexico and Turkey, employment in 2009 was 540 million, including 26 million in agriculture.
23 World Bank, “Turkey Labour Market Study”, 14 April 2006, p. iii; More recent data suggest that 9.4 million of the 21.1 million Turkish workers in 2009 were not registered with the state social security system called Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu (SGK).
24 It was reported that total employment in Turkey rose from 16 million to 22 million between 1980 and 2004; employment in agriculture fell from 8.4 million to 7.4 million during these years. See, Ibid., p.v.
25 According to the OECD, 84% of the 154 million-strong US labour force were wage and salary employees in 2009, while 81% of the 42 million strong German labour force were wage and salary employees.
26 With half of the population in the labour force, the Mexican labour force would have been 54 million rather than 45 million in 2009, and the Turkish labour force would have been 36 million rather than 24 million in 2008 (both numbers would be higher using PRB population data). Applying 82% wage and salary workers to the enlarged 54 million Mexican labour force would mean 44 million wage and salary employees, 16 million more, and applying 82% to the enlarged 36 million Turkish labour force would mean 29 million wage and salary employees instead of 13 million, 17 million more (rounding).
27 Volatility in economic growth and inflation are associated with slower growth in jobs and per capita GDP growth.
28 OECD labour force data suggest that Turkey’s labour force was stable between 2004 and 2009 at about 25 million, but the number of wage and salary employees rose from 11 million to 13 million.
30 World Bank, “Turkey Labour Market Study”, p. i.
31 Turkish workers with 20 years of employment are entitled to 20 months of severance pay, versus an average six months in OECD countries. See, Ibid., p.x. However, not all workers
who should receive severance pay in fact receive such pay, including requiring new hires to
sign undated resignation letters and negotiating with workers to pay them a fraction of the
severance pay due; public sector workers and those employed in the largest firms normally
receive stipulated severance pay. Employer-employee benefit costs averaged 36% of wages in
2005.

32 The 2003 Labour Code allows temp agencies to operate, but restricts employers to using
temp workers only when “objective” reasons exist, such as for seasonal work. See, World
Bank, “Turkey Labour Market Study”, p. xi.

33 Employer pension contributions are based on days rather than hours worked, another factor
encouraging long hours of work.


35 Turkey had major devaluations in 1980, 1994 and 2000-01.

36 Crude oil production is expected to decline from 2.6 million barrels a day in 2010 to 2.1
million in 2015.

37 Mexican health, pension, housing and other social programs are financed by employment-
related taxes, which increases the non-wage cost of hiring formal sector workers. Efforts to
reform labour laws in 2010 stalled.

38 Philip Martin, Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture, Washington, DC, Institute

39 Mercedes González De la Rocha and Agustín Escobar Latapí, “Choices or Constraints?

40 Rodrik argues that Turkish economic growth should be fuelled by domestic savings rather
than FDI, since FDI increases the current account deficit and the exchange rate. Rodrik
argues that Brazil, which also has high real interest rates, is the appropriate model for Turkey,
which should reduce government spending in order to allow the central bank to reduce
interest rates and stimulate domestic investment. Rodrik believes that Turkey must keep its
current account deficit at three percent or less, raise the domestic savings rate from 16 to 28
percent, and intervene to prevent the lira from becoming overvalued. Dani Rodrik, “The
Turkish Economy after the Crisis”, Turkish Economic Association, Discussion Paper 2009/9,

41 One reason for difficult school-to-work transitions for young men is military conscription,
which is generally 15 months (12 months for university graduates). Most employers do not
offer formal jobs to young men until they have completed their military service. Some argue
that conscription contributes to the brain drain from Turkey. Turkey, a country with less than
a fourth the US population, has over 500,000 active military personnel, compared with fewer
than 1.4 million in the US.

42 Harry Flam, “Economic Effects of Turkey’s Membership on the European Union”, in
Bernard M. Hoekman and Sübidey Togan (eds.), Turkey- Economic Reform & Accession to the
European Union, Washington, DC, Co-publication of the World Bank and the Centre for
The term ‘globalization’ has been commonly used to describe the incrementally increasing pace of international relations in the 21st century. Geopolitics, which is a method of political analysis emphasizing the role of geography in international relations, seems anachronistic as a way to comprehend the complex realities of the world at a time of space-time compression. Indeed, this is true for a determinist geopolitical analysis solely relying on constant geographical factors to explain foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, this does not mean that scholars can neglect geopolitical factors when attempting to pursue a proper geostrategy. Even at a time of accelerated globalization states endeavour to expand their influence over resources (such as oil) and trade routes (e.g., sea lanes, not only for the flow of transportation of oil, but also for military purposes) for strategic objectives. Hence, complex geopolitical approaches are required to provide relevant and more realistic analyses to explain changing geopolitical factors that influence foreign policy decisions at a time of geopolitical change and a power shift to the east, to Asia-Pacific.

In Great Powers and Geopolitical Changes, Jakub J. Grygiel has developed a geopolitical approach. With a cautiousness to avoid determinism, the author examines the concept of geography as an independent variable and focuses on the interaction between geopolitics and geostrategy. According to Grygiel’s interpretation, geography is a combination of two factors: immutable geological facts (such as the patterns of lands, seas, rivers, mountain ranges, and climate zones), and the human capacity to adapt to them through changes in production and communications technology. The outcome of this combination of geography and human activities has three variables: the layout of trade routes, the location of resources, and the nature of state borders. This prompted Grygiel to assume that “geography is a geopolitical reality to which states respond by formulating and pursuing a geostrategy” (p. 1). Geopolitics, which is the human factor within geography such as opening new trade routes and technological innovation in transportation and/or...
communication, exists independently of politicians’ strategic motivations or their geostrategy. On the basis of this intellectual vantage point, the author formulates his main argument: “the most successful states are those that match their geostrategy to the underlying geopolitical reality” (p. 20). States that protect their home territory (and their proxies), and politically control resources and their transportation routes will increase and maintain their relative power.

Following this conceptual examination, Grygiel tests his argument by shedding light on three great powers of their time: Venice, the Ottoman Empire, and Ming China. By considering the tremendous geopolitical changes of the 16th century—the discovery of the Americas and the Cape of Good Hope thereby decreasing the importance of Eurasia in favour of Europe’s Atlantic coast and Asia’s pacific coast—as independent variables, the author engages in examining the relative power status of those great powers. Grygiel finds that the match/mismatch between geopolitics and geostrategy of those great powers played a determining role in their rise and fall.

In the case of Venice, for instance, its advantageous location at the access point to the European markets for eastern wares and its eastward foreign policy orientation with system of bases and allies had made Venice a great power. As its geostrategy, which had been directed towards the Italian mainland since the late 14th century, diverged away from the changing geopolitical reality, the Venice Empire was doomed to decline. Likewise, the geopolitical positioning of the Ottomans led to its emergence as regional leader, controlling south eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. However, its geopolitical positioning and particularly its long continental borders constrained the continental power of the Ottoman Empire to develop a (naval) geostrategy to match new geopolitical realities in the 16th century. Indeed, in the mid-16th century, the Portuguese Sea Empire defeated the Ottoman Great Armada in Cairo marking an end to Ottoman ambition to politically control new trade routes running through the Cape of Good Hope to Indian Ocean. Hence, the Ottomans’ landlocked geopolitical situation limited their ability to recalibrate their geostrategy to geopolitical changes in the 16th century, thereby paving the way for their eventual fall. In a similar vein, the rise of Ming China between 1364 and the 1450s had been the product of matching geopolitical reality and geostrategy. During that period, the Ming’s geostrategy achieved success in finding a balance between China’s land borders and extending its influence over the main maritime trade routes in Asia. Later in the mid-15th century, as securing unstable land borders in the north began to consume much of China’s resources
and attention, the Ming dynasty made a misguided geostrategic decision to withdraw from the ocean trade routes. This led China to lose its control over key Asian trade routes connecting it with Europe, thereby hastening the Ming dynasty’s decline.

Following this comparative historical analysis of past great powers, Grygiel draws lessons for the United States in the last chapter of the book. The author highlights this historical lesson: “the understanding of geopolitics and the necessity to reflect it in foreign policy remain vital” (p. 167). By considering the rise of China as a great power (combined with a weak Russia in Eurasia) and the unravelling of the transatlantic bloc as two significant geopolitical changes of our century, Grygiel propose that US policymakers should re-evaluate their geostrategic priorities by forming new alliances (e.g., engaging in new strategic partnerships with states on the northern and north eastern border of China) and developing new (military) technologies to be more deterrent in Asia.

All in all, Great Powers and Geopolitical Changes has achieved its pledge to provide a non-deterministic geopolitical account to serve as a persuasive response to arguments against the importance of geopolitics in the age of globalization. In addition, Grygiel does a great job in combining his sophisticated conceptual analysis with rich historical data. Clearly, this has led the book to become a seminal piece that is likely to inspire forthcoming geopolitical studies and to guide foreign policymakers around the world in formulating their own geostrategy. For their part, Turkish foreign policymakers could gain vital insights in the process of recalibrating Turkey’s geostrategy at a time of profound regional (Arab uprisings) and global (the power shift to the east) geopolitical change.

Emre İşeri,
Assist. Prof. Dr., Kadir Has University
The Globalization of NATO: Intervention, Security and Identity

By Veronica M. Kitchen

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the continued existence and the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was founded on the principle of countering what was perceived to be the Soviet threat, has become a crucial issue in academic as well as political circles. With the publication of her new book *The Globalization of NATO*, Veronica Kitchen contributes to the current debates over the perpetuation and transformation of the organization through discussions of the changing structure, nature, and identity of NATO in light of the impacts of globalization since the end of the Cold War.

The goals behind the founding of NATO were to create a security umbrella for the Atlantic community, to establish an environment based on mutual defence, and to develop a community of security for the members; today, however, as Kitchen argues, especially as regards cross-border and overseas missions, NATO has enlarged its area of influence as well as transformed its approach to the protection of member states. In contrast to the Cold War era, NATO has begun to intervene in out-of-area missions even if the integrity or the security of the entity is not threatened. *The Globalization of NATO* examines the roles that NATO played in the Suez crisis, the Vietnam War, the Bosnian intervention, the Iraq dispute and the Afghanistan intervention with the aim of highlighting NATO’s changing responsibilities and norms in the current decade.

The case studies in Kitchen’s book examine the value of the identity of the NATO community, and although a mentality of mutual defence dominated in the early years of the organization, the last decade in particular has witnessed a major shift in NATO’s perceptions of threats as well as constructs of norms and identity. In the first chapter, the author focuses on how discourses concerning security issues have been determined among the Atlantic countries. As discussed in securitization theory—upon which Kitchen primarily grounds her argument—the public can be convinced through speech acts. In other words, it is possible to create security threats
through talk and debate on a specific issue. In the construction of policies based on “Atlanticism” (p. 5), policy makers have focused on commonalities such as identity, norms, characteristics, and institutions, and they have also used the concepts of friends and enemies to determine what kinds of actions should be undertaken. More precisely, the author stresses that the Atlantic identity is a discourse which enables plausible or legitimate arguments for a particular group or people.

The second chapter argues that the Suez Crisis started a discussion on out-of-area norms. With the Suez crisis, member states tried to regulate common norms for out-of-area missions by claiming that the nationalization of the Suez Canal represented an economic threat to Europe, weakened global stability, and threatened French colonial interests and security in Algeria due to the fact that Nasser supported the rebels in the country. This step was perceived as necessary for members’ mutual security and defence in the future. However, when the nationalization of the canal was not perceived as a security threat by the USA and Canada, British and French efforts to establish a discourse enlarging the entity’s area of interest lost ground. The crisis indicated that the members of NATO still could not agree on the boundaries, responsibilities and identity of the community as well as whether or not out-of-area missions were of secondary importance, especially for the USA, which was the dominant force of the community. In short, NATO was not ready to be converted from a no-war stance to a “political community in the realm of security” (p. 26).

In the third chapter, Kitchen concentrates on the allies’ attitudes concerning the stance taken by the USA vis-à-vis Vietnam. When the USA retaliated against the strikes by Vietnam, the issue of out-of-area missions re-emerged but member states did not perceive the attacks to be a security threat to the community even if the American government tried to characterize the Vietnam War as a moral responsibility for the Atlantic world. Additionally, the USA characterized the acts carried out by Vietnam as an “international war of aggression” (p. 44) and promoted intervention as an indication of the credibility of the NATO community. The USA also sought to develop a rhetoric that defined the crisis within the framework of the Cold War. These arguments, however, failed to convince the United Kingdom, France and Canada, and once again out-of-area missions remained a secondary issue for NATO, not just because of the prioritization of mutual defence but because of the delimitation of responsibilities of member states, many of which chose to pursue peacemaking policies as autonomous actors.

In the early 1990s, as Kitchen argues in the fourth chapter, security threats
began to change for most countries, and they coalesced around such issues as ethnic conflict, international terror, economic strains, organized crime, and environmental destruction. As Kitchen posits, those were the years when the *raison-d'être* of NATO came under scrutiny and the Atlantic community again began to discuss out-of-area missions, and soon after this the decision was made to intervene in the Bosnian conflict after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. There was a consensus among the members that the Bosnian dispute not only put the community’s security in jeopardy but the credibility of member states as well. The Bosnian case was considered to be a milestone which provided the grounds for redefining Atlanticism, questioning the reasons for the existence of NATO, and helping member states rally around the idea that the main task in the transformation of NATO, based on the concepts of democracy, individual freedom, and a market economy, was to support the integration of new democracies in such areas as Eastern Europe. In response to the changing security environment on the international stage, NATO developed a new rhetoric based on the common values and moral principles of its members to sustain its presence in the new era. As Kitchen asserts, the intervention in former Yugoslavia was motivated by the Atlantic community’s changing perspectives as regards its responsibilities, including the possibility of promoting democracy, humanitarian aid, and the protection of human rights.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent US efforts to garner support from member states once again brought out-of-area missions to the agenda. As the author points out in the fifth chapter, NATO announced for the first time that terrorist attacks would be interpreted within the framework of Article 5 as “an attack against them all” (p. 79). Even if the terrorist attacks were labelled as a common threat, member states could not agree, however, on the intervention in Iraq and subsequently the USA accused Iraq of being the financial force behind those attacks and having weapons of mass destruction. While the American and British governments were considering the use of force, they were unable to convince France and Germany even though the USA attempted to pitch the intervention as act of war against terrorism. The Iraq intervention crisis in NATO was crucial in two senses: although this act of terror was declared to be a common security threat to all members, there was no consensus for a military operation and moreover, this crisis was an indicator of the changing norms of NATO regarding mutual defence. The outcome of the crisis indicated that member states are also partners as regards global security issues.

The Afghanistan intervention and the New Strategic Concept of NATO are
the final issues taken up by Kitchen, and she cites these as examples of the transformation of the organization's new norms and responsibilities. The decision to deploy NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan was based on the idea that the Taliban's support for al Qaeda- labelled a terrorist group- would become a threat for all members. On the other hand, since the 9/11 attacks, taking action against terrorist groups and liberating countries from repressive regimes have been announced as NATO's global responsibilities and this encapsulates rebuilding Afghanistan and emancipating the Afghani people (p. 99). However, during the unfolding of the Afghanistan mission, a number of points of conflict arose as regards the distribution of tasks and responsibilities, troop numbers, and the moral responsibilities that member states have towards one another. As a result of the ongoing debates about the strategies of member states in Afghanistan- especially the Canadian request for the deployment of new troops- the alliance released a Strategic Vision in 2008 which included such main strategies as “long-term commitment, Afghan leadership, the integration of civilian and military efforts, and regional engagement” (p. 105). Another joint project carried out by member states was the Declaration of Alliance Security (2009) which marked an effort to correct NATO's weaknesses in responding to the crisis. However, Kitchen claims that those efforts were unable to solve the issues pertaining to “political questions, solidarity, burden sharing and political will” (p. 108). The author proposes that NATO must concretely formalize the social norms in the New Strategic Concepts, which was completed after the book was published, as well as develop new strategies to deal with new challenges like nuclear proliferation, piracy, local conflicts and terrorism.

Overall, Kitchen presents NATO as a powerful organization which has succeeded in maintaining its presence despite conflicts over such issues as common norms, identity, responsibilities, overseas missions, and burden sharing. During the Cold War, the community's main attitudes regarding security were directed against the Soviet threat; however, when the Cold War ended, out-of-area norms went through a process of re-evaluation. The Globalization of NATO attempts to bring to light this transformation which started with the Yugoslavia crisis and gathered momentum following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Kitchen provides a detailed account of this process of change through comprehensive case studies and contributes to the current literature through a discussion of the new types of threats that have arisen in the post-Cold War era. Among other factors, the author emphasizes that the common identity and shared values of
the alliance have ensured its continued existence as well as its transformation into a global-scale alliance, and this in turn is useful as a means to acquiring a better understanding of NATO’s current positions and courses of action.

F. Hande Selimoğlu,
Ph.D. Student, Kadir Has University

Fifty Years of EU – Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story

By Armağan Emre Çakır (ed.)

This book is a review of the 50 years of EU-Turkish relations that started with Turkey’s application for associate membership to the European Economic Community. Taking into account the long time span of relations, which are still developing, the evolving approaches of both parties towards each other are examined in this book with a special emphasis on the ‘delay’ in Turkey’s accession to the EU (p. 4). This volume, edited by Armağan Emre Çakır, carefully explores the nature and reasons for this delay in several dimensions: political, economic, security, ethical, and the sociological dimensions on the levels of identity, and elite and public opinion. The chapters of the book focus not only on the usually emphasized themes of political, economic and security dimensions, but also the generally less emphasized themes of ethics and sociology; however, some important fields such as environment, agriculture or regional policy, or such key dimensions as democracy or human rights and justice remain outside the scope of the book.

The editor has gathered together some of the leading domestic and international scholars in the field as contributors to the book. They offer fresh insights into the half of a century old relationship between the EU and Turkey, provide a number of different perspectives to the themes in EU-Turkish relations, and come up with new questions for further studies in the field. In that regard, they all depart from the common narrative of considering Turkey as undertaking its obligations to progress in the EU membership process and the EU as not giving Turkey its due. Breaking this prevailing perspective towards this relationship, the volume underlines the fact that the nature and future of relations cannot be explained as a two-way game between the parties.
but through the multitude of actors and complex network of relations. This is one of the main strengths of the book.

Regarding the content of the book, the volume starts with one of the most emphasized dimension of the relations, the political dimension. After a brief introductory chapter, in the second chapter Armağan Emre Çakır draws attention to Turkey’s situation within the framework of the EU’s enlargement waves. The author refutes the common perception that EU-Turkish relations is a two-way game between the two parties. Rather, the author emphasizes the importance of the different and multiple actors involved in the relations. The author tries to elaborate the facts that have influenced EU-Turkish relations and predominantly focuses on the interaction of a multitude of actors at multiple levels in a network of relations.

The third chapter focuses on the economic dimension. In this chapter, Tevfik F. Nas argues that the side benefits of the relationship are of central importance and that although Turkey has not progressed during the accession negotiations process, the economic gains in the course of accession cannot be overlooked. Nas provides insight to the economic transformation of Turkey with a special emphasis on the post-1980 restructuring of the Turkish economy, the factors underlying Turkey’s economic transformation, and the principal aspects and the economic impact of the Customs Union with the EU. Nas draws attention to Turkey’s ongoing economic transformation and growth since the early 1960s and discusses the importance of the ‘process’ of relations between Turkey and the EU rather than the ‘outcome’ of Turkey’s full membership to the EU.

In the chapter on the security dimension, Pınar Bilgin highlights the differences in ‘security cultures’ as a source of difficulty in EU-Turkish relations (p. 68). Bilgin argues that throughout the Cold War, the EU put an emphasis on soft power and non-military instruments whereby Turkey put it on military and strategic means. The author rejects the common conviction that security relations between the parties are essential in bringing Turkey closer to the EU. Through a comparative analysis, Bilgin concludes that Turkey’s role as a ‘security provider’ for Europe has eroded gradually, which is one of the essential factors in the delay of Turkey’s accession to the EU (p. 117).

In the chapters dealing with the ethical and sociological dimensions of identity as well as elite and public opinion, the contributors draw attention to rarely focused themes that have shaped the relations over the decades and played a critical role in setting the pace and shape of Turkey’s accession process to the EU. In the fifth chapter, Nathalie Tocci explores the nature and substance of opinions and debates at elite levels within and across the member states. The
The author argues that the delay in Turkey’s accession process is partly embedded in the disconnect between Turkey’s accession process and European debates about EU-Turkish relations. Explaining the underlying beliefs and interests motivating the elite debates about Turkey at domestic, European and global levels, Tocci finds out that the elite debates at the level of member states are shaped mainly by interests of the respective states or the EU rather than by EU-Turkish relations themselves. In that regard, the author depicts misperception, prejudice, ignorance and neglect as the natural outcome of ill-formed elite debates, all of which have significantly contributed to the delay of Turkey’s accession to the EU.

Considering the significance of the opinions and preferences of the mass public on Turkey’s accession to the EU, Ebru Ş. Canan-Sokullu and Çiğdem Kentmen in the sixth chapter aim to identify the direction of European opinion patterns concerning Turkey and explain key determinants of variation in popular support for Turkey’s membership in the EU. The nature, determinants and trends of European public opinion on the debate over Turkey’s EU accession are investigated through descriptive and multinomial logistic regression analysis using Eurobarometer data. Utilizing two mainstream approaches on public opinion, which are utilitarian and identity-based theories, the researchers depict the trends in European public opinion over the last 20 years. Furthermore, using a quantitative analysis, they shed light on the perception towards Turkey in the EU in the last decade. The study concludes that the attitude of the European public towards Turkey’s accession to the EU is of a heavily utility-driven design.

The chapter on the identity dimension deals with the idea of post-westernization. In chapter seven, the authors Chris Rumford and Hasan Türunç, considering the respective transformation in Turkey’s westernization project and in its domestic politics, as well as the changes in the EU’s ideological, cultural and geopolitical elements over the years, call for an alternative approach to understand the relations between Turkey and the EU. For the authors, Turkey’s relations with the EU can only be properly interpreted through the lens of post-westernization. Thus, it is argued that the reciprocal misconceptions can only be overcome through the worthwhile starting point of considering Turkey and EU as sharing a common post-western trajectory. This line of argument by Rumford and Türunç may be beneficial in terms of suggesting a new framework of post-westernization in the study of EU-Turkish relations.

In chapter eight, Thomas Diez brings forth the ethical dimension in the study of EU-Turkish relations and attempts to apply international ethics to this relationship. Starting from the core of the EU enlargement process, Diez primarily explores the obligations that
are involved, particularly on the EU side. The author argues that the established routines, rules and procedures of the enlargement processes should be the only route for the negotiations between the EU and Turkey as well as the only source of rights and obligations for the parties. For the author, initiating new rules or procedures, or developing unfounded expectations, rights or obligations in the accession negotiations process is contrary to the fundamentals of international ethics, and that the outcomes of such developments will further delay Turkey’s accession to the EU.

Overall, it is fascinating to read this volume with every chapter devoted to an aspect of EU-Turkey relations. The authors reveal different perspectives on EU-Turkish relations and show it as a Sisyphean story. With considerable differences of opinions among the contributors of the book, this volume not only sheds light on the main actors and changing parameters in the relations, but also depicts the big picture in which one finds out the achievements as well as the failures of Turkey and the EU in their long relationship. In that regard, this book is a significant contribution to the literature and an essential reference for policy makers and academics interested in EU-Turkish relations, European politics, international relations and political science.

N. Nevra Esentürk,  
Assist. Prof. Dr., Yalova University

The European Union Diplomatic Service: Ideas, Preferences and Identities

By Caterina Carta  

There have been several publications in recent years on the external relations of the European Union (EU), some of which have been attempts to explain how external relations in the EU can be unified despite the different national interests and attitudes of the member states. The European Union Diplomatic Service: Ideas, Preferences and Identities by Caterina Carta is one of these publications and she comprehensively accomplishes the task. The EU, as a non-
state actor in world politics, has always had a complex structure due to the series of treaties and amendments that established it. Attempting to examine the diplomatic system of such a non-state actor is incredibly difficult and requires a great deal of effort, which this author successfully undertakes. To understand the EU’s entire external relations system it would be inadequate, for example, just to investigate the EU’s legal text with respect to international diplomacy alone. Carta analyses the processes of institution and identity building of the European Union’s diplomatic service, both in Brussels and in the Commission’s delegations across the world, and offers an overall portrait of the institutional set-up and organizational culture of the diplomatic system.

This book is the outcome of research completed by the author during a post-doctoral fellowship in Siena, and was financed by the Compagnia di San Paola, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Volkswagen Stiftung, RECON (Reconstituting Democracy in Europe) and the European Commission.

Carta scrutinizes the European External Action Service (EEAS), which started on 1 December 2010 after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, and presents a broad analysis of the new situation in the EU’s diplomatic service. As a way of having a unified voice in diplomacy, the EEAS is a very recent move of the EU. However, the EEAS is not a simple institution but rather a sui generis one that has the function of assisting other institutions in the EU, in other words of facilitating the process of foreign and external policy making. The EU is represented by a network of 136 overseas delegations, which have functions similar to those of embassies. As Carta points out, even with a body such as the EEAS in place, the Commission and Council still have primacy control over the EU’s external relations (p. 76). The main research question of the book is if national diplomats generally represent their state abroad, what do the Commission’s (and now the EEAS’s) diplomats represent? This research aims to provide an overall portrait of the processes of institution and social identity building of the Commission’s diplomatic service, ranging from historical surveys and institutional arrangements, to a definition of the roles of its officials and their group identity.

The book comprises four parts. The first part, entitled the “Conceptualization of the EU Diplomatic System,” has two chapters that examine both the overall EU system including the Commission. In this part, the author focuses on the diplomatic system of the EU as a non-state actor, and reviews the evolution of its diplomacy and its attempts to define the diplomatic model of the EU. Carta, by focusing on the question of who is entitled to play the diplomatic game, presents a dynamic analytical framework for the study of diplomacy in four areas:
Part three is an empirical study of the actors in European diplomacy, the Commission officials who represent the EU abroad. The author evaluates the role of the External Service civil servants who work for the Commission delegates and analyses the findings of a questionnaire submitted to 40 heads of delegation. Carta, using findings from interviews conducted from 2003 to 2005 with Grade A officials who serve or have served in the Commission’s delegations, seeks the answers to such questions as “what does the world of diplomacy entail?”, “who is Europe in the international arena?” and “what kind of international actor should Europe be?” among others. In this part, she gives a broad analysis of the responses with respect to important variables such as the “significant others”: the member states, the United States of America, the cultural other of ‘Islam’, and the Soviet Union. These variables clearly shaped the mindset of the Commission delegates who were surveyed. The last part of the volume, entitled “Prospects for the Near Future,” seeks to predict outcomes for the future based on observations drawn from the preceding chapters. In this part, the author attempts to present the pros and cons of the newly established EEAS by scrutinizing the new provisions for external relations.

The strength of *The European Union Diplomatic Service* is that it combines theory with practice and presents an extensive analysis. In incorporating

1) the international level;
2) the actors entitled to play the diplomatic game;
3) internal organization; and
4) the diplomats themselves.

These four areas are useful in that they allow us to understand the complicated picture of European diplomacy. Additionally, the first part explores the link between the EU’s diplomacy actions and collective foreign policy, illustrating the systemic conditions that have allowed the EEC/EU to acquire a quasi-diplomatic system and introducing the concept of meta-diplomacy in order to capture the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor.

In part two, the author provides an overview of the institution-building process of the EU’s diplomatic system from its inception to the present day and outlines the organizational dimension by examining the legal basis, role, organization and evolution of the EU’s diplomatic system in the nearly 50 years of its activity. In addition, the author describes how the rudimentary External Service of the Commission expanded into broader areas of activity, and then relates the evolution of the Commission’s system of representation to the bigger picture of integration and the process of enlargement of the EC and EU. While doing this, Carta has fascinating interviews with some of the main protagonists.
accounts on the subject to appear in recent years.

Kenan Dağcı, Ph.D., Yalova University Center for International Conflict Resolution. Kenan Dağcı is also a Visiting Scholar at the Cornell University Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies and the Department of Near Eastern Studies

Küreselleşme Sürecinde Afrika ve Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri (Africa and Turkey-Africa Relations in the Era of Globalization)

By Numan Hazar

Turkey’s activism in foreign policy in recent years has been much more observable in its opening towards Africa. In a field where there are few studies and publications dealing with Turkey’s Africa opening and exploring Ankara’s intensive interest in Africa, the book Africa and Turkey-Africa Relations in the Era of Globalization by Numan Hazar provides vast information about the continent’s politics and Turkey’s approach in its new foreign policy. The study consists of four chapters, each of which covers a vast area and subjects.

In the first chapter, Hazar shares his observation on the African continent, ranging from the Western discovery of the continent and colonialism, to regional organizations in Africa and current problems. Classified under 25 sub-titles, this section offers a tour de horizon about Africa, its problems, history, globalization, economic development, cultural elements and many other issues. Rather than an in-depth analysis of the continent’s politics or a detailed coverage of essential elements that explain the contemporary era, the author prefers to describe various issues that are related to each other in a vast set of determinants today. One gets the impression that this section is based on his personal observations and conversations with
locals and internationals when he was a diplomat in the continent. This section gathers a collection of information together from newspapers, personal notes and internet sources like Wikipedia and refrains from offering any new academic and theoretical discussion.

The second chapter is devoted to the Ottoman Empire’s relations with the continent. Mostly based on the Ottoman state’s relations with various kingdoms in the past, such as with Kanem-Bornu (p. 122-126), the main argument of this chapter is that Turkey or Turks had had strong relations with the continent in the past. Excepting a few examples like the story of Abu-Bakr Effendi (p. 132-134) and Mehmet Remzi Bey, who was appointed as an Ottoman consular to South Africa in 1914 (which Hazar does not mention in his book), it is difficult to show that the Ottomans had very strong relations with the central and southern part of Africa. Partly because of this, Hazar mostly focuses on the Ottoman state’s relations with Algeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Sudan and he offers a brief history and general observations about the relations between the Ottomans and those states.

The third chapter focuses more on the 20th century history of Turkish-African relations. How Turkey reacted and what kind of relations existed between Turkey and Africa is analysed since decolonization in 1950s. Hazar provides us with the information that at the start of the “Opening to Africa” policy in 1998 Turkey had only 12 embassies in the continent (p. 202). The author provides inside information on how the new foreign policy towards the African continent was prepared with a full reporting of its details (for the details of the plan, see pp. 208-214). As no other publication provides inside information, nor have there been any releases by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by the minister, one may easily conclude that the author himself might have been a part of policy making and implementing process as an ambassador at that time because he explains the full details of “Opening to Africa Policy”. The new Africa Policy launched in 1998 has changed a great deal over time, especially by 2005 with a new re-formulation and serious implementation, yet the book, by reflecting on the imagination and vision of Turkey in the late 1990s toward Africa, gives information about an era when the seeds of development were sown.

The last section analyses the current state of affairs between Turkey and the African continent, especially since 2002. While it is the shortest chapter in the book (only seven pages long), Hazar gives an overview of the recent developments in Turkish-African relations. He explains Turkey’s economic, political and diplomatic relations with the continent, such as Turkey’s rising status as being a “strategic partner” with the African Union and other local
The biggest weakness of the book is that it aims to say many things by touching on many issues at the same time, which in the end seems to have resulted in a general overview of events and issues related to Africa but not an in-depth analysis or a detailed and comprehensive focus. The book cannot be regarded purely as a scientific investigation but more of an attempt to understand the continent with an interest that combines diplomatic and personal inclination toward the continent. Therefore, rather than advancing (rejecting or debating) an idea or hypothesis and contributing to the field of Turkish-African relations, it serves as a book for a wider academic and non-academic readership. Nevertheless, one should appreciate the efforts of a diplomat who has maintained his passionate interest on Africa.

Mehmet Özkan,
Senior Assistant and Lecturer,
International University of Sarajevo,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
**Nouveaux mondes: Carnets d’après Guerre froide** (New Worlds: Post Cold War Notes)

*By Bertrand Badie*


*Nouveaux mondes: Carnets d’après Guerre froide* by Bertrand Badie, a professor of International Relations at Sciences Po in Paris, consists of question and answers from a monthly internet chat on international affairs, which have been held by the author since 2006, on the Monde.fr website. Some of the topics covered during these exchanges have been international politics, law, international relations, international organizations, the economy, the EU and its international position, international conflicts, multilateralism and human rights, 11 September and its universal effects, terrorism, emerging powers, NATO, UN, religion, secret diplomacy, and the Middle East among others. With respect to its vast and rich content about the international agenda, the book can be considered a reference work and it can be used as a university textbook for courses on international relations. This work reflects the thoughts and analysis of the author. Bertrand Badie characterizes the current situation in the world as “nouveau monde or nouveaux mondes” (“new world or new worlds”).

Talking about the particularities of the “nouveaux mondes”, Badie stresses the importance of communication and by giving the example of the Arab spring; he says that social dynamics are often the primary factors of foreign policy.

Badie’s book is shaped by the events of 11 September. In the first part, “Le monde change”, the author begins his analyses with the events of 11 September and its effects on the international scene and politics. He argues that after 9/11; the world became more multipolar, compared to when international actors got together around the United States before the first Gulf War (p. 33). According to Badie, 11 September showed that there is more than ever a strong need for multilateralism (p. 37). Badie explains the results of 11 September with these comments: “there is another September 11 everyday: the climate of fear, anxiety and suspicion is everywhere. The real victory of terrorists is here. The first principle of their action is to produce uncertainty, fear and mistrust. They succeeded perfectly” (p. 43). The conclusion of the book also dwells upon 9/11 and its consequences.
When looking at the situation in the world ten years after 9/11, the author, in response to a question, says that 9/11 still continues. He claims that the world will come out from the milieu of 9/11 with “a new political, social and diplomatic look on the world” (p. 313).

The preference in the book for a thematic classification instead of a chronologic classification provides readers with a concise picture of events. As the book consists of questions and answers, at every turn a different subject is handled. Essentially, this book presents a new style that brings exchanges made through internet chat between an international readership and the author. In fact, we can say that it was a book written first for the web and then reversed to the paper format. This feature is the originality of this work. Indeed, the readers, from all over the world, define the subject and the debate, shaping the topics the author discusses. This is a book that brings to us a real world tour on international actuality and is thus a rich book that has been shaped by the interests of the international readership in the last five years and enriches the general culture on the international agenda. These exchanges between the author and the reader can even be interpreted in total as a conference on international issues. At the same time, its plain language facilitates the understanding of this work.

Ercan Sarıbaşak,
Ph.D. Student, College Doctoral,
Université de Grenoble, France; Career Diplomat, Third Secretary, Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey

When looking at the situation in the world ten years after 9/11, the author, in response to a question, says that 9/11 still continues. He claims that the world will come out from the milieu of 9/11 with “a new political, social and diplomatic look on the world” (p. 313).

The preference in the book for a thematic classification instead of a chronologic classification provides readers with a concise picture of events. As the book consists of questions and answers, at every turn a different subject is handled. Essentially, this book presents a new style that brings exchanges made through internet chat between an international readership and the author. In fact, we can say that it was a book written first for the web and then reversed to the paper format. This feature is the originality of this work. Indeed, the readers, from all over the world, define the subject and the debate, shaping the topics the author discusses. This is a book that brings to us a real world tour on international actuality and is thus a rich book that has been shaped by the interests of the international readership in the last five years and enriches the general culture on the international agenda. These exchanges between the author and the reader can even be interpreted in total as a conference on international issues. At the same time, its plain language facilitates the understanding of this work.

Ercan Sarıbaşak,
Ph.D. Student, College Doctoral,
Université de Grenoble, France; Career Diplomat, Third Secretary, Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey

When looking at the situation in the world ten years after 9/11, the author, in response to a question, says that 9/11 still continues. He claims that the world will come out from the milieu of 9/11 with “a new political, social and diplomatic look on the world” (p. 313).

The preference in the book for a thematic classification instead of a chronologic classification provides readers with a concise picture of events. As the book consists of questions and answers, at every turn a different subject is handled. Essentially, this book presents a new style that brings exchanges made through internet chat between an international readership and the author. In fact, we can say that it was a book written first for the web and then reversed to the paper format. This feature is the originality of this work. Indeed, the readers, from all over the world, define the subject and the debate, shaping the topics the author discusses. This is a book that brings to us a real world tour on international actuality and is thus a rich book that has been shaped by the interests of the international readership in the last five years and enriches the general culture on the international agenda. These exchanges between the author and the reader can even be interpreted in total as a conference on international issues. At the same time, its plain language facilitates the understanding of this work.

Ercan Sarıbaşak,
Ph.D. Student, College Doctoral,
Université de Grenoble, France; Career Diplomat, Third Secretary, Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey

When looking at the situation in the world ten years after 9/11, the author, in response to a question, says that 9/11 still continues. He claims that the world will come out from the milieu of 9/11 with “a new political, social and diplomatic look on the world” (p. 313).

The preference in the book for a thematic classification instead of a chronologic classification provides readers with a concise picture of events. As the book consists of questions and answers, at every turn a different subject is handled. Essentially, this book presents a new style that brings exchanges made through internet chat between an international readership and the author. In fact, we can say that it was a book written first for the web and then reversed to the paper format. This feature is the originality of this work. Indeed, the readers, from all over the world, define the subject and the debate, shaping the topics the author discusses. This is a book that brings to us a real world tour on international actuality and is thus a rich book that has been shaped by the interests of the international readership in the last five years and enriches the general culture on the international agenda. These exchanges between the author and the reader can even be interpreted in total as a conference on international issues. At the same time, its plain language facilitates the understanding of this work.

Ercan Sarıbaşak,
Ph.D. Student, College Doctoral,
Université de Grenoble, France; Career Diplomat, Third Secretary, Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey

When looking at the situation in the world ten years after 9/11, the author, in response to a question, says that 9/11 still continues. He claims that the world will come out from the milieu of 9/11 with “a new political, social and diplomatic look on the world” (p. 313).

The preference in the book for a thematic classification instead of a chronologic classification provides readers with a concise picture of events. As the book consists of questions and answers, at every turn a different subject is handled. Essentially, this book presents a new style that brings exchanges made through internet chat between an international readership and the author. In fact, we can say that it was a book written first for the web and then reversed to the paper format. This feature is the originality of this work. Indeed, the readers, from all over the world, define the subject and the debate, shaping the topics the author discusses. This is a book that brings to us a real world tour on international actuality and is thus a rich book that has been shaped by the interests of the international readership in the last five years and enriches the general culture on the international agenda. These exchanges between the author and the reader can even be interpreted in total as a conference on international issues. At the same time, its plain language facilitates the understanding of this work.

Ercan Sarıbaşak,
Ph.D. Student, College Doctoral,
Université de Grenoble, France; Career Diplomat, Third Secretary, Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey

Merkezdeki Banka: Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası ve Uluslararası Bir Karşılaştırma (Bank at the Centre: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and an International Comparison)

By Caner Bakır

Bank at the Centre: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and an International Comparison is a book whose subject matter is the political economy of central banking in Turkey. The author Caner Bakır presents a history of the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) and provides insights into its
in an era characterized by high rates of capital mobility in a world in which international financial markets and international financial institutions such as the IMF have the structural power to shape monetary policy. Neither does he leave our discussions on the emphasis on low inflation and price stability and the implications of these policies in the era of the Washington Consensus (WC) and the post-WC era. Over all, the book is well written, well organized, and informative, and provides a solid review of the literature on central banks as well as a detailed history and a comparative analysis of the current state of the CBT.

Bakır points out that the operating principle of the CBT when it was founded was to keep the currency strong and the exchange rate stable. This required a balanced budget and did not lead to inflation. This principle aimed to support the stability of the new Republican regime and it was relatively easier to implement in an environment in which there were no competitive elections. However, this changed with the increasing political competition as Turkey moved from a single-party system to a multiparty one in the 1940s. The period between 1950 and 2001 was characterized by budget deficits and expansionary fiscal and monetary policy as governments became more responsive to the social and economic demands of the public. In this period, the CBT almost acted as an organ of the...
treasury and finance departments, and as a result monetary policy was shaped in accordance with the fiscal requirements of the government. This changed after the 1980s as the role of the state decreased in relation to the private sector with such policies as financial deepening, deregulation and liberalization thanks to the rise of the neoliberal paradigm. As the role of the State Planning Organization in the economic bureaucracy started to lose its importance, the central bank started to gain prominence. The central bank started to focus more on education in its hiring policy and strengthened its research department. The author believes that the central bank had accumulated enough human and bureaucratic resources over this period to enable it to prepare its own legal reforms for its independence.

The 2001 law that granted the independence to the CBT was prepared in four years and was an outcome of factors such as academic studies on the benefits of central bank independence as well as the existence of a transnational network of central bankers. Bakır lists some of the factors that brought about granting independence to the CBT such as the loss of confidence by international actors in Turkish markets following the 2001 economic crisis and the government’s attempts to restore this confidence and regain access to foreign resources; the conditions of the World Bank and IMF in the agreements made in response to the crisis; the goal of harmonization with the norms of the ECB in the EU integration process; and the general acceptance of the idea of legal independence over time.

In his comparative analysis of the CBT with the central banks of eight developed countries (Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand, United States, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, and Japan) and the ECB, Bakır finds that the CBT is the fifth most independent central bank in terms of the legal independence index, with the ECB being the most independent. However, the fact that the CBT is legally more independent than the remaining four banks does not mean that Turkey scores better than these countries in providing low inflation and price stability. Because what determines the independence of a central bank is not only the laws but also the formal and informal institutional regulations, the framework within which a central bank formulates and implements monetary policy. For example, Bakır argues that while between 1930 and 1950 the legal independence index score of the CBT was lower than in all other times, when the relationship between the government and the CBT is considered, the bank was more independent than even today. Bakır also refers to the literature that takes into account the actual independence of a central bank and does not measure independence solely by looking at legal indicators.
When measuring actual independence, indicators such as the rate of turnover of central bank governors and whether or not governors are replaced shortly after a political change of government are taken into account. However, such indices still do not account for the formal and informal institutional regulations within which the governors carry out their tasks. In order to measure actual central bank independence, Bakır compiles data on central bank governors from 133 countries, collecting information on their gender, age, education, length of stay in office and their career history, and compares them with Turkish governors. Based on the 2006 data, most of the central bank governors in the world are men, their mean age is 56 and the average length of their stay in office is five years. In Turkey, from 1931 to 2005, there have been 19 central bank governors and the average of their length of stay in office is less than four years. However, the author does not find any correlation between the governor’s length of stay in office and inflation rate for Turkey.

After reading this book carefully, one would say that the author has a critical stance to the paradigm of central bank independence. He clearly questions how monetary policy conducted by central banks can be independent from international capital flows or from the preferences of global financial markets when capital movements are not regulated, as in the case of Turkey. He asks how the CBT can be considered independent when the IMF sets the inflation target as a conditionality of the loan agreement signed with the Turkish government. According to the CBT law passed in 2001, it is the CBT that should be setting the target, not the IMF. Hence, the author questions the power of the IMF and its transnational bureaucrats in the international political economic system. He also challenges the belief that the main goal of a central bank should be to maintain price stability, asking whether lowering unemployment should be one of the goals as well and whether financial stability can be achieved solely by maintaining price stability. The only problem with the book is that Bakır’s critical stance to the paradigm is not woven thoroughly into the whole text; one has to read the book carefully and make sure to read the last sections or otherwise one may miss his very insightful criticisms.

Çağla Diner,
Assist. Prof. Dr., Kadir Has University
Style and Format

Articles submitted to the journal should be original contributions. If another version of the article is under consideration by another publication, or has been or will be published elsewhere, authors should clearly indicate this at the time of submission. Manuscripts should be submitted to perceptions@mfa.gov.tr.

Submissions are accepted on a rolling basis.

A standard length for PERCEPTIONS articles is 6,000 to 8,000 words including endnotes. The manuscript should begin with an indented and italicised summary up to 150 words, which should describe the main arguments and conclusions, and 5-7 keywords, indicating to main themes of the manuscript. The author is also expected to give a brief biography in a footnote at the beginning of the article.

PERCEPTIONS also publishes reviews of new books or reports; ‘book reviews’ are usually around 700-1,500 words.

Names of the authors, places and the publishing houses are required to be written in their original forms. The styles of the references in endnotes should conform the following examples:

Books


Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, *The Book Title*, p. 100.

In footnotes ‘Ibid.’ should be used where possible, but it should not be used where the previous note contains more than one source.

Articles in Journals

John Smith, "Article Title", *Journal Name*, Vol. #, No. # (Month Year), p. #.

Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, "Article Title", p. #.

Articles in Edited Books


Official Papers

Parliamentary Papers: Select Committee on Manufacturers (Parl. Papers, 1833, VI), 0.456. Subsequent references as:

SC on ... (PP, 1839, VII), 00.2347.

Hansard (Commons), 4th ser. XXXVI, 641–2, 22 Aug. 1895.

Theses

For titles of published and unpublished theses use italics:

John E. Smith, *Title of Thesis*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Name of the University, Year, Chapter #, p. #

Internet References


Images and Figures

All diagrams, charts and graphs should be referred to as figures and consecutively numbered. Tables should be kept to a minimum and contain only essential data.

Numbers

Numbers under 10 should be spelled out.

Use numerical values (14, 233) to express numbers 10 and above.

Figures should be used to express numbers under 10 that are grouped for comparison with figures 10 and above: The results showed that 2 out of 20 recipients disagreed with the proposal.

Use figures and the percentage sign to represent percentages: A significant majority, 62%, said they would support the fundraising campaign.

Use the word “percentage” when a number is not given: Researchers determined the percentage of rats…

Dates, ages, and money should be represented by figures: 2 weeks ago, She was a 2-year old, The workers were paid $5 each.

Common fractions should be written out: One fifth of the respondents…