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Researchers determined the percentage of rats...

Common fractions should be written out: One fifth of the respondents...

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97 Book Reviews
It is a real honour to have been asked to be the guest editor for this special issue of *Perceptions* celebrating Turkey’s sixty years in the North Atlantic Alliance. I would like to thank Prof. Bülent Aras and staff of the Center for Strategic Research (SAM) for inviting me to contribute as guest editor and for all their assistance in helping me to bring this issue together.

Indeed, much has changed since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, yet not only has the Alliance repeatedly proved to be successful in adapting itself to changing circumstances, but Turkey’s relationship with the Alliance has also stood the test of time, despite the perpetual balancing act between the divergence and convergence of regional interests and a common outlook towards the sea change in global affairs.

This edition takes stock of some of the important issues in areas that are not only crucial for NATO but also for Turkey, and of how these issues can be managed in light of that relationship. NATO’s Secretary General, Rasmussen, opens this edition with a preface focusing on Turkey’s role in NATO.

The Foreign Minister, Prof Ahmet Davutoğlu, provides an overview of NATO’s adaptability to a perpetually changing security environment, while offering some robust policy prescriptions on how to keep the Alliance alive into the 21st Century. These prescriptions offer useful insight as to how NATO must adapt further, even by engaging with rising powers such as Russia and China alongside like-minded traditional partners. In fact I foresee potential divergence between NATO and Turkey in engaging with global partners, and this is reflected also in the Minister’s policy prescription from a Turkish perspective. The Minister also underscores the importance of local involvement in overcoming regional problems. This is a principle likely to be shared for some time by NATO and Turkey.

Rebecca Moore provides us with an exploration of NATO’s Partnership Policy adopted in April 2011, which moves towards a more tailor-made and flexible approach to individual partnerships and, as Moore argues, leaves a question mark over NATO’s more traditional partnerships with ‘like-minded’ members that share its values and norms. This also ties into the wider debate in this volume, revisited in other articles, about the changing nature of
partnerships and whether these should be fostered for normative or strategic purposes.

Sean Kay explores European Missile Defence as a necessary but problematic solution for collective defence requirements by providing an overview of missile defence debates within the Alliance, and an evaluation of the necessity and potentially problematic progress of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. In progressing with missile defence, the most significant problem foreseen down the road remains NATO’s relationship with Russia. It is this same relationship which provides the theme of Maxime Larive and Roger Kanet’s article. Apart from missile defence, Larive and Kanet identify NATO’s continuing intentions of Eastern expansion, the globalisation of NATO’s involvement, consecutive Russian policies to rebuild its status as a global power, and the different notions of NATO and Russia about the security of Europe as the main drivers of the deterioration of relations. Despite this pessimistic outlook, it seems that rivalry and cooperation go hand in hand, and cooperation still endures bilaterally between Russia and NATO member states and also within the NATO Russia Council. Perhaps one of the biggest challenges to NATO’s relationship with Russia is the emergence of a ‘two-tier’ NATO, one that still sees the championing of a liberal order beyond its borders, and another keen to engage in territorial defence against an old adversary that is returning to a status of great power.

I explore these divergences in the Alliance through the development of its role from a normative security community to a functional security provider. Within this context, I conclude with Turkey’s role in this security community and evaluate what the likely convergent and divergent perceptions of interests and threats are likely to be down the road.

Certainly, NATO has had far more on its plate than it did in the wake of the first post-Cold War Strategic Concept in 1991. Both internal divisions and external security challenges, at a time of increasing defence cuts and the need for Smart Defence, not only force the Alliance to think strategically but also prompt it to get its own house in order. Since it has been adapting so remarkably for the last two decades, it will no doubt go on doing so, albeit with more crises than usual.

Prof. Dr. Gülnur AYBET
Guest Editor
Preface: NATO and Turkey – Meeting the Challenge of Change

Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN*

When Turkey joined NATO on 18 February 1952, Winston Churchill and Harry Truman were still in office. NATO was a three-year-old alliance, with just 12 members. And it would be another three years before the Warsaw Pact was formed.

Over the next six decades, NATO would prove a vital instrument in the joint endeavour of the transatlantic Allies to promote freedom. And Turkey would prove itself as a key Ally - benefiting from the security provided by NATO, but also making major political and military contributions to the Alliance’s effectiveness.

Strong solidarity among its member nations has characterised NATO from its very beginning. It has underpinned the Alliance’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances, which has been vital to its continuing success.

NATO first prevented the Cold War from getting hot. After the Cold War ended, and when some felt NATO had lost its reason to exist, the Alliance turned into an engine for change. It reached out to countries all over Europe and Central Asia, helped former foes to become friends, opened its door to new members, and took on a significant role in managing security crises.

NATO’s very first operation, ANCHOR GUARD, was in August 1990. It was a deployment of the NATO Airborne early Warning aircraft to Konya, in Turkey, to monitor Iraq’s actions following its invasion of Kuwait and to provide coverage of south-eastern Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack. A few months later, in response to a Turkish request for assistance, NATO deployed the air elements of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force and air defence assets to Turkey, to deter any possible threat from Iraq.

When Yugoslavia broke apart in the 1990s, NATO rallied a unique, multinational effort that was instrumental in bringing peace and stability to the Balkans. After “9/11”, NATO invoked its Article 5 collective defence clause, demonstrating in the clearest possible terms that the attack

* NATO Secretary General
on the United States was considered an attack on all the Allies.

Last year, when the United Nations Security Council appealed to the international community to protect the people of Libya, it was NATO who answered that call. And once again, that was the right thing to do.

The Alliance launched Operation Unified Protector in just six days and completed it successfully within seven months. Partner countries, including many from the region, contributed both politically and operationally. Together, we saved countless lives and prevented a massacre. This is first and foremost a victory for the Libyan people. But we helped pave the way for their journey from dictatorship to democracy.

Many of our 28 NATO Allies have made their own transition to democracy. And we stand ready to share that experience, if needed and if requested, for instance to support the reform of Libya’s security and defence sectors.

Dramatic changes continue to sweep through the Middle East and North Africa. As a modern and vibrant democracy, Turkey can play a crucial role across the region. I am confident that Turkey’s insights and influence will also help NATO to deepen its cooperation with interested countries.

While people in several of the countries to our south are enjoying newfound political freedom, many people across our own NATO member nations continue to be concerned about the current economic crisis. And economy and security are closely interlinked, as high debts and growing deficits can make nations vulnerable.

With budget cuts across the board in many of our nations, we may not have more money to spend on defence. So we must all spend smarter. We can do this by investing on priority projects and focusing on our strengths, and by working together in multinational programmes, to give more Allies access to critical capabilities that they cannot afford on their own. We need to get the very best effect out of every Dollar, Euro or Lira that we spend.

NATO has already made tough reform decisions. For example, we have streamlined our staff at our Brussels headquarters. We have rationalised our agency structure. And we have modernised our military command structure. The NATO decision to locate our land command headquarters in Izmir clearly shows the importance of Turkey for NATO- and of NATO for Turkey.

Turkey has consistently made many other major contributions to our Alliance. This includes deploying Turkish forces on NATO- led operations, such as to ISAF in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo, as well as to Operation Active Endeavour,
our counter-terrorist maritime operation in the Mediterranean. It includes hosting the NATO Centre of Excellence on Defence against Terrorism in Ankara. And it includes agreeing to host a radar that will form an important element of NATO’s missile defence system.

The 60th anniversary of Turkey’s membership in NATO is an opportunity to reflect on our relationship and to recognise the considerable benefits that Turkey gains from its membership of NATO, and that NATO draws from Turkey’s active participation in the Alliance.

This important anniversary is also an opportunity to better connect our security with our citizens. We need to explain that because NATO provides security, they can go about their daily lives free from fear. We need to explain that in today’s world, the risks and challenges we face- such as terrorism, proliferation, and piracy- go beyond borders and no country can face them effectively on its own. And we need to make sure that NATO does not become taken for granted.

For 60 years, Turkey has been an invaluable member of NATO. As I look to the future, I see an increasingly important role for Turkey in the Alliance. Due to its size and location, as well as its strong historical, cultural and economic ties to its neighbours and beyond, Turkey can play a leading role in NATO’s adaptation to the new strategic environment.

Our NATO Summit in Chicago this May will be the next step in that continuing process of adaptation. It will demonstrate that, after 60 years of unchanging commitment and solidarity, NATO and Turkey are still ready, and able, to meet the challenge of change.
“NATO is the most successful defence alliance in modern history.” While some may argue that this is a superficial cliché and that the Alliance is fast becoming irrelevant, others believe that this is a truthful statement reflecting the Alliance’s well-deserved prominent place, not only in the annals of history but also in today’s and, most probably, tomorrow’s security environment. I personally subscribe to the latter school of thought.

Why and how has NATO been successful? Is it due to its robust assets and capabilities? Or due to its firm commitment to its most fundamental mission—collective defence, i.e., its musketeer philosophy: “One for all, all for one?” Could it be its resolve not to compromise the unswerving principles of indivisibility of security, allied solidarity and cohesion which cement the Allies together? Is it its consensual decision-making that ensures unity for a robust and credible Alliance Or is it NATO’s role as the embodiment of the transatlantic link that binds Europe and North America? Or does NATO owe its success to its readiness, willingness and ability to adapt itself to both the slowly evolving international environment and the rapid outbreak of conflicts? I believe that these questions are self-explanatory as to how and why NATO is a success story. The next relevant question, then, is “How can NATO maintain its relevance and success?”

It is true that as an Alliance born in 1949, is a child of another era. It is also true that we have witnessed heated debates on the relevance of NATO in the past two decades. As we have entered the second decade of the 21st century, I consider such debates as a matter of the past. The question at hand now is not “whether NATO is still necessary”, but rather “how NATO could further adapt itself to today’s realities and yet be ready for tomorrow’s uncertainties.”

* Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Dr.
During the 63 years of its existence, NATO has gone through three major stages. NATO was established at a time when the world was divided into two hostile camps along political, ideological and economic lines. The existence of the Alliance with its core mission of collective defence and its deterrent capabilities prevented the Cold War from turning into an armed conflict. Despite severe tensions and armed conflicts that appeared imminent and unavoidable at times, it would hold true to say that the Cold War was actually won without a single shot fired. One can only speculate that this was the natural outcome of a bi-polar world characterised by predictability and balancing of power. Paradoxically enough, the end of the Cold War paved the way for a popular debate on whether or not NATO’s mission was complete and whether it could cease to exist. In other words, NATO had almost become the victim of its own success.

However, it soon became apparent that the Alliance’s value during the Cold War era was no only the provision of security to its Allies against a perceived common threat. NATO was formed in the first place to preserve Western democratic values, and predicated on the principle of common defence. The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty emphasises the Allies’ determination “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisations of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law”. So long as our common values need protecting, NATO would continue to have a raison d’être.

Along with its role of protecting these common values, the Alliance also formed an umbrella for the political reconciliation and integration of Western Europe. Furthermore, NATO helped to ensure and maintain a secure and stable environment for democracy and economic growth. Owing to the security provided by the Alliance, the European political landscape started to enjoy an unprecedented time of peace, stability and welfare. Indeed, such a favourable environment laid the ground for European economic cooperation and integration.

Nevertheless, the post-Cold War euphoria was soon overshadowed by emerging asymmetric threats, as well as by regional and intra-state conflicts, which erupted in the heart of Europe. The war in the former Yugoslavia was an eye-opener for the international community, forcing the realisation of the perils and characteristics of the new security landscape. The asymmetric, trans-
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The bold actions taken by the Alliance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were instrumental in bringing an end to the conflicts raging in the heart of Europe.

NATO’s partnerships, which were initiated by the formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991, have further expanded beyond the Euro-Atlantic geography to include the Mediterranean and the Middle East regions. Distinctive and tailored partnerships have also been developed with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Georgia. All these mechanisms are considered invaluable assets designed to broaden the zone of stability and security in and beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. They serve the purpose of promoting both political consultations and practical cooperation between NATO and its partners.

To summarize, in the post-Cold War era- the second era- in NATO’s life, we witnessed an Alliance that effectively employed both military and political tools in a balanced and complementary fashion. In parallel, a continuous transformation process involving both military and political aspects of the Alliance was effectively put in place.

Then came the 9/11 attacks, colossal and tectonic in nature, which heralded the beginning of a new- the third- era in NATO’s history. The significance of 9/11 was that, for the first time in the history of the Alliance, it paved the way for the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. It also led to an Alliance operation, which was not only “out of area” but also at a strategic distance away from the Euro-Atlantic geography. Another important outcome of this phenomenon was the unequivocal consensus reached among the Allies on the necessity to include terrorism in boundary and unpredictable nature of the newly emerging threats necessitated a holistic and comprehensive approach to security. Thus, security has become not only diverse, but multi-dimensional in nature, involving economic, social, humanitarian and environmental aspects. Under such circumstances NATO has proven to be the most capable organisation to fill the security vacuum created by the complexities of the new environment. In the midst of heated debates on NATO’s “out of area” involvement, the bold actions taken by the Alliance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were instrumental in bringing an end to the conflicts raging in the heart of Europe. It was not only the military machinery of NATO that contributed to the security and stability in Europe, but also its soft power tools, including enlargement and partnership mechanisms, which played a decisive role in the creation of a “Europe whole, free and at peace with itself”.

The bold actions taken by the Alliance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were instrumental in bringing an end to the conflicts raging in the heart of Europe.
NATO’s agenda, as a standing item and as a threat that must be decisively fought by the Allies.

**NATO's distinctive nature as a politico-military organisation, certainly including its military capabilities, must be preserved.**

Over the last decade, the agenda of the Alliance has been characterized by NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan in security and stabilization efforts, in the Mediterranean to fight against terrorism through an Article 5 operation (Operation Active Endeavour) off the shore of Somalia against piracy, in Iraq for the training of Iraqi security personnel, and in Libya for protecting civilians. All these efforts have been essential and instrumental in contributing to security and stability in and beyond the Euro-Atlantic geography. The successful conclusion of Operation Unified Protector in Libya is a solid case in point.

However, unintentionally and perhaps partially due to these recent intense military engagements, NATO’s image has shifted towards being a more military and less political organisation. It is not my intention to question or challenge the military aspect of the fabric that makes up the Alliance. Yet this should not overshadow the political aspect. My concern would rather be about a NATO that is perceived solely as a military tool—a hammer—imposing and implementing political decisions taken elsewhere, or as a military arm of the United Nations. Without any prejudice to the overall precedence of the UN in maintaining international peace and security, I would argue that NATO’s distinctive nature as a politico-military organisation, certainly including its military capabilities, must be preserved. Another important point that I wish to emphasise strongly is the necessity for a legal basis, i.e., UNSC Resolutions, for NATO’s actions. Participation of regional countries and actors in NATO actions, if and whenever the nature of the operation warrants, is also important for the legitimacy of the Alliance’s involvement. These have been the very arguments that guided the Turkish approach to NATO’s involvement in Libya. Thus, a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region became the prerequisites for NATO’s military action in Libya. The successful conclusion of Operation Unified Protector is also a result of this principled approach.

Concerning the developments in the Middle East and the response of NATO towards these events, I see parallels between Eastern Europe in the early 1990s and the current developments in the Middle East. It is generally accepted that NATO played an important role in the transformation of Eastern Europe, and this role has been praised by many commentators. NATO paved the way for peaceful changes in Eastern Europe, and
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we must keep in mind NATO’s success in this respect. What we are witnessing today is the dissolution of Cold War political and economic structures in the Middle East, and NATO must play a constructive role in the ongoing transformations in our neighbourhood.

Until now, old regimes in the Middle East have survived the tides of change due to three frictional forces within the region. The first of these frictions is the tension between the administrations and the ordinary people within the region. The unfolding events in the region are simply a ‘normalization of history’ due to Soviet style regimes being replaced by new regimes. When we witnessed colossal changes in different parts of the world at the end of the Cold War, the Middle Eastern region remained immune to the changes taking place elsewhere. The democratic transformations in Europe and elsewhere were supported by international institutions, however, the tides of change and democratization did not reach to the shores of the Middle Eastern region. NATO must side with the people of this region and support genuine demands for change.

The second reason for the tensions in the region is the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is affecting regional dynamics in direct and indirect ways. This problem is inherited from the Cold War era and is still affecting the regional dynamics, since efforts such as the Oslo Process failed to bring desired peace and stability to the region. Israel aims to continue its policy of occupation and delay regional peace. NATO must pursue a common policy in encouraging Israel to adopt a constructive attitude towards the Arab Spring. Without making advancement in the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it will not be possible to have stability in the Middle East.

NATO’s agenda should not be dominated by a priori negative perceptions of Iran and positive perceptions of Israel, regardless of whatever these countries do.

The third reason is the Arab-Iran rivalry within the region. Dating back to the Iranian Revolution, there is a fear of Persian domination among the Arab states, strengthened by negative memories of the Iran-Iraq war. In considering these factors, I believe that NATO must develop a policy based on strong foundations, and refrain from double standards in approaching the problems in the Middle East. For example, NATO’s agenda should not be dominated by a priori negative perceptions of Iran and positive perceptions of Israel, regardless of whatever these countries do.

Keeping in mind the background of the Arab Spring outlined above, the response of the international community to these events must evolve around three principles. First of all, democratic
transformation should be supported, results of the elections must be accepted - in other words, ‘the right side must be supported’. Instead of supporting long lasting rulers or the toppling of regimes by force, we must encourage a system in which former presidents are able to lead a normal life of retirement in the Middle East. The outcomes of elections should not change our principled position and the agenda of the international community should not be dictated by the security needs of Israel. The maturation of democratic systems requires time and experience; the international community’s support for democratic processes must continue for a smooth transition from authoritarian regimes to democratically elected accountable rulers. If democratic processes are delayed because of the security concerns of some countries, this will be a resistance to the natural flow of history. We should not forget that democracy is a self-regulating mechanism, and our support for democratic processes should not depend on whether election results are in line with our wishes.

Secondly, in overcoming regional problems, the local dimension should not be ignored and regional initiatives should be supported by the international community. The efforts of regional organizations such as the Islamic Cooperation Organization and the Arab League and Turkey’s contributions are good and important examples in this respect, and such regional endeavours can play a constructive role in finding solutions for the conflicts. We must refrain from double standards and pursue a coherent policy regarding policies in the Middle East. For example, in the case of nuclear proliferation, we must construct our policy on concrete principles and apply these same principles equally to each country. Otherwise, the sincerity of NATO’s or other international organizations’ intentions may be questioned.

We should not forget that democracy is a self-regulating mechanism, and our support for democratic processes should not depend on whether election results are in line with our wishes.

Thirdly, the international community must develop inclusive polices and mechanisms. Here, in responding to the developments in any country, we must follow a three-layered policy. In the beginning, we must support domestic mechanisms in that country for finding solutions to the problems. International mechanism may follow if regional ones are not successful. In this respect, NATO must take new perspectives on the rising powers into consideration and develop bilateral relations with countries such as China, Russia and India. Otherwise,
we may end up with a situation where mutual concerns lead to misperceptions. NATO must avoid declarations and actions that would create an image of confrontation with rising actors around the globe.

NATO must take new perspectives on the rising powers into consideration and develop bilateral relations with countries such as China, Russia and India.

This brings me to my final point: “How could NATO maintain its relevance and success?” Of course this cannot be the ultimate purpose. Therefore, we could rephrase this question: “How could NATO, an invaluable asset so far in contributing to international peace and security, keep up the good work?” My first argument would be that NATO’s fundamental purpose, which is collective defence, must continue to be upheld. Secondly, NATO must continue its ongoing adaptation process for efficiently operating within the new security atmosphere. In this respect, NATO reform has so far been successful. We need to keep up this good work, albeit without changing such overarching time-tested principles as consensual decision-making. Reform also must not lead to any cumbersome bureaucratic structures. Thirdly, notwithstanding its role as the essential transatlantic forum for security affairs, we must see NATO as a part of a larger team collectively catering to international peace and security. In the same vein, while absolutely supportive of a broader vision for the Alliance, I would not wish to see NATO turning into a global security organisation or a “mini UN”. As long as the allied determination to protect our security and values prevails, there should be no need to search for a new “raison d’être”. What we need is to remain focused on our fundamental purpose and be confident of our Alliance.

Focusing on our fundamental purpose by no means implies NATO’s isolation from international efforts to manage crises and contribute to peace and security elsewhere. It is clear that the Alliance cannot remain indifferent to emerging challenges emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic geography. The underlying reason for the “out of area” or expeditionary missions and operations is to meet risks and threats where they emerge and before they directly affect the security of the Allies. This reminds me of the famous words of one of the former Secretaries General of NATO, Lord Robertson, who said that “If we do not go to Afghanistan, it will come to us in the form of terrorism and drugs”.

However, the “out of area” operations and missions that NATO have undertaken since the 1990s, as well
as those that may be assumed in the future, do not necessarily mean that the Alliance seeks a global role similar to that of the UN. The critical balance which NATO will find between addressing its traditional missions and tackling new global threats will shape its future success.

In the face of a rapidly changing and complex security environment and the global financial downturn, no single actor alone is capable of providing security. In this regard, comprehensive approach is the name of the game. This requires not only closer and effective cooperation among relevant actors, but also efficient internal coordination and diversification of capabilities within international organisations, including NATO. The importance of the comprehensive approach, with both its internal and external dimensions, has been underpinned by NATO’s new Strategic Concept. As a matter of fact, this notion is a part of NATO’s daily agenda, in particular, in the context of “smart defence” and critical capabilities. In this regard, the ability to tap the existing civilian capabilities in the inventories of the Allies, when need be, is of particular importance for the effectiveness of NATO’s involvement, not only in crises but also in post-conflict endeavours. In fact, even today such involvements come in the form of contributions to stabilisation, consolidation of security, and reform of security and defence sectors in countries such as Afghanistan. As NATO is often the first or the only responder to a crisis situation, it will be important for the Alliance to be able to deploy civilian capabilities for use during emergencies. NATO’s contribution to civil emergency assistance, including its strategic lift capabilities, is also of critical importance during natural disasters. We have seen how important this can be during the floods in Ukraine and the earthquake in Pakistan.

I wish to emphasise that NATO is already playing a greater role than ever before in sustaining and enhancing peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. However, the need to preserve the effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of NATO makes it necessary to resist the temptation of a global role for NATO. Nor would a stronger military role at the expense of political aspects serve the purposes of the Alliance. We are, nevertheless, under the obligation to ensure that NATO is equipped with all the necessary means for tackling both military and political challenges in the 21st century, as the basis for the...
Allies’ collective defence, and an essential forum for security consultations between Europe and North America.

I would conclude by briefly emphasising NATO’s importance to Turkey and Turkey’s importance to NATO. Since the early years of the Republic, Turkey’s defence and security policies have been characterised by dialogue, cooperation and multilateralism. Turkey’s membership to NATO is a clear testimony to this fact. Moreover, it is a solid symbol of Turkey’s Western vocation and her choice of joining with democratic societies governed by universal values.

Turkey is located at the heart of a vast geography in which NATO is engaged in constructive dialogues, comprehensive partnership mechanisms, as well as a number of other operations. Over the last 60 years as a member of the Alliance, Turkey has not only benefited from NATO’s security umbrella but also contributed immensely to the security of her Allies and to NATO’s efforts to project security in the Euro-Atlantic geography and beyond.

During the Cold War years, the Turkish contribution to NATO’s security umbrella was primarily related to the containment of the Soviet threat on the eastern flank of the Alliance. In order to fulfil this mission, Turkey devoted huge amounts of financial and human resources and played an important role in the success of NATO against the Soviet threat. Turkey helped to secure Western identity through its security policies during the Cold War years. With its contribution to Western security, Turkey found its rightful place within the Euro-Atlantic scheme.

In the post-Cold war era, Turkey was in favour of the expansion of the Alliance through the inclusion of new members to extend the zone of peace and security.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey supported the transformation of NATO to respond to new types of challenges that the Alliance and its members were facing. As the only reliable security apparatus of the post-Cold War era, NATO’s role in this era developed out of practice rather than a pre-conceived plan. Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and subsequent developments induced NATO to implement UN Security Council resolutions to provide peace and security. Turkey strongly supported this role of NATO and was one of the keenest members of the Alliance to play a role in ending the inter-ethnic and inter-communal conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. In the post-Cold war era, Turkey was in favour of the expansion of the Alliance through the inclusion
of new members to extend the zone of peace and security. Besides supporting the expansion of NATO to new members, Turkey actively took part in several peace-making and peace-building mechanisms in Europe and elsewhere.

Turkey has proven to be a staunch member of the Alliance, and a net contributor to both regional and global peace and security.

The tragic events of 9/11, the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and the following developments heralded a new era in NATO’s history and the role of Turkey within the Alliance structure. Afghanistan was NATO’s first “out of area” mission beyond Europe, and the aim was to contribute to the stabilization and reconstruction of this country. In this era, along with the changing nature of the threats against the Alliance, NATO started to counter threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unlike in the Cold War years, possible threats that NATO had to deal with were much more diverse, diffuse in nature and difficult to counteract. Turkey’s geographical position and cultural characteristics made it a crucial ally in combatting the threats of the contemporary world.

With Turkish troops and assets deployed in on-going NATO missions and operations in three continents, and extensive contributions - in soft security terms - reaching out to Central Asia, Caucasus, Middle East and Northern Africa through NATO’s partnership mechanisms, Turkey has proven to be a staunch member of the Alliance, and a net contributor to both regional and global peace and security. Due to her geographical proximity as well as cultural and historical ties with the Balkans, Caucasus, Central, Asia and the Middle East, Turkey plays a special role in the Alliance’s outreach to its partners in these regions. Thus, Turkey is not a security consumer, but a security promoter.

Consensus-based decision-making processes and reliance on international law and legitimacy will be the guiding principles of Turkey’s position in NATO.

Turkey has a multidimensional foreign policy with goals of maximum integration in the neighborhood, involvement in nearby regions, and development of ties in areas such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. The new foreign policy line is also active in international platforms and organizations. NATO’s evolution in the post-Cold War era matches Turkey’s approach to the transforming nature of the security challenges in this period. NATO has civilian and
military capabilities and will remain as the only security institution to tackle new challenges. Consensus-based decision-making processes and reliance on international law and legitimacy will be the guiding principles of Turkey’s position in NATO.

There are other perspectives within NATO that assumes a stronger role for some of its members. There are also inclinations toward justifying country-specific interests using NATO as a pretext. Turkey will resist any manipulations of NATO or maneuvers without international legitimacy. NATO’s latest involvement in Libya exemplified the fact that Turkey’s unique characteristic of having access to all the actors in this geography not only enhances NATO’s operation capabilities, but also helps to justify its involvement in the eyes of the regional actors. Turkey will continue to be an asset and an influential actor within NATO if future needs arise for further NATO involvement in the Middle East.

As we approach the 60th anniversary of Turkey joining NATO, I reiterate our commitment to the continued success and relevance of the Alliance. This is not only a matter of principle, but also an inherent aspect of Turkey’s pro-active policies toward promoting peace, stability and sustainable development across the globe.
The Evolution of NATO’s Three Phases and Turkey’s Transatlantic Relationship

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Abstract

This article explores the evolution of NATO as a security community in three phases. It argues that during the Cold War and immediate Post-Cold War era, the Alliance had a focused grand strategy. In the third phase which starts after September 11th, the Alliance’s grand strategy is in flux, while it is engaged in various missions that are a mixture of borderless collective defence, humanitarian intervention, and the safeguarding of trade routes and resources. The place of Turkey as a predominantly ‘functional’ ally in the first two phases and then as a ‘strategic partner’ in the last phase is examined and followed by the likely points of continuing cooperation with NATO and likely divergence of interests in the long term.

Key Words


Introduction

When Turkey joined NATO sixty years ago, NATO was a different kind of an Alliance than the one it has evolved into today, and Turkey was a far more different country, compared to the regionally proactive player it has become today.

While some things with respect to the Alliance’s core functions, such as the provision of collective defence for its member states and the promotion and preservation of the main tenets of a liberal Western order, have not changed, it is the new security challenges that both the Alliance and Turkey find themselves facing that profoundly alter this relationship. These new challenges broadly fall under three categories: i) new security challenges and different threat perceptions ii) The use of old tools versus new tools in dealing with stability, whether these involve the use of military hard power or normative soft power iii) the legitimacy of military intervention.

This article explores the evolution of NATO in three phases, first as a security community with a grand strategy in
the first two phases: the Cold War and immediate Post-Cold War era, and then as an Alliance in flux in terms of trying to focus a grand strategy with a mission of borderless collective defence after September 11th. The place of Turkey as a predominantly ‘functional’ ally in the first two phases and then as a ‘strategic partner’ in the last phase is examined and followed by the likely points of continuing cooperation with NATO and likely divergence of interests in the long term.

Grand Strategies and NATO: The Making of a Security Community

Turkey has been a component of the transatlantic security community since 1952, when it joined NATO. The concept of a ‘security community’ was coined for the first time by Karl Deutsch in 1957. A security community is more than an alliance. It can be built on a defensive alliance like NATO, but what binds its members together is more than a security guarantee. There are common values, norms and principles centring on a common ‘way of life’ which the security community strives to preserve. Throughout the Cold War, the norms and values of the transatlantic security community were very loosely defined under a ‘western’ identity.1 ‘Loosely defined’ because some of the essential norms of the community such as democratic governance, free market economies and human rights were not even consistently adhered to by many of its member states, including Turkey. However, because these member states firmly belonged to a geographically and ideologically defined ‘western bloc’, their place and identity within the transatlantic security community were unquestionably solid. Therefore this was essentially a western identity which rested upon the legitimacy of collective defence and was constructed within a framework of military security.

Throughout the Cold War, the norms and values of the transatlantic security community were very loosely defined under a ‘western’ identity.

Grand strategy is a policy, which combines military and non-military elements such as national resources, diplomacy, national morale and political culture to preserve and enhance a nation’s long term interests in peace and in war.2 The grand strategy of this ‘security community’ was the preservation of a liberal international order, based on the norms of democracy and free markets. This was a mission to preserve a certain ‘way of life’. The means to achieve this goal were military power projection
and the use of international institutions to legitimize the security community’s norms.

In this sense NATO has been but one aspect of a wider western grand strategy, albeit a central one. This grand strategy which was formulated at the end of the Second World War rested on three things, first, the establishment and maintenance of a world order based on the Wilsonian principles of peace/stability; democratic governance and free market economies. This in turn, depended on two things: first, the rehabilitation of Europe and second, the containment of the Soviet Union which existentially opposed the ideas behind this new world order. The establishment of post war institutions from the Bretton Woods system, to NATO and the European Communities formed the skeletal framework for operationalising this vision. By the time the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, the basis of a western security community had already been formed. The principles of a liberal world order would be established through the regulation of international institutions and the containment of communism. In this project, NATO was the military necessity to contain the ‘other’ which posed a threat to that ‘way of life’, because in every grand strategy, the military instrument is focal in achieving its end goals.

Therefore, even at the very beginning, NATO was more than NATO. The transatlantic relationship, embodied and consolidated under the protective umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation constituted the core of a western system consisting of a variety of institutions which ranged from the IMF, the World Bank to the GATT. NATO’s role has always been beyond that of a military alliance. It is more a security community at the heart of a western system linked with a series of political and cultural relations that aim towards “the reconstruction, intensification and perpetuation of a post-war world order”.

The fact that NATO is more than an Alliance but a security community, also explains why it has surprisingly survived well into the post-Cold War era. An Alliance by definition has to be built against something. When that something in the shape of the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, NATO ought to have collapsed together with the Warsaw Pact. The reason why this did not happen is because what defines NATO is not only what it is against, but also what it is for. That is why the basis of NATO is more than a military alliance, it is a security community built on a basis of shared values and norms.

By the time the Second Strategic Concept was announced at the Washington Summit 1999, the second grand strategy of this security community had become apparent: The ‘western security community’ not only expanded its norms to the post-communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but by now it also militarily intervened to ‘put things right’ whenever there was a humanitarian catastrophe.

The wars in the Balkans put NATO center stage in this new grand strategy which heralded the ‘western security community’ as the guardian and implementer of a new international system of collective security. NATO, as the only organization with an integrated military structure became the center piece of that new grand strategy.

According to Paul Kennedy, it was the success of the first phase of this grand strategy which laid the foundation for its continuation in the second phase. Writing in 1991, he observed that “if Truman, Marshall and Acheson, and their advisers had been asked what sort of a world order they hoped would be in place forty years later, the broad outlines might look very close to what exists today”.7 Therefore what made this grand strategy a grand strategy was the fact that it did not end with the defeat communism but rather it rested on the perpetuation of the world order it sought to establish at the end of the Second World War. Yet despite the changes in the international system since 1945, such as the end of American strategic invulnerability, the rise of multi-polarity, the United States’ relative economic decline vis a vis the rise of China, Japan and the growing strength of a United Europe, the 1990s constituted a remarkable continuity of the original western grand strategy. The preservation of international institutions and their promotion to absorb new members became the key western policy decision of the early 1990s, evident from institutional blueprints for a stable Euro-Atlantic region such as NATO’s London Declaration of 1990, the EU’s Maastricht treaty, the OSCE’s Helsinki ‘Challenges of Change’ document. All of these institutional milestones set the agenda for the preservation and promotion of that ‘way of life’ inherited from the Cold War. Democratic governance, stability and free markets would be expanded through the rule of institutions, and their capacity to absorb the post-communist space, through conditionality and acquiescence to its norms. Where conflict broke out to set a ‘bad example’ to these norms that were to be upheld, the west, though reluctantly, and through a piece meal learning process, grasped the necessity and practicality of military intervention for humanitarian purposes, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo.

Thus, the 1990s were the era of benign

In the original New Strategic Concept, adopted in 1991 at the end of Cold War, the risk of instability was highlighted as the new threat.
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The military missions of the transatlantic partnership in the immediate post-Cold War era are notably straightforward, when there was consensus and when the United States took a lead. Bosnia and Kosovo were good examples of this kind of mission cohesion, and perhaps the most significant mission of the post-Cold War era was the one which kick-started the west’s new found role in collective security - Operation Desert Storm of 1991.

It was Bosnia and Kosovo which shaped the Alliance’s role within this new global trend of peacebuilding/statebuilding through military intervention.

The Soviet Union as the big visible enemy was replaced with instability as the phantom menace. In the original New Strategic Concept, adopted in 1991 at the end of Cold War, the risk of instability was highlighted as the new threat. In this new system of collective security, preserving stability and perpetuating the world order inherited from the end of the Second World War, required a new network of relationships and institutions, one that involved building partnerships. Therefore in the 1990s NATO established new partnerships- an early foray into NATO’s agenda of transformation and building global partnerships today.

NATO’s central task in collective security was further enhanced by the peacebuilding discourse in UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace to the re-making of collective security (without a UN resolution) in Kosovo in 1999. It was Bosnia and Kosovo which shaped the Alliance’s role within this new global trend of peacebuilding/statebuilding through military intervention. NATO had its golden age in the 1990s. Not only was it the only organisation with an integrated military structure which could carry out peace enforcement and peace building missions in the Balkans, with high publicity and considerable success (despite initial hesitations and setbacks), it was also not directly facing any immediate threats of a definable nature itself. If peacebuilding was the fad of the 1990s, NATO certainly found its niche and emerged as the winner.

However, the grand strategy of defending and preserving ‘a way of life’ could no longer be undertaken by keeping the ‘other’ out. In the 1990s and beyond, the mission was altered to ‘absorb’ the ‘other’ (the post-communist space) as opposed to containing it. This is where institutions played a vital role in this project. They became the vehicles of conditionality to bring about that absorption.
In the post-Cold War era, the western alliance could not be seen to be preaching the discourse of democracy, human rights and free markets while helplessly watching yet another humanitarian catastrophe in the Balkans unfold on western Europe’s doorstep. The interest to intervene was no longer solely confined to geostrategic logic or resources, but to the ownership of international norms. That ownership of international norms lies at the very heart of the foundation of a western system of institutions, in which the transatlantic security community constitutes the core. As Dieter Mahncke pointed out in 1993, conflicts such as the break-up of Yugoslavia “may simply serve as bad examples gradually undermining the rules of conduct of the (West) European security community”.

Therefore during the first phase of NATO’s evolution, it served a grand strategy of containment. In the second phase of NATO’s evolution, it served a wider western grand strategy of not only preserving the norms and institutions of this security community but also exporting them to the post-Communist space to Europe’s East. Another tenet of this grand strategy was to militarily intervene and put things right when state’s either fell apart or ill-treated their populations. The precedents the 1990s set for normative military power projection were enormously poignant. And because NATO was centre stage to this development, it was perhaps the burden it shouldered in this respect since the 1990s that led to many disappointments in the third phase of its evolution.

During these two phases, NATO fulfilled its role with two essential attributes:

1) its technocratic know-how of military alliance matters including training and defense reform.

2) its normative power as the core institution of a security community of values.

It was in the third phase of NATO’s evolution, that of a return to collective defence, but this time a borderless definition of it, which entered the Alliance into a problematic decade of muddling through new security challenges.

**Borderless Collective Defence, Alliance Cohesion and Ownership of International Norms**

After September the 11th and the United States’ and then NATO’s subsequent engagement in Afghanistan, the Alliance’s military engagement was no longer confined to a part of a wider western system of collective security. Under the 1990s system of collective security, NATO, through its military
interventions was also fighting off ‘bad examples’. After September the 11th, NATO was not just fighting off ‘bad examples’ but a new ‘enemy’. One that was not as clear cut as a militarily powerful state.

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Libya and Afghanistan have proved that the legitimacy of the Alliance’s operations now rely on a mixture of ownership of international norms and the geostrategic logic of defence, and safeguarding resources and trade routes. This could be summed up as a third phase of NATO’s evolution.

Collective defence, as we knew it during the Cold War was tied to a territorial contiguity. It was the territory of the Alliance’s member states that had to be protected. However, Afghanistan is as remote as one can get from Alliance territory. Yet, it did not start as a 1990s ‘benign intervention’ out-of-area operation either. In this sense, Afghanistan was not merely the recipient of ‘benign’ intervention for humanitarian purposes but a downright, straight forward Article 5 type operation to safeguard the security of the Alliance’s member states. After 2001, projecting stability was not only for the greater good but for the defence of the Alliance.

It also meant that NATO not only had to think about security in a conceptually different way but also had to plan its operations to fit this new thinking. This included stabilization missions far away from the traditional defense perimeter of NATO, which also brings together political, military as well as economic tools. Afghanistan showed that these missions were becoming more complex, more distant and more dangerous. The Balkans were essentially peaceful by the time NATO troops went in. In Afghanistan, by contrast, instead of one mission, there were several missions: peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction combat and counter-insurgency.

These new requirements brought on by the new era of ‘borderless collective defence’ also heralded in a rapid transformation and internal adaptation of the Alliance. Perhaps the most intense period of internal transformation was the period between the Prague Summit of 2002 and the Istanbul Summit 2004.

The Prague Summit emphasised the building of capabilities through the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the unveiling of a new command structure and the establishment of the rapidly deployable NATO Response Force. Reaching out to partner states in combating terrorism was another aspect of the Prague template. The Istanbul Summit was more preoccupied with building upon existing partnerships and
forging new ones in the Gulf region. Therefore between Prague and Istanbul the Alliance in fact had plenty to chew upon with regard to specific missions and operations. This meant that at least during this time with the preoccupation of managing ‘damage limitation’ after the transatlantic fallout over Iraq in 2003, and the day to day implementation of the Prague and Istanbul templates, there was no urgent need to revisit the question of the now elusive grand strategy.\(^{10}\) Somewhere between its ongoing missions and attempts to keep up with a rapidly changing security environment, it has lost the vision.\(^{11}\)

**In Afghanistan, there were several missions: peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction combat and counter-insurgency.**

In this respect, all eyes were on the New Strategic Concept, revealed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. But the Strategic Concept unveiled at Lisbon was largely a compromise document between an emerging ‘two tier Alliance’, a Missile Defence system that had been painstakingly agreed upon, and a commitment to reconcile borderless and in area collective defence. One thing that emerged from the summit was that NATO could not go it all alone. Partnerships, both global and regional, and the Comprehensive Approach – that is coordination between military and civilian assets of multiple actors in a crisis response operation, were vital for the way forward.

The Istanbul Summit was preoccupied with building upon existing partnerships and forging new ones in the Gulf region.

The way NATO works with partners, as well as economic and political tools alongside military ones and manages to deploy and maintain missions in long distances from its headquarters, has been the main thrust of NATO’s transformation since the Prague Summit of 2002. However it is evident that the new strategic concept is not just designed to answer the question of grand strategy which seems to be lost in the plethora of Alliance missions, but also to address the emerging ‘two tier alliance’ between those who favor a territorial collective defense, and those who favor further support to NATO’s missions beyond the Euro-Atlantic area as essential for both Articles 4 and 5. For transatlantic security the upcoming two main challenges are the engagement of partners and managing widening threat perceptions within the Alliance. As one gets into the finer details of implementing both, there is a serious risk of damaging alliance cohesion. To some extent this was the theme of the
strategic concept: the twin approach of assuring allies and dynamic engagement beyond the territory of the Alliance without damaging Alliance cohesion.\textsuperscript{12}

Also at the Lisbon Summit, NATO agreed to put in place a transatlantic missile defence system, in accordance with the US plan for a European Phased Adaptive Approach. Phase one is already underway with the radar hosted by Turkey and the deployment of \textit{aegis} ballistic missile ships to act as the interceptors. Phase two will see the deployment of ground based interceptors in Romania. A further two phases foresee the deployment of further ground based interceptors, in Poland.\textsuperscript{13} As Sean Kay points out in his article in this volume, while the first two phases are designed to face immediate threats and are based on viable technology, it is the further two phases that will present problems, not just in terms of technology that does not yet exist, but also in terms of alliance cohesion.

But even in the short run, there could be a gap in threat perceptions. While Turkey insists that the missile defence system is intended for generic threats and therefore no specific threats were named at Lisbon, in official US documents one sees the common reference to Iran.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, the Central and Eastern European allies no more fear an imminent threat from Iran, than from Russia. It would seem that allied cooperation at the early stages of transatlantic missile defence is predominantly driven by the host nation European allies’ desire not to ‘lose’ the strategic partnership with the US. The US driver behind new transatlantic security challenges is twofold: deterrence and partnerships with an emphasis on assured access to the global commons.\textsuperscript{15} While alliance cohesion can be found in assured access to the global commons, there seems little ground for consensus on deterrence and less interest among some European allies in widening partnerships.

At the Lisbon Summit, NATO agreed to put in place a transatlantic missile defence system, in accordance with the US plan for a European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Another development was that somewhere between Prague and Lisbon and the unpredictable Arab Spring that was to follow, it was evident that the ownership of international norms no longer remained exclusively in the domain of Western institutions and for the first time, due to this fact, the Alliance’s grand strategy became less clear cut than it had been in the Cold War and early post-Cold War era. To take stock of the third phase of NATO’s evolution is more problematic than the first two phases.
It seems that after demonstrating its capability to adapt swiftly to changing times, and having maintained its value based identity as a security community, in the last decade NATO has found itself facing many more challenges than in the early years of the post-Cold War era. Afghanistan and the foray into borderless collective defence, has opened the question of a two tier Alliance as the need to balance in area and borderless collective defence becomes more problematic as defence cuts are likely to continue in the era of the financial crisis. The European Phased Adaptive Approach as part of NATO’s new collective defence planning, may bring about Alliance cohesion in the early phases but could easily test Alliance cohesion in the latter phases. The Alliance’s military engagement in Libya- Operation Unified Protector saw a return to NATO’s 1990s role as a provider of collective security and implementer of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. But despite the legal blessing of a U.N. Security Council Resolution, and a successful close to military operations, the Libyan intervention has left a dwindling sense of unease, unlike the NATO operations of this kind in the 1990s. The discomfort over the connection of Responsibility to Protect to regime change and the polarisation of the U.N. Security Council will be lingering after effects of the Libyan intervention. In this sense, NATO’s normative role in setting the agenda for state building is not as robust as in the 1990s. In fact, it is expected that whatever role NATO does play in a post conflict Libya, it will be a narrower, technocratic role, working alongside many other institutions and if only invited by the Libyan authorities. It is quite a far cry from the NATO of the 1990s, when it led the way in ownership of international norms and implemented them. It seems the third phase is best described as NATO in flux, alongside a changing global order.

Turkey in the Security Community: From Functional Ally to a Strategic Partner

Where has Turkey stood as an Alliance member in all the three phases of NATO’s evolution? Although Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 it is the discrepancies in the post-Cold War era, regarding its functional and normative roles in NATO that have highlighted Turkey’s unique tangential place in this security community. The evolution of Turkey’s functional role within NATO can be seen in four phases:

In the immediate post war era, as the transatlantic security community was being established, Turkey was seen by the U.S. and leading European states of the time as a strategic asset in the Middle East. This would correspond to
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the early Cold War period with signing of the Baghdad Pact, the strategically defined ‘Northern Tier’ by the U.S. and the overall objective of countering Soviet designs in the Middle East. This first phase of Turkey’s ‘functional’ asset for transatlantic security pre-dates its joining NATO. Once Turkey joined NATO in 1952, for its Allies, it now constituted not just an important asset in the defence of the Middle East, but also an essential component of the defence of Western Europe. In this sense, not only because of its geostrategic location but also because of its armed forces as a flank country, Turkey was seen as an asset in counter balancing the military imbalance in Europe against the Soviet threat. The third phase, started with the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, and once again, particularly for U.S. policy planners, Turkey’s strategic role in the Middle East grew in prominence. This was followed by the immediate post-Cold War era, where Turkey transformed in strategic importance for the West, from being a flank country to a frontline country during the first Gulf War in 1991. As U.S. policy moved towards ‘globalism to regionalism’, U.S. interests in various regions ‘was still dependent on key allies’. Here, the use of NATO as multilateral tool, and Turkey’s position as a NATO member became all the more important. Therefore, throughout the 1990s, Turkey was no longer only a geographical strategic asset but also an asset in terms of military contribution to NATO out-of-area operations, especially in Balkans. Therefore, as NATO shifted from a predominantly collective defence organisation to a collective security organisation in the 1990s, Turkey’s role within it had stayed more or less the same, as predominantly a ‘functional’ ally. This was an arrangement which suited Turkey as well, but nevertheless it was not part of grand strategic design of a normative western security community.

Turkey emerged centre stage with NATO’s Istanbul summit and the setting of a date for the opening of accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005.

As NATO entered its third phase after September the 11th, it has been in an ongoing reorganisation in terms of thinking about the future grand strategy of the transatlantic partnership. The situation is one of NATO in flux, pondering its grand strategy. Where does Turkey figure in this reorganisation? Up until around 2007, Turkey’s role in this reorganisation was relegated to the margins by its Western Allies. Yet, throughout this time Turkey was one of the most active contributors to various ongoing post-Cold War missions, from ISAF in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia.
While Turkey added its list of crucial contributions to NATO operations with its role in Operation Unified Protector in Libya, it has also stepped into a leading role in shaping the evolving transatlantic grand strategy in the region.

Two turning points could be seen in altering Turkey’s transatlantic relationship and its regional role, the first is the 2003 crisis between Turkey and the US, over the invasion of Iraq. During what became the most serious crisis in transatlantic relations, Turkey played a pivotal role. Yet, while the debate over transatlantic relations in Washington included Turkey as the ‘surprising’ ally, the debate in Europe completely dismissed Turkey’s role in transatlantic relations, instead focusing on power politics between the European big three and the United States. Turkey’s position in the crisis affected two crucial developments. First, the rejection by the Turkish Parliament to allow US troops to cross into Northern Iraq over Turkish territory, thus opening a second front in the war. Second, Turkey’s membership of NATO and its border with Iraq, which caused a major crisis within NATO whereby the legitimacy of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was questioned when three European allies initially refused to support the deployment of a preventative measure in Turkey before the war commenced. In the aftermath of the crisis, Turkey emerged centre stage with NATO’s Istanbul summit and the setting of a date for the opening of accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005.

The 2007 crisis between Turkey and its Allies was another turning point, when the deferment by the US of Turkey’s request for support in dealing with the PKK threat in Northern Iraq reached the climax. After the escalation of attacks by the PKK against Turkish armed forces, the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution authorising a major military incursion into Northern Iraq to eradicate the PKK problem from its root. This resulted in a flurry of diplomatic activity, with allies taking Turkey seriously and re-affirming the PKK as a terrorist organisation, a surge of nationalism in Turkey, all finally resulting in a fresh approach between Turkey and the US, including US timely intelligence over PKK positions to Turkey, and a limited largely aerial intervention on the part of Turkey. What is new about this particular crisis was that it forced the issue of re-evaluating Turkey’s strategic partnership with its western allies. It shifted the U.S. position of ‘damage limitation’ in its relations with Turkey since 2003, to a more proactive concern for Turkey’s security interests in the region. It also
indicated that Turkey’s hard power is still a reckoning factor in shifting Western perceptions of Turkey.

Turkey has insisted that the missile defence system is against generic threats and has expressly avoided the ‘naming names’ as specific threats.

From 2009 onwards, we can really see the fourth phase of Turkey’s transatlantic relationship, when it leaves behind the ambiguous position it occupied in transatlantic relations from 2001 onwards and emerges as a much more regionally assertive power with regional influence. This fourth phase is characterised by Turkey’s soft power, its diplomatic clout and relations with neighbouring states, and at times playing the role of host and mediator in regional disputes. This has been a remarkable transformation that from essentially a ‘functional’ ally reliant on its hard power for much of the Cold War and early post-Cold War era, to a ‘strategic partner’ but one that is more reliant on its soft power. Ironically, this has come about at a time when NATO’s regional influence has become more functional, as it is expected to take on a much more technocratic role in concert with other actors in the region in contrast to its leading role as a normative organisation with hard power in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the Western Balkans in the 1990s. On the other hand, while Turkey added its list of crucial contributions to NATO operations with its role in Operation Unified Protector in Libya, it has also stepped into a leading role in shaping the evolving transatlantic grand strategy in the region.

Turkey and its Allies: Paths of Divergence and Convergence

In the short run, there may well be a discrepancy between the functional and wider strategic aspects of Turkey’s relationship with its NATO Allies. To some extent, this was already observable with the difficulties surrounding the agreement for Turkey to host the radar component of the NATO missile defence system. Turkey was initially reluctant to host the radar component of the system, therefore on one level it resisted the old ‘functional’ role but had a long term strategic interest to the involved in the European Phased Adaptive Approach, if not, for the development of its own missile defence system in the future. In the long run, the EPAA opens up issues with regard to threat perceptions in the Alliance. It is unclear how the development of the EPAA will effect Turkey’s regional relations, especially with Iran.
Turkey has also recently found NATO to be a useful diplomatic tool for military engagement in the region.

However, much of the widening gap in threat perceptions over regional nuclear deterrence is dependent on how one views classical deterrence theory. Turkey has insisted that the missile defence system is against generic threats and has expressly avoided the ‘naming names’ as specific threats. If a country has a religious adherence to classical deterrence theory, it would see the function of a missile shield as part and parcel of a political signal to deter a first strike. In this case, the naming of the threat becomes important. However, for the U.S., despite the naming of Iran as the immediate regional threat in the short run, the U.S. tend to view the missile defence system as a ‘usable’ deployment to be used against any threat as it emerges. In this context, the Turkish and U.S. views are much closer than anticipated. Therefore in the short run, the EPAA could bring about a convergence between some NATO allies, but in the long run, from Turkey’s perspective the provisos of full coverage of Turkey’s territory and Alliance solidarity, that is Turkey’s insistence on ‘fair risk and burden sharing’ among all NATO Allies regarding the EPAA, indicates that any divergence from these agreed principles will also lead to Turkey’s re-evaluation of its position in EPAA.18

While both NATO and Turkey are finding new ground in their usefulness for one another in the region, Turkey has also recently found NATO to be a useful diplomatic tool for military engagement in the region. Turkey’s interest in the EPAA also stems from this. When the Obama administration announced the EPAA, Turkey had an interest in integrating this US plan for a global Missile Defence System with ongoing NATO Missile Defence plans. For Turkey, presenting the transatlantic missile defence as a NATO rather than as a U.S. plan, which had previously been proposed by the Bush administration, seemed to be a more acceptable choice, especially in terms of presenting the plan to Russia, a key energy partner for Turkey. Although potential Russian cooperation with the NATO missile defence system seemed to make some headway after the Lisbon Summit, Russia’s insistence on legal and technical guarantees and the U.S.’s refusal to accommodate these has led to a cooling of relations over a Russian-NATO cooperation in missile defence. A breakdown of relations with Russia over this issue in the future could also impact Turkey’s position within the EPAA.

Turkey is now forging regional and wider partnerships on its own terms, with the Arab world, Russia and China and Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Turkey’s preference of NATO as a regional tool of multilateralism is also evidence on Turkey’s insistence in bringing the Libya intervention under NATO control. While officially, Turkey was initially reluctant to support any intervention in the deteriorating situation in Libya, once France and the United Kingdom with U.S. support, started to launch a military aerial campaign using NATO assets, Turkey made a decision to pursue bringing the whole operation under the control of NATO. It was only after political control of the operation came under the North Atlantic Council, that Turkey became an active participant in Operation Unified Protector, without taking a direct aerial combat role. This way of using NATO as a means of control rather than letting ad hoc coalitions or US led initiatives roam in the region seems to be a Turkish interest that is likely to endure.

While it would seem that Turkey and NATO will have more of a working relationship in regional management, but there may be divergences between Turkey and NATO when looking at some of NATO’s more strategic global priorities in the future. Strategically NATO had two global priorities for the near future: deterrence and partnerships. However, on a regional level it is engaged more as functional, technocratic organisation that takes on roles in Security Sector Reform, Training and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. On the global agenda, NATO’s projections are long term. For NATO, thirty countries around the World are presently developing a missile capability. Not all thirty, even if they acquire the capability, will become a threat to the Alliance. So these are indeed very long term threat perceptions. In the immediate term, Turkey is much more focused on immediate regional threats, such as stability in Syria, the Middle East Peace Process, the Iranian nuclear issue, Palestinian statehood, post conflict reconstruction Libya and the PKK presence in Northern Iraq. For now, emerging missile threats are not on the top of the agenda of security threats for Turkey. Also NATO’s prioritisation of global partnerships may be a likely point of divergence of interests with Turkey. Turkey is now forging regional and wider partnerships on its own terms, with the Arab world, Russia and China and Central Asia and the Caucasus. NATO’s outreach to ‘like- minded democracies’ is less likely to be attractive for Turkey, for example the NATO global outreach to Australia or Japan. Here between Turkey and the

NATO and Turkish interests are more likely to converge on the preservation of stability on the global commons: air, sea, space and cyber space.
Alliance there is a shift from ‘normative’ values as the main indicator for whom you do business with to strategic management of regional interests. NATO is still in the first category, prioritising global outreach normatively with like-minded countries. Turkey is far more interested in the strategic management of regional interests with the Arab world, the wider region and with Russia. On the other hand, NATO and Turkish interests are more likely to converge on the preservation of stability on the global commons: air, sea, space and cyber space. The Lisbon Summit document was very clear that international trade routes, energy trade routes, possible water or food shortages due to environmental crises, managing supply routes during such crises seem to top the agenda of common threat perceptions amongst allies and these are beyond the remit of normal alliance defence roles. Here, global partnerships are of course essential and in preserving the global commons Turkey of course has a common interest with NATO.

Conclusion

The transformation of Turkey’s relationship with NATO in the past sixty years has especially been profound in the last decade. The Alliance survived its transition from Cold War to post Cold War era because it kept in sight its original grand strategy of preserving a ‘way of life’, although the means to achieve this were altered with predominance in collective defence to a predominance in collective security. Throughout this time, Turkey acted first as a flank country and then a frontline country as the importance of the Middle East rose after the first Gulf War in 1991, but nevertheless was seen by its NATO allies as a ‘functional ally’. As NATO grappled to come to terms with a new grand strategy for a new era, particularly after the fall out over the military intervention in Iraq in 2003, Turkey continued to be relegated to the sidelines in the larger transatlantic debates, although it played a crucial role in shaping outcomes in that crisis.

From 2009, as Turkey embarked on a far more proactive regional role, this time, dependent on its soft power, NATO by contrast started to become a much more technocratic organisation, seeking to fulfil certain roles, regional or global in partnership with others.

After the threat of Turkey’s hard power in the region, from 2007 onwards, there was a marked difference from Turkey's NATO allies towards its regional security concerns. From 2009, as Turkey embarked on a far more proactive regional role, this time, dependent on its soft power, NATO by contrast started
to become a much more technocratic organisation, seeking to fulfil certain roles, regional or global in partnership with others. Although NATO eventually took over the Libyan intervention, with a legal backing and regional cooperation, nevertheless, its role was not similar to its leadership as a normative organisation in the Balkans in 1990s. While NATO as an asset of multilaterism in region, in contrast to ad hoc coalitions of U.S. led initiatives may be an attractive alternative for Turkey, there are nevertheless likely divergences between short and long term threat perceptions between Turkey and the Alliance. Despite this, for the foreseeable future, both Turkey and NATO will adjust to a new relationship, one which sees a more functional Alliance and a more strategic driver in Turkey in their regional involvement.
Endnotes


14 Ibid.


16 For the three phases see: Ekavi Athanassopoulou, ”American-Turkish Relations since the End of the Cold War”, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (September 2001).

17 Turkey serves in the EU mission in Bosnia but essentially has served in the same mission under NATO when it was SFOR. After the handover to the EU, the mission continued with some of the existing contributions from non-NATO states.


Sean KAY*

Abstract

This article examines the rationale and implications of NATO’s missile defense program which was an appropriate, but problematic, response to collective defense requirements. By designing a theater-based missile defense in southeastern Europe, the United States has returned the question of credible collective defense back to NATO. The discussion provides a survey of the missile defense debates in NATO and the evolution of the concept under President Barack Obama. It then examines the challenge of constructively engaging Russia in the dynamics of NATO’s missile defense decisions and deployments. The analysis concludes with an overview of what this re-prioritization of collective defense in means for realigning America’s role in NATO.

Key Words

Missile defense, NATO, Iran, Turkey, Russia, containment, collective defense, alliances.

The Dilemma of Modern Collective Defense

Missile defense has been at the core of global security dilemmas since the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile delivery systems. During the Cold War, missile defenses were seen as undermining the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was because missile defense can increase incentives to launch first-strike nuclear attacks if an enemy’s retaliatory response is survivable. At best, associated technological competition can cause arms races. In 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the US and the Soviet Union limited missile defenses and focused the strategic balance on mutual assured destruction. For some American critics of arms control, however, this treaty restricted America’s capacity for national defense. This perspective was made popular by President Ronald Reagan, who’s “Strategic Defense Initiative” had a stated goal of helping eliminate nuclear threats entirely. Physicists and experts regularly remind policymakers

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that the technology is unfeasible and the risk of new arms races high. Yet what American politician wants to argue against defending an American city against nuclear attack even if there is a logic to raising concerns about missile defenses? Missile defense has thus been popular and support for it has become a political litmus test in the United States - regardless of the science or risks.

NATO has struggled since the end of the Cold War over how to make collective defense relevant absent the Soviet threat. As Joseph Lepgold pointed out in 1998, during the Cold War nuclear deterrence worked for collective defense because: “...once anything more than a minimum nuclear deterrent force is provided, it can often be extended to others at little cost. The United States has not hesitated in covering, albeit often implicitly, many states with its nuclear umbrella.”  
Lepgold noted that it would be difficult to persuade allies to undertake a range of new missions absent a unifying threat. The incentives of allies to undersupply capabilities or take risks was exposed in new missions like in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya where victory was achieved for almost inspite of NATO. Now, as dangers of nuclear proliferation rise, the question of whether the allies in NATO can regain their footing on collective defense is a primary concern. A fundamental question arises for NATO members as to whether conventional assumptions of nuclear deterrence applies to a state like Iran. Iran’s conventional military power is antiquated and containable by the collective military power in NATO. However, an Iran with nuclear weapons introduces dangerous uncertainty to the calculus of deterrence. Even a minimal Iranian nuclear capability could enhance Iranian leverage in the Persian Gulf-making it difficult to maintain the flow of oil. The question is increasingly urgent given reports in late 2011 from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program.

Collective defense planning only occasionally arose in NATO after the Cold War as new members joined the alliance. For example, after Russia invaded Georgia in summer 2008, the Polish Prime Minister said that: “Poland and the Poles do not want to be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later- it is no good when assistance comes to dead people.”

Military conflicts, like the 2003 invasion of Iraq also raised concerns- in this case in Turkey. Before the war, Ankara requested that NATO coordinate for collective defense in the event of a retaliatory attack by Iraq against Turkey. This request was rejected by some allies who believed the best way to protect Turkey was to stop a US invasion of Iraq. In crisis, NATO members refused for nearly a month to plan for defense of Turkey. Collective defense planning eventually moved
forward, but only after the US shifted the
discussion out of the political realm of
NATO and into its military committee
(which then did not include France).4 The
allies in NATO had a bigger problem
as security management challenges are
increasingly non-military- ranging from
cyber-attack, energy security, climate
change, terrorism, demographics, and
economic crises.5 The military utility of
NATO seemed increasingly outdated-
particularly as it struggled with basic
warfighting in Kosovo, Afghanistan
and Libya- and especially if it could
not address new collective defense
requirements.

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By 2008, when NATO first
contemplated missile defense, there
were over 120 ballistic missile launches
worldwide- though most of these were
conducted by American or European
allies.6 Iran, in particular, is a significant
concern to European NATO members
given its increasing proximity to missile
ranges. Iran has the largest force of
ballistic missiles in the Middle East and
the second largest in the underdeveloped
world after North Korea. Iran appears
to be developing capacity to produce
weapons grade nuclear material as
suggested by the IAEA in November
2011.7 Iran’s existing missile capability
/about 1,000 total short and long-
range) is mainly old Soviet-era SCUDs.
However, Tehran has been seeking
Russian nuclear-capable, intermediate-
range, strategic air-launched cruise
missiles (KH-55 Granat) and appears
to be consolidating the basis of an
indigenous ballistic missile program.8
The internal “Shahab” system has been
claimed by Iran to test successfully up
to 1,300 kilometers (Shahab-3). Iran
has also researched a 2,500-kilometer
range (Shahab-5) missile and launched
suborbital rockets implying a nascent
capacity for inter-continental ballistic
missiles. For now, these systems may
put southern Europe in range of Iranian
missile launches albeit with limited
accuracy.9 There is thus growing allied
consensus on Iranian objectives but
disagreement on the pace and degree of
capabilities. For example, while Iran was
developing advanced centrifuge capacity,
they also experienced technical setbacks.
Iran likely remained some distance away
from even a crude nuclear weapon test
and without effective long-range delivery
systems. Nonetheless, the combination
of Iran’s behavior outside the norms of
acceptable international behavior gave
the NATO allies legitimate concern.
As Victor Utgoff writes: “Widespread
proliferation is likely to lead to an
occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. This kind of world is in no nation’s interest.”

The idea of a missile attack with nuclear weapons on a NATO ally mandates serious policy consideration.

Even with agreement on the concept, the NATO allies also confront the reality of physics and technological constraints. As Philip Coyle and Victoria Samson state: “...shooting down an enemy missile is like trying to hit a hole-in-one in golf when the hole is moving at 17,000 mph. And if an enemy uses decoys and countermeasures, missile defense is like trying to hit a hole-in-one when the hole is moving at 17,000 mph and the green is covered with black circles the same size as the hole.”

Sometimes a defensive capacity can make offensive war more tempting- and thus scare other countries into balancing efforts or even incentivize “use-it-or-lose-it” preemptive wars. Finally, even if ballistic missile defenses were effectively deployed to cover all NATO territory, these systems would not stop cruise missiles, which fly low and fast and can carry a nuclear payload, or terrorists with a weapon parked on a boat in a harbour. There are about 75,000 cruise missiles worldwide relative to less than a dozen, mainly friendly, nations that have ballistic missiles with ranges longer than 1,000 kilometers. The point about cruise-missiles is important because even if a ballistic missile defense system works, its presence creates incentives to circumvent the system. Defenses that do not work can create a false-sense of security, while simultaneously damaging essential security relationships.

Still, the idea of a missile attack with nuclear weapons on a NATO ally mandates serious policy consideration. If Iran got nuclear weapons, other governments in the Middle East might feel the need to get nuclear weapons. Thus it would be preferable for NATO members to provide reassurance of a defense shield and thus disuade against a chain-reaction of regional nuclear proliferation. One Saudi diplomat was asked how to respond to a nuclear Iran and answered: “With another nuclear weapon.” The initial American response, developed under the administration of former President George W. Bush envisioned the European systems as a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the American national Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The system would have incorporated ten two-staged Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland and an X-band radar in the Czech Republic (and integrated into a radar system in Israel).
This plan was negotiated bilaterally by Washington in discussions with Poland and the Czech Republic sidestepping NATO consultation. Furthermore, the decision was announced without a testing program. As the the Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation (which worked with the US Department of Defense) stated in 2007: “The proposed GMD expansion to the European theater has not accomplished system engineering adequate to support the development of a test program sufficiently detailed to certify a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner.” This was especially problematic because ranges and trajectories require a system based on two-stage rockets which were unproven.

The initial American plan had substantial warfighting deficiencies unique to the European theater of operations. This was because of proximity and reduced time for deployment in the geometry between Iran and Europe made the system more operationally appropriate for continental American defenses than European. The NATO allies nevertheless accepted the American plan seeing it better to engage and influence the systems’ progress as it was proceeding in any event. Serious intra-alliance concerns predictably emerged. If the system did work, would the United States employ its national ballistic missile defenses to protect European allies, or instead reserve them for American territorial defense? Or, would a missile bound for Washington be shot at but risk spreading nuclear debris raining down on Germany or France? Such concerns made European allies seek command and control roles in the NATO system. However, technology and ranges mean that a missile launched from Iran at a European target would provide only 20 minutes to detect, track, and intercept. Thus launch decisions would have to be taken quickly and with precision-something Washington believed only it could guarantee. Russian leaders also seemed to use missile defense concerns to pande to domestic political sentiment.

This program was viewed with deep mistrust in Moscow and negatively impacted US-Russia relations. Russia staked out strong opposition to NATO’s missile defense concepts. This approach was pursued to gain concessions on other issues, such as Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO. At times, Russian leaders also seemed to use missile defense concerns to pande to domestic political sentiment. Nevertheless, the United States worsened the situation by appearing patronizing and insensitive to Russian security concerns as leaders in Moscow perceived them, not as Washington thought they
should percieve them. For example, then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice characterized Russian threats of military redeployments as “pathetic rhetoric” that reflected views which “border on the bizarre.”\textsuperscript{20} Russia, in turn, made clear it would pursue missile development to circumvent NATO systems. Moscow also threatened to deploy missiles with ranges of up to 400 kilometers in Kaliningrad to target missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. Direct pressure was put on the Czechs the day they announced their participation - with Moscow announcing disruptions in the flow of energy supplies in the country.\textsuperscript{21}

**The Obama Reset**

In Winter and Spring 2009, newly-elected president Barack Obama finished a review of existing missile defense plans for Europe. The Obama team opted to reset European missile defense along a premise that programs should be aligned with threats and capabilities. The NATO allies were pleased to adjust as they had been asked by the Bush administration to approve a concept they were uneasy with. In addition to bypassing NATO, the Bush administration often sold their concept with scare tactics. For example, they included in NATO briefings a computer simulation of a hypothetical long-range ballistic missile attack from Iran against each ally’s capital city. This was an Iranian capability that did not exist nor would it for some time. However, the pressure made it politically hard for allied representatives to assess with a measured response.\textsuperscript{22} The initial NATO consensus approach consolidated by the Bush administration was thus thin and mainly a signal to potential aggressors: “The Allied defense posture must make it clear to any potential aggressor that NATO cannot be coerced by threats or use of weapons of mass destruction, and that the Alliance has the capability to respond effectively.”\textsuperscript{23} NATO officials indicated there was value in “dissuading countries from developing missile capabilities in the first place, secondly in deterring an adversary who might think well, we’ve got missiles we potentially could use them but we can’t be sure that we’re going to have the intended effect and, you know, does it still make sense from...the adversary’s perspective, to launch an attack.”\textsuperscript{24} Operational concerns pervaded NATO - especially the lack of coverage for the southeastern countries most vulnerable to Iranian missile ranges. As then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer indicated in 2007: “When it comes to missile defense, there shouldn’t be an A League or a B League within NATO.”\textsuperscript{25} For Poland, the main benefit was that the systems would represent a commitment of about 100 American troops (and Patriot missile batteries) onto their territory, which to them signaled credibility behind Washington’s
commitment to Polish security. Thus many Polish advocates (and missile defense industry advocates) saw the Polish and Czech commitments as a litmus test for American politicians. This was less so in the Czech Republic where public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to the government’s participation. Still, for all of the allies, once having set out and approved, with political buy-in, a major course correction was not an easy bridge to cross.

The Obama team opted to reset European missile defense along a premise that programs should be aligned with threats and capabilities.

Meanwhile, American concerns over costs and burden sharing also emerged over the Bush plan. In 2008, Congress cut $85 million allocated to the Polish and the Czech deployments pending final approval by each country and independent technical evaluations. Congress required that the Defense Department certify that two-stage interceptors have “demonstrated, through successful, operationally realistic flight testing, a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner” before acquisition and deployment. In addition to operational concerns, the question of why the United States should bear the sole cost of a European system grew in Congress - though its own laws made technology-sharing among the allies hard to achieve and thus limited their participation. Still, there was considerable political risk in the United States for the Obama administration to abandon the initial Bush plans. Backers of the Bush administration’s approach argued Obama was going to “sell-out” American allies in Poland and the Czech Republic and was thus weak on national security. Still, the European perspective was primed to welcome a new look at European missile defense. In November 2008, President Nicholas Sarkozy said that missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic would “bring nothing to security” but rather will “complicate things and move them backward.”

France’s Minister of Defense, Herve Morin went further, asking about the expense of a “huge cost” of missile defense, asking “who would hold the key?” and added that: “There are risks, yes, but to say that there is a threat today would need to be checked.”

Russia knew the United States had little to bargain with given that the existing missile defense plans had scant technological basis for success.

President Obama proved domestic critics wrong by showing that the United States was covering more NATO
members and addressing threats from Iran faster and with greater precision. The administration rectified three interrelated dynamics all of which had been hindering American national security. First, the United States focused attention on Iran but made clear that if that problem could be solved with Russian help, Moscow’s concerns could be alleviated. US Under Secretary of State William J. Burns indicated in February 2009, regarding Iran: “If through strong diplomacy with Russia and our other partners we can reduce or eliminate that threat, it obviously shapes the way at which we look at missile defense.”

A private letter to this effect was sent by President Obama to his Russian counterpart, Dmitri Medvedev. The letter specified that if Russia engaged in diplomacy that produced effective results in turning back Iran’s nuclear program there would be no need for the European ballistic missile defense deployments. Russia hinted in response that it too then might not need to make new missile deployments. The problem, however, was that Russia knew the United States had little to bargain with given that the existing missile defense plans had scant technological basis for success. In 2009, NATO thus adjusted the plan on its merits, less so as a bargaining chip with Russia than on the merits of how the system would work for collective defense. NATO’s new look at missile defense stressed that: “Based on the technical and political military analysis of these options, we judge that missile threats should be addressed in a prioritized manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk.”

The new NATO missile defense architecture— the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) would proceed in four distinct phases. Drawing out a sequence starting with most immediate regional threats made sense given public intelligence estimates that fruition of any nuclear threat from Iran was not likely before 2015. The first two phases reflect the convergence of immediate threat concerns and viable technology. The second two—on much longer time horizons—are based on technology that does not exist. These later phases are more political in nature and create new self-inflicted problems for NATO. Phase One is being implemented with a focus on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships equipped with SM-3 Block IA interceptors which are proven and effective. These missiles target an enemy missile close to launch, when it is slow and ascending with higher...
accuracy and speed. The navel vessel *USS Monterey* was deployed in 2011 as part of a rotational deployment of *Aegis* cruisers into the Mediterranean Sea. In September 2011, Turkey agreed to host a land-based early warning radar as a key part of this first deployment. Phase Two is set to be completed in 2015 and would deploy a land-based SM-3 missile defense interceptor site in Romania with a new kind of interceptor - the SM-3 Block IB. Phase Three would deploy in 2018 if technology agreed and include missile interceptors with a longer ranges - the conceptualized SM-3 Block IIA would be deployed. This phase is based on technology that does not exist nor is it likely to and thus seems intended more to reassure Poland. If the plan did function, it would broaden the range of area covered by NATO missile defenses - and reignite serious concerns in Russia. Similarly, Phase Four, set for 2020 would target medium and intermediate range missiles and include Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile threats to the United States... and be problematic for Russia.

**Turkey held out, successfully, for official NATO language that would not specify an adversary- especially Iran.**

Gaining Turkish cooperation in the deployment of an early warning radar system was not a given. The missile defense systems were seen as most benefiting Israel and turning Turkey into a frontline state against Iran whilst Turkey sought better relations with Tehran. Turkey held out for a year before agreeing to the radar installations on its territory. Ankara initially insisted on a role in command and control of systems deployed in Turkey. However, this was a non-starter for the United States which maintains that crisis scenarios require strict American command and control. Turkey held out, successfully, for official NATO language that would not specify an adversary- especially Iran. This was easy enough for NATO- its founding treaty in 1949 never named the Soviet Union. NATO officials now note that there are many countries within range of the European area of collective defense with the capacity for missile delivery systems. As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in November 2010: “We do not want to single out particular countries... More than 30 countries already have - or are aspiring to acquire - missile technologies with a range that can hit NATO territory. So there is no need to single out or name specific countries, because this is an evolving threat.” Nonetheless, there was a tension in that to sell the system to Russia (and thus assuage allies’ concerned about alienating Russia), the system required an emphasis on Iran. Yet for Turkey, this increases concerns about Iran’s reactions, illustrated by the
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman in late 2011 who stated of Turkey that: “We expect our friend and neighbor to be more careful and not prepare the ground for policies which would lead to tension and, beyond any doubt, to complicated consequences as well.” He added that: “Strengthening NATO’s presence in the region itself would be counterproductive to both regional security and also that of Turkey.”38 And yet, showing the difficulty in bridging American priorities, in December 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: “It’s not directed at Russia, it’s not about Russia, it’s frankly about Iran”-discarding Turkish concerns and agreed NATO policy.39

Russia’s Perceptions and Realities

After the announcement in 2009 that the American concept for missile defenses would be religned, Russia reacted favorably. Progress ensued on completion of a new version of strategic arms reductions and, for a period, a new atmosphere seemed attainable in US-Russian relations. Nevertheless, by 2012, Russian opposition to the NATO missile defense plans hardened again. Russian leaders threatened compliance with arms reduction treaties and to target their own missiles at NATO missile defense sites. American and NATO officials continued to stress the limited nature of the systems and to reassure Moscow and, if possible, even link it into the system. However, as Michael McFaul (then senior White House adviser on Russia, and now US Ambassador to Moscow) stated succinctly of the Russians on missile defense: “They don’t believe us.”40 Ultimately, whatever the American or NATO perception of intent, it is important to understand that the Russian view is not solely domestic posturing. It is true, as American negotiators point out, that in their private discussions with their counterparts, Russian officials have been far less belligerent in their opposition to European based missile defenses for NATO.41 However, Russia has significant diplomatic and technical concerns which cannot be so easily discounted.

Diplomatically, the Russians have, in their view, considerable reasons not to trust NATO. While in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the US and Russian leaders (then Soviet) worked successfully on major nuclear arms treaties, the famous phrase of President Ronald Reagan of “trust but verify” has been turned back onto the United States. Russians assert they were told in the early 1990s that NATO enlargement would not go beyond integrated Germany. By 2012, the alliance of 16 had become an alliance of 29 (including former Soviet Republics). Russians were told during the NATO enlargement process that the alliance was purely defensive and would never attack anyone. Yet just days
after the first countries from the former Warsaw Pact were admitted (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), NATO launched an offensive bombing campaign against Serbia- Russia’s friend. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Russia gave open access to its airspace and to US base access in former Soviet republics near to Afghanistan. This was done on the assumption it would be temporary yet American bases remained. In 2002, the US withdrew from the anti-ballistic missile treaty which the Russians feared would undermine the global nuclear balance. By 2009, NATO was- against strongly stated Russian opposition - declaring eventual membership for Ukraine and Georgia. From the Russian point of view, these are not merely domestic political problems but rather reflect a belief that NATO ignored Russia’s perception of legitimate security concerns.

Russia has considerable policy leverage as it can exert pressure on the United States and complicate NATO consensus processes. Russia holds an essential key to economic pressure on Iran. This means Russia has leverage but also a responsibility to be a constructive actor regarding Iran’s nuclear program if it wishes to alleviate its concerns over missile defense. Russia also exerts influence over NATO transit routes into Afghanistan and energy supplies into Europe. Crucially, all the NATO allies genuinely want a positive and constructive relationship with Russia and want a constructive solutions to impasses over missile defenses. Still, comments from the US Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, in December 2011 are both appropriate from the perspective of NATO and at the same time, more reason for concern in Moscow: “Whether Russia likes it or not, we are about defending NATO-European territory against a growing ballistic missile threat...We will adapt the timing and the details to that threat, which is why the focus of our joint effort ought to be about how to figure out how to reduce that threat rather than trying to threaten and retaliate for a deployment that has nothing to do with Russia.”

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Russian technological concerns cannot be easily dismissed because science is a rather immutable reality. The total number of missile interceptors envisaged by the start of the Third Phase of NATO’s deployment would reach as high as 500 interceptors based on more than 40 ships. This would grant US missile defense mobility up into the Black Sea and up into the high north Arctic and include land bases in Poland.
and Romania both of which move the system into range of Russian ballistic missiles. Moscow also asserts that forward deployed radar systems could target three hundred times more missiles for detection than currently deployed American radars. Russia has thus sought written guarantees to limit total missile interceptors numbers and speed. Russian negotiators want a limit of 3.5 kilometers per second which would make the NATO missile interceptors unable to catch up to Russian ballistic missiles. Russia is laying down a marker on Phase Three and Four of the NATO plans which envision SM-3 IIA and IIB missiles with expected speeds of 4.5 kilometers per second at least. The United States, as with the Bush plan, thus continues to risk significant alienation from an essential national security partner over missile defense technology that does not exist.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen testified to Congress that he had “confidence that we can continue to pursue that path” of the SM-3 IIB, even though “the missile you’re talking about I know doesn’t exist yet.”

American officials repeatedly insist that the missile defense system is not a threat to Russian security- but seldom account for the possibility that Russia might define its own national security perceptions. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov asserts that missile defense will seriously poison Euro-Atlantic cooperation on a range of issues. Lavrov and other senior Russian officials assert that the system is really a phased approach towards the global defense system that Moscow perceived under the Bush plans. Lavrov asserted in November 2011 that: “These plans are being implemented with no consideration for Russia’s legitimate concerns, thus undermining the principle of indivisible security.”

NATO has addressed these concerns by consistently offering Russia a role in the missile shield, perhaps incorporating a Russian early warning radar system into it. However, the Russian position has been that they should have joint command-and-control. This would not be feasible as it would both provide a Russian veto over collective defense decisions in NATO and undermine command and control in a crisis.

The problem for NATO is that Russian concerns about the higher speed missile interceptors which would be deployed in Phase Three and Four have scientific legitimacy behind them. As leading missile defense physicist Theodor Postol and analyst Yousaf Butt write: “whether or not the planned system is intended against Russia, the salient point is that it will have some inherent capability against Russia’s strategic forces.” Postol and Butt remind NATO that missile defenses, especially in the European context, are not proven to work- even in phase one an two- in battle- tested scenarios. Moreover, missile defense
systems like that planned in NATO are dangerous since they are easily countered with decoys or by building more missiles to overwhelm the defense systems. Of course, that would prompt NATO to need more defenses, and thus further erode Russian confidence—provoking military counter-measures if only to assure Moscow’s credibility. Even the revamped Obama plan, Postol and Butt conclude, seriously undermines NATO’s common defense. They point out that: “Exaggerating the abilities of missile defense is dangerous...It suggests that political and military leaders have capabilities and options that they, in fact, do not have.” They add that: “There have been no tests of these systems under realistic conditions...the current systems cannot reliably intercept a single test warhead that is launched at a known time on a known trajectory, even when there are no counter-measures or decoy warheads involved.” Consequently, at least regarding phases three and four of the NATO missile defense plan, the alliance is getting no obvious security benefits and simultaneously raising its own costs relative to Russia—which is a decrease in allied security.

Now, the Russians insist on a written treaty guarantee to limit the numbers and kinds of missiles which could be deployed as interceptors. US officials reject that, saying they would provide written assurances but not binding commitments. To do otherwise would be to give a non-NATO member a veto over NATO’s collective defense. Even if the Obama administration wanted to involve Russia at an operational level or to agree to treaty limits, it would not gain approval in the United States Senate. Some Senators argue that defenses should be deployed in the Republic of Georgia—seemingly guided by a desire to signal that America can and will do what it wants, regardless of Russia’s concerns. Even achieving basic integration of Russia into the defense system—as both the Bush and Obama administration hoped—would face opposition in the United States Senate. Thirty-nine Republican members wrote to President Obama in April 2011 opposing providing any “early warning, detection, or tracking” information to Russia—concluding that “any agreement would allow Russia to influence the defense of the United States or our allies...would constitute failure of leadership.” They added that President Obama would have to: “make clear in every engagement with Russia that it will have no say in the location, capability, or timing of US missile defense deployments with a
NATO military alliance...We trust this includes the location of interceptors in Europe, including in Romania and Poland, and missile defense radars whether in Turkey, the Republic of Georgia, or another location that is most advantageous for the defense of the American people.”

For the Russians, this kind of unpredictability drives their desire for legally binding commitments— even if that quest is unrealistic given the mood of the United States Senate. This dichotomy leads senior Russian diplomats like Sergei Lavrov to say: “They keep repeating not to worry, not to worry, it is not targeted against you...If we are to be treated as a potential strategic partner, we’d like people to have respect for our intellectual abilities... We need legally binding arrangements, because good intentions come and go, while military capability is what stays.”

To the Russians, NATO not only appears unserious about involving them, but even if it did, it would not give Russia a say over how the system works. Rather Moscow would be left to trust the good intentions of the NATO allies. A simple exercise illustrates this problem— would America and NATO be comfortable with the same outcome in reverse— i.e. being totally dependent on the good will of Russia to guarantee there defense?

There is also a tension in NATO’s missile defense plans between the diplomatic objective of engaging Russia within the program, and the technological-operational dynamics behind the missile shield concept. This is particularly true, as Richard Weitz has shown, in the areas of information sharing, rapid decision-making, and the sensitivities of technology transfer. As Weitz notes, sharing sensitive technology even among the NATO allies has always been difficult— thus either opening sensitive NATO technology to Russia or relying on Russian technology for the NATO defense plans would be a risky proposition. This would be especially true if, as Weitz writes: “NATO policymakers fear that intelligence about their BMD systems and tactics might find its way to Iran, North Korea, or other states of proliferation concern.” The Bush administration had actually put ambitious proposals to integrate Russia into the system to include planning, sharing radar facilities, and providing for Russian inspections of US missile defense facilities. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a Republican who served president Bush, even suggested that the US could agree to not operationalize the entire system until Iran had demonstrated clear
missile capacity that would threaten the European area.\textsuperscript{54} Thus there is a core dilemma in that policy options for NATO are simultaneously too few concessions for Russia, and too many for the United States.

**Conclusion**

NATO has adopted an appropriate missile defense concept with an initial focus on theater missile defenses, diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran, and ongoing engagement with Russia to achieve common threat management. Should Iran test a nuclear weapon, the NATO missile defense system will be essential to any containment regime.\textsuperscript{55} The best case would be a dynamic where a major change in internal priorities moved Iran to reject nuclear weapons completely.\textsuperscript{56} That would, however, raise an important question: If there were no Iranian threat would NATO still build the missile defense system? Russia suspects NATO would, and thus sees a threat. As former US Senator Sam Nunn states: “The United States and Russia need to pause – take a deep breath and realize that we are at a crossroads in our strategic nuclear relationship...We could stumble to the precipice of strategic danger if we and our Russian friends play a foolish zero-sum game with missile defense.”\textsuperscript{57} Ultimately, one fundamental point is key about missile defense – it has shown that NATO can organize around its core foundation of collective defense. This will be especially important as America’s role in Europe recedes and a new emphasis on Asia grows.\textsuperscript{58} In the coming years, Europe will have to assume lead responsibility for the kinds of “out-of-area” activity that have dominated the alliance since the end of the Cold War. While there are serious challenges remaining for missile defense in NATO, the new approach shows that the United States can lead the alliance in its core mission of collective defense in a new security environment and in innovative, flexible, and adaptive ways.
Endnotes


17 Based on discussions with senior US officials, off-the-record, Summer 2009.


32 Based on off-the-record conversation with senior White House/National Security Council official, Summer 2009.
35 Vice-Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy Director, “Defense Intelligence Agency Statement for the Record”, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 March 2005. By 2012, these estimates were mainly steady though reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency would suggest an acceleration of Iranian nuclear timelines.
39 “NATO, Russia Still Deadlocked on Missile Defense; Russia Warns Time Running Out”, Associated Press, 8 December 2011.


43 Arms Control Association, “Missile Defense Cooperation Stalls”.


45 This approach of plans moving faster than actual technology is referred to in the United States as “spiral development” which includes deployment of existing capabilities before their effectiveness is proven. This approach builds in an assumption of eventual success – even if there is reason to think that assumption might be flawed. See Victoria Samson and Nick Schwellenbach, “Spiraling Out of Control: How Missile Defense’s Acquisition Strategy is Setting a Dangerous Precedent”, Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 2003-2011.

46 Arms Control Associate, “Missile Defense Cooperation Stalls”.


49 Postol and Butt, “Upsetting the Reset”.


51 “Russia Says Time Short in Missile Standoff”, Reuters, 8 December 2011.


54 Ibid., p. 108.


Lisbon and the Evolution of NATO’s New Partnership Policy

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Abstract

NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept identifies cooperative security as one of “three essential core tasks” to be achieved in part “through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe”. To facilitate the construction of this broader network of partners, the Alliance adopted a new partnership policy in April 2011, designed to facilitate “more efficient and flexible” partnership arrangements. The policy offers a number of new tools to foster the cooperative security efforts deemed so critical under the new strategic concept and permits potential and existing partners an opportunity to shape their own relationships with NATO. In so doing, however, it moves the Alliance toward less differentiation between partners and fails to clarify the role of like-minded partners in preserving and extending the liberal security order that NATO’s initial partnerships were designed to enlarge.

Key Words


Introduction

Meeting in Berlin in April 2011, NATO foreign ministers adopted a new partnership policy designed to facilitate “more efficient and flexible” partnership arrangements with NATO’s growing and increasingly diverse assortment of partners. The new policy served to fulfill a pledge taken at the Lisbon summit in 2010 to enhance NATO’s partnerships further by “develop[ing] political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share [the Allies’] interest in peaceful international relations.” Although NATO has since the early 1990s maintained multiple partnership frameworks (e.g. Partnership for Peace (PfP) Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and the Istanbul

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Cooperation Initiative (ICI)), the 2010 Strategic Concept issued at Lisbon makes partnership a key component of NATO’s new strategy, by identifying “cooperative security” as one of “three essential core tasks” to be achieved in part “through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe”. This heightened emphasis on partnership reflected a growing realization that partners are essential to addressing the increasingly global security challenges NATO currently confronts, as well as the emergence of a broad consensus within the Alliance that both existing and prospective partnerships must become more functional. Indeed, the new policy was designed, not only to facilitate greater dialogue among partners outside and across existing partnership frameworks; it also opens to all partners opportunities for practical cooperation with NATO that may previously have been available in only one of NATO’s partnership structures.

Somewhat unexpectedly, NATO found itself with an opportunity to implement the new policy even before its final approval by NATO foreign ministers in April 2011. On March 27, 2011, just prior to the Berlin meeting, NATO had agreed to assume responsibility for Operation Unified Protector in Libya, a mission that necessitated immediate dialogue with regional actors participating in two of NATO’s partnership frameworks; namely, the Mediterranean Dialogue, which dated back to 1994 and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, created in 2004. NATO’s ability to engage these states in dialogue under the new policy affirmed the importance of the Berlin agreement and the flexibility that it offered for engaging partners across existing frameworks.

At the same time, however, the Arab Spring movements of 2011 highlighted one of the key challenges that has plagued many of NATO’s partnership efforts; namely, that of undemocratic partners whose domestic political practices are deeply at odd with the liberal democratic values that NATO has pledged to defend and which remain at the core of its identity. Although the partnership policy adopted in Berlin affirms that a commitment to the values of “individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” remains “fundamental” to NATO’s partnership initiatives, the reality is that many of NATO’s existing as well as potential partners, in the Middle East and beyond, are not liberal democracies. Indeed, non-democratic partners have proved problematic in the past, including in Central Asia where the success of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has depended to a considerable degree on regional partners which- despite their participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council- remain repressive authoritarian
regimes. As NATO continues to reach out to an increasingly diverse group of partners under the new policy, it will be forced to wrestle with the reality that many of those NATO has deemed it necessary to engage—such as China, for example—are not enthusiastic supporters of the liberal security order that NATO has sought to enlarge since the early 1990s.

Ultimately, the issue that NATO has yet to resolve revolves around the fundamental purpose of its partnerships. While the 2010 Strategic Concept identifies cooperative security as a core task to be fulfilled in part through the broadening and deepening of NATO’s partnerships, cooperation cannot be an end in and of itself. Rather, NATO will first have to clarify the longer-term function that partnerships are intended to serve. Indeed, to some degree, disagreements within the Alliance in recent years over the form and function of NATO’s partnerships reflect an absence of consensus regarding NATO’s core function, including the extent to which its focus should be global rather than regional in nature.

The Beginnings of Partnership

The scope and function of NATO’s partnerships has changed enormously since the early 1990s when the Allies first invited their former Warsaw Pact adversaries to establish diplomatic liaisons to NATO and later established institutional frameworks for dialogue and military cooperation in the form of PfP and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which later became the EAPC. At the time of their inception, these institutions were designed to serve largely as political instruments for encouraging the growth of liberal democratic values beyond NATO’s borders and building a new, integrated and democratic Europe. Although PfP began as a means of engaging the states of Central and Eastern Europe, short of permitting them full entry into the Alliance, once the enlargement decision had been taken, it quickly became clear that both PfP and the EACP would serve as instruments for assisting prospective members in implementing the liberal democratic practices expected of NATO members. Moreover, active participation in PfP and EACP activities became an important consideration in membership decisions.

With Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Georgia still in the pipeline as possible NATO members, partnership remains an important tool for completing the unfinished process of European integration and partnership.
observed at the time, the Alliance would have to shift from a “geographic” to “functional” approach if it was to respond effectively to new challenges. Accordingly, NATO’s partnerships also took on a new dimension. Although partnership would remain an important tool in the European integration project, it also came to be understood as a means by which NATO could “project stability” outside of Europe, in part by encouraging partners—both those with and those without membership aspirations—to contribute in some capacity to NATO’s military missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and even Iraq. This new partnership function overlapped with the earlier integrative mission in so far as prospective member states were put on notice that they would be evaluated in part based on their demonstrated ability to act as security producers and not simply as consumers of NATO assistance. From NATO’s perspective, partnership was no longer simply about what NATO could do for partners but rather what partners could do to enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

With Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Georgia still in the pipeline as possible NATO members, partnership remains an important tool for completing the unfinished process of European integration and partnership. Indeed, while all of these states are PfP/EAPC members, NATO maintains special partnership arrangements with both Georgia and Ukraine in the form the NATO-Georgia and NATO-Ukraine Commissions, created in part to assist these states in fulfilling their membership aspirations. Ukraine’s interest in NATO, however, has faded under the current regime, and Georgia is also unlikely to accede to NATO anytime soon, given concerns about antagonizing Russia, which NATO also counts as a partner through the vehicle of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

The Impact of September 11

The focus of NATO’s partnership initiatives has also shifted since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Indeed, NATO’s efforts to equip itself for the post-September 11 era prompted a new phase in the evolution of NATO’s partnerships as the Allies recognized that, in an increasingly globalised world the threats facing them would now stem from well beyond Europe’s borders, especially from areas to the south and east of NATO. As then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson observed at the time, the Alliance would have to shift from a “geographic” to “functional” approach if it was to respond effectively to new challenges.

As NATO’s attention shifted to Afghanistan, the relative importance of existing and potential partners in
desire for a more cooperative relationship with NATO led to the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), permitting Russia to discuss identified areas of mutual interest with the Alliance in a “NATO at 20” format rather than the 19+1 format that characterised the previous NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Improved relations between NATO and Russia also made it possible for Ukraine to move closer to NATO, even before the 2004 Orange Revolution.

NATO’s assumption of responsibility for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2003 also prompted the Alliance to devote greater attention to the five Central Asian members of PfP (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) all of which provided various forms of assistance critical to NATO’s ability to operate effectively in Afghanistan, including military bases, transit routes, re-fueling facilities and cooperation on border security. To a significant degree this cooperation was facilitated by political and military ties developed through PfP, which all of the Central Asian states had joined in 1994, with the exception of Tajikistan, which was admitted in 2002. Not surprisingly then, NATO’s 2004 summit in Istanbul, the theme of which was the renewal and expansion of NATO’s partnerships, began with a “special focus” on partners “in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia.”

September 11 also had a dramatic impact on NATO’s relationships further north and to the east. Russia’s expressed Central Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East also grew. Given a dramatic increase in the strategic significance of these regions, NATO moved during its 2002 Prague summit to enhance both the political and practical dimensions of its existing Mediterranean Dialogue by making available to MD states (Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Jordan, and Algeria) participation in select PfP activities. Although the MD had been established in 1994, it was not initially considered to be a full-fledged partnership on a par with PfP. Two years later during its Istanbul summit, however, the Alliance took steps to elevate the MD to a more formal partnership framework, accompanied by efforts to develop further dialogue and practical cooperation. The perceived success of the MD also prompted in 2004 the launching of the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative (ICI), a new program aimed at developing practical bilateral security cooperation between NATO and the states of the Greater Middle East in such areas as defense reform, defense planning, civil-military relations, information-sharing and maritime cooperation. ICI, which was initially directed toward, but not limited to, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council currently counts among its participants Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.”
part of the effort to expand and deepen cooperation with these states, NATO designated a special representative for the region and launched a Partnership Action Plan (PAP) aimed at facilitating defence reform.\(^8\) Indeed, the absence of democratic political reform throughout the region had made the Central Asian states problematic partners for an Alliance whose identity in the aftermath of the Cold War was all the more grounded on liberal democratic values.

In an effort to encourage domestic political reform in states not yet deemed eligible or not interested in participating in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP)- the program NATO has used since the late 1990s to evaluate and provide guidance to prospective member states- NATO introduced a new initiative during its 2002 Prague Summit. Known as the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), the new programme offered partners the opportunity to draft national plans detailing specific reforms that were to be implemented and then receive country-specific advice and assistance from NATO on meeting these reform objectives.\(^9\) Although the Allies hoped that its Central Asian partners would embrace this opportunity, to date the only Central Asian state participating in the programme is Kazakhstan.\(^{10}\)

The demands of NATO’s ISAF mission have also prompted the Alliance to count among its partners a number of non-European allies who do share its liberal democratic values.

The impact of the ISAF mission on NATO’s partnership initiatives in recent years is also evident in a decision taken in 2010 to offer both Pakistan and Afghanistan additional access to NATO’s partnership activities or “toolbox,” just as it has done with its MD and ICI partners. Prompted by Pakistan’s considerable appetite for NATO assistance, the Alliance has allowed Pakistani officers to participate in select NATO training and education courses in the areas of peace support operations, civil-military cooperation and defence against terrorism.\(^{11}\) NATO’s relations with Pakistan have recently been strained, however, by various developments linked to the ISAF mission, including a friendly fire incident in November 2011 that resulted in the death of 24 Pakistan soldiers from a NATO airstrike.\(^{12}\)

As for Afghanistan, NATO has established a framework for long-term engagement in the form of a Declaration on an Enduring Partnership signed during the 2010 Lisbon summit, which includes a series of agreed programmes and partnership activities in such areas as capacity-building and professional military education, civil emergency
planning, and disaster preparedness. NATO foreign ministers endorsed an initial list of activities at their 2011 meeting in Berlin at which time they also agreed that NATO and Afghanistan would “pursue a partnership dialogue” aimed at determining the scope and content of their co-operation beyond 2012.\textsuperscript{13}

Although NATO has continued to identify liberal democratic values as central to all of its partnership efforts, its partnerships in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Central Asia are fundamentally different from those established in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. Few of these states have aspired to NATO membership, leaving NATO with far less leverage over domestic reforms than it enjoyed with the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the extension of the partnership concept beyond Europe has been driven primarily by the events of September 11 and a subsequent recognition that partners play a critical role in equipping NATO for the global challenges of the post-September 11 world.

That said, the demands of NATO’s ISAF mission have also prompted the Alliance to count among its partners a number of non-European allies who do share its liberal democratic values. Indeed, the most significant partner contributions to the Afghanistan mission have come, not from NATO’s formal partnership structures (e.g. PfP, EAPC, MD, ICI), but from non-European allies such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. These states emerged as key players in Afghanistan at a time when many NATO members were reluctant to provide the troops or other resources deemed critical to the success of the ISAF mission by NATO commanders. Australia, in particular, has contributed troops to the ISAF mission at roughly the same level as the principal NATO member contributors.

Given their importance to the ISAF mission, NATO has actively sought to enhance its relations with these non-NATO, non-EU states, which have been variously labeled, along with others, as “contact countries,” and “other partners across the globe,” but which are more commonly known as “global partners.” Partly in response to the expressed desire of Australia, in particular, for a greater voice in NATO’s decision-shaping and operational planning for the ISAF mission, the Alliance moved during its 2006 summit in Riga to “increase the operational relevance of relations” with its global partners in two particular ways. First, the Allies established that NATO could call for “ad-hoc meetings as events arise” with contributors or potential contributors to NATO’s missions, utilizing “flexible formats”. They also agreed to make established partnership tools more widely available to global partners as well as MD and ICI members.\textsuperscript{14} The goal
was to open up established partnership tools and activities to a broader range of partners and to give partners a greater voice in NATO’s operational decision-making and planning by providing new opportunities for dialogue and practical cooperation across the various partnership frameworks as well as between NATO and those partners not participating in any formal partnership framework. In preparation for its 2008 summit in Bucharest, NATO sought to further facilitate practical cooperation through the introduction of Tailored Cooperation Packages (TCPs) with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. Similar to the Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICPs) offered to MD and ICI partners, TCPs were essentially lists of cooperation activities tailored to serve both the interests of partner states and NATO’s priorities.15

While China’s interest in genuine partnership with NATO, is still difficult to discern, China does have significant interests at stake in the relationship.16

Although NATO currently maintains an unofficial dialogue with both states, neither state participates in any of NATO’s formal partnership structures.17 NATO, however, has been working to develop a relationship with both, based on common interests. For example, through the NATO-China dialogue, NATO and China have exchanged both high and working-level visits on a range of security issues, including the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, North Korea, proliferation, counter-piracy operations and the dangers of failed states. Not insignificantly the above-mentioned states also share NATO’s liberal democratic values, making them more attractive partners than some others as well as potential participants in any effort to enlarge further the liberal democratic security order that NATO committed itself to extending during the early 1990s. Although the Allies have exhibited varying degrees of enthusiasm for further formalization of NATO’s relations with these global partners, they generally agree- as reflected in both the Riga initiatives and the 2010 Strategic Concept- that if NATO is operate effectively in a security environment that is now global rather than regional in nature, it must maintain a worldwide network of security partnerships to facilitate consultation on global security issues. Indeed, issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, cyber warfare, piracy, and energy mandate that this network also include emerging powers such as China and India. 16

While each of NATO’s global partners has its own particular incentives for cooperation with the Alliance, they all share in common with the Allies, a significant number of security challenges, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the dangers of failed
in the Gulf of Aden, and other emerging security threats. China also maintains a military liaison to NATO in Brussels and has sent military delegations for meetings at both NATO Headquarters in Brussels and SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), NATO’s military headquarters near Mons, Belgium.  

Indeed, while China’s interest in genuine partnership with NATO, is still difficult to discern, China does have significant interests at stake in the relationship. Among them is the deployment of NATO forces, not only in Afghanistan, but also in Central Asia—quite literally in China’s backyard. China and NATO are also crossing paths in Afghanistan as a result of significant Chinese investments aimed at securing access to natural resources needed to fuel China’s booming economy. China’s investments and resource interests on the African continent have also prompted its participation in anti-piracy efforts and limited cooperation with the Alliance off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden, where NATO maintains an anti-piracy mission known as Operation Ocean Shield.

The virtue of NATO’s new partnership policy is that it has the potential to facilitate dialogue and practical cooperation with a broad and diverse assortment of partners, including China, by blurring the line or differentiating less between the states that participate in NATO’s formal partnership structures and those who are not members of these frameworks. This development constitutes important progress in moving NATO beyond intra-alliance disagreements regarding the form and function of NATO’s partnerships, dating back to the 2006 Riga Summit.

At Riga, the United States and Britain had advanced a proposal calling for the creation of a new political framework designed to draw allies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea closer to NATO, as a means of enhancing NATO’s ability to operate effectively in Afghanistan and beyond. The proposal, however, generated significant opposition. Some allies viewed it as a unilateral effort by the United States to undermine the EAPC, largely because the U.S. Ambassador to NATO at the time had identified as likely members of such a framework, Sweden and Finland, two states that were already PfP/EAPC members. Many allies were also uneasy with the prospect of deepening political ties between NATO and states well beyond the transatlantic area. Indeed, the proposed framework represented a significant departure from NATO’s existing partnership structures in so far as it followed a functional rather than geographical approach.

**A New Partnership Policy**

Yet, as the 2010 Strategic Concept suggests, not only do the Allies now generally agree that enhancing NATO’s
partnerships with non-European allies is essential if NATO is to respond effectively to global threats, a broad consensus has also emerged in favor of more functional partnerships. Indeed, the goal of the new partnership policy adopted in Berlin in April 2011 was “to substantially deepen and broaden NATO’s partnerships, and increase their effectiveness and flexibility.”21 Ultimately, the policy reflects a recognition that the EAPC has been significantly challenged by the fact that so many of its initial members have acceded to the Alliance, leaving two disparate groups of partners with very different interests; namely, the non-NATO, European Union states and the far less democratic and less developed former Soviet republics. Additionally, while Afghanistan was clearly pivotal in terms of the evolution of the new policy, many Allies also recognized that the demands of the mission had prevented NATO from devoting sufficient attention to the role of partners outside the context of Afghanistan.

Although both the 2010 Strategic Concept and the new partnership policy state that the “specificity” of NATO’s existing partnership frameworks will be preserved—meaning that the Alliance currently has no plans to eliminate or merge any of its existing partnership structures (e.g. PfP, EAPC, MD, ICI)—the new policy states that the Alliance, will, as determined by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), engage and encourage dialogue with “key global actors and other new interlocutors beyond the Euro-Atlantic area with which NATO does not have a formal partnership arrangement.”22 The new policy also broadens the definition of partner to include, not only states but also international organisations such as the European Union and the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organisations—all of which NATO has come to recognize as possessing the civilian expertise and resources so critical to the processes of stabilisation and reconstruction in contexts such as Afghanistan.

The evolution of NATO’s partnership policy offers both existing and potential partners an opportunity to define their own relationship with NATO based on the degree to which they wish to partake of partnership activities or engage in dialogue with the Alliance.

In the interest of promoting dialogue with a broader range of partners, the new policy offers additional opportunities for all partners to consult on issues of common concern with NATO as well as with other partners “across and beyond existing frameworks,” utilizing
what the Alliance refers to as its “28+n” format (the “28” being the 28 NATO members). In the interest of fostering greater practical cooperation, the policy also commits NATO to consolidating and harmonizing the various partnership activities (e.g. military-to-military cooperation and exercises, defence policy and planning, training and education, and civil-military relations) comprising what the Allies refer to as NATO’s “toolbox,” through the creation of a single Partnership Cooperation Menu. As a result, partnership tools that may previously have been available to members of only one of NATO’s formal partnership frameworks are now potentially available to all partners. Additionally, the Alliance agreed to harmonize the process through which partner states identify the various partnership activities in which they wish to participate, by creating a single Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) to replace cooperation programmes that had been unique to individual partnership frameworks, including the Individual Partnership Programme (IPP), established for PfP/EAPC members; the Individual Cooperation Programme (ICP) extended to NATO’s MD and ICI partners; and the Tailored Cooperation Packages (TCP’s) made available to NATO’s global partners. NATO is also considering extending “on a case by case basis,” its IPAP and PARP (Planning and Review Process) programmes to partners outside of PfP/EAPC, thereby offering the Alliance further opportunity to influence political and military reforms in states not aspiring to NATO membership.

These changes have the potential to assist NATO in expanding and deepening dialogue with emerging powers such as China and India, utilizing the 28+n formula. The consolidation of NATO’s partnership tools into one menu will also permit states which presently have no formal connection to NATO to participate in certain unclassified partnership activities should they choose to do so. In short, the evolution of NATO’s partnership policy offers both existing and potential partners an opportunity to define their own relationship with NATO based on the degree to which they wish to partake of partnership activities or engage in dialogue with the Alliance.

Finally, the Berlin Agreement fulfills the pledge made in Lisbon to review and update NATO’s 1999 Political Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-Led Operations (PMF). The revised framework establishes a more structured role for non-NATO contributors to NATO-led missions or “operational partners” such as Australia and New Zealand by enhancing and formalising their decision-shaping and operational planning roles in NATO-led missions. The new document also
specifies both the process for recognizing a non-NATO state as an operational partner, and the process by which operational partners will be consulted and involved in “shaping” operational decisions.26

Although the attention to creating a more formal role for operational partners in NATO-led missions was largely a product of the ISAF mission, the utility of offering such partners a more structured role in NATO missions has now been further affirmed by Operation Unified Protector in Libya. In fact, NATO’s partner states of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Jordan all participated in the operation, prompting NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Berlin in April 2011, to acknowledge and express appreciation for the contributions of regional partners to the mission.27

Libya and the Arab Spring

Indeed, NATO’s unanticipated mission in Libya, which began just prior to the Berlin meeting, reinforced the importance of having partners around the globe and offered the Alliance an opportunity to implement portions of the new partnership policy. NATO relied on its existing MD and ICI partnership mechanisms to facilitate contributions and support for the Libya mission from partners in the region, but it also utilized the new flexible format mechanism to facilitate immediate dialogue with these partners.28 NATO’s success in rapidly establishing high-level contacts with the UN, EU, Arab League, African Union, and Gulf Cooperation Council also bore out the utility of engaging other international institutions as partners.29

The Alliance also sees an opportunity to build on the success of the Libya mission by reaching out, on a case-by-case basis, to potential new partners throughout the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Persian Gulf region, including Libya.

Notably, the Libya mission, coupled with the new partnership policy, has also created opportunities to reinvigorate NATO’s MD and ICI partnerships, which in the past have been criticized as lacking focus and producing little in the realm of practical cooperation. To a significant degree the problem stems from the fact that most of NATO’s partners in the region are not liberal democracies. Indeed, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton alluded to the difficulties inherent in partnering with these states in her remarks to the Munich Security Conference in February 2011. Noting that the United States had built “strong security partnerships” across the Middle East, she also acknowledged that
security and democratic development had yet to “converge in the same way.”

The Middle East is a region in which, historically, there has been significant suspicion and mistrust of NATO.

As NATO foreign ministers observed during a meeting in Brussels in December 2011, however, developments associated with the Arab Spring, including the dramatic popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt—both members of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue—offer new opportunities for NATO to utilize its partnership mechanisms to encourage reform throughout the region. The Alliance also sees an opportunity to build on the success of the Libya mission by reaching out, on a case-by-case basis, to potential new partners throughout the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Persian Gulf region, including Libya.

Looking ahead to NATO’s upcoming Chicago summit, where there is expected to be a significant focus on partnership, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in fact, expressed hope that, by the time of the summit, a new, democratic Libya will be among [NATO’s] partners in the region.

NATO recognises a particular opportunity to build on its experience in promoting democratic control of the militaries of Central and Eastern Europe by focusing on encouraging “security and defence sector reform” in the Middle East. The Alliance also has the option under the new partnership policy of utilizing its PARP process as a vehicle for defence reform. Similarly, NATO could push for domestic political reform by extending to interested states the opportunity to engage in the IPAP process.

Yet, as Isabelle François observes, while NATO has the potential to help African and Arab partners “build their own capacities,” the “countries of North Africa and the Gulf region…are not Central and Eastern Europe. They are not bound by a common objective to join the Alliance.” Indeed, the absence of a link between partnership and enlargement in this region means that NATO’s influence is likely to be much more limited than it was in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Middle East is a region in which, historically, there has been significant suspicion and mistrust of NATO. Indeed, François suggests that, in the aftermath of its Libya intervention, NATO will have to reach out beyond its MD and ICI partners if it is to influence regional security developments. As she puts it, “one does not win many hearts through air strikes even in the case of a successful outcome.”
Implications of the New Partnership Policy

Arguably events linked to the Arab Spring, including the dramatic developments in Libya, highlighted the importance of NATO’s partnership efforts, but they also served to draw attention to NATO’s associations with non-democratic regimes, possibly lending support to an argument that NATO has been focused on “stability” rather than democratic reform as the key to security. Indeed, the conundrum of how to broaden NATO’s partners beyond Europe while at the same time remaining true to its own identity as an Alliance grounded on liberal democratic values is one that has plagued NATO for some time, in Central Asia as well as in the Middle East. As suggested earlier, even though all of NATO’s various partnership documents identify liberal democratic values as central to NATO’s partnership initiatives, the need to equip NATO to combat terrorism and other new threats has been the primary impetus behind NATO’s efforts to develop cooperative relationships with the states of Central Asia and the Middle East in the post-September 11 era.

Non-democratic states have frequently proved problematic partners, however, because their domestic political practices are deeply at odds with the values underpinning the liberal security order to which NATO committed itself during the 1990s. NATO’s relations with partners in Central Asia, for example, have in the past prompted critics to charge the United States and NATO with shoring up repressive regimes by providing them with economic and military assistance in exchange for their cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts. 38 NATO has typically responded to such criticism by arguing that all of its partnership tools are in one way or another imbued with liberal democratic values, offering the Alliance at least some opportunity to encourage political and military reform. However, as NATO’s looks to broaden the scope of its partnerships, it is likely to confront this dilemma more rather than less frequently. Developing closer relations with China, for example, will inevitably force the Alliance to grapple with the fact that China, not only eschews the liberal values at the core of NATO; as a rising power, it also has far greater potential than other non-democratic partners to shape the international order in a decidedly less liberal direction.

NATO’s partnerships serve multiple functions, including supporting NATO’s operations, and enhancing international security, in addition to preparing states for membership and defending liberal democratic values.
For that very reason, though, it is imperative that the Alliance engage China and others that do not necessarily share its values. Indeed, as the 2010 Strategic Concept observes, NATO’s partnerships serve multiple functions, including supporting NATO’s operations, and enhancing international security, in addition to preparing states for membership and defending liberal democratic values.\(^{39}\) If NATO is to be relevant in shaping the larger international order well into the future, it has little choice but to engage a broader group of partners, including both those that do not share its values as well as those that do. Previewing the upcoming Chicago summit, Rasmussen, in fact, affirmed that NATO has an interest in a “strategic partnership” with Russia as well as a “strong partnership with Pakistan.”\(^{40}\)

Global partners such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, among others, do share NATO’s interest in a liberal security order. At the same time, global partners such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, among others, do share NATO’s interest in a liberal security order. Unfortunately, though, NATO has yet to elaborate on a role for these like-minded global partners in shaping a global order grounded on the values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Rather, the trend at NATO since September 11, 2001 has been to focus on the operational value of new partners rather than their potential role in shaping rather than merely responding to the emerging security order. Moreover, the new partnership policy seemingly moves the Alliance toward less differentiation between partners. Indeed, one could potentially argue that the enhanced commitment to cooperative security under the new Strategic Concept reflects, not the values-based conception of security that prevailed during the 1990s, but rather a more realist orientation, in which shared interests rather than shared values constitute the foundation for cooperation. There may also be a danger in defining cooperative security as a core task as the new Strategic Concept does. Indeed, NATO risks elevating the concept to the level of a strategic end rather than a means of achieving some larger goal. Partnership cannot be an end in and of itself, and NATO has yet to articulate clearly the larger strategic objectives it is intended to serve.

The new partnership policy offers NATO an opportunity to consider more fully how it might utilize its partnerships with other liberal democratic states, especially those outside of Europe, as a means of defending and extending the liberal security order most conducive to
both the defence of NATO territory and the long-term flourishing of the Allies’ way of life. As John Ikenberry suggests in *Liberal Leviathan*, in a world in which new powers are rising and threats are increasingly diffuse and uncertain, the security of the United States and others is best served by a milieu-oriented grand strategy aimed at “planting the roots of a reformed liberal international order as deeply as possible.” 41

**NATO has in effect redefined what it means to be a partner.**

The pursuit of cooperative relationships with non-liberal democratic states is not necessarily inconsistent with such an approach. Indeed, given that the vast majority of contemporary security challenges will now emanate from outside of Europe, NATO must engage a broad and diverse group of partners if it is to address these challenges effectively. Utilizing partnership as a means of securing and strengthening the foundation for a liberal security order, however, will require that NATO engage in some differentiation between partners.

Given that NATO will be forced to confront the implications of economic challenges and limited resources during its Chicago summit, the Allies will also need to think seriously about how limited partnership resources should be allocated. Although the new partnership policy suggests that NATO will consider a number of factors in determining how to allocate its resources, including whether the partner aspires to join the Alliance, whether it shares NATO’s values, and whether it is “engaged in defence and larger reforms based on these values,” the list of priorities also includes considerations such as “whether the partner is of special strategic importance for NATO.” The challenge of distributing partnership resources therefore offers NATO an opportunity to identify priorities, speak with greater clarity about the purpose of partnership, and reconnect it to some larger vision of NATO’s core purpose.

The virtue of the new partnership policy is that it moves NATO beyond the disagreements over the form and function of NATO’s partnerships that have troubled it in recent years and offers a number of new tools to facilitate the cooperative security efforts deemed so critical under the new strategic concept. Under the new framework, partnership is no longer limited by geography or constrained by outdated structures. NATO has in effect redefined what it means to be a partner. Although the Alliance will continue to reach out to those with whom it wishes to establish closer relations, the new policy also opens the door for potential partners to shape their relationships with NATO, by expressing interest in dialogue or participation in the Alliance’s menu of
missions beyond Europe has created new ties to like-minded allies well beyond Europe. The Alliance should not waste the opportunity to identify a role for these partners in furthering the liberal values that have always been NATO’s core mission. Indeed, the fate of these values outside the Euro-Atlantic area will inevitably have significant implications for the Allies’ own security.

NATO’s assumption of new missions beyond Europe has created new ties to like-minded allies well beyond Europe.

practical cooperation activities. The policy remains vague, however, as to the larger vision that partnerships are intended to serve. NATO’s earliest partnership efforts aimed at extending eastward the liberal security order established in Western Europe during the Cold War. In the wake of September 11, the focus shifted to equipping NATO politically and militarily for the war on terror. More recently, NATO’s assumption of new
Endnotes


2 Ibid.

3 The Alliance has not yet agreed to extend invitations to either Georgia or Ukraine to join NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP). Europe’s continued dependence on Russia for energy resources and fears of provoking a hostile Russian reaction have prevented some Allies from supporting such a step.


9 IPAPS are drafted every two years rather than annually as is required under MAP.


12 Pakistan responded to the friendly fire incident by shutting down NATO’s supply routes to Afghanistan and removing the U.S. from an air base used to facilitate drone attacks. Anne Gearan, “Pakistan, U.S. Assume Less Cooperation in Future”, Associated Press at http://hosted2.ap.org/APDEFAULT/3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305/Article_2012-01-02-US-Pakistan-US/id-3734a5528d454a6db26974b2c093d4ae [last visited 10 January 2012].


18 Author interviews with U.S. Department of State official and NATO International Staff, February 2011.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid; author telephone interviews with U.S. Department of State official, February and August 2011.


26 “Political Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-Led Operations”; “NATO insists that the “NAC retains the ultimate responsibility for decision-making”.


29 Ibid, p. 7


32 Ibid.


34 “Final Statement”.

35 Author telephone interview with U.S. Department of State official, August 2011.

36 Isabelle François, “NATO Partnerships and the Arab Spring”, p. 11.

37 Ibid.


39 “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”.

40 Rasmussen, “Toward NATO’s Chicago Summit”.

NATO and Russia: A Perpetual New Beginning

Roger E. KANET* & Maxime Henri André LARIVÉ**

Abstract

After a brief period of positive relations between Russia and NATO in the early 1990s, a whole series of crises in relations have led to a general deterioration of the relationship. These crises have resulted from two very different conceptions of self-identity and of the future of security in Europe. Although the divisions became evident already in before the turn of the millennium, the policies of Presidents Putin and Medvedev aimed at rebuilding Russia’s role as a great power contributed further to the divisions. Three areas of NATO policy have been central to Russia’s growing opposition to NATO’s expansion eastward, the development of a missile shield, and the globalization of NATO’s involvement. Prospects for a real reconciliation between Russia and NATO are not positive.

Key Words

Russian foreign policy; Russia-NATO relations; identity and foreign policy; NATO expansion; U.S.-sponsored missile shield; globalization of NATO activity.

“We spend too much energy on what divides us. We should instead focus on what unites us” by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 2009.

Introduction

The post-Cold War period has been far from a stable era, considering the many crises between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia that resulted from the waves of NATO enlargement, the war in Kosovo, support of the West for the color revolutions, the U.S.-sponsored missile shield, and so on. Throughout the two decades following the fall of the Berlin Wall
and of the Soviet Union itself, relations between NATO and Russia have led to the emergence of a significant sense of mistrust on both sides.

The end of the Cold War redefined the relationship between NATO and Russia. On the one side, NATO has been able to transform its *raison d’être* by shifting from an organization solely providing collective defence to an organization proactive in the area of collective security. NATO, initially designed to protect the Euro-Atlantic area from a Soviet attack, evolved into an alliance promoting security in Europe, but also beyond. On the other hand, Russia has been seeking a new identity since 1991. The direct aftermath of the Cold War was a clear period of domestic turmoil ending with the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000. Since 2000, Mr. Putin’s primary mission has been to bring Russia back to its great power status by reasserting its influence over neighboring states and beyond.¹

The status of the relationship has remained one of the most pressing issues for both actors. Andres Fogh Rasmussen made his first speech as the new Secretary General (SG) in 2009 on this very topic: NATO and Russia. Secretary General Rasmussen believes that good relations between the two actors would not only contribute to better European security, but to improved global security.² In the late 1990s David Yost wrote, “no issue is more central to the Alliance’s goal of building a peaceful political order in Europe than relations with Russia.”³ More than a decade later such a statement could not be more accurate. The core members of the Alliance see Russia as the missing piece of the puzzle in order to stabilize and “westernize” the European continent completely. On the other hand, Russia views the European continent as still an area where Russian influence can be increased and maintained.

Both actors share one characteristic: the pursuit of proactive foreign policies. NATO has been proactive by expanding the number of its members, leading several military operations, and broadening its spectrum of activities. On the other hand, Moscow under Putin has also maintained an assertive foreign policy as a way to divide the West and strengthen Russian power and regional influence. For both actors, action is essential for validating existence. In addition, clearly these actions have not been coordinated, as the regular verbal confrontation between the two makes evident.

The broader question of this article about relations between NATO and Russia concerns relations between Russia

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NATO and Russia have had a troubled relationship for historical, cultural, strategic, and political reasons.
and the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO and Russia have had a troubled relationship for historical, cultural, strategic, and political reasons. Is NATO the appropriate platform for strengthening cooperation and security on the European continent and beyond? Can NATO overcome the internal strategic divisions among its members on dealing with Russia? Is Russia willing to cooperate fully with the members of the Euro-Atlantic community through NATO?

This article is structured around three issues. The first looks at each actor separately in order to clarify their understandings of foreign policy as well as their political culture. The second section analyses the actual relations between NATO and Russia. The last part of the article examines three areas of contention— the U.S.-sponsored missile shield, NATO enlargement, and the globalization of NATO.

Two Actors: Two Visions

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Search of Itself?4

The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, DC, in 1949 established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Two of the core components of NATO remain the famous Article 5, which promises security support for any member state which comes under attack, and less popular, but still extremely relevant, Article 2, which commits the member states to work toward strengthening security by strengthening free institutions. These two articles are the heart and soul of NATO and the definition of the concept of “collective defence.”

NATO’s identity has progressively shifted from that of a collective defence organization to one focused on collective security.

In recent years NATO’s principles and identity have clearly evolved and changed in accordance with the international and regional balance of power, but also with the emergence of new security threats. NATO’s identity has progressively shifted from that of a collective defence organization to one focused on collective security. As a collective defence organization NATO’s roles are to deter coercion and military aggression against its members through military capabilities and the use of force, if necessary. This was NATO’s role throughout the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era NATO needed to adjust to the new international threats, in order to survive and remain relevant. The development of a collective security
role has not only been its cognitive transformation, but also its strategic raison d’être. NATO’s collective security role stands for “aspirations for universally shared responsibility for peace and international order.”\(^7\) This strategic and cultural transformation can be illustrated by the new types of missions undertaken by NATO, such as the Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011 or NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa since 2009. These new types of mission, along with the “nation-building” efforts in Afghanistan, are a considerable strategic shift for the Alliance. NATO has become the military instrument of members of the Euro-Atlantic community in dealing with pressing international crises usually based on a UN Security Council mandate.

The Georgia invasion of 2008 was also a major wake-up call for the Euro-Atlantic community, since it was an obvious reaction to Western recognition of Kosovo and the commitment of the United States and others in NATO to grant membership to Ukraine and Georgia.

During the first decade of the 21st century the Alliance has faced considerable internal dilemmas affecting its functioning. The creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, known as the CSDP after the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon) in 1998 led to a fear from the NATO members of a 3D syndrome—decoupling, duplicating, discriminating.\(^8\) The CSDP was perceived as a threat and competitor to NATO until both structures came together in the Berlin Plus agreement in 2003. The new century started with the attack of 9/11 that unified the Euro-Atlantic community and even resulted in the sole historical use of Article 5 as a symbol of that solidarity. However, the honeymoon did not last long. The Iraq crisis of 2003 led to a considerable split between the pro-Atlantic members and the other members of the Alliance. The division between the two sides damaged not only NATO, but also the credibility of trans-Atlantic cooperation. Furthermore, the fact that former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, made a distinction between the new and old Europe affected the unity of the Alliance and the European Union. This led to the questioning of the process of enlargement raising question of trust and reliance.\(^9\)

Even after the considerable transatlantic split, the relations between the members of the Euro-Atlantic community have progressively become stable. The return of France to the NATO military command exemplifies the change of perceptions of the role and use of NATO in European capitals.
In Search of Power and Leverage: Russia in the Times of Vladimir Putin

The collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the tumultuous developments of the 1990s left Russia “weak and frustrated,” especially after the frustrations of the Yeltsin period. The election of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of Russia in 2000 had a major impact on the behavior of Russia regionally, but also internationally, as well as leading to considerable domestic transformation of the Russian political system. Since Putin’s rise to power, Russia foreign policy has been extremely revisionist taking into consideration its military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and the recurrent use of energy as a weapon. “One of the main factors that has permitted this has been its economic performance and the income from energy production and exports.”

Former President Vladimir Putin has embodied a new trend in Russia seeking to re-impose Russia’s power and influence regionally and internationally. “In Putin’s conception, restoring Russia’s power and influence abroad required rebuilding the power of the Russian state at home, particularly halting the erosion of power from the “centre” to the periphery that had occurred under Yeltsin, and regaining state control over the “commanding heights” of the economy.”

Russian leaders Putin and his successor Dimitri Medvedev have been implementing, what has been called a “managed democracy” or “sovereign democracy”. According to Nikolay Petrov and Michael McFaul, the characteristics of a managed democracy are: first, a strong presidency and weak institutions; second, state control of the media; third, control over elections, thus allowing elites to legitimize their decisions; fourth, visible short-term effectiveness and long-term inefficiency. Such a system has been perceived more or less as a democracy à la carte and a challenge against Western values and norms promoted by both NATO and the European Union through their cooperation with former Soviet states. In addition corruption has been rampant at the highest levels of Russian government and society affecting economic redistribution and eroding the roots of democracy, such as the independence of the judiciary system.
of influence.” These men of influence are from the circles of the FSB, formally the KGB, and energy sector. After two terms as president, Putin stepped down to become Medvedev’s Prime Minister in 2008, which has not limited his control over Russia’s power.  

At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin underlined the fact that Russia was back in the forefront of international politics and sought to maximize its national interests, when he broadly attacked virtually all aspects of U.S. policy. The Georgia invasion of 2008 was also a major wake-up call for the Euro-Atlantic community, since it was an obvious reaction to Western recognition of Kosovo and the commitment of the United States and others in NATO to grant membership to Ukraine and Georgia. The invasion was a clear statement by Moscow that Russia remains a powerful actor and “wants the West to accept that the post-Soviet space is part of a Russian sphere of influence.” This latter point was made most explicit in a speech by President Medvedev soon after the war in Georgia, when he referred to post-Soviet space as an area of Russia’s “privilege interests.”

In addition to the usual tensions between Russia and the West, the two waves of EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, added to the NATO enlargements have also contributed to increasing frictions between Russia and the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. The post-Soviet states and others that were part of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence that joined NATO have been seen as lost territories by Russia. Furthermore, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) of NATO have been a powerful instrument of soft power, in order to establish strong relations with important energy partners and/or energy transit states, while promoting strong economic, social, cultural ties aimed at increasing mutual prosperity and stability at the regional level. This has contributed to fostering a fear by Moscow that the involvement of the Western institutions in Russia’s neighbourhood undermines Russia’s influence in an area perceived as a sphere of “legitimate interest.”

The splits between the members of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and Moscow are numerous and considerable: the missile shield; the CFE Treaty; NATO rapprochement with Kiev and Tbilisi; the globalization of NATO; and the question of energy security.

Since the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000, Moscow has implemented and pursued a foreign policy embedded in realpolitik. Moscow’s narratives are in
The splits between the members of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and Moscow are numerous and considerable: the missile shield; the CFE Treaty; NATO rapprochement with Kiev and Tbilisi; the globalization of NATO; and the question of energy security.

The History of NATO-Russian Relations

Relations between NATO and Russia have been at the heart of European and international politics for over sixty years. The history of the relations between the two actors is one of mistrust, competition and problems. The end of the Cold War did not alter this trend, as demonstrated by the multiple crises since the 1990s. The 1990s were a period of difficulties in relations between the two actors starting with a “honeymoon” period following the 1991 declaration of Russian President Yeltsin speaking of an eventual NATO membership for Russia. As underlined by Pouliot, soon after the end of the Cold War, “Moscow seemed on the way to integrate the Euro-Atlantic security community, sparking high hopes for a new peaceful order in the northern hemisphere.” However, this did not last and the question of NATO enlargement of states of Central Europe became a prominent issue. The creation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 continued to contribute to the deterioration of relations between NATO and Russia, for Moscow perceived the PfP as an instrument to increase US power in Europe and to downgrade Russian influence. The turning point in the cooperative relations between NATO and Moscow was 1994 for two reasons: first, NATO involvement in Bosnia; and, second, NATO’s decision to widen its membership.

NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 demonstrated Russia’s inability to influence NATO policy.

The institutionalization of NATO-Moscow relations started in 1997 with the NATO-Russia Founding Act, followed five years later by the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) an official platform for cooperation and discussion. The 1997 Founding Act was a considerable stepping-stone in institutionalizing cooperation between NATO and Russia. The Act laid out the mechanism of cooperation, coordination, joint decision-making and joint action in order to foster relations between NATO and Russia. The Act underlined that:

**Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and**
Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states. [...] NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability.22

At the Lisbon Summit, NATO laid out its new “Strategic Concept,” which includes a segment on revitalizing NATO-Russian relations.

NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 demonstrated Russia’s inability to influence NATO policy, despite the presumed relevance of the Founding Act. In 2002, after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and the “reset” in Russian relations with the United States, the NATO-Russia Council was established at the Rome Summit to improve communication between NATO and the Russian Federation. Recently the council was revitalized, in order once again to rebuild and solidify connections and ultimately cooperation with Russia. In the long term, NATO envisions the use of the NRC for dialogue and joint action with Russia.23 The NRC replaced the existing NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which was supposed to be a 16+1 platform of cooperation and coordination. “The Founding Act did give Russia a special relationship with NATO in the sense that its level of representation and rights of consultation were greater than those accorded to any other non-member state.”24 The NRC is a clear symbol of the institutionalization of the special relations between NATO and Russia25 and was designed to address issues of international security as well as joint projects. However, as argued by Russian analyst Dmitri Trenin, “the NRC, instead of becoming the instrument of Western-Russian security interaction, has turned into a mostly technical workshop- useful, but extremely narrow in scope.”26

From 2002 until 2009, NATO-Russia relations were unstable and difficult. One of the most important issues was the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia. The decision made by the US in 2009 to press the “reset button” in relations with Russia led to a rejuvenation and ultimately solidification of the relations between the US and Russia, and ultimately with NATO.27 “Reset means that Russian relations with the USA, and by extension with NATO, must
Areas of Tension

This section of our analysis examines a number of issues that have contributed to the deterioration of relations between NATO and Russia. Considering the numbers of crisis situations, three areas have been selected: NATO enlargement, the construction of the missile shield, and the globalization of NATO. Cases such as the war in Kosovo, the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement, and others will not be covered in this article.

NATO Enlargement

The question of NATO enlargement is simply a case of regional balance of power. The discussion around NATO enlargement germinated in the early aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger started advocating such move as early as 1991-92. It was under US President Bill Clinton that NATO enlargement became a concrete plan and ultimately a policy. From 1994 until today, with the dilemma surrounding the case of Georgia and Ukraine, NATO enlargement has been a major topic of disagreement with Russia. NATO enlargement has been and continues to be perceived by Moscow as a zero-sum game, in which the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are trying to increase their influence and power at the expense of Russia.
Figure 1: Are the interests of Russia and NATO so far apart?

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<tr>
<th>Perceived Outside Threats</th>
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<th>Russia</th>
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<td>• Iran</td>
<td>• Iran</td>
<td>• Terrorism</td>
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<th>Perception of the other</th>
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<td>• non-zero sum actor</td>
<td>• military bloc</td>
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<td>• declining power</td>
<td>• defence structure</td>
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<th>Strategy for action</th>
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<td>• Deterrence – conventional and nuclear capabilities</td>
<td>• military force</td>
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<td>• Partnership with countries and international organizations</td>
<td>• Realpolitik</td>
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<td>• NATO-Russia cooperation</td>
<td>• bilateral cooperation – Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)</td>
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<th>Zone/issues of tensions</th>
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<td>• use of force to maintain sphere of influence</td>
<td>• NATO enlargement/NATO’s open door policy</td>
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<td>• realpolitik/aggressive narratives</td>
<td>• globalisation of NATO</td>
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<td>• cybersecurity</td>
<td>• R2P</td>
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<th>Areas of action</th>
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<th>Possible Areas of cooperation</th>
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<th>Russia</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Stabilization of Afghanistan</td>
<td>• drug trafficking through cooperation between CSO and NATO</td>
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<td>• prevention of proliferation</td>
<td>• combating terrorism</td>
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<td>• fighting terrorism</td>
<td>• fighting piracy</td>
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<td>• Middle East</td>
<td>• Afghanistan?</td>
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<td>• Iran?</td>
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<th>Strategy to increase cooperation</th>
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<th>Russia</th>
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<td>• rejuvenation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)</td>
<td>• bilateral negotiation with key NATO members outside of NRC</td>
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<td>• seeking transparency on the overall Strategy</td>
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<td>• soft power</td>
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However, the questions around the how, why, who, and when would come at two different periods. How and why were addressed in a 1995 document, *Study on NATO Enlargement*, laying out the different rationales behind NATO enlargement, while the who and when were addressed in the Madrid Summit of 1997. In 1997, Madeleine Albright, then US Secretary of State declared,

*The truth is, the quest for freedom and security in Europe is not a zero-sum game, in which Russia must lose if central Europe gains, and central Europe must lose if Russia gains. Such thinking has brought untold tragedy to Europe and America, and we have a responsibility as well as an opportunity to transcend it.*

During the Bush administration from 2000 to 2008, NATO had an “open-door policy.” The color revolutions of 2003-2005 in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia led NATO to talk about including Ukraine and Georgia within the Alliance, despite Moscow’s strongly voiced opposition. In Putin’s words, the enlargement of NATO is a real threat to the security of Russia, since the expansion is going eastward. Candidates for NATO membership are geographically within the sphere of influence of Moscow, as is the case for Ukraine and Georgia and other possible candidates. In early 2011 the Russian Prime Minister declared, “the expansion of NATO infrastructure towards our borders is causing us concern.”

The main reason is that Russia views NATO as a military rather than as a political structure. In the case of Georgia, there is no doubt that the Georgians are seeking membership for one simple reason, protection from the threat of Russia.

Russia pursued a dual strategy to contain the enlargement process: economic pressures on Ukraine and Georgia, largely through the shutting down of natural gas flows and the 2008 war in Georgia. Georgia and Ukraine were and are still considered as the Russians’ jewels of its lost imperial past, they were the cornerstones of Russia’s regional hegemony and great power status. The Georgian issue started with the diplomatic crisis of 2006 and the 2008 invasion. The 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russia seriously affected relations between NATO and Moscow. It also sent a strong message to Western capitals: Is the West ready to sacrifice its standard of living and security for a state like Georgia? Moscow’s invasion of Georgia was a direct challenge to the true value and power of article 5 of the NATO treaty. Furthermore, the talk of including Georgia within the structure of the Alliance has been perceived by Moscow as a direct threat to its sphere of influence over the entire post-Soviet space. The second case, Ukraine, is equally sensitive, but for different reasons. The case of Ukraine is unique, because it is central to Russian power. As underlined by Zbigniew Brzezinski, without Ukraine Russia cannot remain...
the US under President Bush decided to revive the former “Star Wars” project, or the missile defence shield, previously initiated by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. The project consisted of financing the building of two pieces of the missile shield puzzle: a missile interceptor site in Poland and a X-band radar in the Czech Republic. These two sites were to be part of a larger strategy that included sites in the UK, Greenland, California, and Alaska.

The construction of the missile shield in Europe not only divided the members of the Euro-Atlantic community, but also Moscow and the West. Vladimir Putin has expressed on several occasion, and especially during the 2007 Munich Security Conference, that the US was seeking world domination and warned about the militarization of space. The Russian reaction was that the two sites in Central Europe were, in fact, directed against Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Since then, Russian officials “want to have clear-cut guarantees that the deployable antimissile facilities will not work against Russia’s strategic potential and will not have the appropriate capabilities.”

The question of the missile defence system goes beyond the shield itself. Moscow sees the shield as one issue among many about strategic offensive

**Missile Shield**

As part of the game of regional balance of power, the missile shield has been a considerable area of division and tension between Russia and NATO. In response to the probable rise of a nuclear Iran, a Eurasian empire. The discussions about NATO enlargement and Western support for the democratic movement in Ukraine have directly threatened Russia, which viewed the Orange Revolution and Ukraine’s focus on relations with the West as a major blow to Russia’s sphere of influence. In Moscow, Western involvement in Ukraine in support of democratic changes and even integration within the Euro-Atlantic community and architecture was seen as a threat to Russian objectives.

Ultimately, from Moscow the enlargement of NATO looks like “the creation of a buffer zone in reverse, a means to isolate the new Russia from continental Europe.” NATO enlargement, as well as its open door policy, is seen as a direct challenge to the Russian expansionism embedded in the imperialist and nationalist sentiments re-launched by Vladimir Putin since 2000. This imperial nostalgia is putting considerable strains on the relationship.

**The 2010 Lisbon Summit discussed the possible cooperation between NATO and Russia on the development of a defence shield.**

...
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and defensive nuclear weapons, and the militarization of space. The missile shield touches a sensitive point for Russia. Thus, Moscow does not fully agree with the fact that the threat of ICBMs is as real as it once was. Moscow would tend to believe that it is part of an overall strategy by the US to limit Russian nuclear arsenal.

Given the strong level of Russian opposition to the two-site missile shield and as part of the U.S. “reset” of relations with Russia, in addition to other factors, the Obama Administration in 2009 decided to scrap the two sites in 2009. Alternative approaches to the development of a defensive shield to protect Europe against nuclear missiles from “rogue states” - read “Iran” - were then discussed. The 2010 Lisbon Summit discussed the possible cooperation between NATO and Russia on the development of a defence shield. With the missile shield possibly becoming part of the NATO structure, the tensions between the US and Russia have been looming. The rationale for Washington to move the shield under a NATO-wide command and control system is to improve not only the coverage but also increase its capability. From NATO’s perspective, including Moscow as a partner in the missile shield program would contribute to the construction of a true Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Since the revival of the shield project in 2007, NATO has underlined its commitment to work closely with Russia in the NRC in order to increase cooperation and joint threat assessments. Even though the point was emphasized in the Council of Rome, Roberto Zadra argues that the cooperation within the NRC would not be effective unless a prior bilateral agreement between the US and Russia takes place. Vincent Pouliot notes, as well, that “NATO’s advance toward Russia’s territory and its readiness to take unilateral action anywhere in the world have significantly contributed to revaluing nuclear deterrence in Moscow.” In 2007 Russian President Medvedev declared that Russia would deploy new nuclear capabilities able to destroy the European components of the US shield.

Both the Alliance and the US have made sure to include Russia as a possible partner in the project. In a bold move of policy entrepreneurship, Secretary General Rasmussen invited Russia to cooperate in 2010 and the 2010 Strategic Concept also called for Russia to participate in developing a missile shield for all NATO members in what could provide “one security roof.”

Globalization of NATO Activity

At the end of the Cold War NATO was destined to disappear for one simple reason: the collapse of the Soviet Union had eliminated its purpose for existing. NATO’s raison d’être disappeared in 1991 in the rubble of the Soviet Union.
Since then, NATO has been pro-active in order to survive by contributing to international security. “NATO’s expanded ambit is a result of the new global politics that emerged after the Cold War.” The first NATO mission took place in 1995 in the Balkans. The air campaign over Bosnia and Herzegovina led the way to the 1995 Dayton agreement that brought an end to fighting in the country. Following the air campaign, NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) under UN Mandate was deployed, in order to monitor the peace agreement. In 1999 NATO forces were used in Kosovo in a massive air campaign. Since then NATO has been used in all kinds of operations: in training forces in Iraq, fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa, assisting African Union forces in Sudan, aid relief in Pakistan, monitoring Mediterranean sea. However, the missions in Afghanistan and Libya are two most prominent locations in which NATO has been involved and have placed a considerable burden on the NATO-Russian relationship. In the case of the Afghan mission, NATO has been involved since 2003 as part of the International Stability Action Force (ISAF). Afghanistan was NATO’s first “out of area” operation and its biggest in terms of military capabilities, and forces deployed. The second considerable military mission started during spring 2011 in Libya. Following the approval of the UN Security Council resolution 1973, NATO was mandated to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya. This mission was unique in the sense that NATO’s rationale was embedded in the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In a December 8, 2011 meeting between NATO and Russia, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov expressed Russia’s position on Libya by claiming that Russia reaffirmed its “rejection of the methods of implementing the mandate contained in the UNSC resolutions [no-fly zone and arms embargo].” NATO action in Libya was not only political, but also had an ethical component. This has been perceived by Russia, but also by other countries such as China, as a red line in term of rationale for action. Russian officials have expressed that the “Libyan model” could become a prototype for future actions- implying that it might be used against Russia itself. Thus, the Libyan mission has created further tensions between NATO and Russia, as Russia increasingly perceives NATO as a promoter of Western norms and values targeted, in part at least, against Russia and other post-Soviet states.

**NATO strategy to become a global actor can simply be summarized by the expression of “out of area or out of business.”**

The 1999 Strategic Concept was a turning point in the role of the Alliance as for the first time “out-of-area”
missions were included to the strategic role of NATO. Only two years later, the new strategy was implemented. The 9/11 events marked a new step in the construction of NATO. The fact that the Alliance used Article 5 for the first time in its history as a form of solidarity also underlined the emergence of a new security actor. Following the attacks of September 2001 NATO was used in Afghanistan for its first “out of area operation.” The event marks the shift from collective defence to collective security.

Following the 2004 Summit in Istanbul, NATO declared that “transatlantic cooperation is essential in defending our values and meeting common threats and challenges, from wherever they may come.”51 The same year NATO was involved in a number of missions: expansion of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to all Afghanistan; the maintenance of a presence in Kosovo; enhancement of its presence in the Mediterranean as part of the fight against terrorism; the training of forces in Iraq; the contribution to the global fight against terrorism; the increase in links with Central Asia; and so on. As claimed by Brzezinski, “NATO is clearly not just a European defence system but a trans-Atlantic security system with increasing global reach. [...] So it is expanding its role and is becoming not just a European-focused defence alliance, but a broader international security system.”52

NATO strategy to become a global actor can simply be summarized by the expression of “out of area or out of business.”53 However, this globalization of NATO is perceived as a considerable threat by Moscow for the reason that a global NATO would strengthen the influence of the Euro-Atlantic community in promoting their interests, values, and power.

Conclusion

The 1990s were crucial in shaping the new identity of NATO and Russia. The latter emerged with Vladimir Putin as its leader trying to erase the memories of this lost decade and to reinstitute Russia as a great power. NATO had to change strategically and become relevant in the post-cold war environment in order to survive. It has done both. In this post-Cold War environment, NATO-Russia relations remain relevant, as each has historically been the mirror image of the other. Not only does Moscow see in NATO the failure of the Soviet story, but also an Alliance that has known how to adapt to the new challenges of the 21st century. The intervention in Kosovo in 1999 led to a trend shaping NATO’s strategy into more interventionist tendencies, which attained their highest levels with the Libyan mission of 2011. NATO transformation from being primarily a collective defence mechanism
to becoming a collective security instrument is taking form. As Daadler and Goldgeier argue, NATO’s new role of collective security should lead to an “open membership to any democratic state in the world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfilment of NATO’s new responsibilities.”54 This trend has become particularly worrisome for Russia as it would fully incorporate NATO within the international system.

In this post-Cold War environment, NATO-Russia relations remain relevant, as each has historically been the mirror image of the other.

One of the core problems in relations between NATO and Russia can be summarized through the perceptions by each of the other. The way in which NATO perceives Russia and vice-versa is fundamentally different. Russia sees a military bloc; NATO sees a needed ally. Because of their shared history, NATO and Moscow need to establish their relations not on factors from the past, but instead on focusing on pressing security threats such as nuclear proliferation, Iranian nuclear program, international drug trafficking, piracy, and terrorism. Setting up relations on a shared view of security menaces could be a starting point in the progressive construction of NATO-Russia relations.55

The issues of NATO enlargement, the over-activity of NATO, the missile shield, the aortic, the CFE Treaty, and others will continue to arise. However, three elements could actually affect the relationship either way: the NATO secretary general,56 the NRC, and the nature of NATO. First, since his appointment as the head of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen has made a clear point that NATO-Russia relations are central. Secretary General Rasmussen claimed that NATO and Russia must strengthen their relationship and cooperation despite disagreements and despite international crises, as “it is a matter of necessity.”57 The office of the secretary general could be an asset in fostering the relationship with Russia. The office of the SG under Rasmussen, himself a career politician, has been cultivating consensus among heads of state and government, as well as professional diplomats.58 The new culture emerging from the SG’s office of policy entrepreneurship and new ideas to deal with global security can be an asset as well as a problem.59 The relationship with Russia is much more a political issue than a military one. Having a politician at the head of the Alliance could have a considerable impact on shaping the future Russia-NATO relations.

Second, the use of the NRC needs to be changed. Believing that Russia will play the institutional game would be a mistake. The NRC has not been the
platform of discussion or cooperation that was initially envisioned. The most pressing regional security issues, such as the frozen conflicts of Kosovo, South Caucasus, the missile shield, and so on, have not been tackled within this platform. Instead, these matters have been dealt with at bilateral levels. The NRC needs to incorporate the “real” security questions into its agenda, such as the question of the missile shield, the convention on arms control in Europe, and out-of-area mission such as Afghanistan. In order to bring these issues within the framework of the NRC, Europeans and American will have to move the discussions progressively from bilateral channels to the multilateral ones. Such a strategy to strengthen the NRC will need to be approved by each NATO member, which could be a challenge, as NATO members – especially the powerful ones such as the US, France, and Britain- have traditionally used the bilateral channels to interact with Russia for two reasons: either as a bargaining tool or for reasons of domestic politics. Such bilateral practice of bypassing NATO and the NRC has been damaging to the credibility of the Alliance as well as increasing Moscow’s advantage on sensitive issues. NATO members need to commit to using increasingly the multilateral platform of the NRC, which will create not only an institutional routine, but also strengthen multilateral dialogue between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.

Finally, NATO is becoming a schizophrenic institution. On the one hand, Western European members and the US have come to realize that NATO has developed into an Alliance enforcing collective security and promoting security regionally and internationally. On the other hand, the new members from Central and Eastern Europe still look at NATO as a security blanket protecting them from Russia, as a mechanism of collective defence. They see NATO as a security guarantee from an overactive and unreliable neighbour. NATO’s power of attraction for states like Ukraine and Georgia has also been as protection against Russia. The emergence of a two-tiered NATO has also affected the dialogue with Moscow. The central question is whether NATO is the appropriate platform to foster cooperation between Russia and the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. What is certain is that the increasingly interventionist strategy of NATO in and outside Europe has become a considerable red line for Moscow. NATO has become a powerful

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The new members from Central and Eastern Europe still look at NATO as a security blanket protecting them from Russia, as a mechanism of collective defence.
military instrument and cooperative platform for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community, in order to advance, promote and defend Western values and norms, as well as Western security interests. Russia perceives this strategic shift as a threat to its regional influence, as well as competition. From the Atlantic perspective, NATO is the appropriate instrument for cooperation and has become a crucial piece of the puzzle. The most recent military operation in Libya illustrates clearly its success and value-added in the field of collective security. However, NATO is and will remain seen as a remnant of a “lost past.” The symbols and meaning of the survival of NATO are too vivid and present in the minds of decision-makers to be the appropriate platform of communication and cooperation. NATO was designed to protect the Euro-Atlantic area from a Soviet attack. The historical meaning behind the image of NATO is too heavy
to be able to boost and develop solid ties between the West and Russia.

What is certain is that Russia and NATO are different international actors with a similar agenda: existence through actions. Undeniably, as expressed in official documents, NATO sees Russia as a core component to ensure a secure and stable regional and international space. NATO believes that cooperation between the two actors is not only desirable, but vital, as they both share common interests such as missile defence, counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and a stable international system. Ultimately, trying to find common ground for a better cooperation and coordination will remain a serious challenge. Until both actors are seeking the same thing, the perpetual new beginning of re-establish relations will be inevitable.

The relationship with Russia is much more a political issue than a military one.
Endnotes


4 An excellent recent analysis of NATO and its role in the second decade of the 21st century can be found in Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore (eds.), _NATO: In Search of a Vision_, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2010.

5 As expressed in the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5 reads “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”.

6 Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty declares that “the Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded […]”.

7 Yost, _NATO Transformed_, p. 269; Yost’s study, along with Gülnur Aybet’s, _A European Security Architecture after the Cold War_, New York, St Martin’s Press, 2000, remain the best studies of the process of restructuring of NATO and its mission.


11 Fernandes and Simão, “Competing for Eurasia”, p. 115. For an excellent assessment of the shifts in Russian policy under Vladimir Putin, see Tremin, _Getting Russia Right_.

12 Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, Central Europe”, p. 35.


14 The announcement that he plans to resume the presidency later in 2012, coupled with the apparent fraud in the December 2011 parliamentary elections, contributed to the widespread demonstrations against Putin and the government late in 2011.

16 Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, Central Europe”.


20 Ibid., p. 240.

21 Ibid., p. 243.


25 Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p.93


29 Article 33 of the 2010 Strategic Concept reads: “NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia”, in NATO, “Strategic Concept. Active Engagement, Modern Defence”, p. 10.


32 The rationales behind NATO enlargement were and are several: supporting and sponsoring democratic reforms; fostering cooperation between new and old members of the Alliance; promoting a common
European security governance; increasing transparency in the sector of defence; promoting shared values on the European continent; increasing cooperation with other international organizations such as the EU, OSCE, and the UN; maintaining strong transatlantic ties. NATO, “Study on NATO Enlargement”, at http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/enl-9501.htm [last visited 7 January 2012].

33 Cited in Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 131.


35 Russia’s “gas wars” with Ukraine had other objectives, in addition to demonstrating the latter’s economic dependence on Russia.


37 Pouliot, “The Year NATO Lost Russia”, p. 252.


41 “Opening Remarks and Answers by Russian minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Press Conference after the Meeting of the Russia-NATO Council at Foreign Affairs Ministers Level”, Press Release, Polwire, at http://www.polwire.com/viewwire.aspx?prid=6qnftn5hxll7c5m2a0k7j9e9umkgs9q6l3714ceo34bhjey [last visited 7 January 2012].


43 NATO, “Strategic Concept. Active Engagement, Modern Defence”.


46 Pouliot, “The Year NATO Lost Russia”, p. 251.


52 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Ukraine is neither a pawn nor a queen but a very important figure,” The Day, at http://www.day.kiev.ua/13552 [last visited 7 January 2012].

53 Daadler and Goldgeier, “Global NATO”, p. 105.

54 Ibid.

55 See figure 1.

56 The role of the Secretary General has considerably changed since the end of the Cold War from a secondary figure to become the visage of the Alliance. This trend started with SG Manfred Wörner until today. These SGs have contributed to the transformation of this Cold War institution by making it a more political and diplomatic Alliance. The SGs have increased the visibility and influence of the Alliance through the development of global support.

57 Rasmussen, “NATO and Russia”.


59 Ibid., p. 27.

60 As Joan DeBardeleben has demonstrated, the admission of the post-communist states of Central Europe and the Baltics to the EU compounded the EU’s relations with Russia. See her “The Impact of EU Enlargement on the EU-Russian Relationship”, in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), A Resurgent Russia and the West: The European Union, NATO and Beyond, Dordrecht: The Netherlands, Republic of Letters Publishing, 2009, pp. 93-112.
Turkey & Its Neighbors: Foreign Relations in Transition

By Ronald H. Linden et al

The tale of the two decades in Turkish foreign policy following the end of the Cold War has yet to be written. A trajectory of Turkish foreign policy from the collapse of the Soviet Union until September 11 - an era in which security-driven foreign policies formulated primarily by senior military officials and other state bureaucrats were predominant, was well-captured by Philip Robins’ Suits and Uniforms (2003). The subsequent decade from September 11 to the Arab Spring, characterized by the erosion of security-oriented foreign policy and soft power, has been awaiting a proper in-depth scholarly treatment. Moreover, a complete and comparative account of the two decades is another topic that would command greater interest. Any comprehensive volume about the second decade or a comparison of both decades, however, has yet to be produced in the Turkish speaking academic world, let alone in English. At a time when signs of what will define the third decade following the Arab Spring are emerging, it is indisputable that a clear picture of the previous decade is becoming evident to students of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey and its Neighbors is an attempt to reflect on the second decade of Turkish foreign policy after the Cold War and on the sharp contrast between the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. The product of seven scholars supported by the German Marshall Fund and the Zeit Foundation, the volume focuses on Turkey’s neighbors along the Black Sea, and in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, and asks why tumultuous changes have occurred in Turkish foreign relations during the first decade of this century. Instead of looking at specific causes, such as the Muslim roots of the ruling party, the roles dictated by external powers, and Turkey’s own determination, the authors “envision Turkey’s relations with its neighbors as a function of a particular mix of international and domestic environments and agents” (p. 8). For the authors, developments in Turkish foreign policy have significantly taken place in response to the US, the EU and other organizations at the international level, two Iraqi wars in 1991 and 2003 respectively, the changing nature of the ‘Kurdish question’ at the regional level, the rise of the ‘Anatolian Tigers’, the growth of civil society, and the changing role of the military at the domestic level (see pp. 150-54 in particular).
The volume is composed of separate articles written by different scholars: “Reclaiming Turkey’s Imperial Past”, by Joshua W. Walker, analyzes how and to what extent the Ottoman legacy shaped recent Turkish foreign policy. “From Confrontation to Engagement”, co-authored by Nathalie Tocci and Joshua W. Walker, tackles Turkey’s changing policy in the Middle East from the 1990s to the 2000s. Ronald H. Linden, in his chapter entitled “Battles, Barrels, and Belonging”, examines the historical trajectory of Turkey’s relations with the Black Sea littoral states after the Cold War. “Energy and Turkey’s Neighborhood”, by Ahmet O. Evin, analyzes the policy alternatives, problems, and contradictions relating to Turkey on the issue of energy. “Coming and Going”, by Juliette Tolay, discusses Turkish migration policies in their own historical trajectories with a particular emphasis on the latest developments. Kemal Kirişci, in “Democracy Diffusion”, scrutinizes Turkey’s potential as a purveyor of democratization in its region. “Turkey as an Economic Neighbor”, by Thomas Straubhaar, presents a picture of Turkey’s economic relations. Nathalie Tocci, in “Turkey as a Transatlantic Neighbor”, evaluates the effect of Turkey’s regional policies in recent years on its transatlantic relations. In the concluding chapter, all the scholars summarize their findings and present some insights for the future.

Although the volume is written by different authors, it has some common ground which binds the various chapters together. The main research question for the volume is whether Turkey’s increasing engagement with its neighbors can be interpreted as an increasing disengagement from the West. This question cuts across all the articles in the volume, partly because it was written at a time when the debate on Turkey’s strategic direction took on a strident tone. The volume adopts “a different reading of the implications of Turkey’s foreign policy” (p. 209) and concludes that choosing “national interest”, “prudent realism” (p. 111), and “pragmatic considerations” (p. 150) over an East-over-West argument (p. 83) explains the recent activism seen in Turkish foreign policy. Accordingly, while the chapter by Walker discusses the discursive bond between neo-Ottoman inclinations in recent Turkish foreign policy and its ‘shifting away’ from the West, the second chapter contends that Turkey’s actions in the region are not “driven by its Muslim nature, but rather by international norms” (p. 55).

The volume also discusses how Turkey’s pursuit of foreign policy activism in its region affects its transatlantic relations. For the authors, Turkish foreign policy activities can complement those of the US and the EU policies by pursuing a more independent and pragmatic approach (p.
They even conclude that “divergent Turkish foreign policies could represent an asset” for the US and the EU (210). While Kirişçi draws attention to the synergy between Turkey’s potential as a purveyor of democratization and the promotion of Western democracy in the region, Juliette Tolley sees Turkey’s migration policy as concomitant with the continuous Europeanization in Turkish norms and policies (p. 137). Not only are Turkey’s policies “complementary to the wishes” of the European Union (p. 82), the Turkish economy is also “strongly anchored in Europe” (p. 190).

The volume suffers from the lack of a cogent criticism, however. Although authors define Turkey as “a country whose identity is unresolved” and refer to an “ongoing struggle” over this definition (p. 226), they offer no room for a discussion on how and to what extent this “new” foreign policy has affected this struggle. They also eschew going into detail on the problems of Turkish foreign policy in the first decade of the 21st century. Nor do they touch upon the troubled implications of the American influence upon Turkey’s neighbors, especially in Iraq. In the end, however, the volume provides an informative trajectory of Turkey’s neighborhood policy in the second decade after the Cold War.

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Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Kafkasya
(The Caucasus After the Cold War)

By Kamer Kasım

This book examines politics in the Caucasus in the post-Cold War era from the viewpoint of international relations. The book covers several issues, among them the foreign policies of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia after their independence, along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “frozen conflicts” in the Caucasus, the Caucasian foreign policies of regional powers such as Turkey, Russia and Iran, and the U.S. policy towards the Caucasus as a non-regional power. Energy security makes powerful state structures and inter-state cooperation essential. In the book, the securitization of the energy lines is also discussed and some regulations regarding this issue have been called for.
The Caucasus has long been an arena of competition and conflict over energy resources. There is an ever-present possibility of the frozen conflicts turning into open combat. Ethnic conflicts have prevented Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, which sought alliances to guarantee their safety, from developing healthy relationships with each other and with their neighbours. Therefore, in the first chapter of the book the approaches of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia toward the regional issues, in the context of their relations with the regional powers, are discussed. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue can be considered to be the most important and potentially the most dangerous issue in the Caucasus. Approximately 20% of Azerbaijani soil is still occupied and almost one million Azerbaijani have been displaced, causing the problem of internally displaced persons (the IDPs).

According to Kamer Kasım, the author, in view of the possibility of Azerbaijan using military force to take its lands back, Armenia acts within an insecurity paradigm and becomes more dependent on Russia. Armenia is the only country in the region that Russia deploys troops in without facing any objection. In a similar vein, Georgia, lacking energy resources but located at the crossroads with its coastline by the Black Sea, is also a part of the regional rivalries with effects extending to the August 2008 war and beyond.

In the second chapter the policies of regional powers - Turkey, Russia and Iran - toward the Caucasus are examined. The centre of attention in this chapter is the climate which ended the bipolar international system and allowed regional powers to come to the fore. The author underlines the fact that Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, has played a directive role in the “Near Abroad” policy in the Caucasus. In order to protect its military presence in the region and to maintain its influence, Russia intervenes in the internal affairs of the Caucasian republics. According to the author, Russia’s interventions have not only made the resolution of the frozen conflicts more difficult, but also have deepened these problems even further. Russia has directly or indirectly supported the separatist parties in the Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, while forcing Azerbaijan and Armenia to become members of the Commonwealth of Independent States - a manoeuvre that caused reactions by regional powers such as Turkey.

Having ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties with Azerbaijan, Turkey has given diplomatic support to the Karabakh conflict, and in 1993 closed the land border with Armenia. Meanwhile, the U.S. and the EU support normalization of relations and the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia, which would allow Armenia a door to the West and ease the country away.
from Russian influence. According to Kamer Kasim, the thought of integrating Armenia into the Euro-Atlantic system, which gained momentum especially after the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008, can push Azerbaijan into Russia’s axis. The relations between Turkey and Armenia cannot be distinguished from those between Turkey and Azerbaijan. For Turkey, Azerbaijan is a more significant country than Armenia, particularly in the field of energy. Therefore, opening the land border without solving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue would strengthen Armenia’s hand, and would be contradictory to Turkey’s energy policies and its influential position in the Caucasus. The author also makes the claim that, despite its convenient geographical location, Iran is constrained by several embargoes in carrying its energy resources and by its isolation by the U.S; which compel Iran to follow a pragmatic Caucasus policy in line with Russia’s “Near Abroad” policy.

The third chapter is allocated to the discussion of U.S policy towards the Caucasus. The U.S., the champion super power in the post-Cold War environment, has been active in regions where it previously could not form any dominant policy to protect its interests. According to Kamer Kasim, because of the lobby system in the domestic politics, the U.S. cannot follow a foreign policy congruent with its interests. Although Azerbaijan is the most significant country in terms of energy issues, the U.S. under the influence of the American-Armenian lobby does not provide Azerbaijan with sufficient political support to resolve the Karabakh conflict nor provide financial support to the country. This situation, as a result, damages the U.S.’s East-West energy corridor strategy. Yet, since 9/11, the U.S. has developed a security-enhanced policy towards the Caucasus. In this framework, there was an improvement in the East-West energy corridor and its relations with Azerbaijan. The U.S., which pioneered the making of more systematic security policies, supported the integration of Georgia and Ukraine into the Membership Action Plan (MAP) of NATO. However, due to disagreements among the NATO members, these countries did not become a part of the MAP. According to the author, this situation had encouraged Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008.

In the fourth chapter, the Russian-Georgian war, which represents a turning point in Caucasian politics and in the relations between the West and Moscow in the post-Cold War era, is examined. The outcome of the 2008 war has produced long term risks, despite appearing to be beneficial in the short term. While not having enough support from the West caused disappointment in Georgia, Russia has come to understand that Western countries, especially the U.S., will not deploy their military despite their support for Georgia. According to the author, the secessions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would help Georgia’s
integration with the West. Russia’s use of military power demonstrated that it is operative in the region, which has made countries such as Azerbaijan re-evaluate their relations with Russia. However, it should be noted that there are Abkhazia and South Ossetia-like structures within the Russian Federation that could make the same demands for autonomy and beyond. Furthermore, after what happened in August 2008, Russia could not find support from the West in regards to issues such as Chechnya.

The Caucasus After the Cold War is written from a perspective that presumes the Caucasus to be a region where many regional and non-regional powers are at play. The competition among the regional powers and the clash of interests are also presented. The problems in the Caucasus have been tackled with analyses at the levels of the system, the state and the individual. The author concludes that the problems in the Caucasus cannot be resolved easily, even if the various parties came to a mutual agreement - either of their own accord or forcefully, but that they would only change in form and continue to disrupt regional stability. This book fills a literary gap by presenting critical issues to decision-makers, as well as academics and experts, who all have an interest in the Caucasus.

Hasan Selim Özertem,
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Türk Basınında Dış Habercilik
(Foreign News Reporting in the Turkish Media)

By M. Mücahit Küçükyılmaz and Hakan Çopur

How can one interpret Turkish foreign policy accurately in an environment where multiplicities of actors have different political stances that shape their understanding of foreign policy? It is very difficult to cover objectively the controversial issues of the Turkish foreign policy agenda, such as the allegation of the axis shift in Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-Iranian bilateral relations, and the commentaries following the Israeli assault on the Gaza-bound Turkish aid ship flotilla. In Turkey, domestic politics has always been prioritized over foreign policy issues, which applies to the media coverage as well. Even the actual foreign
Obviously people evaluate Turkish foreign policy according to their own political inclinations. Recently, some analysts drew a picture of Turkey as a country that faces the East, not the West, whereas others assert that Turkey has a multilateral foreign policy. Overall, there seems to be broad agreement that Turkish foreign policy has gained considerable momentum in recent years, that Turkey no longer wants to be an outpost of the West, and that it is becoming a proactive country which seeks to assert its influence in new regions. The debates taking place in the Turkish media on these issues show variations. As this research suggests, as long as Turkish politics is polarized ideologically, the Turkish media will continue to reflect that polarization. The polarization in the Turkish media influences the quality of foreign news coverage so much so that members of the media, whose profession is supposed to cover news impartially, perform their duties in line with their ideologies.

The research also underscores the fact that there is a lack of linguistic skill among the professional journalists; most of whom do not know the languages of Turkey’s neighboring countries. Furthermore, Turkish journalists, according to research results, seem to have no in-depth knowledge of the regions with which Turkey has developed close relations in recent years. The research reveals that the coverage of news from the center of the incidents that Turkey is involved in directly and which receive worldwide coverage are forgotten upon the appearance of a domestic issue in the political agenda. Therefore, as Turkey increasingly emerges as an influential actor on the global stage, it is of great importance to examine meticulously the character of foreign news coverage in the Turkish media.

The research entitled “Foreign News Reporting in the Turkish Media” published by the SETA and conducted by Mücahit Küçükyılmaz and Hakan Çopur is a prominent example of research in this area. Covering three important metropolitan cities- Istanbul, Ankara and Washington D.C. - the research gives outstanding information about the coverage of foreign affairs in the Turkish media. One of the striking research conclusions is that there is a grave problem of expert correspondence in the Turkish media. The research found that the Turkish media covers foreign relations news from their studios in Turkey, rather than by examining incidents in the places where they occur. There is also a considerable importing of stories produced by international news agencies. The Turkish media thus seems to have lagged behind in terms of quality, and also has failed to follow and understand the essence of proactive Turkish foreign policy. These are some of the many conclusions reached by the authors based on almost 60 different interviews with journalists covering foreign relations news.
and from first-hand sources is seen less frequently than its dependency on the Anglo-Saxon international agencies. As a result, one encounters the problem that journalists who have never been to the Middle East or who do not know Arabic or Persian ‘report’ about events in Baghdad, Damascus or Palestine in the same way the West covers them.

The conclusions of the research also reveal that, although some journalists do try to correct their shortcomings at an individual level and at an institutional level, there is an urgent need for structural transformation within the sector to address the deficiency of objective reporting as well as of reporting from places where the incidents occur.

The book *Foreign News Reporting in the Turkish Media*, by Mücahit Küçükyılmaz and Hakan Çopur, provides a well informed debate on such issues as: the press ethics, the need for quality press members, the problem of specialization, and the role of the public and the social partners in foreign news coverage. It seems that, compared to developments in many other countries, the situation in the Turkish media remains far from promising.

Muhammet Çağatay Acar,
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Íran Nükleer Krizi
(The Iranian Nuclear Crisis)

*By Arzu Celalifer Ekinci*


Iran’s nuclear program has become an increasingly alarming issue in world politics, especially in the U.S. political agenda. Considering Iran’s rich oil and gas reserves, its insistence on promoting nuclear energy has been met with great suspicion, and it is believed that its real ambition is to develop nuclear weapons. Although Tehran claims that all of its activities are peaceful and based on the goal of increasing its technological capacity, this explanation does not satisfy the Western world. In this regard, the world’s leading powers - the U.S. and the EU, have been making considerable efforts to suspend Iran’s nuclear program. Thus, on the one hand Tehran’s insistence on carrying out its nuclear program, and on the other hand the U.S. and the EU’s insistence on preventing these activities,
was seen as indispensable during the Shah’s regime, it became a forbidden apple after the Iranian Islamic revolution.” Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Washington has strongly opposed Tehran’s efforts and tried to prevent its activities while claiming that Iran is aiming to develop nuclear weapons. Hence, the Western world started to scrutinize Iran cautiously as it adopted a series of decisions, economic sanctions, and resolution packages, and introduced diplomatic initiatives in order to prevent the crisis. According to the author, Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, all these attempts by the Western world have remained limited and unable to affect both U.S. and Iranian decisions on the nuclear matter, paving the path for a prolonged competition between the two parties. The author pinpoints that the root cause of this crisis is not based on the nuclear program itself but on the current regime in Iran.

In the second chapter, the author primarily examines the role of the EU in the crisis building process and questions the effectiveness of the policies and the strategies pursued by the EU. In order to understand the underlying causes for the EU’s involvement in this process and its general behaviour during the crisis, Ekinci underlines the role of EU’s foreign policy considerations and its priorities in regard to Iran. The EU’s ambition to become a global actor and its aim to prove itself in international politics, has led it to take an active stance...
by playing the role of the mediator in the Iranian nuclear crisis. As rightly stated by the author, “The EU intentionally involved itself in the crisis resolution and took on the role of mediator in the nuclear crisis in order to strengthen its common foreign and security policy and reinforce its image as global actor.” The mediation role of the EU includes strategies ranging from conditional engagement, critical dialogue, and comprehensive dialogue process to coercive diplomacy, all of which pinpoint to different stances in the management of the nuclear crisis, which is in contrast to the U.S. policy. The EU has managed to draw up a new road map by departing from the general U.S. policies of isolating Tehran, and has tried to integrate Iran into the system. Towards the end of the second chapter, the author attempts to answer to what extent the EU efforts have been effective, and reaches the conclusion that although the EU has managed to unify its numerous member states to act as a single unit in dealing with the crisis, its efforts have remained limited as a consequence of the lack of U.S. support in the process. Moreover, the author also puts forward the suggestion that “the EU needs to revise its policies and determine a common approach rooted in transatlantic cooperation by convincing the U.S. and presenting concrete and accurate suggestions.”

The third chapter primarily concentrates on the U.S.-Iranian relations in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution and examines how the U.S. has been dealing with the nuclear crisis. The author also makes a comparison between the U.S. and the EU approaches to Iran, pointing out similarities and differences. The facts presented by the author clearly demonstrate that, following the Islamic Revolution, the U.S. adopted containment and isolation policies toward Iran, as well as consistently tried to block Iran’s nuclear program. Since the 2000s, the Iranian nuclear program has become one of the priorities of U.S. foreign policy. The author ascertains that the Iranian nuclear crisis is not solely an international conflict but has turned into a game based on reciprocal hostility between the U.S. and Iran. Moreover, the author highlights the significance of the reality that a lack of direct dialogue between the two opposing sides has clearly led to a failure of the resolution efforts promoted by third parties. According to Ekinci, U.S. bilateral economic and political sanctions against Tehran have remained weak and ineffective, and those policies also brought undesirable consequences, as they led to the rise of anti-American sentiments among the public. Until now, neither U.S. policies nor EU mediation efforts alone have succeeded in overcoming the nuclear crisis. Moreover, Iran does not seem to be willing to end its nuclear program, nor will the U.S. give up its insistence on preventing Tehran’s activities. In her conclusion, the author presents possible options for
The Iranian Nuclear Crisis provides a comprehensive outlook on different dimensions of this issue through the lenses of the different actors involved in the crisis. Structurally and methodologically, the volume is well-conceived to deepen an understanding of the Iran nuclear crisis. Arzu Celalifer Ekinci is quite successful in allowing the readers to compare the different perspectives and expectations of the parties involved in the crisis. The author clearly addresses the problematic areas that need improvement and offers certain policy options and road maps that may contribute to the resolution of the conflict. The book, on the whole, is an inclusive and thorough study enriched with official reports and data, as well as expert Western and Iranian opinions. Furthermore, the publication of the book is well-timed as the Iranian nuclear crisis has aroused the attention of the world as well as Turkey. All in all, the book adequately illuminates the subject and constitutes a reliable and scholarly source with its detailed analyses.

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Küresel ve Bölgesel Perspektiften Türkiye'nin İltica Stratejisi (Turkey’s Asylum Strategy from Global and Regional Perspectives)

By Yücel Acer, İbrahim Kaya and Mahir Gümüş

Citizens of a country leaving for economic, political and social reasons or because of wars and domestic conflicts, and migrating to another country is a process that has been ongoing for a long time. People who have had to leave the country of their origin for such reasons are called “asylum seekers” or “refugees” in the countries in which they seek refuge. The refugee issue, a result of people looking for a better and safer life, has become a permanent problem that concerns all countries. Today many people living as asylum seekers
or refugees are in need of protection. Countries try to provide protection to those people according to international treaties they acceded to or arrangements in their domestic law. However, discrepancies and omissions in the law often cause asylum seekers and refugees to remain deprived of basic human rights. Legislation relating to asylum is also very incomplete and fragmented in Turkey.

It is very difficult to find a reference book in Turkey that includes issues related to asylum and presents the current situation. The book *Turkey’s Refugee Strategy from Global and Regional Perspectives* written by Yücel Acer, İbrahim Kaya and Mahir Gümüş in 2010 has the characteristics of a reference book on asylum and immigration by determining the current situation in Turkey through a field study.

The book consists of four chapters. The first chapter touches upon the basic concepts related to the subject and the issue of refugees across the world. The concepts of international migration, the origin of refugees, their destination countries, migrants, asylum, asylum seekers, refugees in general and human trafficking are among the basic concepts that are explained. The reasons behind international migration and asylum throughout the world are explained, and the demographics, socio-economic characteristics and regional distributions of refugees are highlighted.

In the second chapter, under the title “Asylum and Refugee Status in International Law,” the development of asylum and refugee legislation, the development of the definition of a refugee in international law, refugee law, the rights and freedoms of refugees in international law, and the difficulties encountered in practice are discussed. The reason why the authors included the regulations in international law in this chapter is that the basic definitions related to asylum are enshrined in international law. That is why international law is the first reference point for countries organizing their domestic laws regarding this issue.

In the third chapter, the state of asylum legislation in Turkey is addressed. In this context, under the title “Asylum Legislation in Turkey and Refugees”, the historical development of this subject in Turkey, the EU harmonization process, the general view, and the rights of asylum seekers in Turkey and its practices are discussed. As mentioned earlier, asylum or immigration legislation in Turkey is quite sparse because it is not regulated by a single law. Emphasizing this point, the book examines the arrangements made in Turkish legislation and the procedure for asylum. The duties of police departments, governorates, and the Ministry of Interior are also mentioned. The book also stresses the place of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the asylum process and how to constitute an institutional structure.
in harmony with the EU. Lastly, the chapter includes the EU National Action Plan harmonization process and the points that will be established and held under this plan.

Within the framework of the National Action Plan, a multiplicity of issues are mentioned, such as institutional restructuring, staff training, envisaged projects, solicited asylum law and policies, administrative and judicial appeals to asylum decisions, the principle of non-refoulement, subsidiary protection, integration training, public assistance, access to the job market, health, access to social, economic and cultural rights, deportation and return operations, increasing public awareness, sources of funding and removal of geographical restrictions.

Although Turkey acceded to both the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the Legal Status of Refugees, it introduced a reservation clause in both contracts that it would accept, as refugees, only those coming from Europe. As a result of the reservation, Turkey does not accept non-Europeans as refugees, and offers them a transition to other countries while providing temporary protection. However, Turkey is expected to lift this geographical restriction in the EU accession process. Another point discussed in the book is how to implement the principle of equal burden-share with EU member countries in order to protect Turkey from an influx of asylum seekers if the above reservation is removed.

The fourth chapter attempts to create a strategic road map for Turkey in relation to asylum. In this context, the primary focus consists of the concept behind the strategy, the strategic structure of Turkish regulations relating to asylum, and the purpose of a new asylum strategy.

The final chapter, “Principles to Dominate the New Immigration Strategy,” constitutes one of the more original portions of this work. A framework of the study is outlined and what needs to be done is explained, such as taking into account international law and the regulations of the EU asylum system, and giving prominence to the humanitarian dimension.

The book, examines its subject systematically, supported by field study and consolidated by the views of authorized people who work in the asylum processes. In its contribution to determine the current situation in Turkey, the book points out that Turkey needs to adopt new and necessary asylum legislations. Turkish legislation should be harmonized with the regulations of international law and the asylum acquis of the European Union (EU).

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Are Muslims Distinctive? A Look at the Evidence

By M. Steven Fish

This is a rare book that successfully combines statistical methods with quantitative data from around the world in order to systematically test commonplace assumptions and prejudices against Muslims. As the book description in its back cover states: “Are Muslims Distinctive? represents the first major scientific effort to assess how Muslims and non-Muslims differ - and do not differ - in the contemporary world.” The result is a major achievement in the social sciences and is of utmost relevance to policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic.

The book answers the following questions about Muslims in the world: compared to Christians and other non-Muslims, are Muslims more religious, more violent, more criminal, more corrupt, more unequal, more inclined to terrorism, more supportive of religious leaders influencing politics, less democratic, or less tolerant of controversial behaviour than Christians and other non-Muslims? Using a wealth of data including the World Values Survey, the book gives clear and sound answers to these questions. Contrary to what prevailing prejudices would suggest, the book shows that in many respects Muslims are not significantly different from non-Muslims. In fact in some respects Muslim-majority societies appear to be performing better than non-Muslim societies. Only a few of the findings are somewhat supportive of Muslims stereotypes. The book is an eye-opener in dispelling popular myths about Muslims and Muslim-majority societies that many people, including the Turks, believe in.

Contrary to what many people believe, Muslims are actually not more religious than Christians. Based on the World Values Survey, 85% of Muslims and 84% of Christians consider themselves as “religious” individuals (p.25). Only 42.9% of Muslims report attending religious services once a week, which is slightly higher than the 36.9% of Christians who do so. Furthermore, when Steven Fish, the author, isolates the Christian Orthodox component, we see that 41.9% of Catholics and 43.9% of Protestants attend religious services once a week, seemingly implying that the Protestants are slightly more religious than Muslims at least according to this indicator (p.26).

Also contrary to the prevailing stereotypes, 65.7% of Muslims - about
two-thirds - agree with the statement that “religious leaders should not influence how people vote”, which is comparable to 71.0% of Christians who agree with the same statement (p.47). About two-thirds of both Muslims and Christians agree on keeping the influence of religious leaders outside of politics. Nonetheless, Muslims are about twice as likely (69%) as Christians (35%) to think that “politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office” (p.51), indicating an aversion to atheists in politics.

When it comes to what Fish describes as “popular tolerance of controversial behaviour” (p.89), Muslims appear to be half as likely to think that homosexuality is justifiable compared to Christians (Muslims score 1.63 and Christians score 3.66 in a tolerance scale of 1 to 10). Muslims are also less tolerant of abortion and divorce. Fish points out that the Qur’an and the Islamic sources are much more permissive of divorce than the Bible and other Christian sources, and the Bible is also arguably more intolerant of homosexuality. He concludes, therefore, that Muslims’ relative intolerance of these behaviours, compared to Christians’, is not a result of the differences in the religious texts of these two major religions, but rather a result of the various interpretations by their contemporary adherents. Moreover, “Muslims are less tolerant of dishonest behaviour than are non-Muslims”, which includes “cheating on one’s taxes” and “claiming government benefits to which one is not entitled” (p.98-9). This finding undoubtedly provides a good example for the moral and political standing and attitudes of Muslim citizens.

Muslim societies are slightly more corrupt than Christian societies. The aggregate average of the Corruption Perception Index scores, where 1 represents the most corruption, for Muslim countries is 3.2 compared to 4.4 for Christian countries (p.112). Malaysia (5.1) and Tunisia (4.6) are significantly less corrupt than the Muslim average. Furthermore, the 19 Muslim countries with the largest populations are significantly more corrupt (2.9) than the 19 most populous Christian countries (4.6).

Muslim societies are at least three times better off than Christian societies in terms of the worst type of crime - intentional homicide. The average murder rate in Muslim societies is 2.6 out of 100,000, whereas it is 7.5 out of 100,000 in Christian societies (p.120). Moreover, Fish demonstrates that the 19 largest Christian countries have murder rates more than five times higher (11.0) than the 19 largest Muslim countries (2.1). Notably, Turkey has a murder rate (3.8) that is almost twice as high as the Muslim average. Nonetheless, the largest Christian countries have exceptionally high murder rates, including the top
four Christian countries, namely, the United States (5.6), Brazil (11.2), Russia (19.9) and Mexico (13.0). This is a very significant difference.

Why might Christian countries have much higher murder rates? A partial answer to this question is given in another chapter where Fish shows Christian countries to have higher levels of economic inequality than Muslim countries, and inequality is correlated with murder rates. The average Gini score, a measure of economic inequality, is 38.0 in Muslim countries, but is 41.1 in non-Muslim countries (p.217). The relative equality of Muslim societies is even more pronounced when one considers income per capita and life expectancy, which are correlated with lower inequality.

Why might Muslim countries have significantly lower levels of inequality than Christian countries? Fish emphasizes the role of Islamic zakat - mandatory annual almsgiving - and other forms of Islamic charity that are either mandatory or highly recommended. He compares these to the encouragement of charity in Christianity, but finds the latter unreasonably demanding, since Jesus told believers “to give up all one has for the poor”, which may be unrealistic. In contrast, Fish argues that specific injunctions, such as the religious duty of Muslims to give 2.5% of their accumulated wealth annually to the poor, perpetuates a habit of poverty alleviation, which may explain lower inequality among Muslims (p.221).

In contrast, Muslim countries suffer from higher gender inequality than non-Muslims countries, apparent in the difference between male and female literacy, life expectancy, earned income, numbers of parliamentarians and cabinet members (pp.176-195). Muslim individuals are more likely to think that a university education and a job are more important for men rather than for women, especially if jobs are scarce, and that men make better political leaders than women (p.182). Although political and socio-economic underrepresentation of women is a global phenomenon, it seems to be particularly acute in Muslim countries.

Muslim countries on average appear to suffer less from large-scale political violence compared to non-Muslim societies, but the 19 largest Muslim countries, in contrast, suffer twice as much from large-scale political violence as the 19 largest Christian countries (p.137). An area where Muslim countries suffer disproportionately is high-casualty terrorist bombings. The six countries with the most occurrences of high-casualty terrorist bombings are, respectively, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Israel, Afghanistan and India (p.154); furthermore, twice as many high-casualty terrorist attacks occur in Pakistan as in Russia (the second country in this list).
attacks. Muslims are more intolerant of abortion, divorce, and homosexuality than Christians, but they are also slightly more intolerant of dishonest behaviour such as cheating on your taxes. Economic inequality is lower in Muslim societies than in Christian societies, but gender-based inequality is higher. Finally, very few Muslim countries are democratic, while most Christian countries are.

I would highly recommend this book to any student or scholar of Muslim societies, and it is most certainly of interest to Turkish scholars. Despite the intensive usage of advanced statistical methods, the book’s findings are written and summarized in each chapter in a style accessible to policy makers, graduate students, and even advanced undergraduates. The book demonstrates that what many people both in the West and in Turkey think they know about Muslim societies is simply incorrect and contradicted by empirical evidence. I would call for a major publisher to translate this book into Turkish, so that it can be accessed not only by the English-speaking academics but also by the educated Turkish public.

Şener Aktürk,
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It is essential to understand the inner dynamics of American politics and its society to conduct an effective analysis of the foreign policy of a country that is still the only super power despite the emerging yet remote challenges seen in Asia. Dr. Ömer Kurtbağ’s book titled *Amerikan Yeni Saği ve Dış Politikası: Hegemonya Ekseninde Bir Analiz* (*The American New Right and Its Foreign Policy: An Analysis Based on Hegemony*) is a rare book in this particular field. On the whole, Kurtbağ’s work is a successful attempt at analyzing the remaking of American hegemony based on Neoliberalism, starting in the Reagan era and consolidating especially during the George W. Bush administration.

The book is underpinned by a strong theoretical basis consisting of international relations theories, with particular emphasis on the Gramscian theory of hegemony. Indeed, throughout the book, the author attempts to explain the conservatives’ attempts to institute Pax Americana by means of the Gramscian understanding of consent. As Kurtbağ illustrates in his work, from the Reagan to the Senior and then Junior Bush eras, the American right tried to legitimate its hegemony by presenting its own interests as global interests, with the exception of the Clinton era, in which internationalism and globalization emerged as trends in the US foreign policy.

After summarizing the path leading to Reagan’s victory, Kurtbağ gives a detailed explanation of the Reagan Doctrine and its pillars, namely, military build-up, peace through strength and ideological fight against communism during the Cold War. The New Right began to defend the idea that the US represents the good in the world, which still continues to dominate US foreign policy. Kurtbağ successfully explains, along with the ideological basis for the conservative thoughts, how the US spread neoliberal economic policies across the world.

Having explained how the Neoconservatives were born in the US, Kurtbağ elaborates on the discussions
in domestic politics after the Cold War of the new grand strategy of the US and how to maintain its hegemony, while analyzing clashing views, such as isolationism vs. internationalism and decline vs. revivalism, with detailed examples. It is noteworthy that the American right defended isolationism, which was traditionally favoured by leftists during the ambiguous political climate following the end of the Cold War. Kurtbağ successfully reflects the ambiguity of the 1990s, both in the US and in Europe: the sudden end of the Soviet regime, the unknown new role of the NATO, the emergence of Germany and Japan, the collective European policy as new challenges for the US, and the ethnic wars such as that in Yugoslavia. The US had to question the proclaimed victory of neoliberalism, despite the uninterrupted attempts to expand it. It is worth mentioning that the Defense Planning Guide of 1992, prepared under the supervision of Paul Wolfowitz, which rejects isolationism, collective security and balance of power, was evidence of the Neoconservatives’ (Neocons for short) search for ways to retain US hegemony after the Cold War.

After a brief analysis of the Clinton era foreign policy, Kurtbağ explains the increasing impact of the Neocons in US Foreign Policy, especially following September 11. For the Neocons, who aimed to restore American global hegemony by means of a pre-emptive strike doctrine, unilateralism, and the export of ‘democracy and freedom’ to other nations, and at home by strict implementation of neoliberal and authoritarian measures, September 11 served as a perfect means to legitimize their agenda. In between the rightist father and son Bush, the Clinton era seems like a brief episode characterized by centrist elements in domestic politics, the idea of the Third Way, economic engagement, increasing internationalism, a preference for humanitarian intervention and nation-building, and a belief in globalization. However, Kurtbağ does not fail to mention that Clinton also acted as a benevolent hegemon for the overall well-being of the world as the main defender of neoliberal globalization.

Although George W. Bush came to office with the intent to expand Pax Americana as a grand strategy, he did not pursue a policy much different from Clinton’s until September 11, which Beck defines as the Chernobyl of Globalization. As Kurtbağ summarizes, Neoconservatism instead of neoliberal internationalism now constitutes the ideological background for the reassertion of hegemony. Furthermore, Kurtbağ argues that the Bush administration continued Reagan’s neoliberal agenda and wished to strengthen it by means of force and Neoconservative ideology. Throughout the book, Kurtbağ explains the ruptures and continuities between the Neocons
and the traditional conservatives. Almost no conservative is against the expansion of democracy or free market. However, they are uneasy about multilateralism and humanist cosmopolitanism.

Kurtbağ allocates a considerable part of the book to explain the philosophical background of the Neocons. It is necessary to know that they are primarily influenced by Leo Strauss, who divides regimes into good regimes and rogue regimes. In their opinion American democracy is without a doubt the least bad one, and if and when necessary American values can be imposed on the world by force. Gramscian version of hegemony and its reinstitution, as well as the idea of consent by power and force, are very central elements of the Neocon mentality. Given this aim, Kurtbağ states that as a result, terror for the neo-cons, along with unilateralism and pre-emptive strike, was a tactic rather than the enemy. To what extent the Neocons were able to regain hegemony is a valid question. Kurtbağ concludes that in a globalizing and increasingly interdependent world, the idea of hegemony by force would backfire and limit US foreign policy. Given the fiasco in Iraq and the alienating impact of hostile rhetoric, the US partially gave up unilateralism on issues such as North Korea and Iran.

As Kurtbağ suggests, neoliberal globalization, which is perceived as a utopian project, seems to have failed, and increasingly people are demanding a more egalitarian system. Throughout his work, Kurtbağ presents criticisms of the harsh nature of Neoliberalism, which leaves the middle and the working classes unprotected. However, it is doubtful that a viable alternative to the system that the current hegemon has established is likely to appear in the foreseeable future.

With its detailed historical record, lengthy explanations of neoliberal economies (which could have been shorter), useful comparative charts and extensive bibliography, Ömer Kurtbağ’s study can serve as a Turkish reference/guide book to contemporary American politics and how it shapes US foreign policy.

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