ALBANIA’S COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION

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In the first months of 1997, just as the world celebrated one year of peace in Bosnia, another Balkan state, Albania, plunged into crisis. The mayhem in Albania was triggered by a collapse in shady pyramid investment schemes, but its root causes were decades of economic mismanagement and political corruption. These continued to plague the country even after the collapse of communism in 1991-1992. Many Albanians targeted their wrath on President Sali Berisha, who was held by many to be responsible for the country’s slide into the abyss. Despite his efforts to restore order, government authority collapsed, and the state fell into anarchy as marauding gangs took control of several cities. International forces were eventually called in to help provide humanitarian assistance, control lawlessness, and prepare for new elections. The elections were held in June, and a new government was formed and quickly garnered much-needed international support. However, questions remain over what it and the international community can further do to foster reconciliation and stability in the country.

In this paper I will focus on the role of international actors—the UN, OSCE, EU, IMF, non-governmental organisations and interested states—in putting Albania back together. All parties recognise that their effort will be crucial simply because Albania itself lacks the wherewithal to recover on its own. In order to assess whether and how international actors will succeed in their efforts I will extend the analysis beyond the immediate crisis in Albania and look for lessons and parallels with other international efforts to reconstruct or preserve troubled states. In so doing, I hope we will be better able to understand what can be done in Albania.

ALBANIA FALLS APART

Albania emerged from years of communist rule in an unenviable position to make a transformation to democracy and the market. Decades of state-mandated economic autarky had left it by far the poorest country in Europe, a veritable Third World outpost in the Balkans. Moreover, under communist rule any sign of dissent or independent political activity was squashed by the secret police. Enver Hoxha, the country’s long-time leader, continued to profess faith in Stalinism and emulated his hero by establishing a personality cult for himself while cutting the country off from the outside world. Hoxha died in 1985, but his successor, Ramiz Alia, was slow to make any changes that would foster development of a civil society or economic growth.

Albania, however, did not prove to be impervious to the winds of change blowing across the rest of the communist bloc. In June 1990, several thousand Albanians, in order to escape the horrific conditions in their country, crowded into Western embassies or onto dubiously seaworthy boats headed for Italy. Toward the end of 1990, a few brave individuals began to push the government to protect human rights, implement democratisation and launch long-overdue economic reforms. Student demonstrations followed, and crowds demolished statues of Lenin, Stalin and Hoxha. In early 1991, the Party of Labour yielded to demands for elections. Possessing immense organisational advantages and enjoying control of most of the media, they won the elections in March 1991. However, the new Socialist Prime Minister, Fatos Nano, did welcome some free-market reforms to jump-start the economy. These would be, however, difficult to implement and too little, too late,
as the government could not overcome growing social unrest and lawlessness. Food riots led the government to invite Italian troops to distribute food aid, and by the end of 1991 Nano resigned in favour of a multi-party coalition government. This government, however, collapsed when the right-wing, vehemently anti-communist Democratic Party (DP) and its leader, Sali Berisha, withdrew support. New elections were scheduled.

In these elections of March 1992, Albania looked to make a clear break with its past. The DP won in a landslide, and Berisha was elected president. He pushed through a number of economic reforms, including mass privatisation, and Albania received a substantial amount of assistance from the US, EU, IMF and World Bank, making it the highest recipient per capita of aid in Eastern Europe. The country, although still impoverished, experienced a real economic turnaround, as there was an 11 per cent rise in GDP in 1993 and 7.4 per cent in 1994, the highest in the region.1 Berisha, in addition to his free market credentials, also became a valued ally of the West because he eschewed flaming up Albanian nationalism in Kosovo or the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

There was, however, a far darker side to the Albanian ‘success story’.2 During this period, Berisha and the DP turned increasingly authoritarian. He purged more moderate figures from the party, arrested his opponents (including Alija and Nano) on charges of corruption and genocide, and stacked courts in his favour with judges who had just taken fly-by-night courses in law. Patronage was dispensed primarily to politicians and groups from northern Albania, the stronghold of the DP. The secret police was reconstructed to serve the DP’s interests. Moreover, there were widespread claims that leading members of the DP were involved in drug smuggling and gun-running to Yugoslavia and possessed extensive contacts with organised crime syndicates.3 Many of these illegally gained funds, it was alleged, were being put into growing pyramid schemes, several of which were run by Berisha’s political allies. The IMF and World Bank both warned the government about the fragility of these schemes, but the government, at best, continued to look askance at their operations. Berisha’s most egregious action, perhaps, occurred in the May 1996 parliamentary elections, which were ‘won’ by the DP amid complaints of vote rigging and intimidation of the opposition. OSCE monitors refused to put their stamp of approval on the elections, and the US and the European Parliament called for a re-vote. Berisha agreed to re-run polls only in 17 of 115 districts, and the opposition again cried foul, boycotting the vote and refusing to take its token seats in parliament. However, even after this episode, most European countries refused to abandon their ally Berisha.

The real crisis broke out only in January 1997. Paradoxically, the Dayton Accords and the lifting of the UN embargo on Yugoslavia dried up many of the funds for the on-going pyramid schemes, forcing their operators to offer higher and higher interest rates to attract investors. Eventually, they offered up to 150 per cent a month, which was completely unsustainable. In January, several of them declared that they could not return money to investors, who by this time had poured up to $2 billion into them, about $700 per person and equivalent to the annual GDP of the country. Virtually every Albanian was affected, and many lost their life savings or had even mortgaged their houses to acquire cash to invest. Angry mobs demanded not only their money back, but also the heads of Berisha and his advisers, who they blamed for allowing this to happen. Protests were especially prolific in several southern towns, such as Vlore, Gjirokastra, Saranda and Berat, which were hit hard by the schemes and enjoyed less of the government largesse dispensed by northerner Berisha. Gangs set fire to DP and government offices in these areas and opened the jails, freeing both common criminals and many of Berisha’s political opponents.

Berisha used several means to quell the protests. He shut down the remaining schemes, and promised investors the return of their stolen money. However, the government clearly lacked the financial means to assuage protesters. Berisha also clamped down on the press and arrested several protest leaders, including leaders of the Socialist and the Social Democratic Parties, and blamed them for the violence. He brushed aside domestic and international criticism of his heavy-handed measures, refusing entreaties to form a coalition government and call for new elections. Instead, on 2 March 1997, he imposed a state of emergency, giving police the right to shoot on sight armed rioters, whom he dubbed “communist rebels helped and financed by foreign espionage services.”4 On the next day, after the government resigned, he was re-elected by the DP-dominated parliament
to a new term of office. Power, on paper at least, was fully at his disposal.

Despite Berisha’s efforts to restore order and maintain power, his position continued to deteriorate as angry mobs raided government munitions depots and became a formidably armed, if still disorganised, force. In some areas of the south members of the army, angry at Berisha’s shenanigans, sided with the opposition. By early March 1997, hundreds had been killed as large parts of the country were under the control of armed thugs and mafiosi posing as ‘Salvation Fronts’. Berisha’s position had become untenable.

Much more, however, than Berisha’s head was at stake. Government authority had virtually collapsed, and the country was embroiled in chaos. Some feared the violence could spill over into neighbouring countries. Fearing the worst and realising that Berisha could do little to improve matters, the international community was spurred to act.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION HELPS RESTORE ORDER

Many outside observers had expressed alarm from the beginning of the crisis, and both governmental and non-governmental organisations criticised Berisha’s handling of the situation. As matters continued to deteriorate, Berisha realised that he would have to make both some concessions to the opposition and some overture for international assistance. The latter would prove to be a crucial factor in the resolution of the crisis.

On 6 March 1997, Berisha finally agreed to meet with representatives of the EU and OSCE. At the same time, and not uncoincidentally, he also agreed to talks with the opposition and offered an amnesty to the rebels. Franz Vranitzky, a former Austrian Chancellor, was appointed to head the OSCE’s mission and became the international point man for Albania. On 8 March, he helped broker a deal between Berisha and the opposition in which the former agreed to form a new coalition government, ease the state of emergency and hold internationally-monitored elections. On 12 March, Berisha appointed Bashkim Fino, a Socialist from the southern city of Gjirokastra, Prime Minister. Unfortunately, however, the machinations of Albanian politicians were proving to be academic, as no one had control over the rebel gangs. Warning that his country was on the brink of civil war, Fino called for the EU and UN to intervene militarily.

This move tossed the ball clearly into Europe’s court. As was the case in Bosnia, while all countries could agree that something should be done, they could not agree on what should be done. Humanitarian assistance was an obvious need, as food supplies were running low in Albania. Germany and Great Britain in particular were frightened of military intervention, fearing involvement in yet another Balkan imbroglio. The US was also reticent to act, fearing that any international mission would be poorly defined. The EU and NATO therefore balked sending troops, leading Carl Bildt, the head OSCE representative in Bosnia, to remark that events in Albania showed (again) that any talk of a common foreign policy for Europe was “pathetic”. Meanwhile, fighting in Albania continued, refugees were fleeing at the rate of a thousand a day, and there was little chance that humanitarian aid could be delivered. Vranitzky stated that “There is no alternative [to foreign intervention] as far as I can see.” Meanwhile, representatives from Italy and Greece, the most popular destinations for Albanian refugees, continued their own diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis and, after being rebuffed by their European partners, turned to the UN to approve sending a multi-lateral force to Albania. On 28 March 1997, the UN authorised a nine-nation protection force of six thousand troops to “facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organisations in Albania.”

The UN-authorised forces, led by the Italians, would, however, encounter many problems in carrying out their mandate. Their mission got off to an inauspicious beginning even before the troops arrived, as a ship carrying Albanian refugees collided with an Italian frigate and sank, killing over 80 Albanians. This ship had departed from the port of Vlore, the largest city controlled by gangs and one of the areas UN forces were charged with securing. This incident sparked anti-Italian feelings
among Vlore residents, some of whom threatened to kill any Italians entering the city. Once the troops were on the ground in mid-April, they had immense challenges in creating a secure environment for the distribution of aid, since Kalashnikovs and grenades had become an accessory item for many Albanians. Disarmament of the renegade bands, however, was left to the Albanian police and military, who were in no position to deal with the problem. Even as aid was delivered, more arms caches were ransacked and violence continued, although the international forces remarkably suffered no causalities. By June the death toll had reached 1,500.

Aside from delivering aid, another objective of the international mission was to stabilise the country before elections, scheduled to be held at the end of June. In mid-May, however, Berisha began to backtrack on his pledge to hold these elections, stating that the proposed proportional representation electoral law would discriminate against his party. Once again, it fell to Vranitzky to forge a compromise among the Albanian parties, showing the importance of international mediation. The campaign, however, continued to be marred by occasional violence and in some cases candidates felt too intimidated to campaign in certain regions. More problems arose in the week prior to the elections as violence escalated and the various sides blamed their opponents for politically-motivated attacks to undermine the elections. Again, however, a compromise was made with the urging of international observers. The three main political parties—the DP, the Socialists, and the Social Democrats—signed in Rome a ‘Pact for the Future of Albania’ in which they recognised the need for a coalition government regardless of the electoral outcome and to grant the opposition key watchdog positions in parliament.

On 29 June 1997, parliamentary elections were held as scheduled. Two-thirds of the voters turned out. The Socialists and their allies won in a landslide, winning 119 seats out of 155, leaving 27 for the DP. Keen to declare its mission a success, the OSCE proclaimed the elections “adequate and acceptable” and Berisha grudgingly accepted defeat and stepped down from office. Others, however, claimed electoral fraud (including the enigmatic figure of King Leka, who lost a referendum to restore the monarchy), and some DP officials fled the country fearing a Socialist-led witch-hunt against them. Fatos Nano was once again chosen Prime Minister, this time of a five-party coalition government (that pointedly excluded the DP), and Rexhep Majdani, another Socialist, was elected President.

Nano began his tenure on a high note, proposing several measures to decrease arbitrary presidential power, bolster checks and balances in government, and restore the rule of law. According to one report, the new rulers were now talking in “an un-Balkan language of conciliation and temperance.” The new Interior Minister, Neritan Ceka, optimistically predicted that the government would be able to restore order throughout the country within six months. Declaring victory and eager to go home, most of the international forces began to pack their bags and depart. While aid would continue to flow into the country, Albanians were largely left to sort out their own problems.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS: RECENT EXPERIENCES

The holding of elections and formation of a new government can undoubtedly be counted as successes, but they are not panaceas. They are only the start of what is likely to be a long and difficult process of national reconstruction. The underlying socio-economic problems, built-up frustrations and atmosphere of intolerance will linger. More steps must be taken to rebuild the country, restore order, encourage investment, strengthen democracy and the rule of law, and promote reconciliation. As one observer noted, “the Albanian cupboard is completely bare.”

Before suggesting what the international community can put into it, it is worth examining some other recent efforts by international actors to restore order and re-build states. By looking at some successes and failures, we will be in a better position to assess prospects for Albania.

Today, when one thinks of international intervention, especially in the Balkans, the case of Bosnia leaps to mind. However, it is important to note that there are important differences between Bosnia and Albania: there was significant outside involvement in Bosnia, Croats and Serbs had irredentist
claims on Bosnian territory, ethno-religious cleavages formed the basis of political mobilisation, and the violence was more pervasive and better organised. For these reasons, keeping peace in Bosnia is undoubtedly more challenging than in Albania.

Nonetheless, Bosnia remains a salient case, not only because of the scope and duration of the conflict, but also its handling by the international community may provide important lessons for future cases of intervention. The most obvious lesson, of course, is that international actors need to take action quickly, present a united front, and be committed and decisive in the face of aggression. For years these basic precepts were lost on the UN, EU, US and NATO, and for this reason many blame the carnage in Bosnia on international inaction. Finally, of course, the warring parties agreed on a settlement, and the manner in which the Dayton Accords were concluded points to a corollary of the above-mentioned lessons: the use of force can positively contribute to international diplomacy. Arguably, this is what motivated the Italians and others to act in Albania.

The patchy implementation of Dayton, however, yields another important lesson: military force may be able to stop fighting, but it alone cannot build civic, democratic institutions or foster a culture of mutual respect and tolerance. In Bosnia today there is peace, but important elements of the Dayton Accords, including creating national political institutions, allowing freedom of movement and prosecuting war criminals, are at best partially fulfilled. All sides recognise that continued peace depends on the presence of NATO troops, which is why the June 1998 withdrawal date was extended. Meanwhile, the flames of nationalism have not been easy to extinguish, as hard-line nationalist parties have done well in democratic elections. However, there has been some positive signs that the international community can help stop the process of ethnic polarisation by offering moral and material support to more moderate and pragmatic candidates. This was best exemplified this past November at the elections in the Republika Srpska, in which the party supported by President Biljana Plavsic, backed by the international community, did surprisingly well and denied a majority in parliament to die-hard nationalists led by the notorious Radovan Karadzic. Obviously, however, this is only a beginning, and real work will have do be done to convince Serbs from all sides that they should work together with Muslims and Croats to build a common state.

Examining the causes of the Bosnian conflict itself may also reveal important lessons. Although one can produce a laundry list of causes of the war, two factors stand out: authoritarianism and ‘hard sovereignty’. Authoritarianism, manifested in the figures and parties of Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and Karadzic, crushed civil society, created an atmosphere of intolerance, and fuelled ethnic-based hatreds and Manichean world views among their supporters. They were the winners in a process of ‘ethnic outbidding’, in which politicians competed to see who would best defend the (ethnically-defined) nation. ‘Hard sovereignty’ means that the state tried to make itself immune to outside influences that might encourage moderation or the development of political alternatives. In effect, leaders attempted to put blinkers on citizens, keeping them focused on the task at hand: defend the nation at all costs. These same two factors characterised Albania for decades, and help explain why it was ripe for crisis in the initial post-communist years. They also point to the need for the international community to encourage democracy and maintain a more visible and effective presence in crisis-ridden states.

Another important case of international efforts of national reconstruction that bears some similarities to the Albanian case is Somalia. In both instances, the state utterly collapsed, regional and ethnic based clans began arming themselves, a humanitarian crisis ensued, and the international community felt compelled to help. Intervention in Somalia, however, proved to be an utter disaster. The reasons are many, but among the most important ones are the lack of early warning and early action, local opposition to deployment of UN (largely US) forces, little co-ordination with NGOs and local actors willing to help, and the inability of peacekeepers to produce real conflict resolution among warring factions. The tragedy of Somalia vividly showed that the UN cannot simply rebuild states that have been ripped apart by violence and, in contrast to the lesson of Bosnia, that the dispatch of overwhelming force (30,000 US troops were sent to the country) does not guarantee success. The reason for this failure is clear enough: there was little political authority within Somalia with which the international community could work. Simply stated, the UN cannot establish
order from complete chaos.

In contrast to the many negative lessons of Bosnia and Somalia, the case of Macedonia has been widely acclaimed as a success for the UN and the policies of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping.14 This mission, first authorised in December 1992 and consisting of over 1,000 soldiers and support staff, was, in contrast to other UN peacekeeping operations, undertaken before significant hostilities broke out. Its mandate is essentially three-fold: to protect Macedonia from external attack, to prevent any infiltration or spill-over of hostilities from neighbouring, unstable areas (Kosovo, Albania), and to assuage inter-ethnic tensions between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, who compose over 20 per cent of the population and have been demanding a number of political, social and cultural rights. Although both external and internal threats to Macedonia remain, the UN mission has been considered a success on all counts. The reasons for its success are several: it entered a situation in which there was little violence and moderate political polarisation, it enjoyed the backing of all major political actors in Macedonia, it has utilised early warning and conflict prevention measures, it has worked extensively with local actors to develop civil society, prevent “ethnic outbidding” and build institutions to ameliorate conflict, and it has enjoyed consistent international support.

The Macedonian case can be held up as a model for future operations, a virtual mirror image of the Somali debacle. However, it cannot be indiscriminately replicated in every situation. The success of any sort of early warning or preventive peacekeeping operation depends upon the given environment, in particular the level of existing polarisation and the willingness of local actors to co-operate with the international community.

Is there a need for such an operation in Albania today? Would it be able to succeed? What specific measures should be taken in the Albanian case? Is there a willingness by international actors to undertake them? It is to these questions that we now turn.

PICKING UP THE PIECES IN ALBANIA

Since the change in government and the departure of the UN-authorised force, Albanians have made some progress in putting their country back together. International actors have contributed to this process. However, much work remains to be done, and international actors will continue to have an important role to play in reconstruction efforts.

Arguably, the most progress to date has been made in the economy. The events in early 1997 brought economic life to a stand-still, and since then there has been some signs of an economic recovery. Inflation is down to 40 per cent, the currency has stabilised, greater fiscal responsibility brought the budget deficit to eight per cent of GNP, pyramid schemes have been closed and output is expected to increase in 1998. An IMF team sent to the country remarked, “We have been impressed by the remarkable progress Albania has made following the crisis earlier this year.”15 Reflecting international concern and confidence, over $640 million in aid has been pledged by the IMF, the World Bank, EU, and donor countries. These funds will be directed not only at macro-economic stabilisation, but also toward investment in infrastructure and small businesses. While this outside support has helped and is to be welcomed, more needs to be done. Gun-toting youths need to find real jobs. The government must collect taxes. Investment must be directed at efforts to improve living standards for Albanians. Aid funds must be productively used and not be siphoned off for purposes of political patronage. IMF austerity programs must be tempered with a social safety net. Private, foreign investment needs to be encouraged. Moreover, even this generous amount of aid is less than half of what Albanians lost in the pyramid schemes. Even if Albania manages to enjoy double-digit growth again, it will take many years for the country to recover fully. Obviously, a long-term commitment from international supporters, not just a band-aid solution, is necessary.

More troubling, perhaps, is the continued lawlessness and violence in the country. Roads are still unsafe at night. Bandits flourish. Blood feuds continue among rival gangs and clans. The
government’s weapons return program has been an absolute failure. Bombs continue to explode mysteriously throughout the country. Fifteen such incidents alone were reported in the thirty days prior to 14 January 1998, when the Socialist Party headquarters in Gjirokastra was destroyed by a blast. Foreign troops, Italians and Greeks, are deployed along Albania’s borders and are helping the Albanian military, but obviously this is a problem that will require a concerted effort to solve.

More ominously, perhaps, this violence is a manifestation of and contributes to Albania’s most serious problem: political intolerance and polarisation. This was made most apparent in September 1997, when Socialist MP Gafur Mazreku shot and wounded a senior DP MP, Azem Hajdari, inside the parliament building. Mazreku has been prosecuted, but the DP nonetheless launched a boycott of parliament, refused to participate in the writing of a new constitution, and called the government a “criminal clique.” Former DP judges, dismissed by the Socialists, have been on a hunger strike, and Berisha has demanded new elections. The Socialists, meanwhile, have accused Berisha of being behind a “politically motivated crime wave” and plotting a coup d’état. Spartak Braho, a Socialist MP, suggested that without Berisha’s arrest “nothing will be regulated in this country.” Observers commented that the current debate over Berisha recalled the meetings of the DP in 1993, when they arrested Nano on political charges.16 Obviously, in this atmosphere it will be hard to bring about political reconciliation, and history risks repeating itself.

The international community is aware of and deeply concerned about this problem. A delegation from the European Parliament noted that there has been little change in political rhetoric since the pre-conflict period, and that “there is a lack of will for reconciliation on both sides.”17 Vranitzky suggested that the primary task now was to “persuade the political parties in the Albanian parliament to co-operate in the interest of the country and not to stay apart, not to polarise in the interest of the parties.”18 The OSCE has suggested that it should play a role in the drafting of a new constitution, and the director of its human rights division, Gerard Stoudman, has called on the DP to end its boycott of parliament. Berisha, however, rejected this appeal, saying his party would not become “window dressing for the government.”19

Until more progress is made in the process of political reconciliation, Albania remains ripe for conflict. International actors recognise this, but thus far their exhortations have had little effect. At the same time, while aid is flowing into the country, economic development is threatened by fears of political instability and violence.

Sitting back and letting Albanians take care of their own problems is unlikely to produce positive results. For this reason, a more pro-active policy is needed. This includes using an array of economic and political carrots and sticks to encourage democracy and promote Albania’s integration into Europe. Aid needs to be targeted at institutions (not leaders or parties), human and civil rights need to be monitored, and international mediators must work with various political parties to promote dialogue and compromise and end the cycle of violence. Beyond this, which is already being done, international forces could be sent in, à la Macedonia, in a preventive peacekeeping mission. This could strengthen the hand of international mediators, prevent groups from sabotaging political agreements, and lessen fear and contribute to confidence building and greater tolerance among Albanian political factions. These forces could help establish the order, heretofore lacking, that would allow new political institutions to survive. In a multi-dimensional and well-integrated peace mission, these forces would also be a strong symbol of international commitment to Albania.

Could such a mission succeed in Albania? There are several reasons to be hopeful. First, the success of the earlier UN-authorised mission would give any new international force credibility. Second, the level of violence is still relatively moderate, meaning that dialogue and political reconciliation are still possible. Third, unlike in the Somali case, there is a recognised authority with which international forces can work. Finally, the government has proven itself quite open to international overtures and would likely welcome such a force.

Of course, there are limitations. Foreign forces alone cannot produce democratic institutions that are sustainable at the local level. However, as the case of Macedonia shows, they can make a
positive contribution if they work with local actors. Moreover, by simply contributing to maintenance of public order, they can boost public confidence in democracy and undermine the position of extremists. Additionally, as we see in Bosnia today, international actors can give support to more moderate and pragmatic forces. While some may counter that this is a violation of sovereignty, it is also the case that ‘hard sovereignty’ is a favourable condition for extremists. The key point is that international actors should support all actors who are willing to play by democratic rules and have the courage to call foul when any side goes astray. Lastly, there may be some concerns about Berisha’s support for a greater international presence in his country. He has already stated that the presence of Greek troops in Albania is a violation of sovereignty. To lessen his potential opposition, one needs to stress the international community’s interest in working with all democratic forces to support the rule of law in the country.

The biggest missing ingredient at this point, however, is international commitment to such a force. This is unfortunate. Not only is more action necessary for Albania’s sake, but it is also in the European, American, and regional states’ interests. The most recent events such as protests in Montenegro and growing violence in Kosovo show that the region is still a powder keg that could easily explode. Bosnia was bad enough, but an international war involving Albania, Yugoslavia, Macedonia and, more than likely, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, would be a disaster for all. International action has already helped secure Macedonia. The same can be done in Albania, contributing much-needed stability to the Balkans.

CONCLUSION

Speaking about the events of early 1997, one Polish politician stated that, “The whole situation in the Balkans, including Albanian matters, has been given insufficient weight by Europe. It would be right if Europe was much more present, including in Albanian matters, to avoid a repetition of what we have seen in the central Balkans.”20 These words, heeded in early 1997, still ring true today. Although matters are less dramatic, Albania is still in crisis. Help is still needed. As a supplement to economic aid and diplomatic encouragement of democracy, preventative peacekeeping in Albania would help prevent history from (again) repeating itself.


4 Reuters, 3 March 1997.


8 In particular, DP candidates avoided southern cities while Socialist candidates were sometimes less than welcome in the north. In Vlore, Albert Shyti, leader of the Vlore Public Salvation Committee, said, “Berisha does not have the moral right to come to the towns where he has caused a real blood bath. If he decides to come to Vlore, we shall not let him.” See ‘Albania: One Way or Another’, Transitions, 4 (2), July 1997, p. 13.

9 In particular, see letter by Jonathan Sunley of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, ‘Disorder
in Albania', New York Review of Books, 4 December 1997, p. 65. He reports several cases of intimidation against DP candidates.


11 Hibbert, Reginald (1997), ‘Dealing with the Dispossessed’, World Today, 53 (5), May, p. 120.


15 New Europe, 21-27 December 1997, p. 34.


17 New Europe, 7-13 December 1997, p.34.

18 New Europe, 9-15 November 1997, p.34.