From Allies to Frenemies and Inconvenient Partners: Image Theory and Turkish-Israeli Relations

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Abstract

By way of utilising and also extending image theory, one of the earliest and longest-lasting research areas in foreign policy analysis, this article discusses the change in the perception of the Other that is currently taking place in both Turkey and Israel. It argues that whereas Israel sees Turkey increasingly as a frenemy, Turkey considers Israel an inconvenient/untrustworthy partner. Israel’s image of Turkey as a frenemy represents a perceived relationship in which Turkey has similar power traits, an inferior culture, and that Turkey presents a threat to Israel’s power and security in the Middle East. Turkey’s image of Israel as an inconvenient/untrustworthy partner represents a perceived relationship in which Israel has similar power and inferior cultural traits, and that Israel is a partner that cannot be trusted. Indeed, the strategic interactions between the two countries, especially since the first significant signs of problems emerged in the mid-2000s, illustrate the level and extent of these changes.

Key Words

Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-Israeli relations, image theory, frenemy, the flotilla incident, decision-making.

Introduction

For decades, Turkey remained the only Muslim country to have recognised Israel, following the country’s recognition of the State of Israel in March 1949, less than a year after its proclamation. Diplomatic missions between the two countries were opened in 1950 at the legation level. Although Turkish-Israeli relations did not have a meaningful content until the 1990s, the relations between the two countries became rather strained when the Israeli tactics used in the 1982 Lebanese War created public outrage in Turkey.1

The improvements in Turkish-Israeli relations that began following the end
of Cold War led Turkey to upgrade its relations with Israel to full ambassadorial states after the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. The real intensification of relations started after the signing of the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1993, with Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin visiting Israel in November of the same year, an unprecedented visit to Israel at that level. More prominently, the Turkish military initiated and signed the first military training agreement between Turkey and Israel in 1996, which led to significant expansion and deepening of strategic alliance, as well as economic cooperation, that marked Turkish-Israeli relations in the second half of the 1990s.

It was the “Mavi Marmara (or “the Flotilla”) incident” of May 2010 that brought the two parties to a major crisis point. Criticisms about close Turkish-Israeli relations increased following the Israeli attack on the Jenin refugee camp in April 2002, which caused massive civilian casualties. In the midst of a major public outcry in Turkey, then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit described the Israeli attacks on the Jenin refugee camp as “genocide” and accused the Israeli government of committing “acts against humanity.” Turkish-Israeli relations ebbed and flowed from November 2002, when the Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkey, until December 2008, when Israel started a three-week offensive in the Gaza Strip. Relations between the two countries further deteriorated after the “Davos incident” in March 2009 and the “low-chair crisis” in January 2010. However, it was the “Mavi Marmara (or “the Flotilla”) incident” of May 2010 that brought the two parties to a major crisis point. It is safe to suggest that the Turkish-Israeli relationship has not recovered since this incident. In fact, tensions between the two countries have once again been increasing since mid-September 2011 following the publication of the United Nations Palmer Report and the Israeli-Greek Cypriot deal on oil and natural gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean.

But what explains the dramatic shift in the relations between these two important and powerful non-Arab states in the Middle East? Is the changing nature of Turkish-Israeli relations a consequence of geopolitical factors? Or should one also consider the role of important perceptual and ideational factors? If neither Turkey nor Israel considers the other side as a strategic partner any more, especially so soon after the golden years of their relationship in the 1990s, what is the new image they have of each other?

Based on preliminary research, this article suggests that a change in the
image of the Other is currently underway in both Israel and Turkey vis-à-vis each other. As the strategic interactions between the two countries and the speeches by leaders in both Turkey and Israel since the first significant signs of problems in 2008 have demonstrated, Israel increasingly sees Turkey as a frenemy, a partner who is simultaneously a rival, and Turkey considers Israel an inconvenient/untrustworthy partner.

This article first examines the literature on the origins and evolution of one of the earliest and longest-lasting research areas in foreign policy decision-making analysis: image theory. Scholars have long pointed out that cognitive concepts and constructs such as images are helpful in explaining foreign policy decision making and state action in international relations. In this section, we evaluate the contributions of this particular research area by focusing on its strengths and weaknesses. I further argue that despite their success in foreign policy analysis, scholars of image theory have yet to successfully explain how images of the Self and the Other alter and how these changes influence relations between two countries. The following part re-focuses our attention on Turkish-Israeli relations in recent years, with an emphasis on a number of crises, and analyses how the images each side has had of the other has been changing over time. In this section, we draw hypotheses from the scholarship on image theory and propose what we believe to be the current images the two countries have of each other. Finally, we summarise our findings and discuss policy implications in the concluding section.

**Foreign Policy Decision Making and Image Theory**

In order to answer the above-mentioned questions about the drastic change in Turkish-Israeli relations, a foreign policy decision-making approach is necessary because individuals’ (and in this case Turkish and Israeli foreign policy decision makers’) interpretations of the world, their view of the Self and the Other, and the ways their preferences become aggregated in the decision-making process can shape what governments and institutions do in the foreign policy arena. As Snyder and his colleagues observed in 1954, “people matter in international affairs” and decision makers can affect the way that foreign policy problems are framed, the options that are selected, the choices that are made, and what gets implemented. They can also play an important role in changing the strategic culture or national roles of their state by altering public opinion or using public opinion to justify and rationalise their foreign policy actions.

Since the 1970s, many foreign policy analysts have especially focused on belief
systems or schemas⁶ and images.⁷ Belief systems or schemas are the “mental constructs that represent different clumps of knowledge about various facets of the environment for interpreting information.”⁸ They simplify and structure the external environment so as to make sense of the world and the situation at hand. The term image refers to “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe.”⁹

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Robert Abelson has observed that schemas and images of the world influence how an individual is going to act in the decision-making process.¹⁰ Such schemas and images become, in Abelson’s terms, the “possessions” of individuals and define who they are politically and what they value. These “possessions,” in return, influence what a person’s goals are likely to be in a particular situation by defining what will be salient to them; what people feel compelled to act upon; and how decisions can differ depending on the lenses through which leaders view the world. In this sense, it is misleading to assume that leaders experiencing the same political event have similar goals and will choose similar responses unless their definitions of the situation and beliefs are somewhat equivalent. In fact, Michael Brecher has said that decision makers do not respond directly to an objectively constituted environment, but rather think and act upon their image of the Other and/or representation of that environment.¹¹

Individuals are beset with limitations when monitoring and analysing highly complex physical and especially social environments.¹² On the one hand, they are constantly bombarded with so much information that it is difficult to absorb and process. On the other hand, crucial information may be missing or uncertain. What is more important is that individuals hold on to their values and beliefs. As a result, decision makers often have to go beyond the information given in order to interpret the world and make necessary judgments. Beliefs, schemas, images, analogies, metaphors, lessons from the past, and expertise provide them with short cuts for deciphering and classifying information to make it manageable.¹³ In effect, the numerous international and domestic factors that decision makers must consider in the decision-making process are channelled through these perceptual filters in
becoming part of “the” interpretation of what is happening.

In Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), belief systems and images become especially important when and how decision makers recognise that there is a problem that needs to be addressed, and how this problem is defined, represented, and/or framed. Framing is a selective representation of what may be going on in a given situation. This “cognitive agenda-setting” tames informational complexity by identifying the key dynamics and processes driving a (foreign policy) problem based on cognitive structures such as images and other types of heuristics. For example, when problems are critical to decision makers holding onto positions of power and influence, such perceptual biases may lead them to see threats where there are none and to become more dogmatic and rigid in their policy preferences. In this regard, the perception of the Other and belief systems become important in the interpretation and framing of a foreign policy problem. In fact, these factors may serve “as a ‘filter’, ‘prison’, ‘blind spot’, and rhetorical ‘weapon’”. Additionally, decision makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images, thereby influencing their interpretation of a problem.

One of the earliest research areas in foreign policy decision-making studies revolved around the systematic analysis of images. This research employed a cognitive approach to study general images held by political elites, especially images of the Self and Other. In the 1950s and 1960s, “within the broader scope of the belief-system-perception-decision-making relationship there [was] a heightened concern for the problem of stereotyped national images as a significant factor in the dynamics of the international system.” Since then, it has been established that “perceptions have their greatest policy impact when they are not isolated beliefs but are part of an integrated gestalt, or combined image, of another country.”

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The term image refers to “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe.” The earliest studies suggested that images can be partial or general and decision makers may or may not state these images consciously in their speeches. Scholars have examined the origins and consequences of the images that states hold of each other, particularly in the context of international conflict.
Nations are divided into two: the “good” and the “bad”, and “perceived hostility or friendliness and the perceived strength or weakness of a unit were central features of a subject’s image of that unit.”\textsuperscript{21} In other words, whether the Other is a friend or an enemy influences one’s perception of threat and how to respond to this perceived threat. If, for example, the Other is an enemy, chances are that one would feel threatened; if it is an ally, one would, on the contrary, feel safeguarded. If there is a way to order countries along a continuum from absolute ally to absolute enemy, there might be a linear relationship between one’s perception of a foreign country’s position on this continuum and the perceived harmfulness to one’s country of an action taken by that country. The higher a country’s ranking is in the continuum towards enemy, for instance, the more its action is likely to be perceived as threatening. Simply put, for many scholars of image theory, national images and how leaders define the situation have important implications for foreign policy decisions.

Later studies expanded on this work in two ways. First, a study by Ralph White (1966) found that in a conflict situation, “mirror images” become important because each party holds a diametrically opposite view of the Other: while they have a positive and benign image of their own, the Other usually has a negative and malicious image. Second, scholars have found that decision makers at times become closed to new information, making it difficult to modify an established view.\textsuperscript{25} Beer and his colleagues, for example, have observed that decision makers often have firmly established images they apply to Holsti, the hostile Other image of the enemy, held by Dulles at the time, was crucially important in explaining the US’s behaviour toward the Soviet Union because he was the “primary, if not the sole architect of American policy \textit{vis-à-vis} the Soviet bloc.”\textsuperscript{22} Dulles continually “resisted new information inconsistent with his image of the Soviet Union by engaging in a variety of psychological processes, discrediting the information, searching for other consistent information, reinterpreting the information, differentiating between different aspects of the information, engaging in wishful thinking, and refusing to think about it.”\textsuperscript{23} This study, in effect, confirmed the argument that “international conflict frequently is not between states, but rather between distorted images of states.”\textsuperscript{24}
others in the international arena, which lead them to see these others as allies or enemies. As they suggest, these “images mediate perception, interpretation, and behaviour; they are used as analogs, allowing extrapolation from past experiences to current and anticipated reality.”

The enemy image is limited to a perception of a threatening Other that is similar in capability and not very different in terms of cultural sophistication.

Richard K. Herrmann and Michael P. Fischerkeller provided well-placed criticism of the efforts to study images in International Relations’s (IR) and FPA’s heavy focus “on a single analytical construct…, the enemy image and the associated spiral model of interaction.” Instead, Herrmann and Fischerkeller proposed a broader theory of ideal images that included five different kinds of strategic perception, which, according to them, had more powerful analytical and explanatory leverage in explaining state action. Their theory, an “interactionist perspective”, was based on a combination of cognitive-psychological approaches to FPA coupled with IR theory.

In their attempt to formulate the five ideal types of national images, Herrmann and Fischerkeller focused on three important factors in one’s creation of the image of the Other: (1) the perceived threat and/or opportunity represented by that actor, (2) the perceived relative capability of the actor, and (3) the perceived culture of that actor. The first two components- the perceived threat/opportunity and relative capability of the Other- are directly related to Boulding’s and Holsti’s examination of both enemy/friend and strong/weak categories and are aligned with the established literature on image theory. The third component is a new component that draws from sociology and psychology. In addition to the enemy image, Herrmann and Fischerkeller appended four images- degenerate, colony, imperialist, and ally- “to add greater analytical diversity to cognitive perspectives.” Another study by Herrmann and his colleagues added yet another image- barbarian- and further argued for a formal theory of international images based on the perception of structural relations between two states. They argued that images are “a constellation of features that cluster together in meaningful ways” and are dictated by the interaction of the above-mentioned three factors.

As Table 1 below shows, the enemy image is limited to a perception of a threatening Other that is similar in capability and not very different in terms of cultural sophistication. The degenerate image represents the image of the Other that is similar in terms of capability but
is suffering from cultural decay. The degenerate can be exploited. The colony image represents a view of the Other that is weaker in terms of capability and culture and provides an opportunity for exploitation. The imperialist image is the opposite of the colony image in that it represents an image of the Other that is superior in capacity and presents an intense threat. The ally image corresponds to a perceived relationship in which the Other has similar cultural and power traits and that there can be a mutually beneficial relationship between the Self and the Other. Finally, in the barbarian image, the Other is perceived to present a threat and that it has inferior culture and superior capability.
**Table 1: Stereotypical Images of Target Actors by Description of Target’s Motivation, Capability, and Decision-Making Process (Adapted from Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Subject’s description of target’s motivation</th>
<th>Subject’s description of target’s capability</th>
<th>Subject’s description of target’s decision-making process (culture)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Motives are judged to be evil and unlimited; they can include a variety of imperial interests in economic, ideological, and communal domination</td>
<td>If aggressor is met with strong opposition, it will be exposed as a paper tiger; this domestic weakness overrides empirical evidence of substantial capability</td>
<td>Leaders are bound by a common cause and are able to plot and execute complex sinister plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>Ready to pursue mutually beneficial economic relations and to cooperate in peaceful joint efforts to protect and improve the global environment; motivated by altruism as much as by self-interest</td>
<td>Military is defensive in orientation and pursues governmental policies willingly; a large patriotic public is willing to make sacrifices to protect the nation's freedom and government’s institutions; popularity of the government enhances its capability</td>
<td>System is well managed and organised but tremendously complicated and sometimes slow-moving because of the many services it delivers to an advanced and complex economy and society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degenerate</td>
<td>Leaders are more concerned with preserving what they have than with a vision for the future and have accepted their fall from greatness, only wanting to make it less painful</td>
<td>Country is less strong than it might be; its available power instruments are discounted due to its unwillingness to actively defend itself or enter intro confontations</td>
<td>Decision making is confused and perhaps anarchic; country lacks focused leadership, organisation, and discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialist</td>
<td>Great cynicism about the altruistic ideology of the great power, including a strong perception of hypocrisy; imperial power is seen as interested in maintaining colony as a source of raw materials, a locus for investments, and a market for its manufactured products and culture; exploitation of one’s country is the imperial power’s goal</td>
<td>Any event that can be viewed as detrimental to the country's well-being is considered another component of the conspiracy controlled by the imperial power; the presence of a “hidden-hand” potential is granted through the willingness of a section of the native elite to enter into collaborative relationship with the imperial power in return for internal support</td>
<td>Imperial power's embassy staff and imperial agents under other cover are perceived to seek to exercise ultimate decision-making control; since contacts between imperial and native bureaucracies are less formalised and routinised, awareness of imperial power decisional diversity is slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony</td>
<td>Good forces: paternal leader; progressive modernised; nationalist; leader driven by interest of the people</td>
<td>Good forces: well-meaning children who need tutelage; can use equipment with supervision, but lack discipline and skill needed to operate and maintain infrastructure, technology, and weapons; hopelessly disorganised and ascriptive in organisation; children in need of leadership</td>
<td>Good forces: try hard but simply cannot manage national affairs in an efficient way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bad forces: radical fanatic demagogue; xenophobic racist extremist; evil dictator; puppet of great-power enemy</td>
<td>Bad forces: well organised into highly disciplined units that follow a strict top-down process of decision making</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table above provides a summary of the stereotypical images of target actors based on their motivation, capability, and decision-making process. The data is adapted from the work of Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) and is intended to illustrate the complexity of international relations and the importance of understanding cultural and decisional factors that influence perceptions and actions.
There are some hypothesised relationships between these ideal-typical images and strategic choices as Table 2 below illustrates. Certainly, these images are the ideal types, and thus they represent less complex images of the Other. In reality, when the prevailing imagery of the Other is more complex, there will be more complex strategies associated with foreign policy choices. Still though, these ideal types and the hypothesised strategic choices are important in determining what foreign policy choices are likely to be considered if the complex imagery resembles to one of the ideal-types of images.

### Table 2: Hypothesised Relationships between these Ideal-Typical Images and Strategic Choices
*(Adapted from: Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Foreign policy strategy that follows from strategic judgments</th>
<th>Main goals of the strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>Deter; protect and shield; build major alliance system, protect geopolitical assets from target; protect credibility as a major power/attractive ally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally</td>
<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
<td>Enhance combined capability and mutual confidence in common action; enhance third-party contribution to common cause; reduce third-party threats that pre-occupy target’s capability; reduce number of power instruments and enhance positive resource contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degenerate</td>
<td>Revisionism</td>
<td>Rollback and deter; build major alliance system; protect geopolitical assets and attract new alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialist</td>
<td>Independent fortress</td>
<td>Reduce target control; deter target intervention or compel its exit; gain support against target; reduce target’s role in region; reduce target’s access to resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony</td>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Ensure existence of cooperative client regime in target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of these theoretical claims were tested in three different experiments. These experimental studies focused on (1) the definition of the sub-components of each image, (2) spelling out the relationship among the components, and (3) establishing the relationship between these images, emotional and affective feelings, and policy choice. Their findings strongly supported the
claims that (1) four of the six images—ally, enemy, colony and imperial—have persistent sub-parts as shown in Table 1; (2) there is a “strong association between affect and image”; and (3) “images of other actors … shape perceived interests in at least two ways. First, an image of an enemy can create instrumental needs such as allies and colonies… Second, and perhaps more important, core values do not directly lead to a policy choice but must be put into a context [emphasis added].”  

More recent studies have consistently found that images affect strategic decisions in systematic ways. For example, Herrmann and Keller show in their 2004 study that although attitudes toward trade and global commerce have become an important new ideational fault-line (or perceptual factor) in international relations with implications on foreign policy choices, “American elites’ perception that a country harbors hostile intentions and/or is nondemocratic (particularly if both elements are present) generally leads to an increased willingness to use force and to contain the target state, along with a decreased preference for engagement strategies.”  

Similarly, the results from an investigation of Lebanese images of the United States lend support to image theory predictions regarding the specific patterns of international relations perceptions that lead to specific international images. Alexander and her colleagues found that Lebanese participants in the experiment tended to perceive the United States as primarily having relatively superior power, inferior cultural status, and incompatible goals, and the strongest image they had of the United States was the barbarian image. Moreover, when these scholars held two of the structural perceptions—high power and goal incompatibility—constant and examined the relationship between status perceptions and endorsement of the barbarian image, they found that perceptions of lower cultural status of the United States were associated with stronger endorsement of the barbarian image.  

Most recently, while attempting to assess the internal validity of image theory in explaining foreign policy behaviour, Rhezeda Bilali also extended the image theory by examining the role of emotions and the strength of in-group identifications in informing an individual’s understanding of international images. In her examination of the interrelationships in the theory components within the
context of Turkish-US relations, Bilali found that while hostility is strongly associated with both the imperialist and the barbarian image, trust is the only emotion associated with the ally image. Another important finding is that different types of in-group identifications such as national versus religious identification corresponded to different images of the Other. Bilali demonstrated that for whom national identity is the main identity-marker, the United States represented an imperial power, whereas for whom religious identity was more important, the United States is viewed as a barbarian. The results from the above-mentioned studies offer important empirical support for the notion that a constellation of interrelated perceptions, or images, are central for generating specific foreign policy behaviour towards the Other.

**Turkish-Israeli Relations**

As mentioned earlier, the tepid relationship between Turkey and Israel following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 began to improve in the 1990s, and intensified significantly between 1996 and 2002. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise the State of Israel, less than a year after its proclamation, and for decades remained the only Muslim state to have diplomatic relations with it. However, the Turkish public and political leaders across the political spectrum always supported the Palestinian cause, which meant that the two countries did not really have any meaningful relationship. The minimal relationship between Turkey and Israel hit its lowest level in 1982 during the Cold War when Israeli tactics used in the 1982 Lebanese War and the Israeli massacres in two Palestinian refugee camps on the Lebanese-Israeli border created public outrage in Turkey.35

It was only after the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference that Turkey upgraded relations with Israel to full ambassadorial status. The 1991 Gulf War and Turkey’s alliance with the US-led coalition against Iraq amplified Turkey’s view of Israel as an ally and a strategic partner. Israel gained new meaning in the eyes of the Turkish security establishment in a period when many European countries questioned the value of Turkey’s military and strategic alliance in the post-Cold War environment. The real intensification of relations started after the signing of the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1993. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin visited Israel in November of the same year, an unprecedented visit at that level. Turkey and Israel signed three agreements over the next year, dealing with security cooperation, combating terrorism, and on agricultural projects in Central Asia.36 More importantly, the Turkish military initiated and signed the first military training agreement between
Turkey and Israel in February 1996. The agreement called for joint training of Turkish and Israeli aircraft pilots, intelligence sharing to a “certain degree”, and permitted Israeli air force jets to fly in Turkish air space.

The Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership of the 1990s was considered to be a relationship of “status quo powers” who were concerned with maintaining the existing geopolitical conditions in the region and found similarities in each other’s political culture. For the Turks and the Israelis, both Turkey and Israel represented the only two democracies in a region filled with authoritarian and dictatorial political systems, both had Western orientation and did not necessarily trust their Arab neighbours, and finally, both had extra special relationships with the United States. The Turkish leadership also wanted to send a signal to the Europeans that Turkey was not “obsessed with Europe”, and that Turkey was ready and able to ally itself with other countries as a reliable political and military partner. Israel viewed its alliance with Turkey as a powerful deterrent against Arab countries—Syria in particular— in the region. The strategic partnership being created primarily by the Turkish military was also seen as an approach to keep the Islamist Welfare Party in check. In fact, the military had chosen to make Israel a central issue to showcase its differences with the Islamists and to challenge their authority after the Welfare Party came to office in July 1996.

Despite significant expansion and the deepening of Turkish-Israeli relations in the 1990s, Israel’s attack on the Jenin refugee camp in April 2002 created a visible crack in relations between the two countries. The bombings that inflicted massive civilian casualties among the Palestinians created a public outcry in Turkey and led Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to go as far to describe the Israeli attacks on the Jenin refugee camp as “genocide.”

Turkish-Israeli relations ebbed and flowed from November 2002, when the Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkey, until December 2008, when Israel started a three-week offensive in the Gaza Strip. The start of the Iraqi War in 2003 and increasing anti-American feelings in Turkey were also important in fuelling criticism against Israel as the Israeli leadership voiced their support for the Iraqi War as one of the main regional allies of the United States. Nonetheless, governments in both countries maintained their cooperation. For example, while Israel did react rather moderately when the Turkish government launched a number of foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East, including an invitation to Hamas leadership to pay an official visit to Turkey following the latter’s victories in the local elections of 2005 and in the parliamentary legislative elections in
2006, the Turkish government reacted very cautiously to Israel’s attack on Hizbullah in 2006.40

Importantly, in addition to maintaining their security relations, the Israeli government accepted Turkey’s proposal to mediate in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Prime Minister Erdoğan, after a visit to Damascus in April 2008, announced Turkey’s mediating role in the initiation of proximity talks between Syria and Israel over the issue of the Golan Heights. Indirect talks between Syria and Israel began in May 2008 under the supervision of Turkish diplomats in Ankara. There were five rounds of talks between then and December 2008.41

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A major blow to Turkish-Israeli relations came when Israel started a three-week offensive in the Gaza Strip in December 2008. The Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip came as a surprise to the Turkish leadership because only days before the start of the operations, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was in Ankara, speaking with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and promising a peaceful approach to the Palestinian-Israeli problem. The offensive operation not only enraged but also humiliated the Turkish leadership, as they felt that they had been betrayed by the Israelis and that their efforts to help create peace between Israel and its neighbours were observably in vain. During a meeting of his ruling Justice and Development Party following the attacks, Prime Minister Erdoğan recalled that the Israeli Prime Minister had voiced firm determination for continuing direct talks between Israel and Syria, and said that “[the] operation, launched despite all of these facts, was also disrespectful to Turkey”.42 Noting the importance of confidence in international relations, Ali Babacan, the foreign minister at the time, suggested that the fact that Turkey was not consulted about the operation in a timely manner shook Turkey’s confidence in Israel and that Turkey decided to halt its efforts to mediate between Israel and Syria.43

The “Davos incident” in January 2009 further deteriorated relations between Israel and Turkey. This incident, which took place at a panel discussion on the Israeli military operation into the Gaza Strip at the World Economic Forum in Davos, was “the peak of a month of strong rhetoric from Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against Israel.”44 At the panel, Erdoğan blamed Israel for the Gaza violence, and Israeli President Shimon Peres defended his
country’s policy for security reasons. The discussion came to a breaking point, however, when the moderator first refused to allow Prime Minister Erdoğan to reply and then tried to repeatedly stop him after the Prime Minister began his emotionally charged response to President Shimon Peres, in which Erdoğan did not hesitate to blame the Israeli leadership for “knowing well how to kill.” After repeated interventions by the moderator, Prime Minister Erdoğan walked off the stage complaining that he was given much less time to speak than the Israeli president and accusing the panel moderator of not allowing him to speak.

If relations between Turkey and Israel reached a historic low point following the “Davos incident,” it was the “Mavi Marmara (or “the Flotilla”) incident” on 31 May 2010 that brought the two parties to a major crisis point. A six-ship flotilla organised by the pro-Palestinian Free Gaza Movement and the pro-Hamas Turkish Humanitarian Relief Fund to deliver humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and to break Israel’s blockade of the territory was intercepted by Israeli special forces in international waters. While the special forces took control of five of the ships without much resistance or use of violence, a confrontation on board the Turkish vessel Mavi Marmara resulted in the killing of eight Turks and one Turkish-American citizen. In addition, more than 20 passengers were injured. Israel considered its actions to be legitimate self-defence. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu suggested that “Had the blockade been breached, this flotilla would have been followed by dozens, by hundreds of ships. The amount of weapons that can be transported aboard a ship is totally different from what we saw get through the tunnels (beneath the Gaza-Egypt border). Hundreds of missiles and rockets, and an innumerable number of weapons can be smuggled aboard a ship.”

Turkey, on the other hand, considered the Israeli actions to be unjustifiable and in contravention of international law. The Turkish leadership called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, on which it held a non-permanent seat at the time, on the very same day of the incident. During the Security Council session, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu called Israel’s actions “banditry and piracy... murder conducted by a state... and barbarism” and charged that “Israel has once again clearly demonstrated that it does not value human lives and peaceful initiatives through targeting innocent civilians.” Prime Minister Erdoğan described Israel’s actions as a “bloody massacre.” In his speech to his party’s parliamentary group, which was broadcasted live by 25 foreign networks while simultaneously translated into Arabic and English, Erdoğan once again
condemned the Israeli attacks, accused Israel of state terrorism and demanded the lifting of the Gaza blockade, and recalled the Turkish ambassador from Tel Aviv. He reiterated his earlier warning to Israel: “Turkey’s hostility is as strong as its friendship is valuable. Losing Turkey’s friendship is in itself a big price to pay.”

Davutoğlu demanded an international inquiry under the supervision of the United Nations with the participation of Turkey and Israel.

On 13 June, mainly in response to international calls for an investigation of the incident, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the establishment of a special, independent public commission to inquire into the events of 31 May. However, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu instantaneously declared that any report by this commission was unacceptable because “the crime was committed in international waters, not in Israel’s territorial waters.” In a way to show Turkey’s distrust toward an Israeli-established commission, Davutoğlu demanded an international inquiry under the supervision of the United Nations with the participation of Turkey and Israel. The Turkish leadership also demanded a formal apology from Israel for the killing of nine civilians, as well as for compensation for the relatives of the victims. Prime Minister Erdoğan added that such an apology would be a condition to continued Turkish mediation efforts in any future peace talks between Israel and Syria. In an interview with Al Jazeera, the Prime Minister responded to a question about the “flotilla incident” by suggesting that it was Turkey’s “grandeur and patience” that prevented it from going to war with Israel.

Although another major crisis was avoided, Turkish-Israeli relations were periodically tension-ridden until the publication of the oft-postponed Palmer Report. The report, which was first leaked before being made public in September 2011, called the commandos’ action on the Turkish ship excessive and unreasonable, condemned the loss of life as unacceptable, and found Israel’s treatment of passengers on the ship abusive. However, the report critically concluded that Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip was legitimate and that it had to be enforced consistently to be effective. The Israeli leadership immediately interpreted the document to be legitimising the Israeli right of self-defence. On the other hand, the Turkish leadership declared it “null and void,” expelled the Israeli ambassador and senior Israeli diplomats in response to Israel’s refusal to apologise.
for the incident, suspended military agreements with Israel, and promised to take measures to ensure freedom of navigation in the eastern Mediterranean, including providing Turkish warships to escort new flotillas to Gaza. The Turkish leadership also announced (but has, to this day, yet to execute) that it would challenge Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip at the International Court of Justice at The Hague.51 Expressing that Turkey always represented an understanding of peace and not conflict, justice and not oppression, Davutoğlu stated “therefore, we have displayed our reaction to the inhumane attacks in Gaza, just as we raised our voices against the massacres in Bosnia and Kosovo.”52

Images, once formed, are hard to change, and when they do change, the change does not always happen in a predictable way.

Since mid-September 2011 a new problem, this time over gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean, has emerged between the two countries. Partly as a way to block the Greek Cypriots from having the precedent of an exclusive economic zone in which they could drill for gas to the detriment of the Turkish Cypriots, partly as a response to the Israeli interception of Mavi Marmara in 2010 and the ensuing tension between the two countries, and partly as a measure to avoid Israel’s becoming a natural gas exporter, Turkey has vigorously objected to Israel’s desire to drill in its exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean Sea. Israel, on the other hand, signed a cooperation agreement with the Greek Cypriot leaders and started drilling for oil and gas despite Turkey’s opposition.

Image Theory and Turkish-Israeli Relations

What do the above-mentioned events between Turkey and Israel, especially those since December of 2008, signify? To what extent is the Turkish-Israeli link that was once considered to be an important strategic partnership in the Middle East irremediably broken? And finally, what are the theoretical and policy implications of these changes on the image theory and the future of Turkish-Israeli relations, respectively?

The two quick and straightforward conclusion one can give from the review of the literature on image theory and the events between Turkey and Israel in the past four years suggest are that, first, the ideal image types provide less help than they did before in examining Turkish and Israeli foreign policies vis-à-vis each other, and second, Turkish and Israeli foreign policy actions vis-a-vis each other clearly illustrate that neither Turkey nor Israel sees the other side as an ally, or a strategic partner, anymore.
The scholarship on image theory has shown that images, once formed, are hard to change, and when they do change, the change does not always happen in a predictable way. In one of the most important studies Charles Osgood suggested that the enemy image of the Other can change when the interactive relationship between the parties promotes gradual reciprocal reduction in tension (GRIT). According to Osgood, the side that initiates a reduction in tension remains uncertain as to the other side’s intentions. Therefore, it protects its basic security but takes an initial de-escalatory move in a peripheral area. Expecting the other side to be suspicious, the first side may make several moves of this type in hopes of inducing reciprocation. When mistrust is high and neither party is willing to make multiple positive initiatives, GRIT is likely to fail. However, when successful or when repeated actions of a party is inconsistent with the expectations that a pre-existing image generates, policy makers start to re-think the existing image. A change in the image of the Other may also be caused by changes in the domestic setting of a country. In return, the change brings with it a realigning of national interests and priorities, as well as foreign policy goals and objectives.

I contend that although the ally image of the Other has yet to be replaced completely by another image in either Turkey or Israel, something which needs to be studied more empirically in the future, a significant shift in the image of the Other is currently underway in both countries. As discussed in detail above, the scholarship on image theory has established that there are three important factors in one’s image of the Other: (1) the perceived threat and/or opportunity represented by that actor, (2) the perceived relative capability of the actor, and (3) the perceived culture of that actor. Based on these three factors and Turkish-Israeli interactions especially since 2008, I tentatively suggest that whereas the Israeli image of Turkey is increasingly that of a frenemy, a partner who is simultaneously a rival and a friend in the region, Turkey considers Israel more and more as an inconvenient/untrustworthy partner.
As illustrated in Table 3, I argue that Israel’s image of Turkey as a frenemy represents a perceived relationship in which Turkey has similar power traits and inferior culture. Moreover, the Israeli perception is that Turkey presents a threat to Israel’s security in the Middle East. For example, in a speech dedicated mostly to the Iranian threat and the current civil unrest in Arab states, Major General Amir Eshel, head of the Israeli Defence Force’s Plans and Policy Directorate, also mentioned Turkey as a point of concern: “We do not see [Turkey] as radical…but where it is heading is a big question.” During a presentation at Herzliya, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rafi Barak also noted Turkey’s ambitions towards becoming a regional superpower and suggested that “we [in the Israeli government] are looking at this closely.” Moreover, for the first time in its history, Turkey’s position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Foreign policy challenge</th>
<th>CULTURE</th>
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<td>(Imperialist)</td>
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<td>CAPABILITY</td>
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<td><strong>MUTUAL GAIN</strong></td>
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<td>Inferior</td>
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one-sided, demanding that Israel take steps to ease the blockade of Gaza or risk unspecified “consequences.”

Despite questions about Turkey’s warmer relations with the Arab Middle East and its increasing foreign policy assertiveness Israel still favours at least friendly relations with Turkey, especially in a volatile time in the region. The international community’s pressure on Iran has not yielded any positive results regarding the issue of Iranian nuclearisation, and violent revolutionary unrest has created an environment with the future unclear and Islamist groups such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood gaining from instability. Some Israeli officials have warned against further deterioration in Israeli-Turkish relations such as, for example, when Turkey excluded Israel from a joint military exercise due to Israel’s offensive against Hamas in Gaza in December 2009. Furthermore, the Israeli leadership welcomes Turkey’s mediation in resolving its problems with certain Arab countries and organisations. For example, most recently in October 2011 Turkey was directly and indirectly involved in brokering a deal between Israel and Hamas in which the Israeli soldier Gilat Shalit, who had been held captive by Hamas for five years, was freed in exchange for more than a thousand Palestinians held in Israeli prisons.

Turkey’s image of Israel as an inconvenient/untrustworthy partner represents a perceived relationship in which Israel has similar power and inferior cultural traits. Israel, irrespective of its small size, has a very powerful military. Moreover, despite the “policy of opaqueness” pursued by the Israeli state, Israel is known to have nuclear weapons capability. The rise of right-wing parties in Israel and an increasing hawkishness on the Israeli-Palestinian issue also seem to be a key factor in Turkey’s changing perception of Israel. In his September 2011 visit to Egypt as part of his North Africa tour, Erdoğan stated in reference to Israel that “states, just like individuals, have to pay the price for murders and for acts of terrorism they have committed so that we can live in a more just world,” and reiterated Turkey’s rejection of the legality of the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. It is also telling that a Turkish television drama, *The Valley of the Wolves*, was clearly able to depict Israeli intelligence agents and diplomats as murderous and cruel in one of its most-watched episodes. Unlike before, Israel seems no longer part of the secularist-Islamist competition in Turkish politics today.

It is very likely that both countries will try to “contain” each other by using different foreign policy instruments.

Nevertheless, the principles of “zero-problem foreign policy” and “pro-active and pre-emptive peace diplomacy” es-
pounced and promoted by the Turkish leadership favours Turkey and Israel continuing to have a mutually beneficial relationship. In other words, despite the bitter rhetoric used against Israel as illustrated above, the Israeli image that is becoming predominant in Turkey is filtered through lenses that are influenced heavily by a desire to create a peaceful and stable regional order, with Turkey having regional power status, based on principles of cooperative security, economic interdependence and good-neighbourly relations, the main pillars of the “strategic depth” doctrine in Turkish foreign policy.

Conclusion

There are several implications of these changing images of the foreign policies of both Turkey and Israel. First and foremost, Turkish-Israeli relations are headed for a tumultuous and less-than-friendly path in the foreseeable future, though Israel and Turkey have acknowledged their mutual need to cooperate. Second, it is very likely that both countries will try to “contain” each other by using different foreign policy instruments. For example, Israel may further increase its relations with the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq in an attempt to build an alliance and to prevent future Turkish influence in the area. Similarly, Turkey could prefer to have closer relations with Egypt under a possible leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. In other words, both countries are likely to pursue policies that would help them protect geopolitical assets and attract new alliances, without provoking each other into an actual war.

This topic would benefit from future research providing an extensive content analysis of the leaders’ speeches, party positions, and government programmes in both Turkey and Israel, as well as in-depth understanding of the foreign policy actions each country has taken towards each other and other political actors in international relations to examine (1) whether or not the suggested change in the image of the Other in both Turkey and Israel vis-à-vis each other is in fact taking place, (2) whether or not the images of frenemy and inconvenient/untrustworthy partner are indeed relevant in analysing the future of Turkish-Israeli relations, and finally, (3) if yes, what this all means for Turkish-Israeli relations in particular, and for Middle East politics in general.
Endnotes


5 Herbert Simon brilliantly showed that human beings can have only bounded rationality, and the “satisficing man” (for example, the foreign policy decision maker) who has this “bounded rationality” is very much a social-psychological creature operating under conditions of time constraints, ill-defined goals, and uncertain conditions, see, Herbert Simon, “Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment”, *Psychological Review*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (March 1956), pp. 129-138.


19 In particular, Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society*; Holsti, “The Belief System and National Images”.


24 Wright’s (1957), quoted in Holsti, “The Belief System and National Images”, p. 244.


29 Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi, “Images in International Relations”, pp. 403-433.

30 Ibid., p. 423.
31 Ibid.
35 Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie”; Altunışık, “The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era”.
36 Sever, “Turkey and the Syrian-Israeli Peace Talks in the 1990s”.
39 Altunışık, “The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era”.
43 Ibid.
45 The “low-chair incident” of January 2010 did not reach a crisis point as Israel apologised to Turkey following the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dani Ayalon’s insult to Turkey’s ambassador to Israel by having him sit in a lower chair than his and pointing this to the press during the photo session.


49 “Turkey FM Says Ankara Entitled to Review Ties with Israel”, Anatolia, 14 June 2010; BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Quoted in Migdalovitz, “Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath”.


53 Charles Osgood, An Alternative To War or Surrender, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1962.

54 The term “frenemy” was used to describe the changing US-Turkish relations by Steven Cook in his opinion piece, “How Do You Say ‘Frenemy’ in Turkish?”, Foreign Policy, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/01/how_do_you_say_frenemy_in_Turkish [last visited 18 June 2012].


56 “Barak Warns Against Further Harming Israel-Turkey Relations”, Haaretz, 12 October 2009.

57 Gökhan Bacık, “Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April- June 2009), pp. 31-41.


59 Hasan Kösebalaban, “The Turkish-Israeli Relations: What is its Strategic Significance?”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 2010), pp. 36–50.

60 In a recent publication, Şaban Kardaş also contends that the relations between Turkey and Israel are headed in a rocky path. See, Şaban Kardaş, “Türk-İsrail Krizi: Moral Politikadan Çatışmaya”, Görüş, Vol. 70 (October 2011), pp. 12-17.