The International Human Rights Movement - A History

By Aryeh Neier

The history of international human rights law and the human rights movement has been an attractive topic for many authors writing in this field. Aryeh Neier's recent publication, *The International Human Rights Movement – A History*, stands out from the others, largely due to his background. Having been trained as a lawyer in America, Neier worked for many years as an executive director of Human Rights Watch. He was also the president of the Open Society Foundation and the national director of the American Civil Liberties Union. In addition to his administrative tasks, he teaches human rights at leading universities. His approach to the field utilizes a combination of legal knowledge and substantial experience.

The first chapter sets out the underlying theme of the book: “the driving force behind the protection of human rights worldwide, today and for roughly the past thirty-five years, has been the nongovernmental human rights movement” (p. 7). The author examines the campaigns of nongovernmental organizations and human rights activists for the adoption of major treaties, such as the 1997 Treaty to Ban Landmines and the 1998 Rome Statute. Throughout the book the author addresses the accomplishments of the human rights movement up until now, the issues at present, and the challenges in the upcoming years.

The author's personal observations are one of the book's strengths, particularly concerning the relationships between dominant countries during the Cold War. His informative depiction of the history of the human rights movement demonstrates that although many were the victims of persecution, the Cold War magnified the importance of citizen efforts to promote human rights.

The book has a total of 13 chapters, two of which them center on the leading human rights organizations in the world: Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Neier argues that the Cold War context played a crucial role in the establishment of Amnesty International in 1961. Great credit is given to Amnesty International due to its capacity to survive through the help of its supporters and its impact on human
rights policies globally. As the founder of Human Rights Watch in the 1970s, the author notes that the new organization came into being because of the weak presence of Amnesty International in the United States, and it filled the gap of Amnesty’s own narrow mandate in the field. Many other human rights organizations operating worldwide are discussed in another chapter. Neier lists only a few countries (including North Korea, Burma, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan) where authorities do not tolerate the emergence of human rights organizations.

It is not only nongovernmental organizations that have pushed states to promote and protect human rights, but also international organizations and national and supranational judiciaries. To underline this fact, Neier pinpoints the influence of the European Union on human rights practices in countries that aspire to full membership. As the author notes, the rulings of the American Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have played an important role in the application of human rights standards at the local level.

The establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court to prosecute and punish those accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide is covered in detail in the section “Accountability”. The author once more shares his personal experience concerning the efforts of some states to undermine the legitimacy and the authority of the International Criminal Court. Even though he is a strong defendant of the International Criminal Court, he expresses doubts about its future capability to carry-out investigations against the leaders of powerful countries.

Neier’s book is about the tireless history of the human rights movement. The author carefully analyzes the role the movement has played in protecting the basic human rights of those accused of terror crimes in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the significant role of human rights activists during the Arab revolutions. Moreover, in the final pages of the book, the author points out future challenges that the movement will face in the coming decades.

All in all, one should not assume that the book is only about the development of the international human rights movement. Neier takes the opportunity to use his legal knowledge to comment on certain disputed concepts and subjects in international human rights law, such as “self-determination”, “independence”, “universal jurisdiction”, “humanitarian intervention”, “the responsibility to protect”, “preventive detention”, “enforcing second generation rights
by courts”, “the connection between developments and rights”, “suspending habeas corpus when countering terrorism”, and “the application of international humanitarian law to asymmetric conflicts”.

I would like to conclude with my sole critical remark, which is that, although the title suggests that the book is about the international human rights movement, more than half of the information provided in each chapter concerns developments that took place in the United States. Even a quick look at the index pages demonstrates that the majority of the names of individuals, institutions, and cases that are listed have American affiliation. Nevertheless, this in no way undercuts the value of the work in contributing to the field of human rights.

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Küyerel Dönüşümler: Küreselleşme, Zihniyet, Siyaset (Glocal Transformations: Globalisation, Mentality, Politics)


Globalisation has become the central point of world politics. Developments in technology and communication have made it easier and faster for people to be in contact with each other and to engage in cultural interaction. Globalisation is often described as the interaction of people living in different regions of the world in the context of a social, economic and cultural circulation of goods, labour and services. It can thus be argued that the globalisation process has started to affect every field. However, the concept of globalisation has become cloudy because it has been used as an explanatory tool for incongruous processes. Conversely, academia has tried to define the globalisation process in order to prevent the concept from being used to explain everything. This book, Küyerel Dönüşümler: Küreselleşme, Zihniyet, Siyaset (Glocal Transformations: Globalisation, Mentality, Politics), edited by Nurullah Ardiç and Sevinç
Alkan Özcan, develops new viewpoints on the globalisation process with an emphasis on its multi-dimensionality. The book analyses not only the effects of the globalisation process on countries, sectors, groups and individuals, but also reactions and arguments against it.

The book takes the concept of “glocal” to examine the interaction between global processes and local dynamics. The book consists of nine chapters, each a separate article that originally came from the symposium entitled “Globalisation” that was held by the Foundation for the Sciences and Arts’ Center for Global Studies (KAM) in Istanbul in 2004.

In the first chapter, “Globalisation and the Crisis of Individual and Civilisation Crisis”, Ahmet Davutoğlu discusses globalisation from three perspectives—stoicism, cynicism and Epicureanism. Stoicism tries to legitimate the current international system by using the arguments of the “end of history”, “clash of civilisations” and “new world order”. Cynicism focuses on postmodern relativities, and Epicureanism looks to maximise individual pleasure instead of the normative happiness that is formulated as Mcworldism. In this context Davutoğlu calls for a new approach in the globalisation process which will connect globalosity and pluralism, inter-civilisational dialogue and intra-civilisational unity, metaphysics and moral happiness.

Kazım Baycar seeks to place globalisation in a historical frame in his chapter “To Globalise the History: Turkey’s Position in the Context of Discussion of the Ottoman Empire and the Nation-State”. He asks fundamental questions regarding globalisation: How do historians perceive the globalisation concept? When did globalisation start? What are the differences between current and past globalisation processes? And how can the Ottoman Empire’s history in the context of globalisation be dealt with? He identifies two approaches to investigate the globalisation process: the historical and the actual approaches. According to the historical approach, the globalisation process dates back to very early in time and has had distinct characteristics at different times. The actual approach on the other hand claims that globalisation has consisted of two waves. The first wave ran from the mid-19th century to the First World War, and the second wave emerged with neo-liberal politics in the 1970s and lasted until the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Although both waves involved the mobility of goods, services and labour, the actual approach seems to be more economics based in its handling of the globalisation process. Baycar examines Ottoman history in the context of these two approaches and emphasises the economic perspective in particular.
Nurullah Ardıç, in the next chapter, “Turkey’s Position in the context of Globalisation and Nation-State Discussions”, discusses the relationship between globalisation and the nation-state and Turkey’s position. Ardıç argues that globalisation has hindered the nation-state in some areas but in other areas it has strengthened it. According to Ardıç, Turkey has been affected by globalisation in social, economic, cultural and communication fields, and especially in the city of Istanbul.

Mehmet Fatih Aysan also claims that it is useless to ignore the demographic and social elements by exclusively focusing on the economic challenges of globalisation to the welfare state. Aysan, in his chapter “Globalisation, Crisis and Welfare State”, tells of health and other social security cuts and the problems that immigration poses on welfare states. In the globalisation process, these problems also reveal themselves in matters related to the state, the family and the market which will shape the future of welfare states.

Immigration is also one of the outcomes of globalisation, and Turkey is a country located in the immigration flows. Özge Aktaş analyses immigration and Turkey’s role in global immigration in his chapter “1960-2000 Global Immigration and Turkey’s Position in the Immigration Area”. Aktaş sees global immigration databases as fundamental sources for quantitative analysis, and in this chapter, she examines the links between the historical continuity and changes in global immigration during the years of 1960 and 2000. Yunus Kaya and Ekrem Karakoç in their chapters look to answer the question of “does globalisation raise anti-immigrant sentiments?” Their findings show that unemployment especially triggers anti-immigration sentiments.

Sevinç Alkan Özcan researches the cultural dimension of globalisation in the context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the chapter “Globalisation and Nationalism: The Former Soviet Area”, in which she examines the reform efforts of the Soviet Union and the nationalist movements. In the next chapter, “The Spectre of Subaltern Globalisation”, Imtiaz Ahmad gives details about “globalisation form below” and “inverse globalisation”. Ahmad focuses on transnational crime and the economics of the process. The internet is definitely the most important development of the 21st century as it facilitates the transmission of information and improves communication. Relying on this, Bünnyamin Atıcı examines the effects of the internet in international cooperation in the chapter entitled “Internet as an Effect Area of Transnational Actors”. The author emphasises that the internet has become a dominant element of international organisations such as the
UN, NATO, the EU, and Amnesty International.

Overall, the book presents useful viewpoints about globalisation in different fields. At the same time it gives new approaches in the study of the globalisation process. As such the book contributes to the existing literature and is therefore strongly recommended for readers and researchers.

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Türkiye’de Militarist Devlet Söylemi
(The Militarist State Discourse in Turkey)

By Ali Balci

Militarist State Discourse in Turkey by Ali Balci is a survey of the period between 1960 and 1983 in Turkey, a period which encompasses three military coups. Utilizing Michel Foucault's concept of discourse, Balci analyses the militaristic discourse that thoroughly dominated the state discourse between 1960 and 1983. The main argument of the study is that the militarist discourse dominated every sphere in Turkey, from the state apparatus to society and to the economy, at this time. Although the book can be read as part of the growing critical literature on civilian-military relations in today’s Turkey, it differs from other studies by situating the militaristic discourse at the centre of its analysis.

The first part of the book defines the term “militarism” and sets the global context where this militarism spread, namely during the Cold War. “Militarisation” and “militarism” are used interchangeably to denote the intervention of the armed forces in politics and the prevalent military-inspired practices in state institutions and society (pp. 20-1). Both terms are also accompanied by a “militarist discourse” which refers, rather ambiguously though, to a comprehensive set of discursive practices embodying the military effect(s) in politics and society. Therefore, Balci uses the term militarist discursive period (militarist söylemsel dönem) to refer to a specific time span.
in the political history of Turkey when militarism, militarisation, and militarist discourses were not challenged by any notable civic oppositional discourse. The book also challenges the existing analyses of military takeovers in Turkey which view them either as inevitable results of an evolutionary political process or historical characteristics of Turkish society. The author argues that the militarist discourse of the period can only be understood by looking at concomitant conditions of the time and their fusion in Turkey and the world (p. 11; pp. 33-41).

The rivalry between the US and Russia and its ramifications on global politics set the historical ground for the emergence and spread of militarist discourse all over the world. Examples of military takeovers from Third World countries provide evidence for the comprehensive effects of this rivalry in the Cold War era (pp. 19-32). Therefore, the militarist discourse prevailing in Turkey in this period is contextualised in the global context of the Cold War. And the increased power of the military is not independent of global power relations of the time. Especially, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and Turkey's entry in the NATO in 1952 were conducive to the proliferation and institutionalisation of the Turkish army in Turkish politics (p. 44). In this section of the book, an extensive body of literature is also surveyed that shows this relationship. For example, the book quotes some examples from other studies to reveal the direct involvement of US intelligence in the formation of paramilitary groups in Turkey against the so-called threat of Communism as it did in other NATO countries (p. 45).

In the second part, which is the main body of the book, Balcı provides a thorough account of the historical incidents that led to the toppling of the Democrat Party, Turkey's ruling party in the 1950s. This, indeed, is where the strengths and weaknesses of the book lie. In this section, Balcı argues that the period under question poses an inconspicuously distinct character from other periods of modern Turkey as all dissident voices were silenced and all aspects of political and social life were militarised. Yet, at the same time, the author concedes that the very conditions that led to this period were also inseparable from the previous conditions. In support of his argument, the author takes on board a considerable amount of literature and examples from various texts that are critically analysed.

The foundation of the National Security Council and the OYAK Bank (the bank of the Turkish armed forces) are analysed to emphasise the political and economic aspects of militarisation. The legal adjustments that intensified the silence imposed by the army, for example
by banning any criticism of the Turkish Armed Forces, are duly exemplified. More significantly, what Balcı brings to the fore consistently is that the deferential attitude of the political parties of the time did not only contribute to the legitimacy of the presence of militarism, but also exacerbated it with their hostile stances towards the Communist movements of the day. This argument is vital because it challenges the image of political parties as subordinate entities and puts them under scrutiny as active agents of this silent period, which Feroz Ahmad famously termed “democracy of political tutelage” (cited on p. 75). The silence that cuts across boundaries within the trajectories of different political groups in Turkey, the leftists, rightists and Islamists, amounts to the internalisation of the army's role as the protector of the country not only against foreign enemies but against the country itself (p. 56).

Balcı concludes that despite the fact that the predominance of the militarist discourse has diminished over time, it still remains a debilitating sub-category of the state discourse in Turkey. Without a doubt, this book is key to understanding today’s Turkish politics in which the remnants of this military discourse are deeply ingrained in all aspects of life. And more importantly, the author’s invariable emphasis on “silence” subtly illuminates the suppression imposed through the militarist discourse; however, this topic needs to be developed further as an analytical category.

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Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History

By Thomas Barfield

Since the war against the Taliban and the intervention in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the academic approach to studying the country has mainly centred on the fields of international politics and geostrategy studies, both of which have mainly looked at Afghanistan's role in the international system or its economic and strategic position. In a psychological environment shaped by the mainstream media’s strong views, a
reliable evaluation about Afghanistan has been limited, as evidenced by the proliferation of Orientalist articles. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, written by Thomas Barfield, however, has a different perspective with a robust argument that makes it easy to understand the circumstances which have brought modern Afghanistan into existence.

Barfield, as an archaeologist and anthropologist, firstly addresses the issue of culture for an in-depth comprehension of Afghan people and politics. He questions the unique aspects of Afghan politics and the common myths pertaining to the country’s political history. He challenges some deep-seated assessments attributed to Afghanistan, such as it being “ungovernable” or “the graveyard of empires”, which do not always correspond to the realities of Afghan history. He points out that stable governments have been established in Afghanistan, especially during the period starting from the Mongol invasion in the 13th century to the collapse of Safavid Dynasty in the 18th century, or during the Durrani Empire, which lasted from 1747 to the Saur revolution two centuries later (p. 51; p. 225). His analysis examines long-term trends with a more historical perspective irrespective of short-term perspectives or daily changes. Undoubtedly the numerous trips he has taken to the region since the 1970s and his 40 years of field experience have also played a role.

In his historical analysis on Afghanistan, Barfield analyses the tension between the *asabiya* (desert) and the *umran* (urban), and adapts it to Afghanistan brilliantly even though he is not a historian (pp. 82-84). The contribution of ibn Khaldun, whom he takes as a reference, in his comments that integrate the current conditions with a long-term historical perspective is clearly visible. It may be considered an appealing feature for Turkish readers. Additionally his approach, which stays clear of Orientalist clichés and focuses on the Turkish dynasties that mark the history of Afghanistan, offers a different perspective to Turkish readers and shows the deep-rooted ties between Turkey and Afghanistan, rediscovering the strong traditional character of Turkish politics and ruling.

While the tradition of Turkish rule in Afghanistan gradually disappeared after 1747 when the Pashtun-dominated dynasties took over, Barfield considers that development the embodiment of an unstable, non-permanent ruling attitude and an elusive political culture. This gives the impression that Barfield does not focus on Pashtun identity and policies in certain parts of the book. He also does not adequately use sources published in local languages which may
be considered a shortcoming in his study. But for all that his book is a stimulating introduction for many people who are interested in Afghanistan's history and political culture due to the book's clear writing, interesting and thought-provoking examples and avoidance of clichés.

As he questions the clichés about Afghanistan Barfield firstly addresses the argument that “the country has never been occupied” and brings that into question, stating that Afghanistan was seized by many conquerors, including Chinggis Khan and Alexander the Great. Analysing the successful strategy which has resulted in Afghanistan being called “the graveyard of empires”, Barfield argues that Afghanistan can be occupied but that it reacts to invaders with a strong “autoimmune disorder” and even if it were occupied it would make the country ungovernable. And he adds that this strategy, which functions efficiently against external conquerors, would harm the country when directed towards the Afghan people themselves as it is today (p. 255). However, the author states that despite a quite fragmented political-social identity which consists of diverse ethnic and religious groups, what secures the integrity of Afghanistan and the legitimacy of the government are the Afghan people's faith and traditions, and that civil war is considered fitna (sedition) in the country, and therefore the rulers who have taken the lead in Afghanistan could build up their legitimacy easily. He emphasises that the Afghan people would even prefer a poor ruler instead of fitna. According to Barfield “the students of Western political science would note that this line of reasoning closely parallels that of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, in which he justified the need for absolute rulers” (pp. 73-74).

Furthermore, in pointing out that Afghanistan is a country full of paradoxes Barfield mentions that the Afghan people have learned how to turn any such paradox into an advantage. Commenting that it is necessary to know the strategies pursued by those dynasties that have successfully ruled Afghanistan, the author compares the attitudes pertaining to those regimes with the current Western perspective. Barfield compares Afghanistan to cheese, arguing that there are different perception about cheese in the East and West. He says that Westerners perceive Afghanistan as a quite smooth and standard American cheese, whereas the former Eastern dynasties, which had succeeded in ruling Afghanistan, especially the Turko-Persian ruling tradition, perceived the country as Swiss cheese with holes on it; in other words those regimes used to take for granted any gap where it was not possible to dominate in ruling the country. He suggests that the Turkish and Persian rulers were successful because they had
never thought of dominating the entire country except for certain trade routes and some important strategic corridors, or worried themselves about filling in every gap or directly ruling every area. The message he gives is as follows: “Ignore the holes, rule the cheese” (pp. 67-70). He argues that the Turko-Persian ruling pattern was more effective as such flexibility ensured that they governed by adopting different rules for different regions rather than trying to impose the same rules and laws on every region. He mentions a similar pattern was implemented in the region by the British who did not try to exercise control beyond the Hindu Kush Mountains even during the great imperial expansion in the Victorian period. According to Barfield the fact that it is not possible to capture and govern a large part of Afghanistan must be recognised.

Suggesting that contemporary Afghan history starts with the Durranis who established Pashtun dominance in 1747, the author underlines that the Pashtuns have long considered themselves a privileged ethnic group for this reason. However, the author argues that Afghanistan had been ruled by Turks, Mongolians or Persians for hundreds of years and there was more stable periods in the country prior to 1747 and the rise of the Pashtun dominance. Highlighting the strong historical ties between Afghanistan and the Central Asia, the author states that in this context the connection between Pakistan and Afghanistan was established on the basis of a common Pashtun identity, but that this Pashtun predominance remains insufficient to understanding the country on its own. Giving detailed information about the ethnic groups in Afghanistan (pp. 23-31), Barfield underlines that only the Turkish dynasties and the hierarchical Turko-Mongolian ruling traditions have demonstrated the capability of joining together the different tribes in a stable manner in the past. He says that such dynasties created an inherited hierarchy once established and the ruler would be faced with no representational or legitimacy issues despite the egalitarian lineage system in Bedouin or Pashtun tribes where each tribe could become the leader through power or influence rather than a certain descent. He argues that this egalitarian system is a quite unstable and troublesome system as the leader is forced to persuade the masses every day to make them follow him and everyone steps up as a chief with a desire to become the leader (pp. 78-82). He argues that the reason the Pashtun dynasties ruled over Afghanistan successfully for 230 years, from 1740 to 1978, was thanks to the Turko-Mongolian system, and that the Durranis founded a royal dynasty rather than a ruling pattern based upon an egalitarian assembly (Loja Jirga) after they had come into power in the early
18th century. He emphasises that after this system was removed by non-royalist communists in 1978, stability could never be regained and it was not possible to eliminate the disorder resulting from Pashtuns’ traditional egalitarian system.

Remarking that Afghanistan is not a failed nation even if it is a failed state, Barfield addresses this issue in chapter five, saying there are four good reasons for this. Firstly, “the persistence of the old central Asian view of political order that never linked ethnicity with nationalism”. Secondly, “each ethnic group in Afghanistan felt secure enough in its own region to cooperate with others as partners at the national level”. Thirdly, “the negative consequences of disunion outweighed internal frictions” and fourthly, “Afghans had few illusions about the nature of state politics, and the compromises necessary to engage in them” (pp. 277-280). Today different groups in Afghanistan define the central government as “an arranged marriage, not a love match”.

According to Barfield in addition to those components which would facilitate the transformation process in Afghanistan the experiences that the Afghan people have had as refugees in recent history has given them diverse expectations, resulting in a country which is more integrated with the “Turko-Persian” identity thanks to the new access routes opening to the Central Asia. Furthermore, while Afghanistan has regained its geopolitical importance thanks to the strategic mineral resources that exist in the country. Although the transformation process is slow, Afghanistan will not disintegrate over ethnic identities like Yugoslavia (p. 252; p. 278). In this context Barfield’s book can be considered as an interesting work about the latest developments and which questions Western clichés as well as a reminder of the shared ties between Turkey and Afghanistan. Additionally Barfield’s comments on developments, which have a distinct humanitarian sensitivity as a result of him being an academic who has spent many years in the region, are praiseworthy.

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There have been a number of volumes published in the last six months regarding world politics and heralding a multi-polar global order, such as Friedman and Mandelbaum’s *It Used to be Us: How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back* (2011) and Joseph Nye’s *The Future of Power* (2011). The two volumes under review here, by Charles Kupchan (of the Council on Foreign Relations and a veteran of the Clinton White House) and Robert Kagan (senior fellow in Brookings Institute and top foreign policy advisor to Governor Mitt Romney), continue this theme. These are both works that claim to be cool-headed diagnoses, offering advice for the American government before 2012 elections.

In the past year the two authors have been duelling in US foreign policy journals articles where Kupchan has referred to Kagan as a neo-con (though not by name). The war of pens between Kupchan and Kagan was intensified when President Obama told the foreign policy press that his thinking has been influenced by Kagan’s latest book. It is not often that a president praises his chief rival’s foreign policy advisor just before an election.

Robert Kagan contends in the first chapter of *The World that America Made* that the US’s primacy will remain robust, as long as it remains committed to its international military commitments and its share of global economic output remains unchanged. In the following chapters, Kagan argues that the American order is a fusion of the important and the desirable features of the current international world order. Kagan remarks that some of the
Kagan in his final chapter concludes that the US cannot afford to be the “Greta Garbo” of nations, referring to the American self-perception of being the reluctant sheriff who only goes to war when someone else calls them to. While Kagan points out the inaccuracies of this self-perception, he also states that neither the US nor the rest of the world could afford to have American power recede. Kagan does not acknowledge any potential effects of a possible decline in power in the pillars of US power, Germany and the EU. And he is ready to gloss over the consequences of the West’s diminishing clout because he thinks that most emerging nations will cast their lot in with the United States rather than challenge American hegemony. “Only the growth of China’s economy,” he writes, “can be said to have implications for American power in the future” (pp. 119-126). Kagan reassures Americans that even rising powers, such as China, will not attempt to challenge the US’s hegemony and will align nicely with the US in important security and defence issues. Moreover, the US will only benefit from the strength of its new allies.

Unlike Kagan and the neoconservative brain trust to which he belongs, Charles Kupchan’s volume neither celebrates nor bemoans the decline of the US’s superpower status as he assesses the possibilities for power sharing and co-existence. He states that in a multi-polar
world there will be striking diversity and that alternative conceptions of domestic and international order will compete and co-exist on the global stage. Kupchan advises that before long, the US should start focusing on managing the transition (p. 183).

Kupchan claims to peer from the lens of the *longue durée* (Ferdinand Braudel); however, he really does not have a long-term view in his book. In chapters one and two, Kupchan explains with broad strokes the rise and fall of the West as a product of its circumstances, looking at its readiness to countenance change and welcome a religious and political diversity that overturned the economic, political and ideological status quo. The rising Rest (as the first example of the rising Rest, the Ottoman Empire is given special attention), according to Kupchan, do not quite cut it.

The third chapter of the book is endemic of both the main strengths and the weaknesses of the book. Kupchan as a foreign policy analyst shines in the policy advice sections, but his whole civilisational analysis takes him into comparative politics territory, where he simply lacks the methodology and a systemic approach. His overreliance on public opinion polls is symptomatic of this.

Kupchan manages to give the global view and he picks through larger trends in the realist vein, a school of thought which acknowledges how power relations are shaped by interdependence. Though being comprehensive, his comparison of the rising powers lacks the focus and discipline of comparative politics. Kupchan, in more than one place, references Kagan’s earlier work, *Return to History*, in which he wrote that a nation’s form of government, not its civilisation, is the best predictor of its geopolitical alignment. Kupchan disagrees strongly with Kagan. He claims that a nation’s geopolitical location and its strategic interests, its socioeconomic make up, its place in the international hierarchy, and its religious orientation are as important in shaping its foreign policy as its form of government (p. 144).

In the fourth and fifth chapters, Kupchan lists the potential rivals to the West’s power and dismisses each of them for not having what it takes. Several references are made to Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries that experienced the Arab Spring. Turkey is characterised as a democracy with an attitude, along with Brazil and India, as Kupchan explains that recent developments in Turkey underscore yet another way in which Muslim countries are taking their own path to modernity. According to him, these rising stars, even if they share some of the West’s liberal
values, will clash over status and prestige with the West because they may feel it is their turn for a place in the sun. The Arab reawakening is referred to as the rising of the middle classes. He warns that religion and politics have become more intertwined and that Western observers should stop assuming that the spread of democracy would mean the spread of more Western values as the clamour for more democracy could mean standing up more to the US, Europe and Israel.

Chapters six and seven are the foreign policy advice chapters and are the strongest in the book. According to Kupchan, the transition to multi-polarity should be managed on two fronts: cohesion in the West, and consensus seeking between the West and the Rest. Team work between those sharing the same values such as the US and EU is advised. And, contrary to Kagan’s view, this team should cooperate with the next world and have modest goals because the US has neither the economic means nor the political will to be the world hegemon any more (pp. 146-187).

Kupchan’s final section is devoted to the rise of China. He adopts a historical comparison of the Sino-American struggle to the Monroe Doctrine when the UK let the US prevail in its immediate sphere of influence. Similar to the US in the 1890s, as China’s naval strength grows, it will challenge the US in western Pacific. Yet, Kupchan thinks that the US should not totally accommodate Chinese ambitions as the UK mistakenly accommodated Germany preceding the First World War.

Kupchan advises the next president to embrace “progressive populism at home” and strategic restraint for US foreign policy, guided by a mix of containment and deterrence (p. 71). He acknowledges that the US’s power is in decline, but rather than fight against it, he thinks the US should re-entrench strategically to let the rising powers shoulder their share of the burden. Kupchan’s diagnosis about American politics is quite apt: a sluggish, ineffective response is fuelling support for partisan nationalist policies by intensifying popular discontent, and the collapse of the middle. His diagnosis about the EU and the European states is less accurate. While Kupchan bemoans the “renationalization of Europe” (p. 152), one could not help ask when was Europe ever de-/post-national? Most of the EU institutions and policy making has been intergovernmental. In order for European Union members to be able to act decisively in the conflicts in their immediate Mediterranean neighbourhood, they need to aggregate strength and overcome inward looking tendencies.

Both authors seem to miss two important developments on both sides of the Atlantic. When Kagan says the US decline is bunk and that the US
cannot afford to let go of the hegemonic order that is set its image, Kagan as well as Kupchan overlook the rise of a new wave of isolationism in the US. How would the rise to power of the Tea Partiers and libertarians go hand in hand with protecting US supremacy in global politics? Similarly, when Kupchan advises Europeans to increase their collective means if they are to make credible their ambitions to become a more capable actor on the global stage, he seems to dismiss the debilitating effects of the deep structural and economic crisis Europe is in.

The key limitation of these works is that they are written for a specific audience, i.e. an American domestic audience, and aim to provide an overview of where things stand and what is to come. Despite its methodological short comings, Kupchan’s book is a superior account of the challenges of multi-polarity and provides a more realistic recipe for managing diversity for a new/old team of American policy makers after the election. Yet, both volumes manage to give foreign policy analysts an update on which kind of thinking (academic and policy oriented) is reigning in the capitol of the world’s current superpower.

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Arab Spring, Libyan Winter

By Vijay Prashad

The wave of social and political change that has been blowing through the Middle East and North Africa regions has been identified by some as “the Arab Revolution”, “the Arab Awakening” and by the author of this book, Vijay Prashad, as “the Arab Spring”. The fruits of the Arab Spring have been seen as the initiatives taken by countries previously ruled by dictatorial regimes to build democratic systems and institutions following free and fair elections. Following the recent events in Libya that ended with the killing of the American ambassador, attention was brought once again to the hardships seen in political and social settings that are going through democratisation.
The aim of Vijay Prashad’s book, *Arab Spring, Libyan Winter*, is to examine the consequences of the Arab Spring, and to make predictions regarding Libya’s future through describing the state of the country before the revolution and then after. The book is made up of two parts. The first part explores the Arab Spring in general, while the second identifies the transformation of the process in Libya.

The first part of the book argues that the Arab Spring was completely influenced by the inner dynamics of the different Arab countries, and that the changes were not either unprecedented or without motives. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the Arab Spring’s underlying historical events and processes. In the introductory section, the author—who has explored Marxist literature on the organisational schemes and discipline of opposition parties and bodies—uses a “mole” metaphor to stress the necessity of movements within the Arab Spring of addressing public demands and organising effectively in order to become strong and successful revolutionary bodies.

The author uses a comparative analysis approach to examine the factors and dynamics that caused the Arab Spring to happen in Libya, as well as in Tunisia and Egypt, countries that have gone through the same path. The author stresses that the Egyptian and Tunisian cases are different than the Libyan case due to the different nature of military involvement. When the protests and the unrest started in Egypt and Tunisia, the armed forces of these countries first took a step back, and then began moving in a parallel direction with the public. The author argues that in Libya the situation was very different since the armed forces loyal to Gaddafi were very cruel to the public (p. 18). This point is one to remember, especially in the case of the new Mohamed Mursi government in Egypt and the Egyptian military’s continued desire to be involved in state matters, as well as its initiatives that are apparently trying to preserve the remnants of the guardianship regime.

A particularly interesting part of the book consists of Vijay Prashad’s thoughts on how the revolution was “hijacked” by the West and how the West was involved in the revolution. Prashad, who is from South Asia, has differing views on this when compared to other authors. The author explores post-Arab Spring developments in the region and the inconsistent policies adopted by the Atlantic powers. The fact that NATO showed no desire to intervene in other countries influenced by the Arab Spring, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen, while it wasted no time in intervening in Libya and stabilising the situation there, is also pointed out by the author. The reason for pointing out this particular fact is also the author’s main
wealthier from oil revenues caused the majority to feel that they were second class citizens and not treated justly. These feelings increased people’s longing for dignity and honour. In this section particular attention is brought to the fact that most of the slogans in the Arab world have been about honour and dignity. The role of Islamic groups previously held in check by dictatorial regimes is also discussed. These movements, after having been forcibly contained for many years, rose to prominence after the Arab Spring and have become important actors in the transition period, especially in Tunisia and Egypt. Classified by the author as “Allah Parties”, these parties are being seen as a legitimate part of the political process and as parties that must have their own place in the system. However, the author has some concerns regarding the loyalty Islamic parties have to democracy, especially when forming democratic institutions and devising social policies (p. 43). As also illustrated in the first section of the book, and in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, there has always been unrest among the people fuelled by anti-government sentiments. In fact, the author argues, the Arab Spring didn’t just erupt after Bouazizi in Tunisia lit himself on fire. These unrests are not history in the making, but rather the continuation of a struggle in a region that has long been the playground for outside powers. In order for a real
spring to come to Tunisia and Egypt, the remnants of the military guardianship mechanisms must be completely removed from the governments.

The author draws attention to the attitude of the United States regarding the uprisings and pursuit of democracy in the Arab world. He focuses on the Egyptian case to say that the maltreatment of the public, the torture and the violations of human rights by the previous regime were completely ignored by the US government (p. 53). The author then goes on to explain the four major foreign policy questions that can shape the United States’ outlook towards the Arab Spring. These concerns are: maintaining stability and the flow of oil to the United States, making sure the governments of these countries align with the United States against terrorism, ensuring that radical groups don’t take a negative attitude towards Israel, and keeping Iran in check (pp. 57-58).

In the second part of the book, Libya’s history, present situation and its future are discussed with a focus on the NATO intervention that came with the Arab Spring. Through a comprehensive research of relevant literature and statements made by interested parties, the author shows how the NATO intervention was encouraged and even called upon. The author doesn't relate the outbreak of uprisings in Libya to economic depression or social injustice but rather to the Gaddafi government’s ruthlessly crushing any demands of democracy. Also, the author indicates that unlike in Egypt and Tunisia the people filling the squares in Libya were from various different socioeconomic classes. Here he reinforces his thesis about oil and its facilitating effect on a NATO intervention.

The author evaluates the uprising which began on 15 February 2011, and makes a particularly interesting point that the Western countries changed their attitudes towards the Arab Spring once the regimes in oil-producing countries were in danger. According to the author, Western countries went from approving of the changes brought about by the Arab Spring, to trying to modify the changes, and finally to directly intervening in the process and guiding the changes to fit their own interests. The author argues that in Libya the main goal of the Atlantic countries was to deflect all possible attention that could be brought on the Gulf countries to Libya, which US and Western interests didn't depend on as dearly. As a result the UN and NATO representatives wasted no time in classifying Gaddafi’s acts against his people as genocide. These statements were highlighted in the international media (p. 164). The United Nations resolution on 19 March creating a no-fly zone was followed by air attacks by France
and the United States. At this point the author makes another point that is worth paying attention to when he argues that the debate the Atlantic nations went through between either allowing massacres or about intervening caused them to ignore any diplomatic efforts that could have resulted in a ceasefire and made Libya go straight to the winter without experiencing the spring. The author believes that this debate was to guise what the intervention really was—a move solely to protect Western interests.

In the conclusion the author stresses once again that after the Arab Spring nothing will be the same in the Arab world. He connects the roots of the Arab Spring to events that took place long ago, as well as to the oil hegemony the West wants to establish in the region. The author argues that the NATO intervention in Libya was conducted as a result of the oil and energy interests of the West. This book is very important in understanding how the Arab Spring changed the political and social structures in Libya, a country where a government still can’t be established. In the introduction the causes of the Arab Spring and its development are analysed, which connects to the second part of the book titled “Libyan Winter”. In this second part statements from related parties are analysed and light is shed on the attempts to legitimate the NATO intervention in the eyes of the international community. The book clearly shows that the Western powers got involved in the process and manipulated it out of its natural course in order to secure their own interests in the region. It is a vital resource to understand the past and present of the Arab Spring and the reaction of the international community.

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