Dr. Ian Lesser, in his most recent policy brief for the German Marshall Fund, writes that Turkey is seen as a soft power in the Balkans and the Middle East in the eyes of Turkish foreign policy makers and outside observers (17 July 2012, German Marshall Fund). Turkey is one of those countries which are challenged to find a balance between its hard and soft power capabilities. Turkey is, at the same time, trying to negotiate a transition from a loyal ally of a super power to a mid-range power which hopes to extend its sphere of influence in its wider region. After reading Nye's latest monograph, one wonders what Joseph Nye would advise Turkey regarding the security crises in its immediate region. Is smart power, promoted as the “future” form of power, a panacea for countries who find themselves in Turkey's situation?

In The Future of Power, Nye offers a new synthesis, which he christens “liberal realism,” that forms the basis for a grand strategy which combines hard power with soft power into a smart power of the sort that won the Cold War (p. 231). Liberal realism is presented as a new synthesis of all international relations theories that came before it. This book, despite the new smart power and liberal realist synthesis, reads like a rehash of the ideas and concepts of his 2004 and 2008 books, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, and Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. The Future of Power is composed of three parts. Part one consists of definitions of types of power, military, economic, and soft powers. In part two, Nye discusses how power moves, its diffusion and transition, and talks about a new hype, cyber-war. Part three introduces the concept of smart power and outlines the steps towards formulating smart power strategies for the US.

The first chapter in part one is where Joseph Nye defines power as how resources can be converted to preferred outcomes, but he quickly adds that one should be aware of the scope and the domain of power (pp. 6-8). In his review of the threes faces of power from Dahl, Baratz and Bachrach, and Lukes, Nye emphasises that framing and agenda setting cannot be collapsed into one dimension of power, as neo-realists like
to argue. As Nye aptly observes about the transferability between hard and soft powers: “A tyrant needs to have enough soft power to attract henchmen” (p. 27). In chapters two and three, Nye deals with more conventional types of power while he reckons that technology is a game changer which tends to lower the costs of conventional forms of military power but is also a double edged sword (p. 37). In cyberwars, he warns, insurgent groups fight the most advanced nations with the very same technology. In terms of economic power, Nye’s verdict is that economic power is highly contingent and it waxes and wanes as states endowed with vast natural resources (such as Russia) battle against states with large markets (or economic blocs such as the EU) who often use the threats of restricting market access using their regulatory power to those beyond their territory (p. 72). Nye adds that efforts to wield economic sanctions depend upon the context, purposes, and skill in converting resources into desired behaviour (p. 74). Soft power is addressed in chapter four of the book where Nye tries to abet the criticisms of his soft power concept for its fuzziness and all-inclusiveness. China, Nye purports, is obsessed with soft power, but the Chinese charm offence often fails due to the regime’s lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of the world (p. 88).

In part two of the book, Nye recognises that networks are the new type of structural power. Connectedness is where the US knew previously how to excel, but has somewhat lost out due to the unilateral and isolationist pressures inside the country. Chapters five and six elaborate on the diffusion and transition of power. Power diffusion occurs most effectively when cyber-tools blur the lines between the organisations with highly structured networks and the individuals with lightly structured networks (p. 138). In chapter six, Nye deals with the question of the US’s decline as a global hegemon. He goes down the list of the likely competitors, dismissing them: China has unsustainable growth; India is too under undeveloped; and Brazil suffers from serious inequality, poverty and infrastructural problems. The rest are not seen as potential challengers in the sense that they are either too small or staunch allies of the US. In the last section of part two, Nye identifies rather effectively three sources of US decline, namely, ballooning debt, political gridlock, and a crisis in secondary education. The last word here is that if the US continues to innovate and be open (even its borders to new immigrants), the US’s hard and soft powers can be sustained.

In the final of the book (part three), Nye finally reveals what smart power is. Since the first time the world public heard the
term “smart power” from the mouth of Secretary Clinton, it has sparked people’s curiosity. As Nye defines it, smart power is a strategic configuration of hard and soft power: “it is not about maximizing power or preserving hegemony…. but about finding ways to combine resources into successful strategies in the new concept of power diffusion and the rise of the rest” (p. 208). Nye lists five steps towards building a US smart power strategy. This particular section reads like a list of policy suggestions for a second Obama administration. Nye concludes that the US will need a smart power strategy that stresses alliances, institutions and networks in order to cope with the rise of the rest even though Nye assures the reader at the end that no other country now or in the future is more capable than the US to “rediscover how to be a smart power” (p. 234).

_The Future of Power_, unlike the other reincarnations of Nye’s soft power concept, is a more nuanced example of an effort to understand how technology impacts the exercise and diffusion of power. Nye’s important contribution is to make students of international relations think more clearly about the relational aspect of power. Nye, however, would have been more effective if he had presented a more nuanced view of how new types of wars, such as cyberwars, are fought. Generally states fight cyberwars through hard power and through the disproportionate use of the resources in state hands, such as states resorting to hacking or defacing websites which they deem to be harmful. The larger problem of the book is also a larger problem about the soft or smart power concept: how can soft/smart power be measured? Nye gives only a very small indication for comparing countries’ soft power capacities. In his view, soft power can only be judged from the point of others, allies and rivals alike, and is thus largely contextual.

Reminiscent of Katzenstein’s small states argument, Nye argues that small states rather than military behemoths adapt better to changing conditions (p. 42). Nye also acknowledges that while larger states have more resources, smaller states, and increasingly non-state actors, through the information revolution have enhanced their soft power, and thus have levelled the playing field. What Nye misses to recognise is that historically small states have always made more use of smart power strategies than Nye talks about in order to continue to survive.

Organisationally, each part of the book neatly comprises exactly 100 pages with very concise subsections that deal with a different aspect of power. In my view, the argumentation would have functioned better if the order of the chapters had
been turned upside down with the part on smart power coming first and the other two parts leading from it rather than culminating in it. It is anticlimactic when the reader discovers that the hefty smart power concept at the end is what can be summarised as “context matters.”

This is a helpful book for students of international relations who have been introduced to the vast body of Nye’s work but did not have a chance to read him in detail. It can also contribute to current and future US foreign policy makers in the Obama administration. In the days and weeks leading up to the US elections, it would be even more useful to domestic and international audiences to compare Nye’s vision for the US with its alternative as brought forth by the Republican nominee.

Deniz Bingöl, Ph.D., ACCENT Int.

Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics

*By John J. Mearsheimer*

There is a prevalent belief among the citizens of many countries that their leaders do not always tell the truth and communicate frankly with their constituency, especially when national security is at stake, and that delicate policy decisions are made behind closed doors. Yet, scholars and practitioners have lacked theoretical tools and hypotheses for examining the phenomenon of lying in international politics. With this study, however, those interested in the subject will have to look no further. Professor John J. Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, regarded as one of the most prominent realist scholars in foreign policy, has penned an incisive treatise on one of the most controversial but least studied aspects of international politics.

Mearsheimer’s *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics* lays the foundation for theoretical analyses on lying as an instrument of statecraft by raising a set of consequential questions: What is lying? Why do national leaders lie to each other? Is lying
commonplace in international politics? Do leaders tell inter-state lies for the benefit of the populace or for themselves and their inner circles? Does the self-help nature of an international system have something to do with the occurrence and frequency of inter-state lying? Undoubtedly, the detailed discussion of these questions throughout the book is instrumental for international relations students to grasp the true dynamics of international affairs.

Building on this framework, this study establishes a typology of seven different forms of lies told by statesmen: inter-state lies, fear-mongering, strategic cover-ups, nationalist mythmaking, liberal lies, social imperialism, and ignoble cover-ups. Here, the author decided to exclude the last two kinds of lying on the grounds that these lies are used to avail merely small groups of elites rather than the entire nation and he names this group of lies as “selfish lies” (p. 23).

Interestingly, this study elicits several unexpected and controversial findings that even took the author aback. The first example of these surprising conclusions is that national leaders and their diplomatic personnel “tell each other the truth far more often than they tell lies” (p. 25). Second, given that political leaders tend to lie, they are more likely to deceive their own people rather than other governments, even at the risk of potential blowback and/or backfiring. Critics could challenge Mearsheimer’s assertion that inter-state lying is not as widespread a tool of statecraft as one would suspect. Nonetheless, the author underpins that argument with a reasonably solid rationale by stating that “it is usually difficult to bamboozle another country’s leaders, and even when it is feasible, the costs of lying often outweigh the benefits” (p. 28).

Mearsheimer provides a good number of historical examples to support his argument that leaders tell lies to accomplish strategic aims (strategic lies) and direct those untruths at their own public rather than at other states. The author draws almost all of his examples from the history of American foreign policy, e.g., George W. Bush’s lies that Saddam’s Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the run-up to the Iraq war, Lyndon Johnson’s misrepresentation of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and Dwight D. Eisenhower’s false statements about the American U-2 spy plane’s violation of Soviet air space.

Nevertheless, Mearsheimer’s insistence on drawing all examples from Western countries leaves the reader uncertain as to whether the same hypotheses can be applied to the non-Western world. Critics could argue that Mearsheimer’s
biased decision about historical examples narrows the applicability of his theoretical framework since it fails to explicate different cultural readings and versions of lying. Accordingly, three distinct definitions of lying and Mearsheimer’s typology of lies could be interpreted quite differently dependent on a person’s cultural identity. For example, some non-Western nations might not even regard concealment and spinning as a lie, let alone two distinct forms of lying, whilst other nations may consider any form of falsehood as a deliberate lie.

Moreover, one of the hallmarks of Mearsheimer’s work is that it distinguishes so-called sheer lying from “concealment” and “spinning”, which are conceptualised as two other kinds of deception utilised by national leaders in international affairs. However, it can be argued that concealment and spinning are, at best, more nuanced forms of lying that make no substantial difference as long as the ultimate objective is to deceive other governments and their citizens or domestic public. Here, the author deliberately chooses to dissect even subtle nuances between acts of lying, since incorporating spinning, concealment, and outright falsehoods in a single group of lying would imply that lying between national governments is a relatively normal art of diplomacy.

Likewise, in *Why Leaders Lie* Mearsheimer makes a distinction between “selfish lies” and “strategic lies” from the very beginning. He argues that, while the former “have little to do with *raison d’etat*, but instead aim to protect leaders’ own personal interests or those of their friends” (p. 11), strategic lies are used for the sake of national interest. Thus, the author refers only to strategic lies when he utilises the term international lying. Mearsheimer’s stark distinction between “strategic lies” and “selfish lies” also seems to limit the book’s perspective since the author’s approach relies on a contentious and spurious distinction. National leaders may tell a lie that they believe not only serves the national interest but also benefits leaders’ positions in the government and their close associates. Accordingly, it can be speculated that selfish lies and strategic lies are inextricably linked, serving both leaders’ calculations in domestic politics and their interests abroad. This mechanism reminds us of the “two-level game theory” which hypothesises international interactions (i.e., international negotiations) as a product of two-tier dynamics: the intra-national level and the international level (Putnam, 1998).

That said, Mearsheimer concedes that his study does not provide all of the insights about lying in international
politics. He actually did not intend to produce an exhaustive piece on the topic of lying and its various forms. Instead, the author zeroes in on strategic lies to provide a starting point for further discussion within the literature. Mearsheimer also proposes a parsimonious theoretical template to scholars upon which future studies can be built. The field of international relations would particularly benefit from Mearsheimer’s typology of lies by incorporating quantitative and/or qualitative data in order to develop a more comprehensive analytical framework to examine every form of lying in international politics.

All in all, this book puts forward a novel perspective for the discussion of the art of statecraft and effectively addresses an underdeveloped field within international relations literature by introducing a theoretical framework and several case studies. Why Leader Lie is also a highly entertaining and succinct book which facilitates reading for non-specialists. However, due to its conciseness, this study leaves readers with many more questions than answers. This impressive book is strongly recommended to scholars, students and also readers in general interested in the hitherto underestimated role of lying as a tool of statecraft in international politics.

References


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Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China

*By Turan Kayaoğlu*

In recent years International Relations students have had a chance to read many valuable books in which the Turkish case is used as a theoretical contribution to theories of International Relations. No doubt Turan Kayaoğlu’s *Legal
Imperialism is one of the best examples of this newly emergent literature. The volume reads as follows: the introductory section discusses the rise and fall of extraterritoriality in the 19th century and links this development to debates among International Relations scholars about sovereignty. The first chapter introduces the relation between positive law and sovereignty, with special emphasis on the colonial experience of the 19th century. It also examines the replacement of natural law with positive law, which facilitated Western imperialism in Asia and other colonial locations. The second chapter gives a detailed analysis of how extraterritoriality emerged as a tool of Western imperialism. It also attempts to describe Asian resistance to Western extraterritoriality. The three subsequent chapters are devoted to an explanation of extraterritoriality with three case studies: Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China. The concluding chapter provides a preliminary analysis of the American legal imperialism which replaced British imperialism following the Second World War. The remainder of this review focuses on the book’s contribution to theories of sovereignty and imperialism.

One of the most agreed upon issues in the International Relations discipline is the close relationship between the Westphalian system and sovereignty. According to this assumption, the state sovereignty of our age is the product of the Westphalian system, in which external intervention in internal affairs was significantly reduced among European states. Turan Kayaoğlu’s Legal Imperialism is an attempt to challenge the persistent ignorance of “the role Western ideology and the colonial encounter played in the construction of sovereignty” and it argues that “Western state practices and judicial discourses clarified, crystallised and consolidated the elements of sovereignty doctrine” in these encounters (p. 17). For Kayaoğlu, sovereignty is not something developed and consolidated solely within Western thought and practices, but rather through encounters between Western colonial powers and Asian and African states, because the construction of sovereignty requires establishing the ‘other’ (p. 32-3, 40). In other words, the thing what makes sovereignty possible for the West is the interaction between the Western world and the non-Western world, representing the non-sovereign ‘other’. Therefore, “sovereignty is not given but, rather, is created by ideas and practices” of Western actors in their relations with the non-Western world (p. 19). For Kayaoğlu, this relational and constructed character of sovereignty is evident in the “imperial legal episteme” through which the West was/is able to advance its colonial dominance over the East.
The imperial legal episteme excluded all non-Western entities from the sphere of positivist law, in which the law belongs to a specific political community, namely the state. Because of the imagined relation between the state and the positive law of the West, the non-Western entities that had no application of positive law in their domestic affairs were separated from the ultimate character of being a state, i.e., sovereignty. Therefore, all non-Western entities were called ‘non-sovereign actors’. As a result, once non-Western lawlessness had been demonstrated and the non-sovereign character of the East was constructed by the West through the delegitimisation of non-Western law, extraterritoriality emerged “as a natural solution to protect the rights of the Western subject” who travelled to and lived in non-Western societies (p. 34). Extraterritoriality, “a legal regime whereby a state claims exclusive jurisdiction over its citizens in other states” (p. 2), created a difference between the Western states and the others, which functioned as the very basis of sovereignty. In other words, it was extraterritoriality in non-Western societies through which sovereignty of the Western states were clarified, crystallised and consolidated.

The relational character of sovereignty, Kayaoğlu warns us, was not unique to the Western experience because “law has not only been a tool of imperialism, it has also been a tool of anti-imperialism” (p. 148). The incompatibility of extraterritoriality with territorial sovereignty was used by non-Western countries as a strategy for their fight against the Western domination of their own territories. Although Asian and African countries gained their sovereignty at the end of the struggle, the fight for satisfying the positivist criteria and the constitution of positive legal institutions created mimic states in the non-Western world. However, the spread of Western-style sovereignty did not result in the end of the imperialist relations between the West and the rest. Kayaoğlu also warns us about “the emergence of a new form of extraterritorial jurisdiction” following the Second World War (p. 195). As in the British Empire case, the law, again, has been an imperial tool for the U.S. when it opens “foreign markets and investment opportunities to American companies” all around the world (p. 196).

Kayaoğlu’s fascinating book brings international relations, international law and the study of imperialism together and makes an important contribution towards understanding the way in which the Western world has dominated the rest of the world. By taking western states as a unitary body, the book also challenges explanations based on the realist
interests of relations between states. For Kayaoğlu, “the great powers’ policies regarding extraterritoriality transcended the geopolitical struggle among them. Rivals collaborated with one another against Japan, [the Ottoman Empire and China]. The debates about extraterritoriality should thus be understood within a Western versus non-Western context rather than as a state-centric strategy” (p. 73).

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Reforming the European Union: Realizing the Impossible

By Daniel Finke, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch and George Tsebelis

The book *Reforming the European Union: Realizing the Impossible* by Daniel Finke, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch and George Tsebelis is a meticulous analysis of the path that led from the European Convention to the Lisbon Treaty. Through the empirical testing of theoretical arguments on reform making and institutional change it attempts to answer some crucial questions about how reform comes about in a European Union of 27 member states. The authors investigate the role of chief executives, political leaders, governmental agents and voters in this process. Through this comprehensive enquiry they come to the conclusion that even though there was no final outcome in the form of a revised treaty, they can provide a systematic explanation for every decision and its consequences. They argue that if a majority of EU leaders agree on reform, they will find the strategies to realise it.

The first chapter by George Tsebelis uses a veto player analysis of the process from the European Convention to the Lisbon agreement and he highlights the importance of the new methods used in the negotiation for the European Convention, which were quite different from the usual intergovernmental methods for negotiations. He sees this as the intention of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing,
who refused to accept the status quo as a feasible option. In order to adopt the treaty, Tsebelis argues for the importance of refraining from referenda and making symbolic changes in the text of the treaty, including changing of its name.

Chapter two by Sven-Oliver Proksch investigates the European Convention by examining the positions of the delegates and the presidency, and he identifies the main areas of conflict in partisan differences and over EU jurisdiction. Chapter three by Tsebelis and Proksch argues that it was d’Estaing’s strategic leadership through controlling the agenda and his creative, consistent and overpowering agenda-setting process that allowed the countries to go beyond the status quo. In their view, d’Estaing did this through limiting the number of amendments, creating an iterated agenda-setting process, and prohibiting voting.

Chapter four by Thomas König and Daniel Finke focuses on the actors and their positions on the Treaty of Nice, providing an overview of the entire reform process, identifying the relevant actors, and measuring their positions with respect to the jurisdictions and institutional rules of the European Union. They argue that political leaders pursue their interests strategically rather than sincerely, taking into consideration other actors involved in the process; in other words considering their distance to or from the status quo, and paying attention to domestic actors, mainly other parties and voters. In chapter five the same authors discuss why so many political leaders decided to hold referenda on the constitutional treaty, and argue that the leaders wanted to escape domestic criticism, especially if facing opposition parties whose support was crucial for ratification. They work with the hypothesis that political leaders simultaneously promote national interests and their strategic interests in terms of public support and chances for re-election.

König and Finke turn in chapter six to principals and agents by arguing that the agreement resolved by sending their agents to the negotiating table. They identify the agents’ credibility as major sources for their success. The Irish “resistance” is discussed in chapter seven again by König and Finke. They investigate the role of the German presidency, the hottest issues, and the role of the Irish government in the ratification process. In the conclusion, the authors of the book claim that this process had shown that if there is will, Europe “can indeed achieve the seemingly impossible”.
Book Reviews

The book presents a very thorough and concise analysis. With its clear structure, excellent organisation and heavy empirical focus, it presents probably the most systematic examination of the EU’s path from the European Convention to the Lisbon Treaty. It provides very valuable insights for both students of European integration and scholars interested in the institutional reform process of the European Union. It will be interesting to see to what extent the models and conclusions can be applied in the European Union’s future reform efforts.

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Bağımsızlıklarının Yirminci Yılında Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri, Türk Dilli Halklar – Türkiye ile İlişkiler (Turkic Speaking People and the Central Asian Republics in the Twentieth Year of Independence: Relationships with Turkey)

By Ayşegül Aydınğün and Çiğdem Balım (ed.).

Turkey’s acquaintance with the people in Central Asia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 created great enthusiasm among the Turkish public and policymakers. However, this enthusiasm prevented Ankara from realising that rooted political and social realities in Central Asia continued to emanate from the times of the Soviet Union. Scholars from Turkey and the West could not produce an accumulation of knowledge because of the difficulties in accessing accurate information about the region due to Soviet isolationism. However, thanks to ethnic ties with Central Asia, Ankara, underestimating the remaining Russian influence and the other global powers’ aspirations on the region, thought the coast was clear as the Soviet Union had collapsed. Ankara not only lost time and effort until it identified and recognised these realities about Central Asia, but it also could not formulate an effective realistic foreign policy towards the region. Fortunately, after 20 years, as the number of mistakes made during
this initial enthusiasm has diminished, both the Turkish and Central Asian people have begun to learn more about and understand each other.

This book, *The Central Asian Republics in the Twentieth Year of Independence, Turkic Speaking People – Relationships with Turkey*, edited by Ayşegül Aydingün and Çiğdem Balım, is the first of three books from a project that is aiming to overcome the problem of understanding the political, social and economic structures of the former Soviet republics. The project, “Re-Demarcated Borders, Structured Identities in Eurasia”, aspires to investigate political and social transformations in the region, especially by paying attention to the nation-building and state-building processes in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Central Asian countries in the 20 years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Presuming that the breakup of the Soviet Union brought about a re-demarcation of borders and the re-structuration of identities that led to severe social, cultural, and political transformations in Eurasia, this project, supported by the Turkish Language Association, the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey and the Ataturk Culture Centre, also aims at analysing Turkey’s relations with these republics and the effect of Turkey and the Turkish language and Turkish culture on the region; putting forward plausible recommendation for Turkey to develop or reconfigure new relations with the republics; making an accurate analysis of the developments in the region; analysing how Turkic-speaking people have been affected by this transformation; evaluating Turkey’s policy towards this transformation; and investigating how Turkey is perceived by the titular and non-titular Turkic-speaking people in the region.

The book consists of detailed investigations into the political, cultural, social and economic transformation in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan; an examination of the socio-political environment of titular and non-titular Turkic-speaking people in the region; and an analysis of how Turkey and the Turkish people are perceived in these countries. The authors emphasise the importance in the development of Turkey’s relations with the Central Asian republics in the last 20 years. It is believed that an accurate understanding of both the transformation that occurred in Central Asia and of Turkey’s relations with Central Asia in the past 20 years can guide Turkey’s future foreign policy. The authors argue that because of its isolation, it was difficult to get any information about Central Asia in Soviet times. Thus, before the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, there was a belief, not only in Turkey but also in the West, that the Central Asian structures (e.g. political, social, and linguistic) were homogeneous. However, after the dissolution it was seen that all five Central Asian Republics were different from each other. Each republic followed different political and economic strategies. Probably the most severe tragedy was that the Central Asian people got used to the political borders, demarcated by the Soviet regime without taking care of ethnic, cultural and natural realities, and the following years have seen the republics securing the state structures through preserving these borders.

Parallel field research was conducted for this study in June and July of 2011 in all five Central Asian republics. A semi-structured interview method was used. This method allows the researcher to conduct parallel research in the different countries and to compare between each other. In this method, the researcher asks extra questions based on the answers interviewee gives in order to uncover unique information.

This book consists of ten chapters. After the introduction, the second chapter, “An Overview of Central Asian History for Understanding Today”, focuses on the history of Central Asia. It is important to provide a general history of Central Asia at the beginning because the rest of the book is an investigation of the transformation in post-Soviet Central Asia. It is stressed in the book that it is impossible to understand today’s Central Asia and the ongoing transformations in the region without knowing the Central Asian tribe-like structures, and the diversities and similarities in social, political and economic life of Central Asian people before the nation-states had been formed. After the history chapter the book continues with five consecutive chapters on the five Central Asian countries. These are structurally quite the same and provide data on economic development and population, focusing on the geographic, economic, social, political and cultural structures of the countries. The authors provide historical and factual information about the processes leading to independence. These chapters also investigate the endeavours that were made in implementing unique state- and nation-building processes in each republic by referring to the political characteristics and language policies which were closely related to national identity and nation building. The non-titular nationalities in each country are analysed as well. The circumstances in which the non-titular people live, and the change that has occurred in the lives of these people due to the transformations in the previous 20 years,
are analysed in detail. The perception of Turkey and the Turkish people in these individual countries is also investigated. The eighth chapter, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards Central Asia and Turkey’s Operations in the Region in the Previous 20 Years”, as can be understood from the title, consists of an analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy initiatives towards the region. While reading this chapter, readers are going to find out about Turkey’s official and non-official institutions that have been conducting foreign policy activities in the region. In the ninth chapter, “Nation State Building in Central Asia and Turkey: A General Assessment”, Turkey’s relations with the individual Central Asian states over the previous 20 years is investigated. The authors compare Turkey’s relations with each country in the region, and also analyse Turkey’s changing foreign policy attitudes towards the region according to the transformations in Turkey’s domestic political atmosphere. In the conclusion, “Towards the New Beginnings’, the author examines potential ways to develop Turkey’s relations with Central Asia and emphasises that Turkey’s bilateral relations with the countries in the region are not only shaped by Turkey and the other interacting party, but also by the global powers. The attitudes and approaches of the global powers towards this region have a potential to determine the foreign policies of other actors inside or outside the region.

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