Abstract

The study of civil-military relations remains dominated by Samuel Huntington’s 1957 book, The Soldier and the State, but it is unclear if the work retains external validity when applied in a contemporary context. Turkey’s volatile history of civil-military relations makes it a useful case with which to test Huntington’s propositions. Specifically, I examine the 28 February Process of 1997 and the subsequent shift in Turkey’s civil-military relationship to test the propositions that military autonomy and professionalism are the keys to civilian control of the military. These propositions are supported by underlying assumptions that privilege ideational factors and establish a division between different forms of civilian control. The Turkish case undermines these assumptions and contributes to the pursuit of a more generalisable theory of civil-military relations.

Key Words

Civil-military relations, 28 February Process, coup, institutions, democratisation.

Introduction

Samuel Huntington’s canonical study of civil-military relations, The Soldier and the State, offers sweeping analysis that few in the field have attempted to replicate since the book’s publication in 1957.¹ Many studies of civil-military relations seek to build on Huntington’s theoretical framework, making minor amendments without seriously challenging the consistency of his theory. Yet, scholars continue to lament the state of civil-military relations theory, often calling for a more generalisable theory.² I thus utilise Turkey’s record of civil-military relations to determine if Huntington’s theory can be applied beyond the American context and to thereby ascertain how a more generalisable theory, if possible, may be produced.

Huntington’s theory consists of two main propositions. First, military autonomy breeds military professionalism. Second, a professionalised military will voluntarily stay out of politics. For Huntington, the best (but not the only) way to ensure civilian control of the military is...
thus to make the military and civilian spheres largely autonomous, thereby inculcating military professionalism. Enhanced professionalism is alleged to create ideational change in the officer corps, making military intervention unthinkable through a process of socialisation. If this is the case, we should expect more coups and a generally more stormy civil-military relationship when the military lacks autonomy. Moreover, a professional military would not be expected to stage coups d’état.

In addition to the propositions introduced above, an analysis of the Turkish case will allow for an exploration of two assumptions that pervade theories of civil-military relations. First, many assert that ideational factors are the most significant drivers of civil-military relations. Such theorists take their lead from Huntington, for whom military professionalism is the key to civilian control. Second, most theorists have again adopted Huntington’s framework by assuming that two different types of civilian control exist. “Objective” and “subjective” civilian control thus provide a starting point for most studies of civil-military relations. Objective control utilises military autonomy to inculcate professionalism, which allows civilians to establish control of the military. Civilians acquire subjective control, the lesser of the two for Huntington, merely through maximising their power in relation to the military. Few have asked if these two key assumptions are descriptively accurate or conducive to the creation of a general theory of civil-military relations.

Turkey has a tumultuous history of civil-military relations. After experiencing coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, Turkey’s political leaders finally appear to have established control of the military. Although the relationship remains precarious, the “post-modern” coup of 1997 (also known as the 28 February Process), the military’s last major intervention in Turkish politics, now appears to be an inimitable feat. Yet, the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) is exactly the sort of party- a conservative, Islamist one- that has often been assailed by the military. Previous coups targeted conservative leaders- Adnan Menderes in 1960, Süleyman Demirel in 1971 and 1980, and Necmettin Erbakan in 1997. That the AKP’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has remained at the forefront of Turkish politics for over a decade is a testament to his party’s consolidation of power over the military. I focus mainly on the 28 February Process and the recent shift in Turkey’s civil-military relations to assess the generalisability of Huntington’s theory.

Turkey makes a useful, appropriate case study for two reasons. First, its multiple coups provide data that allow for a straightforward examination of the subject. Second, those coups make
Turkey an apparent outlier. Scholars agree that the Turkish military has been autonomous and professional since the foundation of the Republic, conditions that Huntington predicts should produce a positive civil-military relationship. Data richness allows for the testing of Huntington’s theory; Turkey’s status as an outlier makes it an appropriate case from which to derive a new theory (or the foundations thereof).

Huntington sets objective control as the goal for all societies and argues that subjective control remains the norm in many non-democratic and democratising states because of “the tendency of many civilian groups still to conceive of civilian control in subjective terms”.

I begin by elaborating on Huntington’s major contributions to civil-military relations theory, and I briefly survey other theories of civil-military relations to trace Huntington’s influence in the field. I then assess Turkey’s recent history of civil-military relations to determine if the Turkish case is consistent with Huntington’s propositions. I provide an alternative explanation for change in Turkey’s civil-military relationship, and I conclude with a discussion of the lessons to be derived from this case study and applied to future theories of civil-military relations.

Huntington’s Propositions and Theories of Civil-Military Relations

Samuel Huntington provides the starting point for any discussion of civil-military relations because he was the first to make a serious attempt at crafting a theoretically rich study of the subject. Many others have written on the topic of civil-military relations, but few have matched the scope and resilience of Huntington’s work. To briefly define the scope of this subject, “civil-military relations” is defined as “the interaction between the leaders of the armed forces and political elites occupying the key national government positions in the state”, while civilian control is “that distribution of decision-making power in which civilians alone have the authority to decide on national politics and their implementation”.

In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington argues that there are two possible patterns of civilian control, subjective and objective. These are presented as “directly opposed”, mutually exclusive possibilities. Subjective control requires the empowerment of certain civilian groups or institutions, creating an imbalance of power that favours civilians.
Objective control relies on military autonomy to inculcate professionalism and secure civilian control. Huntington contends that objective control is the ideal form of civilian control and that it is best secured by creating a professional officer corps. That is, the key to establishing a durable system of civilian control is to change the attitudes of military officers. Where this optimal form of civilian control exists, military intervention is unthinkable; civilian control becomes “the only game in town”. Huntington sets objective control as the goal for all societies and argues that subjective control remains the norm in many non-democratic and democratising states because of “the tendency of many civilian groups still to conceive of civilian control in subjective terms”.

From this argument I derive two testable propositions. First, the military’s degree of autonomy should affect its proclivity for coups, with more autonomous militaries less likely to plot or execute coups. Second, increasing military professionalism should similarly reduce the likelihood of coups. That is, Huntington posits an inverse relationship between the degree of military autonomy and professionalism and the likelihood of coups. According to this argument, increased military autonomy and professionalism should play a significant role in Turkey’s turn towards civilian control. For Huntington, professionalism is distinguished by “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness”. Expertise denotes the specialised knowledge and skill necessary to become a professional in a given field, responsibility refers to Huntington’s requirement that a “professional man” be involved in work that is essential to the maintenance of society and corporateness is the sense of unity shared by a group. Huntington never clearly defines military autonomy, but it can be defined as “an institution's decision-making authority”. These definitions have been rightly criticised for being difficult to operationalise and compare across cases, but they provide a starting point that has not moved since 1957. While more precise, measurable definitions would be useful, the creation of such concepts is beyond the purview of this study.

As mentioned above, Huntington's two most basic assumptions are that ideational change is the key to civilian control and that civilian control can take two different forms. Many subsequent works on civil-military relations rely on at least one of these assumptions. Morris Janowitz, a contemporary of Huntington, offers a somewhat different formulation of civil-military relations that relies on the same assumptions. He argues that militaries are heterogeneous and will necessarily be politicised to some degree, meaning that military autonomy cannot be assured.
to a different policy prescription but not to a significantly different theory. In Janowitz’s telling, a politicised military must be countered by more rigorous civilian oversight, not greater autonomy.18 While Janowitz differs on the details, he ultimately arrives at the same basic conclusion as Huntington. “The constabulary officer performs his duties... because he is a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth.”19 Janowitz and Huntington both see military professionalism as the key to civilian control; they differ only on the mechanism best suited to foster military professionalism. Again, ideational change is at the core of the argument.

More recent works on civil-military relations have taken many different approaches, but almost all pay homage to Huntington. Alfred Stepan considers factors like public opinion and the character of the military, following the field’s typical emphasis on ideational factors.20 Michael Desch, whose work identifies the threat environment as the key to change in civil-military relations, adopts Huntington’s preference for “objective control”.21 Scholars have also introduced less theoretical approaches to examine variation in civil-military relations, assessing the interplay between civilians and the military in war and crises.22 In doing so, these analyses have shown that a durable system of civilian control requires constant reinforcement, but no general theory of civil-military relations has emerged from recent scholarship. The few that have attempted to craft general theories of civil-military relations have failed to gain traction, and Huntington retains his prominent place in the field of civil-military relations.23

Adopting Huntington’s assumptions may be justifiable given the few alternatives, but many scholars have similarly taken the problematic approach of focusing on the United States. While scholars of international relations have understandably focused on great powers, this preference need not be imported to the narrower examination of civil-military relations.24 Rather, it would be more productive to find cases that have a relatively high degree of variance in patterns of civil-military relations. The United States has experienced little change therein and is likely studied for its successful record of civilian control. Scholars may arrive at a better understanding of the forces that drive civil-military relations by examining cases in which the variables in question display greater change over time. Turkey, with its experience of lengthy periods of both civilian and military dominance and a history that has been punctuated by coups, is an ideal case study with which to test Huntington’s propositions.

Some scholars, finding early works on civil-military relations lacking in theoretical rigour or predictive accuracy, have called for a more systematic approach to the study of civil-military
relations, while other have declared that a general theory of civil-military relations is unworkable. Peter Feaver contends that Huntington and Janowitz, “the two deans of American civil-military relations”, failed to such an extent that an entirely new theory is needed. Feaver asserts that there are four requirements of such a theory- it must start with the assumption that civilians and the military occupy separate spheres; it must explain “the factors that shape how civilians exercise control of the military”; it must transcend the idea of military professionalism; and it must be a deductive theory. This study does not put forward such a theory but instead seeks to add to Feaver’s list and to assist in the creation of a more generalisable theory of civil-military relations.

Framework

I have already established that according to Huntington’s theory, concomitant increases in the Turkish military’s autonomy and professionalism would be expected to precede the Turkish turn towards civilian control. In order to test this theory, I trace Turkey’s civil-military relationship from the post-modern coup of 1997 to the present day, providing qualitative examinations of the Turkish military’s autonomy and professionalism. I also examine an alternative explanation to see if it follows the Turkish case more closely than Huntington’s theory.

As indicated above, I seek to test Huntington’s propositions on his own terms and therefore do not re-define any key words. I refer to the two ideal types of civilian and military control when I mention “patterns of civil-military relations”, and when I refer to civilians and militaries, I refer to particular institutions in which policy-making power is vested- in Turkey, for example, the General Staff is the most prominent decision-making body within the Turkish Armed Forces. Other studies have argued for the inclusion of a third actor, the general public, in the definition of civil-military relations. I do not find the arguments for this addition persuasive, however, given the typical national security community’s insulation from public pressure. Indeed, Huntington points out that previous attempts to foster a greater connection between the military and society failed.

This study is informed by realist theories of international relations, as is noticeable in my preference for material factors and power considerations. Put plainly, “When civilian government is ineffective, the executive is unable to control the military.” Civilians must possess power over the officer corps and wield it effectively.
and wield it effectively. When I speak of power, however, the term should be understood to represent more than raw capabilities. I emphasise “the ability of one group to influence and control… another group,” an ability that in the domestic sphere is often dependent upon mundane items like veto players.\textsuperscript{32} Realist theory also informs the generally positivist assumptions and methods I use to advance the search for a parsimonious theory of civil-military relations.

The Turkish military has long been an autonomous entity, to the extent that Turkey has been described as having “a double-headed political system” split between civilian leaders and the military.\textsuperscript{33}

The study of civil-military relations is a necessary venture because democratic consolidation can only occur where civilian control is the dominant pattern of civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{34} While some works on civil-military relations emphasise this connection, the literature on democratisation exhibits little interest in the civil-military relationship.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, scholars rarely make specific recommendations on how to manage civil-military relations, often ascribing shifts in the relationship to higher powers at work in the international system or to more nebulous variables over which civilians have no control. By refining theories of civil-military relations, future research may uncover more practicable recommendations on the attainment and maintenance of civilian control.

The Turkish Case

The post-modern coup of 1997 is the focus of this study, but it must first be situated in the context of Turkey’s lengthy struggle to gain control of its military.\textsuperscript{36} For over 20 years after it became an independent state in 1923, Turkey was controlled by a single party led by former military officers- Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his successor, İsmet İnönü. Once Turkey adopted a competitive, multi-party system, the military began to chafe under direction from conservative politicians. After the conservative Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) defeated Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) in 1950, it took only 10 years for the military to stage its first modern coup in 1960.\textsuperscript{37} The military would later overthrow democratically elected but conservative political leaders in 1971 and again in 1980.\textsuperscript{38} The latter represented the military’s most direct, sustained attempt to shape the political system, and after holding power for three years and introducing a new constitution, the military called for elections in 1983.\textsuperscript{39} These three major coups laid the
foundations for the post-modern coup of 1997. I briefly explore this episode, also known as the 28 February Process, before turning again to Huntington's propositions and assessing their validity in light of the Turkish experience.

The conservative Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) emerged from the 1995 election with the greatest number of seats in parliament, but it held only 28.7% of available seats. Still, the firmly secularist parties that finished second and third failed to form a coalition and were unable to block the RP and its Islamist leader, Necmettin Erbakan, from assuming power. Instead, the runner-up, the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) formed a tenuous agreement with the RP in which each party leader would act as prime minister for two years of the four-year term. Erbakan was to serve the first two-year term.

With little effective opposition, Erbakan did not have much to fear from political rivals, but his conservative policies antagonised the military. Erbakan's foreign policy consisted largely of overtures to Middle Eastern and North African states- a turn in Turkish foreign policy made possible by the dissolution of the Soviet Union- and his rhetoric often went beyond the bounds deemed acceptable by the military. The military made its misgivings known in a private meeting with Erbakan shortly after he made an official visit to Libya in late 1996. Still, the conflict did not come to a head until 31 January 1997, when municipal officials in the RP-controlled Sincan district of Ankara organised a meeting to decry alleged Israeli human rights abuses and to express support for Hamas and Iran. The military promptly sent tanks through the streets of Sincan and followed this show of defiance by submitting to the government a number of directives ostensibly intended to secure the secular character of the state. The military enumerated these commands after the National Security Council meeting of 28 February. 

The Turkish military’s autonomy has been in steady decline for several years, but this does not appear to have affected its professionalism. The link between these two variables is tenuous at best.

Erbakan refused to accede to the military’s demands and resigned amid sustained pressure. Uniquely, though, the military did not directly intervene to overthrow the prime minister. Instead, the military relied upon less direct methods, leaking information (and misinformation) of political scandals to Kemalist media outlets and relying on the support of Kemalist elements of civil society- this is why it received the “post-modern” label. Nonetheless,
the coup hastened the disintegration of Erbakan's RP, and continuing political and economic turmoil prevented other parties from gaining a strong hold on parliament.\textsuperscript{47} With new general elections approaching in 2002, however, two factions emerged from the remnants of the RP and sought to rebuild the party, despite the recent memory of military intervention. The outlawed party had split into groups dominated by the "traditionalists" and the "innovators", the respective creators of the Felicity Party (\textit{Saadet Partisi}, SP) and the AKP.\textsuperscript{48}

The AKP won 363 of the 550 seats available in the parliamentary elections of 2002 and has dominated Turkey's political system ever since. Most significantly, the party's dominance has extended to the military. Though the civil-military relationship is still troubled- the so-called Sledgehammer Plot uncovered in 2010 is among the most visible signs of these tensions- it is markedly better than in decades past when the military could easily depose any civilian governments.\textsuperscript{49} Despite the military's occasional discontent with the state of affairs, the AKP has rebuffed any pressure the military has brought to bear. That is, it has assumed control of the military. Civilians alone are now in charge of policy-making in Turkey. I now return to Huntington's propositions to determine if increased military autonomy and professionalism played any role in Turkey's turn towards civilian control.

Huntington's first proposition is that increased military autonomy yields greater military professionalism. The Turkish military has long been an autonomous entity, to the extent that Turkey has been described as having "a double-headed political system" split between civilian leaders and the military.\textsuperscript{50} Since the AKP came to power, however, a variety of legal and institutional reforms have made the military less autonomous. These changes include greater civilian oversight of military promotions, the removal of military officers from certain governmental institutions and constitutional reforms designed to reduce the political power of military institutions like the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{51} Moreover, this trend is continuing. If the AKP succeeds in its attempt to craft and pass a new constitution, it may ensure that the Chief of the General Staff, who currently reports directly to the prime minister, reports in the future to the defence minister.\textsuperscript{52} The Turkish military's autonomy has been in steady decline for several years, but this does not appear to have affected its professionalism. The link between these two variables is tenuous at best.

Huntington's second proposition holds that a professional military will voluntarily stay out of politics. Professionalism in the Turkish military has been a constant, however, and this has not prevented it from overthrowing civilian governments.\textsuperscript{53} Turkey inherited
its army from the Ottomans, for whom the matters of military professionalism and modernisation drove major reforms in the 19th century. Modern Turkey’s military officers believed that it was a professional obligation to intervene “whenever the civilian politicians had made too great a mess of things”. Indeed, one scholar argues that in the Turkish case, greater professionalism may have undermined rather than solidified civilian control. Any analyst seeking to impugn the professionalism of the Turkish military would have to define the term in a tautological manner, labelling any military that stages a coup unprofessional. Utilising Huntington’s own criteria to determine professionalism (expertise, responsibility and corporateness), it must be acknowledged that the Turkish military has been generally professional even while orchestrating coups.

An Alternative Explanation

The Turkish case does not match Huntington’s expectations. Turkey’s turn towards civilian control was made while military autonomy was in decline and while professionalism was held constant, bringing the generalisability of Huntington’s theory into question. The circumstances surrounding the 28 February Process and the AKP’s consolidation of power point instead to the importance of institutional arrangements in establishing an effective civil-military relationship.

### Economic and political stability has strengthened civilian institutions in relation to the military.

Although most theories of civil-military relations borrow from Huntington by using a framework that privileges ideational factors, some focus on institutions. Samuel Finer, for example, argues that patterns of civil-military relations can be explained with reference to different “levels of political culture”, a term that initially appears to be another ideational factor. His measure of political culture, however, is based on the level of coherence of a country’s institutions. As with most other variables identified in theories of civil-military relations, Finer’s measure may be difficult to operationalise, but it is clear that it is based on the relative strength of civilian institutions. This gauge is given a more accurate name—institutional development—in Huntington’s later work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. A high level of institutional development is characterised by strong political institutions that can repel or deter military intervention, allowing civilians to assume and maintain control of the economy and state. 

Economic and political stability has strengthened civilian institutions in relation to the military.
Huntington’s two propositions fail to explain how Turkey has instituted civilian control of its military, pointing to flaws in his theory’s underlying assumptions. The first assumption, that ideational factors like military professionalism are the most significant drivers of change in civil-military relations, fails in light of the Turkish case. As mentioned above, the Turkish military has always been considered professional. The Turkish military’s professionalism and the weakness of Turkey’s prior civilian governments would suggest that civil-military relations are not about a state’s “intellectual climate”, as Huntington contends, but its institutional framework. Indeed, Turkish political institutions have been strengthened by several years of economic growth and declining political fragmentation. Civilian power relative to the military has been growing, and Turkish politicians have introduced reforms to further accentuate this power disparity. Material factors, not ideational ones, are ultimately responsible for the shifts in institutional development that have

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enabled the Turkish government to gain control of its military.

Huntington’s second main assumption is that civilian control can be divided into two basic types, objective and subjective. Objective control, the ideal form of civilian control, relies on military autonomy and professionalism to keep the military out of politics, while civilians can assume subjective control by merely increasing their power in relation to the military. Indeed, the Turkish case might look like one in which only subjective control exists. I argue, however, that this division is unhelpful in crafting a theory of civil-military relations and that the ideal types of civilian control and military control are more useful.

The line between subjective and objective control is hazy at best, and even when they are taken as two separate forms of civilian control, it is not entirely clear how a state benefits from the establishment of objective control. Huntington wrote *The Soldier and the State*, after all, due to his fear that the Cold War would foist upon the United States a crisis in civil-military relations. Objective control is supposedly founded on an ideational shift that makes military intervention anathema to the officer corps, yet it apparently cannot defray conflict between civilians and the military. There is no point at which civilian control becomes irreversibly entrenched. In reality, objective and subjective control look very much alike, and the broader term of civilian control seems better suited to describe the desired basis of civil-military relations. The dichotomy of subjective and objective control offers a distinction without a difference, and future theories of civil-military relations can replace these terms without sacrificing analytical clarity.

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As indicated above, Huntington’s later work, although it relegates civil-military relations to a supporting role, show a greater appreciation for the role of effective, legitimate political institutions in discouraging military intervention. The contrast between subjective and objective control fades too as Huntington moves farther from *The Soldier and the State*. Yet, his initial preference for ideational factors and different forms of civilian control has been replicated in many subsequent works on civil-military relations. While some recent works have begun to focus on institutions and other material considerations, Huntington’s assumptions still significantly influence the field.
Future theories of civil-military relations would do well to abandon Huntington’s assumptions and focus more specifically on the balance of power between civilian and military institutions. A national military’s organisational structure typically makes it a relatively powerful entity from the start, forcing civilians to develop robust, stable institutions if they are to compete. A glimpse at Turkey’s lengthy history of economic instability and political fragmentation—two problems that have been largely alleviated under the AKP’s rule—would suggest that such factors play a larger role in shaping patterns of civil-military relations that do ideational factors like military professionalism. Previous theories of civil-military relations have often focused on the military and its characteristics; future theories ought to focus on drivers of change in the relative strength of civilian and military institutions.

Conclusion

Contrary to Huntington’s propositions, a careful study of the Turkish case suggests that military autonomy and professionalism are not enough to ensure civilian control of the military. Rather, the balance of power between civilian and military institutions is of greater consequence. This undermines the two main assumptions that Huntington and his successors have made regarding civil-

military relations—namely, the assumptions that ideational factors are the keys to change in civil-military relations and that civilian control is best described as objective or subjective. This conclusion yields two main recommendations, one for scholars and the other for policymakers. For scholars and students of civil-military relations, this study suggests that a new, more generalisable theory of civil-military relations will need to depart from the propositions and assumptions mentioned above. Huntington’s theory does not travel well. Others have already described some requirements of any new theory of civil-military relations. I add to that list by emphasising the primacy of material factors in establishing civilian control of the military. Though there is unlikely to be a single factor that contributes always and everywhere to civilian control, from the Turkish experience I conclude that economic and political factors are likely to be more important than military autonomy and professionalism. Future research is
needed to more clearly identify which factors are the most significant drivers of change in civil-military relations and to incorporate these variables into a general theory of civil-military relations.

For policy-makers, my conclusions suggest that efforts to promote democratic consolidation ought to focus on strengthening civilian institutions. Without civilian control of the military, democratisation is unlikely to succeed, and the most effective way to ensure civilian control of the military is to strengthen civilian institutions. Though this seems intuitive, studies of civil-military relations rarely yield policy recommendations focusing on material factors that can be manipulated by policy-makers. In the Turkish context, for instance, political fragmentation might be reduced by changing election laws, particularly those relating to Turkey’s electoral threshold. In relation to democracy promotion as an aspect of foreign policy, much has been made of military-to-military engagement as a means to inculcate professionalism in foreign armies. Unfortunately, such policies will not prevent civilians from being overthrown if they prove to be incompetent. If democracy promotion is to be used as a tool of statecraft, such efforts should simply focus on strengthening civilian institutions—political parties, the judiciary, electoral regimes and the like— but such efforts remain a risky business.

Future theories of civil-military relations must emphasise institutional development. Given the centralised, hierarchical nature of the military, institutional arrangements must be weighted in favour of civilians. In order to establish a durable imbalance of power in their favour, governments must pay closer attention to material factors than to ideational factors like military professionalism. This explanation for shifts in civil-military relations removes the field’s traditional emphasis on the character of the military and places the focus on the strength of competing institutions. To adapt Kenneth Waltz’s maxim on war, coups occur when there is nothing to prevent them. The onus is on civilians to ensure that militaries do not have such an opportunity.
Endnotes

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10 Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique”. As Feaver points out, even Huntington’s foremost critic, Morris Janowitz, offered an argument based largely on military professionalism.


14 Ibid., pp 8-10.


18 Ibid., pp. 349-350.

19 Ibid., p. 440.


25 Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State*, pp. 342-345. Barany argues that it is not possible to craft a general theory of civil-military relations.


27 Ibid., pp. 168-170.


33 Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State*, pp. 42-43, 339-340; Croissant, et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism”, p. 951. A proper discussion of this assumption- that civilian control is necessary for democracy- is beyond the scope of this study, but Barany and Croissant, et al., capably examine the issue.


48 Ibid., p. 359.


53 Kamrava, “Military Professionalization”, pp. 68-70; Claude E. Welch, Jr., “Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes, or Random Events”, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (April 1992), p. 327. Both authors provide examples of professionalised militaries from Argentina to Israel that have not met Huntington’s expectations.


60 Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 78-79.


66 Ibid., pp. 315-317.


69 Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 2-3. Feaver proposes a theory that applies the four criteria he previously established as requirements for any general theory of civil-military relations. Feaver’s principal-agent framework suggests that the military will “work” or “shirk”
based on the extent of civilian oversight and expected punishment for military shirking. My argument complements this model by suggesting that the degree of civilian oversight and punishment is a function of certain material factors, though the relative importance of different material factors is a matter for future research.


