
Turkey's Quest for a "New International Order": The Discourse of Civilization and the Politics of Restoration

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Abstract

This article argues that the increasing emphasis of civilization in Turkish foreign policy discourse fundamentally affected Turkey's criticism of the current international order. Political elites during the Justice and Development Party era have framed their critiques of international order in the context of the "politics of restoration"; the political discourse seeks to re-construct Turkey's national, regional and international political discourse and engagement. They have also re-contextualized the politics of restoration along the axis of a discourse of the "New Turkey". In this sense, the "New Turkey" discourse reproduced the civilizational identity part of Turkey's international order narrative by blending it with an anti-hegemonic "dissident" discourse. Instead of taking civilization as a given, as many studies concerned with the relationship of Turkish foreign policy and civilization have done, this article takes Davutoğlu's constitutive role of the idea into account and analyzes the framework provided by the term for the politics of restoration of national, regional, and global order while considering civilization as a historical institution formed by the interaction between culture-economics-politics and a "being-knowledge-values" based mentality.

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The author would like to thank Yekta Zülfikar, Handan Öz and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Key Words

Civilization, politics of restoration, self-perception, international order and Turkish foreign policy.

Introduction

The most significant impact of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) on Turkish foreign policy has been that it has re-opened Turkey's understanding of "international order" to a discussion on the basis of a "new representation of civilizational belonging".¹ Before the JDP, Turkey's foreign policy was determined through a secular-nationalist identity with the purpose of reproducing a Westphalian political unit at the regional level. This meant the acceptance of the universality of modern Western civilization and the establishment of Turkey as an integral part of the universal civilization. Resulting from a search for a new "political subjectivity" and "strategic autonomy"² in the regional and international system, the discourse of a new order not only redefined Turkey's position in world politics geopolitically and culturally, but also succeeded in *de-*

centering the historical construction of Turkey as an integral part of the Western civilization. Thus, a new supra-national, namely civilizational, “political unit” has become preponderant in Turkish foreign policy discourse instead of the historically Western-oriented nation-state political unit, the dominating principle in the conceptions of the Westphalian international order.³ The transformation of such an obscure and highly transnational new “civilizational identity” into a foreign policy framework-determinant discourse formed a strong political, moral, and psychological gravitational field against Turkey’s “state-centric identity” in the international order.

Gradually included in the new discourse of international order of Turkish foreign policy, the reference to civilization has come to function as oppositional, as a search for anti-hegemony, and as a center of an increasingly pluralist world order perspective vis-à-vis the existing world order and its dominance.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for instance, committed to promoting this discourse in the “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative jointly led by Spain and Turkey, and through the use

of concepts such as “global civilizational consciousness”, “global civilizational perspective”, and “global civilizational politics”, requested the “restoration” of the international order along the axis of multiculturalism.⁴ Moreover, first as an academic, then as a chief advisor, Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister, respectively, Ahmet Davutoğlu time and again referred to the concept of “civilization”; thus he took on the role as the architect of Turkey’s “civilizational discourse”. While both implicitly using the concept of civilization, they also applied the notion as the cornerstone of Turkey’s global foreign policy outlook. The constitutional role of civilization in foreign policy discourse took Turkey’s foreign policy into a two-layer transformation. First, the civilizational discourse caused an internal change in the identity of the State (of Turkey). Second, it helped in gradually presenting a “New Turkey” in the regional and global system, and served the purpose of legitimizing Turkey’s “dissident” position especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Gradually included in the new discourse of international order of Turkish foreign policy, the reference to civilization has come to function as oppositional, as a search for anti-hegemony, and as a center of an increasingly pluralist world order perspective vis-à-vis the existing world order and its dominance.⁵ President Erdoğan’s trademark expression, “the world is bigger than five,” which he

stated at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 2014 and repeated in many other international meetings, and his maxim, "the West is no longer the only center of the world," have both made Turkey's dissident position even clearer.⁶

Within the context of the aforementioned double-dimension, the "West as the ideal civilization" paradigm was eliminated from the actual constructivist role of Turkey's foreign policy identity and was transformed both into a collocutor of the inter-civilizational interaction and into its new "Other". The political elites who presented the European Union (EU) membership as an "alliance of civilizations" project⁷ later placed the West into the center of criticisms targeting the international order along civilizational terms. This type of civilizational thought deeply affected Turkey's foreign policy discourse and practices from the inside out, and caused an important change in the role Turkey wished to play in the reformation of the international order.

Of those who examine the civilization-foreign policy nexus in Turkish foreign policy, a vast majority prefer to take the concept of civilization as a *given*. Many of the analyses of the concept focus on Davutoğlu's understanding and use of the civilizational concept without first examining its use in the context of Turkey (national), the Islamic world (regional), and the search for a new international

order (universal).⁸ While for some, civilization points to a *worldview* based on Islam, for others it is an *ideology* used as a means of political Islam. From both perspectives, the reflection of civilization in foreign policy has been termed as neo-Ottomanist causing a departure from the West, and regarded as a geopolitical imagination imposing its own representation of civilization.⁹ The fact that Davutoğlu refers to civilization as a *historical institution* rather than an *ideology* has been ignored.¹⁰

Instead of taking civilization as a given, this article takes Davutoğlu's constitutive role of the idea into account and analyzes the framework provided by the term for the restoration of national, regional, and global order, while considering civilization as a historical institution formed by the interaction between culture-economics-politics and a "being-knowledge-values" based mentality. The first section of this study analyzes how Davutoğlu approaches Turkey's civilizational perpetuity in his own works and speeches, and how it has been "functionalized" in foreign policy and in the context of the transformation of international order. The second section will consider how Davutoğlu turned the "politics of restoration"-frequently appearing in the search for a new subjectivity- into reality and how, in particular, it has been added to the discourse of "New Turkey" created by President Erdoğan. The third section

examines the kind of civilizational basis provided by civilization as a historical institution and a political unit for the formation of a pluralist international order and a greater scale of “restoration politics” in connection with Turkey’s search for a new international order.

A synthesis of civilizational discourse and “restoration politics” has caused a significant transformation in Turkey’s foreign policy identity.

The main claim of the article is that a synthesis of civilizational discourse and “restoration politics” has caused a significant transformation in Turkey’s foreign policy identity. In addition, that civilization takes center stage in Turkey’s demand for a “post-Western international order” since those who have founded such a civilizational discourse consider civilization not as an ideology but as a historical institution (agent).

Civilizations and World Orders: The Foundational Role of Ahmet Davutoğlu

Many scholars of Turkish foreign policy believe that Ahmet Davutoğlu is one of the important figures who has shaped Turkey’s perspective of international order and civilizational

identity during the JDP era. In order to understand what Davutoğlu means by “civilization” and how he considers the unit of civilization in the formation of world orders, it will be sufficient to consider three important texts written during different time periods. In all three works, he discusses civilization both as a concept and as a central power for the realization of “global systemic” changes as a “whole of institutionalized norms”, and for the world order to assume its final form. According to Davutoğlu, every world order contains within it an essence of civilization, and thus, produces some form of civilizational order. For Davutoğlu, civilization’s “singularity”, as a concept, is a problematic view in the restoration of the present international order. The claim of “one civilization’s universality” causes the formation of a hierarchical relationship among civilizations, and serves the establishment of a hegemonic world order. The preference for the plural use of the term “civilization” (as civilizations) will both show the presence of different civilizations in history and will eventually save inter-civilizational interactions from a type of “absolute” hierarchical relationship in the formation of a new and just global order.¹¹

Davutoğlu begins by offering a broad conceptual panorama of the meaning of civilization(s) and their role in world politics. Civilizations, for him, designate distinct paradigms of human and

social existence, comprising cognitive, normative, aesthetic, and spiritual aspects. Accordingly, differences among civilizations derive from the different epistemic, normative, and ontological premises undergirding them. From this perspective, civilizations develop distinctive perceptions of space and time, and of the meaning and purpose of human and social life. The question, then, is how the diversity of historical constellations can find ways to meet productivity and assemble into "global order". In that context, civilizations, for Davutoğlu, "do not emerge in spatial or temporal isolation, but rather the confluence of a system of being-knowledge-value, where time and space perception places mentality in a dialectical relationship with history, out of which civilizations flourish. This leads us to a certain notion of "order" as a conventional and institutional structure".¹²

When taken as a *trilogy*, it is possible to state that Davutoğlu develops his approach to self-perception (*ben-idraki*, in Turkish, also can be defined as self-cognizance),¹³ civilization, and world order in a detailed manner in his three works. In this sense, while in *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*¹⁴ he puts forward the formative qualities of a "world order" written upon the basis of "self-perception", he discusses the civilization-based transformation in the international system and the

main points of the current crisis in the global system within a historical context in his *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World*.¹⁵ In *Strategic Depth*,¹⁶ where he examines Turkey's foreign policy and how it can adapt to the final international order, Davutoğlu tries to put forward a Turkey-centered geopolitical perspective of a country going after a "new strategic mentality". In each of his three works, the concept of civilization holds center stage.

Writing that in *Alternative Paradigms* he would be attempting to formulate an intellectual relationship between "ontological perception" and "political perception", Davutoğlu attempts to understand the interaction among perception parameters based on being-knowledge-value and the structures of law-economics-politics within the context of history. By doing so, Davutoğlu tries to understand the interaction between the "intellectual transformation" and the "economic-political transformation" throughout the history by mainly focusing on the transformation of world order. In *Civilizational Transformation*, Davutoğlu brings forward the concept of self-perception, to describe the intellectual background of the connection between ontological consciousness and political identity, and to express an awareness of identity that integrates existential perception with historical and political perception.¹⁷ He further develops the concept and places it at

the core of his theoretical framework,¹⁸ beyond conjectural identity debates. In both works, Davutoğlu claims that there is a consistent connection between the existential understanding and the historical and political understanding, asserting that these three levels are where collective identity consciousnesses are established.¹⁹ In *Strategic Depth*, which focuses directly on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, Davutoğlu redefines the consciousness of collective identity through both history and geography, and uses it to formulate a new “strategic mentality” for Turkey.²⁰ When considering his three works altogether, Davutoğlu leans toward the concept of civilization as a “unit of analysis”, and thus, forms an integrative abstract level. The claim that there is a valid historical relationship between the formation of a self-perception that reflects the qualities of the civilizational concept, and a sustainable and peaceful world order, forms the basis of Davutoğlu’s world “order” understanding. In consequence, Davutoğlu’s “world order” is not a system that can be understood solely with material elements, which by itself is of central importance in Turkey’s critique of the international order.

The Concept of “Self-Perception” and Civilizations

The self-perception that Davutoğlu espouses as the essence of civilizations

forms the first ring of his understanding of world order. In his article “Civilizations’ Self-Perception”, Davutoğlu both attributes a positive meaning to the civilizational concept and points to the plurality of civilizations²¹ by defending different forms of self-perception created by various civilizational imaginations. In the last quarter of the 20th century, described by Davutoğlu as a time of “civilizational revitalization and political confrontation”,²² he alleges that the predominating claim of Western academia that ‘Western civilization has brought history to an end by presenting liberal democracy to humanity as a gift’ is false. In this sense, it may be deduced that Davutoğlu, in all three works, attempts to find answers to two main claims: The first is his opposition to “endism”.²³ The discourse of endism is based on the presumption of an imagination of the Western civilization hegemonic order which disregards the historical dynamism of alternative civilizational imaginations. This historic dynamism is placed on the axis of cultural conflict instead of universality by the thesis of “radicalizing” non-Western civilizations.²⁴ Therefore, he argues against such theses, asserting that there is a new awakening at the axis of new civilizations.²⁵ The second claim, which might seem like a contradiction, is his attempt to develop an argument against the previous two theses’ representations and analyses of Islamic civilization and Turkey.

While in the first, there is a frame of thought propounding elements of internal consistency and historical continuity in Islamic civilization, the second one narrates Turkey's historical and geographical "centrality" and the establishment and transformation stages of its political culture within this civilization. To put it clearly, he, on the one hand, objects to the theses which blend Western civilization's hegemonic and Euro-centric reading of history, fortified by the discourse of liberal democracy, as "others" in an essential manner of non-Western entities and marginalizes them in the course of history. But on the other hand, he challenges the depiction-especially that of Huntington- of Turkey as a "torn country" having a difficult time to define itself²⁶ under the feeling of "divided belonging".

The elements of being-knowledge-value forming the framework of the present international order have constituted the Western civilization on the basis of hierarchical supremacy; however, its "associating the entire history of humanity to the historical course of Western civilization" is problematic.

In all three of his works, Davutoğlu, defending the claim that history does not follow a course of linear-development, argues that the end of the Cold War, rather than causing the "end of history", gave rise to a process wherein an extensive civilizational revitalization and transformation²⁷ can once again be brought onto the stage of history in the non-Western civilizations, and in Islamic civilization in particular. Therefore, civilizational revival has made the restoration of the present international order more necessary than ever. According to Davutoğlu, the elements of being-knowledge-value forming the framework of the present international order have constituted the Western civilization on the basis of hierarchical supremacy; however, its "associating the entire history of humanity to the historical course of Western civilization"²⁸ is problematic. This problematic imagination of the world order has ended with the Western civilization triumphantly declaring their "ultimate dominance" over other civilizations. In this sense, representations employed by the Western civilization, such as "the West and the Rest", and their variations of political forms oppose to the "diversity of history" and to the presence of multiple civilizations. As the source of the inconsistency of the present international order,²⁹ Davutoğlu discusses the dominance of the Western civilization's conceptualization of the

“unity of history”, which has been constructed through the three trivets, in reference to Arnold Toynbee, i.e. “the egocentric illusion, the illusion of the ‘unchanging East’, and the illusion of progress as a movement that proceeds in a straight line”. To put the matter bluntly, he mainly opposes the idea of “the Rest” as the passive object of the history. For Davutoğlu, the concept of the *recipient civilization*, itself, reflects an egocentric self-perception powerful enough to accept or reject the conservation of others.³⁰ For this reason, a crisis of the world order means a civilizational crisis as well. According to Davutoğlu, the set of values that determine international relations cannot be considered independently from the paradigmatic elements of the dominant civilization. Thus, the phenomenon called the “world-system” is also being created in the transition process of these factors from local to universal at the institutional and mental levels. Here, the international systemic transformations throughout the world history are tackled as a transformation that “occurs at the axis of civilization” in the final stage.³¹ Consequently, the most important foundational parameter of civilizations, for Davutoğlu, is their contribution of an “original understanding to the individual’s ontological status by providing a new self-perception based on a worldview.”³² The fundamental elements of the concept of “self-perception,”

which he borrows from Husserl³³ (*Selbstverständnis*) are, according to Davutoğlu, the individual’s idea of Being/God and the ego, and their “life world” (*Lebenswelt*).³⁴ The notion of worldview gives color to the different aspects of self-perception, which forms the hard core of civilization (*Weltanschauung*). In this frame, Davutoğlu’s main claim about the “essence” of civilizations is:

(...) the fundamental element that facilitates the formation of civilizations, the rise of civilizations and their ability to resist the potential dominance of other civilizations is the self-perception which clarifies a civilizational prototype. The final factor in the formation of a self-perception is neither institutional nor formal domain, but a worldview which places the problematic existence of an individual within a meaningful framework.³⁵

Here, the relationship between self-perception and identity is critical in terms of reflecting Davutoğlu’s perspective of civilization. Identity is defined politically and legally (awareness of citizenship in modern sense), rather than sociologically and, in the face of self-perception, corresponds to a civilization’s essence being placed in a very superficial position. Because for Davutoğlu, “while identity can be defined through the social, economic, and political authority, and can be attributed by them, self-perception relying on the subject as its basis cannot, in any way, be defined or exterminated by another authority”.³⁶

Self-perception and the matter of identity are closely linked to another important part of Davutoğlu's civilization discourse, namely, "multiple civilizations", as well as their comparative analysis. Moving from the assumption that if not legally, there are philosophic and cognitive differences among world civilizations. He compares these civilizations from a historical perspective and on two main levels: there are six main elements (time, space, knowledge concepts, and the relationships of human-nature, human-god, and human-human) that surround self-perceptions and an individual's mentality as a "civilization prototype". On the first level, Davutoğlu determines five different self-perception types: strong and hard self-perception, strong and flexible self-perception, strong and local self-perception, weak and hard self-perception, and weak and flexible self-perception. On the second level, he considers the fundamental elements that make up self-perception as a result of these differentials, and examines them comparatively within the archetype of the Western and Islamic civilizations. In this context, according to Davutoğlu, Islamic civilization possesses a "strong quality as it leans on a well-defined, comprehensive, consistent, and universal worldview"; whereas it is both flexible and encircling in terms of an "influencing capacity".³⁷

When Davutoğlu's concept of civilization is considered within the

context of the qualities listed above, it is seen that civilization is an "organic" existence, has its own ontological being/status, and almost like humans, it is born, grows, matures, eventually weakens and regresses, and in some cases, dies. In this context, it is understood that Davutoğlu has a multi-civilizational approach. Secondly, what makes a civilization's defining qualities explicit are consistency/prevalence and continuity. Thirdly, it can be said that Davutoğlu's understanding of civilization is idealistic from a philosophic standpoint.³⁸ The reason is that according to Davutoğlu, "mentality transformation", as a philosophical-ideational element, is at the root of the civilizational order and transformation which gives the world order its final form. Fourthly, although civilizations are, in reality, cultural entities, material cultural elements should also be included in this circle of meaning. Lastly, Davutoğlu's civilizational understanding presents an *essentialist* perspective. Civilizations, which possess an independent ontological status, almost have a certain essence and this essence cannot easily be influenced from the outside.³⁹ In this context, the essence of civilizations does not, and will not, presumably change to a meaningful degree throughout the history. This situation leaves Davutoğlu's civilization approach exposed to what Susan Buck-Morss terms the issue of "strategic essentialism".⁴⁰ The

foundational elements of a civilization and the construction of a world order on the basis of civilization form the bedrock of Davutoğlu's understanding of order.

The Parameters of “Civilizational Order”

According to Davutoğlu, there are six formative parameters of civilizations: redefinition of self-perception (ontological dimension), human knowledge (epistemological dimension), and human values (normative dimension); reconstruction of *time* consciousness and historical imagination, reshaping of *space* (particularly in the form of restructuring the city), and reestablishment of a world order. Among them the first three constitute the philosophical and ethical foundations of the being-knowledge-value paradigm and the last three represent the historical manifestations of particular being-knowledge-value paradigms in social, economic, and political structures.⁴¹

The epistemological paradigm which developed parallel to the ontological level throughout history is formed from the answers given to four basic questions: sources of knowledge, the systematization of knowledge theoretically, transfer of knowledge into practice (technology, economic structuring, or legal form), and social hierarchy based on the authority of knowledge. Thus,

according to Davutoğlu, “civilizational self-perception is one of the basic building blocks in the formation, development, and resistance capacities of civilizations”.⁴² In this context, a civilization can become a living form only if it can assert its self-perception in a way comprehensive enough to influence *Lebenswelt*. Western socio-economic constructs, Islamic cities, Chinese social order, or the Indian social hierarchy are all closely linked with the differing self-perceptions of the respective civilizational traditions.

The third formative element; in other words, the “restructuring of the value system and the standardization of human behaviors’ moral foundations”⁴³ represent the axiological dimension. Here, Davutoğlu offers a two level analysis to see the importance of human values in constructing a social order. While the first level comprises the restructuring of a value-system as the foundation of a new relationship between ethics and law, the second level is about providing the individual human being with basic norms to standardize behavior in daily social life. Constructing the categories of good and bad, ethical and unethical, legitimate and illegitimate is essential to interpreting the meaning of life and establishing a social order.⁴⁴ Here Davutoğlu argues that civilizations posit certain values to guide human behavior and to constitute the normative basis of a legal system.⁴⁵

While the states represent the translation of the city order into a more sophisticated structure in an integrated geographical zone and cultural, economic, and political sphere, the world order marks the most comprehensive realization of order in terms of internal social consistency, geographical prevalence, and historical continuity.

The fourth formative dimension of civilization is the development of a new perception of *time* within a new imagination of historical consciousness. The transition from mythological to historical imagination marks an important stage in the construction of historical consciousness in traditional civilizations. In this regard, the modern western civilization has distinctive characteristics regarding time perception and historical consciousness, such as the secularization of the perception of time leading to the idea of progress and the Eurocentric conception of the flow of human history.⁴⁶ The fifth formative dimension of civilization is defined with reference to the spatial understanding of order. According to Davutoğlu, there are two aspects of the spatial dimension of civilizational formations, one being about the perception of space, and the other about the city as the "geo-cultural

form" and the historical realization of the being-knowledge-value paradigm in physical space.⁴⁷ The historical emergence of a civilizational space in this context has three preconditions: "a geopolitical zone suitable for security and basic needs, a geo-economic zone for the integrity of economic activity, and a geo-cultural milieu for the consistency and continuity of cultural life. Historical civilizations emerged and rose in an integrated space where these conditions were met."⁴⁸

In the last formative dimension, Davutoğlu treats states and world order as the conventional and institutional forms of civilization. Within this understanding, while the states represent the translation of the city order into a more sophisticated structure in an integrated geographical zone and cultural, economic, and political sphere, the world order marks the most comprehensive realization of order in terms of internal social consistency, geographical prevalence, and historical continuity.⁴⁹ Davutoğlu argues that establishing an order is a process of reflecting a worldview onto historical existence. Therefore, the close relationship between "worldview" and "world order" is an indication of the existence of civilizations as historical actors. Historically, Pax Romana, the Abbasid Caliphate, and Pax Ottomana were all different world orders established by their respective civilizational traditions. When it comes to Western civilization, Davutoğlu


offers three historical moments in the transformation of international order in the West. He also defines this transformation not only in terms of world order amongst the European states, but prefers to contextualize order in terms of the civilizational transformation.

The delay of this readjustment of the world order did not only lead to frozen conflicts in sensitive geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural zones, but also provoked a global level of tension in power sharing.

In the first stage of this civilizational transformation, Renaissance and Reformation achieved an intellectual revolution and mercantilism generated an economic sea change. Together they created a new political order- that is the Westphalian nation-state system established after the collapse of the preceding traditional political order of the Holy Roman Empire. In the second stage, the Newtonian, Industrial, and French revolutions transfigured the perceptions of natural, economic, and political order, leading to two important developments: the Congress of Vienna as the European system of political order and colonialism as the new world order prevailing across the globe. The power structure of the European center expanded itself into the

periphery through the colonial world order. The second phase of historical transformation of world order was that of colonial order.⁵⁰ In this new concept and its geopolitical context, there was a geographical discontinuity. The transition from European colonialism to Pax Americana took place through a new international legal system and institutional design. The end of the Cold War with the fall of Berlin Wall was a strong indicator of the need for a new international convention along with the rise of globalization. The delay of this readjustment of the world order did not only lead to frozen conflicts in sensitive geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural zones, but also provoked a global level of tension in power sharing.⁵¹ According to Davutoğlu, the international society now stands at the edge of the most comprehensive civilizational transformation in history whereby almost all accumulated human heritage in different forms are becoming part of the most complex process of interaction in the form of globalization.⁵² The current global transformation, therefore, requires an understanding of the past, the present, and the future as a continuum rather than fragmentation in order to contribute to the restructuring of the international system into a more stable and just order.⁵³ In this context, the question of how Turkey can contribute and adapt itself to the transformation of international order is very important.

Figure 1: Davutoğlu's Civilizational World Order



“Strategic Depth”: The Geopolitical Dimension of Turkey’s Civilizational Identity

The “self-perception”, which Davutoğlu takes as the essence of civilizations and its association with the world order, is explained more clearly in *Strategic Depth* where he considers the geopolitical dimension of Turkey’s civilizational identity. The oft-used

“strategic mentality” in *Strategic Depth* is a fundamental conceptualization like “self-perception” and, just as it does in the discussion of civilization, forms the essence of his geopolitical discussion. This strategic mentality is, just as in the conceptual narrative he visits in the analysis of civilization, a Turkey-specific framework in which political elites and different segments of the society are prompted to a new orientation.

The politics of restoration penetrates into the spirit of Strategic Depth, for the restoration of the “civilizational rupture” caused by the “old paradigm” can only be restored with a new understanding of time and space.

However, the “self-perception” of *Strategic Depth* is more than just a state of individual consciousness; it is a *geopolitical* state that encompasses the varying forms of belongingness to a certain civilization, cultural identity, and their manifestations through societies’ perception of time and space. The politics of restoration penetrates into the spirit of *Strategic Depth*, for the restoration of the “civilizational rupture” caused by the “old paradigm” can only be restored with a new understanding of time and space. Re-locating Turkey in the international order can only be achieved through the utilization of a new strategic mentality. In this sense, the purpose of the politics of restoration is to overcome the multifaceted geopolitical and geo-cultural crisis that has been created socially and historically at the level of the elites.⁵⁴

The situation by itself necessitates a re-interpretation of Turkey’s “strategic depth” through a new reading of the elements of the nation-state, the religion-society-state, and the “international

order”. Even though Davutoğlu does not offer a change that ignores the idea of nation-state, he does to a great extent revise the discriminatory qualities inherent to the idea of the nation-state. Indeed, the political unit of the nation-state, which Davutoğlu sees as one of the two prongs of the civilizational crisis, is also causing a crisis for Turkey’s civilizational belonging.⁵⁵

In *Strategic Depth*, geography is the fundamental point which correlates the re-configuration of Turkey’s civilizational identity with geopolitical language. According to Davutoğlu, geography is one of the foundational elements that makes an actual contribution to the formation of civilizations. However, geography can only turn into a meaningful world (geopolitical) imagination through civilizational belongingness,⁵⁶ and civilizations develop geographical perception from their own self-perceptions.⁵⁷ Thus, the geopolitical dimension of Turkey’s civilizational identity is being used as both an inseparable part of an imagination of ancient civilization and as a constituent element of a new political unit.

The depth offered by Turkey’s geographical place is the result of civilizational continuity, while the historical depth is a result of an interregional geopolitical whole corresponding to a “central” position in terms of world politics.⁵⁸ This approach allows Davutoğlu the opportunity to

establish a Turkey-centered systemic geopolitical model while reinterpreting Turkey's international status. In the aftermath of the Cold War, geopolitical gaps and a search for an order in the global system brought the problem of Turkey's geopolitical status and its discursive position into question. The answer to this question is quite obvious for Davutoğlu: Turkey, having inherited the historical and geographic legacy of the Ottoman Empire, retains all of the continuity elements of the more comprehensive Islamic civilization, and thus "possesses a central geopolitical status".⁵⁹ What is important here is the reunification of the Islamic world, which undergoes geopolitical, geo-cultural, and geo-economic break-ups, around Turkey only through a new geopolitical status and responsibility. According to Davutoğlu's geopolitical vision, the first circle of this geographical super-structure contains borders. The second one is to connect geopolitical zones to each other; the third is to integrate the geopolitical front lines and reservoirs. Each level supports the "central" geographical position of Turkey. In this sense, *Strategic Depth* handles the Islamic world both as a geographic super structure, consisting of inter-regional transitions, and a historical element as part of the same civilization. At this point, civilization is one of the nodes of *Strategic Depth's* idea of a geographic super-complex and is an element that allows Turkey to be part

of the international system. As a result, Davutoğlu, in *Strategic Depth*, draws a geopolitical framework by which Turkey will adapt to the global system through restoring its internal integrity and its outer face that projects this integrity to the outside, namely foreign policy.

The "Politics of Restoration" and Turkey's Adaptation to International Order

As a new phenomenon, the politics of restoration in the JDP era arises through the criticism of the nation-state, the republican security culture and the civilizational discourse, that has been produced on the basis of the Kemalist ideology.⁶⁰ Just as Davutoğlu is a foundational figure for the reproduction of Turkey in terms of civilizational identity, he is also one of the main actors behind the construction of the restoration discourse. However, it is necessary to state that the idea of restoration has become more frequently used after 2011, when the JDP began to consolidate its power. The restoration has also become a part of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's discourse of "New Turkey" after his election as President in August 2014. Therefore, what is meant by restoration is the process of restructuring the "old regime" and determining the principles to carry the establishment of the "New Turkey". Davutoğlu's main idea for restoration, on the other hand,

may be summed up as “catching the spirit of the time.”⁶¹

Davutoğlu first introduces his idea of restoration primarily at a historical level and asserts that there is a mutual relationship between the historical transformation of the international order and Turkey’s adaptation to this process. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey today is undergoing a new process of restoration in order to adapt to the transformation that the international system is experiencing.⁶² Here, it may be said that with this idea of restoration Davutoğlu establishes both an intellectual and mental basis, and a historical continuity through the Ottoman-Turkish modernization processes. Historicity reflects the transformation of the modern international order and the restoration periods of the State and of political understanding that occurred as a response to the referred transformations on the axis of the Ottoman-Turkish history of politics; the intellectual level is the normative manifestation of this restoration. In this sense, as with any other social crises and transformations in different periods of history in the international order, the Ottomans also experienced the connected “constitutive” periods - first from the transition of the old world order to modernity and then from modernity to the global world order. These constitutive periods are the times in which “great restorations” have been

experienced; as the referred restorations help the accumulation of the society, the state, and the civilization to prevail against current challenges, therefore facilitating adaptation to the global transformation.⁶³ Currently in the midst of its fourth great restoration period, Turkey has previously experienced three great restoration periods.

The first was the Köprülü restoration, which occurred reciprocal to the Westphalian Order (1648) that allowed for the modern world order to come forward in Europe. The Köprülü restoration represented a “new-traditional” form of restoration, which reconstructed the tradition in the transition from the old to the modern, and redefined the Ottoman Empire within the new international order.⁶⁴ In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and with the arrival of the Vienna order in 1815, the responses produced to the challenges of modernity came out mostly as an effort on the part of the Ottomans to adapt to this system. As a constituent element of the modernization of Ottoman-Turkey, the *Tanzimat* reforms, according to Davutoğlu, represent the transition from ancient to modern in the world order. The *second great restoration* period was initiated by the struggle for independence against imperialist forces in the War of Independence that followed the First World War, which ended the 1815 Vienna Order and caused the collapse of the Ottoman state.

This restoration period was consolidated by the globalization of the international order and by the establishment of the Republic of Turkey as a fully independent member of this order and as a response to this change. The *third great restoration* process of Turkey followed in order to adjust to the new international order founded after the signing of the Versailles Treaty and the end of World War II, and to adapt to the strategic choice of a multi-party political system.⁶⁵

The fourth period is the 21st century; which embodies all of the elements of transition periods—from the old to the modern, from the modern to the global— and prepares the ground for the old to be rediscovered. This new period is witnessing the restoration of both the international system on a global level and the regional system of which Turkey is a part. Considered historically, both Turkey's domestic and foreign policies are undergoing a great restoration process as a response to other great "geopolitical transformations".⁶⁶

Davutoğlu's restoration policy is mainly based on three principle dimensions, each of which aims to transform Turkey in terms of political understanding and structure, and each of which, at the same time, wishes to position the dynamism that is liberated from this transformation, as a power instrument in the changing international system. The first part of the restoration in question involves the restoration of domestic politics.

The Restoration of Domestic Politics

In the speech Davutoğlu delivered during the JDP's 1st Extraordinary Congress, where he elucidated nine main headings of his restoration policy,⁶⁷ the first dimension (in a general sense) was that of domestic politics. The purpose of the restoration in domestic politics is to facilitate the discursive and institutional transformation of the "Kemalist discourse of nation-state" that has formed the main framework of the Republic's historical modernization experience. There is a search for the reformulation of the discursive and institutional instruments and webs that have come to the fore with the securitization of politics due to the dominating "security of the regime" idea in Kemalist discourse. Decentralization of the Kemalist securitization technique sits at the core of the inner ring of Davutoğlu's restoration of domestic policy restoration and helps the restriction of freedoms in the "political sphere" built along the axis of threats.⁶⁸

While the deepening of democracy will displace the "politics of security" that has built up along the technobureaucratic center, it will also necessitate the philosophical and institutional restoration of the state and the bureaucracy. Just as there is the purpose of toppling the old political order which fictionalized the state as something disconnected from and

beyond the people, there is also an effort here to philosophically construct a “new state ethics”. This “state ethics” will only be possible through further deepening of democracy to the level of freedoms and human dignity, and it will institutionally only be possible with a new constitution. Therefore, the road to the restoration of domestic politics goes through the elimination of clandestine power relations “hidden” in different forms in different institutions both philosophically and institutionally, and the reconstruction of the state within the context of “justice”, “freedom”, and “institutional flexibility”.⁶⁹ It is possible to say that Davutoğlu takes the concept of national will as a reference. Therefore, the restoration of domestic politics requires not only the deepening of democracy but also the removal of a force originating from an “untestable will” that stands in opposition to the political will encouraged by the “national will”.

Restoration of the State Identity and National Order

The second dimension of the frame drawn for democracy, human rights, and the institutional re-establishment of the state in domestic politics is the restoration of identity. In this sense, during the first restoration period, which occurred during the *Tanzimat* period, there was an effort to construct

a supra-identity under the label of “Ottomanist” belongingness. A new identity imagination built along the axis of the “national identity” was in question during the second restoration period experienced in the Republic. In the third restoration period, an identity was introduced and explained through the static parameters of ideological identities during the Cold War.⁷⁰ Because the periods during which these identities were built also directly became the source of the state’s political actions, Davutoğlu defends that the changes, both at the mental and the constitutional level, of the identity restoration during the JDP period should be completed.

It is understood that Davutoğlu’s view of identity restoration has two essential dimensions. By “restoring” an identity narrative that both excludes and homogenizes an identity imagination fortified by the nation-state paradigm, Davutoğlu states that the political reference of the non-exclusionary new identity is the “identity of citizenship” and its social reference is the “identity of common history.”⁷¹ For this reason, identity restoration must first be experienced in the nation-state’s understanding of “inflexible” identity. Historically speaking, the transition from cohesive/eclectic old identities to the exclusionary/homogenizing modern nation-state identity has caused important drifts in Turkey’s historical civilization codes.

The purpose of foreign policy restoration is to increase Turkey's ability to adapt, as an "active subject", to the transforming international order by redefining itself, and to contribute in a constitutive manner to the formation of the new world order by using its influence in the international balance of power.

In other words, Davutoğlu argues that the will and power of togetherness, which comes from sharing a common past and a common experience, forms the basis of the identity restoration. While planning the identity of citizenship as the basis for the ethno-religious dimension of Turkey's identity restoration, the identity of common history should be thought of as a common ground for both the multiculturalism built around "being from Turkey" (*Türkiyelilik*) and as one that encompasses all of the societies who share the same geographic basin, Turkey. Stated differently, the identity restoration built along the line of a common history considers the different elements in the same geographic basin not as an "opposition" or as "opposite sides", but rather within "consubstantiality".⁷² While Davutoğlu's restoration of identity necessitates the reformulation of the nation-state

identity, which will become a source for the creation of a "democratic identity" designed and adopted at a larger scale, it will also work to build a new "regional democratic imagination" along the same line.⁷³ The situation necessarily invites the displacement of the old paradigm by phasing out the Turkishness reference that unavoidably reproduced the political regime formed around nationalism and secularism, and will procure the construction of a new national identity on the axis of democratic pluralism.

Restoration of Foreign Policy and Regional Order

Foreign policy forms the third dimension of Davutoğlu's idea of restoration. The purpose of foreign policy restoration is to increase Turkey's ability to adapt, as an "active subject", to the transforming international order by redefining itself, and to contribute in a constitutive manner to the formation of the new world order by using its influence in the international balance of power.⁷⁴ Foreign policy restoration has three fundamental dimensions: (i) reconstruction of the historical imagination about the foreign policy mentality and practices that have been constructed at the center of the secular nation-state; (ii) reshaping Turkey's geographic imagination; and (iii) reorganizing Turkey's place in the global

system by calibrating its political and economic relations. Thus, by developing a flexible geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural model, Turkey will remove its passive/fringe element in the international system and will eventually contribute to the formation of a “pluralist international order”.⁷⁵ According to Davutoğlu, a non-hierarchical world order that is politically *multipolar*, economically *multi-centered*, and culturally *multi-cultural*, will allow for Turkey to use power parameters more effectively.⁷⁶

The mentality dimension is the foundational dimension of foreign policy restoration; in which a new perspective is created through the reconstruction of a historical imagination and understanding of time. We come across with the dimension of mentality as one of the “establishing parameters of civilizations”⁷⁷ in Davutoğlu’s other works. The dimension of mentality is mirrored in foreign policy as the acceptance of a new mentality to set “strategic orientation”. Hence, the understanding that will direct Turkey’s geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural standing and state action must be, “the consciousness as a common product of historical accumulation, which contains the world of cultural, psychological, religious and social values, and the geographic area wherein such an accumulation takes place and is reflected, and the product of the

determination of the viewpoint of that society of its place in the world.”⁷⁸

Appearing as one of the fundamental principles of the JDP’s foreign policy, “zero problems with neighbors” and “balance between freedom and security” take the lead as the practical sources of foreign policy restoration. The aforementioned principles are important in two respects.⁷⁹ Firstly, they transformed Turkey into a more dynamic country by presenting a framework of a practical political model, which led to deepening democracy against the protectionist and defensive political attitudes of central actors in the international system who were trying to dominate through the post-9/11 security discourses and practices. Secondly, by propping up the foreign policy framework on the principle of freedom, rather than the security discourse, these two principles displaced the “historical coding” of Turkey with her neighbors, and thus made possible a new “socio-political” kind of relationship.⁸⁰ The situation allowed for the opportunity to reformulate the different countries sharing the same historical continuity in a large geographical basin, not as nation-states against each other, but as parts of the same history on a socio-cultural level. Undoubtedly, it is not accurate to say that such a restorative idea has come to an end today within the context of Turkey’s present foreign policy parameters. The idea does, however,

require attention from the point of the "change" it creates in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy paradigms.

The point of intersection between the above idea and the politics of "zero problems" should be found in Turkey's changing border perspective. The exclusionary understanding of space, which had been left to the devices of hegemonic discourse, not taking into account anything except for legal borders and ignoring historical and cultural continuities, was set aside. Then, by opening to debate the issue of legality concerning the inter-state "border" concept, borders were brought into the center of foreign policy as a social construct at a sociological and cultural level. This new understanding—especially with the pre-Arab Spring High Level Strategic Collaboration, the reciprocal removal of visas, and the reconsideration of the understanding of "border" previously presented in foreign policy via the newly created economic mechanisms—allowed Turkey to include its nation-state borders not as a line separating it from neighboring countries, but rather as part of foreign policy mechanisms as a dynamic and flexible social area that changes in accordance with the international and regional conjuncture. Therefore, while on the one hand it created an eclectic understanding of borders that was on the axis of democratization and further (in a balanced way) from the security

discourse, it also transformed Turkey from a country that followed the strategy of maintaining the status quo, out of an impulse to protect one's borders, to the status of a more active country.⁸¹

The second important area of restoration in foreign policy is that Turkey has entered a new phase of "geographic imagination". What Davutoğlu means by restoration here is that it is necessary for Turkey to reposition its international standing in accordance with the changing parameters in a way that will reflect its historical and geographic depth. The equivalent of this in foreign policy principles is that of the "central country" and the "new diplomatic style" that has been instated.⁸² In this way, for geographic imagination, it is possible to say that there is a restorative search in terms of moving from a nation-state reference, the borders of which are set and homogenized on a piece of land, to a transnational geopolitical category when moving toward civilization. As a result, with the discourse of a central country, the transformation⁸³ that was experienced during the Republic—where there was a switch from the scale of civilization to that of state—will be reversed, and a search for moving from the state scale to that of civilization will be in question.

The third area of foreign policy restoration is to be included as a "global actor" in the process of the reconstruction of the international order

through efficient diplomacy.⁸⁴ One of the fundamental events that Davutoğlu frequently emphasized during his tenure as Foreign Minister was that the international system was in transition, and thus, frequent global crises would be faced.⁸⁵ As a matter of fact, the global scale of the effects of regional crises in the aftermath of the Cold War caused “three big earthquakes.”⁸⁶ The first was the *geopolitical* earthquake following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the second was the *security* earthquake⁸⁷ in the aftermath of 9/11, and the last was the economic crises which contributed to the *econo-political* earthquake⁸⁸ alongside the Arab Spring. Directly affected by the period of the three earthquakes and their results, Turkey was unprepared for the first earthquake and was late to adapt to the transformation of the international system. It tried to respond to the second by making a choice along the lines of freedom and security.⁸⁹ For the third, Turkey attempted to adapt through an axis of democratic norm-value in its foreign policy perspective.⁹⁰ Attempting to unite this adaptation period with criticism of the order, Turkey advocated that restoration is necessary, not just at the national level, but on a regional and a global scale as well. This strategy also forms the basis of Turkey’s critique of a West-centered global order and its political, economic, and cultural monopoly and claim of universality.

“Civilizations not Civilization”: The Making of a Multicultural World Order

The politics of Turkey’s restoration sets an example for a discussion of the global order about how the institutional and normative dimension of the global system applies to this reform. In this sense, the international system, being subject to reform, has opened up a discussion among political elites in which they approach the matter from a “unified discourse.” For example, former President Abdullah Gül iterated the need for a reform in the international system at the level of “three-dimensional” “imperfect equilibrium” where normalization at political, economic and cultural levels requires “a new understanding of equality.”⁹¹ According to President Erdoğan, the global community is in need of new basic freedoms, justice, and “awareness of global civilization” based on equality. Alongside his universal call for a new global system, Erdoğan emphasizes that human beings take precedence in this new order from an ethical perspective in the global civilization politics.⁹² According to Erdoğan’s new global civilizational politics, there needs to be not a “new civilizational design, but rather, a guide which aims to stop the dangerous path humanity is facing.”⁹³ In this sense, Turkey, as other emerging countries voice their demands for reforms in the international order,

appears to be in search of a "post-western international system". However, Turkey's criticism of the international order sits upon a much more cultural vein as compared to the others since the country frequently verbalizes its claim of being the representative of a non-Western civilization.

At the same time, Erdoğan's demand for a reform in the current global system is three-dimensional, and is also aligned with Davutoğlu's "civilization-based" perspective. Firstly, from Turkey's perspective, today's international system is problematic and suffers from bad governance. The UN governance model is seen as an example of such problems, as its "veto" order troubles the global system when it comes to critical decision-making processes. Under the umbrella of the UN "the representative power must be just" and its applicability must be "inclusive and overarching" across the regions. This type of renewal will not only facilitate the limitation of sub-regional order crises⁹⁴ but also reposition Turkey's rise in the international system.

Turkey's criticism of the international order sits upon a much more cultural vein as compared to the others since the country frequently verbalizes its claim of being the representative of a non-Western civilization.

The demand to reform the UN system is not limited to the question of comprehensive fair representation. Another problem that has become apparent over time is Turkey's critique of the UN Security Council's lack of effectiveness. This issue has surfaced even more in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The civil war in Syria is an example of how Turkey and how the regional order have created a tectonic shift. For example, Erdoğan warns that "if we leave the issue to the vote of one or two members" (referring to Russia and China) "of the permanent five at the United Nations Security Council, then the aftermath of Syria will be very hazardous and humanity will write it down in history with unforgettable remarks".⁹⁵ Erdoğan thus essentially calls for the elimination of the veto power of the permanent members (P5) and of the unanimity requirement to pass resolutions. Therefore, the P5's individual veto power is one of the key pillars of today's international system, and Turkey believes it is responsible for the UN's relative lack of success over the past decades.

Nevertheless, the aforementioned cultural vein in Turkey's search for a new international order goes beyond the country's demands for political and economic reforms. As a result, one of the most important criticisms regarding the UN Security Council's decision-making capacity in global security issues is that

the Council only focuses on material power while seeking security throughout the world. To this end, an advisor from the Prime Minister's office denoted the following point: "When creating problem-solving procedures, actors who are able to use soft power methods such as language, belief, understanding of justice, and principles should be included in the decision-making process."⁹⁶

The reconstruction of Turkey within the global cultural order is incorporated to the construction of a global civilization at a larger scale.

This statement and the like, especially coming from Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's analysis, project a view in which Turkey's post-western international order vies for a pluralistic, diverse, and interdependent system. This rhetoric may be related to the politics of restoration at the point of a civilizational order in which Turkey will take on a role as an active country- for Davutoğlu, civilizational transformation is the final stage of the world order.⁹⁷ This is a search about a "cultural order" that integrates different historic entities to the system rather than reading the global system in terms of norms, understandings and practices through a single historical perspective. From this perspective, Turkey promotes a multi-cultural and heterogeneous

system in which all can co-exist; a "cooperative system" that is inclusive and more representative as a form of global governance. A new global governance model is, therefore, one that is not restricted to a "single society, particular countries, continents or nations, but one that is inclusive and looks out for the interest of the entire humanity."⁹⁸ In this sense, the new global order for Turkey should be: legitimate, transparent, and democratic; representative and completely open to participation; should work to solve inactive and active conflicts in order to increase stability; and finally, should lean on the principles of security and reform for everyone.⁹⁹

The reconstruction of Turkey within the global cultural order is incorporated to the construction of a global civilization at a larger scale. The reconstruction process has two dimensions: an inward one and an outward one that allows Turkey's integration with the global system. Erdoğan envisioned this system and explained it as follows: "At this point, history and destiny give Turkey a different duty and responsibility. Having borne the mission of keeping together different societies for centuries and to build bridges between the East and West, our country can play a leading role in the development and spread of a new civilizational consciousness in the new period."¹⁰⁰

The inward dimension is about what kind of a place Turkey will have within

the international system as a country that has blended historical and civilizational elements of continuity. Especially in the last period, the concept of a "New Turkey," which has begun to gain popularity among the public, also signifies a distancing from the old paradigm of civilizational representation. While this new civilizational perspective objects to Turkey joining the international order as an integral part of the Western *polity*, it also constructs Turkey as a historical and civilizational part of Islam within the international order.

The multi-cultural civilizational order is not just a way of expressing something about Islamic civilization, but is, in fact, a much more comprehensive discourse which contains all civilizations.

The second dimension of the cultural order related to Turkey is its outward approach, and reflects an interaction and search for transformation along the civilizational axis as a way that will continue the real power transformation in the global system. This kind of search, which stands against the use of the word *civilization* to be used separately for humanity, loudly states that non-Western civilizations have entered a period of revitalization through globalization. In this sense, the multi-

cultural civilizational order is not just a way of expressing something about Islamic civilization, but is, in fact, a much more comprehensive discourse which contains all civilizations. Because of this, the "New Turkey" discourse mixed with the civilizational paradigm differentiates the post-Western international order understanding.

According to Davutoğlu, in a period where globalization offers a re-blending of the continuity elements of the old cultural basins, a Euro-centered civilizational desire will not keep its hegemonic position for long. For this reason, the cultural order must assume a character that is much more pluralist and all institutional mechanisms that will be constructed around this cultural order should be redesigned to be able to carry this dynamism.¹⁰¹ Globalization, prompting all societies in a multifaceted manner, also transforms the differentiation among lines of civilization into a point of critique for Turkey. The Chinese, Muslims, Indians, Africans, and Latin Americans have come to be participants in the production of history because of the dynamic character of globalization, and Turkey is in search of becoming a part of this historical production.¹⁰² The imagination of a democratic and pluralist global system introduces Turkey's adaptation to the global order through a critical integration by adding another dimension to the JDP's civilizational discourse. It also

foresees a reciprocal interaction process where Islamic civilization's historically established normative values (war, peace, security, etc.) are included in the present international order. In place of hegemony for the success of this civilization-based shared existence, it calls for an international order that is versatile, multi-dimensional, comprehensive, pluralist, and democratic.

Conclusion

Just as the 2000s began a new period for Turkey's domestic and foreign policy, it also brought a period of transformation in the real power elements within the global system. In the global order of the period, in opposition to the Atlantic-centered international order, a Pacific-centered reformist understanding followed the reaction rising from Europe. The new rising powers who were beginning to increase their real power capacity in this period also brought a political, economic, and cultural "dissident discourse" to the present structure of the international order. During this period, the "rising powers" proclaimed the need for reforming the international system while also concentrating their critiques on the weaknesses of the "comprehensiveness" and "effectiveness" of the UN. The search at the state level was defined by those studying international relations as the pursuit of a post-Western international order. This order came up against the

international order that was operating over the West-centered politics and security architecture, as the search for a politically multi-polar and culturally cosmopolitan system. Fundamentally, it was defined as a system where the West's material and ideological superiority eventually faded and in its place the need for a normative global consensus gradually increased.

Turkey expressed the need to reform the institutions of the international system by opposing the European-centered reading of history and proposing the construction of a more pluralist order.

Parallel to this, thinking that the current order was facing a depression, Turkey has since the 2000s placed its criticism of the order within a political and economic discourse as well as a civilizational one. In this sense, Turkey entered a search for the reconstruction of the international order around a model of "good global governance"¹⁰³ that would be politically multipolar, economically multi-centered, and in terms of civilization would be multi-cultural and pluralist.¹⁰⁴ The goal of this search was the removal of the West-centered emphasis from the world order narrative of the present international system. Because Turkey advances this effort in our present world

(of globalization), the old cultures and civilizations have entered a period of renewal and that very globalization takes different cultures from being passive followers of modernization and changes them into active subjects. This situation by itself gave Turkey's search for an identity within the international system a new direction. For this reason, Turkey expressed the need to reform the institutions of the international system by opposing the European-centered reading of history and proposing the construction of a more pluralist order. This understanding bears similarities to the post-Western international order paradigm in Turkish foreign policy.¹⁰⁵

How the representation of Islamic civilization will be transferred into the international system with the rise of Turkey and what the relevant mechanisms would be remain as open-ended questions.

However, the increased emphasis on civilization in Turkish foreign policy fundamentally affected Turkey's cultural criticism of the international order and caused the country to change its foreign policy paradigm, which coded the Western system as the final target of an advancing political understanding. Foreign policy makers and political elites defined this period as "restoration

politics", and thus both historicized and then recreated it along the axis of the "New Turkey" discourse. In this sense, the "New Turkey" discourse reproduced the civilizational identity part of Turkey's international order narrative by blending it with an anti-hegemonic "dissident" discourse. Civilization came to be referred to as an "actor" at the systemic level. There are two main discerning dimensions of the civilizational identity: first, it caused the birth of a new geopolitical vision blended with Islamic solidarity discourse and shaped around the institutional and normative representations of the Islamic world at a historical level. Second, it is the start of a new way of viewing Islamic civilization's normative-based order narrative as a value in establishing the multi-cultural structure of world order. To conclude, as has been argued in this article, when these two factors are taken jointly with Turkey's "politics of restoration", it can be said that civilization is used as an institution and an actor in international politics. This situation in and of itself shows Turkey's socialization with international society at a fundamental level. This socialization will determine the framework of Turkey's search for international order from this point on. However, how the representation of Islamic civilization will be transferred into the international system with the rise of Turkey and what the relevant mechanisms would be remain as open-ended questions.

Endnotes

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- 9 For civilization-based analyses and for analyses about its relations to Turkish foreign policy see, Burhanettin Duran, “Understanding AK Party’s Identity Discourse: A Civilizational Discourse and Its Limits”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2013), pp. 91-109; Pinar Bilgin and Ali Bilgiç, “Turkey’s ‘New’ Foreign Policy toward Eurasia”, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2011), pp. 173-199; Martina Warning and Tuncay Kardeş, “The Impact of Changing Islamic Identity on Turkey’s New Foreign Policy”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 2011), pp. 123-140.
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- 11 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Foreword: Civilizational Revival in the Global Age”, in Fred Dallmayr, M. Akif Kayapınar and İsmail Yaylacı (eds.), *Civilization and World Order: Geopolitics and Cultural Difference*, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2014, p. vii.
- 12 Davutoğlu, “The Formative Parameters of Civilizations”, p. 91.
- 13 I would like to thank one of the reviewers for his/her suggestion about the English translation of *ben-idraki* (self-perception) as self-cognizance. S/he argues that “Davutoğlu’s term “*ben-idraki*” refers to an unmistakable understanding of the self. It is not developed in relation to others as in the case of identity. It emerges from inside as a reality and the subject just defines itself with that recognitions. Therefore, I would suggest employing the term of *self-cognizance* rather than *self-perception*. This is not only semantic. It directly changes

the meaning of Davutoğlu's view." The definition is acceptable, but in his other articles in English, Davutoğlu uses *self-perception*. Therefore, I prefer his translation of *ben-idraki*.

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- 17 Davutoğlu, *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World*, p. 8.
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