
On Turkey's Trail as a "Rising Middle Power" in the Network of Global Governance: Preferences, Capabilities, and Strategies

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Abstract

Acknowledging Turkey as a "rising/emerging middle power", occupying a middle ground between traditional (or Western) middle powers and non-traditional middle powers, this paper aims to reassess Turkey's changing power and position in the complex power hierarchies and the changing architecture of global governance through its preferences, capabilities and strategies by using a comparative analysis. It then briefly resumes its findings to assess the driving factors, conditions and specific characteristics explaining Turkey's contribution to global governance compared to a cluster of eight selected countries composed of the five BRICS countries, labeled as non-traditional middle powers, and Canada, Australia and South Korea, as traditional middle powers. Finally, it looks at Turkey's contribution to global governance at the institutional level, with a special focus on Turkey's 2015 G20 presidency as a test case for understanding its global governance activism. In the final analysis, this study underlines that Turkey's ambitious agenda for its G20 presidency gives clear signals of its future preferences and middle power activism in less hierarchical G20-type forums in which developed and developing countries are equally represented and middle power countries are allowed more manoeuvring capacity.

Key Words

Global governance, international order, Turkish foreign policy, rising middle powers, traditional middle powers, emerging non-traditional middle powers, G20.

Introduction

In recent years, one of the most important debates in international politics is about the ongoing global power shifts occurring in the international system in favor of the rising powers, and the impact of power transition on the international system and global governance. In this new world structure, rising middle powers have started to take over a prominent role from the major powers and have sought to change the international system in line with their own interests, strategies and values, by assuming new responsibilities in major international organizations. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, we have been witnessing the ascendance of "the West and the rest" discourse in the so-called "post-American" or "emerging international system," in which the rising middle powers have already engaged

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in developing alternative strategies for solving the international problems and strengthened their bargaining and pressure capacities towards the Western powers.

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The way, with which preferences and capabilities, and through which strategies, the rising middle powers have been contributing to global governance, is an understudied field in the International Relations (IR) literature in terms of theoretical and empirical studies. On the other hand, there exists a conceptual ambiguity in the IR literature around concepts that have generally been used in an interchangeable way, such as “rising (or emerging) powers”, “middle or middle range powers” and “regional powers,” and these overlapping roles make the analysis more complicated and contested. Another aspect of this fluidity of concepts is an increasing need to provide an empirical and comparative research on the preferences, capabilities

and strategies of rising powers in the context of major/great powers, traditional (or Western) middle powers, and non-traditional (or emerging) middle powers. For instance, Russia and China are labeled both as major, rising and regional powers, while Australia and Canada (which are conceptualized in this study as “rising traditional middle powers”) are generally considered as both traditional middle powers and regional powers and, to a lesser extent, rising powers, due to their rising economies. Similarly, some countries like Brazil, India, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, and Turkey are labeled both as “rising powers” and “emerging/non-traditional middle powers” (but are labeled in this study as rising (or emerging) middle powers).

Given this overlapping conceptual framework, Turkey has generally been neglected in most of the studies in IR on rising powers and middle powers despite its rising middle power status over the last decade. One of the novelties of this paper is to reassess Turkey’s changing power status in the complex power hierarchies and categories under the auspices of “rising/emerging middle powers” occupying a middle ground between traditional middle powers and non-traditional middle powers, mainly due to its unique position and its bridge-building role between “the West and the rest”. Another novelty of this paper to the IR and Turkish foreign policy literature

is to understand Turkey's position and contribution in the changing architecture of global governance. Here, Turkey's capability in the global governance will be compared using appropriate statistical data with those of the selected other eight states, including the five BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and three traditional middle powers, Canada, Australia and South Korea. This cluster of eight states is selected mainly due to their representative character of the two different rising "middle power" categories, *non traditional* and *traditional*. A third novelty of this paper is to use Turkey's current presidency to the G20, since December 2014, as a test case for understanding its global governance activism as a rising middle power in the light of the triad, *preferences*, *capabilities*, *strategies*.

Not all countries who joined the rank of rising powers or middle range powers have actively been engaged with international institutions or global governance and have been keen on assuming more responsibility in a post-American world order. Of course, it is a complex task to depict under which circumstances, within which membership to international organizations and on the basis of which ideational and material contributions rising middle powers participate in global governance. How well or poorly a state has contributed to global governance needs to be empirically researched, and this of course requires a

systematic comparative study by taking into consideration different variables.

In this backdrop, the first part of this paper looks towards Turkey's preferences, capabilities, and strategies with respect to global governance. Accordingly, firstly Turkey's *preferences* regarding the changing international order and global governance structure will be explained. Secondly, in order to understand Turkey's rising middle power *capabilities*, a comparative approach based on five criteria previously used by Hongying Wang and Erik French in their 2013 article entitled "Middle Range Powers in Global Governance"¹ will be used. On the basis of the interpretation of data in our tables, this study will briefly resume its findings to assess the driving factors, specific conditions and characteristics explaining Turkey's contribution to global governance as a "distinct" rising middle power. Thirdly, Turkey's global governance *strategies* in terms of commonalities and differences with those of other rising middle powers will be explained. Here, the way Turkey's "unique" rising middle power status simultaneously generates different and accommodating perspectives and outcomes in the shifting world order compared to other rising middle powers will also be explained. The second part of the paper will look at Turkey's contribution to global governance at the institutional level, with a special focus on Turkey's more ambitious policies towards the G20.

Turkey as a Rising Middle Power in the Existing Global Governance: Preferences, Capabilities and Strategies

Turkey's attention to the architecture of global governance goes back to the 1920s, when it first criticized the decision-making mechanisms and structure of the League of Nations, established in the aftermath of the First World War in the framework of the unfolding of a collective security understanding. In its session on 16 December 1925, to which Turkey did not participate, the League of Nations (LN) decided to leave Mosul to Iraq under the mandate of the United Kingdom.² This decision of the LN was harshly criticized by Turkey for having been illegitimate and against international law, and Turkey accused the LN of having acted under the guidance of the UK in the Mosul question.³ This criticism of Turkey on the LN today still shares some common features with Turkey's current approach to international order and the UN decision-making system, which is far from being anti-systemic, but rather is more related with the mechanisms and the structure. In the Cold War years, when Turkey remained as a close ally to the U.S. in particular and the West in general, Turkey's within system challenge was less vocal and only became apparent with the unfolding of international crises closely concerned with its national interests (for instance, the

Cyprus conflict). Similarly, the successive Yugoslavian crisis triggered in the 1990s led to the rise of an international order criticism-based discourse in Turkish foreign policy. The Iraqi War of 2003 and the Arab revolts which started in late 2010 all made Turkey's UN-centered order criticism more apparent in its foreign policy.⁴ Turkey's rising criticism of the UN's unfair decision-making mechanisms has increased its tone with the deterioration of the Syrian civil war after 2012. Since Turkey's quest for international justice for the deepening Syrian tragedy in the major global governance institutions, as well as regional organizations have proven abortive, its within system challenge to international order started to be accompanied by a differentiated activism in the global governance system. Turkey's "rising middle power" status needs to be further analyzed in terms of preferences, capability and strategy in the new global geometry of power.

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Preferences

Turkey's self-identification as a pro-Western state belonging to the Western camp has long avoided the country perceiving itself as an autonomous global player with global interests. In the Cold War years and in the 1990s, Turkey lacked a combination of material resources, as well as diplomatic and ideational power. It also avoided embracing a middle power model that could elevate and differentiate its position in the global system. Turkey's longlasting economic shortcomings, mainly due to its foreign debt and chronic inflation problems and its dependance since the 1980s on Western financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, did not open up space for its advancement of a global foreign policy role and a nuanced institutionnalism. This period was marked by Turkey's Western-centric approach to international order, which attributed it a "fixed" Western ally role rather than an "evolving" role in search of different forms of actorness in the international system. During the first decade following the end of the Cold War, Turkey's own domestic problems combined with economic instabilities also made it difficult for Turkish leaders to take on new forms of diplomatic initiatives in global affairs through an autonomous middle power foreign policy agenda.

In fact, the emergence of the Turkish model with the collapse of the Soviet Union- a role model to be emulated by

the newly established post-Soviet Turkic Republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia- created potential for Turkey-as-a-middle power to attempt some regional efforts at bridging the Occident and Orient.⁵ However, Turkey's low role performance, mainly due to its lack of material resources in acting as a model for the Turkic Republics,⁶ did not turn to a regional leadership that could also have fostered Turkey's global role in the international system. Since regional power and global power status are mutually interdependent and a weakness in one will affect the other, Turkey's limitations in projecting regional power in the Cold and post-Cold War era and even today, significantly affect its rising power status and its contribution to global governance.

Regarding Turkey's preferences in terms of the global governance system, it can also be argued that Turkey's top institutional foreign policy priority has, since 1959 when it made its first application for membership to European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU), been integration as a full member. Its multilateralism mostly aimed at realigning its foreign policy with that of its Western allies. In this respect, Turkey's "follower" role did not provide it with new possibilities in terms of autonomous diplomatic activity. However, the deterioration of Turkish-American relations with the Iraqi War in 2003, the blockage of Turkey-EU

negotiations in 2006 and the considerable increase in its material power also made Turkey more inclined in global politics to act as an active agenda-setter and a normative foreign policy actor seeking a cosmopolitan and pluricentric world order⁷ rather than a passive follower. Turkey's efforts for gradual normalisation of its relations with the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, with some of its neighbours in other surrounding regions, like Armenia, also opened up space for Turkish foreign policy to take on new and more diversified foreign policy roles with a global connection, such as mediator, peace-broker, humanitarian actor and development aid contributor. The first decade of the 2000s witnessed a significant number of Turkish attempts in forging its regionalization and international socialization in formal and informal regional and international institutions and groups. The same period was in turn marked by a strong Turkish activism in the UN through its non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council from 2009 to 2010. This of course provided it with new opportunities to play a more constructive role in global governance by strengthening its within-system challenge and its reform aspirations vis-à-vis the international order. This membership to the UN Security Council and a Turkey-Brazil joint initiative in the spring of 2010 regarding a fuel-swap deal with Iran accelerated Turkey's active engagement with regard to the global governance

institutions, particularly the UN. Turkey's activism in the UN has also covered its close engagement within the work of the UN General Assembly and its other subsidiary bodies. Turkey's candidacy to the United Nations Security Council for non-permanent membership during the 2015-2016 term, despite its failure, is another sign of Turkey's continued willingness to become more actively involved in global governance related issues inside the UN. Another novelty with regard to Turkey's global politics concerns its increasing activism over the last five years in extra-regional countries in Africa and Latin America, thanks to its cultural and development cooperation policies. Turkey's rising donor status at the international level, especially across the African continent, is also a good indicator of the change in Turkey's global governance policies in recent years.⁸

Turkey's multilateralism in recent years is not only restricted to its increasing activism in the UN. Turkey's G20 strategy under its 2015 rotating presidency gives clear signals about Turkey's future preferences and reform aspirations in terms of global governance. On the other hand, in recent years, Turkey has shared a more common ideational ground with the BRICS countries, despite some differences in their strategies, about the reform of the global political and financial institutions, particularly the UN and IMF. Here what is at stake is to understand the degree of influence

of Turkey's current global governance policies over the international order compared to other rising middle powers, both traditional and non-traditional ones. Turkey's capabilities also matter together with its preferences and strategies in grasping its relocation as a rising middle power in global governance.

Capabilities

This study assumes that states' participation to global governance can change according to four main factors. This is an assumption which I have partly borrowed from the analytical framework of an article by Hongying Wang and Erik French written in 2013:⁹ *i) material power, ii) the degree of states' dependence on the global economy, iii) states' behaviours towards the existing international order (either as a reformist or a bystander country), iv) socializational and institutional power (can be measured by looking at the length of a country's membership in major international organisations) and v) the strength of their civil society.* These five factors hypothesized in Wang and French's article refer to a combination of neorealist, liberal, critical, constructivist and post-internationalist theoretical perspectives and thus successfully synthesize the insights of these theories in order to explain the reasons behind the more active involvement of some middle powers in global governance than others. The five criteria derived from the above mentioned theories offer general

insights into variation among rising middle powers' participation in global governance. Rather than using a single theoretical approach to explain middle power activism, this study employs Wang and French's *five factors-based eclectic explanation*, each of which is supported by a different IR theory.

Material Power

As neorealist theory suggests, a state's participation in global governance should be conditioned by its relative power and its dual objectives for survival and independence.¹⁰ Accordingly, a state should only be actively participating in global governance if i) this conforms to its national interests; ii) its security would not be jeopardized; and iii) it does not have the sufficient capacity to act autonomously in order to preserve its interests with regard to global governance.¹¹ While a weak state wishing to be actively involved in global governance may lack the necessary capabilities, a major power may seek to act unilaterally in the international system with the aim of maintaining its own interests.¹² However, middle powers have more capacity to influence the development in the world despite their limited material power compared to major powers. According to Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, middle powers are defined by their foreign policy behaviour rather than their size.¹³ These

secondary states exhibit autonomy from major powers and thus they seek to ameliorate injustice in the international system by finding peaceful solutions to international crisis.¹⁴ One of the characteristics of middle powers is that they are likely to be more inclined to take cooperative efforts to respond to the problems of global governance.¹⁵

Trade interdependence increases diplomatic cooperation among trade partners and also positively impacts the involvement of the latter in global governance by assuming more responsibilities.

Given this, the first factor assumes that the more a middle power has material power (defined in terms of economic, military power and of population) the more it has the tendency to solve some international problems unilaterally or bilaterally, showing less willingness to search for multilateral solutions.¹⁶ It can be argued that the material power of a country, among the middle powers, has a negative impact on its participation in global governance.

The Degree of States' Dependence on the Global Economy

As the liberal theories of international relations suggest, economic interdependence serves in reinforcing

cooperation and preserving peace among states, pushing the latter to find peaceful solutions to international crisis.¹⁷ Accordingly, trade interdependence increases diplomatic cooperation among trade partners and also positively impacts the involvement of the latter in global governance by assuming more responsibilities. This second factor, derived from liberal theories, assumes that the more a country becomes dependent on the global economy, the more it has a positive impact on its involvement in global governance. It signifies that the more a country has dependence on trade and investment, the more it seeks to foster multilateral cooperation in order to find responses to global crises.

States' Behaviours towards the Existing International Order

While neorealism considers the state as a unitary and rational actor seeking to maximise its interests, critical theories underline that states' behaviours are generally conditioned by elite interest and mentality. The attitude of a country toward the international order also impacts how and to what degree it participates in global governance. The more a country identifies itself with the international order by seeing itself as part of key global governance institutions, the more it seeks to improve these institutions by actively participating in global governance. On the other hand,

there exist some behavioural differences between traditional middle powers and emerging middle powers regarding whether or not they seek deep global change in the global governance. As stated by Eduard Jordaan, "*dictated by their semi-peripheral status, compared with the core position of traditional middle powers in the global economy, emerging middle powers favour greater reform to global economic rules and structures.*"¹⁸ In this respect, the emerging middle power orientation can be seen as "reformist" while that of the traditional powers is "appeasing" depending on their different positions in the global economy. Here an "appeasing" approach refers to "*the pacification and containment of potential threats to world order, an agenda less radical than that of merging middle powers that prefer greater reform.*"¹⁹ Another way of understanding behavioural differences among middle powers is to classify them as "reformist or bystander."²⁰ The reform preferred by emerging middle powers is not fundamental or essentialist, given the fact that these semi-peripheral economies in turn benefit from their preponderance over peripheral states, especially in their geographical vicinity.²¹ In addition, since the economically privileged governing elites in most of the emerging middle powers see little alternative to the existing liberal international order, their challenges to the global economic structures are more reformist rather than fundamental or structural in nature.²²

Since emerging middle powers are not homogenous and their attitudes towards the international system can vary according to the different global governance institutions and forums and to the specific cases and conditions, it is also very difficult to rank in our study the nine selected countries by using statistical data. Rather, as shown in Table 3, these countries are classified either as reformist and bystander in their orientation vis-a-vis the global governance structures and the recent international crisis. In doing so, Russia and China's permanent membership to the UNSC and their resistance to change in the UN decision-making mechanisms will also be taken into consideration.

Socializational and Institutional Power

From the constructivist perspective, norms and socialization are key in strengthening cooperation among states. States sharing and following common international norms are likely more willing to participate in global governance. It is very difficult to examine to what extent and to which international norms states have been socialized. However, as stated by many constructivist theorists, international institutions are important vehicles for socializing their members into certain norms.²³ Given this, this study acknowledges the length of membership

to international organizations as the fourth factor underlying variation in middle powers' participation to global governance and suggests that this factor also impacts the degree of socialisation of these countries in the cultures and values of these organisations and in the international order. In doing so, five major international organizations are selected for the evaluation of institutional membership of the nine countries: the UN, the WTO, the WHO, the IMF, and the World Bank (see Table 4).

A state with a developed civil society is likely to contribute more effectively to global governance on the ideational base through new initiatives and projects.

The Strength of Civil Society

Post-internationalists claim that global governance is not only related with states, but also with non-state actors. They emphasize the increasing importance of these non-state actors, most particularly that of civil society, in global governance. The fifth factor, the strength of civil society, assumes that the weaknesses in states' ability to provide solutions to global governance problems and their low profile attitude

in global governance institutions are caused by the underdevelopment of civil societies in these countries. Accordingly, a state with a developed civil society is likely to contribute more effectively to global governance on the ideational base through new initiatives and projects. In order to measure the strength of civil society in the nine selected countries this study also uses the the 6th wave of World Values Survey between 2010 and 2014. This survey was conducted by a group of social scientists under the World Values Survey Association, which makes interviews with a representative sample from each country in order to understand sociocultural and political change by looking at values and beliefs in the relevant society.

Findings

Regarding the first factor (hereafter F1), material power, it can be argued that Turkey's relative low material power, defined in terms of economic output (GDP), growth competitive index (GCI), Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC), military output (military expenditure), and demography (population) compared to the five BRICS countries (except South Africa) and Canada, Australia and South Korea, has a positive impact on its participation in global governance. This finding is consistent with F1. Turkey's lower material power capacity

pushes it to be actively involved in global governance institutions, forums and initiatives. As Table 1 shows, in terms of size of economy, China, Brazil, Russia and India, among the BRICS countries, rank respectively higher than Turkey. When the three traditional middle powers, Australia, Canada and South Korea are added to Table 1, Turkey is ranked as the country with the second lowest sized economy among these nine countries. When it is compared to the BRICS, China, Russia, India and Brazil occupy respectively the high end in terms of military spending, while Canada, Australia, Turkey and South Africa are respectively at the low end. With the inclusion of Australia, Canada and South Korea in the BRICS+Turkey group, Turkey is ranked as the 7th country and is followed respectively by Canada and South Korea. In terms of Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC),²⁴ which measures state power beyond GDP, Turkey, among these nine countries, is ranked 6th. While China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Korea occupy the high end, Turkey, Canada, Australia and South Africa are respectively at the low end. Here Turkey appears as having a CINC superior than the two traditional middle powers, Canada and Australia. Regarding their Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI),²⁵ the three traditional middle powers, Canada, Australia and South Korea, are respectively at the top of the list with their

high Growth Competitiveness Index. They are followed by China, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, India and Russia. The fact that Turkey has a higher GCI score than that of the strongest BRICS also shows that, despite its low GDP (compared to the other eight countries, except South Africa), it is economically competitive in terms of growth.

In terms of F2, as Table 2 on trade dependence illustrates, South Korea is ranked as the country with the highest trade dependence. South Korea is known as a trade-dependent economy or a trading nation in the global economy. Currently, China is South Korea's largest trading partner and Korea's economy is heavily dependent on China. Canada is second highest in trade dependence. It is important to emphasize that the U.S. occupies the first place in Canada's trade dependency. Table 2 shows that Turkey is ranked as the fourth country at the high end in terms of trade dependence and can be considered a trade dependent country with its relatively high trade dependency rate. This finding is consistent with the F2, which assumes that trade dependence positively impacts a country's active involvement in the global governance and thus explains Turkey's active engagement with global governance institutions as a trade dependent country.

In terms of F3, it seems clear that currently Turkey strongly identifies with the international order and its related problems. Compared with countries

like China and Russia, it is more likely that Turkey perceives itself as reformist vis-à-vis the existing global governance structures (see Table 3). Russia and China, as permanent members of the UNSC, do not express interest in changing the structures and the mechanisms of major international organizations, mainly those of the UN. Since the start of the Arab revolts in late 2010, Turkey has gradually become more reformist and more likely to challenge the international order. Our observations resonate with this F3.

Turkey's high trade dependence strengthens its middle power internationalism in the global economy with its increasing interest in reforming the major global financial institutions.

Regarding the F4, among the nine countries, Turkey has a relatively long membership in the selected five international organizations. Turkey ranks as the 5th country having the longest membership to these organizations, and this is also consistent with its active participation in global governance (see Table 4). Membership by Russia, China and South Korea to these organizations are shorter than other countries in the cluster. The findings regarding Turkey conforms to the F4, claiming that Turkey, together with Canada, Australia, Brazil,

India and South Africa, have been more acculturated in these organizations than have Russia, China and South Korea.

With regard to F5, it can be argued that a stronger civil society also positively impacts a state's contribution to global governance. India appears as the country having the highest participation to civic organisations. As the table 5 shows, Turkey appears as the 8th country at the low end among the nine. Although this may appear inconsistent with the F5 on the surface, it can be explained in practice by many other reasons including the recent growth of Turkish civil society and the nature of the global governance activism, which does not necessarily need civil society. For instance, in Turkey's increasing humanitarian diplomacy towards Africa, the active role of Turkish civil society organizations is not negligible. It is important to note that middle powers' activism varies according to one issue-specific area to another. Similarly, despite its lowest civil society participation among the nine states, South Africa currently plays an active role in global governance institutions (particularly the UN) mainly about Africa related issues.

The evaluation of Turkey's participation in global governance as a middle power on the basis of the aforementioned five factors clearly illustrates that Turkey's relatively low material power compared to that of the non-traditional (except South Africa) and traditional

middle powers gives it an advantage in interfering more actively in global issues through cooperation. Similarly, Turkey's high trade dependence strengthens its middle power internationalism in the global economy with its increasing interest in reforming the major global financial institutions. Turkey's strong identification with the problems of global governance and its increasing degree of socialization in the cultures and values of the major international organisations

also make it both a legitimiser²⁶ and a reform-seeker country. In the Turkish case, this duality of roles leads to a more active participation of Turkey in global governance pushing it to assume more global responsibilities. Turkey's relatively weak civil society seems to have not negatively impacted its recent activism in global governance since this activism mainly stems from the political decision-makers' own strategic priorities and foreign policy choices.

Table 1: Material Power (in terms of population, GDP (in bil. USD), military expenditure, CINC, and Growth Competitive Index)

Turkey, the BRICS & traditional middle powers (Australia, Canada, South Korea).				Turkey and the BRICS							
Country	Population	GDP* (bil.USD)	Military expenditure ** (mil. USD)	CINC***	Growth Competitive Index ****	Country	Population	GDP (bil. USD)	Military expenditure	CINC	Growth Competitive Index
Turkey	81,619,392	788,863	19,085	0,014317	4.45	Turkey	81,619,392	788,863	19,085	0,014317	4.45
Brazil	202,656,788	2,248,780	31,456	0,0245967	4.33	Brazil	202,656,788	2,248,780	31,456	0,0245967	4.33
Russia	142,470,272	2,017,470	87,837	0,0392739	4.25	Russia	142,470,272	2,017,470	87,837	0,0392739	4.25
India	1,236,344,631	1,858,744	47,398	0,0734437	4.28	India	1,236,344,631	1,858,744	47,398	0,0734437	4.28
China	1,355,692,576	8,229,490	188,460	0,198578	4.84	China	1,355,692,576	8,229,490	188,460	0,198578	4.84
South Africa	48,375,645	382,337	4,108	0,0063162	4.37	South Africa	48,375,645	382,337	4,108	0,0063162	4.37
Canada	34,834,841	1,821,445	18,460	0,010683	5.20						
Australia	22,507,617	1,534,425	23,963	0,007113	5.09						
South Korea	49,039,986	1,222,807	33,937	0,023878	5.01						

Sources: * Total population, 2014, CIA Worldfactbook (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>)

**GDP, 2012 current prices. Source: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx?isshard=true>

***Military expenditure by country, 2012 current figures. Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2013.

**** Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC), as of 2007. Source: National Material Capabilities, Correlates of War Dataset, v3.02. See also <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc4.htm#cinc>.

The Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC) is a statistical measure of national power created by J. David Singer for the Correlates of War project in 1963. It uses an average of percentages of world totals in six different components. The components represent demographic, economic, and military strength. More recent studies tend to use the (CINC) score, which focuses on measures that are more salient to the perception of true state power beyond GDP.

***** Growth Competitiveness Index: World Economic Forum (2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf. The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) attempts to quantify the impact of a number of key factors which contribute to create the conditions for competitiveness, with particular focus on the macroeconomic environment, the quality of the country's institutions, and the state of the country's technology and supporting infrastructure. The data used to measure GCI are administrative data (publicly available data), such as enrollment rates, government debt, budget deficit and life expectancy, which are obtained from internationally recognized agencies, notably the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the IMF, and the World Health Organization (WHO). Furthermore, it uses data from the World Economic Forum's annual Executive Opinion Survey (Survey). Its producers are World Economic Forum with Columbia University. Table 2.

Table 2: Trade Dependence (2010-2013)

Trade (% of GDP)	Canada	Australia	South Korea*	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
2010	60	40	96	48	23	50	48	55	56
2011	63	41	110	57	25	52	54	55	61
2012	62	43	110	58	27	52	55	52	62
2013	62	41	103	58	28	51	53	50	65
Average	61,75	41,25	104,75	55,25	25,75	51,25	52,5	53	61

*South Korea is known as a trade-dependent economy or a trading nation. The South Korean economy has the highest trade dependence rate among the Group of 20 (G-20). Currently, China is South Korea's largest trading partner and South Korea is China's third largest. South Korea's economy is heavily dependent on China. Source: World Bank Database, Trade (% of GDP), at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS>

Table 3: Middle Powers' Behaviours towards the International System*

Role/attitude	Canada	Australia	South Korea	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
Bystander	Non	Non	Non	Non	Non	Yes	Non	Yes	Non
Reformist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Non	Yes	Non	Yes

*This table is applied to our nine selected countries by the author in a similar way used by Hongying Wang & Erik French in their 2013 article.

Source: Hongying Wang and Erik French, "Middle Range Powers in Global Governance", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.34, N.6 (2013), p. 993.

Table 4: Length of IO membership

Institution	UN	WTO/GATT	WHO	IMF	World Bank	Average
Canada	70	20/67	69	70	70	59,8
Australia	70	20/67	67	68	68	58,6
South Korea	24	20/48	66	60	60	46
Turkey	70	20/64	67	68	68	58,6
Brazil	70	20/67	67	69	69	59
Russia	70	3	67	23	23	37,2
India	70	20/67	67	70	70	59,4
China	70/44***	14	69/43**	70/35*	70	41,2
South Africa	70	20/67	68	70	70	59,6

Source: United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, at <http://www.un.org/en/members/>
 World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm

World Health Organization, at <http://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/members-en.pdf>

IMF Fund, List of Members, at <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm>

World Bank, Member Countries, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members>

*Taiwan was expelled from the IMF when China was admitted in 1980.

** China gained its seat in the WHO in 1972.

***China gained its seat in the UN in 1971.

Table 5: Participation in Civic Organizations 2010-2014 (Sixth Wave)

Civil Society	Australia (2010-2014)	Brazil (2010-2014)	China (2010-2014)	Turkey (2010-2014)	Russia (2010-2014)	India (2010-2014)	South Korea (2010-2014)	South Africa (2010-2014)	Canada (2005-2009)
Church or religious organization									
Not a Member	57,9 %	28,4%	94,7%	97,3%	93,2%	48,2%	53,0%	18,5%	49,4%
Inactive Member	25,7%	21,6%	3,5%	1,3%	4,1%	30,6%	18,7%	25,4%	22,5%
Active Member	14,9%	49,5%	0,9%	1,1%	2,0%	21,1%	22,5%	56,2%	27,9%
Sport or recreational organization									
Not a Member	47,1%	86,6%	90,6%	95,5%	93,0%	54,5%	65,4%	54,6%	56,5%
Inactive Member	19,3%	2,8%	7,2%	2,7%	3,9%	27,7%	16,6%	29,8%	14,1%
Active Member	31,6%	8,9%	2,2%	1,5%	2,4%	17,8%	10,0%	15,6%	29,0%
Art, music or educational organization									
Not a Member	67,6%	89,7%	92,5%	96,6%	95,8%	55,1%	68,3%	60,2%	64,0%
Inactive Member	13,3%	2,4%	6,0%	1,5%	2,1%	34,2%	16,7%	29,6%	12,6%
Active Member	16,9%	7,1%	1,3%	1,6%	1,5%	10,7%	5,7%	10,2%	23,1%
Labor Union									
Not a Member	76,8%	85,3%	93,0%	97,4%	88,4%	57,7%	82,7%	64,2%	73,6%
Inactive Member	11,9%	6,0%	6,2%	0,7%	8,6%	29,2%	5,1%	27,3%	12,5%
Active Member	9,0%	7,7%	0,8%	1,5%	2,0%	13,1%	1,6%	8,5%	13,5%
Environmental Organization									
Not a Member	57,9 %	28,4%	94,7%	97,3%	93,2%	48,2%	53,0%	18,5%	82,9%
Inactive Member	25,7%	21,6%	3,5%	1,3%	4,1%	30,6%	18,7%	25,4%	9,9%
Active Member	14,9%	49,5%	0,9%	1,1%	2,0%	21,1%	22,5%	56,2%	6,6%
Professional association									
Not a Member	71,3%	89,4%	97,8%	97,6%	95,7%	55,3%	80,6%	65,8%	70,6%
Inactive Member	12,6%	3,3%	1,7%	1,1%	1,9%	32,6%	5,6%	27,2%	10,0%
Active Member	13,6%	6,4%	0,3%	0,9%	1,4%	12,1%	3,6%	7,0%	18,6%
Other organization									
Not a Member	62,8%	96,5%	92,6%	77,0%	95,9%	51,1%	68,6%	65,2%	87,6%
Inactive Member	2,2%	0,8%	0,6%	0,6%	1,8%	31,5%	13,7%	27,8%	6,9%
Active Member	4,4%	1,9%	0,1%	0,5%	1,4%	17,4%	6,4%	7,0%	4,8%
Averages									
Not a Member	63,05%	72,04%	93,7%	94,1%	93,6%	52,87%	67,37%	49,57%	69,22%
Inactive Member	15,81%	8,35%	4,1%	1,31%	3,78%	30,91%	13,58%	27,5%	12,64%
Active Member	15,04%	18,71%	0,92%	1,17%	1,81%	16,18%	10,32%	22,95%	17,64%

Source: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>; <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp

Strategies

Turkey's global governance strategy has both commonalities and differences with that of other rising middle powers, traditional (or Western) or non-traditional. On the one hand, Turkey's aspirations for a pluricentric, more cosmopolitan and just post-Western world order, which can easily be detected in the Turkish leaders' various discourses, share a certain common ground with those of the so-called 'rising BRICS states'. On the other hand, Turkey's challenge to the existing international order is not structurally anti-Western in nature. The intrinsic Western features of its identity and its historical institutional attachments to the West generally keeps Turkey from using blocking or hard bargaining mechanisms against its Western allies. Unlike other rising powers in the BRICS group, Turkey does not possess significant influence in regional organizations not only in its own neighborhood but also in other extra-regions. This institutional weakness of Turkey at the regional level also affects its ability to play a more constructive and vocal role in international institutions.

The intrinsic Western features of its identity and its historical institutional attachments to the West generally keeps Turkey from using blocking or hard bargaining mechanisms against its Western allies.

Another commonality that Turkey shares with the BRICS countries, is that they all have a growing material power (in terms of human development, economic and military) pushing them to seek a more influential role in global affairs on different issue-specific areas and to different degrees. For instance, India and China have increasingly been contributing to UN peacekeeping operations, while Brazil has engaged in playing a more influential role in its region on state-building issues, especially in Haiti. Brazil has also started to address problems regarding food security and biofuel.²⁷ China has recently become more vocal regarding climate change and prevention of pandemics,²⁸ while in recent years Turkey has increasingly become an important development aid contributor to Africa and an active humanitarian actor vis-a-vis international crisis. More recently, it has taken a more active stance on economic, trade cooperation and development, as seen clearly in its 2015 G20 presidency agenda. The ways in which the rising middle powers challenge the liberal international order also varies depending on specific issue areas and from one state to another. Whereas China and India generally oppose international interventions for humanitarian purposes, Turkey, for instance, was favorable towards the idea of a possible humanitarian intervention for ending the Syrian civil war. Although Brazil pursues an assertive

policy in the area of trade and energy, it lags behind other rising middle powers in multilateral diplomacy within the UN and security arrangements. South Africa's activism in global governance is much more concentrated on Africa related issues and multilateral diplomacy within the major institutions, especially the UN, by playing an active role in UN General Assembly deliberations and a blocking role in the UNSC.²⁹

As a part of its new global governance strategy, it seems likely that Turkey, like other non-traditional middle powers, seeks to amplify its rising power influence within certain multilateral institutions and forums in which decision-making rules are based on consensus or near consensus.

Another common feature of the rising non-traditional middle powers concerns their increasing willingness to reinforce cooperation with one another bilaterally and within regional and international organizations. The G20 coalition within the WTO, security cooperation in ASEAN and other regional forums, and cooperation between Russia and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), can be cited as concrete examples of further cooperation among the

rising powers. Similarly, Turkey-Brazil cooperation for a fuel swap deal with Iran in 2010 can also be seen as a good indicator of the unfolding intra-rising powers cooperation on global diplomacy issues and has also been considered by some scholars and leaders as a blocking attitude towards the P5+1 countries' demand for maintaining sanctions against Iran.³⁰

Another commonality is that all middle powers, traditional or non-traditional, assume a certain legitimiser role in the international order. This means that they all benefit from the institutionalization of the liberal world order and, due to their limited capacities and their efforts through international organizations, they legitimize the arrangements of the global inequalities. In addition, their limited capacity prevents them from single-handedly shaping the global order and this inability makes them selectively and functionally take initiatives on certain global problems.³¹

Despite these commonalities, Turkey's global governance strategy can also be distinguished from those of the other rising non-traditional middle powers in many respects. In fact, as a rising middle power Turkey occupies a place between the traditional middle powers (for instance, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Japan and some European countries as well) and the non-traditional middle powers (for instance the five BRICS states, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, etc).

While the latter never became fully integrated to the post-1945 order, most of the traditional middle powers have long been acknowledged as an integral part of the Western order ideologically, discursively and institutionally. Turkey, despite its common strategies with the non-traditional middle powers, shares with the traditional middle powers³² both inside and outside looking perspectives about the Western liberal order and this gives it a "distinct" and "differentiated" role among other middle powers and a larger manoeuvring capacity both as an accommodating and challenging actor.³³ Turkey's long and deep institutional relations with the West since the Cold War years, its ongoing "problematic" candidacy to the EU, and its close security and diplomatic relations with the U.S, despite some difficulties in relations, put some limits on Turkey's hard bargaining and challenging behaviours towards the major powers. This also gives strong signals about the continuity of Turkey's "in-between" and "middle ground" global governance strategy embedded in its "soft" international order criticism in the upcoming years.

As a part of its new global governance strategy, it seems likely that Turkey, like other non-traditional middle powers, seeks to amplify its rising power influence within certain multilateral institutions and forums in which decision-making rules are based on consensus or near consensus. Turkey's middle power

activism in global governance gives the appearance of assuming a dual role of legitimizer/stabilizer and soft challenger. Turkey's limited capacity to bring about global and regional change makes it vulnerable in times of international crisis and regional conflicts (as seen clearly in the Syrian civil war), and this strengthens the stabilizing dimension of its middle power activism committed to global and regional orderliness and security. Nevertheless, this legitimizer/stabilizer role of Turkey coexists with its soft challenger and reformist role seeking greater reform in the global governance institutions and occasionally challenging great powers.

Regarding the question of governance reform of the major international financial institutions, Turkey has also strong preferences towards liberalization, and thus supports the reform demands about restructuring voting power in the World Bank in favor of developing economies, and changing the IMF's quota system and the structure of its executive board. In this vein, then Prime Minister (current President of the Republic) Erdoğan stressed that "developing states should be given more roles within the IMF, and their administrative representation should be enhanced,"³⁴ and he called for a new currency quota system within the IMF.³⁵ Erdoğan also proposed an alternative "Turkish Lira zone" in response to the economic crisis in the Euro-zone

countries.³⁶ He also criticized the IMF's USD-based usage and called for IMF acceptance of the gold-based regime as an alternative.³⁷ Another sign of Turkey's new global governance strategy can also be seen in its rhetorical involvement in the four MIST countries (namely, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey), a recently coined acronym, which refers to the four emerging economies in the next tier of large emerging economies.³⁸ In this respect, Turkey's 2015 G20 presidency will provide it the opportunity for greater consultation and cooperation with the other rising middle powers with regard to the ongoing review/reform processes of major financial institutions.

The G20 as a Test Case of Turkey's Global Governance Activism

One of the changing characteristics of the current global governance in terms of middle power activism can be observed very clearly in the institutional design of the G20, in which a group of non-G8 states have been accorded membership in the original institutional design of the G8. The G20, having developed under the institutional model of the G8 and on the basis of an ensemble of common activities, provides a proper ground and catalyst for projecting middle power diplomacy. The mechanisms of the G20 help its non-G8 members use their

entrepreneurial and technical leadership in the selected domain of activities by being attributed the status of an exclusive top-tier community. Given this, it can be argued that the G20 is a good example and a test case of Turkey's middle power activism and the transformation of its global governance strategy in recent years.

Turkey's presidency for 2015 seems to open up a new era, not only for Turkey's middle power diplomacy and activism towards the G20, but also for its unfolding "nuanced" stance vis-à-vis changing global governance frameworks.

After the G20's establishment in 1999 on the sidelines of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings on finance, Turkey initially adopted a pragmatic but relatively low profile approach towards the G20 and avoided investing politically too much into the G20 as an international platform. Turkey's policy entrepreneurship within the G20 has so far been weaker than that of other middle powers inside the G20. Here it must be reminded that Turkey's inclusion in 1999 into the G20 came at a time when Turkish foreign policy had adopted a multidirectional and proactive approach in world politics, embedded

in a new multilateral understanding reinforced specifically with the declaration of Turkey's candidate status to the EU.³⁹ Later on, the 2008 global financial crisis provided Turkey a new opportunity to actively participate in shaping the rules and institutions of the post-crisis global economy, as opposed to its previous standing as a peripheral partner and the passive complier of rules imposed from above by the powerful core.⁴⁰ In fact, Turkey's increasing activism in foreign policy was carried out throughout the 2000s and with the upgrading of Turkey's power status at the international level, the strategic importance of the G20 began to increase in the eyes of Turkish decision-makers as an inclusive platform of global economic governance, and enabled Turkey to participate in the global governance reform process.⁴¹

Turkey's presidency for 2015 seems to open up a new era, not only for Turkey's middle power diplomacy and activism towards the G20, but also for its unfolding "nuanced" stance vis-à-vis changing global governance frameworks. The 2015 rotating presidency of the G20 has currently been perceived by Ankara as a major opportunity for Turkey to showcase its rising status at the international level as an economic and political power, while at the same time raising the profile of the G20 as a major global political economy platform. Despite the fact that the G20 was

elevated to the leaders' level only after the 2008 global financial crisis, it functions with a very weak organizational structure without a general secretariat. Since the financial crisis, Turkey has been supporting the idea of the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the G20 and has mostly been interested in quota reform within the IMF in order to increase the institution's capacity.⁴² It seems likely that under its presidency Turkey will push for the formation of a permanent secretariat in Istanbul, despite opposition emanating from some industrialized major powers. With the aim of strengthening its global ownership, Turkey is also committed to solving under its presidency the G20's organizational problems, mainly coming from the "diverse and dispersed" profile of its members and its expanding official mandate, which causes some problems in terms of political legitimacy and crosscutting jurisdiction with international organizations.⁴³ As Sadık Ünay has noted, Turkey's rising middle power activism under its first rotating presidency could be explained through two main axis: The first axis aims to monitor the ongoing structural reforms like maintaining sustainable global growth in the G20 and diminishing imbalances between the developed and the least developed countries. The second axis seeks to pursue a wider development and innovation approach with the aim of establishing coalitions with countries

with similar development needs inside and outside the G20.⁴⁴

As Turkish leaders underlined in the 2014 G20 Brisbane Pre-Summit conference,⁴⁵ Turkey plans to steer its own course on the G20 in 2015, and seeks to develop a clear “ontological position” on its ability to tackle truly global issues, rather than just those that affect G20 economies. In his closing address conference, current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stressed that “the 2015 G20 presidency will be a philosophical, symbolic and practical move away from the “narrow” agenda focused on economic fundamentals”.⁴⁶ According to Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan, three words will guide Turkey under its presidency: “inclusiveness, implementation and investment.”⁴⁷ He went on to note that Turkey would “bridge the gap between developed economies and undeveloped countries to fight global inequality”, seeking to include poor countries in decision-making. Babacan also announced that the 2015 G20 leaders’ summit, to be held in November in Antalya, aims to discuss topics including “strong, sustainable and balanced economic growth, climate change, global development and the fight against corruption.” Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s strong rhetoric on the subject of climate change was also striking: “on most issues we act as the heads of nation states, but on climate change we should act as the ministers of home affairs of

humanity”. In line with this, Davutoğlu also underscored the need to look at the links between economic and political issues in an interconnected world. He also emphasized the need to have a more inclusive G20 agenda, which should represent not only the 20 member countries but would be more global, including the low-income developing countries (LIDCs)⁴⁸ and he emphasized that the relation between G20 and non-G20 countries is as important as the relations of G20 members.”⁴⁹

As stated by the Turkish Prime Minister, another objective of Turkey’s 2015 G20 presidency is that Turkey would expand the G20’s role beyond economic cooperation and decision-making to issues such as the refugee crisis in Eastern Europe, the ebola outbreak in West Africa, and ethno-sectarian extremism in the Middle East. In addition, among Turkey’s highly ambitious priorities for its 2015 G20 presidency, are topics like trade liberalization (favouring a multilateral trading system and supporting Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement), increasing employment (creation of high quality jobs for women and young people), promoting SMEs (small and medium enterprises), stimulating infrastructural investments (seeking a greater cooperation between development banks of the member states), promoting energy collaboration, reforming the international tax system, and fighting corruption.⁵⁰

The Cold War environment's ideological divisions and Turkey's strong dependence on its Western allies in terms of economics and military could not provide the Turkish leaders with an appropriate ground to effectively apply their pluricentric and multidirectional worldview to the country's foreign policy choices.

Turkey's expanding G20 presidency agenda also illustrates Turkey's willingness to forge its institutional power at the international level and its strategic priorities in terms of political and economic governance. On the other hand, the way Turkish leaders seek to raise the G20's institutional status globally through implementation of some organizational reforms is also a good indicator in showing Turkey's current and future global governance approach based on "effective multilateralism" and "middle power activism." Turkey's perception of the G20 also differs from that of the BRICS countries, which avoid investing too much in this platform and rather pursue a "hedging strategy" by seeking structural reforms in international institutions like the IMF. In contrast to the BRICS, Turkey sees the G20 as a unique platform especially

for those middle powers who have been ardent supporters of the development of the forum since its establishment (for instance, South Korea, Australia, Mexico and Indonesia), and who favor multilateralism in order to balance the unilateral behaviours of major powers and to mediate between the latter and the emerging powers on sensitive issues.⁵¹

Conclusion

Since the 2000s, Turkey has been doing more in managing global challenges, expressing a greater interest in reforming global governance institutions, and taking initiatives in formal and informal international platforms. Compared to the Cold War years and the 1990s, when Turkey was under-performing in global governance, it now sees itself less as a bystander vis-a-vis the global governance system. Of course, the fact that Turkey lagged behind in participating in global governance up until the end of the 1990s can also be partially explained by its strong identification with the West in terms of identity, security and foreign policy. The Cold War environment's ideological divisions and Turkey's strong dependence on its Western allies in terms of economics and military could not provide the Turkish leaders with an appropriate ground to effectively apply their pluricentric and multidirectional

worldview to the country's foreign policy choices. This also made it difficult for the Turkish leaders, despite their attempts in the Cold War era and the 90s, to develop and adopt a civilizational self-perception different from the Western one at both the discursive and practical levels.⁵² Aside from the change in the country's foreign policy identity and civilizational perception, many other factors like possession of necessary material, ideational and institutional power resources, the increasing dependence on the global economy, and the strength of civil society have also impacted and strengthened Turkey's global power status and its more active involvement in global governance since the 2000s. An active foreign policy agenda with its new ingredients such as mediation, conflict resolution, development aid, and humanitarian diplomacy, supported by the principle of zero problems with neighbours and a different civilizational and geopolitical understanding⁵³ at the ideational level, have all led to the emergence of a new vision and strategy of global governance. A more active presence in international organizations and forums and a greater participation in joint initiatives taken regionally or internationally vis-à-vis emerging crises or ongoing conflicts, have also impacted the way and the degree to which Turkey has become more actively involved in global governance over the last decade.

Its call for reform in the major global governance institutions refers to a strong need and demand for a international justice-based, equal, cosmopolitan and pluricentric world order in a changing international system that currently lacks appropriate decision-making and conflict resolution mechanisms in response to international crises, such as that in Syria.

Turkey's preferences and strategies in terms of global governance, compared to those of other rising middle powers, give clear signals about its possession of a middle ground between the non-traditional middle powers and traditional Western ones. Turkey's strong institutional attachments to the post-1945 liberal order, the nature of its liberal order criticism (which does not contain anti-Western roots and a third worldist ideological background), positions it closer to the Western middle powers. In fact, Turkey's current challenge to the international order is revision-oriented rather than being anti-systemic. Its call for reform in the major global governance institutions refers to a strong need and demand for a international justice-based, equal, cosmopolitan and pluricentric world order in a changing international

system that currently lacks appropriate decision-making and conflict resolution mechanisms in response to international crises, such as that in Syria.

On the other hand, as seen clearly in the G20 case, in the short term at least, rising middle power approaches to questions of international order are likely to be concentrated on maximizing each country's own

interests, balancing others rather than acting collectively for a revised order, or forming a collective block against the major powers. The BRICS countries appear more willing than Turkey to use hard bargaining and hedging mechanisms against the major powers. In contrast, with the exception of its cooperation with Brazil in 2010 on a swap deal with Iran

and its negative vote in the UNSC with regard to sanctions against Iran, Turkey generally adopts soft bargaining strategies and rarely uses hedging towards its Western allies. Turkey's ideological and institutional belonging to the Western bloc, as well as its close relations with the U.S as the hegemonic power of the system, brings it closer to the Western

traditional middle powers seeking revision in the international system through strengthened cooperation arrangements and mechanisms in the formal and informal global governance institutions and forums. The increasing tone of Turkey's criticism of the UN's decision-making mechanisms and Erdogan's "the World is bigger than five"⁵⁴ rhetoric can also be assessed in

Turkey's ideological and institutional belonging to the Western bloc, as well as its close relations with the U.S as the hegemonic power of the system, brings it closer to the Western traditional middle powers seeking revision in the international system through strengthened cooperation arrangements and mechanisms in the formal and informal global governance institutions and forums.

terms of its search for a just, equitable and cosmopolitan international order capable of collectively responding to international crises and human tragedies in some chaotic regions of the world. Turkey's ambitious agenda and working plan for its G20 presidency gives clear signals of its future preferences in taking an active place in less hierarchical

G20-type forums in which developed and developing countries are equally represented and middle power countries are donated with more manoeuvring capacity.

With regard to its capacity as a rising middle power in the changing international order, it can be deduced from our findings that Turkey's relatively

low material capacity in terms of GDP compared to that of other rising middle powers, its high trade dependence, its strong perceptions about its possible constructive role and middle power actorness, and its long membership in major international organizations having increased its international socialization, all serve to make Turkey potentially a more active player in global governance. Despite its low participation rates in civil society organizations compared to those of the other eight rising middle power

countries (ranked 8th among the nine countries), in recent years Turkish society has increasingly become more sensitive and inclined to global governance problems (for instance, humanitarian crisis, enviromental and climate change-related problems, poverty, unemployment, gender inequality, etc). This development could also strengthen Turkey's hand in multilateralism and global governance in the upcoming years and lead to raising its voice in calls for the reform of global governance institutions.

Endnotes

Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and Berdal Aral, Murat Yeşiltaş, Birgül Demirtaş for their fruitful comments and suggestions, as well as Ferit Belder for his valuable technical assistance.

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