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PERCEPTIONS - Winter 2014

Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order: An Introduction

Emel PARLAR DAL and Gonca OĞUZ GÖK*

In recent years there has been a significant increase in the number of academic studies on changes in the current international order and the way the so-called rising powers have been contributing to these changes through their behaviours and strategies of global governance.¹ Hot debates are still ongoing in academic and political circles about whether, despite their normative challenges to the current order, these rising states have been successfully integrated into the rule-based and open liberal international order through international cooperation or have been destabilizing the liberal global governance with the aim of changing the order and functioning of global governance institutions according to their own interests. If a power transition is currently under way in the international system, how the rising, middle and major powers are facing the systemic, regional and domestic effects of

this transition remains as a fundamental question requiring an answer. On the other hand, there exists confusion in the International Relations (IR) literature with regard to the conceptualization and categorization of the ‘rising powers’ and their similarities and differences. There is a general tendency in the literature to restrict the field of research to the key rising powers such as China, Brazil, Russia and India or the middle powers and their subcategories. ‘Regional powers’ also appear as another category of states which have become of greater concern to many scholars and observers in recent years. This overlapping conceptual fluidity adds new confusion to the literature and makes it harder for countries like Turkey to be appropriately conceptualized and categorized.

This special issue aims to address this theme by opening a new ground of research for Turkish foreign policy and its changing power status in the global system by profiling Turkey as both a “middle” and “rising” power. Turkey has become the world’s 17th biggest economy and a member of The Group of Twenty (G-20) in the last decade, with

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an increasingly expanding material and soft power. Turkey is certainly leaping forward, though at a lesser degree when compared to the core big rising powers like China, India and Brazil. Yet its rise is somehow different from the latter, not only structurally, but also ideologically. Despite its increasingly critical stance in regard to the global governance institutions and their decision-making mechanisms in recent years, the normative challenges to Turkey and its behavioural posture within the current international order need to be nuanced from those of the other rising powers in the Global South. Turkey's complaints about the current international order are not informed by an anti-Western attitude or Third Worldist ideology, but clearly fall into the framework of a *within-system challenge*.

This special issue also touches upon the “normative” dimension of Turkish foreign policy through an in-depth analysis of Turkey's understanding of international law, justice and ethics and of its shifting approach to the UN over the years. It is known that the increasing normativity and cosmopolitanism in Turkish foreign policy under the AK Party government have been harshly criticized by some political and academic circles both inside and outside the country in recent years. It is thus important to draw on the regional and international challenges to Turkey's regional and global rise, as is done in this special issue.

This issue also looks at Turkey's rise and quest for a new international order from the window of the Muslim world and through the use of alternative approaches, discourses and policies such as “the civilizational discourse”. It also takes up the theme of, “civilizational justice” and the Muslim perception of injustice as key components of the Muslim grievances about the global order. A number of analyses in this issue take on board the recent developments in the Middle East after 2011, commonly known as the “Arab Spring”.

The dual themes of “Turkey in the global governance” and “Turkey-as-a-middle power” have conspicuously been lacking in Turkish foreign policy literature and thus are in need of further elaboration, both conceptually and empirically. To partially fill this gap, this special issue also contains an article that seeks to locate Turkey in the current liberal global governance as a “rising middle power” occupying a middle ground between the traditional middle powers and the non-traditional or emerging middle powers. The said study then assesses Turkey's preferences, capabilities and strategies in the changing network of global governance. A second article serves a similar purpose by providing an evaluation of Turkey's global governance strategy in the context of its 2015 G20 Presidency.

Against this backdrop, a set of questions crop up to flesh out Turkey's

interaction with the international order, such as the following: How can one best locate and conceptualize Turkey in the current international order? What are the delineating features of Turkey's conception and behavioural posture vis-à-vis the current international order in the context of law, justice and ethics? How can one make sense of Turkish conceptions of "world order" through alternative lenses? How can one interpret its relatively different approach to the UN today compared to the past? How can one profile Turkey's recent activism in global governance and compare its "rising" power status with that of other traditional middle powers and the BRICs countries? Informed by such questions, this special issue brings together five articles under the main theme of this special issue and aims to understand the ways in which Turkey and other rising powers position themselves in the current international order vis-à-vis the major powers. They also seek to shed light on Turkey's behavioural posture and conceptual outlook that accompany its quest for a new international order. Aside from these five articles under the main theme of "Turkey and the international order", this special issue also contains two other articles providing insights into Jordan and the Arab Spring and Afghanistan's transition challenges after 2014.

Turkey's Behavioural and Normative Posture within the Current International Order

It is known that the world is currently witnessing colossal global changes, which are in fact the birth pangs of an emerging post-Westphalian international order: the decline of the hitherto consecrated principles of sovereignty, territoriality, and non-intervention; the rise of democracy and human rights; the entry of new actors and processes into the realm of international politics; the expansion of supranational organizations and legal systems. Today, international society is facing three main challenges, as observed by Hurrell: "the need to capture shared and common interests, to manage unequal power, and to mediate cultural diversity and value conflict."² These aspirations will continue to be adjourned so long as global politics continues to be marred by a legitimacy deficit.³ Hence the choice about the nature of international order is between one emphasizing technical management of global affairs and global governance, against one that underscores manifold problems, "political" in nature, that have to be solved.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, contrary to expectations, the armed and non-armed interventions and imperialistic intrusions launched by

states with hegemonic impulses and allegedly humanitarian motives in the Muslim world and more generally in the developing world have aborted the likelihood of a transition to a peaceful and egalitarian international order. The West's promiscuous exploitation of the low level of human rights and democracy in certain non-Western countries that stand up against Western hegemony, by virtue of military interventions, geopolitical exclusion, and international sanctions, speaks volumes about the chequered history of the place of human rights and democracy in the international order after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The collective enforcement mechanism of the UN as formulated in Chapter VII often falls prey to the power political game played out in particular by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The Council, more often than not, has stifled the hope of the world community for genuine peace and justice since the early 1990s. The troubling question, therefore, revolves around the level of deterrence which could possibly be exercised by the UN Security Council against aggressive states. If the contemporary international order is to be sustainable, it ought to give greater voice to the will and aspirations of the South within international political, economic and financial institutions, while formulating policies that will assist in the elevation of the standards of peace, justice and material conditions

in the impoverished South. In the words of Shapcott, "The ethical framework associated with Westphalian sovereignty- which gives only minor moral significance to the suffering of outsiders- seems less than adequate."⁴ In an age in which "democracy" and "human rights" have become the "mantra" of world politics, the sustainability of the international order can only be achieved if and when global structures and processes become transparent, democratic and inclusive. If we assume that international order shapes the rules and mechanisms through which international society is constructed, this could easily presuppose the existence of a "family" of nations and communities that are bound together and cooperate in solidarity. This solidarity is a prerequisite for peace, prosperity and justice in the world.

In spite of the globalization of international law, which holds the promise of offering effective solutions to global problems while elevating the status of human rights and democracy as cardinal principles of international law, the **power politics** emanating from the imperial appetite of hegemonic actors continue to stifle the longing of Asian and African societies for peace, justice and better living standards. Indeed, we ought to be aware of the existing

"...crisis of global governance beyond the capacities of a world of sovereign states. In such a setting, the global war on terrorism has been understood as a new hegemonic project to assert dominance

over the South while keeping the world economy tilted to favour the North. One reason for efforts at dominance may be to control resources, but other motives, including partisan national interests, also play a role.”⁵

One disturbing feature of the current changes and trends in international law is the apparent disregard of the needs, aspirations and interests of the Muslim world by international institutions and powerful states. Although the Muslim world constitutes roughly one fifth of the world population, it gets a very low share of world revenues or a say, *inter alia*, about the future of international law and society. As noted by Abu Ni'meh, “the Islamic countries are being pressured and even harassed into being ready for ‘appropriate’ changes in International Law, however much that disturbs or upsets them.”⁶ That the Muslim world does not get its fair share of decision-making prerogatives in the UN (and most other international organizations such as the World Bank and World Trade Organization) once again became manifest when, during debates about reforming the UN Security Council, which was a fashionable topic a decade ago, there was almost no discussion about possible ways in which to ensure better representation for the Muslim world within this body, while the same actors had no qualms about conceiving the possibility of conferring permanent membership within the UN Security Council for states as diverse as Japan, Germany, India and Brazil.

As is noted by observers, Turkey has been pursuing a multilateral and multidimensional foreign policy since 2002. Turkish foreign policy is no longer attuned to the vagaries of the American geopolitical interests or the whimsical dictates of the European Union, but is rooted firmly in the “Ankara criteria”. The point of departure for this behavioural role is the Turkish priorities, vision of international society, and long-term projections. Turkey’s present government is committed to “reforming” the international system which, in Turkish eyes, is beset by global injustices, economic and social inequality, excessive militarisation, undemocratic representation and decision-making in major international institutions, and the geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-cultural marginalisation of the Muslim world. Not surprisingly, therefore, global and/regional actors with hegemonic ambitions have become rather weary of Turkey’s moral stand⁷ on issues ranging from the endurance of poverty in the South to Israel’s enduring military occupation of and massive human rights violations in the Palestinian territories, from its unflinching denunciation of the *coup d’état* in Egypt that removed the elected President Mohammed Morsi from power in July 2013 to its repeated calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. This normative search and behavioural posture reinforce the “moral” ingredient of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey's challenging posture within the international order is also linked to its ascendancy to the club of "rising powers". The narrative about "the rise of the rest" has become a major explanatory framework for the shifting constellation of power in the world today. The new power challengers are variably referred to as "emerging or rising powers", "great/major powers", "middle or middle range powers (traditional or non-traditional (or emerging))" and "regional powers". As is commonly agreed, the successive economic crises and the high inflation rates, as well as big societal and economic inequalities made it hard for Turkey to gain the status of an "emerging/rising power" up until the first years of the 2000s. However, the monetary policy and the structural reforms carried out just after Turkey's currency and banking crisis of 2001 helped Turkey's economic recovery and the improvement of its financial sector in the second half of the first decade of 2000s. With high economic growth over the last decade, Turkey gained the opportunity to utilize its material resources for influence at the regional and global levels. In other words, over the last decade, many aspects of Turkey's power were fungible in important policy frameworks. Turkey's ability to turn resources into outcomes and its clear upward trajectory in economic power made it possible for it to raise its power status to that of a "rising middle power" in the global hierarchy of power.

However, when compared to the core rising powers like China, India and Brazil, Turkey's material power, and thus its bargaining power, still remains lower vis-à-vis the established powers. As in the case of other rising powers, Turkey has still limited ability to exert influence in the more traditional realms of foreign policy. Turkey's rising power status can only yield policy outcomes if it can use its regional, economic, military and political weight against the major powers on a host of geopolitical matters as a bargaining tool. On the other hand, Turkey's active participation in regional and international organizations would certainly give it substantial multilateral weight and bargaining capacity. On some regional issues, Turkey appears to have the ability to frustrate or block (although it has done so very rarely) Western posturing as seen clearly in the 2010 Turkish-Brazilian-Iran swap deal (which was aborted by the US).⁸ However, in the Syrian crisis, Turkey failed to turn its rising power status into a useful asset for its foreign policy strategies and convince its Western allies, particularly the U.S., to put its full weight behind the opposition against the Assad regime. In this respect, the Syrian civil war clearly illustrates the limitations of Turkey as a rising and regional power. This also confirms the assumption that rising powers may occasionally punch above their weight, especially in a threat environment with transnational security challenges.⁹

Obviously, like other rising powers, Turkey is clearly seeking to establish itself as the pre-eminent power in its region. Yet, the ongoing disorder and turmoil in the Middle East seem not to have provided it with a convenient atmosphere to wield its power. However, Turkey seeks to balance its relatively low profile regional actorness in the Middle East with a growing middle power activism at global governance institutions and forums like the UN, the G20, and in other extra-regions like Africa and Latin America. In the financial realm, it appears clear that Turkey would wish to see the construction of a more effective global financial governance system, and is ready to use some bargaining mechanisms vis-à-vis the major powers together with the other rising powers. In matters of security, especially as it relates to the Middle East, despite the existence of divergences of its point of view with some of its allies, particularly the U.S., with regard to the region's key problems, Turkey stands out as an accommodating and challenging actor,¹⁰ and not as a hard bargaining and blocking one; indeed Turkey prefers cooperation as a response to regional and transnational threats. As a natural concomitant of its membership within the Western security system, Turkey's challenging attitude is not meant to obstruct major-power initiatives. This posture separates out Turkey from other rising powers on major questions of world order and in the management of global problems.

A multitude of writers working from quite different perspectives agree that directing attention to the rising powers beyond the West is vitally significant for an understanding of how the global order is being reshaped in the 21st century. Accordingly, a scholarly literature is burgeoning that problematizes the “foreign policy choices” of rising powers with regard to the “international order”, while drawing on the rising powers' increasing economic and political might that could pose a challenge to “established institutions”. In this vein, a prominent scholar on rising powers, Andrew Hurrell, suggests that international institutions are not just concerned with liberal purposes of solving common problems or promoting shared values, but they are also “sites of power” that reflect and entrench power hierarchies.¹¹ Accordingly, rising powers are well aware of the reality that “world order is increasingly maintained by international institutions”.¹² Against this background, it is no surprise that aspiring major powers or rising states are expected to devote so much attention to international institutions like the United Nations. We are thus able to witness Russia's preoccupation with the Security Council; Chinese resistance to any reform of the UN Security Council that would add new permanent members; Brazil's campaign for a permanent seat in the Council;¹³ and India's efforts to become an “agenda mover” on various

issues reflecting its newfound role as a bridge between North and South in the UN.¹⁴ Turkey's UN Security Council temporary membership in 2009- 2010 and its application for the period 2015-2016 clearly illustrate increasing willingness on the side of Ankara to have an active role in the UN. Similarly, South Africa wanted a repeat of its holding a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council in 2007-2008 by applying for membership in the same body for the period between 2010-2012, which eventually materialized.

These foreign policy moves on the part of aspiring rising states are consistent with their insistence on an "inter-governmental" and "UN-based vision" for the future world order. The rising powers often articulate a desire to strengthen aspects of international institutions, but with a specific emphasis on "egalitarian" and "just" redistribution of political decision-making authority, while at the same time championing their own case for representation. In this regard, rising powers tend to advocate a more "equitable", "just" and "legitimate" multilateralism through United Nations.¹⁵ This goes well with Hurrell's suggestion that power transitions among major states have never been simply about clashes of material power and material interest; rather, conflicts over "rival justice claims" have often been a determinant factor in the history of world order. Contestation over these

"normative claims" has long been at the heart of international politics, and the return over the past decade of more Hobbesian or Westphalian tendencies has brought them once more to centre stage. Thus, for Hurrell, emerging powers have laid great emphasis on arguments for *normative issues* like, "justice" and "fairness" and they will naturally seek to revise the dominant norms of the system in order to reflect their own interests as well as values through international institutions.¹⁶ What is notable is the way in which "rising states" have become more proactive- for example, using the language of democracy and representativeness to constantly push for the "reform" of international institutions, particularly the UN Security Council. States like Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey have mobilized claims for "normative" issues like greater representational fairness (as with membership of the Security Council) and distributional justice (as with Brazil's promotion of a global hunger fund and Turkey's attempt to lead global humanitarian efforts reflected in its hosting of the first UN Humanitarian Summit in 2016) in the UN platform. In this vein, Fontaine and Kliman assert that states like Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey offer great potential as partners to "extend" the global order.¹⁷ However, it is much less clear how far any of these rising states, including Turkey, have moved in terms

of becoming producers of the “ideas” that will shape conceptions of global order in the future.¹⁸

Assessment of Individual Articles

In “Muslim Perceptions of Injustice as an International Relations Question”, Hasan Kösebalaban argues that the Muslim world is deeply suspicious of the international order on account of the deeply felt sense of injustice committed against Muslims. In the author’s view, the root of the problem lies in the lack of sufficient opportunities within the existing international institutions and decision-making bodies for Muslim participation. This is compounded by the lack of stable political institutions and political fragmentation within the Muslim world which undermines Muslim actors’ ability to take a joint and assertive posture within the international order. Kösebalaban asserts that Muslim grievances about the existing international arrangements derive in particular from the failure to address the Palestinian problem, lack of overall interest in the plight and aspirations of Muslim minorities, and the lack of democracy in most of the Muslim countries. In all these cases, it is first and foremost the West which impedes the cause of justice, (positive) peace and democracy in the Muslim world. The author also notes that the West has also sought to

sabotage the emancipatory potential of the “Arab Spring” that began at the end of 2010 by aligning itself mostly with the counterrevolutionary political forces, as in the case of its support for the military junta that deposed the elected President Mohamed Morsi in 2013 and its failure to support the opposition against the murderous Assad regime in Syria.

Kösebalaban is also critical of the fact that international relations theories decline to address the issue of “justice” in favour of political and economic interests of states because they are grounded in a materialistic paradigm. By contrast, Islamic international relations theory considers “justice” as a key component of its conceptual and analytical concerns and views “peace” not only as the “absence of war”, but combines it with justice and a just social order.

In the article entitled “Turkey’s Quest for a “New International Order”: The Discourse of Civilization and the Politics of Restoration”, Murat Yeşiltaş argues that the most important effect of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkish foreign policy has been that it re-opened Turkey’s understanding of “international order” up for discussion on the basis of a “new representation of civilizational belonging”. According to him, the increased emphasis on civilization in Turkish foreign policy fundamentally affected Turkey’s cultural critique of the international order and caused it to change its foreign policy paradigm

that coded the “Western system as the final target of an advancing political understanding”. Foreign policy makers and political elites defined this period as “restoration politics” and thus both historicized it and then recreated it along the axis of the “New Turkey” discourse. Building on Ahmet Davutoğlu’s three scholarly works, namely *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory, Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World*, and *Strategic Depth*, the paper asserts that Davutoğlu leans toward the concept of “civilization” as a “unit of analysis” and the key discourse for “New Turkey” which seeks to reproduce the “civilizational identity” as part of Turkey’s international order narrative by blending it with an anti-hegemonic “dissident” discourse.

Accordingly, Yeşiltaş argues that this “civilizational identity” caused the birth of a new geopolitical vision that was blended with the Islamic solidarity discourse and which was shaped around the institutional and normative representations of the Islamic world on a historical level. It is the start of a new way of viewing Islamic civilization’s normative-based order narrative as a value in establishing the multi-cultural structure of world order. This goes well with Davutoğlu’s conceptualization of new “cultural order” in the sense that in a period where globalization offers a re-blending of the continuity elements

of old cultural basins, a Euro-centred civilizational fancy will not keep its hegemonic position for long. In the final analysis, Yeşiltaş demonstrates that since the early 2000s Turkey has placed its critique of the international order within a political and economic discourse as well as a “civilizational” one. Yet, as the paper suggests, how and through which mechanisms the representation of Islamic civilization will be transferred to the international system by virtue, inter alia, of Turkey’s rise still remain as open-ended questions.

In her contribution to this special issue, “Tracing the Shift in Turkey’s Normative Approach towards International Order through Debates in the UN”, Gonca Oğuz Gök draws on Turkey’s changing “normative approach towards international order” in a historical perspective through the debates in the UN over the last decade. To this end, she first analyzes the normative challenges posed by rising states towards the international order by giving reference to the rich literature on “rising powers and international order”. In doing so, she also focuses on the role of international institutions in providing the rising powers with space for coalition building, bargaining and counterbalancing the major powers. Secondly, Oğuz Gök aims at understanding the historical evolution of Turkey’s normative approach towards international order from a comparative perspective by mainly focusing on two consecutive periods, the 1990s and 2000s.

Here the author investigates to find out if there has been a shift in Turkey's normativity towards the international order and in its order criticism since the 1990s. For the author, Turkey's "*order-criticism*" is not a new phenomenon and goes back to the Republican era. However, as stated by the author, despite its criticisms with regard to the UN's decision-making system, Turkey was generally cautious in adopting an anti-system stance towards the UN and its mechanisms and, as a result of this, it followed the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations throughout the Cold-War years. In the post Cold War era, Turkish rulers started to raise the tone of their criticism about the UN's failure in responding to crises and did not hesitate to openly declare their expectations from the UN. The author also points out that the second half of the 1990s was marked by Turkey's multiple quests for a new role and position in the changing world order. The "world state", "bridge", "Turkish model" concepts can be seen, in this respect, as part of Turkey's willingness to relocate and reconceptualise itself in the changing international conditions of the 1990s.

From the article by Oğuz Gök, one can also deduce that since the 2000s there has been a gradual shift in Turkey's order-criticism compared to the 1990s. This new approach to international order has been shaped by both more "concrete" normative suggestions and a brand new order-building role at the regional

and global levels. The author also underlines the "Davutoğlu" effect in the construction of this new international order understanding both discursively and empirically over the last decade. In the last part of her article, Oğuz Gök also explains the reasons behind Turkey's vociferous criticism of the UN and other major global governance institutions. She concludes that Turkey's normative resistance to the international order is concretized by its increasing reform demands and its willingness to extend the existing international order by proposing an "international justice-based alternative approach" to the current order, which needs to be reconstructed *within*, not outside, the UN platform.

In the article entitled "On Turkey's Trail in the Network of Global Governance as a 'Rising Middle Power': Preferences, Capabilities, and Strategies", Emel Parlar Dal discusses Turkey's contributions to global governance as a "rising middle power". She seeks to take up the case of Turkey which, she notes, is largely neglected within the academic literature on the "rising powers". Parlar Dal takes up this challenge by evaluating Turkey's shifting status in the power hierarchy within international society. She argues that the root causes of Turkey's elevation to the status of a "rising middle power" within the last decade could also be sought in the current Turkish government's more "nuanced" pluricentric perception of international society, its differing

civilizational understanding and its new cosmopolitan worldview. The author also draws on a number of other factors: “possession of necessary material, ideational and institutional power resources, the increasing dependence on global economy, and the strength of civil society.” She designates Turkey’s place between traditional middle powers such as Canada, Australia and South Korea and non-traditional middle powers like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. In this context, she draws on Turkey’s “unique position and its bridge-building role between ‘the West and the rest’”.

The author delineates the main contours of Turkey’s “reformist”, and certainly not anti-systemic, rather “within system” posture on the issue of global governance, which include a call for greater justice, more representative and participatory mechanisms for international decision-making, more effective conflict-resolution mechanisms, and the recognition of the pluricentric configuration of the world order today. This overall context explains a great deal about Turkey’s reformist agenda as the new holder of the presidency of the G20 in 2015: overseeing sustainable growth at the global level; reducing economic disparities between the North and South; establishing coalitions with which it has similar developmental needs; and engaging the G20 with global problems that are beyond its immediate and specific concerns.

In his contribution to this special issue, entitled “Transformation Trajectory of the G20 and Turkey’s Presidency: Middle Powers in Global Governance”, Sadık Ünay first presents a historical and institutional evolution of the G20 since its foundation in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In this study, Ünay also touches upon the evolution of the G20 after the 2008 global financial crisis under the Bush and Obama administrations respectively, and explains how the G20 was symbolically and superficially designed at the leader’s level as an umbrella organization through an expansion of the club of the G7; with the former now including prominent rising powers like China, India and Brazil. As noted by the author, after the elevation of the Forum to the leader’s level in 2008, the G20 engaged in transforming global financial governance into a shared operational area between the Global North and the South. Despite all these efforts, as indicated by the author, there still exists some limitations of the G20 in terms of institutional effectiveness, legitimacy and agency.

In Ünay’s view, in order to overcome the current structural problems and the “legitimacy/ownership deficit” of the G20, a more inclusive policy agenda regarding development issues appears as a must. The differing strategies of the BRICS and middle powers regarding the G20 are also scrutinized by Ünay. He holds that while the

middle powers as insiders in the G20 are more committed to the activities of the forum, the BRICS prefer adopting hedging strategies and thus remain reluctant towards actively becoming involved in the day-to-day running of the forum. In the final analysis, the author explains how the transformation trajectory of the G20 over the years and the middle powers' increasing activism in this platform have matched Turkey's ambitious global governance agenda in general and its 2015 G20 Presidency programme in particular. According to the author, the increasing weight of development issues in the G20 agenda over the last five years has also fitted well Turkey's multidirectional foreign policy, geographically covering the developing countries from different continents. Ünay also states that Turkey's objective of establishing an institutional basis for the G20 that would also welcome the least developed countries (LDCs) may also be seen as a reflection of Turkey's middle power activism and its bridge building role between the developed and developing countries. The author suggests that Turkey's rotating 2015 G20 presidency could create leverage for Turkey's middle power actorness in global governance and its call for reform in major global governance institutions.

Two articles on a theme different from the main theme of the issue are also included in this special issue and contribute to this special issue's

multi-perspective approach to regional and international affairs. In "Jordan and the Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities", Nuri Yeşilyurt aims to analyze the impacts of the Arab Spring on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Acknowledging the fact that among Arab monarchies, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the most vulnerable because of its small size, poor economy, fragmented society and uneasy neighborhood, the article specifically deals with the survival of the Hashemite regime in the course of the Arab Spring by analyzing the main sources of stability/instability for the regime. Yeşilyurt asserts that Arab Spring brought more benefits to the Hashemite regime than problems in the sense that the regime has been successful in overcoming radical Islamist challenges, deepening economic problems and the growing unrest among East Bankers. Yet, the article stresses that the long term sustainability of Jordan's stability is still questionable since it is highly dependent on external factors, namely the regional conjuncture and foreign assistance.

In "Post-2014 Drawdown and Afghanistan's Transition Challenges", Saman Zulfqar draws on the challenges of transition that Afghanistan has been facing since the 2014 drawdown of foreign troops from the country. The author aims to depict the country's various transition challenges related with security, economics and domestic

politics and tries to assess how regional states could play a constructive role in facilitating the transition process in Afghanistan. For the author, among all the transition processes it is the process of political transition that has been the most challenging and decisive in shaping the contours of the new order in the making in Afghanistan. Saman Zulfqar also emphasizes that political transition will be incomplete unless the reconciliation process with insurgent groups, namely the Taliban, is successfully resumed. In the final analysis, the author concludes that the onus for making the transition process successful rests on the Afghan people themselves, who have been suffering for decades from tribal and ethnic conflicts and civil war.

This special issue wraps up with a tribute dedicated to Ali Mazrui, written by one of his students, M. Akif Kayapınar. As a complementary piece to Hasan Kösebalan's article, the tribute, entitled "A Life of 'Long Debate': A Tribute to Ali A. Mazrui (1933-2014)", presents a short biography of Professor Mazrui, who was a spirited Africanist, a conscientious public intellectual, a prolific writer and a life-long activist against abuses of power and violation of human rights. In his works, Mazrui specifically focuses on the role and significance of "culture" in world politics, as opposed to power based explanations. Kayapınar asserts that the solution offered by Mazrui for the prevailing

inequalities in the world today was a "world-federation of cultures", which he believed to be more relevant than an order based solely on the distribution of power and security concerns. This tribute completes this special issue's "order" debate by emphasizing once again the "ethical" and "cultural" dimension of international politics as well as sensitivity towards basic freedoms, fundamental human rights and inequality in a changing international order.

In Guise of Conclusion

This special issue thus offers a multi-disciplinary panorama for assessing Turkey's changing power status in the existing international order via a framework of multiple perspectives, and locates Turkey as a "rising" power with a number of peculiarities. Turkey's rise in the current power hierarchy seems to influence not only its normative stance vis-à-vis recent international developments and regional crises, but also its preferences and strategies with regard to the changing global governance and the liberal international order. As most of the papers of this special issue have argued, despite the existing limitations and constraints to its regional and, to a lesser extent, global rise, Turkey has shown its willingness to participate in efforts to build a more effective set of arrangements for a more equitable and just international order. Turkey's new pluralistic and multi-

centric approach to international order is not only based on a communitarian understanding of international solidarity, but also on a cosmopolitan worldview which is universalistic in terms of global citizenship, justice and ethics.¹⁹ In this respect, in the new normative agenda of Turkish foreign policy, the quest for global justice and order criticism are interlinked. On the other hand, Turkey's quest for a new international order, its civilizational approach and encompassing understanding based on the idea of the coexistence of multiple civilizations and multiple modernities also constitutes a critical dimension of its new outlook. Turkey's multicentric approach to the international order also explains its recent activism in global governance institutions. The new global governance, as understood by Turkey, seeks to establish interactions between civilisations, while contributing "to the emergence of a genuine global culture in which convergence and pluralism coexist."²⁰

Aside from Turkey's nuanced normative stance vis-à-vis international crises and its quest for a justice and ethics-based international order, that which is new in Turkey's current approach to the global order is its increasing willingness to act as a middle power between the West and the rest. However, given current structural and regional constraints, this new role conception has been held in check by some limitations. Compared to the other rising powers like China,

India, Brazil and South Africa, Turkey's ability to exert diplomatic influence in its own sub-region, namely the Middle East, is actually limited due to the ongoing regional instability, chaos and the emerging security threats, such as the one emanating from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In contrast, other rising powers enjoy an incomparable manoeuvring capacity and growing diplomatic influence in their sub-regions, which may enable them to frustrate Western diplomacy and wield significant power. Since the occupation of Iraq by the US in 2003, no new regional order has emerged in the Middle East, and, with the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, the region has come to witness new power antagonisms among major powers, regional states and the emerging non-state actors (armed and unarmed). In this highly chaotic atmosphere, no state is powerful enough to play a regional power broker role. Here it must be reminded that between roughly 2005-2013, Turkey positioned itself as a regional power in the Middle East thanks to its proactive foreign policy, increasing trade relations, and socialization with the regional countries. Although Turkey successfully responded to the region's challenges and performed credibly in the areas of mediation, conflict resolution and development cooperation in the first decade of the 2000s, the aggravation of the Syrian civil war after 2012 and the military *coup d'état* in Egypt in 2013

partly sabotaged its regional calculations; as a result, its rising regional power status in the Middle East could not generate effective policy outcomes. Turkey's relatively diminishing political influence in the Middle East over the last three years has slackened its global rise by weakening its regional competitiveness vis-à-vis the other rising powers who are, at the same time, eminent regional actors in their own sub-regions.

In spite of occasional “road accidents”, Turkey continues to be unequivocal about its active advocacy for a reform of the Western-dominated global order in order to introduce more representative, effective and just institutional structures. In this context, in its criticism towards the West for having adopted a double-standard vis-à-vis the international crises of the last decade, Ankara has come to take on “a brand new role” aiming to “bring a higher moral standard to global governance” during this period.²¹ Yet, despite intense criticisms towards the workings of the UN system, in practice, the UN has continued to be an important arena in Ankara's search for a *just international order* as well as in its efforts to “restructure” the world order. Furthermore, as a rising power that takes part in the Western institutions, Turkey's emphatic calls for a revision of the international system are clearly distinguished from those of other rising

states, granting it membership within a plethora of Western international institutions. In this context, Turkey's “normative resistance” of the last decade is designed to propose an “international justice-based alternative approach” to the existing international order which needs to be reconstructed *within*, not outside, the UN platform.

Finally, as guest editors we would like to thank first Prof. Berdal Aral for his valuable contribution to this special issue since the very beginning. He made significant efforts at every stage for maximizing the academic value and content quality of this issue. Without his rigorous help, criticism and sense of organisation we doubt it would have been possible for us to finish this issue of *Perceptions*. We also thank all the authors for their valuable contributions to this issue as well as Birgül Demirtaş, deputy editor of *Perceptions*, for her feedback and editing and Murat Yeşiltaş for his encouragement and kind help. As the guest editors, we hope this issue on Turkey and the International Order will bring novelty to both the IR and Turkish foreign policy literature and will provide a thought-provoking volume about the current debates on how to locate Turkey in the changing international order and how to understand its new position in global governance institutions compared to other prominent rising powers.

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Muslim Perceptions of Injustice as an International Relations Question

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Abstract

This article argues that political instability and conflict in the Middle East and the larger Muslim world are caused by perceived marginalization and systematic injustice suffered by Muslim societies both at the domestic and international levels. In contrast to essentialist explanations of political instability in the Muslim world, the article calls for an institutional explanation, highlighting destabilizing effects of political marginalization especially in an increasingly globalized world. Exclusion of Muslim societies from international authority structures is a direct result of fragmentation of political authority and lack of democracy in the Muslim world. Western theories of International Relations are ill-fitted to explain the contribution of perceptions of civilizational injustice because they emerged within a statist and materialist paradigm. Muslim critics differ fundamentally from these approaches in that they see justice rather than order as the basis of a lasting world peace.

Key Words

Islam, international system, peace, civilizational justice, democracy, the United Nations, globalization.

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Introduction

The brutal murder by two Muslims of twelve journalists and policemen at the office of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris created shock waves across Europe and the world. Since then numerous similar incidents have occurred. The radical terror groups such as ISIS been able to recruit militants from more than eighty countries from Indonesia to Morocco, from Australia to Spain. Most of its recruits are urban, young and educated. The question of what drives these individuals, who would otherwise be seeking normal life-styles and successful professional careers, to travel to a conflict zone and join a terrorist organization is an important analytical puzzle. The conventional responses offered by essentialist approaches draw our attention to what it regards as the violent core character of Islam that leads its young adherents to radicalism. In this view, it is the text of the religion which shapes and guides action. In the Muslim world, a similar approach asserts that violence is a result of the prevalence of a certain interpretation of religion. If it is replaced by “the real Islam” or alternatively a more

reformist interpretation of Islamic texts, the crisis would be solved. In contrast to such simplistic but nevertheless commonplace accounts, this article asserts that the explanations should be sought at the level of material factors. The text gains meaning only in the specific structural and institutional context in which it is read and interpreted. The root of the problem lies therefore in the absence of participatory institutions both at the local and international level. The widespread perception in the Muslim world is that they are subject to a systematic domestic and international injustice but are denied participatory mechanisms to voice their grievances. The absence of democracy at the domestic level in the majority of Muslim countries means that public perceptions are often not represented by their states. Furthermore, the fragmented political structure of the Muslim world results in the absence of Muslim participation in key international organizations.

Exclusion of Muslim societies from international authority structures is a direct result of fragmentation of political authority and lack of democracy in the Muslim world.

Participant units of the contemporary international system are states and often the states are themselves the principal

causes of conflicts and wars. In the context of the Muslim world, where authoritarianism is the norm and democracy is a rare exception, states lack the crucial linkage with their societies to credibly represent them at the international level. At the same time, the United Nations is built upon an undemocratic system which grants five of its members veto power over decisions concerning major international crises. Major conflicts where their direct interests are at stake remain unaddressed and justice will be rendered only in specific cases where they do not have conflictual positions. As the Syrian case demonstrates, authoritarian leaders may enjoy protection of one or more of the permanent members of the Security Council and human rights violations are therefore seldom addressed. For more than six decades, the UN Security Council has failed to address the question of Palestine in a fair and forceful manner precisely because major powers offer unquestionable support to Israel. Especially since the end of the Cold War, Muslim populations in numerous locations have experienced civil wars, communal violence, and oppression by their states, but these issues are not raised by any major power and brought to the agenda for international decision-making. The lack of a permanent Muslim-majority member of the UN Security Council despite the fact that Muslims represent the largest civilizational category without this member-

ship is the pressing question facing the international system. Discussions about the expansion of the Security Council are often about the inclusion of India or Brazil as new permanent members but they are rarely about the issue of *Muslim* representation. The obvious reason for this omission is the fact that the legitimate unit of analysis in international politics is the state rather than religious groups or civilizational categories. Basically the question of representation confronting Muslims as a civilizational category is caused by severe political fragmentation of the Muslim world in that there is no larger Muslim state having a population capable of enforcing itself as a significant political power playing a major international role and legitimately demanding participatory position. In its absence, genuine Muslim political grievances are simply ignored by international powers.

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The goal of this article is to call for a re-thinking of the root causes of political violence in the Muslim world. It aims to locate the issue in the political context, presenting a perspective that is

focused both on domestic and international dimensions of the question of representation. The central argument is that sources of political violence are rooted not in a specific culture or religion but in the perceived absence of representation and denial of voice, both at the level of domestic and international system. Hence, the recruitment ability of militant Islamist movements cannot be explained solely by reference to religion or a particular interpretation of religion. It is deeply rooted in the domestic and global political context which suppresses demands of Muslim masses to voice their grievances. In the words of Richard Falk, the discourse of globalization without a fair civilizational participation is nothing more than “false universalism.”¹ As rapidly globalizing, increasingly urban and educated Muslim societies demand political participation not only at the domestic but also at the global level, along with the failure to channel such demands into peaceful political participation through democratic decision-making mechanisms, a strong backlash is created.

Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations has certainly challenged the traditional statist IR paradigm, but in the way he locates the source of international conflict in the inherent character of civilizations, most particularly Islam, he falls into the trap of essentialism. Yet accepting the validity of civilizations as significant identity categories does not

necessarily translate into believing in the inevitability of a civilizational clash. This article locates the source of conflict in the way Muslim populations are excluded from domestic and global representative mechanisms. The inability of domestic and international political institutions to represent their voices and grievances feeds into a deep sense of injustice among Muslim societies, thereby contributing to the socio-psychological background of political violence.

Accepting the validity of civilizations as significant identity categories does not necessarily translate into believing in the inevitability of a civilizational clash.

The article starts with a discussion of Huntington's theory of clash of civilizations, and elaborates on how his essentialist explanations regarding the cause of conflict contradicts with his earlier institutionalist approach, which ironically, offers a more accurate explanation. Similarly, mainstream IR theories do not address the issue of civilizational justice, as notions of civilization and justice are outside of their analytical framework that focuses on peace as maintenance of stability and order. In contrast, critical-minded scholars of Muslim background offer an alternative concept of peace not

as the absence of conflict and war but as a condition stemming from the presence of justice. In the current structure in which Muslims suffer from a severe fragmentation of political authority and denial of democracy, essential prerequisites for peace are missing.

The Clash of Civilizations or the Crisis of Representation?

Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations?* presents a powerful challenge to the statist paradigm on which both actual international politics and theoretical thinking about international relations are based.² Huntington believes that the future conflicts in the world will be primarily among civilizations, which include Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese civilizations. In his prediction, "nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future."³ Huntington's clash of civilizations has been influential not because of the value and consistency of his claims and arguments but rather because of the enormous political impact it created in the context of the post-Soviet Balkan conflicts. Many critics note that Huntington predicts

the effects that his discourse itself has created, thus engaging in a self-fulfilling prophecy.⁴ Henderson and Tucker refute the empirical accuracy of Huntington's claims by asserting that most of the pre-Cold War and Cold War conflicts took place among states belonging to the same civilizational groups and the civilizational membership has not played any role in the post-Cold War interstate conflicts.⁵ Yet others see that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the ever increasing frequency of political violence and terrorism in the Muslim world prove his arguments.⁶

Furthermore, *the Clash of Civilizations* offers a strong criticism to the idea that there is one single, universal civilization. He accepts other cultural units as authentic civilizations but does not see them as capable of grasping liberal Western values. In this sense the attempt by the West to export its liberal values is not only futile but more significantly it creates a reaction by allowing the Others to perceive the West as imperialist.⁷ Here Huntington repeats the conventional essentialist discourse which sees traditional Muslim societies developing a cultural reaction to the effects of modernization and globalization that bring to them liberal Western values. He fails to acknowledge that anti-Western reaction is not due to democratization and liberalization of Muslim societies but rather postponement and denial of these processes due to repeated outside interventions. In Huntington's frank expression, "the West

won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion [...] but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do."⁸

While *the Clash of Civilizations* has received a sharp reaction from most academics and intellectuals, it has created an undeniably strong impact outside the scholarly boundaries. Undoubtedly, he has succeeded to provoke attempts to find a place for the notion of civilization within the IR theory.⁹ Yet the mainstream IR theory has stayed away from integrating this concept into its analytical framework. For the most part, IR theories accept states as the major organizing and building blocks of international politics. Two leading theories of International Relations, Realism and Liberalism, differ only in terms of their view about the nature of the state, its characteristics and its behavior, but not about its primacy in international politics. Civilization, however, is fuzzy, ambiguous, and, most significantly, lacks explicit agency.¹⁰

Interestingly Huntington comes from a pioneering institutionalist background of explaining the roots of chaos in changing societies. Yet his theoretical orientation gradually shifted from institutionalism to culturalism and civilizational essentialism. In its theoretical orientation, *the Clash of Civilizations* represents a dramatic shift from two of his previous, more academically-oriented works: the *Political Order in Changing Societies* and *the Third Wave*.¹¹

The Political Order in Changing Societies demonstrated the destabilizing effects of economic modernization when it is not coupled with political modernization. Economic modernization creates an empowered society and increased societal demands for political change. Huntington predicts that when this modernization is not followed by a parallel process of political institutionalization or democratization, the outcome will be societal conflict. As Huntington explains,

Social and economic change—urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization, mass media expansion—extend political consciousness, multiply political demands, broaden political participation. These changes undermine traditional sources of political authority and traditional political institutions. ...The rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability and disorder. The primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.¹²

In 1968, Huntington's interest was the effects of modernization at the domestic level. Yet his theory can easily be applied to the global level to explain the effects of globalization. Globalization aggravates and expands the scope of the effects of modernization; it leads to increased access by societal groups to global education and media, ultimately increasing political expectations for political participation. Now instead of the national media, we talk about global and interactive

social media which renders authoritarian state control on information ineffective. In line with Huntington's predictions, these expectations are accompanied by effective participatory institutions at the international level, the outcome will be global disorder and violence.¹³

In *the Third Wave*, Huntington avoids to some extent cultural determinism and presents cultures as dynamic and complex categories. He acknowledges the existence of some inherent cultural obstacles in Islam to democratization, most significantly the absence of secularism and the values in these cultural traditions that are congruent with the principles of democracy such as egalitarianism and voluntarism.¹⁴ In the process, cultural features that are in agreement with democracy can supersede those that are unfavorable to it. In other words, a cultural transformation is possible if requisite institutional structures are in place.

Three years before the publication of Huntington's article, the renowned Orientalist Bernard Lewis saw a civilizational conflict between Islam and the West, which he described as an ancient conflict: "We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations— the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both."¹⁵

Dominant IR theories are ill-fitted to explain the role of civilizational identity and civilizational justice in causing conflict and peace.

Like Lewis, Huntington sees the root of the conflict in unchanging, essential characteristics and belief-system of Islam. In his view, Islam has an inherent propensity to violence due to its militarism and its inability to coexist with non-Muslims. He states, "Islam's borders are bloody and so are its innards. The fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power."¹⁶ In contrast, Western civilization is uniquely characterized by values and institutions including pluralism, individualism, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom.¹⁷ He rejects that Western colonialism and post-colonial imperialism have anything to do with the production of violence. Yet he recognizes the absence of core Muslim states providing central authority as a contributing factor to the prevalence of conflict: "Islam is a source of instability in the world because it lacks a dominant center. States aspiring to be leaders of Islam, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and potentially Indonesia, compete for influence in the Muslim

world; no one of them is in a strong position to mediate conflicts within Islam; and no one of them is able to act authoritatively on behalf of Islam in dealing with conflicts between Muslim and non-Muslim groups."¹⁸

Huntington refuses to associate this fragmented power structure and the absence of a dominant political authority in the Muslim world with imperialism. Neither does he acknowledge the role of the civilizationally undemocratic decision-making structure of the international system, which inherently fails to address legitimate political grievances of Muslim masses. As Abdullahi an-Na'im maintains, while the actual perpetrators of political violence may be small in number, there is always a widespread sympathy and support by a much larger number of people at the mass level, and this will not end unless the grievances of the wider constituency are addressed. For an effective conflict resolution, "it is necessary to try our utmost to understand and respond to the underlying injustice that may make any wider community sympathetic to the claims of terrorists, without conceding those claims as such or accepting that terrorism can ever be a legitimate or justified means of redressing any perceived grievances. The most compelling example of this is the occupation and humiliation, loss of land and humanity suffered by Palestinians."¹⁹

“Civilizational Justice” as a Missing Concept in IR Theory Debates

Dominant IR theories are ill-fitted to explain the role of civilizational identity and civilizational justice in causing conflict and peace. There are two reasons for this. First, they emphasize material interests, order and stability over normative values including human rights and justice. Furthermore, mainstream IR theories, particularly realism, are based on a statist paradigm of international politics and a fluid, non-material and extra-territorial concept like civilizational identity is hard to integrate into their analytical framework.

Moral concepts such as justice and equality are not among the core interests of mainstream IR theories. In these approaches, the crucial linkage between justice and peace is missing. Realists believe that peace is caused by balance of power in an anarchic international system; Liberals hold that international organizations mitigate the effects of anarchy and contribute to cooperation among states. Hans Morgenthau, founder of classical realism, famously states, “international politics is a struggle for power.”²⁰ Universal moral principles do not apply to actions of states in the autonomous realm of politics, which dictates rational pursuit of interests defined as power.²¹ There is simply no contradic-

tion between rationality and morality, as “the rationally right and the ethically good are identical.”²² State leaders might have ulterior goals defined in terms of religious, philosophic or social ideals. “But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power.”²³ Hence dictates of rationality and power politics reign supreme. In structural realism, most prominently espoused by Kenneth Waltz, the anarchical nature of the international system dictates rationality in foreign policy decisions. The system ensures that the primary motivation of states is survival and states do not differentiate among other states when it comes to security.²⁴ Cultural commonalities or civilizational identity do not create a special bond between states as moral considerations are secondary to security priorities.

Young European Muslims facing difficulties of integration may feel alienated from the cultural system in which they live and seek an external identity that offers them cultural self-confidence and feelings of superiority.

In contrast to realism which sees states as undifferentiated units regardless of their domestic society, culture, and in-

stitutional structures, liberalism has a culture-specific bias accepting “the distinctiveness of interstate relations among modern Western states.”²⁵ Liberalism holds that behavior of states is determined by state preferences, which are shaped by domestic societal actors, public opinion, interest groups as well as political and economic systems. State preferences emerge as an outcome of conflict of interests among societal actors and interest groups to shape foreign policy. In liberalism, such societal groups, including identity-based groups, are construed as rational units, competing against each other to shape state preferences in order to serve their interests. Hence a liberal conception of the state is materialist and unable to account for non-material sources of conflict. Yet in contrast to realism which sees all states as equally capable of acting rationally, liberalism has a definite cultural bias in believing in the superiority of liberal values and institutions in generating peace.

The role of civilizational identity in international politics could best be explained by constructivism as a theoretical approach that incorporates non-material factors. However, statist and structuralist interpretations of constructivism including the one espoused by Alexander Wendt do not attempt to explain collective identity formations at the societal and individual levels.²⁶ Statist constructivism explores common identity build-

ing processes among states. Formation of civilizational identity, however, is a societal and individual process, as those who feel belonging to a civilizational identity are individuals rather than states. In fact, civilizational identity may work against the national-identity building process, by forcing minorities within a larger cultural system to identify with an external identity. Young European Muslims facing difficulties of integration may feel alienated from the cultural system in which they live and seek an external identity that offers them cultural self-confidence and feelings of superiority.

Employing Johan Galtung’s terminology, both Realism and Liberalism understand peace as the absence of war (*negative peace*), rather than having a positive content of justice, human rights and the constructive resolution of conflict (*positive peace*). As Galtung states, “*structural positive peace* would substitute freedom for repression and equity for exploitation, and then reinforce this with *dialogue* instead of penetration, *integration* instead of segmentation, *solidarity* instead of fragmentation, and *participation* instead of marginalization.”²⁷

Mainstream IR theories think of peace in terms of the absence of war rather than as stemming from justice mainly because of the materialist ontology on which they are based. Despite their claims for objectivity and universality, theories of International Relations reflect a para-

digm of thinking and perspective on the way international relations are conducted or should be conducted normatively. As Robert Cox states, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space...There is, accordingly, no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective.”²⁸ The theories that came to be dominant in the literature after the Second World War were ideological perspectives on international politics. They primarily reflected how international politics looked from the perspective of the major powers, particularly the United States. Hence their primary emphasis has been stability and security rather than reform or change. According to Acharya and Buzan, realism, liberalism and even alternative approaches like the English School speak for the status quo great powers and the maintenance of their position in the international system.²⁹ When it is applied to the domestic political realm, Islamic political theory, particularly developed in later stages, similarly emphasizes order and stability as important values and calls for avoidance of anarchy and chaos. Political authority is valued as it provides security and protection, maintains legal order, and safeguards the rights of indi-

viduals and groups.³⁰ Yet, an Islamic paradigm of politics also highlights justice as the basis of and prerequisite for peace. As Khadduri states, “any public order devoid of justice tends to breed tension and conflicts, and therefore would undermine and ultimately destroy the foundation on which peace is established. Yet in human experience, justice proved so compelling a goal in some societies that its pursuit often prompted men to break the peace. In the relationship among nations, peace proved to be the proximate, but justice is the ultimate objective, if public order were ever to endure.”³¹

Realism asserts that justice cannot be materialized in the absence of order whereas Islamic tradition sees a wrong order as constituting injustice.

Islam’s conception of peace is at odds with Realism’s prioritization of order over justice. Realism asserts that justice cannot be materialized in the absence of order whereas Islamic tradition sees a wrong order as constituting injustice.³² In an Islamic theory of International Relations, as developed by Abu Sulayman, justice is ranked before peace among the cardinal principles of such a theory.³³ In his introduction to Abu Sulayman’s book, the late Palestinian-American scholar Ismail R. al-Faruqi writes that there is a strong need in the world today for an

international order that would establish a just and permanent peace. This world order would be “without tyranny, one which recognizes the differences and distinctions- religious, cultural, social, and economic- of the peoples of the world as legitimate, and that would found its law upon their common need to order their lives as they wish in justice and freedom.”³⁴ As stated by Kelsay, the Islamic tradition accepts peace not as the avoidance of strife or the absence of war, but as emerging from the struggle for a just social order.³⁵ Hence the Islamic paradigm considers justice as a higher ranking value than a mere absence of war. The present international system, the core institution of which is the United Nations, prioritizes order over justice. According to Hashmi, the UN Charter places greater emphasis on values of sovereignty, order, and peace over individual or collective rights and justice.³⁶ Similarly, Ali Mazrui believes that the UN Charter reflects “a Christian tendency to regard peace and ‘love’ as an answer to the scourge of war,” whereas the Islamic ethical system rests not on the commandment to love, but on the struggle for justice.³⁷

According to Davutoğlu, Muslim societies have lost their confidence in the international system as a result of perceived neglect of their issues and unfair treatment.

Richard Falk provides a powerful criticism of both statist IR theories and Huntington’s theory clash of civilizations. While employing civilizational analysis, he disagrees with Huntington as to why civilizational conflict takes place. For Falk, the absence of Muslim participation in key international organizations and decision-making processes contributes to a widespread Muslim perception of exclusion. Moreover, this absence contributes to an anti-Islamic bias in addressing the controversial issues concerning Muslim populations.³⁸ Falk refers to Ahmet Davutoğlu’s criticism of international system’s treatment of political crises in the Muslim world. According to Davutoğlu, Muslim societies have lost their confidence in the international system as a result of perceived neglect of their issues and unfair treatment:

The Muslim masses are feeling insecure in relation to the functioning of the international system because of the double standards in international affairs. The expansionist policy of Israel has been tolerated by the international system... The international organizations, which are very sensitive to the rights of small minorities in Muslim countries, did not respond against the sufferings of the Muslim minorities in India, the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Kashmir Burma, etc. The atomic powers in some Muslim countries like Pakistan and Kazakhstan have been declared a danger when such weapons have been accepted as the internal affairs of other states such as Israel and India. Muslims, who make up about 25 % of the world’s population, have no permanent member in the Security Council and all appeals from

the Muslim world are being vetoed by one of the permanent members. The Muslim masses have lost their confidence in the international system as a neutral problem-solver after the experiences of the last decade.³⁹

Echoing a similar perspective, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami objects to the undemocratic nature of the UN system: “Why should a few countries have privileges because they won the last world war and have more power, and why should they be able to use the institutions and tools created in the United Nations for promoting peace and understating to impose their demands and interests?”⁴⁰ Among other Muslim leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey, offers one of sharpest criticisms of the way the international system has responded to conflicts such as Palestine and the way the UN security system is structured. As Erdoğan asserts, the exclusive veto power system creates an unfair situation as their decisions often negate the will of the UN body. The resulting frustration causes despair: “the double standards of the modern world create a deep lack of trust for the people. This distrust tarnishes the perception of justice and leads millions of people to fall into despair... Quicker and more effective mechanisms should be formed for the solution of global and regional problems, and the U.N. should act bravely when it comes to the defending of the right.”⁴¹

Naturally, the absence of Muslim states in key international organizations

can be explained and justified from a purely statist power-based perspective by referring to the absence of any qualifying Muslim majority state in terms of population, size of economy or military power. Likewise, from a perspective that rejects the validity of multiple civilizational categories, there is simply no issue on which the West is represented by three countries and the Muslim world, with a population of 1.6 billion, does not have a permanent member at the UN Security Council. Even then, one needs to explain why Indonesia is excluded despite having almost the combined population of three of the five permanent UN Security Council members- France, the United Kingdom, and Russia. At the same time, the case of India and Brazil, as the largest members of Huntington’s other non-Western civilizations, should also be discussed. Certainly the severe political fragmentation of the Muslim world contributes to the absence of Muslim representation in the global decision-making processes. Economic and political reintegration of the Muslim world leading to a unified political authority in the same way Europe has achieved integration would only be possible with democratization. Yet the suppression of democratic aspirations in the Muslim world by domestic regimes in collaboration with international powers, primarily the West, alienates the Muslim masses and destroys their optimism about their futures. Clearly, the present fragmented

political structure in the Muslim world has been an outcome of colonialist power structures.

Two Sources of Perceptions of Civilizational Injustice in the Muslim World

Colonialism and Fragmentation of Political Authority

In the map of civilizations drawn by Samuel Huntington, the modern Islamic world appears to be the most fragmented, competing in this matter with Africa and Latin America. Other civilizational categories are characterized by the presence of dominant states or politically and economically integrated blocs. The United States and European Union, China, Russia, and India are building blocs of the civilizations which Huntington accepts they belong to. In the case of Islam, the picture is that of an extreme political fragmentation, which is a contradiction given Islam's strong emphasis on the notion of one Muslim community (*ummah*).

In this new balance of power, Muslim lands were integrated into the global economy as colonies and suppliers of raw materials for European industries, as well as consumers of European finished products.

As noted by Hashmi, the fragmentation of Muslim political perspectives started soon after the death of Prophet Muhammad, over the question of leadership.⁴² In Islamic history, numerous Muslim empires simultaneously contested not only over territory, but also over the title of Caliphate and the claim to legitimately represent the entire *ummah*. Yet the post-colonial political structure of the Muslim world is unprecedented in its level of political fragmentation. Despite the Crusaders and the Mongol invasions, the change in political power from Arabs to Turkic rulers, and the loss of Muslim control in the Iberian Peninsula, the overall balance of power long remained in favor of the Muslim side. This picture drastically changed with the advent of modern colonialism and industrialization in Europe, leading to a complete dominance of the West over the Muslim world. In this new balance of power, Muslim lands were integrated into the global economy as colonies and suppliers of raw materials for European industries, as well as consumers of European finished products.

Muslim attempts to resist territorial dissolution and integration into the Euro-centric global economic system through reform and defensive modernization not only largely failed, but also, more significantly, such attempts augmented the situation of dependency because they could be financed through cash crops sold to Europe as well as by

European financing.⁴³ The advent of Russia as the challenger to European colonial powers ended the long history of the British-French conflict. They chose to support the Ottoman empire against Russian expansionism, but this support often came in exchange for trade concessions, which allowed for further market penetration of European powers into the Empire. Later the unification of Germany changed all of these calculations and led to Britain, France and Russia coming together in an attempt to deny Germany's advance into the Ottoman Middle East. Deprived of their traditional Western allies, the Ottomans moved closer to Germany. The background for a catastrophic confrontation among European great powers was ready.

World War I was the most decisive event in shaping the current political map of the Middle East, the political and cultural heart of the Muslim world. It ended the era of political unity under Muslim imperial systems and started an era of fragmentation. The Ottoman Empire was carved into pieces at the hands of British and French cartographers. The Arab world was divided into more than 20 units with no regard to historical, ethnic, sectarian, or geographic bases. Each of these units were then placed under colonial regimes, mandate administrations, or authoritarian monarchies. This arbitrary division of land created new minorities and planted the seeds of much of today's ethnic and sectarian conflicts

in the region. With few exceptions, states were created through imperial design at the center of which lies secret maneuvering of two colonial powers, Britain and France. As stated by Ali Mazrui, "In the first half of the century, the West had colonized more than two thirds of the Muslim world- from Kano to Karachi, from Cairo to Kuala Lumpur, from Dakar to Jakarta. The first half of the 20th century also witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the more complete de-Islamization of the European state system. The aftermath included the abolition of the Caliphate as the symbolic center of Islamic authority. The *ummah* became more fragmented than ever and became even more receptive to Western cultural penetration."⁴⁴

The traumatic memory of these brutal wars and conflicts lingers in the minds of millions of young North Africans especially in the face of rejection by France, alongside with other former European colonialists, to deal with burden of its history.

Under the secret Sykes- Picot Agreement of 1916, Britain and France divided the Middle East into their distinct zones of direct control and influence, contradicting the promises which Britain made to Sharif Hussein under the Hussein-

MacMohan Correspondence (1915-16) as a reward for the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Following the conclusion of the war, this arrangement was endorsed by the League of Nations in 1919 under Article 22 of its Covenant declaring Syria as the French and Iraq and Palestine as the British mandates. In August 1920, the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign the Treaty of Sèvres, as the final nail on the coffin of the empire. According to the treaty, Anatolia would be divided and occupied by Greece, Britain, France, and Italy, an independent Armenia and Kurdistan would be established, while the British and the French mandates in Syria, Iraq and Palestine would be recognized. Turks were given only a tiny and landlocked piece of land in the center of Anatolia. Nationalist Ottoman military officers rejected the Sèvres Treaty and liberated much of Anatolia by successfully organizing a popular struggle of national independence, leading to the establishment of modern Turkey. However, Syria, Iraq and Palestine remained under the control of Britain and France. In Palestine, the British plan was to establish a Jewish homeland as promised under the Balfour Declaration (1917). A massive influx of Jewish populations and forced exodus of Palestinians gradually changed population dynamics, followed by the eventual establishment of Israel in 1948 at the United Nations. Between 1947 and 1949, 760,000 Palestinians were forced to flee their country due to

the fear created among the civilians as a result of numerous massacres committed by violent Jewish organizations.⁴⁵ The United Nations thus wrapped up the task of drawing the political map of the Middle East through direct occupations and interventions.

By the onset of the First World War, colonization of the rest of the Muslim world was nearly complete, leading to indigenous Muslim resistance movements in those places. Direct European colonial presence continued until the end of the Second World War which led to the decline of European colonial powers, and in the new post-war world system, new independent Muslim states came into existence. However, the boundaries of these new states reflected colonial experiences. In the Malay world, Dutch-colonized Indonesia became independent in 1949 and Malaysia was established in 1963 out of the British-colonized Malaya. In some other locations, the experience of colonization by a single European power did not guarantee political unity. In the French-colonized North Africa, Tunisia and Morocco (1956), and Algeria became separate independent states. In the case of Algeria, independence was achieved in 1962, after a decade-long war of independence in which nearly one million Algerians were killed and 1.8 million Algerians were uprooted from their homes.⁴⁶ Libya experienced a similar anti-colonial struggle. The traumatic memory of these brutal wars and

conflicts lingers in the minds of millions of young North Africans especially in the face of rejection by France, alongside with other former European colonialists, to deal with burden of its history. In the British colonial India, fragmentation of Muslim populations into three large pieces created a long-lasting legacy, paving the way for modern ethnic and religious conflicts in the region. In addition to tensions between India and Pakistan that saw many wars before it escalated into a nuclear arms race, the on-going conflict of Kashmir is a legacy of colonialism.⁴⁷ As they are the winning founders of the current international system, the attitude of former European colonial powers about this part of their history is at best a complete denial if not an arrogant claim that colonialism brought benefits to the colonized.

Even though the period of colonialism has officially ended, the era of post-colonial interventions has started. This meant numerous military interventions with the direct support of the outside powers, most notably the United States. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became the most burning issue felt throughout the Muslim world throughout the 1980s. The outcome of this occupation was the death of nearly 1.5 million Afghan civilians and millions of others had to flee from their country and became refugees in neighboring countries. The impact of the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation

has continued to be felt long after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to an even more bloody tribal and ethnic civil war. Afghanistan became the rallying point and training camp for numerous militant Arab Islamist organizations who initially enjoyed the encouragement as well as financial and military support of the United States and wealthy Arab states. After the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989, the previously US-allied radical groups, most significantly al-Qaeda launched a wave of anti-American terror attacks, the most dramatic among which was September 11. This opened yet another chapter of imperial intervention in the fate of this poor, landlocked yet extremely strategic nation.

The end of the Cold War paved the way for resurfacing of old identity issues in international politics. The fate of Muslim minorities, particularly in the territory of the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc became a new issue. Between 1992 and 1995, the Bosnian War created a massive humanitarian disaster, causing thousands of civilian casualties all under the watch of major powers. In the words of Robert Fisk, "Ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia went on for years before we intervened. Ethnic cleansing of Christians and Yazidis in Iraq- and the murder of American hostages in Syria- brought an almost immediate response."⁴⁸

The Soviet Union disintegrated into newly independent nations but when

Azerbaijan declared its independence it provoked a sharp response from Moscow. The Azerbaijan and Armenian conflict resulted in the occupation of Nagorno Karabagh by Armenia and this occupation continues to be ignored by the international system. In the post-Cold War system, with the notable exception of Kosovo, Muslim minority communal conflicts fail to draw a worldwide attention and remain unresolved. Spots of conflicts such as Kashmir in India, Chechnya in Russia, Patani in Thailand, Xinxiang in China, Mindanao in the Philippines, and Arakan Muslims in Myanmar, have their distinct historical and sociological roots. Yet they continue to be utilized as efficient mobilization sources for global militant movements in the absence of any efficient international response to them.

Denial of Democracy and Political Participation

Muslim minorities are not the only suppressed communities. In the absence of democracy, Muslims do not enjoy their full degree of political and economic freedoms in most majority-Muslim states themselves. While the rest of the world is experiencing a wave of democratization, the Muslim world presents itself as a curious exception. As Larry Diamond points out, “[as] every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant

democratic presence... the continuing absence of a single democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly.”⁴⁹ The question why the Muslim world has stayed outside of the global movement towards democratization despite the end of the Cold War can be answered either by reference to culture and value system of Islam or material variables such as the effects of oil.⁵⁰ Others have maintained that the lack of democracy is an Arab rather than a Muslim gap.⁵¹ Yet like economy-based arguments, domestic institutional explanations needs to highlight one crucial factor more clearly: the role of outside interventions that help sustain authoritarian political structures at the expense of democratization.

The end of the Cold War brought optimism as a new wave of democratization demolished authoritarian systems in East and Central Europe, yet it became clear soon that the Muslim world could not be included in this wave.

Postponement of democratization in the Muslim world was seen as a strategic necessity in the context of the Cold War and still continues to be seen this way. The United States often sponsored and supported military takeovers in the Third World, including numerous occasions

in its Muslim allies. The most dramatic example of Western anti-democratic interventions was the military coup against the democratically-elected Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953.⁵² The Iranian coup set an example to be repeated in other cases from Indonesia to Pakistan and Turkey. The effects of these takeovers have been disastrous for the consolidation of democratic systems and critical institutions including political parties. The end of the Cold War brought optimism as a new wave of democratization demolished authoritarian systems in East and Central Europe, yet it became clear soon that the Muslim world could not be included in this wave. In February 1992, following the victory in Algeria of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in the first round of the general elections, the military staged a coup cancelling the second round of the elections and forcing the country's president to resign. The reaction of the international powers, particularly Europeans, was muted. French politicians from the right to the left were alarmed at the prospects of an Islamist victory, which they feared would create not only a wave of migration to France, but also trigger revolts in other countries of North Africa. Likewise, the United States remained silent.⁵³

In Turkey, the electoral success of the Welfare Party prompted the intervention of the military into politics, and the democratically elected government was forced to resign under pressure by the

military in 1997. The Welfare Party was closed down and its leaders, including Necmettin Erbakan, were banned from politics. The process of militarization that came to be known as the February 28 process resulted in a massive suppression of the cultural and political rights of conservative members of Turkish society. Nine years later, the outcome of the 2006 elections in the Palestinian territories, which ended with the victory of Hamas, was not accepted, leading to a coup against Hamas that paved the way for the currently fragmented structure of Palestine. The Algerian and Palestinian elections demonstrated that the Western rhetoric of democracy promotion could be quickly reversed by the discourse of Islamist threat.⁵⁴

In 2011, the Arab Spring ushered in an era of new hope for democracy and political transformation in North Africa and the Middle East. Dictators who were in place for decades, largely thanks to the external support they enjoyed, crumbled one after the other in the face of popular uprisings. In Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown in January 2011 following violent street demonstrations that started in December 2010 after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid. This incident led to a wave of popular demonstrations in numerous Arab countries. Protests erupted in January 2011 in Egypt and after just 18 days, Husni Mubarak, who had held power since 1981, offered his resignation under

pressure from the military. Four days after a massive popular uprising shook the four-decade long rule of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya and as a result of an international intervention, al-Qaddafi was overthrown in August 2011. Meanwhile, protests forced Yemen's long-reigning Ali Abdullah Salih to resign and flee the country in January 2012.

The success of all these revolts motivated Syria's long-suppressed opposition to seize the opportunity and start a revolt against Bashar al-Assad in January 2011. The protests provoked an extremely violent response from the regime, starting a still-continuing massive civil war in the country. As a result of the conflict, nearly 350,000 Syrians have been killed and an estimated 9 million others have fled their homes since March 2011. More than three million Syrians have sought refuge in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Despite US President Barack Obama's personal definition of the use of chemical bombs as the final point for an international intervention in Syria, and despite the fact that sarin gas bombs were dropped on civilians in the Ghouta suburbs of Damascus in August 2013 by Assad regime's forces, the international community continues to stand idle in front of this massive humanitarian disaster. Yet when ISIS started its terror acts, brutally executing its American and European hostages, the White House acted promptly and started an aerial bombing campaign. Many critics of the US-led

bombing point out the fact that unless the root causes of this conflict are eliminated, it will be impossible to neutralize this threat by aerial attacks. Otherwise Syria will be perceived by larger Muslim masses as the 14th Muslim country that the United States has bombed since 1980.⁵⁵ Despite this fact, US Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the United States would have to negotiate with Assad, a move that Turkish Prime Minister Davutoğlu promptly described as similar to "shaking hands with Hitler."⁵⁶

As the Syrian conflict was evolving into a civil war of catastrophic proportions, the Arab Spring suffered its other major setback in Egypt with the military coup against the country's first democratically elected President Muhammed Mursi in July 2013. Once again, major international powers displayed their known pragmatic reaction of siding with authoritarianism rather than with democracy. Democratic Western governments, most notably Germany, have not lost much time to embrace the new military regime in Egypt, rolling out the red carpet for the new Egyptian dictator. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the United States to restrict aid to a country "whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree." Thus in order to avoid cutting aid to Egypt, Washington has refused to accept that Sisi's take-over amounted to a military coup. Secretary of State John Kerry went so far as to call the military intervention a move towards

“restoring democracy.”⁵⁷ The United States and democratic European powers who tirelessly preach democracy elsewhere when it is in their interests obviously did not have any problem with the fact that the military regime’s courts have sentenced democratically elected Muhammad Mursi and nearly a thousand leaders and members of the Muslim Brotherhood to death penalty and that Egyptian security forces brutally suppressed anti-coup demonstrations, killing over one thousand civilians. The regime started to carry out these executions in March 2015.⁵⁸ This double-sided behavior of the West has received sharp criticism from many intellectuals and the media. As a *New York Times* editorial states, “the Obama administration has refused to even call the coup a coup and moved too gingerly to protest the military’s excesses. It has to be more honest about the unsavory choices it is making, including whether any support for a repressive army will ever bring stability and democracy.”⁵⁹ Another editorial makes the following observation: “Just when the United States is battling Sunni extremists in Iraq and Syria, seeking to isolate the terrorist group known as the Islamic State, Egypt’s crushing authoritarianism could well persuade a significant number of its citizens that violence is the only tool they have for fighting back.”⁶⁰

Still there are those other Western intellectuals who support exclusion of Islam from the democratic landscape.

David Brooks illustrates the deeply-rooted essentialist suspicions in the West about democracy in Muslim countries especially when elections allegedly guarantee the success of Islamists:

Promoting elections is generally a good thing even when they produce victories for democratic forces we disagree with. But elections are not a good thing when they lead to the elevation of people whose substantive beliefs fall outside the democratic orbit... This week’s military coup may merely bring Egypt back to where it was: a bloated and dysfunctional superstate controlled by a self-serving military elite. But at least radical Islam, the main threat to global peace, has been partially discredited and removed from office.⁶¹

Conclusion

Among Huntington’s civilizational categories, the Muslim world has some unique characteristics. It is the largest and politically the most severely fragmented civilizational category. It is an island of authoritarianism with few successful electoral democracies. Finally, despite its demographic size constituting roughly a quarter of the world’s population, it lacks representation in global political and economic decision-making institutions. Political fragmentation, crisis of democracy, and exclusion from the international system are all inter-related factors that perpetuate a sense of civilizational injustice among Muslim masses.

Political fragmentation, crisis of democracy, and exclusion from the international system are all inter-related factors that perpetuate a sense of civilizational injustice among Muslim masses.

There is a widespread perception among Muslims that their legitimate grievances are ignored not only by domestic authoritarian regimes but also by the international system. Continuous suppression of political rights, unresolved Muslim minority problems, continued foreign military presence in Muslim lands, and the question of Palestine are among the central Muslim grievances. The slow response of the international community to the war in Bosnia and now in Syria is bitterly noted in the Muslim psyche. Huntington seeks answers to the question of violence in the Muslim world in the text of Islam, largely ignoring the political context. Many Muslims and non-Muslims fall into the same trap in trying to cure the problem by offering a softer version of Islam. Materialist and statist tradition in the scholarship of International Relations focuses on order, stability and peace as the absence of war. Yet the question is political, and political crises can be solved with political responses.

The Muslim world will be unable to solve this representation crisis unless a process of economic and political integration is achieved through full democratization. The Arab Spring has offered a glimpse of hope in this direction but once again it was suppressed through the collaboration of authoritarian regimes and international powers acting with the same instincts they developed during the Cold War. The endorsement by these powers of the Egyptian military coup that toppled the country's first and only democratically elected president, illustrates the continuation of this mentality which prioritizes relations with authoritarian regimes at the expense of popular will. Yet suppression of democratization does not terminate the political aspirations of increasing numbers of educated, urban and rapidly globalizing young Muslims who are now armed with the tools of information technology. As Huntington predicted as early as 1960s, unless political aspirations of the upwardly mobilizing modern young elites are channeled into political participation through an inclusive democratic system, instability and political violence will be the only expected outcome.

The Muslim world will be unable to solve this representation crisis unless a process of economic and political integration is achieved through full democratization.

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Turkey's Quest for a "New International Order": The Discourse of Civilization and the Politics of Restoration

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Abstract

This article argues that the increasing emphasis of civilization in Turkish foreign policy discourse fundamentally affected Turkey's criticism of the current international order. Political elites during the Justice and Development Party era have framed their critiques of international order in the context of the "politics of restoration"; the political discourse seeks to re-construct Turkey's national, regional and international political discourse and engagement. They have also re-contextualized the politics of restoration along the axis of a discourse of the "New Turkey". In this sense, the "New Turkey" discourse reproduced the civilizational identity part of Turkey's international order narrative by blending it with an anti-hegemonic "dissident" discourse. Instead of taking civilization as a given, as many studies concerned with the relationship of Turkish foreign policy and civilization have done, this article takes Davutoğlu's constitutive role of the idea into account and analyzes the framework provided by the term for the politics of restoration of national, regional, and global order while considering civilization as a historical institution formed by the interaction between culture-economics-politics and a "being-knowledge-values" based mentality.

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Key Words

Civilization, politics of restoration, self-perception, international order and Turkish foreign policy.

Introduction

The most significant impact of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) on Turkish foreign policy has been that it has re-opened Turkey's understanding of "international order" to a discussion on the basis of a "new representation of civilizational belonging".¹ Before the JDP, Turkey's foreign policy was determined through a secular-nationalist identity with the purpose of reproducing a Westphalian political unit at the regional level. This meant the acceptance of the universality of modern Western civilization and the establishment of Turkey as an integral part of the universal civilization. Resulting from a search for a new "political subjectivity" and "strategic autonomy"² in the regional and international system, the discourse of a new order not only redefined Turkey's position in world politics geopolitically and culturally, but also succeeded in *de-*

centering the historical construction of Turkey as an integral part of the Western civilization. Thus, a new supra-national, namely civilizational, “political unit” has become preponderant in Turkish foreign policy discourse instead of the historically Western-oriented nation-state political unit, the dominating principle in the conceptions of the Westphalian international order.³ The transformation of such an obscure and highly transnational new “civilizational identity” into a foreign policy framework-determinant discourse formed a strong political, moral, and psychological gravitational field against Turkey’s “state-centric identity” in the international order.

Gradually included in the new discourse of international order of Turkish foreign policy, the reference to civilization has come to function as oppositional, as a search for anti-hegemony, and as a center of an increasingly pluralist world order perspective vis-à-vis the existing world order and its dominance.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for instance, committed to promoting this discourse in the “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative jointly led by Spain and Turkey, and through the use

of concepts such as “global civilizational consciousness”, “global civilizational perspective”, and “global civilizational politics”, requested the “restoration” of the international order along the axis of multiculturalism.⁴ Moreover, first as an academic, then as a chief advisor, Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister, respectively, Ahmet Davutoğlu time and again referred to the concept of “civilization”; thus he took on the role as the architect of Turkey’s “civilizational discourse”. While both implicitly using the concept of civilization, they also applied the notion as the cornerstone of Turkey’s global foreign policy outlook. The constitutional role of civilization in foreign policy discourse took Turkey’s foreign policy into a two-layer transformation. First, the civilizational discourse caused an internal change in the identity of the State (of Turkey). Second, it helped in gradually presenting a “New Turkey” in the regional and global system, and served the purpose of legitimizing Turkey’s “dissident” position especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Gradually included in the new discourse of international order of Turkish foreign policy, the reference to civilization has come to function as oppositional, as a search for anti-hegemony, and as a center of an increasingly pluralist world order perspective vis-à-vis the existing world order and its dominance.⁵ President Erdoğan’s trademark expression, “the world is bigger than five,” which he

stated at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 2014 and repeated in many other international meetings, and his maxim, "the West is no longer the only center of the world," have both made Turkey's dissident position even clearer.⁶

Within the context of the aforementioned double-dimension, the "West as the ideal civilization" paradigm was eliminated from the actual constructivist role of Turkey's foreign policy identity and was transformed both into a collocutor of the inter-civilizational interaction and into its new "Other". The political elites who presented the European Union (EU) membership as an "alliance of civilizations" project⁷ later placed the West into the center of criticisms targeting the international order along civilizational terms. This type of civilizational thought deeply affected Turkey's foreign policy discourse and practices from the inside out, and caused an important change in the role Turkey wished to play in the reformation of the international order.

Of those who examine the civilization-foreign policy nexus in Turkish foreign policy, a vast majority prefer to take the concept of civilization as a *given*. Many of the analyses of the concept focus on Davutoğlu's understanding and use of the civilizational concept without first examining its use in the context of Turkey (national), the Islamic world (regional), and the search for a new international

order (universal).⁸ While for some, civilization points to a *worldview* based on Islam, for others it is an *ideology* used as a means of political Islam. From both perspectives, the reflection of civilization in foreign policy has been termed as neo-Ottomanist causing a departure from the West, and regarded as a geopolitical imagination imposing its own representation of civilization.⁹ The fact that Davutoğlu refers to civilization as a *historical institution* rather than an *ideology* has been ignored.¹⁰

Instead of taking civilization as a given, this article takes Davutoğlu's constitutive role of the idea into account and analyzes the framework provided by the term for the restoration of national, regional, and global order, while considering civilization as a historical institution formed by the interaction between culture-economics-politics and a "being-knowledge-values" based mentality. The first section of this study analyzes how Davutoğlu approaches Turkey's civilizational perpetuity in his own works and speeches, and how it has been "functionalized" in foreign policy and in the context of the transformation of international order. The second section will consider how Davutoğlu turned the "politics of restoration"-frequently appearing in the search for a new subjectivity- into reality and how, in particular, it has been added to the discourse of "New Turkey" created by President Erdoğan. The third section

examines the kind of civilizational basis provided by civilization as a historical institution and a political unit for the formation of a pluralist international order and a greater scale of “restoration politics” in connection with Turkey’s search for a new international order.

A synthesis of civilizational discourse and “restoration politics” has caused a significant transformation in Turkey’s foreign policy identity.

The main claim of the article is that a synthesis of civilizational discourse and “restoration politics” has caused a significant transformation in Turkey’s foreign policy identity. In addition, that civilization takes center stage in Turkey’s demand for a “post-Western international order” since those who have founded such a civilizational discourse consider civilization not as an ideology but as a historical institution (agent).

Civilizations and World Orders: The Foundational Role of Ahmet Davutoğlu

Many scholars of Turkish foreign policy believe that Ahmet Davutoğlu is one of the important figures who has shaped Turkey’s perspective of international order and civilizational

identity during the JDP era. In order to understand what Davutoğlu means by “civilization” and how he considers the unit of civilization in the formation of world orders, it will be sufficient to consider three important texts written during different time periods. In all three works, he discusses civilization both as a concept and as a central power for the realization of “global systemic” changes as a “whole of institutionalized norms”, and for the world order to assume its final form. According to Davutoğlu, every world order contains within it an essence of civilization, and thus, produces some form of civilizational order. For Davutoğlu, civilization’s “singularity”, as a concept, is a problematic view in the restoration of the present international order. The claim of “one civilization’s universality” causes the formation of a hierarchical relationship among civilizations, and serves the establishment of a hegemonic world order. The preference for the plural use of the term “civilization” (as civilizations) will both show the presence of different civilizations in history and will eventually save inter-civilizational interactions from a type of “absolute” hierarchical relationship in the formation of a new and just global order.¹¹

Davutoğlu begins by offering a broad conceptual panorama of the meaning of civilization(s) and their role in world politics. Civilizations, for him, designate distinct paradigms of human and

social existence, comprising cognitive, normative, aesthetic, and spiritual aspects. Accordingly, differences among civilizations derive from the different epistemic, normative, and ontological premises undergirding them. From this perspective, civilizations develop distinctive perceptions of space and time, and of the meaning and purpose of human and social life. The question, then, is how the diversity of historical constellations can find ways to meet productivity and assemble into "global order". In that context, civilizations, for Davutoğlu, "do not emerge in spatial or temporal isolation, but rather the confluence of a system of being-knowledge-value, where time and space perception places mentality in a dialectical relationship with history, out of which civilizations flourish. This leads us to a certain notion of "order" as a conventional and institutional structure".¹²

When taken as a *trilogy*, it is possible to state that Davutoğlu develops his approach to self-perception (*ben-idraki*, in Turkish, also can be defined as self-cognizance),¹³ civilization, and world order in a detailed manner in his three works. In this sense, while in *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*¹⁴ he puts forward the formative qualities of a "world order" written upon the basis of "self-perception", he discusses the civilization-based transformation in the international system and the

main points of the current crisis in the global system within a historical context in his *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World*.¹⁵ In *Strategic Depth*,¹⁶ where he examines Turkey's foreign policy and how it can adapt to the final international order, Davutoğlu tries to put forward a Turkey-centered geopolitical perspective of a country going after a "new strategic mentality". In each of his three works, the concept of civilization holds center stage.

Writing that in *Alternative Paradigms* he would be attempting to formulate an intellectual relationship between "ontological perception" and "political perception", Davutoğlu attempts to understand the interaction among perception parameters based on being-knowledge-value and the structures of law-economics-politics within the context of history. By doing so, Davutoğlu tries to understand the interaction between the "intellectual transformation" and the "economic-political transformation" throughout the history by mainly focusing on the transformation of world order. In *Civilizational Transformation*, Davutoğlu brings forward the concept of self-perception, to describe the intellectual background of the connection between ontological consciousness and political identity, and to express an awareness of identity that integrates existential perception with historical and political perception.¹⁷ He further develops the concept and places it at

the core of his theoretical framework,¹⁸ beyond conjectural identity debates. In both works, Davutoğlu claims that there is a consistent connection between the existential understanding and the historical and political understanding, asserting that these three levels are where collective identity consciousnesses are established.¹⁹ In *Strategic Depth*, which focuses directly on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, Davutoğlu redefines the consciousness of collective identity through both history and geography, and uses it to formulate a new “strategic mentality” for Turkey.²⁰ When considering his three works altogether, Davutoğlu leans toward the concept of civilization as a “unit of analysis”, and thus, forms an integrative abstract level. The claim that there is a valid historical relationship between the formation of a self-perception that reflects the qualities of the civilizational concept, and a sustainable and peaceful world order, forms the basis of Davutoğlu’s world “order” understanding. In consequence, Davutoğlu’s “world order” is not a system that can be understood solely with material elements, which by itself is of central importance in Turkey’s critique of the international order.

The Concept of “Self-Perception” and Civilizations

The self-perception that Davutoğlu espouses as the essence of civilizations

forms the first ring of his understanding of world order. In his article “Civilizations’ Self-Perception”, Davutoğlu both attributes a positive meaning to the civilizational concept and points to the plurality of civilizations²¹ by defending different forms of self-perception created by various civilizational imaginations. In the last quarter of the 20th century, described by Davutoğlu as a time of “civilizational revitalization and political confrontation”,²² he alleges that the predominating claim of Western academia that ‘Western civilization has brought history to an end by presenting liberal democracy to humanity as a gift’ is false. In this sense, it may be deduced that Davutoğlu, in all three works, attempts to find answers to two main claims: The first is his opposition to “endism”.²³ The discourse of endism is based on the presumption of an imagination of the Western civilization hegemonic order which disregards the historical dynamism of alternative civilizational imaginations. This historic dynamism is placed on the axis of cultural conflict instead of universality by the thesis of “radicalizing” non-Western civilizations.²⁴ Therefore, he argues against such theses, asserting that there is a new awakening at the axis of new civilizations.²⁵ The second claim, which might seem like a contradiction, is his attempt to develop an argument against the previous two theses’ representations and analyses of Islamic civilization and Turkey.

While in the first, there is a frame of thought propounding elements of internal consistency and historical continuity in Islamic civilization, the second one narrates Turkey's historical and geographical "centrality" and the establishment and transformation stages of its political culture within this civilization. To put it clearly, he, on the one hand, objects to the theses which blend Western civilization's hegemonic and Euro-centric reading of history, fortified by the discourse of liberal democracy, as "others" in an essential manner of non-Western entities and marginalizes them in the course of history. But on the other hand, he challenges the depiction-especially that of Huntington- of Turkey as a "torn country" having a difficult time to define itself²⁶ under the feeling of "divided belonging".

The elements of being-knowledge-value forming the framework of the present international order have constituted the Western civilization on the basis of hierarchical supremacy; however, its "associating the entire history of humanity to the historical course of Western civilization" is problematic.

In all three of his works, Davutoğlu, defending the claim that history does not follow a course of linear-development, argues that the end of the Cold War, rather than causing the "end of history", gave rise to a process wherein an extensive civilizational revitalization and transformation²⁷ can once again be brought onto the stage of history in the non-Western civilizations, and in Islamic civilization in particular. Therefore, civilizational revival has made the restoration of the present international order more necessary than ever. According to Davutoğlu, the elements of being-knowledge-value forming the framework of the present international order have constituted the Western civilization on the basis of hierarchical supremacy; however, its "associating the entire history of humanity to the historical course of Western civilization"²⁸ is problematic. This problematic imagination of the world order has ended with the Western civilization triumphantly declaring their "ultimate dominance" over other civilizations. In this sense, representations employed by the Western civilization, such as "the West and the Rest", and their variations of political forms oppose to the "diversity of history" and to the presence of multiple civilizations. As the source of the inconsistency of the present international order,²⁹ Davutoğlu discusses the dominance of the Western civilization's conceptualization of the

“unity of history”, which has been constructed through the three trivets, in reference to Arnold Toynbee, i.e. “the egocentric illusion, the illusion of the ‘unchanging East’, and the illusion of progress as a movement that proceeds in a straight line”. To put the matter bluntly, he mainly opposes the idea of “the Rest” as the passive object of the history. For Davutoğlu, the concept of the *recipient civilization*, itself, reflects an egocentric self-perception powerful enough to accept or reject the conservation of others.³⁰ For this reason, a crisis of the world order means a civilizational crisis as well. According to Davutoğlu, the set of values that determine international relations cannot be considered independently from the paradigmatic elements of the dominant civilization. Thus, the phenomenon called the “world-system” is also being created in the transition process of these factors from local to universal at the institutional and mental levels. Here, the international systemic transformations throughout the world history are tackled as a transformation that “occurs at the axis of civilization” in the final stage.³¹ Consequently, the most important foundational parameter of civilizations, for Davutoğlu, is their contribution of an “original understanding to the individual’s ontological status by providing a new self-perception based on a worldview.”³² The fundamental elements of the concept of “self-perception,”

which he borrows from Husserl³³ (*Selbstverständnis*) are, according to Davutoğlu, the individual’s idea of Being/God and the ego, and their “life world” (*Lebenswelt*).³⁴ The notion of worldview gives color to the different aspects of self-perception, which forms the hard core of civilization (*Weltanschauung*). In this frame, Davutoğlu’s main claim about the “essence” of civilizations is:

(...) the fundamental element that facilitates the formation of civilizations, the rise of civilizations and their ability to resist the potential dominance of other civilizations is the self-perception which clarifies a civilizational prototype. The final factor in the formation of a self-perception is neither institutional nor formal domain, but a worldview which places the problematic existence of an individual within a meaningful framework.³⁵

Here, the relationship between self-perception and identity is critical in terms of reflecting Davutoğlu’s perspective of civilization. Identity is defined politically and legally (awareness of citizenship in modern sense), rather than sociologically and, in the face of self-perception, corresponds to a civilization’s essence being placed in a very superficial position. Because for Davutoğlu, “while identity can be defined through the social, economic, and political authority, and can be attributed by them, self-perception relying on the subject as its basis cannot, in any way, be defined or exterminated by another authority”.³⁶

Self-perception and the matter of identity are closely linked to another important part of Davutoğlu's civilization discourse, namely, "multiple civilizations", as well as their comparative analysis. Moving from the assumption that if not legally, there are philosophic and cognitive differences among world civilizations. He compares these civilizations from a historical perspective and on two main levels: there are six main elements (time, space, knowledge concepts, and the relationships of human-nature, human-god, and human-human) that surround self-perceptions and an individual's mentality as a "civilization prototype". On the first level, Davutoğlu determines five different self-perception types: strong and hard self-perception, strong and flexible self-perception, strong and local self-perception, weak and hard self-perception, and weak and flexible self-perception. On the second level, he considers the fundamental elements that make up self-perception as a result of these differentials, and examines them comparatively within the archetype of the Western and Islamic civilizations. In this context, according to Davutoğlu, Islamic civilization possesses a "strong quality as it leans on a well-defined, comprehensive, consistent, and universal worldview"; whereas it is both flexible and encircling in terms of an "influencing capacity".³⁷

When Davutoğlu's concept of civilization is considered within the

context of the qualities listed above, it is seen that civilization is an "organic" existence, has its own ontological being/status, and almost like humans, it is born, grows, matures, eventually weakens and regresses, and in some cases, dies. In this context, it is understood that Davutoğlu has a multi-civilizational approach. Secondly, what makes a civilization's defining qualities explicit are consistency/prevalence and continuity. Thirdly, it can be said that Davutoğlu's understanding of civilization is idealistic from a philosophic standpoint.³⁸ The reason is that according to Davutoğlu, "mentality transformation", as a philosophical-ideational element, is at the root of the civilizational order and transformation which gives the world order its final form. Fourthly, although civilizations are, in reality, cultural entities, material cultural elements should also be included in this circle of meaning. Lastly, Davutoğlu's civilizational understanding presents an *essentialist* perspective. Civilizations, which possess an independent ontological status, almost have a certain essence and this essence cannot easily be influenced from the outside.³⁹ In this context, the essence of civilizations does not, and will not, presumably change to a meaningful degree throughout the history. This situation leaves Davutoğlu's civilization approach exposed to what Susan Buck-Morss terms the issue of "strategic essentialism".⁴⁰ The

foundational elements of a civilization and the construction of a world order on the basis of civilization form the bedrock of Davutoğlu's understanding of order.

The Parameters of “Civilizational Order”

According to Davutoğlu, there are six formative parameters of civilizations: redefinition of self-perception (ontological dimension), human knowledge (epistemological dimension), and human values (normative dimension); reconstruction of *time* consciousness and historical imagination, reshaping of *space* (particularly in the form of restructuring the city), and reestablishment of a world order. Among them the first three constitute the philosophical and ethical foundations of the being-knowledge-value paradigm and the last three represent the historical manifestations of particular being-knowledge-value paradigms in social, economic, and political structures.⁴¹

The epistemological paradigm which developed parallel to the ontological level throughout history is formed from the answers given to four basic questions: sources of knowledge, the systematization of knowledge theoretically, transfer of knowledge into practice (technology, economic structuring, or legal form), and social hierarchy based on the authority of knowledge. Thus,

according to Davutoğlu, “civilizational self-perception is one of the basic building blocks in the formation, development, and resistance capacities of civilizations”.⁴² In this context, a civilization can become a living form only if it can assert its self-perception in a way comprehensive enough to influence *Lebenswelt*. Western socio-economic constructs, Islamic cities, Chinese social order, or the Indian social hierarchy are all closely linked with the differing self-perceptions of the respective civilizational traditions.

The third formative element; in other words, the “restructuring of the value system and the standardization of human behaviors’ moral foundations”⁴³ represent the axiological dimension. Here, Davutoğlu offers a two level analysis to see the importance of human values in constructing a social order. While the first level comprises the restructuring of a value-system as the foundation of a new relationship between ethics and law, the second level is about providing the individual human being with basic norms to standardize behavior in daily social life. Constructing the categories of good and bad, ethical and unethical, legitimate and illegitimate is essential to interpreting the meaning of life and establishing a social order.⁴⁴ Here Davutoğlu argues that civilizations posit certain values to guide human behavior and to constitute the normative basis of a legal system.⁴⁵

While the states represent the translation of the city order into a more sophisticated structure in an integrated geographical zone and cultural, economic, and political sphere, the world order marks the most comprehensive realization of order in terms of internal social consistency, geographical prevalence, and historical continuity.

The fourth formative dimension of civilization is the development of a new perception of *time* within a new imagination of historical consciousness. The transition from mythological to historical imagination marks an important stage in the construction of historical consciousness in traditional civilizations. In this regard, the modern western civilization has distinctive characteristics regarding time perception and historical consciousness, such as the secularization of the perception of time leading to the idea of progress and the Eurocentric conception of the flow of human history.⁴⁶ The fifth formative dimension of civilization is defined with reference to the spatial understanding of order. According to Davutoğlu, there are two aspects of the spatial dimension of civilizational formations, one being about the perception of space, and the other about the city as the "geo-cultural

form" and the historical realization of the being-knowledge-value paradigm in physical space.⁴⁷ The historical emergence of a civilizational space in this context has three preconditions: "a geopolitical zone suitable for security and basic needs, a geo-economic zone for the integrity of economic activity, and a geo-cultural milieu for the consistency and continuity of cultural life. Historical civilizations emerged and rose in an integrated space where these conditions were met."⁴⁸

In the last formative dimension, Davutoğlu treats states and world order as the conventional and institutional forms of civilization. Within this understanding, while the states represent the translation of the city order into a more sophisticated structure in an integrated geographical zone and cultural, economic, and political sphere, the world order marks the most comprehensive realization of order in terms of internal social consistency, geographical prevalence, and historical continuity.⁴⁹ Davutoğlu argues that establishing an order is a process of reflecting a worldview onto historical existence. Therefore, the close relationship between "worldview" and "world order" is an indication of the existence of civilizations as historical actors. Historically, Pax Romana, the Abbasid Caliphate, and Pax Ottomana were all different world orders established by their respective civilizational traditions. When it comes to Western civilization, Davutoğlu


offers three historical moments in the transformation of international order in the West. He also defines this transformation not only in terms of world order amongst the European states, but prefers to contextualize order in terms of the civilizational transformation.

The delay of this readjustment of the world order did not only lead to frozen conflicts in sensitive geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural zones, but also provoked a global level of tension in power sharing.

In the first stage of this civilizational transformation, Renaissance and Reformation achieved an intellectual revolution and mercantilism generated an economic sea change. Together they created a new political order- that is the Westphalian nation-state system established after the collapse of the preceding traditional political order of the Holy Roman Empire. In the second stage, the Newtonian, Industrial, and French revolutions transfigured the perceptions of natural, economic, and political order, leading to two important developments: the Congress of Vienna as the European system of political order and colonialism as the new world order prevailing across the globe. The power structure of the European center expanded itself into the

periphery through the colonial world order. The second phase of historical transformation of world order was that of colonial order.⁵⁰ In this new concept and its geopolitical context, there was a geographical discontinuity. The transition from European colonialism to Pax Americana took place through a new international legal system and institutional design. The end of the Cold War with the fall of Berlin Wall was a strong indicator of the need for a new international convention along with the rise of globalization. The delay of this readjustment of the world order did not only lead to frozen conflicts in sensitive geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural zones, but also provoked a global level of tension in power sharing.⁵¹ According to Davutoğlu, the international society now stands at the edge of the most comprehensive civilizational transformation in history whereby almost all accumulated human heritage in different forms are becoming part of the most complex process of interaction in the form of globalization.⁵² The current global transformation, therefore, requires an understanding of the past, the present, and the future as a continuum rather than fragmentation in order to contribute to the restructuring of the international system into a more stable and just order.⁵³ In this context, the question of how Turkey can contribute and adapt itself to the transformation of international order is very important.

Figure 1: Davutoğlu's Civilizational World Order



“Strategic Depth”: The Geopolitical Dimension of Turkey’s Civilizational Identity

The “self-perception”, which Davutoğlu takes as the essence of civilizations and its association with the world order, is explained more clearly in *Strategic Depth* where he considers the geopolitical dimension of Turkey’s civilizational identity. The oft-used

“strategic mentality” in *Strategic Depth* is a fundamental conceptualization like “self-perception” and, just as it does in the discussion of civilization, forms the essence of his geopolitical discussion. This strategic mentality is, just as in the conceptual narrative he visits in the analysis of civilization, a Turkey-specific framework in which political elites and different segments of the society are prompted to a new orientation.

The politics of restoration penetrates into the spirit of Strategic Depth, for the restoration of the “civilizational rupture” caused by the “old paradigm” can only be restored with a new understanding of time and space.

However, the “self-perception” of *Strategic Depth* is more than just a state of individual consciousness; it is a *geopolitical* state that encompasses the varying forms of belongingness to a certain civilization, cultural identity, and their manifestations through societies’ perception of time and space. The politics of restoration penetrates into the spirit of *Strategic Depth*, for the restoration of the “civilizational rupture” caused by the “old paradigm” can only be restored with a new understanding of time and space. Re-locating Turkey in the international order can only be achieved through the utilization of a new strategic mentality. In this sense, the purpose of the politics of restoration is to overcome the multifaceted geopolitical and geo-cultural crisis that has been created socially and historically at the level of the elites.⁵⁴

The situation by itself necessitates a re-interpretation of Turkey’s “strategic depth” through a new reading of the elements of the nation-state, the religion-society-state, and the “international

order”. Even though Davutoğlu does not offer a change that ignores the idea of nation-state, he does to a great extent revise the discriminatory qualities inherent to the idea of the nation-state. Indeed, the political unit of the nation-state, which Davutoğlu sees as one of the two prongs of the civilizational crisis, is also causing a crisis for Turkey’s civilizational belonging.⁵⁵

In *Strategic Depth*, geography is the fundamental point which correlates the re-configuration of Turkey’s civilizational identity with geopolitical language. According to Davutoğlu, geography is one of the foundational elements that makes an actual contribution to the formation of civilizations. However, geography can only turn into a meaningful world (geopolitical) imagination through civilizational belongingness,⁵⁶ and civilizations develop geographical perception from their own self-perceptions.⁵⁷ Thus, the geopolitical dimension of Turkey’s civilizational identity is being used as both an inseparable part of an imagination of ancient civilization and as a constituent element of a new political unit.

The depth offered by Turkey’s geographical place is the result of civilizational continuity, while the historical depth is a result of an interregional geopolitical whole corresponding to a “central” position in terms of world politics.⁵⁸ This approach allows Davutoğlu the opportunity to

establish a Turkey-centered systemic geopolitical model while reinterpreting Turkey's international status. In the aftermath of the Cold War, geopolitical gaps and a search for an order in the global system brought the problem of Turkey's geopolitical status and its discursive position into question. The answer to this question is quite obvious for Davutoğlu: Turkey, having inherited the historical and geographic legacy of the Ottoman Empire, retains all of the continuity elements of the more comprehensive Islamic civilization, and thus "possesses a central geopolitical status".⁵⁹ What is important here is the reunification of the Islamic world, which undergoes geopolitical, geo-cultural, and geo-economic break-ups, around Turkey only through a new geopolitical status and responsibility. According to Davutoğlu's geopolitical vision, the first circle of this geographical super-structure contains borders. The second one is to connect geopolitical zones to each other; the third is to integrate the geopolitical front lines and reservoirs. Each level supports the "central" geographical position of Turkey. In this sense, *Strategic Depth* handles the Islamic world both as a geographic super structure, consisting of inter-regional transitions, and a historical element as part of the same civilization. At this point, civilization is one of the nodes of *Strategic Depth's* idea of a geographic super-complex and is an element that allows Turkey to be part

of the international system. As a result, Davutoğlu, in *Strategic Depth*, draws a geopolitical framework by which Turkey will adapt to the global system through restoring its internal integrity and its outer face that projects this integrity to the outside, namely foreign policy.

The "Politics of Restoration" and Turkey's Adaptation to International Order

As a new phenomenon, the politics of restoration in the JDP era arises through the criticism of the nation-state, the republican security culture and the civilizational discourse, that has been produced on the basis of the Kemalist ideology.⁶⁰ Just as Davutoğlu is a foundational figure for the reproduction of Turkey in terms of civilizational identity, he is also one of the main actors behind the construction of the restoration discourse. However, it is necessary to state that the idea of restoration has become more frequently used after 2011, when the JDP began to consolidate its power. The restoration has also become a part of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's discourse of "New Turkey" after his election as President in August 2014. Therefore, what is meant by restoration is the process of restructuring the "old regime" and determining the principles to carry the establishment of the "New Turkey". Davutoğlu's main idea for restoration, on the other hand,

may be summed up as “catching the spirit of the time.”⁶¹

Davutoğlu first introduces his idea of restoration primarily at a historical level and asserts that there is a mutual relationship between the historical transformation of the international order and Turkey’s adaptation to this process. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey today is undergoing a new process of restoration in order to adapt to the transformation that the international system is experiencing.⁶² Here, it may be said that with this idea of restoration Davutoğlu establishes both an intellectual and mental basis, and a historical continuity through the Ottoman-Turkish modernization processes. Historicity reflects the transformation of the modern international order and the restoration periods of the State and of political understanding that occurred as a response to the referred transformations on the axis of the Ottoman-Turkish history of politics; the intellectual level is the normative manifestation of this restoration. In this sense, as with any other social crises and transformations in different periods of history in the international order, the Ottomans also experienced the connected “constitutive” periods - first from the transition of the old world order to modernity and then from modernity to the global world order. These constitutive periods are the times in which “great restorations” have been

experienced; as the referred restorations help the accumulation of the society, the state, and the civilization to prevail against current challenges, therefore facilitating adaptation to the global transformation.⁶³ Currently in the midst of its fourth great restoration period, Turkey has previously experienced three great restoration periods.

The first was the Köprülü restoration, which occurred reciprocal to the Westphalian Order (1648) that allowed for the modern world order to come forward in Europe. The Köprülü restoration represented a “new-traditional” form of restoration, which reconstructed the tradition in the transition from the old to the modern, and redefined the Ottoman Empire within the new international order.⁶⁴ In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and with the arrival of the Vienna order in 1815, the responses produced to the challenges of modernity came out mostly as an effort on the part of the Ottomans to adapt to this system. As a constituent element of the modernization of Ottoman-Turkey, the *Tanzimat* reforms, according to Davutoğlu, represent the transition from ancient to modern in the world order. The *second great restoration* period was initiated by the struggle for independence against imperialist forces in the War of Independence that followed the First World War, which ended the 1815 Vienna Order and caused the collapse of the Ottoman state.

This restoration period was consolidated by the globalization of the international order and by the establishment of the Republic of Turkey as a fully independent member of this order and as a response to this change. The *third great restoration* process of Turkey followed in order to adjust to the new international order founded after the signing of the Versailles Treaty and the end of World War II, and to adapt to the strategic choice of a multi-party political system.⁶⁵

The fourth period is the 21st century; which embodies all of the elements of transition periods—from the old to the modern, from the modern to the global— and prepares the ground for the old to be rediscovered. This new period is witnessing the restoration of both the international system on a global level and the regional system of which Turkey is a part. Considered historically, both Turkey's domestic and foreign policies are undergoing a great restoration process as a response to other great "geopolitical transformations".⁶⁶

Davutoğlu's restoration policy is mainly based on three principle dimensions, each of which aims to transform Turkey in terms of political understanding and structure, and each of which, at the same time, wishes to position the dynamism that is liberated from this transformation, as a power instrument in the changing international system. The first part of the restoration in question involves the restoration of domestic politics.

The Restoration of Domestic Politics

In the speech Davutoğlu delivered during the JDP's 1st Extraordinary Congress, where he elucidated nine main headings of his restoration policy,⁶⁷ the first dimension (in a general sense) was that of domestic politics. The purpose of the restoration in domestic politics is to facilitate the discursive and institutional transformation of the "Kemalist discourse of nation-state" that has formed the main framework of the Republic's historical modernization experience. There is a search for the reformulation of the discursive and institutional instruments and webs that have come to the fore with the securitization of politics due to the dominating "security of the regime" idea in Kemalist discourse. Decentralization of the Kemalist securitization technique sits at the core of the inner ring of Davutoğlu's restoration of domestic policy restoration and helps the restriction of freedoms in the "political sphere" built along the axis of threats.⁶⁸

While the deepening of democracy will displace the "politics of security" that has built up along the technobureaucratic center, it will also necessitate the philosophical and institutional restoration of the state and the bureaucracy. Just as there is the purpose of toppling the old political order which fictionalized the state as something disconnected from and

beyond the people, there is also an effort here to philosophically construct a “new state ethics”. This “state ethics” will only be possible through further deepening of democracy to the level of freedoms and human dignity, and it will institutionally only be possible with a new constitution. Therefore, the road to the restoration of domestic politics goes through the elimination of clandestine power relations “hidden” in different forms in different institutions both philosophically and institutionally, and the reconstruction of the state within the context of “justice”, “freedom”, and “institutional flexibility”.⁶⁹ It is possible to say that Davutoğlu takes the concept of national will as a reference. Therefore, the restoration of domestic politics requires not only the deepening of democracy but also the removal of a force originating from an “untestable will” that stands in opposition to the political will encouraged by the “national will”.

Restoration of the State Identity and National Order

The second dimension of the frame drawn for democracy, human rights, and the institutional re-establishment of the state in domestic politics is the restoration of identity. In this sense, during the first restoration period, which occurred during the *Tanzimat* period, there was an effort to construct

a supra-identity under the label of “Ottomanist” belongingness. A new identity imagination built along the axis of the “national identity” was in question during the second restoration period experienced in the Republic. In the third restoration period, an identity was introduced and explained through the static parameters of ideological identities during the Cold War.⁷⁰ Because the periods during which these identities were built also directly became the source of the state’s political actions, Davutoğlu defends that the changes, both at the mental and the constitutional level, of the identity restoration during the JDP period should be completed.

It is understood that Davutoğlu’s view of identity restoration has two essential dimensions. By “restoring” an identity narrative that both excludes and homogenizes an identity imagination fortified by the nation-state paradigm, Davutoğlu states that the political reference of the non-exclusionary new identity is the “identity of citizenship” and its social reference is the “identity of common history.”⁷¹ For this reason, identity restoration must first be experienced in the nation-state’s understanding of “inflexible” identity. Historically speaking, the transition from cohesive/eclectic old identities to the exclusionary/homogenizing modern nation-state identity has caused important drifts in Turkey’s historical civilization codes.

The purpose of foreign policy restoration is to increase Turkey's ability to adapt, as an "active subject", to the transforming international order by redefining itself, and to contribute in a constitutive manner to the formation of the new world order by using its influence in the international balance of power.

In other words, Davutoğlu argues that the will and power of togetherness, which comes from sharing a common past and a common experience, forms the basis of the identity restoration. While planning the identity of citizenship as the basis for the ethno-religious dimension of Turkey's identity restoration, the identity of common history should be thought of as a common ground for both the multiculturalism built around "being from Turkey" (*Türkiyelilik*) and as one that encompasses all of the societies who share the same geographic basin, Turkey. Stated differently, the identity restoration built along the line of a common history considers the different elements in the same geographic basin not as an "opposition" or as "opposite sides", but rather within "consubstantiality".⁷² While Davutoğlu's restoration of identity necessitates the reformulation of the nation-state

identity, which will become a source for the creation of a "democratic identity" designed and adopted at a larger scale, it will also work to build a new "regional democratic imagination" along the same line.⁷³ The situation necessarily invites the displacement of the old paradigm by phasing out the Turkishness reference that unavoidably reproduced the political regime formed around nationalism and secularism, and will procure the construction of a new national identity on the axis of democratic pluralism.

Restoration of Foreign Policy and Regional Order

Foreign policy forms the third dimension of Davutoğlu's idea of restoration. The purpose of foreign policy restoration is to increase Turkey's ability to adapt, as an "active subject", to the transforming international order by redefining itself, and to contribute in a constitutive manner to the formation of the new world order by using its influence in the international balance of power.⁷⁴ Foreign policy restoration has three fundamental dimensions: (i) reconstruction of the historical imagination about the foreign policy mentality and practices that have been constructed at the center of the secular nation-state; (ii) reshaping Turkey's geographic imagination; and (iii) reorganizing Turkey's place in the global

system by calibrating its political and economic relations. Thus, by developing a flexible geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural model, Turkey will remove its passive/fringe element in the international system and will eventually contribute to the formation of a “pluralist international order”.⁷⁵ According to Davutoğlu, a non-hierarchical world order that is politically *multipolar*, economically *multi-centered*, and culturally *multi-cultural*, will allow for Turkey to use power parameters more effectively.⁷⁶

The mentality dimension is the foundational dimension of foreign policy restoration; in which a new perspective is created through the reconstruction of a historical imagination and understanding of time. We come across with the dimension of mentality as one of the “establishing parameters of civilizations”⁷⁷ in Davutoğlu’s other works. The dimension of mentality is mirrored in foreign policy as the acceptance of a new mentality to set “strategic orientation”. Hence, the understanding that will direct Turkey’s geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural standing and state action must be, “the consciousness as a common product of historical accumulation, which contains the world of cultural, psychological, religious and social values, and the geographic area wherein such an accumulation takes place and is reflected, and the product of the

determination of the viewpoint of that society of its place in the world.”⁷⁸

Appearing as one of the fundamental principles of the JDP’s foreign policy, “zero problems with neighbors” and “balance between freedom and security” take the lead as the practical sources of foreign policy restoration. The aforementioned principles are important in two respects.⁷⁹ Firstly, they transformed Turkey into a more dynamic country by presenting a framework of a practical political model, which led to deepening democracy against the protectionist and defensive political attitudes of central actors in the international system who were trying to dominate through the post-9/11 security discourses and practices. Secondly, by propping up the foreign policy framework on the principle of freedom, rather than the security discourse, these two principles displaced the “historical coding” of Turkey with her neighbors, and thus made possible a new “socio-political” kind of relationship.⁸⁰ The situation allowed for the opportunity to reformulate the different countries sharing the same historical continuity in a large geographical basin, not as nation-states against each other, but as parts of the same history on a socio-cultural level. Undoubtedly, it is not accurate to say that such a restorative idea has come to an end today within the context of Turkey’s present foreign policy parameters. The idea does, however,

require attention from the point of the "change" it creates in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy paradigms.

The point of intersection between the above idea and the politics of "zero problems" should be found in Turkey's changing border perspective. The exclusionary understanding of space, which had been left to the devices of hegemonic discourse, not taking into account anything except for legal borders and ignoring historical and cultural continuities, was set aside. Then, by opening to debate the issue of legality concerning the inter-state "border" concept, borders were brought into the center of foreign policy as a social construct at a sociological and cultural level. This new understanding—especially with the pre-Arab Spring High Level Strategic Collaboration, the reciprocal removal of visas, and the reconsideration of the understanding of "border" previously presented in foreign policy via the newly created economic mechanisms—allowed Turkey to include its nation-state borders not as a line separating it from neighboring countries, but rather as part of foreign policy mechanisms as a dynamic and flexible social area that changes in accordance with the international and regional conjuncture. Therefore, while on the one hand it created an eclectic understanding of borders that was on the axis of democratization and further (in a balanced way) from the security

discourse, it also transformed Turkey from a country that followed the strategy of maintaining the status quo, out of an impulse to protect one's borders, to the status of a more active country.⁸¹

The second important area of restoration in foreign policy is that Turkey has entered a new phase of "geographic imagination". What Davutoğlu means by restoration here is that it is necessary for Turkey to reposition its international standing in accordance with the changing parameters in a way that will reflect its historical and geographic depth. The equivalent of this in foreign policy principles is that of the "central country" and the "new diplomatic style" that has been instated.⁸² In this way, for geographic imagination, it is possible to say that there is a restorative search in terms of moving from a nation-state reference, the borders of which are set and homogenized on a piece of land, to a transnational geopolitical category when moving toward civilization. As a result, with the discourse of a central country, the transformation⁸³ that was experienced during the Republic—where there was a switch from the scale of civilization to that of state—will be reversed, and a search for moving from the state scale to that of civilization will be in question.

The third area of foreign policy restoration is to be included as a "global actor" in the process of the reconstruction of the international order

through efficient diplomacy.⁸⁴ One of the fundamental events that Davutoğlu frequently emphasized during his tenure as Foreign Minister was that the international system was in transition, and thus, frequent global crises would be faced.⁸⁵ As a matter of fact, the global scale of the effects of regional crises in the aftermath of the Cold War caused “three big earthquakes.”⁸⁶ The first was the *geopolitical* earthquake following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the second was the *security* earthquake⁸⁷ in the aftermath of 9/11, and the last was the economic crises which contributed to the *econo-political* earthquake⁸⁸ alongside the Arab Spring. Directly affected by the period of the three earthquakes and their results, Turkey was unprepared for the first earthquake and was late to adapt to the transformation of the international system. It tried to respond to the second by making a choice along the lines of freedom and security.⁸⁹ For the third, Turkey attempted to adapt through an axis of democratic norm-value in its foreign policy perspective.⁹⁰ Attempting to unite this adaptation period with criticism of the order, Turkey advocated that restoration is necessary, not just at the national level, but on a regional and a global scale as well. This strategy also forms the basis of Turkey’s critique of a West-centered global order and its political, economic, and cultural monopoly and claim of universality.

“Civilizations not Civilization”: The Making of a Multicultural World Order

The politics of Turkey’s restoration sets an example for a discussion of the global order about how the institutional and normative dimension of the global system applies to this reform. In this sense, the international system, being subject to reform, has opened up a discussion among political elites in which they approach the matter from a “unified discourse.” For example, former President Abdullah Gül iterated the need for a reform in the international system at the level of “three-dimensional” “imperfect equilibrium” where normalization at political, economic and cultural levels requires “a new understanding of equality.”⁹¹ According to President Erdoğan, the global community is in need of new basic freedoms, justice, and “awareness of global civilization” based on equality. Alongside his universal call for a new global system, Erdoğan emphasizes that human beings take precedence in this new order from an ethical perspective in the global civilization politics.⁹² According to Erdoğan’s new global civilizational politics, there needs to be not a “new civilizational design, but rather, a guide which aims to stop the dangerous path humanity is facing.”⁹³ In this sense, Turkey, as other emerging countries voice their demands for reforms in the international order,

appears to be in search of a "post-western international system". However, Turkey's criticism of the international order sits upon a much more cultural vein as compared to the others since the country frequently verbalizes its claim of being the representative of a non-Western civilization.

At the same time, Erdoğan's demand for a reform in the current global system is three-dimensional, and is also aligned with Davutoğlu's "civilization-based" perspective. Firstly, from Turkey's perspective, today's international system is problematic and suffers from bad governance. The UN governance model is seen as an example of such problems, as its "veto" order troubles the global system when it comes to critical decision-making processes. Under the umbrella of the UN "the representative power must be just" and its applicability must be "inclusive and overarching" across the regions. This type of renewal will not only facilitate the limitation of sub-regional order crises⁹⁴ but also reposition Turkey's rise in the international system.

Turkey's criticism of the international order sits upon a much more cultural vein as compared to the others since the country frequently verbalizes its claim of being the representative of a non-Western civilization.

The demand to reform the UN system is not limited to the question of comprehensive fair representation. Another problem that has become apparent over time is Turkey's critique of the UN Security Council's lack of effectiveness. This issue has surfaced even more in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The civil war in Syria is an example of how Turkey and how the regional order have created a tectonic shift. For example, Erdoğan warns that "if we leave the issue to the vote of one or two members" (referring to Russia and China) "of the permanent five at the United Nations Security Council, then the aftermath of Syria will be very hazardous and humanity will write it down in history with unforgettable remarks".⁹⁵ Erdoğan thus essentially calls for the elimination of the veto power of the permanent members (P5) and of the unanimity requirement to pass resolutions. Therefore, the P5's individual veto power is one of the key pillars of today's international system, and Turkey believes it is responsible for the UN's relative lack of success over the past decades.

Nevertheless, the aforementioned cultural vein in Turkey's search for a new international order goes beyond the country's demands for political and economic reforms. As a result, one of the most important criticisms regarding the UN Security Council's decision-making capacity in global security issues is that

the Council only focuses on material power while seeking security throughout the world. To this end, an advisor from the Prime Minister's office denoted the following point: "When creating problem-solving procedures, actors who are able to use soft power methods such as language, belief, understanding of justice, and principles should be included in the decision-making process."⁹⁶

The reconstruction of Turkey within the global cultural order is incorporated to the construction of a global civilization at a larger scale.

This statement and the like, especially coming from Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's analysis, project a view in which Turkey's post-western international order vies for a pluralistic, diverse, and interdependent system. This rhetoric may be related to the politics of restoration at the point of a civilizational order in which Turkey will take on a role as an active country- for Davutoğlu, civilizational transformation is the final stage of the world order.⁹⁷ This is a search about a "cultural order" that integrates different historic entities to the system rather than reading the global system in terms of norms, understandings and practices through a single historical perspective. From this perspective, Turkey promotes a multi-cultural and heterogeneous

system in which all can co-exist; a "cooperative system" that is inclusive and more representative as a form of global governance. A new global governance model is, therefore, one that is not restricted to a "single society, particular countries, continents or nations, but one that is inclusive and looks out for the interest of the entire humanity."⁹⁸ In this sense, the new global order for Turkey should be: legitimate, transparent, and democratic; representative and completely open to participation; should work to solve inactive and active conflicts in order to increase stability; and finally, should lean on the principles of security and reform for everyone.⁹⁹

The reconstruction of Turkey within the global cultural order is incorporated to the construction of a global civilization at a larger scale. The reconstruction process has two dimensions: an inward one and an outward one that allows Turkey's integration with the global system. Erdoğan envisioned this system and explained it as follows: "At this point, history and destiny give Turkey a different duty and responsibility. Having borne the mission of keeping together different societies for centuries and to build bridges between the East and West, our country can play a leading role in the development and spread of a new civilizational consciousness in the new period."¹⁰⁰

The inward dimension is about what kind of a place Turkey will have within

the international system as a country that has blended historical and civilizational elements of continuity. Especially in the last period, the concept of a "New Turkey," which has begun to gain popularity among the public, also signifies a distancing from the old paradigm of civilizational representation. While this new civilizational perspective objects to Turkey joining the international order as an integral part of the Western *polity*, it also constructs Turkey as a historical and civilizational part of Islam within the international order.

The multi-cultural civilizational order is not just a way of expressing something about Islamic civilization, but is, in fact, a much more comprehensive discourse which contains all civilizations.

The second dimension of the cultural order related to Turkey is its outward approach, and reflects an interaction and search for transformation along the civilizational axis as a way that will continue the real power transformation in the global system. This kind of search, which stands against the use of the word *civilization* to be used separately for humanity, loudly states that non-Western civilizations have entered a period of revitalization through globalization. In this sense, the multi-

cultural civilizational order is not just a way of expressing something about Islamic civilization, but is, in fact, a much more comprehensive discourse which contains all civilizations. Because of this, the "New Turkey" discourse mixed with the civilizational paradigm differentiates the post-Western international order understanding.

According to Davutoğlu, in a period where globalization offers a re-blending of the continuity elements of the old cultural basins, a Euro-centered civilizational desire will not keep its hegemonic position for long. For this reason, the cultural order must assume a character that is much more pluralist and all institutional mechanisms that will be constructed around this cultural order should be redesigned to be able to carry this dynamism.¹⁰¹ Globalization, prompting all societies in a multifaceted manner, also transforms the differentiation among lines of civilization into a point of critique for Turkey. The Chinese, Muslims, Indians, Africans, and Latin Americans have come to be participants in the production of history because of the dynamic character of globalization, and Turkey is in search of becoming a part of this historical production.¹⁰² The imagination of a democratic and pluralist global system introduces Turkey's adaptation to the global order through a critical integration by adding another dimension to the JDP's civilizational discourse. It also

foresees a reciprocal interaction process where Islamic civilization's historically established normative values (war, peace, security, etc.) are included in the present international order. In place of hegemony for the success of this civilization-based shared existence, it calls for an international order that is versatile, multi-dimensional, comprehensive, pluralist, and democratic.

Conclusion

Just as the 2000s began a new period for Turkey's domestic and foreign policy, it also brought a period of transformation in the real power elements within the global system. In the global order of the period, in opposition to the Atlantic-centered international order, a Pacific-centered reformist understanding followed the reaction rising from Europe. The new rising powers who were beginning to increase their real power capacity in this period also brought a political, economic, and cultural "dissident discourse" to the present structure of the international order. During this period, the "rising powers" proclaimed the need for reforming the international system while also concentrating their critiques on the weaknesses of the "comprehensiveness" and "effectiveness" of the UN. The search at the state level was defined by those studying international relations as the pursuit of a post-Western international order. This order came up against the

international order that was operating over the West-centered politics and security architecture, as the search for a politically multi-polar and culturally cosmopolitan system. Fundamentally, it was defined as a system where the West's material and ideological superiority eventually faded and in its place the need for a normative global consensus gradually increased.

Turkey expressed the need to reform the institutions of the international system by opposing the European-centered reading of history and proposing the construction of a more pluralist order.

Parallel to this, thinking that the current order was facing a depression, Turkey has since the 2000s placed its criticism of the order within a political and economic discourse as well as a civilizational one. In this sense, Turkey entered a search for the reconstruction of the international order around a model of "good global governance"¹⁰³ that would be politically multipolar, economically multi-centered, and in terms of civilization would be multi-cultural and pluralist.¹⁰⁴ The goal of this search was the removal of the West-centered emphasis from the world order narrative of the present international system. Because Turkey advances this effort in our present world

(of globalization), the old cultures and civilizations have entered a period of renewal and that very globalization takes different cultures from being passive followers of modernization and changes them into active subjects. This situation by itself gave Turkey's search for an identity within the international system a new direction. For this reason, Turkey expressed the need to reform the institutions of the international system by opposing the European-centered reading of history and proposing the construction of a more pluralist order. This understanding bears similarities to the post-Western international order paradigm in Turkish foreign policy.¹⁰⁵

How the representation of Islamic civilization will be transferred into the international system with the rise of Turkey and what the relevant mechanisms would be remain as open-ended questions.

However, the increased emphasis on civilization in Turkish foreign policy fundamentally affected Turkey's cultural criticism of the international order and caused the country to change its foreign policy paradigm, which coded the Western system as the final target of an advancing political understanding. Foreign policy makers and political elites defined this period as "restoration

politics", and thus both historicized and then recreated it along the axis of the "New Turkey" discourse. In this sense, the "New Turkey" discourse reproduced the civilizational identity part of Turkey's international order narrative by blending it with an anti-hegemonic "dissident" discourse. Civilization came to be referred to as an "actor" at the systemic level. There are two main discerning dimensions of the civilizational identity: first, it caused the birth of a new geopolitical vision blended with Islamic solidarity discourse and shaped around the institutional and normative representations of the Islamic world at a historical level. Second, it is the start of a new way of viewing Islamic civilization's normative-based order narrative as a value in establishing the multi-cultural structure of world order. To conclude, as has been argued in this article, when these two factors are taken jointly with Turkey's "politics of restoration", it can be said that civilization is used as an institution and an actor in international politics. This situation in and of itself shows Turkey's socialization with international society at a fundamental level. This socialization will determine the framework of Turkey's search for international order from this point on. However, how the representation of Islamic civilization will be transferred into the international system with the rise of Turkey and what the relevant mechanisms would be remain as open-ended questions.

Endnotes

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- 6 “Erdoğan: Dünya Beşten Büyüktür”, *Al Jazeera Türkçe*, 24 September 2014.
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- 8 For the few detailed studies on this topic see, Nurullah Ardıç, “Modernite, Kimlik, Siyaset: Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun Medeniyet Söylemi”, in Köse, Okumuş ve Duran (eds.) *Stratejik Zihniyet*, pp. 47-89; Nurullah Ardıç, “Civilizational Discourse, the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ and Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 16, No. 3, (2014), pp. 101-122.
- 9 For civilization-based analyses and for analyses about its relations to Turkish foreign policy see, Burhanettin Duran, “Understanding AK Party’s Identity Discourse: A Civilizational Discourse and Its Limits”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2013), pp. 91-109; Pinar Bilgin and Ali Bilgiç, “Turkey’s ‘New’ Foreign Policy toward Eurasia”, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2011), pp. 173-199; Martina Warning and Tuncay Kardeş, “The Impact of Changing Islamic Identity on Turkey’s New Foreign Policy”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 2011), pp. 123-140.
- 10 Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1994.
- 11 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Foreword: Civilizational Revival in the Global Age”, in Fred Dallmayr, M. Akif Kayapınar and İsmail Yaylacı (eds.), *Civilization and World Order: Geopolitics and Cultural Difference*, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2014, p. vii.
- 12 Davutoğlu, “The Formative Parameters of Civilizations”, p. 91.
- 13 I would like to thank one of the reviewers for his/her suggestion about the English translation of *ben-idraki* (self-perception) as self-cognizance. S/he argues that “Davutoğlu’s term “*ben-idraki*” refers to an unmistakable understanding of the self. It is not developed in relation to others as in the case of identity. It emerges from inside as a reality and the subject just defines itself with that recognitions. Therefore, I would suggest employing the term of *self-cognizance* rather than *self-perception*. This is not only semantic. It directly changes

the meaning of Davutoğlu's view." The definition is acceptable, but in his other articles in English, Davutoğlu uses *self-perception*. Therefore, I prefer his translation of *ben-idraki*.

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- 17 Davutoğlu, *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World*, p. 8.
- 18 Ahmet Davutoğlu "Medeniyetlerin Ben-idraki", *Divan: Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi*, Vol. 2, No. 4, (1997), pp. 1-53.
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Tracing the Shift in Turkey's Normative Approach towards the International Order through Debates in the UN

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Abstract

The “normative turn” associated with the post-Cold War order has been influential in rising states’ increasing reference to normative issues like justice and fairness. Rising powers are expected to challenge the established institutions or at least attempt to revise the dominant norms of the system in order to reflect their own interests and values. This paper tentatively treats Turkey as a rising state and attempts to understand the gradual “normative shift” in Turkey’s approach towards international order in the context of Turkey-UN relations over the last decade. To this aim, Turkey’s normative approach towards the international order will be comparatively analyzed through the debates at the UN focusing specifically on two consecutive periods, the 1990s and the 2000s. By doing that, the paper will theoretically question and empirically analyze the extent to which Turkey took a revisionist or integrationist posture towards the international order in the UN platform over the last decade.

Key Words

Rising states, international order, Turkey, normative foreign policy, United Nations.

“The most casual observer of the international scene can see that the problem of the world order has not been solved.”¹

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Introduction

There emerges broad consensus among scholars that the current international order is undergoing a major restructuring in the post-Cold War era, especially in the last decade. As Zakaria argues, a great transformation or a tectonic power shift has been taking place: “the rise of the rest” and in particular the “rise of Asia.”² On the one hand, recent shifts in the global political economy have witnessed the emergence of several newly powerful states from the South.³ On the other hand, this global shift has been accompanied by the parallel rise of regionalism of emerging powers for which regionalism is seen increasingly as an important policy tool demonstrating their influence at the global level.⁴ The present structural transformation of the global system has reminded us that we live in a dynamic world where empires and systems come and go according to history’s dictates. What makes this process of change much more significant is the fact that the dynamism of “rising states” is in marked contrast to *Europessimism*.⁵ In

this vein, the recent financial crises in many western countries not only have severely negative economic effects, but they also challenge the idea of a *stable, western-led global order*. In a relatively short period of time, there has been a dramatic shift from the talk of a *liberal moment* in the early post-Cold War period to the focus on a *US Empire* in the early years of this century to the analyses of *rising states* and more recently to a *post-western world order*.⁶

Rising powers are expected to challenge the established institutions or at least attempt to revise the dominant norms of the system in order to reflect their own interests and values.

In times of global power transitions, a prevailing question centers on the position of rising powers towards international order as well as their growing economic and political might to challenge its established institutions.⁷ As a result of its significant increase in its material capabilities- particularly its economy- as well by its peers' recognition of its increasing importance in the international scene,⁸ Turkey has recently been defined among the "MIST" countries, which is coined to describe the next tier of large emerging economies- "Mexico, Indonesia, South

Korea and Turkey"- after BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).⁹ In parallel to its rising economic and political power status at the global level, Turkey has witnessed a doctrinal foreign policy change accompanied by an increasing regional and normative approach both in discourse and practice as well as new or content-enriched diplomacy instruments.¹⁰ Accordingly, there is a dynamic scholarly literature on Turkey's new foreign policy together with a chain of references presenting Turkey as a trading state, regional power, and/or an emerging economy.¹¹ In most of these studies, Turkey's new position vis-à-vis the current international order has been widely discussed in reference to its ability- as well as limitations- to use its soft power or to its growing efforts to be influential in regional affairs.¹² However, few serious attempts have so far been made to analyse Turkey's *normative posture* towards the international order, in a comparative manner, via its post-Cold War policies in the UN platform.¹³

This paper conceptualizes Turkey as a "rising state", aims at understanding its changing "normative approach towards the international order" in a historical-comparative perspective through the debates at the UN. To this aim, firstly, the normative challenges posed by rising states towards the international order will be theoretically investigated. In order to do that, the paper will first theoretically

problematize the interplay between rising states and the international order as well as its established institutions. Secondly, by conceptualizing Turkey as a rising state, its normative approach towards the international order will be comparatively analyzed through the debates at the UN with specific focus on two consecutive periods, the 1990s and the 2000s. Accordingly, the paper will investigate whether there is any meaningful shift in Turkey's normative approach towards the international order in the last decade. In this vein, the favorable domestic and systemic conditions under Justice and Development Party (JDP) rule in the last decade that enable Turkey's "order criticism" and their limitations will be problematized. This study aims to contribute modestly to both the ongoing debates on the interplay between rising states and the international order as well as the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy, from theoretical and empirical perspectives.

Analyzing the Interplay between Rising States and the International Order: The Role of International Institutions

'Rising states' is a complex and multidimensional term and there is no commonly accepted definition among scholars of what an emerging

or rising power is. One of the most evident commonalities is their growing economic weight in world politics.¹⁴ As Ikenberry puts it, for the first time in the modern era, economic growth is bringing non-Western developing countries into the top ranks of the world system. Their collective size and impact on global trade, finance, energy, and the environment are predicted to make them important players. According to Ikenberry, these are remarkable developments from not only the economic dimension but they also have potentially far-reaching implications for power and governance in world politics.¹⁵ In other words, these countries' increasing might in the global economy is believed to have the potential to reshape the global political landscape of the 21st century.¹⁶ By the same token, Andrew Hurrell suggests that these rising states all have a relatively high degree of at least potential military and political-power resources, a reasonable degree of internal cohesion, and some ability to contribute to the generation of a revised international order. Furthermore, each aspires to a more influential role in global affairs.¹⁷ Accordingly, it is a widely held view among scholars that rising powers are portents of change in the international order.¹⁸ But the question remains, what is the precise nature of this change?

The current generation tends to have more confidence in their ability to effect the “redistribution” of wealth, prestige, and power in the global political economy, though, and tend therefore to be more “integrationist” than the first generation of post-colonial leaders.

A multitude of writers working from quite different perspectives is in agreement that the rise of emerging countries beyond the West is pivotal to understanding how the global order is being reshaped in the 21st century. According to Ikenberry, the current world order is “hard to overturn and easy to join.”¹⁹ New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority as well as opportunities to play a role in governing the current order.²⁰ Therefore, the specific character of today’s rising states and the interests, incentives, and constraints that they manifest and face make integration and accommodation more likely than radical transformation.²¹ Similarly, Cooper and Flames assert that the established powers were challenged explicitly because of their privileged role in systemic terms, as expressed in their veto status inside the main governing institutions of the world order, like the UN. Therefore, the intensity of the challenge was magnified

by a psychological sense among the emerging states of being “outsiders” in the multilateral system, kept away from these privileges.²² Philip Nel argues that rising powers basically ask for “recognition” and “redistribution” in the world economic and political order. In this vein, the current generation tends to have more confidence in their ability to effect the “redistribution” of wealth, prestige, and power in the global political economy, though, and tend therefore to be more “integrationist” than the first generation of post-colonial leaders.²³

One the other hand, for some scholars, this global order, though it was routinely referred to as such, never had the potential to encompass the entirety of the world. As Richard Falk argues, the EuroWestcentric world order does not now, and never did benefit the vast majority of the peoples of the world. Falk argues that it is in fact psychologically harmful because it failed to appreciate diverse civilizational traditions, exploiting the peoples and resources of these traditions by constructing self-serving rationalizations for dominance.²⁴ In this vein, Fontaine and Kliman assert that states like Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey offer great potential as partners to *extend* the global order.²⁵ In this vein, a prominent scholar on rising powers, Andrew Hurrell, suggests that power transitions among major states have never been simply about clashes of material power and material interest. Conflicts over *rival justice claims*

have often been a determining factor in the history of world order. Contestation over these normative claims has long been at the heart of international politics, and the return over the past decade of more Hobbesian or Westphalian tendencies has brought them once more to centre stage. Thus for Hurrell, emerging powers have laid great emphasis on arguments for normative issues like, “justice” and “fairness” and they will naturally seek to revise the dominant norms of the system in order to reflect their own interests as well as values.²⁶

Yet, as Nathalia Tocci asserts, apart from more ambiguous claims like justice and fairness, there are three main dimensions that define “normative” foreign policy: (i) what an actor wants (its goals); (ii) how it acts (the deployment of its policy means); and (iii) what it achieves (its impact).²⁷ Firstly, according to Tocci, normative actors aim to shape the international environment constantly over time by regulating it through international regimes, organizations and law. Secondly, the actor itself should be legally committed to internal legal standards of democracy, transparency and accountability as well as to external legal commitments such as the UN framework and international law. Thirdly, in order to create a normative impact, an international actor's direct or indirect actions and inactions should preserve the international legal environment and lead to some institutional, policy or

legal changes within a third country.²⁸ Nevertheless, it is still unclear for many scholars whether the preference of rising states is to work through core established international institutions or to utilize other parallel forms of international coordination in order to realize their normative purposes.²⁹

The ability of rising powers to exert their influence through international institutions is challenged by the hierarchical and unequal structure of current global governance institutions. Sometimes the “ordering” role of hierarchy was formalized as in the special rights and duties of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, or the weighted voting structures of the IMF or World Bank. Secondly, the regional context can be a source of weakness for rising powers either because of unresolved regional conflicts or because of regional instability and the sheer difficulty of maintaining influence (like in the Middle East). As Hurrell argues, regional context is also crucial for aspiring rising powers in the sense that a state may be seen as a rising state- to the extent that it fulfils a managerial or order-producing role within its region. Thirdly, attempts to develop a global role as a “rising power” can easily raise the concerns of regional neighbours. This has been particularly evident in the reactions of regional second-tier states, like the attempt by India and Brazil to obtain permanent seats on the UN Security

Council.³⁰ In this vein, being sceptical of the role of international institutions, some scholars argue for the emergence of “an ambiguous new order...in which multilateral institutions...have only a limited role to play alongside emerging national and regional strategies.”³¹

Turkey’s increasing regional and international profile especially in the first half of the 2000s with regards to its remarkable economic growth, diplomatic outreach and its growing visibility in international institutions, has led many scholars to conceptualize Turkey as a “rising state” while at the same time discussing the limitations of its rise.³² This study tentatively treats Turkey as a “rising state”, and attempts to understand its changing “normative posture” towards the international order via its policies in the UN platform. Accordingly, the rest of the paper will theoretically question and empirically analyze the extent to which Turkey, as a rising state, has taken a “revisionist” or “conformist-integrationist” posture towards the international order in the UN throughout the 21st century. As Turkey gained political as well as economic power and influence, has it become more “integrationist” towards the international order and its institutions like the UN or “revisionist” towards them? In other words, how could one explain the interplay between Turkey’s rise and international institutions? Is it rising at the expense of the current order

which, inevitably, leads to the declining role of international institutions in Turkish foreign policy or do established institutions of the current international order, like the UN, increasingly provide Turkey with political space to build new coalitions in order to try to affect an emerging (new) order that would be reflective of its own interests as well as values? Above all, is Turkish foreign policy experiencing a “normative turn” in terms of foreign policy objectives, means of implementation, and policy outcomes, over the last decade?

In light of these questions, the next section will analyze the evolution of Turkey’s posture towards the international order in the 21st century in terms of the role of the UN in a comparative perspective through the debates in the UN platform. To better understand the continuities and changes in Turkey’s “normative” approach towards “order” in the last decade, Ankara’s approach towards “international order” with its “established institutions” since the early Republican era first needs to be briefly highlighted.

Turkey and the International Order: The Role of the UN in Turkish Foreign Policy Tradition

Ever since the early Republican era, Turkey has always maintained certain

values and principles as the basis of its foreign policy, but it has also been shaped by the responses it has given to structural changes in the global order. Among many, the country's foreign policy has been guided by a normative commitment to the unchanged ideal of "peace at home, peace in the world", through multilateral cooperation.³³ In this vein, since the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, Turkish rulers have demonstrated their positive posture towards multilateral cooperation by arguing that "Mustafa Kemal's understanding of 'peace in the world' denotes multilateral defence of the peace".³⁴ Accordingly, the identity of the new Turkish Republic was defined by Mustafa Kemal as a "modern state which aims to coexist peacefully with international society of states."³⁵ Turkey's approach towards the League of Nations was shaped by the new Republic's search for "legitimacy" of its newly constructed nation-state identity in the post-World War I international order and also search for "security" in both the domestic and international arenas. Yet, the League experience quickly turned out to be short of proper implementation of its founding principles and ultimately proved incapable of preserving peace and preventing aggression in the 1930s, eventually collapsing with the onset of the Second World War.

Following the end of the Second World War, Turkey was among the 50

founding members of the UN, when Hasan Saka, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, and Feridun Cemal Erkin, the first permanent representative of Turkey in the UN, signed the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference in 1945.³⁶ Throughout the Cold War, the US-Soviet rivalry was the main factor shaping UN activity in world politics, and due to the veto mechanism, the UN's role was very limited. The 1950 Korean War and "decolonization process" of the late 1950s and 60s were two main cases that shaped the UN activity in the course of the Cold War. During those years, Turkish leaders declared at every possible occasion that "acting in accordance with the UN Charter and UN Resolutions is the main guiding principle of Turkish Foreign Policy."³⁷ Accordingly, in his speech before the United Nations, Permanent Representative of Turkey in the UN, Selim Sarper defined Turkey as a "peace-loving and freedom-loving country with an unshakable faith in the fundamental idea of the United Nations."³⁸ The UN was both a "socialization" platform for Turkey in its quest for the Westernization ideal and also a rational choice in its search for "security" in the field of foreign policy during the Cold War years.³⁹ This was reflected in Turkey's participation in the 1950 Korean War. By joining the Korean War, Turkish rulers did not only aim to "secure" Turkey from threats, but also "enhance" its prestige among the "peace-loving" states.⁴⁰ In other words,

Turkey aimed to strengthen its security as well as secure its place in the western international order, by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The traces of this “ideational” and “political” posture could also be seen in Ankara’s foreign policy towards the “decolonization” process in the UN General Assembly during the Cold War years. In the post-Second World War era, organized political groups in Africa and Asia began fighting on behalf of a whole ‘people’ against colonial powers. The fundamental principle on which these struggles were granted legitimacy was the right of peoples to “self-determination”. Contrary to the posture adopted by most Asian and African countries, Turkey remained neutral or voted in favour of the French position at the UN General Assembly regarding the independence of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco in the 1950s. In Turkey’s view, France’s relations with these territories were a matter for France, and therefore they were not within the competence of the United Nations.⁴¹ This approach could be explained with reference to Turkey’s close alignment with the Western world after World War II. At the time, Turkish foreign policy-makers had another immediate and specific political concern. Greece had brought the question of Cyprus, which was then under British rule, before the UN General Assembly in 1954. Turkey was apprehensive on the application of the self-determination

principle which might lead to an eventual unification of the island with mainland Greece.⁴² Therefore, in accordance with Turkey’s perceived interests, the “self-determination” principle was given *conflicting* interpretations in different situations during the Cold War years. For instance, Turkey supported the implementation of the principle of self-determination for the overwhelmingly Muslim province of Kashmir, which was part of India, in order to show its support for Pakistan and to strengthen the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) links with this country, although it opposed the implementation of this principle in the determination of the future status of Cyprus in the UN platform.⁴³

In terms of Turkey’s posture towards the third world in the UN platform, there was a growing rapprochement between the non-Western world and Turkey on the question of decolonization in the 1960s. Accordingly, Turkey acted as a co-sponsor of the UN General Assembly resolution 1514, adopted in 1960 and entitled the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’.⁴⁴ Yet, Turkey’s support for “decolonization” of the Third World was highly influenced by Turkey’s Western ties. Except in the 1950s, Turkey generally sided with non-Western countries, unless the resolutions in question did not fundamentally undermine the confines of its pro-Western foreign policy. As Berdal Aral

asserts, Turkish attitude towards the decolonization issue could be described as one of ‘*unprincipled sympathy*’ for the long fought struggle of the Third World nations.⁴⁵ Although Turkey demonstrated increased willingness towards supporting the struggle of Third World nations after the 1960s, it did not “actively” and “consistently” participate in international normative attempts at creating and extending international standards to bring about a more peaceful and equitable international system. Due to its specific reservations on issues like the Cyprus problem, Turkey generally remained “suspicious” about normative issues such as human rights, protection of minorities and self-determination.⁴⁶ Therefore, as Gönlübol puts it, UN norms and resolutions were the “main guiding principle” in Turkish foreign policy, yet Turkey’s posture towards the UN was also “political,” aimed at securing Turkey’s integration with the western block.⁴⁷

On the other hand, Turkey began to express its “unhappiness” with the workings of the the UN, just after its establishment in 1945. Accordingly, Turkish rulers did not hesitate to express the need for “urgent UN reform” as early as 1947, by criticizing the UN for not being a “representative” organization.”⁴⁸ Despite criticisms towards the UN system and its decisions, Turkey was “cautious” to act in marked contrast to the decisions and resolutions of the

United Nations during the Cold-War years. Since its entry into the League of Nations in 1932 and later in 1945 to the United Nations, a closer look at the main historical parameters during the Cold War era shows that despite some exceptional periods in the 1960s and 1970s, where Turkey had to intervene militarily in Cyprus due to the growing inter-communitarian conflicts, Turkey has generally pursued a peaceful “multilateral” diplomacy by remaining explicitly attached to the norms and decisions of the United Nations.⁴⁹ Turkey’s attitude towards the UN during the Cold War was predominantly “*conformist-integrationist*”- and the UN platform was considered as the *main addressee* of Ankara’s foreign policy choices. Yet, Turkey’s heavily and exclusively “Western-oriented” foreign policy in the aftermath of World War II mostly rendered its relations with the non-Western world “conditional” on its relations with the West, without a substantial “normative agenda” of its own in the UN platform.⁵⁰

Ankara was largely affected by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the transformation of the political landscape in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as well as the eruption of violent ethnic and regional conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Turkey, the UN and International Order in the 1990s: Between Geopolitical Anxiety and Active Diplomacy

The 1990s were marked by an increased number of conflicts in many parts of the world accompanied by increased expectations of international organizations like the UN due to the end of the superpower rivalry. In the 1990s, Turkey faced the challenge of adjusting to new international realities as a result of the changes sweeping its immediate neighbouring regions. In this regard, Ankara was largely affected by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the transformation of the political landscape in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as well as the eruption of violent ethnic and regional conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus.⁵¹ In the post Cold War environment, Turkish rulers openly declared their expectations from the UN to take a leading role in the resolution of conflicts as well as in the creation of a new international order.⁵² Accordingly, the collective response of states under the UN umbrella to the aggression by Iraq towards Kuwait in the 1990 Persian Gulf War was welcomed by Turkey as a clear sign of the increased effectiveness of the UN in a post-Cold War world order. In this vein, Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin declared Turkey's happiness with the UN's leading role in the post-Cold War era:

...It (the UN) has demonstrated how effective it can be by playing a leading role in the liberation of Kuwait, showing that it can function as its founders intended nearly half a century ago.⁵³

However, the Bosnian War that began in 1992 and the UN's response during the course of that war resulted in failed expectations on the side of Turkey towards the organization's ability to cope with the changing realities of the post-Cold War order. In fact, as early as the 1990s, Turkish rulers openly declared in the UN platform on every possible occasion that the most severe challenge to the new order was being posed by the series of crises unfolding in the former Yugoslavia. In this regard, Turkey conceptualized the Bosnian war as a "big damage" to the emerging new world order.⁵⁴ During the course of the Bosnian War (1992-1995), Turkish rulers openly criticized the UN for its "ineffectiveness" and "inability" to end a humanitarian tragedy and repeatedly asked for a "representative", "effective" and "accountable" Security Council reflecting the changing international order.⁵⁵

Despite growing uneasiness in Turkish public opinion towards the UN's inability to respond to the Bosnian war, Ankara did not choose to act unilaterally and instead continued its "multilateral efforts" in the UN platform, stressing the "international legitimacy" principle.

Despite intense criticism towards the UN, the 1990s were marked by one of the most active multilateral diplomacies of Turkey in the UN platform since its establishment. Ankara strived to take a role in the restructuring of the post-Cold War regional and global order through multilateral platforms, especially the UN. Considering the turbulent 1990s, Turkey's foreign policy focused mainly on political and security issues as it tried to play an "active role" in the solution of the Yugoslavian crises. There were many letters directed from Turkey towards the UN Secretary General during the Bosnian War, accompanied by many speeches of Turkish diplomats and rulers recorded in the UN platform.⁵⁶ Turkish newspapers were organizing signature campaigns towards the UN headquarters.⁵⁷ Ankara's diplomacy in the Islamic Conference Organization was also crucial in demonstrating Turkey's approach towards the role of the UN in the sense that Turkey asked the Islamic Conference leaders to work within the UN platform in order to secure a credible response towards the war.⁵⁸ Therefore, despite growing uneasiness in Turkish public opinion towards the UN's inability to respond to the Bosnian war, Ankara did not choose to act unilaterally and instead continued its "multilateral efforts" in the UN platform, stressing the "international legitimacy" principle.⁵⁹

Hence, not only in rhetoric, but also in practice, in the face of intense

criticisms both on moral, legal and political grounds, the UN continued to be the "main addressee" of Turkey's multilateral efforts in the post-Cold War order. Accordingly, Turkey developed many proposals before the UN for the solution of the Bosnian War, tried to become a bridge between the Bosniaks and the international community, and negotiated with Milosevic to prevent the Kosovo War.⁶⁰ As in the case of Bosnia, Turkey supported the UN Security Council Resolution 794, adopted on 8 December 1992, which authorised military enforcement action in order to tackle the Somalian humanitarian crisis. Ankara contributed to the UN Operation in Somalia, called UNOSOM, as part of a Unified Task Force- UNITAF- between January 1993 and February 1994. Turkey also took part in the UNOSOM II operation as the commander of the peacekeeping force in Somalia between May 1993 and January 1994.⁶¹ Despite limitations, Ankara hoped that the UN Security Council resolution on Somalia would be a "model" for taking collective military measures towards the Bosnian War and struggled to convince the UN Security Council members for collective military intervention towards the Bosnian War. Yet, the UN Security Council shunned military action in the case of the Bosnian War until 1995.⁶² In the aftermath of the wars in question, Ankara contributed to the "establishment of a new regional

order” by sending soldiers to the peacekeeping missions, both in Bosnia and later Kosovo. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, Turkey participated in NATO’s IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later KFOR in Kosovo.⁶³

One should also note that an important landmark affecting the shift in Turkish foreign policy towards a normative approach in the 1990s was the proclamation of Turkey as an official candidate for EU membership in 1999. After this declaration, the EU’s norm diffusion towards Turkey led to a rapid Europeanization process that also contributed to the rising of awareness in Turkey about the importance of defending the EU’s core principles both in domestic and foreign policies so as to reach its European ideal.⁶⁴ Yet, still, the 1990s turned out to be a period of “geopolitical anxiety”⁶⁵ in terms of questioning Turkey’s future role in the new world order as well as in organizations like NATO.⁶⁶ Thus, Turkey’s active foreign policy towards its surrounding regions was also prompted by Turkish foreign policy makers’ worries about Turkey’s decreased geostrategic importance for the West in the early 1990s.⁶⁷ With the end of the Cold War, Turkey struggled hard to find its “own role” in the emerging post-Cold War order and initiated an active foreign policy in different regional arenas.⁶⁸ This posture on the side of

Turkish rulers had been evident in their repeatedly underscored diverse discourse of identifying Turkey’s potential role as a “model”, “destination” and “bridge” between the East and the West during the course of the 1990s.

In this regard, the “world state” concept of İsmail Cem, the Foreign Minister of the coalition government between 1999 and 2002, also points to how Turkey’s foreign policy role was conceived normatively in various- and sometimes conflicting- terms during the 1990’s international order. Cem argued that Turkish foreign policy has been alienated from its cultural roots and historical past and it must be replaced with a new understanding based on the awareness of Turkey’s rich identity and historical assets inherited from the Ottoman states.⁶⁹ For Cem, Turkey, as a democratic country having reached European standards of human rights in the Islamic world, should be presented to other Middle Eastern countries as “a model” in the emerging post-Cold War order. Accordingly, Cem outlined his vision for Turkey as “to transform her into a world state”:

A world state positioned among the major centers of the world and representing a unique blend of civilizational assets, historical experiences and strategic attributes. One that is not a mere observer of others’ success stories but has its own achievements that sometimes makes them envious as well. One that consistently develops its special relations

with the regions with which she shares a common history. One that, in line with Atatürk's legacy, constitutes a role model for nations with parallel cultural backgrounds.⁷⁰

Cem's "world state" conceptualization was crucial in the sense that it laid down a new vision for Turkey's future role in the new world order in the post-Cold War era. However, in practice, the domestic, as well as regional dynamics made it hard for Turkey to act on these claims in the 1990s. Turkey's complex domestic constraints in terms of democratic deficits and the Kurdish issue, combined with its security-based foreign policy priorities, did not create an appropriate context for a comprehensive normative agenda in foreign policy.⁷¹ Although Turkey followed an active diplomacy in cases like the 1990 Persian Gulf War and the 1992-1995 Bosnian War in the UN platform, there was only a limited manifestation of Turkey's willingness to adopt a "leading role" on issues of regional and global importance focusing explicitly on a "normative" agenda in the UN platform.

All in all, undoubtedly, since its establishment, Turkish foreign policy witnessed one of the most "active diplomacies" in its history within the UN platform during the 1990s. This posture was most evident in Ankara's relentless struggle to convince the UN Security Council for a collective military intervention towards the Bosnian War, as well as in its immediate support for

the UN efforts during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91. Although normative concerns came to the fore in Turkish foreign policy discourse, especially after the Balkan crises,⁷² Turkey's increased engagements in the UN platform were predominantly shaped by its immediate "security" considerations as well as its attempts to fashion a new "role" for itself in the emerging post-Cold War order. As Sayari puts it, above all, the strengthening of its ties with the West remained the primary motivating force for Ankara's engagement in its surrounding regions during the course of the 1990s' international order that was shaped by uncertainty both at home and abroad.⁷³

Turkey, the UN and the International Order in the 2000s: Normative Resistance and an "Order-Building" Role

Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey's foreign policy has reflected a more "*value-oriented*" outlook towards order, both in discourse and practice.⁷⁴ The new foreign policy approach towards order is more interested in "*building influence*" in its region as well as across the globe through international institutions.⁷⁵ In this regard, the new rulers did not just capitalize on the "active diplomatic initiatives of the

1990s”, but also demonstrated increasing “willingness” to adopt a new “*order-building role*” in the last decade especially through the UN platform.⁷⁶

According to Davutoğlu, world order has been going through major earthquakes since the end of the Cold War, and these have shaped Turkey’s potential as well as limitations in foreign policy making.

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009-2014), who served as the chief advisor to the Prime Minister between 2002-2009, was the architect of new thinking in Turkish foreign policy. According to Davutoğlu, world order has been going through major earthquakes since the end of the Cold War, and these have shaped Turkey’s potential as well as limitations in foreign policy making. Since the policies Ankara pursued during the immediate post-Cold War era were not that proactive, Turkey paid a heavy price in the face of the first earthquake. Nevertheless, Turkey has emerged as a powerful state in the subsequent second and third earthquakes, namely September 11 and more recently the world economic crises.⁷⁷ More importantly, although there have always been regulatory agreements among the powerful states at the transitional turning points of the world order, there was, however, no real

agreement among states on what the new order would be like after the Cold War. For AKP leaders, this provided an important opportunity for Turkey, in terms of both its “possible role” in the making of a future international order and its “critique” against the structure of the current order.⁷⁸

In this vein, Turkey’s foreign policy role in the AKP era is defined as being one of the main actors in the construction of the new regional/global order(s):

... Our vision is a regional order that is built on representative political systems, reflecting the legitimate demands of the people where regional states are fully integrated to each other around the core values of democracy and true economic interdependence... At the global level, we will aspire to build in a participatory manner a new international order that is inclusive of the international community at large...⁷⁹

This “new international order” vision has been conceptualized to encompass three dimensions: i) political order based on dialogue and multilateralism; ii) an economic order based on justice and equality; and iii) a cultural order based on inclusiveness and accommodation.⁸⁰ Accordingly, Turkish leaders have criticized and at times challenged the current international order on “political”, “economic” and “cultural” grounds on multilateral platforms and called for a revision to its institutional architecture:

You have the UN Security Council still reflecting the post-Second World War geopolitical balances... We think that in

the UN there should be a much more “participatory” political order, much more “justice oriented” economic order and a much more “inclusive” cultural order.⁸¹

In parallel with their predecessors, today's Turkish rulers raise in every possible occasion “the urgent demand” for a much more “representative” and “effective” order in the UN System.⁸² In this regard, Prime Minister Erdogan's (2003-2014) remarks in 2012 on the UN's paralysis over the Syrian uprisings that the “UN is facing a serious test of effectiveness,” clearly illustrates the “continuity” in Turkish rulers' approach towards the role of the organization in the 1990s:

The United Nations is facing a serious test. That test is about whether or not the Organization can represent the good conscience of the international community and act in accordance with it. In other words, it is about whether it can translate humanity into practice or not. So far, the track record has not been promising.⁸³

What's crucial here is that, for AKP leaders, in addition to the “institutional ineffectiveness” and problematic economic order, there is also the problem of “cultural order” within the international system. This concern became visible in Davutoğlu's criticism of the “Eurocentric” cultural world order. A Eurocentric cultural approach cannot, he argued, be shaping the future of humanity in a world of rising states. More importantly, in Davutoğlu's words, there should be certain “new values

that should be injected.”⁸⁴ Such normative issues are one area in which Turkey has been maintaining a sustained criticism of the international order, and Turkish leaders seem convinced that the current order fails to uphold justice and breeds inequality and mistreatment.⁸⁵ “This is a search about a “cultural order” that integrates different historic entities to the system rather than reading the global system in terms of norms, understandings and practices through a single historical perspective.”⁸⁶

Ankara's “normative resistance” towards the current UN order is best symbolized in Turkish rulers' recurring discourse of “the world is bigger than five”.⁸⁷

Since 2002, Turkey has acted critically of the UN not only for its failure to play an effective role in the maintenance of peace and security in the world, but also for its inability to adequately support the “development” needs of impoverished nations. In particular, Turkey has asked the UN to concentrate more on all issues related to human rights and development.⁸⁸ The new “normative” paradigm in Turkish foreign policy was also evident in the search for the alleviation of poverty and inequality in the world. In this regard, in their criticism towards the UN system, Turkish leaders attribute to their country “a new role” aiming to “bring a higher moral standard to global governance and politics and achieve a harmony of *realpolitik* and norms-based foreign policy.”⁸⁹ In parallel to that, in the words of Abdullah Gül, “Turkey's unique historical,

political, and social experience bestows upon it both a role and a responsibility to promote peace, security.”⁹⁰ Reflected in Davutoğlu’s “humanitarian diplomacy”⁹¹ concept, compared to their predecessors, AKP rulers increasingly emphasized their willingness to take “responsibility” in shaping the international order, ranging from security issues to environmental ones. In this regard, emphasis on Turkey’s global responsibility not only as a firm defender of universal values, but also as a state with a strong willingness to extend its assistance to “the people who rise up to demand such values” is illustrative of Turkey’s “normative” approach in shaping a new world order:

In pursuit of our global objectives, we will endeavor to listen to the consciousness and commonsense of humanity, and become a firm defender of universal values... We will extend our assistance to the people who rise up to demand such values.⁹²

In practice, Turkey has been a vocal advocate in the plight of the Palestinians and the Syrians. It has also emerged in the last decade as a major force in addressing the issues of global underdevelopment and the humanitarian suffering in Africa.⁹³ Turkey took many initiatives to contribute in shaping a just global order especially through utilizing international platforms. More importantly, Turkey has also been taking an interest in global issues which are prominent in the UN’s agenda, even though they do not necessarily fall within the traditional domain of Turkish

foreign policy.⁹⁴ In this vein, Turkey was the first non-Western country to host the 4th UN Conference on Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in May 2011. The UN World Food Programme (WFP) has already named Turkey as one of the major donors towards alleviating the acute food crisis in Africa. Turkey’s contributions to the UN and to projects in the least developed regions of the world have been on a steady increase over the last decade.⁹⁵ Turkey’s voluntary contributions to the United Nations amounted to almost US\$ 12 million in 2005 and 2006, including a donation worth US\$ 600.000 to the newly-founded “Central Emergency Response Fund”.⁹⁶ Displaying a systematic uptick, Turkey became the world’s 4th largest donor in development cooperation and the 3rd in humanitarian aid relief in 2012, providing assistance to 131 countries listed as aid recipients in 2011.⁹⁷ In 2010 Turkey co-chaired with Egypt an “International Donor’s Conference for the Reconstruction and Development of Darfur” in Cairo. Also, in May 2010 Turkey hosted the Istanbul Somalia Conference organized within the UN framework. Subsequently, in June 2012 the second international conference on Somalia was held in Turkey under the theme: “Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015.” On 26 September 2013, while speaking at the World Humanitarian Summit of the 68th UN General Assembly, the UN Secretary General praised Turkey’s international

assistance and declared that Turkey will host the first World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.⁹⁸ In this vein, Turkish rulers have increasingly become strong advocates of Asian, African and Latin American struggles for peace and prosperity in international platforms, first and foremost in the UN.⁹⁹

Therefore, despite intense criticisms towards the workings of the UN system, in practice, the UN has increasingly become an important arena in Turkish rulers' search for a just international order as well as their efforts to "restructure" the world order. In the words of Abdullah Gül:

The United Nations provides a political and moral compass for our endeavours towards a just international order- a better order that will prevent new conflicts, ensure that human rights are upheld and lead to more equitable and sustainable distribution of prosperity.¹⁰⁰

Turkish rulers took every opportunity to emphasize the crucial role of an "effective" UN in the international order as well as Turkey's "commitment" to strengthen the UN system in its own foreign policy:

Since the 2000's, Turkey's order-criticisms encompass more concrete normative suggestions to "extend" the global order, as well as an "increased willingness" to take a more "active role" in the UN platform.

Strengthening multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations in the international system is a fundamental aspect of our foreign policy. It is the strongest hope and guarantee for a safer and better world.¹⁰¹

Accordingly, since the 2000's, Turkey's order-criticisms encompass more concrete normative suggestions to "extend" the global order, as well as an "increased willingness" to take a more "active role" in the UN platform. In this vein, the Turkish Foreign Ministry's report called "Turkey's Priorities for the 62th Session of UN General Assembly" in 2007¹⁰² has been remarkable in terms of documenting Turkey's priorities and expectations from the UN in a wide range of areas as well as suggesting contributions from Turkey in establishing a just new world order.¹⁰³ In practice there is evidence in the last decade of a tremendous surge in the number of initiatives taken in international platforms, namely the UN, aimed at "restructuring the international order" towards a just settlement of disputes. Turkey's non-permanent seat in the 2009-2010 period and also her second application for UN temporary membership for the 2015-2016 term clearly demonstrate Ankara's increasing "willingness" over the last decade to take the "responsibility" in reconstructing the international order through the UN platform. Ankara had been longing for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council since 1961 and the 2009-2010 membership was a great achievement for

Turkey, since the long period of absence has been a major obstacle in Turkish foreign policy, restricting its “visibility” in the international arena.¹⁰⁴

Turkey’s efforts since 2011 at finding an effective resolution to the Syrian uprising emphasizing the humanitarian tragedy also aimed at mobilizing the UN platform to take effective measures.

Turkish leaders’ intense diplomacy in the UN platform in recent years on issues like the Syrian uprisings, the Palestinian issue and the Iranian Nuclear Program illustrates Turkey’s increased visibility in the UN platform aimed at finding a just solution to crucial problems in world politics. In this regard, Turkish rulers’ active campaign in 2012 for a non-member observer status to the Palestinian state before the UN General Assembly Platform was remarkable. Turkey’s efforts since 2011 at finding an effective resolution to the Syrian uprising emphasizing the humanitarian tragedy also aimed at mobilizing the UN platform to take effective measures. Accordingly, Turkish rulers strived to guarantee further collective measures towards Syria and harshly criticized the UN on many occasions of indirectly supporting the oppression of the Syrian

people by “failing to unite on Syria.”¹⁰⁵ In fact, Turkey has raised the Syrian issue both before the General Assembly and before the Security Council many times and also sponsored draft resolutions in the General Assembly.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, Turkey’s efforts together with Brazil on the Iranian nuclear program, resulting in the Tehran agreement and intense diplomacy to avoid further sanctions to ensure diplomatic talks has been illustrative of its efforts in the UN platform to take responsibility in shaping the international order.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, Turkey significantly supported and promoted cultural international initiatives at the UN like the UN’s “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative launched in 2005. The project certainly constitutes a new perspective in Turkish foreign policy, in which Turkey has assumed the position of the spokesperson of the Islamic world and for the first time has undertaken a pioneering role in a global initiative.¹⁰⁸

One should also note here that Turkey’s increasing quest to adopt a normative “order-building” role in the last decade towards the international order has been made “possible” in the existence of available systemic, regional and domestic factors. Firstly, Turkey’s growing regional role, especially up until the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, was crucial. When Turkey had little influence in its region, it mattered little whether Ankara had a normative foreign policy or not. Turkey had the luxury of acting without giving

much thought to its responsibility to espouse a more ambitious foreign policy based on “values.” When Turkey increased in power and influence however, the question of “values” became a much more significant issue.¹⁰⁹

Secondly, as Öniş and Kutlay suggest, at the systemic level, the hegemonic power transformations have provided a window of opportunity for rising powers to act relatively more independently in comparison to periods when systemic control mechanisms were tight and robust.¹¹⁰ Hence, the strong agency on the part of current Turkish rulers who pursue a greater role for Turkey in restructuring the international order is well-suited to the conducive external environment in the 2000s, in which new operational areas were opened for rising powers in the world system.¹¹¹ In this vein, the increasing pressure put on the UN system for “reform calls” as a result of structural transformations in the last decade also fostered Turkey’s agency in terms of normative “order-criticism”. Moreover, financial crises in the global economy and the so-called “Europessimism” accompanied by Western powers’ struggle to preserve the established order might be argued to have enabled a more receptive environment towards alternative demands coming from rising states. Not only such systemic factors, but also favourable domestic conditions fostered Turkey’s attempt to adopt a global role towards responsibility in shaping world order.

Yet, in the last decade, there were clear limitations towards Turkey’s normative posture in bringing about sound policy outcomes. In the most recent Syrian crises, Turkey undoubtedly played an important and constructive role in terms of humanitarian aid and welcoming massive numbers of Syrian refugees from the other side of the border. Yet, Turkey has been unable to convert its commendable unilateral effort to a genuine multilateral effort.¹¹² As the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey increased dramatically, Turkey appealed to the UN in 2012 and asked for the implementation of the principle of “responsibility to protect” in Syria.¹¹³ Nevertheless, Turkey’s efforts failed to produce the desired outcomes as in the case of the refusal of prominent international actors to establish no-fly zones or humanitarian corridors in Syria. Indeed, for some scholars, Turkey’s Syrian policy has been to some extent counter-productive as it has undermined Turkey’s image of being a benign regional power, by drawing it into sectarian conflicts and over-involvement in the domestic politics of key Arab states. What is more, since the onset of the Arab uprisings, Turkey has been blamed by some for disrespecting the principle of national sovereignty.¹¹⁴

Likewise, the AKP government displayed a great deal of sensitivity towards the military coup in Egypt on “normative” grounds, and has been quite critical of the EU leaders for not being equally responsive. However, this kind of

sensitivity and the pro-democratization posture adopted towards events in the outside world do not easily generate international attention and credibility, given the growing belief that Turkey's democratic credentials display a number of important deficiencies.¹¹⁵ In this regard, Turkey's ability to adopt a normative foreign policy role is also argued to have been downgraded in recent years with shortfalls in domestic politics with regards to an occasional lack of tolerance towards freedom of expression, the failure to write a new constitution and the lessening belief in the rule of law. "Furthermore, Ankara's contradictory foreign policy approaches towards some Middle Eastern countries' human rights policies like Saudi Arabia and its silence towards Sudanese government's human rights violations in Africa have increasingly been criticized on normative grounds for being double-standard."¹¹⁶

If sustained, the ongoing “normative” restructuring process in Turkish politics in terms of democratization, freedom and human rights, accompanied by a relatively peaceful, stable and prosperous domestic order, will continue to prompt Turkey's eagerness to adopt a normative foreign policy role in the UN platform.

In the same vein, some scholars argue that Turkey's humanitarian and development activities in Africa as well as its growing sensitivity towards the neighbouring regions were motivated mostly by a desire to open new markets for its rapidly growing and globalizing commercial interests.¹¹⁷ Moreover, its previous campaign for a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for the 2009-2010 period also seemed to have precipitated a wave of Turkish aid activism toward Africa in the 2000s. This was accompanied by the opening of embassies and financing projects in sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn secured a number of votes for Turkey during its successful bid for a UN Security Council seat in 2009-2010.¹¹⁸ Above all, Turkey's, inability to get the necessary votes for the 2015-2016 Security Council membership in the UN General Assembly as well as the counter-campaign initiated by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, clearly demonstrated Turkey's limitations in exerting its influence through international institutions in a changing, highly volatile regional context. Nevertheless, if sustained, the ongoing “normative” restructuring process in Turkish politics in terms of democratization, freedom and human rights, accompanied by a relatively peaceful, stable and prosperous domestic order, will continue to prompt Turkey's eagerness to adopt a normative foreign policy role in the UN platform.

Conclusion

Since the 2000s, there have been clear indications of Turkey's changing power status as a result of its increasing hard and soft-power capabilities in foreign policy accompanied by an increasing enthusiasm on the side of Turkish rulers to take an active role in regional and global affairs. The United Nations Development Programme dubbed its 2013 Human Development Report "The Rise of the South". The states that belong to the group of rising powers is remarkably diverse and large; they include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the 'BRICS'), as well as, states like Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey.¹¹⁹ Similar to the leaders of the BRICS, Turkish leaders are increasingly seeking to have an active role in the UN platform. We could thus witness Russia's preoccupation with the Security Council; Chinese resistance to any reform of the UN Security Council that would add new permanent members; Brazil's campaign for a permanent seat in the Council; and India's efforts to become an 'agenda mover' on various issues reflecting its newfound role as a bridge between North and South in the UN. Considering the triad offered by Turkish policy makers under the AKP government, in terms of a new *political, economic and cultural order*, there is a clear "*normative resistance*" against the idea of a unipolar world order and its

frozen institutions, often accompanied by the conviction that the international system is gradually, but ineluctably, moving toward multipolarity with the phenomenon of rising states.¹²⁰

As a rising power with attachments to Western institutions of the current world order such as NATO, the Council of Europe, the EU and the OECD, Turkey's demand for a revision of the international system is clearly distinguished from the demands of other rising powers.

One should note here that Turkey's increasing visibility in global affairs and several of its critical normative discourses as well as foreign policy moves vis-a-vis the West are sometimes taken as indicators that it has adopted or may adopt a "revisionist stance" towards the current international order. Yet, Turkey's "*order-criticism*" is hardly new and goes back to the Republican era. By comparatively analyzing the historical evolution of Turkey's approach towards the international order as well as its foreign policy practices in the UN platform, this study demonstrates that since the 2000s, Turkey's order-criticisms encompass more concrete normative suggestions to extend the global order, as

well as an increased inclination to take a more active role in the UN platform as a result of favourable domestic and systemic factors. Nevertheless, as a rising power with attachments to Western institutions of the current world order such as NATO, the Council of Europe, the EU and the OECD, Turkey's demand for a revision of the international system is clearly distinguished from the demands of other rising powers.¹²¹ Turkey's bond with the West rests on more than shared strategic interests as Turkey's centuries old westernization ideal with its institutional relations has left indelible marks on Turkey's culture and institutions.¹²² "In fact, Turkey's current challenge to the international order is revision-oriented rather than being anti-systemic."¹²³

At the systemic level, the structure and the working methods of the UN Security Council is one of the main obstacles towards rising states' ability to shape the course of developments as well as Turkey's ability to play a central role in shaping international politics.

Turkey's "normative resistance" is designed to propose an "international justice-based alternative approach" to the existing international order which needs to be reconstructed *not*

outside but in the UN platform. Yet, it would be wrong to argue that all these efforts on the side of Turkish rulers fostered "optimal" outcomes in terms of sound accomplishments. At the systemic level, the structure and the working methods of the UN Security Council is one of the main obstacles towards rising states' ability to shape the course of developments as well as Turkey's ability to play a central role in shaping international politics. Again, the changing regional context after the 2011 Arab uprisings has already had a remarkable effect on Turkey's "normative foreign policy role" as well as on Turkey-UN relations. The diminishing regional support for Ankara became manifest during elections for the Security Council for the period between 2015-2016. Its failure to obtain a non-permanent seat at the Security Council clearly revealed the limitations of Turkey's increasing role in the UN platform. Thus, although there has been a clear manifestation of Turkey's enthusiasm to adopt a normative foreign policy role in terms of defining new normative aims and frequent use of normative means, the normative outcomes seems to be much more complicated, especially in the last couple of years.

Above all, the UN's almost 70 years old "frozen" system faces an *increased pressure* for "structural change" with ongoing global systemic and political transformations in the last decade.

This creates a tension in which the organization will either *reorganize* its system to adopt the process of change in world politics or face some kind of diminishing legitimacy. In this vein, the “heightened pressure” resulting from crises of the international order as well as the legitimacy of the UN system has the potential to open up new areas for

rising states’ normative resistance in the search for a just and representative international order. As being one of the founding members of the UN, the world organization will continue to remain at the center of Turkey’s increasing efforts to search for an effective, representative and just international order.

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On Turkey's Trail as a "Rising Middle Power" in the Network of Global Governance: Preferences, Capabilities, and Strategies

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Abstract

Acknowledging Turkey as a "rising/emerging middle power", occupying a middle ground between traditional (or Western) middle powers and non-traditional middle powers, this paper aims to reassess Turkey's changing power and position in the complex power hierarchies and the changing architecture of global governance through its preferences, capabilities and strategies by using a comparative analysis. It then briefly resumes its findings to assess the driving factors, conditions and specific characteristics explaining Turkey's contribution to global governance compared to a cluster of eight selected countries composed of the five BRICS countries, labeled as non-traditional middle powers, and Canada, Australia and South Korea, as traditional middle powers. Finally, it looks at Turkey's contribution to global governance at the institutional level, with a special focus on Turkey's 2015 G20 presidency as a test case for understanding its global governance activism. In the final analysis, this study underlines that Turkey's ambitious agenda for its G20 presidency gives clear signals of its future preferences and middle power activism in less hierarchical G20-type forums in which developed and developing countries are equally represented and middle power countries are allowed more manoeuvring capacity.

Key Words

Global governance, international order, Turkish foreign policy, rising middle powers, traditional middle powers, emerging non-traditional middle powers, G20.

Introduction

In recent years, one of the most important debates in international politics is about the ongoing global power shifts occurring in the international system in favor of the rising powers, and the impact of power transition on the international system and global governance. In this new world structure, rising middle powers have started to take over a prominent role from the major powers and have sought to change the international system in line with their own interests, strategies and values, by assuming new responsibilities in major international organizations. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, we have been witnessing the ascendance of "the West and the rest" discourse in the so-called "post-American" or "emerging international system," in which the rising middle powers have already engaged

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in developing alternative strategies for solving the international problems and strengthened their bargaining and pressure capacities towards the Western powers.

Rising middle powers have started to take over a prominent role from the major powers and have sought to change the international system in line with their own interests, strategies and values, by assuming new responsibilities in major international organizations.

The way, with which preferences and capabilities, and through which strategies, the rising middle powers have been contributing to global governance, is an understudied field in the International Relations (IR) literature in terms of theoretical and empirical studies. On the other hand, there exists a conceptual ambiguity in the IR literature around concepts that have generally been used in an interchangeable way, such as “rising (or emerging) powers”, “middle or middle range powers” and “regional powers,” and these overlapping roles make the analysis more complicated and contested. Another aspect of this fluidity of concepts is an increasing need to provide an empirical and comparative research on the preferences, capabilities

and strategies of rising powers in the context of major/great powers, traditional (or Western) middle powers, and non-traditional (or emerging) middle powers. For instance, Russia and China are labeled both as major, rising and regional powers, while Australia and Canada (which are conceptualized in this study as “rising traditional middle powers”) are generally considered as both traditional middle powers and regional powers and, to a lesser extent, rising powers, due to their rising economies. Similarly, some countries like Brazil, India, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Argentina, and Turkey are labeled both as “rising powers” and “emerging/non-traditional middle powers” (but are labeled in this study as rising (or emerging) middle powers).

Given this overlapping conceptual framework, Turkey has generally been neglected in most of the studies in IR on rising powers and middle powers despite its rising middle power status over the last decade. One of the novelties of this paper is to reassess Turkey’s changing power status in the complex power hierarchies and categories under the auspices of “rising/emerging middle powers” occupying a middle ground between traditional middle powers and non-traditional middle powers, mainly due to its unique position and its bridge-building role between “the West and the rest”. Another novelty of this paper to the IR and Turkish foreign policy literature

is to understand Turkey's position and contribution in the changing architecture of global governance. Here, Turkey's capability in the global governance will be compared using appropriate statistical data with those of the selected other eight states, including the five BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and three traditional middle powers, Canada, Australia and South Korea. This cluster of eight states is selected mainly due to their representative character of the two different rising "middle power" categories, *non traditional* and *traditional*. A third novelty of this paper is to use Turkey's current presidency to the G20, since December 2014, as a test case for understanding its global governance activism as a rising middle power in the light of the triad, *preferences*, *capabilities*, *strategies*.

Not all countries who joined the rank of rising powers or middle range powers have actively been engaged with international institutions or global governance and have been keen on assuming more responsibility in a post-American world order. Of course, it is a complex task to depict under which circumstances, within which membership to international organizations and on the basis of which ideational and material contributions rising middle powers participate in global governance. How well or poorly a state has contributed to global governance needs to be empirically researched, and this of course requires a

systematic comparative study by taking into consideration different variables.

In this backdrop, the first part of this paper looks towards Turkey's preferences, capabilities, and strategies with respect to global governance. Accordingly, firstly Turkey's *preferences* regarding the changing international order and global governance structure will be explained. Secondly, in order to understand Turkey's rising middle power *capabilities*, a comparative approach based on five criteria previously used by Hongying Wang and Erik French in their 2013 article entitled "Middle Range Powers in Global Governance"¹ will be used. On the basis of the interpretation of data in our tables, this study will briefly resume its findings to assess the driving factors, specific conditions and characteristics explaining Turkey's contribution to global governance as a "distinct" rising middle power. Thirdly, Turkey's global governance *strategies* in terms of commonalities and differences with those of other rising middle powers will be explained. Here, the way Turkey's "unique" rising middle power status simultaneously generates different and accommodating perspectives and outcomes in the shifting world order compared to other rising middle powers will also be explained. The second part of the paper will look at Turkey's contribution to global governance at the institutional level, with a special focus on Turkey's more ambitious policies towards the G20.

Turkey as a Rising Middle Power in the Existing Global Governance: Preferences, Capabilities and Strategies

Turkey's attention to the architecture of global governance goes back to the 1920s, when it first criticized the decision-making mechanisms and structure of the League of Nations, established in the aftermath of the First World War in the framework of the unfolding of a collective security understanding. In its session on 16 December 1925, to which Turkey did not participate, the League of Nations (LN) decided to leave Mosul to Iraq under the mandate of the United Kingdom.² This decision of the LN was harshly criticized by Turkey for having been illegitimate and against international law, and Turkey accused the LN of having acted under the guidance of the UK in the Mosul question.³ This criticism of Turkey on the LN today still shares some common features with Turkey's current approach to international order and the UN decision-making system, which is far from being anti-systemic, but rather is more related with the mechanisms and the structure. In the Cold War years, when Turkey remained as a close ally to the U.S. in particular and the West in general, Turkey's within system challenge was less vocal and only became apparent with the unfolding of international crises closely concerned with its national interests (for instance, the

Cyprus conflict). Similarly, the successive Yugoslavian crisis triggered in the 1990s led to the rise of an international order criticism-based discourse in Turkish foreign policy. The Iraqi War of 2003 and the Arab revolts which started in late 2010 all made Turkey's UN-centered order criticism more apparent in its foreign policy.⁴ Turkey's rising criticism of the UN's unfair decision-making mechanisms has increased its tone with the deterioration of the Syrian civil war after 2012. Since Turkey's quest for international justice for the deepening Syrian tragedy in the major global governance institutions, as well as regional organizations have proven abortive, its within system challenge to international order started to be accompanied by a differentiated activism in the global governance system. Turkey's "rising middle power" status needs to be further analyzed in terms of preferences, capability and strategy in the new global geometry of power.

Since Turkey's quest for international justice for the deepening Syrian tragedy in the major global governance institutions, as well as regional organizations have proven abortive, its within system challenge to international order started to be accompanied by a differentiated activism in the global governance system.

Preferences

Turkey's self-identification as a pro-Western state belonging to the Western camp has long avoided the country perceiving itself as an autonomous global player with global interests. In the Cold War years and in the 1990s, Turkey lacked a combination of material resources, as well as diplomatic and ideational power. It also avoided embracing a middle power model that could elevate and differentiate its position in the global system. Turkey's longlasting economic shortcomings, mainly due to its foreign debt and chronic inflation problems and its dependance since the 1980s on Western financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, did not open up space for its advancement of a global foreign policy role and a nuanced institutionnalism. This period was marked by Turkey's Western-centric approach to international order, which attributed it a "fixed" Western ally role rather than an "evolving" role in search of different forms of actorness in the international system. During the first decade following the end of the Cold War, Turkey's own domestic problems combined with economic instabilities also made it difficult for Turkish leaders to take on new forms of diplomatic initiatives in global affairs through an autonomous middle power foreign policy agenda.

In fact, the emergence of the Turkish model with the collapse of the Soviet Union- a role model to be emulated by

the newly established post-Soviet Turkic Republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia- created potential for Turkey-as-a-middle power to attempt some regional efforts at bridging the Occident and Orient.⁵ However, Turkey's low role performance, mainly due to its lack of material resources in acting as a model for the Turkic Republics,⁶ did not turn to a regional leadership that could also have fostered Turkey's global role in the international system. Since regional power and global power status are mutually interdependent and a weakness in one will affect the other, Turkey's limitations in projecting regional power in the Cold and post-Cold War era and even today, significantly affect its rising power status and its contribution to global governance.

Regarding Turkey's preferences in terms of the global governance system, it can also be argued that Turkey's top institutional foreign policy priority has, since 1959 when it made its first application for membership to European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU), been integration as a full member. Its multilateralism mostly aimed at realigning its foreign policy with that of its Western allies. In this respect, Turkey's "follower" role did not provide it with new possibilities in terms of autonomous diplomatic activity. However, the deterioration of Turkish-American relations with the Iraqi War in 2003, the blockage of Turkey-EU

negotiations in 2006 and the considerable increase in its material power also made Turkey more inclined in global politics to act as an active agenda-setter and a normative foreign policy actor seeking a cosmopolitan and pluricentric world order⁷ rather than a passive follower. Turkey's efforts for gradual normalisation of its relations with the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, with some of its neighbours in other surrounding regions, like Armenia, also opened up space for Turkish foreign policy to take on new and more diversified foreign policy roles with a global connection, such as mediator, peace-broker, humanitarian actor and development aid contributor. The first decade of the 2000s witnessed a significant number of Turkish attempts in forging its regionalization and international socialization in formal and informal regional and international institutions and groups. The same period was in turn marked by a strong Turkish activism in the UN through its non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council from 2009 to 2010. This of course provided it with new opportunities to play a more constructive role in global governance by strengthening its within-system challenge and its reform aspirations vis-à-vis the international order. This membership to the UN Security Council and a Turkey-Brazil joint initiative in the spring of 2010 regarding a fuel-swap deal with Iran accelerated Turkey's active engagement with regard to the global governance

institutions, particularly the UN. Turkey's activism in the UN has also covered its close engagement within the work of the UN General Assembly and its other subsidiary bodies. Turkey's candidacy to the United Nations Security Council for non-permanent membership during the 2015-2016 term, despite its failure, is another sign of Turkey's continued willingness to become more actively involved in global governance related issues inside the UN. Another novelty with regard to Turkey's global politics concerns its increasing activism over the last five years in extra-regional countries in Africa and Latin America, thanks to its cultural and development cooperation policies. Turkey's rising donor status at the international level, especially across the African continent, is also a good indicator of the change in Turkey's global governance policies in recent years.⁸

Turkey's multilateralism in recent years is not only restricted to its increasing activism in the UN. Turkey's G20 strategy under its 2015 rotating presidency gives clear signals about Turkey's future preferences and reform aspirations in terms of global governance. On the other hand, in recent years, Turkey has shared a more common ideational ground with the BRICS countries, despite some differences in their strategies, about the reform of the global political and financial institutions, particularly the UN and IMF. Here what is at stake is to understand the degree of influence

of Turkey's current global governance policies over the international order compared to other rising middle powers, both traditional and non-traditional ones. Turkey's capabilities also matter together with its preferences and strategies in grasping its relocation as a rising middle power in global governance.

Capabilities

This study assumes that states' participation to global governance can change according to four main factors. This is an assumption which I have partly borrowed from the analytical framework of an article by Hongying Wang and Erik French written in 2013:⁹ *i) material power, ii) the degree of states' dependence on the global economy, iii) states' behaviours towards the existing international order (either as a reformist or a bystander country), iv) socializational and institutional power (can be measured by looking at the length of a country's membership in major international organisations) and v) the strength of their civil society.* These five factors hypothesized in Wang and French's article refer to a combination of neorealist, liberal, critical, constructivist and post-internationalist theoretical perspectives and thus successfully synthesize the insights of these theories in order to explain the reasons behind the more active involvement of some middle powers in global governance than others. The five criteria derived from the above mentioned theories offer general

insights into variation among rising middle powers' participation in global governance. Rather than using a single theoretical approach to explain middle power activism, this study employs Wang and French's *five factors-based eclectic explanation*, each of which is supported by a different IR theory.

Material Power

As neorealist theory suggests, a state's participation in global governance should be conditioned by its relative power and its dual objectives for survival and independence.¹⁰ Accordingly, a state should only be actively participating in global governance if i) this conforms to its national interests; ii) its security would not be jeopardized; and iii) it does not have the sufficient capacity to act autonomously in order to preserve its interests with regard to global governance.¹¹ While a weak state wishing to be actively involved in global governance may lack the necessary capabilities, a major power may seek to act unilaterally in the international system with the aim of maintaining its own interests.¹² However, middle powers have more capacity to influence the development in the world despite their limited material power compared to major powers. According to Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, middle powers are defined by their foreign policy behaviour rather than their size.¹³ These

secondary states exhibit autonomy from major powers and thus they seek to ameliorate injustice in the international system by finding peaceful solutions to international crisis.¹⁴ One of the characteristics of middle powers is that they are likely to be more inclined to take cooperative efforts to respond to the problems of global governance.¹⁵

Trade interdependence increases diplomatic cooperation among trade partners and also positively impacts the involvement of the latter in global governance by assuming more responsibilities.

Given this, the first factor assumes that the more a middle power has material power (defined in terms of economic, military power and of population) the more it has the tendency to solve some international problems unilaterally or bilaterally, showing less willingness to search for multilateral solutions.¹⁶ It can be argued that the material power of a country, among the middle powers, has a negative impact on its participation in global governance.

The Degree of States' Dependence on the Global Economy

As the liberal theories of international relations suggest, economic interdependence serves in reinforcing

cooperation and preserving peace among states, pushing the latter to find peaceful solutions to international crisis.¹⁷ Accordingly, trade interdependence increases diplomatic cooperation among trade partners and also positively impacts the involvement of the latter in global governance by assuming more responsibilities. This second factor, derived from liberal theories, assumes that the more a country becomes dependent on the global economy, the more it has a positive impact on its involvement in global governance. It signifies that the more a country has dependence on trade and investment, the more it seeks to foster multilateral cooperation in order to find responses to global crises.

States' Behaviours towards the Existing International Order

While neorealism considers the state as a unitary and rational actor seeking to maximise its interests, critical theories underline that states' behaviours are generally conditioned by elite interest and mentality. The attitude of a country toward the international order also impacts how and to what degree it participates in global governance. The more a country identifies itself with the international order by seeing itself as part of key global governance institutions, the more it seeks to improve these institutions by actively participating in global governance. On the other hand,

there exist some behavioural differences between traditional middle powers and emerging middle powers regarding whether or not they seek deep global change in the global governance. As stated by Eduard Jordaan, "*dictated by their semi-peripheral status, compared with the core position of traditional middle powers in the global economy, emerging middle powers favour greater reform to global economic rules and structures.*"¹⁸ In this respect, the emerging middle power orientation can be seen as "reformist" while that of the traditional powers is "appeasing" depending on their different positions in the global economy. Here an "appeasing" approach refers to "*the pacification and containment of potential threats to world order, an agenda less radical than that of merging middle powers that prefer greater reform.*"¹⁹ Another way of understanding behavioural differences among middle powers is to classify them as "reformist or bystander."²⁰ The reform preferred by emerging middle powers is not fundamental or essentialist, given the fact that these semi-peripheral economies in turn benefit from their preponderance over peripheral states, especially in their geographical vicinity.²¹ In addition, since the economically privileged governing elites in most of the emerging middle powers see little alternative to the existing liberal international order, their challenges to the global economic structures are more reformist rather than fundamental or structural in nature.²²

Since emerging middle powers are not homogenous and their attitudes towards the international system can vary according to the different global governance institutions and forums and to the specific cases and conditions, it is also very difficult to rank in our study the nine selected countries by using statistical data. Rather, as shown in Table 3, these countries are classified either as reformist and bystander in their orientation vis-a-vis the global governance structures and the recent international crisis. In doing so, Russia and China's permanent membership to the UNSC and their resistance to change in the UN decision-making mechanisms will also be taken into consideration.

Socializational and Institutional Power

From the constructivist perspective, norms and socialization are key in strengthening cooperation among states. States sharing and following common international norms are likely more willing to participate in global governance. It is very difficult to examine to what extent and to which international norms states have been socialized. However, as stated by many constructivist theorists, international institutions are important vehicles for socializing their members into certain norms.²³ Given this, this study acknowledges the length of membership

to international organizations as the fourth factor underlying variation in middle powers' participation to global governance and suggests that this factor also impacts the degree of socialisation of these countries in the cultures and values of these organisations and in the international order. In doing so, five major international organizations are selected for the evaluation of institutional membership of the nine countries: the UN, the WTO, the WHO, the IMF, and the World Bank (see Table 4).

A state with a developed civil society is likely to contribute more effectively to global governance on the ideational base through new initiatives and projects.

The Strength of Civil Society

Post-internationalists claim that global governance is not only related with states, but also with non-state actors. They emphasize the increasing importance of these non-state actors, most particularly that of civil society, in global governance. The fifth factor, the strength of civil society, assumes that the weaknesses in states' ability to provide solutions to global governance problems and their low profile attitude

in global governance institutions are caused by the underdevelopment of civil societies in these countries. Accordingly, a state with a developed civil society is likely to contribute more effectively to global governance on the ideational base through new initiatives and projects. In order to measure the strength of civil society in the nine selected countries this study also uses the the 6th wave of World Values Survey between 2010 and 2014. This survey was conducted by a group of social scientists under the World Values Survey Association, which makes interviews with a representative sample from each country in order to understand sociocultural and political change by looking at values and beliefs in the relevant society.

Findings

Regarding the first factor (hereafter F1), material power, it can be argued that Turkey's relative low material power, defined in terms of economic output (GDP), growth competitive index (GCI), Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC), military output (military expenditure), and demography (population) compared to the five BRICS countries (except South Africa) and Canada, Australia and South Korea, has a positive impact on its participation in global governance. This finding is consistent with F1. Turkey's lower material power capacity

pushes it to be actively involved in global governance institutions, forums and initiatives. As Table 1 shows, in terms of size of economy, China, Brazil, Russia and India, among the BRICS countries, rank respectively higher than Turkey. When the three traditional middle powers, Australia, Canada and South Korea are added to Table 1, Turkey is ranked as the country with the second lowest sized economy among these nine countries. When it is compared to the BRICS, China, Russia, India and Brazil occupy respectively the high end in terms of military spending, while Canada, Australia, Turkey and South Africa are respectively at the low end. With the inclusion of Australia, Canada and South Korea in the BRICS+Turkey group, Turkey is ranked as the 7th country and is followed respectively by Canada and South Korea. In terms of Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC),²⁴ which measures state power beyond GDP, Turkey, among these nine countries, is ranked 6th. While China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Korea occupy the high end, Turkey, Canada, Australia and South Africa are respectively at the low end. Here Turkey appears as having a CINC superior than the two traditional middle powers, Canada and Australia. Regarding their Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI),²⁵ the three traditional middle powers, Canada, Australia and South Korea, are respectively at the top of the list with their

high Growth Competitiveness Index. They are followed by China, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, India and Russia. The fact that Turkey has a higher GCI score than that of the strongest BRICS also shows that, despite its low GDP (compared to the other eight countries, except South Africa), it is economically competitive in terms of growth.

In terms of F2, as Table 2 on trade dependence illustrates, South Korea is ranked as the country with the highest trade dependence. South Korea is known as a trade-dependent economy or a trading nation in the global economy. Currently, China is South Korea's largest trading partner and Korea's economy is heavily dependent on China. Canada is second highest in trade dependence. It is important to emphasize that the U.S. occupies the first place in Canada's trade dependency. Table 2 shows that Turkey is ranked as the fourth country at the high end in terms of trade dependence and can be considered a trade dependent country with its relatively high trade dependency rate. This finding is consistent with the F2, which assumes that trade dependence positively impacts a country's active involvement in the global governance and thus explains Turkey's active engagement with global governance institutions as a trade dependent country.

In terms of F3, it seems clear that currently Turkey strongly identifies with the international order and its related problems. Compared with countries

like China and Russia, it is more likely that Turkey perceives itself as reformist vis-à-vis the existing global governance structures (see Table 3). Russia and China, as permanent members of the UNSC, do not express interest in changing the structures and the mechanisms of major international organizations, mainly those of the UN. Since the start of the Arab revolts in late 2010, Turkey has gradually become more reformist and more likely to challenge the international order. Our observations resonate with this F3.

Turkey's high trade dependence strengthens its middle power internationalism in the global economy with its increasing interest in reforming the major global financial institutions.

Regarding the F4, among the nine countries, Turkey has a relatively long membership in the selected five international organizations. Turkey ranks as the 5th country having the longest membership to these organizations, and this is also consistent with its active participation in global governance (see Table 4). Membership by Russia, China and South Korea to these organizations are shorter than other countries in the cluster. The findings regarding Turkey conforms to the F4, claiming that Turkey, together with Canada, Australia, Brazil,

India and South Africa, have been more acculturated in these organizations than have Russia, China and South Korea.

With regard to F5, it can be argued that a stronger civil society also positively impacts a state's contribution to global governance. India appears as the country having the highest participation to civic organisations. As the table 5 shows, Turkey appears as the 8th country at the low end among the nine. Although this may appear inconsistent with the F5 on the surface, it can be explained in practice by many other reasons including the recent growth of Turkish civil society and the nature of the global governance activism, which does not necessarily need civil society. For instance, in Turkey's increasing humanitarian diplomacy towards Africa, the active role of Turkish civil society organizations is not negligible. It is important to note that middle powers' activism varies according to one issue-specific area to another. Similarly, despite its lowest civil society participation among the nine states, South Africa currently plays an active role in global governance institutions (particularly the UN) mainly about Africa related issues.

The evaluation of Turkey's participation in global governance as a middle power on the basis of the aforementioned five factors clearly illustrates that Turkey's relatively low material power compared to that of the non-traditional (except South Africa) and traditional

middle powers gives it an advantage in interfering more actively in global issues through cooperation. Similarly, Turkey's high trade dependence strengthens its middle power internationalism in the global economy with its increasing interest in reforming the major global financial institutions. Turkey's strong identification with the problems of global governance and its increasing degree of socialization in the cultures and values of the major international organisations

also make it both a legitimiser²⁶ and a reform-seeker country. In the Turkish case, this duality of roles leads to a more active participation of Turkey in global governance pushing it to assume more global responsibilities. Turkey's relatively weak civil society seems to have not negatively impacted its recent activism in global governance since this activism mainly stems from the political decision-makers' own strategic priorities and foreign policy choices.

Table 1: Material Power (in terms of population, GDP (in bil. USD), military expenditure, CINC, and Growth Competitive Index)

Turkey, the BRICS & traditional middle powers (Australia, Canada, South Korea).			Turkey and the BRICS								
Country	Population	GDP* (bil.USD)	Military expenditure ** (mil. USD)	CINC***	Growth Competitive Index ****	Country	Population	GDP (bil. USD)	Military expenditure	CINC	Growth Competitive Index
Turkey	81,619,392	788,863	19,085	0,014317	4.45	Turkey	81,619,392	788,863	19,085	0,014317	4.45
Brazil	202,656,788	2,248,780	31,456	0,0245967	4.33	Brazil	202,656,788	2,248,780	31,456	0,0245967	4.33
Russia	142,470,272	2,017,470	87,837	0,0392739	4.25	Russia	142,470,272	2,017,470	87,837	0,0392739	4.25
India	1,236,344,631	1,858,744	47,398	0,0734437	4.28	India	1,236,344,631	1,858,744	47,398	0,0734437	4.28
China	1,355,692,576	8,229,490	188,460	0,198578	4.84	China	1,355,692,576	8,229,490	188,460	0,198578	4.84
South Africa	48,375,645	382,337	4,108	0,0063162	4.37	South Africa	48,375,645	382,337	4,108	0,0063162	4.37
Canada	34,834,841	1,821,445	18,460	0,010683	5.20						
Australia	22,507,617	1,534,425	23,963	0,007113	5.09						
South Korea	49,039,986	1,222,807	33,937	0,023878	5.01						

Sources: * Total population, 2014, CIA Worldfactbook (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>)

**GDP, 2012 current prices. Source: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx?isshard=true>

***Military expenditure by country, 2012 current figures. Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2013.

**** Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC), as of 2007. Source: National Material Capabilities, Correlates of War Dataset, v3.02. See also <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc4.htm#inc>.

The Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC) is a statistical measure of national power created by J. David Singer for the Correlates of War project in 1963. It uses an average of percentages of world totals in six different components. The components represent demographic, economic, and military strength. More recent studies tend to use the (CINC) score, which focuses on measures that are more salient to the perception of true state power beyond GDP.

***** Growth Competitiveness Index: World Economic Forum (2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf. The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) attempts to quantify the impact of a number of key factors which contribute to create the conditions for competitiveness, with particular focus on the macroeconomic environment, the quality of the country's institutions, and the state of the country's technology and supporting infrastructure. The data used to measure GCI are administrative data (publicly available data), such as enrollment rates, government debt, budget deficit and life expectancy, which are obtained from internationally recognized agencies, notably the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the IMF, and the World Health Organization (WHO). Furthermore, it uses data from the World Economic Forum's annual Executive Opinion Survey (Survey). Its producers are World Economic Forum with Columbia University. Table 2.

Table 2: Trade Dependence (2010-2013)

Trade (% of GDP)	Canada	Australia	South Korea*	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
2010	60	40	96	48	23	50	48	55	56
2011	63	41	110	57	25	52	54	55	61
2012	62	43	110	58	27	52	55	52	62
2013	62	41	103	58	28	51	53	50	65
Average	61,75	41,25	104,75	55,25	25,75	51,25	52,5	53	61

*South Korea is known as a trade-dependent economy or a trading nation. The South Korean economy has the highest trade dependence rate among the Group of 20 (G-20). Currently, China is South Korea's largest trading partner and South Korea is China's third largest. South Korea's economy is heavily dependent on China. Source: World Bank Database, Trade (% of GDP), at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS>

Table 3: Middle Powers' Behaviours towards the International System*

Role/attitude	Canada	Australia	South Korea	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
Bystander	Non	Non	Non	Non	Non	Yes	Non	Yes	Non
Reformist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Non	Yes	Non	Yes

*This table is applied to our nine selected countries by the author in a similar way used by Hongying Wang & Erik French in their 2013 article.

Source: Hongying Wang and Erik French, "Middle Range Powers in Global Governance", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.34, N.6 (2013), p. 993.

Table 4: Length of IO membership

Institution	UN	WTO/GATT	WHO	IMF	World Bank	Average
Canada	70	20/67	69	70	70	59,8
Australia	70	20/67	67	68	68	58,6
South Korea	24	20/48	66	60	60	46
Turkey	70	20/64	67	68	68	58,6
Brazil	70	20/67	67	69	69	59
Russia	70	3	67	23	23	37,2
India	70	20/67	67	70	70	59,4
China	70/44***	14	69/43**	70/35*	70	41,2
South Africa	70	20/67	68	70	70	59,6

Source: United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, at <http://www.un.org/en/members/>
World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm

World Health Organization, at <http://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/members-en.pdf>

IMF Fund, List of Members, at <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm>

World Bank, Member Countries, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members>

*Taiwan was expelled from the IMF when China was admitted in 1980.

** China gained its seat in the WHO in 1972.

***China gained its seat in the UN in 1971.

Table 5: Participation in Civic Organizations 2010-2014 (Sixth Wave)

Civil Society	Australia (2010-2014)	Brazil (2010-2014)	China (2010-2014)	Turkey (2010-2014)	Russia (2010-2014)	India (2010-2014)	South Korea (2010-2014)	South Africa (2010-2014)	Canada (2005-2009)
Church or religious organization									
Not a Member	57,9 %	28,4%	94,7%	97,3%	93,2%	48,2%	53,0%	18,5%	49,4%
Inactive Member	25,7%	21,6%	3,5%	1,3%	4,1%	30,6%	18,7%	25,4%	22,5%
Active Member	14,9%	49,5%	0,9%	1,1%	2,0%	21,1%	22,5%	56,2%	27,9%
Sport or recreational organization									
Not a Member	47,1%	86,6%	90,6%	95,5%	93,0%	54,5%	65,4%	54,6%	56,5%
Inactive Member	19,3%	2,8%	7,2%	2,7%	3,9%	27,7%	16,6%	29,8%	14,1%
Active Member	31,6%	8,9%	2,2%	1,5%	2,4%	17,8%	10,0%	15,6%	29,0%
Art, music or educational organization									
Not a Member	67,6%	89,7%	92,5%	96,6%	95,8%	55,1%	68,3%	60,2%	64,0%
Inactive Member	13,3%	2,4%	6,0%	1,5%	2,1%	34,2%	16,7%	29,6%	12,6%
Active Member	16,9%	7,1%	1,3%	1,6%	1,5%	10,7%	5,7%	10,2%	23,1%
Labor Union									
Not a Member	76,8%	85,3%	93,0%	97,4%	88,4%	57,7%	82,7%	64,2%	73,6%
Inactive Member	11,9%	6,0%	6,2%	0,7%	8,6%	29,2%	5,1%	27,3%	12,5%
Active Member	9,0%	7,7%	0,8%	1,5%	2,0%	13,1%	1,6%	8,5%	13,5%
Environmental Organization									
Not a Member	57,9 %	28,4%	94,7%	97,3%	93,2%	48,2%	53,0%	18,5%	82,9%
Inactive Member	25,7%	21,6%	3,5%	1,3%	4,1%	30,6%	18,7%	25,4%	9,9%
Active Member	14,9%	49,5%	0,9%	1,1%	2,0%	21,1%	22,5%	56,2%	6,6%
Professional association									
Not a Member	71,3%	89,4%	97,8%	97,6%	95,7%	55,3%	80,6%	65,8%	70,6%
Inactive Member	12,6%	3,3%	1,7%	1,1%	1,9%	32,6%	5,6%	27,2%	10,0%
Active Member	13,6%	6,4%	0,3%	0,9%	1,4%	12,1%	3,6%	7,0%	18,6%
Other organization									
Not a Member	62,8%	96,5%	92,6%	77,0%	95,9%	51,1%	68,6%	65,2%	87,6%
Inactive Member	2,2%	0,8%	0,6%	0,6%	1,8%	31,5%	13,7%	27,8%	6,9%
Active Member	4,4%	1,9%	0,1%	0,5%	1,4%	17,4%	6,4%	7,0%	4,8%
Averages									
Not a Member	63,05%	72,04%	93,7%	94,1%	93,6%	52,87%	67,37%	49,57%	69,22%
Inactive Member	15,81%	8,35%	4,1%	1,31%	3,78%	30,91%	13,58%	27,5%	12,64%
Active Member	15,04%	18,71%	0,92%	1,17%	1,81%	16,18%	10,32%	22,95%	17,64%

Source: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>; <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp

Strategies

Turkey's global governance strategy has both commonalities and differences with that of other rising middle powers, traditional (or Western) or non-traditional. On the one hand, Turkey's aspirations for a pluricentric, more cosmopolitan and just post-Western world order, which can easily be detected in the Turkish leaders' various discourses, share a certain common ground with those of the so-called 'rising BRICS states'. On the other hand, Turkey's challenge to the existing international order is not structurally anti-Western in nature. The intrinsic Western features of its identity and its historical institutional attachments to the West generally keeps Turkey from using blocking or hard bargaining mechanisms against its Western allies. Unlike other rising powers in the BRICS group, Turkey does not possess significant influence in regional organizations not only in its own neighborhood but also in other extra-regions. This institutional weakness of Turkey at the regional level also affects its ability to play a more constructive and vocal role in international institutions.

The intrinsic Western features of its identity and its historical institutional attachments to the West generally keeps Turkey from using blocking or hard bargaining mechanisms against its Western allies.

Another commonality that Turkey shares with the BRICS countries, is that they all have a growing material power (in terms of human development, economic and military) pushing them to seek a more influential role in global affairs on different issue-specific areas and to different degrees. For instance, India and China have increasingly been contributing to UN peacekeeping operations, while Brazil has engaged in playing a more influential role in its region on state-building issues, especially in Haiti. Brazil has also started to address problems regarding food security and biofuel.²⁷ China has recently become more vocal regarding climate change and prevention of pandemics,²⁸ while in recent years Turkey has increasingly become an important development aid contributor to Africa and an active humanitarian actor vis-a-vis international crisis. More recently, it has taken a more active stance on economic, trade cooperation and development, as seen clearly in its 2015 G20 presidency agenda. The ways in which the rising middle powers challenge the liberal international order also varies depending on specific issue areas and from one state to another. Whereas China and India generally oppose international interventions for humanitarian purposes, Turkey, for instance, was favorable towards the idea of a possible humanitarian intervention for ending the Syrian civil war. Although Brazil pursues an assertive

policy in the area of trade and energy, it lags behind other rising middle powers in multilateral diplomacy within the UN and security arrangements. South Africa's activism in global governance is much more concentrated on Africa related issues and multilateral diplomacy within the major institutions, especially the UN, by playing an active role in UN General Assembly deliberations and a blocking role in the UNSC.²⁹

As a part of its new global governance strategy, it seems likely that Turkey, like other non-traditional middle powers, seeks to amplify its rising power influence within certain multilateral institutions and forums in which decision-making rules are based on consensus or near consensus.

Another common feature of the rising non-traditional middle powers concerns their increasing willingness to reinforce cooperation with one another bilaterally and within regional and international organizations. The G20 coalition within the WTO, security cooperation in ASEAN and other regional forums, and cooperation between Russia and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), can be cited as concrete examples of further cooperation among the

rising powers. Similarly, Turkey-Brazil cooperation for a fuel swap deal with Iran in 2010 can also be seen as a good indicator of the unfolding intra-rising powers cooperation on global diplomacy issues and has also been considered by some scholars and leaders as a blocking attitude towards the P5+1 countries' demand for maintaining sanctions against Iran.³⁰

Another commonality is that all middle powers, traditional or non-traditional, assume a certain legitimiser role in the international order. This means that they all benefit from the institutionalization of the liberal world order and, due to their limited capacities and their efforts through international organizations, they legitimize the arrangements of the global inequalities. In addition, their limited capacity prevents them from single-handedly shaping the global order and this inability makes them selectively and functionally take initiatives on certain global problems.³¹

Despite these commonalities, Turkey's global governance strategy can also be distinguished from those of the other rising non-traditional middle powers in many respects. In fact, as a rising middle power Turkey occupies a place between the traditional middle powers (for instance, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Japan and some European countries as well) and the non-traditional middle powers (for instance the five BRICS states, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, etc).

While the latter never became fully integrated to the post-1945 order, most of the traditional middle powers have long been acknowledged as an integral part of the Western order ideologically, discursively and institutionally. Turkey, despite its common strategies with the non-traditional middle powers, shares with the traditional middle powers³² both inside and outside looking perspectives about the Western liberal order and this gives it a "distinct" and "differentiated" role among other middle powers and a larger manoeuvring capacity both as an accommodating and challenging actor.³³ Turkey's long and deep institutional relations with the West since the Cold War years, its ongoing "problematic" candidacy to the EU, and its close security and diplomatic relations with the U.S, despite some difficulties in relations, put some limits on Turkey's hard bargaining and challenging behaviours towards the major powers. This also gives strong signals about the continuity of Turkey's "in-between" and "middle ground" global governance strategy embedded in its "soft" international order criticism in the upcoming years.

As a part of its new global governance strategy, it seems likely that Turkey, like other non-traditional middle powers, seeks to amplify its rising power influence within certain multilateral institutions and forums in which decision-making rules are based on consensus or near consensus. Turkey's middle power

activism in global governance gives the appearance of assuming a dual role of legitimizer/stabilizer and soft challenger. Turkey's limited capacity to bring about global and regional change makes it vulnerable in times of international crisis and regional conflicts (as seen clearly in the Syrian civil war), and this strengthens the stabilizing dimension of its middle power activism committed to global and regional orderliness and security. Nevertheless, this legitimizer/stabilizer role of Turkey coexists with its soft challenger and reformist role seeking greater reform in the global governance institutions and occasionally challenging great powers.

Regarding the question of governance reform of the major international financial institutions, Turkey has also strong preferences towards liberalization, and thus supports the reform demands about restructuring voting power in the World Bank in favor of developing economies, and changing the IMF's quota system and the structure of its executive board. In this vein, then Prime Minister (current President of the Republic) Erdoğan stressed that "developing states should be given more roles within the IMF, and their administrative representation should be enhanced,"³⁴ and he called for a new currency quota system within the IMF.³⁵ Erdoğan also proposed an alternative "Turkish Lira zone" in response to the economic crisis in the Euro-zone

countries.³⁶ He also criticized the IMF's USD-based usage and called for IMF acceptance of the gold-based regime as an alternative.³⁷ Another sign of Turkey's new global governance strategy can also be seen in its rhetorical involvement in the four MIST countries (namely, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey), a recently coined acronym, which refers to the four emerging economies in the next tier of large emerging economies.³⁸ In this respect, Turkey's 2015 G20 presidency will provide it the opportunity for greater consultation and cooperation with the other rising middle powers with regard to the ongoing review/reform processes of major financial institutions.

The G20 as a Test Case of Turkey's Global Governance Activism

One of the changing characteristics of the current global governance in terms of middle power activism can be observed very clearly in the institutional design of the G20, in which a group of non-G8 states have been accorded membership in the original institutional design of the G8. The G20, having developed under the institutional model of the G8 and on the basis of an ensemble of common activities, provides a proper ground and catalyst for projecting middle power diplomacy. The mechanisms of the G20 help its non-G8 members use their

entrepreneurial and technical leadership in the selected domain of activities by being attributed the status of an exclusive top-tier community. Given this, it can be argued that the G20 is a good example and a test case of Turkey's middle power activism and the transformation of its global governance strategy in recent years.

Turkey's presidency for 2015 seems to open up a new era, not only for Turkey's middle power diplomacy and activism towards the G20, but also for its unfolding "nuanced" stance vis-à-vis changing global governance frameworks.

After the G20's establishment in 1999 on the sidelines of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings on finance, Turkey initially adopted a pragmatic but relatively low profile approach towards the G20 and avoided investing politically too much into the G20 as an international platform. Turkey's policy entrepreneurship within the G20 has so far been weaker than that of other middle powers inside the G20. Here it must be reminded that Turkey's inclusion in 1999 into the G20 came at a time when Turkish foreign policy had adopted a multidirectional and proactive approach in world politics, embedded

in a new multilateral understanding reinforced specifically with the declaration of Turkey's candidate status to the EU.³⁹ Later on, the 2008 global financial crisis provided Turkey a new opportunity to actively participate in shaping the rules and institutions of the post-crisis global economy, as opposed to its previous standing as a peripheral partner and the passive complier of rules imposed from above by the powerful core.⁴⁰ In fact, Turkey's increasing activism in foreign policy was carried out throughout the 2000s and with the upgrading of Turkey's power status at the international level, the strategic importance of the G20 began to increase in the eyes of Turkish decision-makers as an inclusive platform of global economic governance, and enabled Turkey to participate in the global governance reform process.⁴¹

Turkey's presidency for 2015 seems to open up a new era, not only for Turkey's middle power diplomacy and activism towards the G20, but also for its unfolding "nuanced" stance vis-à-vis changing global governance frameworks. The 2015 rotating presidency of the G20 has currently been perceived by Ankara as a major opportunity for Turkey to showcase its rising status at the international level as an economic and political power, while at the same time raising the profile of the G20 as a major global political economy platform. Despite the fact that the G20 was

elevated to the leaders' level only after the 2008 global financial crisis, it functions with a very weak organizational structure without a general secretariat. Since the financial crisis, Turkey has been supporting the idea of the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the G20 and has mostly been interested in quota reform within the IMF in order to increase the institution's capacity.⁴² It seems likely that under its presidency Turkey will push for the formation of a permanent secretariat in Istanbul, despite opposition emanating from some industrialized major powers. With the aim of strengthening its global ownership, Turkey is also committed to solving under its presidency the G20's organizational problems, mainly coming from the "diverse and dispersed" profile of its members and its expanding official mandate, which causes some problems in terms of political legitimacy and crosscutting jurisdiction with international organizations.⁴³ As Sadık Ünay has noted, Turkey's rising middle power activism under its first rotating presidency could be explained through two main axis: The first axis aims to monitor the ongoing structural reforms like maintaining sustainable global growth in the G20 and diminishing imbalances between the developed and the least developed countries. The second axis seeks to pursue a wider development and innovation approach with the aim of establishing coalitions with countries

with similar development needs inside and outside the G20.⁴⁴

As Turkish leaders underlined in the 2014 G20 Brisbane Pre-Summit conference,⁴⁵ Turkey plans to steer its own course on the G20 in 2015, and seeks to develop a clear “ontological position” on its ability to tackle truly global issues, rather than just those that affect G20 economies. In his closing address conference, current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stressed that “the 2015 G20 presidency will be a philosophical, symbolic and practical move away from the “narrow” agenda focused on economic fundamentals”.⁴⁶ According to Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan, three words will guide Turkey under its presidency: “inclusiveness, implementation and investment.”⁴⁷ He went on to note that Turkey would “bridge the gap between developed economies and undeveloped countries to fight global inequality”, seeking to include poor countries in decision-making. Babacan also announced that the 2015 G20 leaders’ summit, to be held in November in Antalya, aims to discuss topics including “strong, sustainable and balanced economic growth, climate change, global development and the fight against corruption.” Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s strong rhetoric on the subject of climate change was also striking: “on most issues we act as the heads of nation states, but on climate change we should act as the ministers of home affairs of

humanity”. In line with this, Davutoğlu also underscored the need to look at the links between economic and political issues in an interconnected world. He also emphasized the need to have a more inclusive G20 agenda, which should represent not only the 20 member countries but would be more global, including the low-income developing countries (LIDCs)⁴⁸ and he emphasized that the relation between G20 and non-G20 countries is as important as the relations of G20 members.”⁴⁹

As stated by the Turkish Prime Minister, another objective of Turkey’s 2015 G20 presidency is that Turkey would expand the G20’s role beyond economic cooperation and decision-making to issues such as the refugee crisis in Eastern Europe, the ebola outbreak in West Africa, and ethno-sectarian extremism in the Middle East. In addition, among Turkey’s highly ambitious priorities for its 2015 G20 presidency, are topics like trade liberalization (favouring a multilateral trading system and supporting Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement), increasing employment (creation of high quality jobs for women and young people), promoting SMEs (small and medium enterprises), stimulating infrastructural investments (seeking a greater cooperation between development banks of the member states), promoting energy collaboration, reforming the international tax system, and fighting corruption.⁵⁰

The Cold War environment's ideological divisions and Turkey's strong dependence on its Western allies in terms of economics and military could not provide the Turkish leaders with an appropriate ground to effectively apply their pluricentric and multidirectional worldview to the country's foreign policy choices.

Turkey's expanding G20 presidency agenda also illustrates Turkey's willingness to forge its institutional power at the international level and its strategic priorities in terms of political and economic governance. On the other hand, the way Turkish leaders seek to raise the G20's institutional status globally through implementation of some organizational reforms is also a good indicator in showing Turkey's current and future global governance approach based on "effective multilateralism" and "middle power activism." Turkey's perception of the G20 also differs from that of the BRICS countries, which avoid investing too much in this platform and rather pursue a "hedging strategy" by seeking structural reforms in international institutions like the IMF. In contrast to the BRICS, Turkey sees the G20 as a unique platform especially

for those middle powers who have been ardent supporters of the development of the forum since its establishment (for instance, South Korea, Australia, Mexico and Indonesia), and who favor multilateralism in order to balance the unilateral behaviours of major powers and to mediate between the latter and the emerging powers on sensitive issues.⁵¹

Conclusion

Since the 2000s, Turkey has been doing more in managing global challenges, expressing a greater interest in reforming global governance institutions, and taking initiatives in formal and informal international platforms. Compared to the Cold War years and the 1990s, when Turkey was under-performing in global governance, it now sees itself less as a bystander vis-a-vis the global governance system. Of course, the fact that Turkey lagged behind in participating in global governance up until the end of the 1990s can also be partially explained by its strong identification with the West in terms of identity, security and foreign policy. The Cold War environment's ideological divisions and Turkey's strong dependence on its Western allies in terms of economics and military could not provide the Turkish leaders with an appropriate ground to effectively apply their pluricentric and multidirectional

worldview to the country's foreign policy choices. This also made it difficult for the Turkish leaders, despite their attempts in the Cold War era and the 90s, to develop and adopt a civilizational self-perception different from the Western one at both the discursive and practical levels.⁵² Aside from the change in the country's foreign policy identity and civilizational perception, many other factors like possession of necessary material, ideational and institutional power resources, the increasing dependence on the global economy, and the strength of civil society have also impacted and strengthened Turkey's global power status and its more active involvement in global governance since the 2000s. An active foreign policy agenda with its new ingredients such as mediation, conflict resolution, development aid, and humanitarian diplomacy, supported by the principle of zero problems with neighbours and a different civilizational and geopolitical understanding⁵³ at the ideational level, have all led to the emergence of a new vision and strategy of global governance. A more active presence in international organizations and forums and a greater participation in joint initiatives taken regionally or internationally vis-à-vis emerging crises or ongoing conflicts, have also impacted the way and the degree to which Turkey has become more actively involved in global governance over the last decade.

Its call for reform in the major global governance institutions refers to a strong need and demand for a international justice-based, equal, cosmopolitan and pluricentric world order in a changing international system that currently lacks appropriate decision-making and conflict resolution mechanisms in response to international crises, such as that in Syria.

Turkey's preferences and strategies in terms of global governance, compared to those of other rising middle powers, give clear signals about its possession of a middle ground between the non-traditional middle powers and traditional Western ones. Turkey's strong institutional attachments to the post-1945 liberal order, the nature of its liberal order criticism (which does not contain anti-Western roots and a third worldist ideological background), positions it closer to the Western middle powers. In fact, Turkey's current challenge to the international order is revision-oriented rather than being anti-systemic. Its call for reform in the major global governance institutions refers to a strong need and demand for a international justice-based, equal, cosmopolitan and pluricentric world order in a changing international

system that currently lacks appropriate decision-making and conflict resolution mechanisms in response to international crises, such as that in Syria.

On the other hand, as seen clearly in the G20 case, in the short term at least, rising middle power approaches to questions of international order are likely to be concentrated on maximizing each country's own

interests, balancing others rather than acting collectively for a revised order, or forming a collective block against the major powers. The BRICS countries appear more willing than Turkey to use hard bargaining and hedging mechanisms against the major powers. In contrast, with the exception of its cooperation with Brazil in 2010 on a swap deal with Iran

and its negative vote in the UNSC with regard to sanctions against Iran, Turkey generally adopts soft bargaining strategies and rarely uses hedging towards its Western allies. Turkey's ideological and institutional belonging to the Western bloc, as well as its close relations with the U.S as the hegemonic power of the system, brings it closer to the Western

traditional middle powers seeking revision in the international system through strengthened cooperation arrangements and mechanisms in the formal and informal global governance institutions and forums. The increasing tone of Turkey's criticism of the UN's decision-making mechanisms and Erdogan's "the World is bigger than five"⁵⁴ rhetoric can also be assessed in

Turkey's ideological and institutional belonging to the Western bloc, as well as its close relations with the U.S as the hegemonic power of the system, brings it closer to the Western traditional middle powers seeking revision in the international system through strengthened cooperation arrangements and mechanisms in the formal and informal global governance institutions and forums.

terms of its search for a just, equitable and cosmopolitan international order capable of collectively responding to international crises and human tragedies in some chaotic regions of the world. Turkey's ambitious agenda and working plan for its G20 presidency gives clear signals of its future preferences in taking an active place in less hierarchical

G20-type forums in which developed and developing countries are equally represented and middle power countries are donated with more manoeuvring capacity.

With regard to its capacity as a rising middle power in the changing international order, it can be deduced from our findings that Turkey's relatively

low material capacity in terms of GDP compared to that of other rising middle powers, its high trade dependence, its strong perceptions about its possible constructive role and middle power actorness, and its long membership in major international organizations having increased its international socialization, all serve to make Turkey potentially a more active player in global governance. Despite its low participation rates in civil society organizations compared to those of the other eight rising middle power

countries (ranked 8th among the nine countries), in recent years Turkish society has increasingly become more sensitive and inclined to global governance problems (for instance, humanitarian crisis, enviromental and climate change-related problems, poverty, unemployment, gender inequality, etc). This development could also strengthen Turkey's hand in multilateralism and global governance in the upcoming years and lead to raising its voice in calls for the reform of global governance institutions.

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Transformation Trajectory of the G20 and Turkey's Presidency: Middle Powers in Global Governance

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Abstract

This study presents a theoretically informed account of the institutional evolution of the G20 since its foundation in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In so doing, it highlights the strategic intentions of the Bush-Obama administrations in the U.S. and their counterparts in Europe to design and empower the G20; as well as the reactions of the major emerging powers who saw the G20 as a platform to challenge the status quo from within, and “middle powers” trying to intermeditate in between. Afterwards, the main items of Turkey’s political and economic agenda as the rotating president of the G20 in 2015 are highlighted. In this context, the respective position of the G20 within the global governance architecture and Turkey’s demands to include issues such as energy, food security, development of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and institutional links with the least developed countries (LDCs) will be taken under the spotlight.

Key Words

G20, Global Economic Governance, Middle Powers, Turkey.

Introduction

Since the formation of the Bretton Woods regime of managing international economic relations, there have been numerous historical conjunctures during which the institutional and normative foundations of this regime have been questioned. With the impact of financial globalization and the increasing frequency of global financial crises since the 1990s, attempts to problematize and question the Bretton Woods regime on the one hand and alleviate its operational deficiencies on the other became increasingly more pronounced. In this context, the closed-circuit cooperation mechanisms among the advanced industrialized countries such as the G7, which provided informal platforms of policy coordination and conflict resolution among a select group of countries, have started to look a bit anachronistic in view of the rapidly changing balances of the world economy. Therefore, the formation of the G20 first as a technical cooperation platform among the major Central Banks and Finance Ministries in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis represented

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a move in the right direction as far as the need for more inclusive governance mechanisms is concerned.

With the impact of financial globalization and the increasing frequency of global financial crises since the 1990s, attempts to problematize and question the Bretton Woods regime on the one hand and alleviate its operational deficiencies on the other became increasingly more pronounced.

Afterwards, despite the continuation of technical coordination, a rather muted period followed suit during the first decade of the 2000s characterized by abundant liquidity in international financial markets and reduced need for top-level policy coordination. However, the urgency to provide a coordinated international response to the global economic crisis in 2008-2009 that exploded in the Western markets triggered the dynamics for the elevation of the G20 to the leader's level. The unanticipated success of the coordinated international response, in turn, facilitated the ascendancy of the G20 to become the locus of contemporary debates on global economic governance. Unlike previous examples of elite coordination such as the G7, which represented "exclusive

decision-making clubs" of advanced industrialized countries, the G20 opened a new window for participatory global governance by bringing together the 20 largest and systemically important economies across the world.

Despite their structural reservations, emerging powers such as the BRICS countries and second generation middle powers such as the MINTs or MIKTA countries attached great importance to the G20 as a paramount platform where they could directly express their demands for global governance reform to leading global platforms. Turkey has not been an exception to this general rule. As an emerging power located in the midst of strategically important regions of the Balkans, Caucasia, the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey greatly has valued the G20 since its inception as a crucial platform of global economic governance. Given Turkey's growing diplomatic activism and expanding economic relations with regions such as Latin America, East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa over the course of the last decade, the rotating presidency of the G20 in 2015 was seen as a great opportunity to improve the country's global profile even further. The political leadership also perceived this Presidency as an opportunity to reflect Turkey's main emphasis in diplomatic relations on development issues by trying to form linkages between the members of the G20 and the least developed countries (LDCs) in different geographies.

Against this background, this study is predicated on a fundamental research question that explores the respective capacity of middle powers such as Turkey to instigate structural and long-term changes in global governance platforms exemplified by the G20. To this end, the article presents a theoretically-informed account of the institutional transformation trajectory of the G20 since its foundation in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In so doing, it highlights the strategic intentions of the Bush and Obama administrations in the U.S. and their counterparts in Europe to design and empower the G20; as well as the reactions of the major emerging powers who saw the G20 as a platform to challenge the global status-quo from within, and the position of “middle powers” trying to intermediate in between. The study also evaluates the considerable expansion in the policy agenda and institutional remit of the G20 over the course of the 2000s and highlights the performance and legitimacy debates that this expansion stimulated. Afterwards, the main items of Turkey's political and economic agenda as the rotating President of the G20 in 2015 are highlighted. In this context, the respective position of the G20 within the global governance architecture and Turkey's demands to include issues such as energy, food security, development of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and institutional links with

the least developed countries (LDCs) are taken under the spotlight. The particular contribution of the study centers around the potential production of generalizations concerning middle power diplomacy within global platforms in the light of both the possibilities and limits of Turkey's middle power diplomacy within the G20.

Historical Transformation Trajectory of the G20

Even though the historical roots of the G20 as an informal international platform that brings together the largest and “systemically important” economies in the world to discuss pressing issues in financial governance go back to 1999, the real impetus for its institutionalization and elevation to the leader's level was provided by the global economic crisis in 2008. Expectedly, the profound and deep impact of the global crisis sent a series of shock waves across the global economy, leading prominent observers to predict that its consequences would be more devastating than the Great Depression in the 1930s. Given the depth and magnitude of the initial crisis and the fact that it originated from the Global North in contrast to major previous financial crises, it became apparent that existing informal coordination mechanisms such as the G7 were unable to deal effectively with the challenges created by the crisis. Advanced industrial economies that

entered the crisis conjuncture with structural problems in their financial sectors and were urgently expected to initiate radical reforms acted in slow motion to kickstart a restrained move for recovery. In the immediate post-crisis period, moderate employment growth in the U.S., continuing economic stagnation in Japan despite the expansionist policies of Abe government and the European sovereign debt crisis which triggered levels of unemployment in some countries hovering around Great Depression levels continued to underscore the fragile nature of the global economy.¹

While the growth momentum was temporarily restored in the emerging economies outside the core of the global system between 2010 and 2012, serious concerns of recession were revived with lackluster growth and declining global demand after 2013.

Despite the early success of concerted efforts by major economic players to instigate a comprehensive crisis-exit strategy, the prolonged impact of the global crisis continued to weigh on the world economy, which remained dangerously unbalanced and constantly threatened by novel fragilities. While

the growth momentum was temporarily restored in the emerging economies outside the core of the global system between 2010 and 2012, serious concerns of recession were revived with lackluster growth and declining global demand after 2013. The pace of exchange rate adjustment and potential asset price bubbles in China, which also witnessed declining growth, also caused serious concerns, along with a new round of currency wars between the United States, the European Union and the emerging markets to keep their economies competitive under tense conditions.

This was hardly surprising as the multipolar global structure reflected a sophisticated network of flows between established industrial economies and emerging economic powers whereby non-state actors played a prominent role alongside nation-states. Therefore, multifaceted forms of interaction were established between the transnational market economy and the neo-Westphalian system of competing nation states.² The perceptible change in the major parameters of the 'unipolar global political economy'³ dominated by the US in the context of the 'embedded liberal compromise'⁴ of the post-war era and two generations of neoliberalism since the 1980s (forms of Washington and Post-Washington Consensus) acquired a new impetus with the global economic crisis after 2008. In retrospect,

the key policy lesson to be derived from the substantial impact of the global crisis was that the rapid evolution of global financial markets and the integration of the global financial system far outpaced the development of comprehensive international regulatory frameworks.⁵ In other words, the expansion and intensification of international financial integration proceeded under a serious deficit in global governance which was deliberately neglected for a long time by prevalent actors in the system. Up until the explosion of the global crisis, international financial markets went through an accelerated process of integration thanks to advancements in legal and technical infrastructure, whereas macro-prudential regulation and supervision, intended to prevent crisis tendencies, were taken rather lightly by national authorities. Ideologically, on the other hand, the continued prevalence of the revamped neoliberal globalization rhetoric provided a useful discursive support for this policy failure.⁶

As the institutional design and control of the whole G20 process was carefully completed under an Anglo-American compact, the image of participative multilateralism was conceived politically useful for the White House.

In this environment, major investors and institutions dealing with financial mediation skillfully exploited the existing legal and regulatory gaps in frameworks between relevant authorities within countries and across different national jurisdictions.⁷ The natural consequence of excessive risk-taking and insufficient global regulatory oversight was an accumulation of systemic risks threatening the sustainability of the global financial system and vibrancy of the real economy.⁸ The widespread sensation of panic in the immediate aftermath of the global crisis highlighted the importance of preparing the right international regulatory framework “before” the advancement of global financial integration on the ground. To put it differently, it became commonsense to raise the idea that “globalizing regulation” has to be seen as an inevitable counterpart and balancing act to the “globalization of capital markets”.⁹ What this meant especially for the theory and practice of global economic governance was the rise of yet another wave of neo-regulationism in the context of existing and novel institutional structures.¹⁰

The recognition concerning the urgent necessity for more effective regulatory oversight was especially strong in the United States as the global financial meltdown that started in October 2008 was widely perceived as an American product due to the contagion effect of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and

the collapse of key private financial institutions such as Lehmann Brothers and AIG. In order to stimulate a shared and participatory response by all crucial players in the global economy and alleviate the image of a “declining hegemonic power”, the American administration swiftly instigated a strong and high-level diplomatic campaign. However, given the kind of vulgar unilateralism that the Bush administration followed under a strict neoconservative ideology in geostrategic matters such as the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the inclusive diplomatic endeavor that led to the elevation of the G20 to the leader’s level as the leading global forum on economic governance was both a surprising and smart move. By creating an umbrella organization at the leader’s level and enhancing the restrictive club of G7 by including rising powers led by China, India and Brazil in the heart of the governance framework, the United States administration successfully created a sense of “complex interdependence”¹¹ and shared responsibility for the future of the world economy, while deliberately paving the way for debates of multipolarity in the global system. On the other hand, as the institutional design and control of the whole G20 process was carefully completed under an Anglo-American compact, the image of participative multilateralism was conceived politically useful for the White House. That is why the Obama

administration continued its enthusiastic support for the G20 process in the aftermath of the presidential elections.

Successive U.S. administrations acknowledged responsibility both for causing the contagion and dealing with the repercussions of the global financial crisis through expanded forums of international cooperation. American efforts for the establishment of a high-level coordinating body that would engage with global economic governance started with initiatives aimed at forming linkages with existing institutional establishments. Most notably, the decision to hold a special meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers on the margins of the semi-annual meetings of the World Bank and IMF after 2008 constituted a watershed decision to determine the future configuration of the group. The more technically-oriented group comprised of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G20 members was already coming together under the aegis of the IMF since the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1999. In this context, innovative policy entrepreneurs, such as the Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, performed a crucial function of convincing the major global actors to elevate the Forum to the leader’s level.

However, when Paul Martin and the U.S Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers tried to come up with a list of countries that ought to be included

in the new group, they did not prefer to produce the list of 20 largest economies or most populated states in the world. Instead, they formulated a relatively more representative institutional compact which encompassed the world's largest economic actors, such as the U.S., China, Japan and Germany, along with the leading regional powers in certain geographies and "systemically important" actors. Therefore, certain European countries, exemplified by Spain and Netherlands, were not included in the G20 despite their considerable economic size; but crucial regional political and economic powers such as South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Argentina were taken into the group in view of their representative capacity. Therefore, most of the emerging powers that were expected to increase their leverage in the global political economic system were incorporated into the policy coordination network of the G20, along with conventional global powers.¹²

In this vein, against their widespread image of discarding the unpopular practices of their predecessors, President Obama and his administration maintained and carefully expanded the ongoing game plan regarding the institutionalization of the G20 as the new core of the global governance architecture. Meanwhile, the institutional control of the G20 forum was expectedly kept within the Anglo-American condominium as the first

three summit meetings were held in Washington D.C. (2008), London (2009) and Pittsburgh (2010). Closed circuit institution building reached its zenith when the leaders of the member states recognized the G20 as the "premier forum for international economic cooperation" (read as global economic governance) and established the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), which sought to promote "strong, sustainable and balanced growth" through multilateral review of and consultations on members' policies.¹³

One of the most important achievements of the G20 was to transform global financial governance from an operational area seen as a sole preserve of the Global North to a shared operational area between the Global North and the South.

From the perspective of debates on "reordering and multipolarity" in the global system,¹⁴ the formation of the G20 as a top-level coordinating body reflected an ambitious but realistic vision to open up the management of global economic governance at the zenith of power. Given the insufficiency of informal coordination mechanisms such as the G7 to cope with the impact of the global economic crisis, the decision to bring

together 20 leading powers, including representatives of the Global South such as the BRICS countries led by China, and MINTS such as Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico, was an unavoidable one.

As the emerging market economies have grown and increased their clout within the global economy, the Bretton Woods system, with its exclusionary rules and institutional structures, have increasingly been called into question for no longer reflecting the global balances of economic power, nor the responsibilities that various countries needed to exercise for the management of the world economy.

In retrospect, the coordination performance of the newly elevated G20 was impressive in its capacity as a rapid reaction force following the global crisis.¹⁵ Symbolically, one of the most important achievements of the G20 was to transform global financial governance from an operational area seen as a sole preserve of the Global North to a shared operational area between the Global North and the South. Both the Washington and London Summits witnessed the production of concrete

action plans, which included crucial steps to improve financial oversight and regulation by reforming existing financial institutions and creating new ones such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB). From the perspective of emerging powers, the G20 also became a powerful international platform on which various proposals for the reform of global financial architecture including IMF reform were voiced with rigour, even though most of these proposals could not be realized due to congressional resistance in the U.S.

The evolution of the policy agenda of macroeconomic coordination within the G20 went through three successive phases over the last few years. In the first one, which comprises the period from the Washington to Pittsburgh summits, the policy focus was on stimulating the global economy across the board by supporting growth and alleviating financial fragilities. All the G20 members were requested to contribute to the collective effort to the extent permitted by their domestic fiscal situation, as fighting against the global recession was accepted as a common public good. In the second phase, which comprises the period from the Toronto to Cannes summits, the policy agenda shifted towards a more complex and comprehensive set of policy objectives with the aim of combining continued support for growth and budgetary consolidation, while avoiding a resurgence of acute global imbalances.

In the last phase, which comprises the period from the Cannes Summit to the present, the focus of the policy agenda shifted to the alleviation of the European sovereign debt crisis and potential contributions to its solution from the rest of the world's leading economies. During the transition from the earlier to the later stages, disagreements among the G20 membership as well as between the members and non-members became more pronounced. Especially in this final phase, frictions among the G20 members have increasingly surfaced in view of the substantial financial contributions demanded to bail out ailing European economies.¹⁶

Challenging the Status Quo From Within: The Attitude of Emerging Powers towards the G20

In understanding the attitude of emerging powers towards the G20 it is imperative to look at the evolution of the rules that govern and shape global economic engagement. Needless to say, these rules do not simply include formal black-letter law such as the main rules and regulations concerning international trade, but include accepted norms of behavior that keep the international economic system operational. Both the formal rules and normative principles impacting on the functioning of the

global political economy in its current configuration were determined by the Euro-American compact following the Second World War. But the liberal assumption that these rules also served other nations by providing common goods and ensured global growth and prosperity was kept as the ideational basis of the original and revamped Bretton Woods systems. For much of the post-war period, the agreed rules of international finance were determined by the Financial Stability Forum and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) dominated by the U.S., Great Britain and Germany. The international principles of financial crisis resolution were determined by the IMF and World Bank, dominated by the global powers in the G7. The framework rules of international trade were determined by the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, also dominated by the G7 and Western powers, which triggered increasing rejections from emerging powers up until the foundation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.

As the emerging market economies have grown and increased their clout within the global economy, the Bretton Woods system, with its exclusionary rules and institutional structures, have increasingly been called into question for no longer reflecting the global balances of economic power, nor the responsibilities that various countries

needed to exercise for the management of the world economy. There have already been fundamental changes to governance and membership of the rule-setting bodies (middle powers such as Canada and Australia especially pushed for these changes), but permanent change in governance structures in a way to give more voice and representation to emerging powers was needed.¹⁷ Therefore, the formation of the G20 and its elevation to a leader's-level forum was a crucial indication of at least formalistic inclusion of the emerging economies into global economic decision-making.

In this context, unlike previous attempts to reform the G7 group of developed states from inside, the formation of the G20 provided formal equality to emerging powers in global governance with the established actors of the global economic system. Confirmation of this elevated status for the emerging powers was visible through the assumption of rotating Presidency of the G20 Finance Ministers group by India in 2002; China in 2005 (despite its partial financial integration); South Africa in 2007; and Brazil in 2008 in the midst of the global financial crisis. In the following years, the respective responses of emerging powers to the new formulation of the G20 has varied considerably. To begin with, it was commonplace to portray the large emerging powers within the group of BRICS as the major winners from the institutional elevation of the G20

because they acquired the opportunity to bargain with the conventional powers on a level playing field. In this respect, the elevation of the G20 to the political leader's level was interpreted as an unprecedentedly successful attempt by the major emerging powers to extend their participation in key institutions of global governance.¹⁸ The BRICS countries, led by China, were particularly satisfied for being included in this new platform of international cooperation as their formal status and bargaining power was elevated. But at the same time, they followed a smart "hedging strategy" by following multiple policy agendas in different institutional bodies and carefully tried to keep them isolated from each other.

The roots of this reluctance on the part of emerging economies to lend full commitment to the G20 process could be traced back to the memories of other exclusionary institutional experiments such as the GATT regime.

Therefore, the choice of the BRICS countries was to follow a relatively low profile within the forum and to avoid leading the G20 on a number of key initiatives by taking responsibility on an individual or group-based fashion.

Especially China, India and Brazil followed an approach to the G20 reminiscent of their attitude within the World Trade Organization, where they interfered into motions which seemed in open conflict with their essential national interests, but avoided acting as policy entrepreneurs who proposed innovative cooperation models. Being perfectly aware that the G20 process was principally an Anglo-American initiative and the policy agenda was determined in the Atlantic axis, the major emerging powers in the BRICS preferred to keep their alternate options for international and regional cooperation open.

Comparatively speaking, the roots of this reluctance on the part of emerging economies to lend full commitment to the G20 process could be traced back to the memories of other exclusionary institutional experiments such as the GATT regime. As known, the GATT system was structured as a “rich men’s club” where negotiations were held on an invitation-based and secretive “green room” meetings among the systematically important actors such as the U.S., E.U., Canada and Japan. Historically, this kind of exclusionary decision making on issues that would influence the majority of developing countries has triggered widespread resentment and resistance against the GATT and encouraged developing countries to focus on alternative platforms within the United Nations

over the course of the 1960s and the 1970s, such as UNCTAD and UNDP.¹⁹ In turn, the reform of the international trading system witnessed the creation of the WTO as an inclusive platform, which includes emerging powers along with the established ones and with improved transparency procedures for the smaller and poorer countries. Although the G20 was constructed as a relatively inclusive forum of global governance compared to the GATT, it was still seen to be lacking the transparency and accountability elements that would be required from any international institution aspiring to acquire widespread legitimacy.²⁰

As the main motivation which brought the BRICS countries together stemmed from their common desire to become insiders and founding actors within the central institutions of global governance, declaratory calls regarding support for the G20 were maintained in a measured manner. But this support was confined to the conception of the G20 as an instrument of realizing the more pressing issue of equality of representation in central institutions of global governance. Therefore, various declarations of the BRICS group often recognized the G20 as a crucial global coordination mechanism to realize macroeconomic policy coordination and ensure growth, while calling for a radical reform of the international monetary and financial systems in a way to increase the say of the emerging markets and developing

countries, especially with reference to critical issues such as the IMF's quota system.²¹

The G20 has been trying to be active in agenda setting in international trade and macroeconomic management issues without the ownership of the majority of its members.

Therefore, it was not surprising to see that despite declaratory calls raising the “same boat spirit”²² between developed and developing countries within the G20, the sense of common economic destiny was largely confined to the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis. Once the worst of the financial calamity was over, national economic priorities and ambitions for international competitiveness prevailed over superficial calls declaring the need to maintain a strong and stable financial system. Nonetheless, the BRICS countries, while criticizing some of the operational principles of the G20, avoided giving the image of a rival grouping and instead preferred to act as a lobby group within the G20 with limited commitment for making sacrifices for global stabilization. However, the complex nature of the composition of the countries involved in the G20 meant that most of the critical issues concerning global economic

governance triggered the formulation of cross-cutting cleavages around which there emerged mixed and *ad hoc* coalitions of established and emerging powers.

This state of affairs was totally understandable as the G20 process itself has become the institutional site for a number of conflicts within the global political economy: G20 members included countries with a current account surplus versus current account deficit countries; there were members who were seen responsible for currency manipulations, as well as members whose currencies were manipulated; there were established democracies versus authoritarian regimes; developed versus developing economies, and so on.²³ Moreover, it is still questionable whether the emergence of the G20 as more than a rapid reaction force against the global crisis is doing any good to the existing institutional structures of global governance. There is a strong case arguing that the attitude of the G20 to “stand above” formal institutions such as the WTO, IMF and World Bank with specific policy responsibilities triggers unnecessary turf wars among technocrats, and makes the solution of technical problems even more difficult.

In effect, the G20 has been trying to be active in agenda setting in international trade and macroeconomic management issues without the ownership of the majority of its members. In some cases, it

even tried to get involved in geopolitical confrontations exemplified by the decision to exclude Russia from the 2014 Summit over its invasion of Ukraine. But the BRICS countries successfully countered this motion and displayed that they will not shy away from protecting existing alliances and sub-coalitions within the G20 platform when the going gets tough. These experiences in sensitive geopolitical issues such as conflict zones around the Black Sea and Middle East regions must constitute policy lessons for the Turkish Presidency to calibrate their expectations as the management of the group is carried out throughout the year 2015.

Building Bridges Through Diplomacy: Middle Powers in the G20

In the conventional genre of the international relations literature, the term *middle powers* is often used to indicate those nation-states that are not expected to act effectively in the global system via unilateral actions; but may be able to exert a systemic impact in small groups or alliances through multilateral institutions. These nation-states are not generally considered as major global powers, but they still possess crucial coalition-building capacities with the global and regional actors, which gives them increased clout.²⁴ When the general trends in the aftermath of

the Second World War are evaluated, there are apparent commonalities that characterize middle power behaviour including: a commitment to work through multilateral institutions and a rules-based international system; selecting niche areas on which specific foreign policy priorities are focused; engaging in intensive conflict resolution activity; and trying to contribute to regional and global public goods. The basic rationale underlying the tendencies of middle powers is to curb the unilateral temptations and club behavior of great powers in the global system. However, successful execution of such international engagement obviously requires a host of material and human resources, an innovative diplomatic elite core and a national ambition to play a high-profile and visible role in international platforms.²⁵

Compared to the hedging strategy of the BRICS countries, middle powers acting as insiders in the G20 showed a high degree of commitment to the activities of the forum.

In this theoretical context, it needs to be emphasized that a number of middle powers have effectively utilized the G20 as a suitable international platform to raise their global visibility and effectiveness. In

general, these were relatively developed emerging economies that were not as sizeable in terms of population or geographical extension as the major emerging powers of China, India or Russia. This category of middle powers fits nicely with the newly established MIKTA group of countries, namely Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia, as well as *the* traditional middle power, Canada. As this select group of countries had more to gain from following the code of conduct within the G20, they exercised agency within the complicated G20 framework and acted as policy entrepreneurs between established and emerging powers in critical conjunctures. Successful examples of middle power diplomacy within the G20 were witnessed during the co-presidency of Canada and South Korea in 2010, the Mexican Presidency in 2012, the Australian Presidency in 2014 (and possibly, the current Turkish Presidency in 2015).²⁶ In an environment where the established powers have formed institutional groups such as the G7 and major emerging powers through the BRICS group of countries, such middle powers had a much greater incentive to get actively involved in G20 processes, since they were potentially more vulnerable to structural shifts and shocks in the world economy. Indeed, as the heterogenous group of the G20 ran into various bottlenecks, middle powers utilized these as opportunities to emerge

as innovative policy entrepreneurs. Moreover, institutional innovations such as the Troika of the G20 provided new avenues for the impact of middle powers on global governance through participatory decision making.

Compared to the hedging strategy of the BRICS countries, middle powers acting as insiders in the G20 showed a high degree of commitment to the activities of the forum. More often than not, they were able to increase their policy effectiveness by focusing on specific and targeted activities within the G20 and forming coalitions through various working groups. Therefore, middle power diplomacy traditionally focused on coalitional activity with established and emerging powers on specific issues during the day-to-day running of the G20 governance, rather than the high-politics of summit diplomacy. After all, in the context of a volatile and shifting global order, it would be too simplistic to conceptualize the internal politics of the G20 by looking at the dichotomy of established versus emerging powers. The middle powers, for their part, exert considerable influence on the policy agenda and act as practical stabilizing forces within the forum by diffusing conflicts on specific issue areas. So far, the most effective forms of middle power diplomacy have been realized by South Korea and Australia, whereas potentially important middle powers such as Turkey and Indonesia have been comparatively

less effective in determining the policy agenda and diffusing conflicts. However, both of these countries possess great potential to leverage their systemic and geostrategic importance into middle power diplomacy and Turkey's Presidency of the G20 in 2015 constitutes a great opportunity to increase her influence in this respect.

Arguably, South Korea displayed the most exceptional attitude of diplomatic assertiveness among the middle powers in the advancement of niche issues in the context of the G-20 process.²⁷ In that respect, South Korea's successful middle power diplomacy, if studied carefully, might offer crucial lessons for the political leadership and technocratic figures responsible for policy implementation in Turkey. In retrospect, South Korea's success in policy entrepreneurship resulted from careful strategic planning, targeting the right issues and setting traceable policy targets. By utilizing conventional instruments of middle power diplomacy, such as quiet shuttle diplomacy and issue-based mediation, South Korea surprisingly exerted a political weight which went beyond Japan, China and India within the G20. This is clearly illustrated with Seoul's success in convening the first G20 summit outside the Anglo-Saxon world in 2010. Under its presidency, South Korean leadership developed policy proposals which could be acceptable for both the developed and

developing countries at the same time such as the proposal to boost domestic demand in China to support global growth, or strengthening the IMF's crisis prevention role by expanding emergency funds to be offered to developing countries in times of potential financial crises.²⁸ As a country which realized a fast structural transformation over the course of the last decades, South Korea also acted as a "bridge-builder" between the advanced industrialized and newly industrializing countries with significant human development needs.

The commitment of innovative middle powers such as South Korea to open-ended international processes such as the G20 is expectedly far greater than that of the larger emerging powers such as the BRICS countries, which practically limit their presence to a blockage function. Countries such as Australia, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey have a large stake in acting as innovative policy entrepreneurs and making substantial intellectual contributions to ongoing global policy debates, so that they could exert a weight above their actual material capacity in the global system between established and emerging powers. However, this priority obviously necessitates a narrowed policy focus on specific issue areas in which there is a realistic chance of finding compromises.

From a different vantage point, the thematical strategy followed by smaller but systematically important countries

such as Singapore and Switzerland, which constitute the core of the Global Governance Group (3G), is also illuminating. As soon as the G20 platform was elevated to the leader's level, Singapore, as a non-member, took the initiative to arrange inclusive meetings with non-members, especially those which were placed under intense pressure in the context of decisions against offshore financial centres. The form of smart economic diplomacy adopted by the political leadership in Singapore aimed to form more equitable relations with the G20 forum through the 3G initiative.²⁹ From the perspective of global governance, on the other hand, the involvement of smaller countries to discussions on specific aspects of global governance provided an additional dimension of international legitimacy to the G20. The Obama administration tried to widen up this legitimacy window further by including representatives from economic agencies of the United Nations to the G20's Sherpa meetings. But as far as Singapore was concerned, policy advocacy on a specific issue area such as offshore financial centres allowed this small but effective state a *de facto* "insider status" within the G20, as a result of which it was invited to successive G20 summits by the host countries. Singapore, along with countries that had a vested interest in negotiating financial issues and offshore financial centers, such as Switzerland and Lichtenstein, joined

the group of rule makers in the context of global economic governance through platforms such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), rather than staying as passive rule takers.

Expanding Mandate, Shrinking Legitimacy: Structural Problems of the G20

Following the Pittsburgh Summit (2010), the policy agenda of the G20 began to gradually expand into various policy areas including energy security, climate change, poverty alleviation, job quality, trade and investment. The expansionist trend in the institutional remit and mandate of the G20, which crystallized in the post-Pittsburgh period, has largely continued unabated so far. In the meantime, the Cannes Summit (2011) was convened amid high expectations concerning effective steps in critical issues of global governance, including the management of the Eurozone crisis. But developments in the aftermath of the Summit proved that those expectations were largely premature and unwarranted as far as the institutional capacity of the G20 was concerned. Especially the emerging powers led by the BRICS countries, despite formally collaborating with their Western partners for global stability within the G20 framework, proved

extremely reluctant when it came to share the substantial financial burden of reviving the European economy. Despite a growing schism between established and emerging powers particularly about the burden-sharing aspects of global reforms, the policy agenda continued to widen into such issues as tax reform, financial regulation, employment promotion, trade, energy, development policies and corruption.

Especially the emerging powers led by the BRICS countries, despite formally collaborating with their Western partners for global stability within the G20 framework, proved extremely reluctant when it came to share the substantial financial burden of reviving the European economy.

Although the effort which culminated in the construction of the G20 forum represented one of the most important achievements in international diplomacy and cooperation, the mere existence of the forum did not guarantee a solution to the profound problems of global financial governance, regulation and institutional reform. The crux of the G20's effectiveness was the willingness of its members to formulate common

decisions and follow up those decisions with independent action through a spirit of mutually beneficial cooperation. In the long-term, the institutional effectiveness of the G20 will remain dependent on entrenching a common understanding that such cooperation is vital to achieve global stability and prosperity. Leaving aside the sense of collective responsibility and voluntary cooperation, there is no supranational authority or legal framework to enforce the G20 decisions and agreements via existing international institutions which operate with rather circumscribed remits.³⁰

Frankly speaking, continued expansion in the policy agenda of the G20 following the global economic crisis created an unavoidable sense of agency-creep and decline in institutional credibility and effectiveness. In this process, regular compliance with the G20 policy proposals generally came from advanced industrial economies, particularly in areas relating to prudential macro-economic policy measures in line with their national interests and limited reform of international financial institutions. Hence, the ambitious vision stated at the Pittsburgh Summit to make the G20 *the Central Forum of Global Governance* had to be downgraded as the group was increasingly stuck in national debates in sensitive areas such as trade, employment, property rights and development. There emerged a vicious institutional circle whereby the

G20 began to lose its original purpose and direction as the initial urgency of the global financial crisis has gradually abated. The leading members of the group in the Western world constantly tried to reshape its operational mandate within a broader policy agenda. However, an ever-broadening policy agenda without clear institutional mechanisms proved increasingly less realistic and further undermined the authority and credibility of the forum.

Leaving aside the sense of collective responsibility and voluntary cooperation, there is no supranational authority or legal framework to enforce the G20 decisions and agreements via existing international institutions which operate with rather circumscribed remits.

In this vein, developments in the field of international trade provide ample material displaying the reel-politique aspects of the institutional limitations of the G20. The global financial crisis in 2008 did not trigger marginal forms of protectionism and beggar-thy-neighbour policies comparable to the levels in the 1930s, largely as a result of the coordination efforts by the G20. However, the success of the G20 to maintain the relatively liberal nature of the international trading

system amidst the crisis was not reflected into the advancement of the complicated trade negotiations among its members in the context of the Doha Round (The Doha Development Agenda) of the World Trade Organization. Despite calls from the G20 to conclude the Doha round in a reasonable time frame, specific disagreements on a plethora of issues continued in the light of varying national interest definitions. Similarly, the G20's decision to focus on critical issues such as global value chains and food security proved controversial and attracted strong criticisms at the World Trade Organization Conference in Bali in 2013.³¹ Therefore, it seems that there is an inverse relationship between the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of the G20 as an international governance platform, and the scope of its designated mandate, which shall be taken into consideration while contemplating its future under the Turkish presidency.

On the other hand, although the G20 was presented to the global public opinion as an inclusive global governance platform, the emerging powers were not included in the early stages when the institutional structure of the group was designed. This exclusivity created certain problems of legitimacy and representation from the inception of the forum and triggered various criticisms from non-members. For instance, as a non-member from Europe, Norway was among the most vocal critics of the G20, frequently

questioning the mandate of this platform to take decisions with potentially global implications. Moreover, it was stated that the G20 did not have clear criteria for membership; members were hand-picked from among the 20 largest and systemically important countries in the world economy, but the notion of “systemic importance” was defined by a handful of core economies. More importantly, unlike the informal groupings like the G7 that were essentially defined as “discussion clubs”, the G20 assumed a self-designated formal position as the institutional hub of global financial governance, so that other technical institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank were given directions. Non-members, including some of the advanced but smaller economies such as Singapore, Switzerland and Norway, were also expected to follow the decisions made by the group in the name of protecting global stability. From another angle, the exclusionary nature of G20 membership meant that not a single country from among the least developed countries (LDCs) was included in this elite group, as a result of which most urgent issues of global development were not reflected into the policy agenda.³² This issue constitutes a clear window of opportunity for the Turkish leadership despite debates about the over-extension of the mandate.

Despite hitherto mentioned limitations of legitimacy, so far the practical value of the G20 has resulted from the willingness of leading political

actors to engage with the pressing problems of the post-crisis period that could exert a destabilizing impact on the whole global economic system. However, the underlying tendency of the Western leaders to expand the scope and mandate of G20 operations into critical areas such as development, food and energy security, governance reform and anti-corruption measures, triggered widespread resistance from members and non-members alike. The lesson for the Turkish leadership is that the future vision of the G20 should be drawn in a realistic manner by taking the issues of legitimacy and effectiveness into account and developing more inclusive strategies.

Turkey's Role as the G20 President: Middle Power, Agenda Setter and Bridge Builder

Turkey has been an integral part of the G20 process since its inception in 1999 in the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Turkey's inclusion in the G20 was not surprising as it was within the largest twenty economies with respect to its share of world GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP), as well as its population. But its substantial economic size and statistical significance notwithstanding, Turkey's inclusion also reflected a strategic decision on the part of the founding fathers of the G20 in

view of its various crucial assets. As a regional power located in the midst of the Balkans, Caucasia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Turkey was equipped with precious historical, economic, cultural and political ties with numerous countries in its surroundings and beyond. Being a manufacturing-based economic powerhouse in the Middle East, it possessed the largest national economy in the Muslim world in both current prices and PPP measures, followed by Indonesia. Moreover, it had institutional ties with the Western world as a member of NATO, the OECD and the Council of Europe, while pursuing accession negotiations for full membership with the European Union. As far as global financial governance is concerned, Turkey has had a long-term relationship with the IMF and the World Bank, first as a debtor country in the context of stabilization programmes and later as an active and constructive player in the international scene. Therefore, from the inception of the G20, Turkey's involvement in this major platform of global economic governance was wholeheartedly supported by the founders, who conceived Turkey's membership as an opportunity to bridge Asian countries with Europe; and developed countries with developing countries.³³

From the perspective of shifting global power balances in the world system, it seems plausible to categorize

Turkey as a middle power reminiscent of other G20 members such as Australia, Mexico, Indonesia and South Korea (MIKTA). Turkey's rising foreign policy activism, intensive visibility in international platforms, and conflict resolution initiatives over the course of the last decade reflected most of the predominant features of classical middle power behaviour. In this sense, holding the rotating presidency of the G20 provides novel opportunities for Turkish policy makers to carry the diplomatic weight of the country from the field of conventional interstate diplomacy to economic diplomacy and increase Turkey's gravitas through the G20 as the leading platform of global economic governance.

Turkey's rising foreign policy activism, intensive visibility in international platforms, and conflict resolution initiatives over the course of the last decade reflected most of the predominant features of classical middle power behaviour.

As far as prudent financial and macroeconomic governance is concerned, Turkey has drawn many lessons from the crises in the 1990s and the twin financial crises it experienced in 2000 and

2001. In the context of a stabilization programme dubbed “The Programme for Transition to a Strong Economy,” the entire national framework of macroeconomic and financial regulation went through a radical overhaul in the first decade of the new millennium under Economy Minister Kemal Derviş and later under successive AK Party governments. Major improvements were achieved with regard to capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, enhancement of deposit-based funding and the political autonomy and professionalization of the Central Bank (TCMB). Furthermore, the strengthening of autonomous regulative bodies such as the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK), Financial Markets Boards (SPK) and the insertion of stricter licencing for new financial institutions, revitalized the banking sector as a major sponsor of sustainable growth. In some areas, the financial regulatory architecture in Turkey became even more robust than that of some of the advanced industrialized countries, a fact which has been frequently stressed in admiration following the global economic crisis. Despite the negative impact of the global crisis in 2008-2009, Turkey showed one of the best crisis-exit performances in the world following China, and maintained its position within the G20 as a confident and respected economic actor with sound fundamentals.

Turkey's Potential Contributions to the G20 Agenda

As the G20 is a predominantly leader-driven international platform, the most important advantage of holding the rotating presidency and hosting the summit meetings is to oversee and contribute to the agenda formation processes throughout the year. Therefore, the G20 presidents usually try to add new items to the standard financial/economic G20 agenda to leave their mark on global governance debates. As a proactive and ambitious middle power, it is only normal that Turkey will follow a similar path and bring some of the pressing global issues that are normally dealt with by the United Nations or other international organizations to the G20 agenda. But before moving on to Turkey's priority agenda items under its presidency, some procedural clarifications are in order.

When it comes to the internal coordination of the G20 process within the Turkish state mechanism, the G20 Summits are conventionally attended by the Turkish Prime Minister in charge, rather than the President, at a given point in time. At the meeting of Finance Ministers, Turkey is represented by the Coordinating Economy Minister, who is generally appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister at the same time.³⁴ The

more technical meetings of G20 Deputy Finance Ministers is attended by a top-level economy bureaucrat responsible for the management of the Turkish treasury, operating under the Prime Ministry and Coordinating Economy Ministry, namely the Undersecretary of Treasury. Finally, the Turkish *Sherpa*, indicating the political representative of the country's leadership, is a top-level diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁵ Over the years, there emerged a de facto division of labour between the Undersecretary of Treasury, who coordinates Turkey's financial and economic agenda within the G20 including external relations with the IMF and the World Bank on a technical level; and the Sherpa, who undertakes the coordination of the broader political and diplomatic agenda that incumbent governments wish to bring to the attention of the G20 members.

Regarding most of the controversial policy issues on the G20 policy agenda concerning international trade rules and poverty alleviation issues, Turkey's position has approximated to the position adopted by developing countries and emerging markets.

Depending on the international conjuncture and pressing global matters,

the agenda items pursued by the Sherpa have included a wide range of issues such as international development challenges, climate change, migration, epidemics, human trafficking and so on. The historic speech made by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu at the G20 Summit in Brisbane at the end of 2014, gave the first indication on the issues that the Turkish leadership wanted to bring to the international agenda, including the Middle East peace process, migration flows from Syria and Iraq, the Ebola epidemic in Africa, development challenges facing the least developed countries (LDCs) and global coordination on food and energy security. Specifically, the issue of supporting small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to foster global growth is selected as the main theme to be pursued under the Turkish Presidency, cross-cutting all other agenda items.³⁶

Turkey's Respective Stance on Economic Agenda Items of the G20

In retrospect, Turkish economy bureaucrats and diplomats have followed the fundamental policy debates on the reform of global governance architecture within the G20 with great interest since its inception and tried to make substantive contributions. Turkey's respective stance within this global platform has predominantly reflected

its national identity as an emerging market with substantial developmental needs. Therefore, regarding most of the controversial policy issues on the G20 policy agenda concerning international trade rules and poverty alleviation issues, Turkey's position has approximated to the position adopted by developing countries and emerging markets. However, when it came to the issues related to the modernization of the global financial system, Turkey has stood firmly with the core countries in the G7 and constantly stressed that a sharp split between the developed and developing countries concerning financial reform would seriously harm the G20 process.

Ankara is especially interested in seeing a comprehensive quota reform that would transform the IMF to a more representative international institution and a doubling of the IMF's total quota allocations so that its institutional capacity could be enhanced dramatically.

For instance, in view of the robust nature of its financial sector following comprehensive regulatory reforms in the 2000s, Turkey fully supported the G20 agenda on global financial oversight and regulation, which assumed very limited intervention into international financial

flows. Yet, just in line with its optimum middle power attitude, Turkey also tried to play a constructive role within the G20 as a member of the OECD group of industrialized countries and an emerging market, and tried to alleviate the concerns of emerging markets over the destabilizing impact of short-term capital flows.

Turkey's emerging market identity is most visible when it comes to debates concerning a radical overhaul of the Bretton Woods institutions in a way to give more voice, power and responsibility to the emerging markets in global governance. Turkish delegations have continued to press for a second round of more radical quota reform in the IMF along with major emerging powers, despite it being one of the four countries that took best advantage of the *ad hoc* quota increase in 2006.³⁷ Ankara is especially interested in seeing a comprehensive quota reform that would transform the IMF to a more representative international institution and a doubling of the IMF's total quota allocations so that its institutional capacity could be enhanced dramatically. In this sense, structural reform of the Executive Board of the IMF, where the European Union is overrepresented, is a related issue. However, with Turkey's entrance into the Executive Board of the IMF in 2012, this issue was relegated into a secondary position of national strategic importance.

One of the major financial topics for Turkey's G20 Presidency concerns the respective position of the international credit rating agencies in the world economy and prospects for better global regulation.

On the other hand, Turkey stands shoulder to shoulder with the BRICS countries and emerging markets in questioning the contentious “gentlemen’s agreement” between Europe and the U.S., which assumes that the Managing Director of the IMF shall be from Europe; while the President of the World Bank shall be from the U.S. In line with Turkey’s principled and inclusive foreign policy line, the Turkish delegations stress that top management positions of international institutions should in principle be open to individuals from all nationalities from the developed and developing world, so that existing levels of organizational legitimacy and policy ownership could be improved. Moreover, Turkey supports the position of South Korea and similar middle powers in pushing for a more open, transparent and objective eligibility criteria for IMF financial assistance through channels such as the *Flexible Credit Line*, which was designed as a more flexible crisis prevention and resolution instrument based on *ex ante* conditionality for well performing economies. Likewise,

as a developing country which had to endure 19 IMF Stand-by Programmes as a result of recurring financial and macroeconomic crises before the achievement of a sustained growth path in the 2000s and seizure of credit relations in 2008, Turkey is rightly sensitive towards the intrusive character of IMF conditionality. It supports initiatives to reduce the political and economic intrusiveness seen in the application of IMF conditionality and argues that there should be more national ownership for effective crisis prevention and response.

One of the major financial topics for Turkey’s G20 Presidency concerns the respective position of the international credit rating agencies in the world economy and prospects for better global regulation. The debate concerning the methodologies, institutional alignments and links of international credit ratings agencies is a hotly debated topic in Turkey, as it is in numerous emerging markets negatively affected by allegedly unfair ratings evaluations and double standards.³⁸ Many emerging economies have expressed serious concerns about the scientifically questionable methodologies; different evaluations between similar cases in different conjunctures; as well as the lack of transparency and accountability of these institutions in assessing major banks and treasuries with crucial consequences.³⁹ Turkey will certainly utilize its G20 presidency as a perfect opportunity

to bring the issue of reforming the international regime of credit rating agencies and constituting a “global code of conduct” for their operations to the attention of G20 members.

Turkey has consistently advocated that the overall political agenda of the G20 Summits must be broadened considerably so that this crucial platform could play determining roles in development-related and humanitarian issues beyond narrow technical debates on global financial governance.

Finally, Turkey supports the G20/OECD initiatives that were started by Germany and France against the abuse of banking secrecy rules for the purposes of tax evasion and transferring financial resources illicitly to offshore tax havens. This is also quite normal given that the Turkish state institutions are eager to establish tighter domestic control mechanisms over companies and individual investors attempting to stay in the grey economy or realize tax fraud via illicit transfer of funds abroad. However, despite its willingness to toughen up the rules against tax evasion and illicit transfers, Turkey stood distanced from categorical controls on international financial flows. For instance, with regard to debates in the G20 to institutionalize a

globally coordinated financial transaction (or Tobin) tax (FTT) to control speculative attacks and promote development, decision-makers in Ankara adopted a negative stance arguing that such transnational taxes would only increase costs in the global financial system. This rather conservative approach towards international financial controls has a lot to do with the existence of a sound deposit insurance system in Turkey (TMSF) and the fact that the state did not have to bail out any banks during the global economic crisis.

Since the elevation of the G20 to a global governance forum at the leader's level, Turkey's official position regarding the institutional remit of this global platform has been crystal clear. Turkey has consistently advocated that the overall political agenda of the G20 Summits must be broadened considerably so that this crucial platform could play determining roles in development-related and humanitarian issues beyond narrow technical debates on global financial governance. However, calls for the widening of the policy agenda have proceeded under the recognition that the more political or humanitarian issues that are added to the G20 agenda such as human development, food security, climate change, poverty alleviation, energy supply security, energy efficiency or marine environment protection, be done so in view of their links with the core economic and financial agenda of

responding to the global crisis. Therefore, there was always close attention to the organic way in which the expansion of the policy agenda was carefully managed.

Conclusion: The Turkish Presidency and the Future of the G20

Despite positive symbolic steps to create a more inclusive global governance architecture since 2008 by giving more voice and representative presence to the emerging powers in the world economy, institutional reform has proved to be an elusive process. As it stands, the G20 is still struggling to be a relevant top-level platform for the fiercely contested realm of global governance, despite the rather grandiose political rhetoric and exaggerated expectations on the part of various actors. Following the early success of the exit strategy after the global crisis, in which both established and emerging powers had a common stake, the coordination capacity of the G20 has remained at low levels. There are various reasons underlying this weak institutional effectiveness, such as those stressed in the study including the lack of mutual trust between established and emerging powers; the lack of concrete institutional restructuring in the IMF, WTO, the World Bank and the BIS; as well as deeply entrenched problems of legitimacy and “agency creep” generated by the ever-expanding mandate of the G20.

Outside its core technical goal of providing financial stability, the G20 was not successful in articulating a view of long-term, sustainable and balanced development in a way that facilitates international dialogue in a globally coherent way.

In this study, we summarized the historical trajectory of the G20's institutional evolution, underlined the expansion in the mandate and remit of the platform and looked at the opportunities and limits of potential contributions by the Turkish Presidency. We emphasized the fact that the increasingly apparent “legitimacy deficit” of the G20 towards non-members can only be overcome by adopting a more inclusive policy attitude especially regarding development issues. It was also stressed in the study that in the case of critical regional problems such as the protracted Euro-crisis, the respective contribution of the G20 through top-level policy coordination remained rather negligible, as emerging powers avoided to take up the substantial burdens of rescue packages. The current institutional configuration and ownership/legitimacy problems of the platform creates serious structural limitations. Outside its core technical goal of providing financial stability, the G20 was not successful in articulating a view of long-term, sustainable and balanced

development in a way that facilitates international dialogue in a globally coherent way. Prevention of systemically destructive competition requires efficient mechanisms of global governance and the most crucial contribution the G20 process could make is to help bridge the gap between the national and the global, in full cooperation with the existing global international institutions, as well as engaging the world of academia, civil society and think tanks.

It was also highlighted that a number of “middle powers” effectively utilized the G20 as a suitable international platform to raise their global visibility and effectiveness. Compared to the hedging strategy of the BRICS countries, middle powers acting as insiders in the G20 showed a high degree of commitment to the activities of the forum. They were able to increase their policy effectiveness by focusing on specific and targeted activities within the G20 and forming coalitions through various working groups. Therefore, middle power diplomacy traditionally focused on coalitional activity with established and emerging powers on specific issues during the day-to-day running of the G20 governance, rather than the high-politics of summit diplomacy.

One of the key points underlined in the study was that the underlying tendency of the Western leaders to expand the scope and mandate of G20 operations into critical areas such as development,

food and energy security, governance reform and anti-corruption measures, triggered widespread resistance from members and non-members alike. The key policy lesson deduced in the study for the Turkish leadership was that the future vision of the G20 should be drawn in a realistic manner by taking the issues of legitimacy and effectiveness into account and developing more inclusive strategies.

These type of initiatives towards increased inclusiveness shall be seen as “Turkey’s responsibility towards the Global South” and are likely to constitute the backbone of Turkey’s strategy to expand the G20 agenda both politically and economically.

Concerning the potential contributions and visionary openings of the Turkish Presidency at the G20 it was argued that the transformation trajectory of the G20 policy agenda over the course of recent years matched the aspirations of Turkish governments, whereby the G20 became established as a long-term coordinating platform for global economic governance, rather than a short-term and technical financial crisis response unit. Moreover, as part of Turkey’s proactive foreign policy of inclusive engagement with developing countries

in many regional geographies, increasing the weight of development issues in the G20 agenda has been warmly welcomed since the Seoul Summit in 2010. In this respect, Turkey's calls to establish an institutional platform that would bring the G20 member countries together with the least developed countries (LDCs) in

Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere found strong reflections. Normatively, these type of initiatives towards increased inclusiveness shall be seen as "Turkey's responsibility towards the Global South" and are likely to constitute the backbone of Turkey's strategy to expand the G20 agenda both politically and economically.

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Jordan and the Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities

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Abstract

This article aims to make a comprehensive analysis of the impacts of the Arab Spring on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In particular, it tackles with the question of how the Hashemite regime could survive the Arab Spring. Furthermore, it aims to contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate about the resilience of Arab monarchies by trying to find out if the survival of the Hashemite monarchy during the Arab Spring has more to do with factors endogenous to the regime or exogenous to it. After analysing the main challenges and opportunities that the Arab Spring created for Jordan, this article argues that challenges that the Hashemite regime faced during this period either disappeared or are outbalanced by the opportunities it enjoyed, and these opportunities originated from both exogenous and endogenous factors.

Key Words

Jordan, Arab Spring, King Abdullah II, Hashemites, Arab monarchies.

Introduction

Unlike many Arab republics, Arab monarchies have not experienced any regime changes since the revolutionary currents started to sweep through the Arab world in 2011.¹ This situation drove scholars to write extensively about the main factors that make Arab monarchies resilient.² While some explanations underscore factors that are endogenous to the regimes, like legitimacy and institutional advantages enjoyed by monarchies;³ others emphasize factors that are more exogenous to the regimes, like the oil rents and allies (both foreign and domestic) that help monarchical regimes to survive.⁴

Among Arab monarchies, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is surely one of the most vulnerable because of its small size, poor economy, fragmented society and uneasy neighbourhood. Yet, in spite of all these vulnerabilities, Jordan so far has succeeded to remain an island of security and stability in a sea of revolution, turbulence and war. Since independence, the Hashemite regime survived two inter-state wars against Israel in 1948 and 1967, a number of coup attempts in the 1950s,

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a civil war between 1970 and 1971, and civil unrest in 1989. Under King Abdullah II,⁵ the Hashemite regime still hangs on, in spite of the destabilizing effects of the recent revolts in the region. Accordingly, considering its immense vulnerabilities, taking a closer look at the performance of the Hashemite regime during the Arab Spring has surely much to contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate about the resilience of Arab monarchies.

Between 2011 and 2013, Jordan witnessed periodic demonstrations protesting the government, demanding political and socio-economic reforms, and on some occasions, calling for the downfall of the regime.

This paper aims to make a comprehensive analysis of the impacts of the Arab Spring on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In particular, it deals with the survival of the Hashemite regime in the course of the Arab Spring by focusing on the main sources of stability and instability for the regime during this period. It can be argued that the Arab Spring posed the most serious threat that King Abdullah II has faced since he ascended the throne in 1999. Between 2011 and 2013, Jordan witnessed periodic demonstrations protesting the government, demanding political and socio-economic reforms,

and on some occasions, calling for the downfall of the regime. Furthermore, political, economic and social costs of the ongoing conflicts in Jordan's neighbourhood put an extra burden on the shoulders of the regime. Although these developments do not equate with the mass anti-regime demonstrations in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Libya, they were severe enough to destabilize the tiny kingdom. That said, this article argues that the Arab Spring created very important opportunities for the Hashemite regime as well, which eventually outbalanced the above-mentioned challenges. Moreover, it contends that these opportunities are products of both exogenous and endogenous factors.

In the following sections, firstly, the main trajectory of popular protests and the regime's reform efforts in Jordan since 2011 are outlined. Secondly, a detailed analysis of the destabilizing effects of the Arab Spring on the Kingdom is made. In this respect, the study focuses on the rise of Islamism (both in its moderate and radical forms) in the region and its implications for Jordan; the Kingdom's deepening economic crisis; and soaring unrest among the East Banker population. In the third section, the article concentrates on the advantages that the Hashemite regime enjoyed thanks to the Arab Spring. These opportunities can be classified as increased foreign assistance; dissuading effects of regional turmoil on Jordanian public, and empowerment of the King's

image as a pro-reform figure fighting against the forces of the *status quo* within the regime. Lastly, in conclusion, an overall assessment of the main challenges and opportunities that the Arab Spring created for Jordan is made, and the reason opportunities seem to be more dominant as of 2014 is explained.

Protests and Reforms

On 14 January 2011, the same day that the Tunisian President Zine al Abidine ben Ali fled the country, protests criticizing poverty, unemployment and corruption were launched in major Jordanian cities including Amman, Karak, Irbid, Salt and Maan.⁶ In fact, the political atmosphere in the country had already been tense due to debates surrounding the November 2010 elections, which had been boycotted by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) due to its objections to the Election Law, and which produced a largely loyalist parliament.⁷ In the January protests the major demand of the protestors was the resignation of Prime Minister Samir Rifai. This was Jordan's first "Day of Rage" and it was organized by "The Jordan Campaign for Change" (Jayeen), an alternative reform coalition formed by urban pro-reform activists in early January 2011. Traditional opposition movements like the JMB, the Baathists and leftist parties joined the protests in the following weeks and called for both

political and economic reforms in the Kingdom.⁸ Their inclusion increased both the number of protestors and the pressure on the government.

Political reform demands shared by all segments of the opposition included establishment of a truly parliamentary political system in which the government is drawn from the elected parliamentarians rather than appointed by the King, and in which the parliament actually legislates rather than simply implementing the initiatives of the government and the King. In addition, they wanted a more democratic Election Law, which would not include the current single non transferrable vote (SNTV)⁹ system. Furthermore, they also called for more freedom of expression, fewer roles for the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) in public life, a more independent judiciary, and an end to widespread corruption.¹⁰

The first critical move of the new government was to appoint a 52-member National Dialogue Committee (NDC) in March 2011 in order to open a dialogue with representatives of various political parties, professional associations and civil society organisations about political reform matters in the Kingdom.

The government's first response to the protests was the introduction of some aid packages and salary increases, yet it was not successful in easing the unrest.¹¹ On 1 February 2011, the King finally bowed to the major demand of the protestors and sacked the government of Samir Rifai. In his place, he appointed Marouf Bakhit, an ex-general and former prime minister, and charged him with forming a national dialogue for genuine political and economic reforms.

The first critical move of the new government was to appoint a 52-member National Dialogue Committee (NDC) in March 2011 in order to open a dialogue with representatives of various political parties, professional associations and civil society organisations about political reform matters in the Kingdom.¹² The JMB refrained from joining the Committee because of its "limited remit, which excluded constitutional reforms."¹³ The establishment of the NDC, however, did not appease the protestors. On 24 March 2011, a pro-reform sit-in was organized in Amman's Dakhiliyya Square by the "Youth of March 24", a newly formed opposition movement consisting of mainly urban youth activists. The major demands of the protestors were essential political and economic reforms for a truly free and social democracy. On the second day, the sit-in grew stronger with support from other opposition movements like Jayeen and the JMB. However, an attack against

the protestors by regime supporters, which resulted in one dead and over 100 injured, dissuaded the protests over the following weeks.¹⁴

Nearly one month after these deadly clashes, the King ordered the establishment of the Royal Committee to Review the Constitution (RCRC) on 26 April 2011 in order to appease the opposition with the promise of genuine reforms. The RCRC's task was to revisit the entire Constitution while taking into consideration the recommendations that would be submitted by the NDC in June 2011.¹⁵ On 14 August 2011, the RCRC submitted its recommendations for constitutional changes on 42 articles. The following month, nearly all amendments were approved by the Parliament and the Senate with minor alterations and subsequently signed by the King on 30 September 2011.

The major amendments to the Constitution included, above all, creation of a Constitutional Court with "oversight on the constitutionality of the applicable laws and regulations" (Art. 58) and an independent commission "to supervise the parliamentary electoral process and to administer it in all of its stages" (Art. 67). The new provisions also limited the government's ability to issue temporary laws in the absence of the parliament (Art. 94) and obliged it to resign in case of the Parliament is dissolved (Art. 74). Finally, the King's ability to postpone parliamentary elections indefinitely was

removed with the amendments (Art. 73).¹⁶ Predictably, the amendments fell short of the expectations of the opposition figures who have been calling for a truly parliamentary government and reduction in the power of the King.¹⁷

In October 2011, the King reshuffled the cabinet once again and this time Awn al Khasawneh, a former judge of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, replaced Marouf Bakhit as the new prime minister. Bakhit had been under great pressure from the public and the parliament since his involvement in a corruption scandal that had been revealed in the press in September 2011.¹⁸ Khasawneh's appointment was received optimistically among the opposition mainly because of his strong international career and untarnished reputation.¹⁹ Yet, his duty lasted barely more than six months. Although he was keen in carrying out genuine political reform and fighting corruption, he came to be at odds with the King, the GID, and some parliamentarians over his proposed reforms, which were accused of favouring the JMB.²⁰ Eventually, he was forced to resign on 26 April 2012 and Fayez al Tarawneh, a former prime minister and conservative political figure, replaced him.

The main task of Tarawneh's government was to prepare a new Political Parties Law and Election Law, which entered into force in June 2012 and July 2012 respectively. The new Political

Parties Law encouraged formation of stronger and bigger political parties based on political rather than tribal affiliations. Furthermore, the Interior Ministry's authority to licence new political parties and government's oversight of them has been limited by the new law. Overall, the new Political Parties Law was considered "progressive" by the opposition.²¹ The new Election Law, however, fell too short of expectations. The major changes it brought were firstly, a mixed electoral system in which 27 of 150 seats would be allocated to the national level (known as the national list) and the remaining seats to the constituency level. Secondly, the female quota was increased from 12 to 15 seats by the new law. The opposition did not welcome the new law because it allocated very few seats to the national level (only 18 %), it did not annul the SNTV system at the constituency level, and it left the gerrymandered electoral districts intact.²² Accordingly, harsh criticism and protests against the new Election Law followed, while the opposition threatened to boycott the upcoming general elections.²³

Disregarding the opposition's dissatisfaction with the electoral reforms, the King inaugurated the general election process in October 2012 by dissolving the Parliament and reshuffling the government for the fourth time since 2011. Abdullah Ensour, a veteran politician and former deputy prime minister, was appointed prime minister

with the task of preparing the country for general elections. The road to the elections was not that smooth though. On 13 November 2012, when the new government decided to lift the fuel subsidies as an IMF guided austerity measure to fight the high budget deficit, angry protests swept across the country.²⁴ Rage increased day by day, as protestors shouted anti-regime slogans and damaged public property. Two people were killed and several injured in deadly clashes between the police and protestors.²⁵ It took several days before calm returned to the country.

The King promised to consult the parliamentary blocs before the appointment of the new prime minister, although no such provision exists in the Constitution.

The election schedule was not affected by the violent riots of November 2012. Once calm prevailed, the King tried to restore the election atmosphere and revive the public's interest in the reform process with an interview he gave to Jordanian newspapers, and with two discussion papers published on his official website.²⁶ In his remarks, the King promised to consult the parliamentary blocs before the appointment of the new prime minister, although no such provision exists in the Constitution.

Finally, the first general elections in the Kingdom after the outbreak of the Arab Spring took place on 25 January 2013. Despite the boycott of the JMB-affiliated Islamist Action Front (IAF) and numerous leftist and nationalist parties, voter turnout was higher than in the previous two elections. In 2013, 56.6% of registered voters went to the polls, compared with 53% in 2010 and 54% in 2007.²⁷ Moreover, voting process in the elections, which were presided over by the newly formed Independent Electoral Commission, was considered free and fair by national and international observers.²⁸ Although around 70% of the MPs were newcomers, the vast majority of the new parliament were loyalists without party affiliations.²⁹ Overall, the election process was portrayed as a victory for the King and defeat for the boycotting opposition, above all the JMB.³⁰

In line with the King's previous comments, the Chief of the Royal Court held consultations with MPs throughout February 2013 in order to specify the name of the new prime minister. While the MPs were unable to reach a consensus on the name, the King finally decided to appoint the incumbent Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour as premier one more time.³¹ His 19 member cabinet, the smallest in Jordan's recent history, was sworn in on 30 March 2013, and won a vote of confidence on 23 April 2013 with a narrow majority (55%).³²

The primary challenge that the Arab Spring created for the Hashemite regime has been the rise of Islamism, both in its moderate and radical forms, in the Arab world.

In the following months, the number of pro-reform protests in Jordanian cities decreased tremendously, mainly due to the deepening crisis in Syria and its growing human and economic burden on Jordan. Additionally, disappointment with the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) government in Egypt in July 2013 contributed to limiting the pro-reform rallies of the JMB.³³

Challenges

The Rise of Islamist Movements

The primary challenge that the Arab Spring created for the Hashemite regime has been the rise of Islamism, both in its moderate and radical forms, in the Arab world. Although the Hashemites always enjoyed a certain degree of religious legitimacy as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, this has never made the pro-Western kingdom completely immune to Islamist challenges. The historical tacit alliance between the Monarchy and the JMB against leftist, nationalist and Nasserist movements had already been damaged with the

Israeli-Jordanian Peace in 1994.³⁴ The JMB still remains the largest and the most organized opposition movement in Jordan, though mainly operating within the legal limits of the Monarchy. That said, the rise of Islamist movements in the wake of the Arab Spring created a regional conjuncture that tremendously increased the JMB's self-confidence. The election victories of the MB-affiliated political parties in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, consolidation of the MB in post-conflict Libya, and the re-emergence of the Syrian MB in the struggle against the Assad regime were marks of a MB ascendancy in the region.

Amman initially responded to the advance of the MB in the region by mending its ties with HAMAS, which was expelled from the Kingdom shortly after Abdullah became King in 1999. By receiving a delegation of HAMAS, headed by its political leader Khaled Mashal, twice in 2012, Amman sought to accommodate the rising popularity of the MB in the region and persuade the JMB to support the reform process in Jordan and to participate in the upcoming elections.³⁵ However, thanks to this regional conjuncture, a more self-confident and ambitious JMB participated vigorously in weekly demonstrations, generally avoided the regime-led reform projects and boycotted the first post Arab Spring elections in January 2013. More importantly, as a former spokesman for the Jordanian

government, Samih Maaytah, noted, the group shifted its goals from “[achieving] reforms to pursuing power, particularly since the Brotherhood succeeded in Egypt and Tunisia”.³⁶ Some JMB figures went as far as declaring that an “Islamic state would soon be established” in Jordan.³⁷ Although the JMB never officially called for the downfall of the regime, the King clearly showed his distrust of the movement by accusing it of receiving commands from the Egyptian MB, of disrespecting the Jordanian constitution, and of aiming to overthrow the regime eventually. He called the JMB “wolves in sheep’s clothing” and stressed that he would not allow it to “hijack the cause of democratic reform in the name of Islam”.³⁸

The arrest of several JMB members, including its deputy head Zaki Bani Irshid, in Autumn 2014, demonstrates that the regime has started to adopt a tougher stance against the movement.

The fortunes of the JMB were reversed with the overthrow of the Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in a *coup d'état* headed by General Abdul Fattah al Sisi in July 2013. While warmly embracing the new Egyptian government, the Jordanian regime

increased its pressure over the JMB, with a harsh media campaign against the movement.³⁹ Meanwhile, a serious divide broke out within the JMB between the moderate figures (doves) and the hardliners (hawks), who were still controlling the movement. The moderates’ launch in October 2013 of the “Zamzam Initiative” against the hardliner leaders, with subtle support of the Jordanian government, further weakened the JMB.⁴⁰ The arrest of several JMB members, including its deputy head Zaki Bani Irshid, in Autumn 2014, demonstrates that the regime has started to adopt a tougher stance against the movement.⁴¹ Unlike Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates however, Amman has not gone as far as imposing a total ban on the movement, believing this would only serve to radicalize the JMB. It seems that the Monarchy prefers to keep its relations with the JMB at the lowest possible level so that the latter would neither control the government nor challenge the regime.

Perhaps a more alerting consequence of the Arab Spring for the Hashemite regime has been the rise of radical Islamism in the region and its possible repercussions for Jordan. It is believed that there are at least 2,000 Jordanians fighting in Syria among the ranks of Salafist Jihadist groups like the Al Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Their eventual return to Jordan is considered a serious threat against the

stability of the Kingdom.⁴² The growing popularity of radical Islamist currents, particularly in impoverished Jordanian cities, was clearly observed in summer 2014, when pro-ISIL demonstrations were held in Maan and Zarqa, apparently hailing the group's recent territorial gains in Iraq.⁴³ Amman has responded to the recent rise of radical Islamism by taking extra security measures at home and on its borders, by exploiting the friction between Al Nusra and ISIL,⁴⁴ and lastly by carrying out airstrikes against ISIL targets in Syria as part of the US-led anti-ISIL coalition.⁴⁵ The threat posed by Salafist Jihadist groups in neighbouring Iraq and Syria and their supporters (both actual and potential) inside Jordan does not seem likely to disappear in the near future.

Deepening Economic Crisis

The second negative consequence of the Arab Spring for Jordan was its deepening economic crisis. Throughout 2011, the government tried to quell the protests by introducing several subsidies, salary increases and grant programs. In the first two weeks of the protests, for instance, a US\$ 550 million package of subsidies was introduced.⁴⁶ In September 2011, the government even sacked the Central Bank Governor, Faris Sharaf, whose insistence on fiscal austerity measures was jeopardizing the government's welfare projects.⁴⁷ All these

projects eventually increased the burden on the national budget and destabilized the Kingdom's economy.

There were also some critical economic losses due to factors out of Jordan's control. The Kingdom was badly affected by interruptions in the flow of cheap Egyptian natural gas to the Kingdom due to several terrorist attacks on the pipeline in the Sinai Peninsula after the Egyptian Revolution. Egyptian gas was covering nearly 80% of Jordan's electricity production and its disruption forced the Jordanian government to resort to more expensive short-term alternatives, dramatically increasing losses of the state-owned National Electricity Power Company.⁴⁸ Due to the fact that the flow of Egyptian natural gas had not as of 2014 resumed to pre-revolution levels, the Jordanian government began considering other long-term cost-effective energy alternatives, such as Israeli natural gas, nuclear energy, renewable energy resources, and oil shale.⁴⁹

Another burden on Jordan's economy has been the ongoing crisis in Syria. Apart from blocking Jordan's trade route to the north, the crisis has brought a serious refugee problem for Jordan, which is already home to over two million Palestinian and 30,000 Iraqi refugees. According to the UN Refugee Agency, as of 2014, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan reached 610,000, of whom more than 80% live in cities.⁵⁰

Accommodation, food, water, health, education, employment and other basic needs of the Syrian refugees, which account for 10% of the total Jordanian population, put a heavy burden on the country's already limited resources. It is reported that, as of March 2014, the government has spent around US\$ 1.5 billion for Syrian refugees. More than half of this amount was covered by Jordan, and the rest was funded by international donors.⁵¹ Additionally, sporadic riots of Syrians in the Zaatari refugee camp, which is home to over 80,000 refugees, has to a certain extent deteriorated the security situation in the country.⁵²

The Jordanian economy is still suffering from the negative consequences of the Arab Spring revolts and remains highly dependent on foreign aid and loans for fiscal stability.

As a result of all the above-mentioned factors, the Jordanian budget deficit's ratio to GNP (excluding foreign grants) rose sharply from 7.7% in 2010 to 12.6% in 2011 and then gradually fell to 9.7% in 2012 and 8.1% in 2013.⁵³ The deadly riots of November 2012 against IMF-imposed austerity measures clearly demonstrated the social and political

costs of fiscal discipline in Jordan. Overall, the Jordanian economy is still suffering from the negative consequences of the Arab Spring revolts and remains highly dependent on foreign aid and loans for fiscal stability. Although dependency and vulnerability have always been main features of the Jordanian economy, these figures clearly show that the Arab Spring exacerbated this situation even further.

Growing Unrest among East Bankers

The third challenge that the Hashemite regime faced during the Arab Spring was the extensive mobilization of urban and rural East Bankers against the political and economic system. East Bankers are the native population of Jordan, later outnumbered by Palestinians who came to Jordan and become Jordanian subjects as a result of the successive Arab-Israeli wars of the 20th century. Since they have always been the powerbase of the Hashemite regime and the main source of personnel for the bureaucracy and the security apparatus,⁵⁴ the East Bankers' growing disaffection and possible mobilization against the regime is generally considered the most threatening scenario of instability in Jordan.⁵⁵ Considering the decades-old mutual mistrust between the Monarchy and the (mostly lower and middle class) Palestinian majority, loss of East Banker support may have devastating results for the Hashemite regime.

The disenfranchisement of East Bankers had already started in the 1990s with the introduction of neoliberal economic policies that generally favoured urban upper classes (mostly Palestinian) and disfavoured the rural classes and public employees (mostly East Banker).⁵⁶ During the reign of King Abdullah II, neoliberal policies gained more vigour, and eventually a young generation of (mostly Palestinian) businesspersons started to be politically relevant.⁵⁷ This gradual ethnic and class based drift within the power elites of the Kingdom has caused growing discontent among the East Banker population and encouraged their active participation in the Arab Spring protests. Above all, it has become common among many East Bankers to associate the widespread corruption and economic hardships in the country with the largely Palestinian urban elite.⁵⁸

One of the most important signs of the East Banker population's dissatisfaction with the regime was the famous petition of the National Committee of Military Veterans addressed to the King in May 2010, nearly one year before the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In this petition, the veterans expressed their concerns regarding the neoliberal economic policies, widespread corruption, and the growing influence of Palestinians in the Kingdom.⁵⁹ Moreover, in February 2011, 36 figures from prominent East Banker tribes issued a statement in which they

directly accused Queen Rania, who is of Palestinian origin, of "building power centres for her interest".⁶⁰

Most of the new opposition movements that were formed in the course of the Arab Spring also had a greater East Banker composition, although they are neither ethnic nor anti-Palestinian movements.

Perhaps the most remarkable symbol of the East Bankers' dissatisfaction with the current regime is the still ongoing unrest in the southern city of Maan. The impoverished city has witnessed sporadic bloody riots and clashes between the security forces and local population since 2011.⁶¹ Even more alarming for the regime is the growing popularity of Salafist jihadist groups like ISIL among the younger Maanis, who are marginalized by poverty and state repression.⁶² At this point, it is important to note that Salafism is particularly appealing for tribal East Banker Islamists, who consider the JMB as a Palestinian-oriented organization.⁶³

Most of the new opposition movements that were formed in the course of the Arab Spring also had a greater East Banker composition, although they are neither ethnic nor anti-Palestinian movements. For instance, Jayeen and the Youth of March 24, two of the most

remarkable new opposition movements, were composed of mainly urban East Banker reformists.⁶⁴ More crucially, during the Arab Spring, Jordan also witnessed the mobilization of the East Banker tribal youth in the rural areas for economic and political reforms. This trend was collectively called “Hirak”, and it encompassed nearly 40 autonomous tribal youth movements from across the country.⁶⁵ Hirak protesters became quite famous with the high tone of their criticism of the regime. Some of them violated redlines of the Hashemite regime not only by ridiculing King Abdullah but also by proposing his half-brother and former crown prince Hamzah as the new king, arguing that he would get along better with the East Banker tribes.⁶⁶ Despite lacking a grand organization and coordination, Hirak represented the widespread dissatisfaction of younger generations of rural East Bankers.

Opportunities

Soaring Foreign Aid

The first opportunity that the Arab Spring created for Jordan was the increasing amount of foreign aid. The political turbulence caused by the Arab Spring in the region helped the Hashemite regime considerably to tap additional political, economic and military assistance from foreign actors who have an interest in Jordan’s stability.

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As a moderate, pro-Western kingdom which has a peace agreement with neighbouring Israel, Jordan has received enormous assistance from the Western countries. The United States, the primary foreign donor of Jordan, has raised its financial assistance steadily since 2011. The total amount of Economic Support Fund allocated to Jordan rose from US\$ 362 million in 2011 to US\$ 460 million in 2012, to US\$ 564.4 million in 2013 and to US\$ 700 million in 2014.⁶⁷ Additionally, the US administration provided a total amount of US\$ 2.25 billion in loan guarantees to Jordan on two separate occasions in 2013 and 2014,⁶⁸ and more than US\$ 388 million toward the needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan.⁶⁹

The US augmented its military cooperation with Jordan as well. In December 2012 a US task force of “planners and other specialists” was sent to Jordan to help the Jordanian Army defend its border with Syria. This was followed by the deployment of a US Army headquarters element of

200 personnel in April 2013 to “detect and stop chemical weapons transfers along Jordan’s border with Syria”. Lastly, in June 2013, after participating in a military training exercise in Jordan, the US administration left “a Patriot missile battery and its associated support systems, F-16 fighter aircraft, and various command and control personnel” in Jordan in order to support the Jordanian Army.⁷⁰

The European Union is the other major Western power assisting Jordan during this period. In addition to its €223 million assistance in the framework of European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument Assistance between 2011 and 2013, the EU decided at a meeting between Jordan and the EU Task Force in February 2012 to provide Jordan with an additional €70 million from the Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth Programme.⁷¹ At the same meeting, the EU members also pledged to give Jordan nearly €2.7 billion as loans and grants until 2015.⁷² Lastly, as of May 2014, the EU Commission has channelled to Jordan €246.4 million in response to the Syrian refugee crisis.⁷³

Along with Western states, the IMF and World Bank have provided tremendous assistance to Jordan. The IMF’s US\$ 2.05 billion loan in August 2012 was complemented with World Bank loans and grants, which have amounted to US\$ 700 million since 2011.⁷⁴

Apart from Jordan’s Western allies, some regional countries that deem the Monarchy’s collapse as a red-line for their own security have extended a hand to the Kingdom as well. Here, Saudi Arabia’s effort to keep the revolutionary fervour away from fellow Arab monarchies is most striking. Riyadh’s US\$ 1.4 billion grant in cash to Jordan was vital in covering the Kingdom’s budget deficit in 2011.⁷⁵ Moreover, the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) offered membership to Jordan and Morocco in May 2011, apparently as a sign of Sunni, pro-Western Arab monarchies’ solidarity against the revolutionary currents of the Arab Spring.⁷⁶ Although the GCC membership was not realized due to internal GCC opposition, the body decided in December 2011 to offer Jordan US\$ 5 billion in development aid over the next five years, delivery of which began in 2013.⁷⁷ Lastly, in January 2013, Saudi Arabia decided to send aid worth US\$ 10 billion to help Syrian refugees inside Jordan.⁷⁸

Israel is also quite anxious about the stability of the Jordanian monarchy, with which it has had a peace agreement since 1994. Israeli officials stated to their European counterparts that the stability of the *status quo* in Jordan is a red-line for them.⁷⁹ King Abdullah tried to maintain this tacit alliance by levelling down his criticism of Israel. The Israelis, in turn, allowed Amman to host exploratory talks between Israel and the

Palestinian Authority in January 2012, in part to help the King to improve his image and position.⁸⁰ Although bilateral relations were not upgraded officially during the Arab Spring, Israel continues to see Jordan as a buffer state against the rising turbulence and radical Islamism in the region. As an example of this, in July 2014, Israel clearly stated that it is ready to help Jordan by all means in case of an ISIL-led attack against Jordan.⁸¹

As the revolutionary fervour caused by the swift regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt gradually dimmed due to the ongoing political instability in those countries and prolonged bloody inner conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the majority of Jordanians became more appreciative of the relative security and stability they enjoy in the Kingdom.

Overall, Jordan seems to buttress both its economy and strategic position mainly thanks to Western and regional powers, which have high stakes in the Kingdom's stability and security. As of 2014, Jordan seems to have maintained economic stability to a certain extent, yet it remains highly dependent on external aid, which reached US\$ 1.6

billion in 2013.⁸² It is also reported that the Jordanian government manages to benefit from the Syrian refugee crisis by exaggerating the total number of Syrians in Jordan in order to tap more aid from the international community.⁸³

Dissuading Effects of the Conflicts in the Region

Another important advantage that the Hashemite regime enjoys thanks to the Arab Spring is the dissuading effects of ongoing instability and insecurity in Jordan's neighbourhood. As the revolutionary fervour caused by the swift regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt gradually dimmed due to the ongoing political instability in those countries and prolonged bloody inner conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the majority of Jordanians became more appreciative of the relative security and stability they enjoy in the Kingdom.⁸⁴ This feeling was further beefed up with recent advances of ISIL in Iraq.

Actually, in contradiction with the republican regimes in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, the Hashemite regime in Jordan does not have a reputation of brutal repression against political dissent.⁸⁵ Once the Arab Spring broke out, rather than blocking the protests completely, the regime hastened to make amendments to the Public Assemblies Law in May 2011 to abrogate the necessity to get permission prior to demonstrations.⁸⁶ More

importantly, the security forces received strict orders from the King not to use excessive force against the demonstrators—though three people died during the protests nonetheless.⁸⁷ Moreover, after many incidents of clashes between reformist and loyalist demonstrators in 2011, regime officials even pressured the latter to cancel their protests on some occasions to prevent clashes, as was the case on the eve of big JMB protests in Amman in October 2012.⁸⁸

Consequently, comparisons with neighbouring countries has generally had moderating and even dissuading effects on popular protests in Jordan, and thus, the number of protests has diminished sharply from 2013 on.⁸⁹

The King's Image Management

Lastly, the Arab Spring created a unique opportunity for the King in terms of image management. Throughout the Arab Spring, King Abdullah portrayed himself as a committed reformer fighting against the powers of the *status quo*. He underlined on numerous occasions that there are certain centres of power (in his words, the “old guards”) within the regime that are resisting reform. These conservative political elites, according to the King, have penetrated very critical institutions like the GID, and have been subverting his reform efforts for some time.⁹⁰ When the Arab Spring came, the King remarked, the Monarchy was able

to “overcome this resistance to change and forge ahead with accelerated, more comprehensive and ambitious reform.”⁹¹ With this discourse, the King sought to create a “reformist King” image among the public.

Yet, for the King, defending “comprehensive and ambitious reform,” does not necessarily mean that it should be swift. In contrast, he has emphasized that more time and effort is needed for the empowerment of the middle class and the development of nation-wide political parties, which are considered two vital elements of a liberal parliamentary democracy.⁹² Otherwise, it will result in chaos and instability. Regarding the political parties, he says that “the vision is for Jordan to have two to five political parties, ideally representing left, right and centre.”⁹³ Considering the fact that the IAF is the most organized and powerful political party in Jordan, what the King aspires for is the development of other political parties that can compete with the IAF in nation-wide parliamentary elections and prevent the monopoly of the JMB in power in case of genuine political opening up. Apparently with the same rationale, Western governments seem to be content with the King's incremental approach to reform in Jordan.⁹⁴ Hence, the King is able to portray himself as a pro-reform figure, while at the same time trying to convince the public that reforms should proceed slowly.

In this atmosphere, the regime's gradualist approach to political reform, which has won the consent of its Western allies, further diminished the possibility of the JMB's coming to power.

Furthermore, during the Arab Spring, King Abdullah took advantage of being an "individual monarch" by making frequent cabinet shuffles in the name of reform. Such moves are more difficult to make in the "dynastic monarchies" of the Gulf, where the key government posts are occupied by family members of the ruling dynasty.⁹⁵ Using the prime ministers (and the cabinet) as a safety valve by sacking them frequently is a well-known tactic of the Hashemite monarchy to defuse public anger in times of crisis since the political opening up of 1989.⁹⁶ By changing the prime minister four times in two years, King Abdullah seems to have employed this tactic quite actively and successfully during the Arab Spring. Consequently, this tactic further helped the King save his pro-reform image.

Conclusion

When all factors are taken into consideration, it seems that the Arab Spring brought more advantages to the Hashemite regime than disadvantages.

This is not to say that the Jordanian regime is completely immune to the revolutionary fervour. To the contrary, as a small and vulnerable state with a fragmented society, Jordan will always be exposed to the potential destabilizing effects of developments in its neighbourhood, over which it has almost no control. However, taking a closer look at the particular case of the Arab Spring, it seems that the major challenges that the Jordanian regime faced during this period either disappeared or have been outbalanced by the opportunities it enjoyed.

The rising violence and instability in the neighbourhood simply increased the value and legitimacy of the Jordanian regime in the eyes of the Jordanian public.

First of all, regarding the Islamist challenge, the Jordanian regime seems to be quite confident mainly due to the steady weakening of the JMB since the ouster of the Egyptian MB from power in 2013, which resulted in a serious divide within the movement. In this atmosphere, the regime's gradualist approach to political reform, which has won the consent of its Western allies, further diminished the possibility of the JMB's coming to power. It can be argued that the JMB's status as a legal opposition

movement lowers its chances to directly challenge the regime. Being aware of this situation, the Monarch is not willing to impose a total ban on the movement.

As for the radical Islamist movements like Al Nusrah and ISIL, they appeal to only a small minority of the Jordanian population in certain cities, remain divided among themselves, and are unlikely to defeat the Jordanian Army, which, unlike the Syrian and Iraqi Armies is still a strong, professional and unitary force backing the regime. Furthermore, the US and Israel will certainly be eager to intervene in case the Jordanian Army fails to stop these movements.

Secondly, regarding the deepening economic problems, it should first be noted that ever since its independence in 1946, Jordan has generally suffered economic hardships and refugee crises and been dependent on external resources. Therefore, the economic hardships and the refugee crisis that the Arab Spring caused are neither a new phenomenon for the regime nor something it cannot deal with. Moreover, it is not difficult to predict that foreign assistance will continue to flow into Jordan in increasing amounts, since major Western and regional actors still give utmost importance to its stability.

Thirdly, regarding the growing unrest among East Bankers, the regime now seems to be at ease mainly due to the ongoing infighting in Syria and

instability in Egypt. Almost none of the East Bankers desire their country to be dragged into a fierce infighting like Syria, and thus, they eventually turned out to praise the stability they enjoy in Jordan and to refrain from further protests. The rising violence and instability in the neighbourhood simply increased the value and legitimacy of the Jordanian regime in the eyes of the Jordanian public. At this point, it should also be noted that the ongoing tense situation in Maan, which witnessed a number of deadly riots during 2014, cannot be generalized to the whole country. Overall, as the regional turmoil does not seem likely to end in the foreseeable future, the Jordanian regime will continue to benefit from this conjuncture for a long time.

The long term sustainability of Jordan's stability is still questionable since it is highly dependent on external factors, namely the regional conjuncture and foreign assistance.

In view of above, it can be easily argued that the Hashemite regime successfully dealt with the main instabilities caused by the Arab Spring and remained as an island of stability and security in a turbulent region. However, the long term sustainability of Jordan's stability is still questionable since it is highly

dependent on external factors, namely the regional conjuncture and foreign assistance. Thus, regarding the academic debate about the resilience of Arab monarchies during the Arab Spring, Jordan's experience shows that the two main factors in the regime's survival, namely increasing foreign assistance and dissuading effects of conflicts in the region, are exogenous to the Monarchy. Yet, factors endogenous to the regime do have relevance as well. As an individual monarch, King Abdullah successfully took advantage of the Arab Spring

not only by using the successive Prime Ministers and cabinets as a safety valve against potentially destructive public anger, but also by portraying himself as a pro-reform figure struggling against the *status quo* powers within the regime. These tactics are more related with the institutional structure of the Hashemite regime rather than external factors, and not shared by most of other Arab monarchies. Therefore, the Hashemite monarchy's survival was a result of both exogenous and endogenous factors.

Endnotes

- 1 The remaining monarchies in the Arab world are Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain.
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Post-2014 Drawdown and Afghanistan's Transition Challenges

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Abstract

The prospects of a post 2014 drawdown of foreign troops from Afghanistan and the subsequent transition process have raised concerns about the capacity of the Afghan state to endure the challenges of transition. The process of security transition was initiated in 2011 with the handing over of security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces. The passing years have exposed the weaknesses of the Afghan forces while highlighting future security challenges for Afghanistan. Likewise, the process of political transition has been completed by the formation of a Unity Government in Afghanistan. The task of economic transition is a challenging one as it depends on the transformation of the Afghan economy. The paper aims at identifying the transition challenges and their implications for Afghanistan. It discusses the interests and policies of various stakeholders in the Afghan conflict. The paper highlights the role of regional states in facilitating the transition while defining its significance for regional stability.

Key Words

Afghanistan, transition, BSA, ISAF, Elections, TAPI and CASA-1000.

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Introduction

Since October 2001, when the US-led NATO forces launched the 'war on terror,' Afghanistan has remained under the control of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Though a political government has been in place since 2002, it has worked in consultation with the US and coalition forces.

After a lengthy and expensive war, Afghanistan is passing through various phases of transition. Before proceeding further, it is important to understand the concept of transition. It is one that has been described as follows:

Transition is a multifaceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources (means) in a sovereign territory to influence institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals (ends) guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently complex and may include multiple smaller scale transitions that occur simultaneously or sequentially. These small scale activities focus on building specific institutional capacities intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term goals.¹

Afghanistan's transition process can be termed as a cross-institutional transition- security, political and economic- that 'explores the interdependencies of simultaneous transitions.'² At the regional and international levels, security transition has remained the most discussed issue while the political and economic transitions somehow could not get as much importance as they deserved. All three, security, political, and economic transitions are interdependent and complement each other.

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The security transition was initiated in 2011 as the first transition, and it continued till the end of 2014. The political transition in Afghanistan was much awaited due to its significance in complementing the security and economic transitions. In this regard, Afghanistan's presidential elections of 2014 can be termed as the first step towards political transition. A successful political transition will enhance the confidence of donor states to support the process of economic transition from a war economy to a self-sustaining economy.

Afghanistan's Security Transition

Of the three transitions, the security transition in Afghanistan has remained a much debated issue. The debate has been dominated by the withdrawal of Coalition Forces, the handing over of security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the post-2014 challenges faced by Afghan forces.

The guidelines for security transition were set in the NATO Summit held in Lisbon in 2010. It was decided to hand over security responsibilities to ANSF by the end of 2014. The plans for the withdrawal of NATO combat troops were also endorsed at the Chicago Summit in 2012.³

The pace for Afghanistan's security transition was set with the ANSF's assuming of security responsibility across the country. Security was handed over to the Afghan forces in a phased manner with the first phase starting on 22 March 2011. President Karzai announced the initiation of the first phase of security transition with the handing over of security responsibility to ANSF in seven districts and provinces.⁴ The second phase of transition began on 27 November 2011 and following this phase Afghan Forces became responsible for the security of areas comprising fifty percent of Afghanistan's population.⁵

With the initiation of the third phase of security transition on 13 May 2012, the security of all the provincial capitals across Afghanistan, comprising around seventy five percent of Afghan population became the responsibility of ANSF.⁶ On 31 December 2012, President Karzai announced the fourth phase of security transition. With this announcement twenty three provinces out of thirty four came under the control of ANSF. With the launch of the fifth and final phase of the transition process on 18 June 2013, the remaining eleven provinces came under ANSF control, which had been taking the tactical lead in executing combat operations against the insurgents.

With the handing over of security responsibility to Afghan forces, the focus of the NATO-led ISAF shifted from combat operations to supporting the capabilities of ANSF.⁷ The process of withdrawal of coalition forces has continued for quite some time as the number of US troops declined from 100,000 in 2010 to 66,000 in 2013.⁸ By February 2014, United States forces were reduced to 33,000 and a likewise decrease has been noted in the number of NATO-led ISAF forces.⁹ The presence of US troops as well as NATO forces in the Post-December 2014 period was to be decided by the signing of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and Afghanistan.

Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)

The much delayed BSA was signed on 30 September 2014, a day after President Ghani took office. Dialogue over the BSA had been dominating US-Afghanistan relations since 2013 due to the differences over contentious issues that had stalled the negotiation process. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai wanted to secure “firm, specific and multi-year financial aid commitments” from the US, but these were rejected because making such pledges was in violation of US law, under which Congress allocates foreign aid on a yearly basis.¹⁰ Another issue during the negotiations had been the key US demand to continue counter-terrorism operations to target Al-Qaeda independently after 2014, while President Karzai insisted on channeling these operations through ANSF, with the US only sharing intelligence. Another non-negotiable US requirement from the Afghan government had been the demand for granting legal immunity to US troops staying in Afghanistan after 2014. President Karzai finally agreed to most of the provisions of the BSA except for the issue of granting legal immunity to US troops, and made the final approval of the agreement conditional to the endorsement of the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly of Afghans). Members of the Loya Jirga endorsed the signing of the BSA but President

Karzai, notwithstanding the approval of the Jirga, further delayed signing of the agreement until the new President was sworn into the office.

The BSA came into force on 1 January 2015 and will remain in force 'until the end of 2024 and beyond' unless terminated by either side on two years notice. It allowed 10,000 United States troops to stay in Afghanistan after the combat mission ended on 31 December 2014.

Under the BSA, the United States will undertake supporting activities by primarily focusing on enhancing the capability of Afghan forces by 'advising, training, equipping, supporting and sustaining' these forces.¹¹

Under the BSA annexes, the US military will have access to nine land and air bases, including the massive airfields at Bagram, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. These bases will not only be used for air operations in Afghanistan but also for launching US drone strikes that continue across the border in the tribal area of Pakistan.¹² The additional bases in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Helmand, Gardez and Shindand will ensure American military access across Afghanistan.¹³

The Afghan government agreed to grant legal immunity to American troops by accepting the United States' exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over its soldiers who commit any criminal or

civil offences in Afghanistan.¹⁴ The text of the BSA clearly indicates that US military's counter-terrorism operations are intended to complement and support Afghan forces' counter-terrorism operations, with Afghan forces taking the lead in operations that could include entry into homes.¹⁵

The United States reiterated its commitment to seek funds on a yearly basis to support the training and equipping of Afghan forces so that they can address internal as well as external threats. The BSA also touches upon the issue of external aggression and affirms that Washington and Kabul will work together to develop an appropriate response- considering political, military and economic measures.¹⁶

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the NATO-Resolute Support Mission

After completion of the ISAF mission in December 2014, the training and assistance for Afghan forces would be provided by a new follow on NATO-led 'Resolute Support Mission' commencing in 1 January 2015.¹⁷ The legal framework for the Resolute Support Mission was provided by the 'Status of Forces Agreement' which was also signed on the same day as the BSA.

Given the lacking capabilities of Afghan forces in intelligence-gathering and logistics, the signing of the security agreements to train the nascent Afghan forces was considered imperative for the presence of coalition forces whose legal mandate was to expire in December 2014.

This agreement lays down the terms and conditions under which NATO forces will be deployed in Afghanistan. Approximately 12,000 personnel from NATO and partner nations will be deployed in support of the mission. This agreement only covers the capacity building of Afghan forces and does not cover counter terrorism cooperation.¹⁸ Given the lacking capabilities of Afghan forces in intelligence-gathering and logistics, the signing of the security agreements to train the nascent Afghan forces was considered imperative for the presence of coalition forces whose legal mandate was to expire in December 2014.¹⁹

In this context, one should not ignore the phenomenon of “insider attacks,” as the signing of the BSA and the presence of foreign troops may enhance tension between Afghan forces and foreign troops, much like increased friction between Afghan forces and the ISAF

was observed during 2012. Though some Afghan soldiers had attacked the coalition forces since 2006, these incidents greatly increased in number in 2012, when a 40% increase from 2011 was noted in “insider attacks,” eventually resulting in the reduction of forward deployment of ISAF troops with Afghan forces. Various measures were taken to reduce such incidents, but these attacks could not be eliminated.²⁰

The Afghan National Security Forces and Future Challenges

The Afghan National Security Forces consist of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Air Force (AIF), and the Afghan National Police (ANP) along with the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Afghanistan's intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS).²¹

The Afghan Security Forces have reached their full target strength of 350,000.²² With the assumption of tactical responsibilities across the country, the ANSF have been suffering intense casualties. According to a statement released by former President Hamid Karzai's Cabinet, the Council of Ministers, more than 13,000 Afghan soldiers and police officers have been killed and around 16,511 Afghan soldiers and police officers have been

wounded during the war.²³ Most of these losses occurred during the last three years and reportedly the Afghan death toll is four times higher than that of the international coalition forces, which during the 13 year conflict lost 3,425 soldiers, out of which 2,313 were American.²⁴

To keep the morale of the forces high, Afghan officials have not been disclosing the death toll of the Afghan forces, but these statistics raise important questions about the capability and effectiveness of Afghan forces to sustain themselves on prolonged basis. An important reason for the inefficiency of the Afghan forces has been the lack of sufficient training. To meet the demand for increased numbers of Afghan forces, the quality of training has been compromised.

The Afghan security forces have also been facing the challenge of high attrition rates, which present a risk to the sustainability of the future force. Attrition not only threatens the force's long-term effectiveness it adds pressure on the recruitment process and is a waste of training resources.²⁵

Moreover, logistics has always been a problem for any regular force in Afghanistan and it remains a challenge today. An ineffective logistic capability, difficult terrain, and the ability of irregular forces to disrupt lines of communications all inhibit the operational tempo of the forces.²⁶

Apart from these issues, the diverse ethnic composition of the Afghan army has been the biggest challenge to achieving cohesion in the ANSF. Contrary to the ethnic proportion of the general population, the over-representation of ex-Northern Alliance Tajiks and the under-representation of Southern Pashtuns, particularly among the officer class, has been noted. The task of ethnic balancing could be even more challenging and may further enhance ethnic fissures by strengthening the ethnic identities while compromising loyalty to the national army.²⁷

Furthermore, Afghanistan's tribal culture and history also pose a formidable challenge to the development and sustainability of the Afghan army. Afghan history shows that reformation of the national army has in the past led to the over-development of the army. It not just became too powerful to be controlled by the state but also threatened the tribal structure of the state. Thus, state and tribes both sought to undermine it by raising tribal levies and private militias to maintain the balance of power.²⁸

Not just the Afghan army but the Afghan Air Force also faces serious challenges and lags far behind expectations. Its training and development will be an important task for NATO forces staying in Afghanistan post-2014. As far as the Afghan National Police is concerned, it has been transformed from a paramilitary force to

a civilian force, with police capabilities to maintain law and order throughout the country. The US Special Forces have trained the 18,000 personnel of the Afghan Local Police that has contributed to maintaining stability in some areas, but the possibility of a reemergence of warlord militias seriously threatens the future efficacy of the force.²⁹

Afghanistan's long term stability depends on ANSF, which faces many challenges. Apart from ethnic imbalances and operational deficiencies, ANSF needs to secure enduring financial commitments from Western states. The signing of the BSA and the Status of Forces Agreement with NATO will ensure the financial assistance to train and further develop the capabilities of ANSF.

Political Transition

To ensure a successful political transition, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework postulated the development by early 2013 of a comprehensive election timeline for electoral preparations.³⁰ Following these guidelines, the Afghan government introduced two parliamentary bills that were approved and ratified by the National Assembly and the Afghan President. The first bill was to restructure the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), and

after approval it came to be known as the Structural Law. The second bill laid out election procedures and policies and after approval it came to be known as the Electoral Law. These laws were passed to ensure fair elections, to prevent presidential control over the independent election commission and to prevent the interference of other governmental agencies in the electoral process. Given the previous controversies in the 2009-2010 elections, the new legislation was deemed necessary to improve the election monitoring system and to enhance transparency.

Notwithstanding the electoral reforms and legislation, the Afghan Presidential elections held in April 2014 gave rise to a political crisis due to the inability of any one candidate to secure more than 50% of votes in the elections. It is enunciated in the Afghan constitution that a candidate must secure more than 50% of votes otherwise run-off elections will be held to decide the successful candidate. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who has a mixed Tajik-Pashtun background and has been a leader of the Northern Alliance, had a lead in getting 44.5% of votes. He had served as Foreign Minister during President Karzai's first term in office and had been a candidate during the 2009 Presidential elections in Afghanistan as well. Dr. Ashraf Ghani, an ethnic Pashtun and a former World Bank official, secured 31.5% of the votes.³¹

Given the ethnic polarization of Afghan society and ethnic rivalries, there were fears that run-off elections might spur a new wave of violence and instability while further highlighting the ethnic cleavages within Afghan society. Contrary to these fears, the Afghan people enthusiastically participated in the elections with an impressive voter turnout.

The Afghan run-off elections, which were held on June 14, 2014 between the front-runners of the April elections, Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ashraf Ghani, did give rise to controversies. The Independent Election Commission announced results of the run-off elections showing Mr. Ghani leading with 56.4% of votes to Mr. Abdullah's 43.6%.³² Mr. Abdullah, charging fraud, rejected the election results and demanded an audit of suspected ballots.

Dr. Abdullah's refusal to accept the election results prolonged the political deadlock. In this context, US Secretary of State John Kerry held talks with Mr. Ghani and Mr. Abdullah to broker the election dispute. US intervention ultimately resolved the issue by creating a National Unity Government in Afghanistan. The unity government was formed as a power sharing agreement where Mr. Ghani became the President of Afghanistan and Mr. Abdullah took charge as Chief Executive Officer.

The new post of chief executive was created for Mr. Abdullah and he was

granted 50% share in the cabinet. He will become the Prime Minister after the convening of the Loya Jirga in two years' time to approve the constitutional amendment required for this purpose.³³

A significant aspect for peaceful political transition relates to future good governance in Afghanistan, as the Karzai government was highly criticized for rampant corruption and mismanagement.

After taking oath as President on September 29, 2014, Mr. Ghani promised to form the cabinet within 45 days, in consultation with the Chief Executive, but it took him almost three months to announce 25 nominees after lengthy negotiations with Mr. Abdullah. These cabinet nominees had to get the approval of the Parliament but unfortunately only 8 of 25 were approved by the Afghan parliament.³⁴ The key positions of Ministers of Economy, Defence and Justice all remain vacant so far.

The Afghan presidential elections have been the decisive factor in determining future political stability. Another significant aspect for peaceful political transition relates to future good governance in Afghanistan, as the Karzai government was highly criticized for rampant corruption and

mismanagement. Afghanistan has long been lacking political watchdogs, so introducing political reforms will not be an easy task for the Afghan government. As far as the role of other states in facilitating Afghanistan's political process is concerned, Indonesia and Tanzania, the two states with large Muslim populations and impressive track records in eliminating corruption and improving governance, can be given the task of helping to bring about political reforms in Afghanistan.³⁵

Reconciliation with the Taliban

Political transition will remain inconclusive unless the reconciliation process with insurgent groups is resumed and successfully completed. Dialogue with the Taliban has been the most challenging task so far. It is more than a tripartite affair because the concerns of different stakeholders also matter in defining the terms of engaging with the Taliban. The outcomes of reconciliation have to be acceptable not just for the Afghan government, the Taliban and the United States, but also for Afghanistan's ethnic minorities, who have been dominating the political and military affairs of the country for more than a decade. Initially, Dr. Abdullah opposed the talks with the Taliban but later on changed his stance, while Mr. Ghani has long been urging reconciliation with the Taliban.

Before anticipating the future of the reconciliation process, it would be desirable to briefly review the past efforts to engage the insurgent groups. An important factor that hindered the reconciliation process from the beginning has been the lack of trust among the three parties to the Afghan conflict regarding their divergent interests in engaging the insurgents.

President Karzai, while highlighting the policy priorities of his government in 2009, identified peace and reconciliation as the key areas of focus.³⁶ To achieve this objective, the National Consultative Peace Jirga was convened in 2010. Though the Jirga composition was highly criticized due to the dominant presence of warlords it nevertheless succeeded in building national consensus on conditions under which direct negotiations between the Afghan government and the insurgent groups would take place. A resolution was adopted by the Jirga participants that called upon all parties to avoid discussing contentious issues that might harm national unity and limit the reconciliation options. It sought security and safety guarantees for those willing to quit the insurgency, and also called for speedy training of the Afghan National Security Forces. It proposed the establishment of a High Peace Council (HPC) to overview the implementation of the Jirga's resolution at the district and provincial levels and the establishment of a committee to deal with 'Prisoners Release' issues.³⁷

The High Peace Council was formed through a Presidential decree in October 2011. The Council was chaired by former Afghan President and prominent Northern Alliance leader Burhanuddin Rabbani. After his assassination in April 2012, his son assumed the chairmanship of the Council. The HPC not just involved the political actors to formulate the reconciliation strategy but also reached out to the neighboring and regional states to get their support for the Afghan led peace process.

The failure of US military strategy to defeat the Taliban changed the United States approach towards reconciliation with the Taliban as the Obama Administration showed willingness to reach out to moderate elements within the Afghan Taliban.

On the issue of reconciliation with the Taliban, the composition of the HPC was criticized due to the presence of warlords who remained involved in the war against the Taliban, and for most of its members being known as having “war expertise rather than peace expertise”, a factor that had a negative impact on building trust and confidence between the Afghan government and the Taliban.³⁸

The most daunting task for the United States Administration has been to bring the Karzai government and the Taliban to the negotiating table. The mistrust between the two parties has remained an irritant in the initiation of the peace process. The Afghan Government and the US Administration had diverging views on the reconciliation and reintegration process. Initially, the United States agreed to reintegrate the mid-level Taliban into mainstream society but was unwilling to include top leadership in the reconciliation process, while the Karzai Government was willing to hold talks with Taliban leadership.

The failure of US military strategy to defeat the Taliban changed the United States approach towards reconciliation with the Taliban as the Obama Administration showed willingness to reach out to moderate elements within the Afghan Taliban. The US bypassed the Afghan government and held secret talks with the Taliban. In November 2010, direct contact between US officials and the Taliban was facilitated by German and Qatari officials in Munich, Germany. The preliminary talks started in February 2011 in Doha and came to be known as the Doha Process. The opening of a Doha office showed the willingness of the two parties to the Afghan conflict, the US and the Taliban, to negotiate. It also highlighted the desire to seek a political end to the war. Taliban representatives set preconditions for the

release of five Taliban prisoners detained in Guantanamo Bay and in return they offered to release an American soldier, Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, held prisoner since 2009. The US refusal to agree on a prisoners release agreement stalled the Doha process, which could not be revived until after 18 months, when the Taliban agreed to resume talks.

President Karzai has always remained distrustful of the United States and other Western partners regarding dialogue with the Taliban and it became evident from President Karzai's criticism and opposition of the Doha Peace process. He boycotted the process mainly due to the Taliban's use of the Islamic Emirates flag and plaque at the Taliban office and also suspended talks over the BSA.³⁹ As a result, the US held back on direct talks with the Taliban. President Karzai always wanted to be at the center of any dialogue process with the Taliban and also feared that if such an initiative worked out well it would give the Taliban international legitimacy as a significant political actor in Afghan politics. He demanded the closure of the Taliban Office and in response Qatari officials removed the plaque and flag.

Taliban representatives have rejected the election process and the legitimacy of the new President as well. President Ashraf Ghani, after coming to power, invited the Afghan Taliban to join in a peace process. The Taliban highlighted three conditions for ending the Afghan conflict.⁴⁰ Firstly, all foreigners should

immediately leave Afghanistan. Secondly, all the agreements including the security pact with the US should be cancelled. Thirdly, an Islamic government should be established.⁴¹ This three point agenda of the Taliban is now being taken seriously and is posing challenges to the new government in Afghanistan.

Economic Transition

Apart from the political and security transitions, transformation of Afghanistan's war economy, which is heavily dependent on foreign assistance, will be a real challenge in the post-2014 drawdown of forces. Despite more than a decade of western aid and assistance to make the Afghan economy self-sustaining, the budget shortfall has been constantly increasing.

According to World Bank estimates, Afghanistan will need more than US\$ 7 billion annually over the next decade to sustain a functional government, to maintain infrastructure and to fund the Afghan Army and Police. But the real concern has been the willingness of donors to provide funds.

An analysis of the United States strategy regarding Afghan transition shows that economic transition had remained a neglected subject and has not been able to gain as much importance as the security and political transitions. Given the lack of an integrated economic strategy, the

US interagency policy group produced a document in September 2009 entitled 'US Economic Growth Strategy for Afghanistan: FY 2009-2011.'⁴² The document suggested that US economic policy should be based on four pillars: job creation; providing basic services; the construction of infrastructure; and the development of fiscal sustainability.⁴³ Though prospects for sustained economic growth did not get the desired attention, development of logistics and transit facilities has been an integral part of US counter-insurgency strategy.⁴⁴

Similarly, a report co-authored by S. Frederick Starr and Andrew C. Kuchins in May 2010 identified that a comprehensive economic strategy for Afghanistan must meet four criteria.⁴⁵ First, the future economic strategy for Afghanistan must directly and manifestly improve the lives of Afghans, Pakistanis and the people of the Central Asian Republics so that a broader regional consensus regarding Afghanistan's stability could be developed. Second, an economic initiative might reduce the incentive to achieve military victory and diminish the need for large US military presence. Third, economic strategy must complement the military strategy. Fourth, the economic strategy must leave the Afghan government with a sustainable revenue stream and it must be coordinated with the goal of transferring full sovereignty to Afghanistan by the end of 2014.⁴⁶

In this regard, the only strategy that meets these criteria as suggested by policymakers is the transformation of Afghanistan into a trade and transport hub linking Central Asia and the Middle East with South and Southeast Asia. This concept has been fully supported by the Afghan government and at the Kabul Conference in July 2010 President Karzai presented the future vision for Afghanistan as "reemerging 'Asian Roundabout', a central point of interconnection of goods, ideas, services, and people in the fast expanding Asian economy."⁴⁷ Keeping in view the enhanced Afghan trade with its neighbors, he was hopeful that the 'Roundabout' vision would materialize soon and quoted the example of Pakistani imports, which have grown from US\$ 26 million in 2001 to over US\$ 4 billion in 2010.⁴⁸

The Afghan government started to institutionalize the concept of a "Silk Road Initiative," with the view to give regional neighbors a higher stake in stabilizing Afghanistan. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Natural Gas Pipeline Project and the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000) present huge economic and political opportunities for Afghanistan. The implementation of TAPI would enable Afghanistan to generate revenue by getting transit fees and by enhancing employment

opportunities. As far as Afghanistan's war economy is concerned, this project would enable Afghanistan to sustain its economic growth, which is dependent on foreign aid, and will be the biggest challenge for the Afghan government after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

The most significant hurdle in the actualization of the project is Afghanistan's precarious security situation. Herat, one of the largest provinces of southwest Afghanistan, shares a border with Iran, and is a volatile region because of its proximity to Kandahar and Helmand, which are centers of resistance against coalition forces. This proximity makes investors fearful of future insecurity. Secondly, the Afghan National Security Forces have taken over security responsibilities, and given the past performance of Afghan forces, it is unclear whether they would be able to provide pipeline security.

Likewise, CASA-1000 (comprised of four countries: the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan) is the transmission infrastructure project that will put in place the commercial and institutional arrangements as well as the infrastructure required for 1,300 megawatts of sustainable electricity trade.⁴⁹ In addition to the World Bank, several other development partners have agreed to provide financing for CASA-1000 including the Islamic Development Bank and the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID). The CASA-1000 project will enhance energy interdependence between the Central Asian and South Asian states. The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan have abundant hydropower generation capacity that exceeds national needs in summer but becomes insufficient in winter. Exporting surplus electricity to South Asia will help Pakistan and Afghanistan to meet their electricity needs during the summer and would enable the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan to generate revenues.

Realization of these projects depends on the development of infrastructure. Afghanistan, though geographically at the crossroads of regions, possesses inadequate road infrastructure, non-existent rail network, and lacks pipeline infrastructure for transiting Central Asian oil or gas resources to South Asia.

Though neighboring states have connected the landlocked Afghanistan to the outside world through ancient trade and transit networks, the decentralized nature of Afghan polity has encouraged cross border linkages on a cultural or ethnic basis, and resulted in stronger ethnic identities rather than encouraging national identity and loyalty to the state.

Moreover, Afghanistan's untapped deposits of iron ore, copper, and lithium valued between US\$ 1 and US\$ 3 trillion presents huge prospects for economic development.⁵⁰ The Afghan government and the international donors have also pointed to Afghan mineral wealth as a potential savior of the economy. According to World Bank estimates, after mining, Aynak's copper and Hajigak's iron ore deposits could earn US\$ 500 million in revenue within seven years.⁵¹ This wealth could be utilized fully if Afghanistan is connected to a regional transport network.

Regional Consensus Building

The regional states can play a significant role in facilitating the Afghan transition process because regional players greatly influence the internal dynamics of Afghanistan, ranging from politics to economic activity. For decades, regional states have been meddling in Afghan internal affairs by supporting different ethnic groups to protect their own interests, and have subsequently contributed to fueling the internal conflicts in Afghanistan. Though neighboring states have connected the landlocked Afghanistan to the outside world through ancient trade and transit networks, the decentralized nature of Afghan polity has encouraged cross border linkages on a cultural or ethnic basis, and resulted in stronger ethnic identities rather than

encouraging national identity and loyalty to the state.⁵²

Given their importance, regional states can help in facilitating the transition process by developing consensus on non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and not supporting different ethnic factions. These states can help in capacity building in Afghanistan while respecting the sensitivities of neighboring states. Pakistan has long been facing the fallout of Afghan conflict and the chaos and instability in Afghanistan directly affects Pakistan's stability. Pakistan did play role in facilitating the dialogue process between the United States and the Taliban and it also tried to bridge the gulf between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government by releasing prominent Taliban prisoners from Pakistani jails. This can also be termed as an attempt to build trust and confidence between Pakistan and Afghanistan. After years of war, the NATO-led ISAF coalition has also realized the importance of a regional approach to address the issues of stability and security in Afghanistan. For some years, efforts have been made to develop institutional frameworks for neighbors to coordinate among themselves to participate in developmental activities in Afghanistan. Such initiatives would help to accommodate the interests of stakeholders and would create a conducive environment for successful political and security transitions.

Conclusion

After years of war, Afghanistan has been passing through various phases of transition. All three transitions (security, political and economic) are interconnected, and while success in one sphere will complement the others, failure of one transition may hinder progress in the other transitions.

The NATO-led Resolute Support mission and U.S. troops will stay in Afghanistan to train Afghan forces but there are serious concerns about the capability of Afghan forces to provide security or to withstand the insurgency.

It is the process of political transition that has been the most challenging one and will define the contours of the emerging order in Afghanistan. With the transfer of political power, one aspect of political transition has been completed but the new Afghan government faces many challenges including reconciliation with the Taliban and a precarious economic situation.

The primary responsibility for making the transition process successful rests on the Afghans themselves, who have been facing the sufferings of wars for the past three decades.

The primary responsibility for making the transition process successful rests on the Afghans themselves, who have been facing the sufferings of wars for the past three decades. Their internal conflicts, tribal rivalries and ethnic and culture-based priorities have caused civil wars and have also provided external powers with opportunities to enhance their own interests at the cost of Afghanistan's peace and stability. The successful completion of transition processes, though a challenging task, should lead to durable peace and stability in Afghanistan, because a stable Afghanistan is the key to regional stability.

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47 "President Hamid Karzai's speech at the International Conference on Afghanistan on 20 July 2010", at <http://www.afghanistan-un.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/president-karzai-speech.pdf> (last visited 10 July 2014).

48 Ibid.

49 "World Bank Group Invests in Energy Trade between Central Asia and South Asia", at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/27/world-bank-group-invest-in-energy-trade-central-south-asia-pakistan> (last visited 2 July 2014).

50 Jayshree Bajoria, "Afghanistan's Crucial Economic Transition", at <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistans-crucial-economic-transition/p26679> (last visited 25 June 2014).

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A life of “Long Debate”: A Tribute to Ali A. Mazrui (1933-2014)

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Thus he once told his interlocutor in an interview, as reported in *the New York Times*, “My life is a long debate”. As a spirited Africanist, a conscientious public intellectual, a prolific writer, a passionate teacher, and as an admirable personality with high self-confidence, Professor Ali A. Mazrui left behind him, when he passed away on 13 October 2014, voluminous and highly influential publications-including more than thirty books and hundreds of articles- thousands of students, and a strong legacy of “debate” against global injustices. His life-long struggle was more specifically directed against abuses of power and violation of human rights, whether by great powers of the world, like the United States or by leaders of unprivileged countries, such as Idi Amin of Uganda.

What made him a distinguished public intellectual were, most probably, his capacity, originality, and willingness to articulate ideas completely alien to the mainstream conventional wisdom in the West. The mainstream intellectual community was shocked, for example, when during the BBC’s prestigious Reith Lectures he defended the idea that

the only realistic way yielding to the elimination of nuclear threat was actual nuclear proliferation all over the world. Only then, maintained Mazrui, could the disproportional power of the West have been balanced and the injustices towards the poor Third World countries have been prevented.

Another surprising, as well as ambitious, solution he offered for the prevailing injustices in the world today was a world-federation of cultures, which he believed to be more applicable and desirable than an order based purely on the distribution of power and security concerns. In his highly influential work, *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective*, Mazrui argued that a federation of pluralistic yet complementary cultures could mitigate both domestic and international conflicts, through a parallel process of, what he called, “cultural convergence.” This cultural federation is based on three principles: “first, an acceptance of cultural interdependence among the constituent parts; second, an acceptance of the principle of parity of esteem among the constituent cultural units...; and third, a promotion at a federal level of ‘cultural fusion’ which is the equivalent

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of sharing the central powers of sovereign in a political federation.” Mazrui’s appreciation of the role and significance of culture in world politics, long before Samuel Huntington, should also be seen as an indication of the originality of his thought and perceptiveness of his mind.

His ethical position and logic of criticism was reasonably balanced and unprejudiced, as well as robust and smart. As one might have predicted, for example, Salman Rushdie’s highly controversial 1988 novel could not escape his sharp criticism. Yet, at the same time, as an adamant advocate of the freedom of expression, his strong opposition to the death sentence passed on Rushdie by the Ayatollah Khomeini was similarly unequivocal.

Professor Mazrui’s personal self-esteem and intellectual courage and willingness to wrestle with these sorts of controversial issues may partly be attributed to his family background as well as personal traits. Born in Mombasa, Kenya, Professor Mazrui came from a politically and intellectually powerful family. His father, Sheikh Al-Amin Ali Mazrui, was an eminent Islamic scholar of the region and the clan that the family belonged to had ruled Mombasa for over a century until 1837. Father Mazrui, who died when Professor Mazrui was fourteen, had wanted his son to follow his own path and, to this end, to attend the Al-Azhar University in Cairo. However, having been awarded a scholarship to travel to

Britain, Professor Mazrui preferred to study political science at Manchester University. Having graduated from Manchester University with Distinction, Mazrui continued his post-graduate studies at Columbia University and obtained a Ph.D. degree from Oxford University. Professor Mazrui’s remarkable education background helped him to secure a respected--though not always liked--position within the mainstream intellectual community and increased the degree of the impact of his criticisms of the systemic powers and applications. Professor Mazrui served in political science departments and centers of African studies at several universities, including Makerere University in Uganda, Cornell University in New York, and the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. Professor Mazrui was the Albert Schweitzer Professor at Binghamton University in New York when he died at the age of 81.

Apart from Africa, of which Professor Mazrui was one of the best-known specialists all over the world, his books and scholarly articles explored topics like international politics, political Islam, and globalization. In 2005, the American journal, *Foreign Policy*, nominated Ali A. Mazrui among the top 100 public intellectuals alive in the world as a whole.

Thus, Ali A. Mazrui had a life of long debate, which was probably an inevitable burden of his triple heritage: indigenous Africa, Islam, and the West.