Public Diplomacy through Diaspora Engagement: The Case of Turkey

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Abstract

After more than 50 years of migration history, the recognition of Turkish migrant immigrants as “diaspora” took place only recently, illustrating the changes in the Turkish state’s strategies towards embracing these populations. In the early 2000s, the government needed the Turkish diaspora to refurbish the image of Turkey and boost the stale EU membership agenda, and realized that the diaspora could be used as a tool for public diplomacy to exert “soft power”. In this article, we argue that the new Turkish diaspora policy was shaped by the recognition of an emerging transnational Turkish diaspora and the re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy after 2002 when the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power. We also argue that

the institutionalization process targeting the diaspora went hand in hand with a shift in ideology and political atmosphere as well as other relational factors.

Key Words

Public Diplomacy, State-Led Transnationalism, Migrant Organizations, Diaspora, Turkey.

Introduction

Over the last decade, the concept of diaspora has appeared in the policy making discourse of Turkey, marking the adoption of a new perspective towards almost 6 million Turkish emigrants living in different continents. As the classical global usages of the term attributed a victimized character of migrant populations, it was for some time rather controversial to juxtapose the word ‘Turkish’ with the concept of ‘diaspora’ in foreign policy and decision-making circles. Moreover, the term has been previously used in public parlance and academia to signify other ethnic and religious groups (including Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Assyrians, Kurds and even Alevis

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who migrated from Turkey), rather than Sunni Turks, which according to Kirişçi¹ have represented the main determinant ethnic and religious identity by the Turkish state since the early Republican period, despite the official definition of citizenship. However, since the term “diaspora” has undergone major transformations in history, the reluctance of connoting the term diaspora with Turkish immigrants has also gradually disappeared. Etymologically, diaspora was derived from the third century BCE Greek translations of the Torah and used for the first time specially referring to the uprooting and scattering of Jews to denote those archetypal groups maintaining an intact identity despite traumatic dispersion into distant lands.²

From the 1960s onwards, the classical meaning of “victim” diasporas extended in such a way to include the dispersion of Africans and even the Irish. After the 1980s, diaspora was deployed as a metaphoric designation to describe different categories of international migrants- expatriates, forced migrants, voluntary migrants, ethnic and racial minorities.³ Other typologies, such as labour, trade and imperial diasporas, were later added to the original prototypical victim diaspora.⁴ Between the 1990s and early 2000s, the term was usually discussed within the framework of globalization and accepted as an expression of identity in flux.⁵ Although there is still an ongoing discussion about what constitutes a diaspora, the common characteristics of diaspora in the 21st century are described as follows: voluntary or involuntary dispersion of a group of people into two or more locations, sharing a collective memory of their original homeland, displaying general commitment to the well-being and restoration of the original homeland through dense linkages, and maintaining either group boundary over time or some form of cultural hybridity.⁶

As transnationals par excellence, nation-states and diasporas are also in constant negotiation with each other.

This new understanding of diaspora that has taken over from the older concepts of the term as victims who were forced to move from their homeland and still holding onto a ‘myth of return’, paved the way for better insights into diaspora engagement through concepts such as “transnationalism from below” and “transnationalism from above”.⁷ The former refers to the migrant organizations established in the country of residence and the latter underlines the state-centered approaches on diaspora. As transnationals par excellence, nation-states and diasporas are also in constant
negotiation with each other. On one hand, diaspora institutions represent “state-led transnationalism” or “long-distance nationalism”, since they project domestic policies beyond their borders into diasporas as well as to those who stay at home. On the other hand, diaspora institutions also include migrant organizations which demand higher recognition by nation-states and even stipulate changes in the practices of the home country. The *modus operandi* of such institutions has been re-defined as a result of globalization and de-territorialization, which now extends beyond the reach of any particular nation-state. Consequently, diaspora institutions can be regarded “as an expression of post-national, supranational, or transnational membership”.

Today, diaspora(s) have the ability to mobilize a collective identity not only in the receiving country and in the “imagined homeland”, but within the social and even virtual space in solidarity with other co-ethnic members living in different countries. Typical diasporas are in constant contact and able to create and re-create their “transnational social spaces”. They propagate political mobilization in a host country through unifying factors, such as ethnicity and religion. They join forces around a common goal by using political opportunity structures available to them, i.e. citizenship and lobbying. They instil intergenerational cultural transmission in order to sustain the continuity of their values within the diaspora and thus prevent incoming generations from becoming ‘de-traditionalised’ and culturally disconnected from the homeland. They get involved with home country political structures by sending remittances, facilitating investments, making philanthropic donations, establishing professional networks for technology transfer, lobbying for security and foreign policy interests of home countries, and participating in out-of-country voting. Therefore, rather than fixed social groups, diasporas are now recognized as constituency-building projects mobilized by political and social entrepreneurs, including policy makers. Similarly, the old notion of seeing a diaspora as an outflow of human resources, or an exodus of skilled people and part of
a brain-drain, was replaced with the idea that diasporas can indeed act as a bridge between countries of residence and origin.  

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Despite an earlier reluctance to use the term diaspora as attributed to Turkish immigrants living abroad, the turn in “state-led transnationalism” and pursuing a policy of active engagement with diasporas explains the increasing popularity of the term not only in the Turkish media but also in academic, business, and bureaucratic circles. Departing from the former perspectives of classifying Turkish skilled migrants as a total loss for the homeland and labour migrants as machines for remittances, Turkey finally realized the potential of its diaspora with strong connections to homeland. This is certainly related with the increasing economic power of the diaspora and the intensifying transnationalism with return migrants, circular migrants, and upcoming generations who are more versed and politically mobilized. It is also related with the rising global trend in which migrant populations are increasingly being re-labelled as diasporas and in which there is growing interest on behalf of nation-states to engage with their diasporas.

After more than 50 years of migration history, the recognition of Turkish migrant populations as diaspora took place only recently, illustrating the changes in the Turkish state’s strategies towards embracing these populations. Back in the 1990s, there were already efforts in place to mobilize the Turkish migrant populations, but these endeavours were usually not very successful partly because of the diversity and sharp divisions and partly because of the lack of systematic programs targeting diasporic members. Nevertheless, in the early 2000s, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government needed a Turkish diaspora to refurbish the image of Turkey and to boost the stale EU membership agenda. It realized that the diaspora could be used in both ways: as a tool for “soft power” and as an instrument to support the government’s agenda. In this article, we argue that the new Turkish diaspora policy was shaped by the recognition of an emerging transnational Turkish diaspora in Western Europe and the United States and the re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy after 2002,
when the AKP came to power. The establishment of a new state elite and shift in power has eventually led to the implementation of a new official discourse on modernity and Muslim national identity in Turkey. As a result of this political transition, either new diasporic organizations supporting the government were established in major European cities making certain others obsolete, or new leadership was selected for the long-running migrant organizations and federations. This era, ushering in more diaspora engagement by the state, also represents the process of institutionalization in Turkey in order to coordinate activities with the new migrant organizations. The institutionalization process not only paved the way for Turkey to help out ethnic kin as well as those in need in different parts of the world but also coincided with the new driving force in Turkish foreign policy – the move from being a country in the periphery to being a core country. The new outlook in Turkish foreign policy also allows us to gain a perspective on Turkey’s new interest to play a role in extending humanitarian assistance in a vast geography extending from Africa to Asia as one of the most important global players in the international arena and in becoming a champion for the rights of the oppressed Muslims around the world as in the case of the Rohingyas and Palestinians.

The next section will evaluate diaspora engagement by the Turkish state and state-led transnationalism in detail. We argue that an institutionalization process aiming to engage diaspora with the home country went hand in hand with the shift in ideology and political atmosphere as well as other relational factors.

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Diaspora Engagement as a Tool for Public Diplomacy

Diplomacy in a traditionalist view is characterized by “official communication between governments, usually behind closed doors” and depicted “as a game where the roles and responsibilities of actors in international relations are clearly delineated”. However, this definition remains inadequate in describing the current state of affairs where there is a
“fuzzy world of postmodern traditional relations”, involving many actors outside of the institutional limitations of diplomatic activity. These activities go hand in hand with the state’s interest in using what is now called as “public diplomacy”, in which the states attempt to disseminate references to the nation and their image. In fact, although such efforts to remodel international public relations existed even in the age of monarchies in Europe, the emergence of professional image cultivation across national borders first took place following the First World War. During this period, states started to search for strategies to use “power over opinion”, which was “not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power”. Today, many countries are in search of effective usages of that tool. Now referred to as “public diplomacy”, it aims to shift the activity of diplomacy from an intergovernmental to “government-to-people” relationship, while at the same time incorporating non-state actors into the game. “Public diplomacy” has become a buzzword especially thanks to the accelerated development of information technologies - the new grounds for governments to “win the war on hearts and minds” of their constituencies and of other populations.

Within the past decade, public diplomacy and other related objectives such as “nation branding” were also introduced and used systematically by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government offices. According to İbrahim Kalın, the Chief Advisor to the President in Turkey, the use of public diplomacy “as a platform for the implementation of soft power” began mainly with the launching of the Office of Public Diplomacy within the Turkish Prime Ministry in 2010. In a previous article appearing in Perceptions, Kalın outlined the main objective of the use of public diplomacy in Turkey as reshaping the pre-existing negative images of Turkey in the international realm and replacing them with a new “Turkish story”. This new “Turkish story” reflects the image that the AKP governments have attempted to create since the early 2000s, of Turkey as a “strong country” that could perform as a bridge between “civilizations” in the international platform. This neoliberal “national branding” was epitomized by a number of overlapping framings by AKP representatives from the early 2000s to early 2010s, which shifted from the Kemalist “western” orientation to a more assertively “eastern” and “southern”. It was represented by new frames of reference, such as the Turkish state’s undertaking of a central position in the Middle East/West Asia (MEWA) region as an illustration of “moderate Islam”, its assuming of a coalescing role between the countries.
that held the heritage of the Ottoman Empire, or an emphasis on its ability to respond to the pressures and demands of the “western world”. Kalin described the cornerstones of the new diplomacy tool as reflecting the transformations in international relations and in the domestic context in relation to a number of aspects: (i) fusing traditional Islamic-Ottoman culture with socio-economic modernization; (ii) citizens’ self-positioning from being a “problematic and small footnote in the Euro-centric historical narrative” to being “active agent(s) in the formation of its own history”; (iii) internal transformation and the process of normalization especially regarding taboo subjects related to minorities, democratization and human rights; (iv) approximating locality and globalization. Kalin also argued that aside from a range of state institutions, other actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, aid organizations, universities, and the media were indispensable to Turkey’s public diplomacy efforts.

While the state’s involvement in the globalization of domestic issues had already taken place in earlier periods, especially in the United States, it had been practiced rather sporadically and its outreach had been significantly limited.

It is within this perspective that the migrant populations from Turkey living in Europe and elsewhere have been incorporated into the government’s attempts, to be used as public diplomacy tools in the international arena. Giving the example of a mass demonstration in France in 2012 by Turkish migrant populations, Ünver suggested that the indirect involvement of the Turkish state in organizing and directing such events was an illustration of its interest in influencing its domestic policy issues through its community living abroad. While the state’s involvement in the globalization of domestic issues had already taken place in earlier periods, especially in the United States, it had been practiced rather sporadically and its outreach had been significantly limited. In the succeeding sections, we focus on how Turkey’s embracing of its immigrants as “diaspora” overlaps with its public diplomacy efforts in the post-2002 era.

Turkish State’s Policies for Diaspora Engagement and State-Led Transnationalism

The period that followed the AKP’s coming to power after 2002 has witnessed the acceleration of the state’s engagement policies towards citizens living overseas, in an attempt to increase its presence and control
missions, and especially by the general consulates. The number of Turkish foreign missions increased from 163 in 2002 to 236 as of 2017, incorporating 135 embassies and 86 consulates as well as permanent delegations and trade offices. This number is expected to increase to 263 in the coming years pending decisions by the Council of Ministers. The consular officials were asked to improve their services to the Turkish citizens living abroad, and to be more responsive and accommodating to their demands.

In both the public and private realms. In this section, we expound on the major policy transformations targeting Turkish diaspora in four different arenas that have undergone the most critical changes. These transformations can be analysed under four headings. These are: (i) the institutional setting, which comprises a series of changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the establishment of the new coordinative mechanisms dealing with Turkish emigrants; (ii) the ideological setting, mainly centred around the exportation of Turkish culture and state religion; (iii) the political (electoral) setting, which was altered after the introduction of external voting from abroad since 2012; and finally (iv) the relational setting between the Turkish state and Turkish emigrant populations, involving both individual and associational relations.  

**Institutional Setting**

The first approach by the Turkish state to reach individual citizens living abroad was a response to the mounting criticisms by migrant populations especially in the European countries about the inadequacy of the consular services and the patronizing attitudes of the state officials. As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began a reform campaign to increase the number and enhance the quality of services provided by the foreign missions, and especially by the general consulates. The number of Turkish foreign missions increased from 163 in 2002 to 236 as of 2017, incorporating 135 embassies and 86 consulates as well as permanent delegations and trade offices. This number is expected to increase to 263 in the coming years pending decisions by the Council of Ministers. The consular officials were asked to improve their services to the Turkish citizens living abroad, and to be more responsive and accommodating to their demands.  

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Other than establishing closer ties with the Turkish diaspora through the diplomatic missions abroad, the new institutional setting offered alternative channels to Turkish diasporic members through which they could institutionally interact with the state’s other representative bodies abroad.
In 1998, the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad and the High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, were founded under the Prime Ministry, in order to carry out research and monitor the problems faced by Turkish citizens abroad and communicate them to the Turkish parliament. This was followed by the reorganization and expansion of the responsibilities of the General Directorate of Foreign Relations and Workers Abroad Services established in 2001 under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. After a long period of preparation, the Presidency on Turks Abroad and Relative Communities (YTB) was founded in 2010 as an institution for further coordination efforts. Although the idea of establishing a separate institution fully-functioning on the issues of Turkish immigrants and Turkic communities had already existed since the 1990s, it was reduced to the role of a state ministry responsible for non-resident citizens. The state ministry was directly tied to the Prime Minister’s office without a clear-cut and specific institutional, administrative and financial structure to support any relevant activities. With the motto of “wherever our citizens and kin communities live, we are there”, the YTB is placed at the heart of Turkey’s policy towards its extra-territorial members, as a coordinator of different institutions’ engagements with citizens and civil society organizations abroad, as well as with kin communities and international students living in Turkey. The Presidency’s mission statement signalled the government’s vision about creating extra-territorial spheres of influence demarcated by varying degrees of connection based on shared civic or ethnic identity. Some state officials often referred to the establishment of such an institution as an important step towards a more comprehensive governing of citizens and dual citizens who are living outside of Turkey’s territories. Following the institutional examples of other nation-states with large diasporas, Turkey evidently decided to reinforce ties between the state and its emigrants.

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The co-ordination of citizen affairs in the YTB is organized under four geographical regions, based on the concentration of Turkish diaspora population and distance. The first region is Germanic-speaking communities, which includes Germany, Austria.
and Sweden, and the second region encompasses all other European Union countries. The third region is English-speaking overseas countries, which includes the United States, Canada and Australia, and the fourth region is all other remaining countries. In theory, from 2011 to 2015, the four regional coordination mechanisms worked together with the yearly consultation of an advisory committee, operating on policy areas that are exclusive to the countries or regions. However, since Germany holds more than 3 million Turkish origin immigrants out of which 1.5 million are still Turkish citizens and/or dual citizens with eligibility to vote in general and presidential elections, there has been utmost attention given by the institution to the Turkish community living in this country.

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The YTB currently coordinates the state of affairs between the citizens living abroad and the ministries in Turkey, while at the same time cooperating with foreign missions regarding the activities and programs organized outside Turkey. The Presidency designates and advocates on certain policy areas to the policy-makers, such as in the case of amendments related to extra-territorial voting rights, which allowed emigrants to vote from abroad. The Presidency uses three mechanisms to implement its strategies: coordination, advocacy, and state-society dialogue. State-society dialogue takes a substantial portion of the YTB’s activities and strategies, which is primarily marked by the financial assistance granted to civil society organizations, universities, international organizations, think tanks and research centres since 2011. In 2013, the language used in the definition of priorities for financial assistance shifted from a traditional one (e.g. “improving work and employment”, “strengthening family structure”, “organizing cultural cooperation and exchange”) towards a new discourse focusing on more specific policy areas, such as “fight against discrimination” or “active citizenship”. The financial support provided by the YTB extends beyond the host countries of Turkish emigrants, as in the case of funding provided to countries such as Somalia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This broad geography illustrates the Turkish state’s interest in bringing the management of non-resident citizens and other ethnic and religious groups with an assumed shared identity under
the same institutional roof.33 Another institutional sphere that has been formed around the coordinating role of the YTB is reinforced by a number of other institutions working in the areas of cultural promotion, representation of economic interests, humanitarian development and the promotion of Turkey’s image through media. Among these institutions, the Yunus Emre Foundation was established in 2007 and its cultural centres founded in many countries in Europe and elsewhere have emerged as a crucial public diplomacy tool. According to Kaya and Tecmen,34 Yunus Emre cultural centres reflect the Turkish state’s attempts to emphasize the importance of cultural interaction and cultural representation in foreign policy and bilateral relations. In countries with a large presence of Turkish migrant communities, the centers were established with an emphasis on how they constitute a “home” for the Turkish citizens, while at the same time adopting a role of “cultural bridges” by promoting Turkish culture.35

**Ideological Setting**

Following the institutional setting, the second issue is the reconstruction of an ideological setting abroad. One of the key elements of the Turkish state’s emigrant policies in the 1980s was concentrated on the exportation of culture and ideology in order to strengthen emigrants’ sense of belonging towards Turkey. There have been two main instruments with this regard, namely religion and education, around which the institutional configurations were made, through the intervening role of the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs), the Ministry of Education, and the coordinative mechanism under the Bakanlıklararası Ortak Kültür Komisyonu (Interministerial Common Culture Commission). Under the reactive emigrant regime that characterized policy making towards Turkish immigrants in the 1980s until mid-1990s, the establishment of these instruments was the result of the members of the migrant community who had settled since the 1960s, but more importantly as a reaction to the dissident groups that did not comply with the official state ideology, like Kurds supporting the PKK, who found a base of support in Europe,36 or members of “oppositional Islam” like followers of Kaplan.37 However, the Diyanet’s presence has shifted from a mostly reactive perspective of controlling oppositional Islam outside Turkey towards the replication of Turkey as a model of moderate Islam on the international scene with its instruments for engaging its non-resident citizens compliant with its official ideology.
Since the early 2000s, the Turkish state’s activities in the area of religion intensified gradually. The Diyanet solidified its presence further in many countries where Turkish immigrants predominantly live. One of the earlier initiatives of the recent epoch has been the third Din Şurası (Religious Council) in September 2004, which was organized by the Diyanet to bring together theologians, politicians and intellectuals who were actively involved with religious services for Turkish citizens living overseas. Bruce argues that the resolutions of this council have been reflected on the activities of the Diyanet over recent years, including the increase in the number of religious personnel, the foundation of a bureau to represent the Diyanet in relation with the European Union, and initiatives for positioning Diyanet federations and foundations overseas as official interlocutors with the national authorities, particularly in Europe. As of 2017, Diyanet counsellor offices are based in 15 countries, and attachés from religious affairs hold 21 offices in nine countries around the world, with the majority being positioned in Germany. In addition to these initiatives, the Diyanet started new programs to integrate the new generations among the Turkish diaspora. The new programs are comprised of the Uluslararası İlahiyat Programı (International Theology Program) that aims to educate young Turkish immigrants in Turkey with the aim of employing them later in countries of settlement and the foundation of the Faculty of Theology in Strasbourg, which could become a centre of attention of the high-level education of Islamic theology for young generations of Turkish diaspora. Furthermore, two Islamic Universities were established in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.

The increasing presence of the Diyanet in the Turkish state’s diaspora engagement policy corresponded with the shifts from the Kemalist laicité towards the reinforcement of state religion during the same period. Based on the analysis of the World Values Survey on religiosity, tolerance and changing social values in Turkey which was carried out between 1981 and 2007, there has been an intensification toward conservatism since the mid-1990s. Turkish society and politics were also coupled with the discourses, strategies and social provisioning policies in order to maintain the state’s central position in the regulation of religious affairs. Therefore, the Diyanet’s role as the institutional embodiment of monopolizing religion by the state in Turkey and abroad was sustained in the post-2003 period. It also continued to act as a way of creating closer ties between the state and the emigrant communities around the daily practices of religion and to keep their culture
intact while focusing on integration in the host society. While this may alienate some factions of Turkish emigrants like Alevi and non-Muslims, this engagement was deemed particularly important to counter the propaganda by extremist interpretations of religion, and radicalization of the Turkish diaspora and recruitment of terrorist organizations.

**Political (Electoral) Setting**

The third setting, which has witnessed a sharp change from the earlier periods, is related to the accessibility of non-resident citizens to voting rights. Allowing citizens living outside the territories to vote is a practice that has increasingly become common for many electoral democratic states in recent decades. According to a survey conducted in 2009, 129 out of 198 states were known to allow their emigrants to vote for national elections of the home country although with a range of different forms, giving out different implications for the nature of the relationship between emigrants and the states. Currently three common patterns are adopted by nation-states regarding extra-territorial voting, based on exercise and use of the voting process: (i) vote in home district; (ii) vote abroad for home district; and (iii) vote abroad for direct representation. While many states opt for allowing emigrants to vote in polling stations abroad or by post, rather than returning to the country of origin in order to vote, only a few permit emigrants to elect their own representation with an exclusive constituency.

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In the Turkish case, from 1987 onwards Turkish immigrants were given the option to cast a vote in the elections only at customs. Therefore, diaspora members were expected to return to the country of origin for voting. Moreover, not all custom posts had ballots providing voting for emigrants, and it was limited with more populous entry gates, namely the land customs in Edirne, and air customs of İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara, Antalya and Adana. This changed in 2008 with amendments made to the Law No. 5749 on Basic Provisions on Elections. The changes in the electoral system resulted in the registration and collection of data on the available extra-territorial voters, which in the past would have been determined by the number of
voters who went to the ballot box at the border gates and airports upon entry to the homeland. Following the first amendment in 2008, a bill was passed in May 2012 that specifically determined the conditions of external electoral participation in diplomatic missions and consular offices where the number of Turkish eligible voters were reported to be at least 2.8 million.47

According to the bill, (i) citizens living outside Turkey would be able to vote in national elections and referenda simultaneously with elections in Turkey, (ii) customs voting would continue to be practiced, (iii) they would be able to vote at ballots in diplomatic and consular representations at a pre-designated time, (iv) they would also be able to vote during their stay in Turkey.48 External electoral participation, i.e. out-of-the-country voting, was practiced in 2014 for the first time during the Presidential elections and later on, during the general elections in 2015 and for the Constitutional referendum in 2017. During the first elections in 2014, electoral turnout remained very low at 18.9% at both customs and consular ballots combined, mainly as a result of the system which allowed citizens to vote only at the appointment time that they obtained through registering on the internet, as well as the lack of clear notification by the government and the consulates. Considering that the Turkish electoral system is based on the d’Hondt method with a 10% electoral threshold, the extra-territorial voters comprised of 5% of the total number of voters had significant implications for the results of the elections. The current system works through a complex set of calculations, which divides the votes cast outside the country to the number of seats that a political party has already secured in the 85 constituencies in Turkey based on its ratio to the total number of votes by Turkish citizens. Moreover, the results clearly suggested an increasing popularity of Erdoğan among the diaspora in major European countries. During the 2014 Presidential Elections, he received more votes in Germany (68.63%), Australia (56.35%), Austria (80.17%), Belgium (69.85%), Denmark (62.85%), France (66.02%), and the Netherlands (77.95%) than the Turkey average of 51.79%.49 In the General Elections in November 2015, although turnout was low, out of the 36% of all valid votes, the AKP got almost half of the votes from citizens living abroad while the main opposition party, CHP (Republican People’s Party) remained as low as 17%. In fact, the AKP again became the main party in major European countries, including Germany, Austria, France, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Romania.50 In the 2017 Referendum, the AKP gained a landslide victory in Germany, France as
well as in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. 51

Relational Setting

Although the history of emigration *en masse* from Turkey to Europe began in the 1960s, legislative frameworks that set the relations between the state and its citizens living outside were introduced much later. Accepting that Turkish immigrants settled in Europe for longer term and they were no longer simply *Gastarbeiter*, a “dual citizenship practice” was hastily announced with an amendment to the Turkish Constitution in 1981. The legal framework for increased involvement in the social and cultural affairs of emigrants was followed by the inclusion of Turkish citizens abroad in the 1982 Constitution, in which Article 62 noted:

Accepting that Turkish immigrants settled in Europe for longer term and they were no longer simply *Gastarbeiter*, a “dual citizenship practice” was hastily announced with an amendment to the Turkish Constitution in 1981.

The Government takes measures to ensure family unity of the Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate their children, to meet their cultural needs and to provide social security, to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their coming back. 52

The 1982 constitution underscored the necessity of taking measures to address the various needs of Turkish citizens living abroad, especially related to social security and cultural rights. At the same time, it led to the creation of an understanding of “*persona grata* living abroad” (*yurtdışında yaşayan ‘makbul’ vatandaş*). According to the term, the groups of people who are determined as “anarchists and terrorists” are excluded from a relationship with the state despite their Turkish citizenship. Among the groups that have been determined as such were those refugees from Turkey who sought asylum in Western Europe after the military takeover in 1980. They were criticized as making “biased and purposeful propaganda” against Turkey and therefore constituted a constant problem for the Turkish state. 53

This was definitely not surprising considering the political situation at the time. Those who were referred to as *persona grata*, on the other hand, were able to keep their Turkish citizenship. This process was even facilitated by the state regardless of their newly-acquired
citizenship in countries of settlement. This clause has been kept as its original following the Referendum in 2017.

The parliamentary investigative commission of 2003 emphasized that citizens living abroad should have access to more rights by naturalizing in their countries of residence.

The early 1990s were marked by a number of incentives facilitating the administrative, cultural and social engagement of emigrants with Turkey who would give up their citizenship. In 1995 an amendment was made to the Turkish Citizenship Law, providing privileged non-citizen status. Known as the “pink card”, which was later replaced with the “blue card” in 2009, it granted rights to those who gave up Turkish nationality: residing, acquiring property, being eligible for inheritance, operating businesses, and working in Turkey like any other citizen of Turkey. Following a parliamentary investigation report in 1996 that suggested the existence of “distance” between the consular missions in Europe and the Turkish citizens living abroad, a state ministry was founded to represent non-resident citizens, followed by a consultative committee established of migrant representatives. However, this committee was criticized by migrant organizations established by Turkish diaspora, for not effectively representing themselves. The parliamentary investigative commission of 2003 emphasized that citizens living abroad should have access to more rights by naturalizing in their countries of residence, but at the same time they should maintain close ties with the state of origin. The report further suggested a number of issues that aimed to restructure the state-diaspora ties:

i) Keeping in mind of their permanency abroad at present, our citizens abroad should be promoted to acquire host country citizenship;

ii) Ties with our citizens and the next generations should be protected and improved;

iii) Our citizens should become bridges of good relations and friendship between host countries and our country;

iv) Especially citizens living in the EU countries should realize their rights acquired by the EU and other international jurisprudence, defend them in every platform and be informed about them. Initiatives should be made so that the EU entitles the same rights
Public Diplomacy through Diaspora Engagement

that it provides other candidate state citizens to our citizens;

v) Citizens should be protected against xenophobia, discrimination and acts of violence;

vi) Every individual who is tied to the Turkish Republic by citizenship and has not participated in terrorism is very important and valuable to our state regardless of their settlement country. The Republic of Turkey should stand together with them by all means. Our citizens should be informed about this issue with the help of embassies, consulates, all related entities and the media circulated via brochures, booklets, and documents. This issue should be properly addressed and made public through the websites of relevant institutions;

vii) It should be among the privileges of our country to see that our citizens abroad benefit from the rights that will protect their cultural identities at the highest level.55

The parliamentary report drew the lines of an anticipated diaspora regime, which determined emigrants’ relationship with both Turkey and the countries where they reside. As active citizens in both geographies, the citizens of Turkey were expected to become intervening actors on behalf of Turkey when necessary and build bridges between the societies/states that they live in and the Turkish society/state.56 Yet, the report codified the nature of the relationship with the Turkish state and the host states differently than before. It put emphasis on the diaspora’s right to claim social, political and cultural benefits in host countries, while the relations with the Turkish state remain within the boundaries of allegiance to homeland, where the state assured the protection of its citizens’ rights not solely within its own jurisprudence, but also promised guarantees in legal and socio-cultural terms outside of its borders. Even though the transformation in the policymaking on the diaspora has been embedded in change in understanding of the citizenship regime, the dual designation of belonging and expectations from the diaspora endured. In line with this new understanding, the Turkish state would watch out for its citizens no matter where they live while Turkish emigrants should continue to demand for their rights in countries of settlement. To attract more supporters in the diaspora, Turkish officials also assumed the role of a “big brother”, protecting its citizens as well as co-ethnics with a fervent nationalist discourse calling them to resist all forms of assimilation, and to fight against Islamophobia and eventual loss of religious identity. In his official visits to Europe, President Erdoğan asked the members of the emigrant populations
to be loyal to Turkey while enjoying citizenship rights in host countries and criticized Europe’s migration policies as assimilationist. In 2008, during his address to the Turkish community in Köln right after a hate crime that took place in Ludwigshafen resulted in the tragic death of 9 Turkish immigrants, Erdoğan underlined the main themes in state-led transnationalism:

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“Assimilation is a crime against humanity. But you also need to understand that you cannot and should not see yourselves as temporary anymore in today’s Germany and Europe. It is telling that despite the large number of (our people), basic problems persist. Of course, our children will learn Turkish. This is your right to transfer language and values to upcoming generations. Yet, if you learn the language of the country that you live in and several more, this would put you in an advantageous position in every field. With 3 million living in Germany alone, the Turkish community has the potential to be effective and to be a determining factor in German politics today. Why can’t we have mayors in Europe, more representatives in political parties in Europe and in the European Parliament? Why shouldn’t [Europe] take our opinion in devising social policies? Despite being a handful, some [diaspora] communities are quite influential thanks to their lobbying efforts. Why don’t we do the same to protect our own interests?”

In the latest general elections in Germany in September 2017, after facing a series of political problems with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Erdoğan also warned Turkish immigrants living in Germany to vote carefully for the benefit of the Turkish state and community. While his supporters, such as the Allianz Deutscher Demokraten (Alliance of German Democrats) (AD-D), a political party established mainly by Turkish and other Muslim immigrants, especially used slogans with Erdoğan’s picture saying “be united with Turkey’s friends”, his move also received strong criticism in Germany as intervening in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state.
Diaspora Members as Symbolic Ambassadors: Who is In, Who is Out?

As explained earlier, the parliamentary report of 2003 enunciated that Turkish citizens who had good ties with the home state were expected to become “bridges of good relations” between countries of residence and origin. In other words, since they are more permanent than diplomatic representatives who come and go, they were given the duty of symbolic ambassadors of Turkey. In fact, since the 1960s Turkey adopted various practices of naming groups of emigrants, changing from *gurbetçi/yurtdışı işçi* (guest worker/worker abroad) to *yurtdışı vatandaşlar* (citizens living abroad). This departure in terminology indicated not only the permanence of Turkish citizens abroad but also was critical in the implementation of policies that were specifically built for the Turkish diaspora. The shift that began partly in the 1990s and was consolidated during the early 2000s, has been distinguishable from that of earlier periods, as it harbours a state-driven re-imagination of the nation, and an attempt “to extend the boundaries of the nation beyond the territorial limits of the state”.

According to Şahin-Mencütek and Erdoğan, the framing of a “strong country” was also adopted in the institution-building and citizenship-related policies under the new diaspora engagement regime, as in the case of the adoption of the bill that extended voting rights for all non-resident citizens. Based on the migrant composition and political opportunity structures available in host countries, however, Turkey’s engagement with its diasporic communities in Western Europe and North America differed to a great extent. In Germany, there is a large Turkish immigrant population, around 3 million, of which 1.383,040 have only Turkish citizenship and almost 250,000 have dual citizenship. Yet, these emigrants from Turkey are very heterogeneous, belonging to different ethnic and religious...
affiliations. In addition to ethnocultural heterogeneity, the socio-economic background and political inclination of the Turkish diaspora in Germany has changed over time. The earlier migrant workers which started to head for Germany in the 1960s came from rural backgrounds while the later immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s were more urban, more educated and political dissidents. Therefore, other than already “hostile” migrant organizations from the viewpoint of the Turkish state, like the Kurdish associations, the lobbying potential in Germany by Turkish migrant organizations was quite limited before because of a lack of lobbying experience and human capital, differences in opinion, and their focus on securing equal treatment.61

Despite the Turkish state’s interest in reifying a somewhat homogeneous “Turkish diaspora” in Europe and in the United States, the diversity endures among the migrant populations. Together with the rising politicization in Turkey and elsewhere over the past years, this diversification leads to the emergence of a variety of “voices” that are not always compatible with the state perspective. Nevertheless, the mechanisms that had been explained above in order to secure a grassroots support among some of the migrant groups seem to have given their results. In Germany and the Netherlands especially, the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) is at the moment attempting to centralize its position as a lobbying organization by being politically active through rallying events and working closely with the Turkish government. Very often, the strategies that are used by this organization, as well as its close institutional ties with the Justice and Development Party attracts criticisms from the other migrant organizations in Europe. In the United States, the different profile of Turkish diaspora—quite skilled and professional with higher average income than many immigrants— is seen both as an advantage and disadvantage. These highly-skilled, highly educated and “Kemalist” actors among the Turkish diaspora in the US continue to lobby for Turkey despite their distance from the governing party and criticism.
against their conservative outlook. Yet, new actors in the US diaspora, who represent the shift from the traditional state approach towards the Kemalist elite, have also emerged recently with closer ties to the government. The Diyanet Center of America (also known as the Turkish American Community Centre) has been running actively since 2008 by Diyanet officials from Turkey out of a giant mosque complex built in Maryland in 2013. This non-profit organization is offering Koran courses and community-building activities for the more observant living in the US, which was quite unheard of in the 1980s and in the 1990s for less skilled Turkish immigrants living in Paterson, New Jersey and in Rochester, New York. Another actor is the Turkish American Cultural Society (TACS) which is working closely with the YTB, nad which funds Turkish migrant organizations in the US. Nevertheless, not all diasporic groups were included within the framework of representation as symbolic ambassadors. Since the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, there has been an ongoing effort to put an end to the activities of Gülenists (FETÖ) and their organizations in Europe and in America, such as the American Turkish Friendship Association (ATFA) and the Rumi Forum in the US. There is also an expectation that the European and American counterparts as well as the Turkish diaspora living there should support Turkey’s efforts to curb the transnational activities of acknowledged terrorist groups operating in and outside the country.

Conclusion

Under successive governments since 2013, Turkey has intensified its engagement policies towards its diaspora to increase its presence and control in both public and private realms. In order to carry out state-led transnationalism and to disseminate the dominant ideology, a number of changes took place at the institutional level, such as creating mechanisms to coordinate efforts more effectively as well as the introduction of external voting from abroad since 2012. As the Turkish state’s institutional and administrative presence abroad has become consolidated, it is expected that diaspora members assume a bridging role as they are considered as permanent communities with

Under successive governments since 2013, Turkey has intensified its engagement policies towards its diaspora to increase its presence and control in both public and private realms.
transnational linkages to the homeland. Yet, the diversity and fragmentation within the Turkish diaspora indicate that we cannot talk about a monolithic and unified entity. Therefore, any state policies to engage with this group should take this diversity into consideration. In addition, although we focus in this paper mainly on the state’s engagement with emigrants, diaspora engagement is a two-way process, as it also includes the change they bring to the countries of origin through reactions and demands, i.e. transnationalism from below.

Moreover, Turkey has been experiencing strains with some EU countries and the US since 2017. It is evident that finding a solution to these escalating issues by involving only some diaspora members to act on behalf of Turkish interests could be problematic, especially considering the dual allegiance of citizenship that many of these populations hold with the host countries, as well. Certainly, there is a need to keep diplomatic channels open with the use of skilled Turkish diplomatic corps by implementing diplomatic tools and language, which have always been Turkey’s strong suit. This is also important in building a stronger support among all Turkish migrant populations that assist the home country politically and economically while obtaining their earned rights in their countries of residence. The recent high-level official visits to France and Germany as well as TÜSİAD’s involvement with its German counterparts are certainly positive developments to secure normalcy in bilateral relations. Surely, the position of Turkey in the global economy, the democratic steps to be taken despite problems faced at home will determine the leverage it enjoys in the international community and the relations that it builds with the emigrant populations who would become “bridges for good relations” between Turkey and the host countries.

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It is expected that diaspora members assume a bridging role.
Endnotes


Accommodated, or Excluded?”, in Akçapar (ed.), Turkish Immigrants in Western Europe and North America, pp. 57-77.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.


22 Ibid.


25 Ibid.


28 Ibid., p. 10.


32 Damla Bayraktar Aksel, *Home States and Homeland Politics*.
33 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
47 T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu. “Onikinci Cumhurbaşkanı Seçimi, Ülkeve Temsilcilik Bazında Seçmen ve Sandık Sayıları”, at http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/faces/HaberDetay?training_id=YSKPWCN1_4444005790_afrLoop=6151344199156628&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=6t5sxyvma_1%40%3F_afrWindowId%3D6t5sxyvma_1%26_afrLoop%3D6151344199156628%26training_id%3DYSKPWCN1_4444005790%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D6t5sxyvma_43 (last visited 17 October 2017).
Şebnem Köşer Akçapar and Damla Bayraktar Aksel


52 This clause has been kept in the Constitution as in original following the Referendum in 2017.


54 Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, Transnational Politics, p. 110.


