
Assessing the Role of Trade in the Formation of Turkey's Civilian Power in Africa

Emel Parlar DAL*, Ali Murat KURŞUN**,
Hakan MEHMETCİK***

Abstract

This paper attempts to assess the civilian character of Turkey's political economy in sub-Saharan Africa with a special focus on its trade policy towards African countries. It also seeks to explore the degree to which its trade policies towards the continent contribute to the construction of a civilian foreign policy. Additionally, this study delves into the linkages between "power and trade" and between "civilian power and trade". Assuming that Turkey is not usually conceived as a traditional civilian power in the IR literature and political debates, this paper aims to fill the lacuna in the existing literature focusing on the impact of trade on the making of

civilian power. Applying Maull's three-faceted framework of civilian power characteristics (cooperation, use of economic means, development of supranational structures), this study concludes that in Turkey's emerging "civilian power" objectives, trade's role is larger in the use of economic means for securing national goals and cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives than in the development of supranational structures for international management level.

Key Words

Civilian Power, Trade Power, Turkey-Africa Relations, Turkey's Trade Policies, Civilian Power-Trade Nexus.

Introduction

This paper attempts to assess the civilian character of Turkey's political economy in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa) with a special focus on its trade policy towards African countries. It also seeks to explore the degree to which these trade policies contribute to the construction of a civilian foreign policy

* Assoc. Prof., Marmara University, Department of International Relations, İstanbul, Turkey,

E-mail: emelparlar@yahoo.com

** Research Assistant, Marmara University, Department of International Relations, İstanbul, Turkey,

E-mail: alimuratkursun@gmail.com

*** Assistant Professor, Marmara University, Department of International Relations, İstanbul, Turkey,

E-mail: hakanmehmetcik@gmail.com

and actorness. As one of the composing elements of civilian power, trade has the capacity to strengthen interdependence and cooperation among countries and to engender changes in countries' structural power and international influence. The ways countries derive their international power at both the normative and civilian levels and their capability to build an effective interconnectedness among different policy and influence areas continue to require deep investigation in IR on both analytical and empirical grounds. In addition, this study delves into the linkages between "power and trade" and between "civilian power and trade".

Acknowledging that trade is an influential power maximizer and legitimizer, this paper is structured around the following research questions: In which way(s) has trade affected Turkey's civilian power capacity in Africa since the 2000s? How has Turkey's trade power impacted the way it has grounded its emerging civilian power in an era marked by regional uncertainties and global anxieties? What are the opportunities and challenges Turkey has faced in developing its civilian power in Africa through trade? Can the trade and civilian components of a foreign policy be successively and effectively merged?

As Turkey has not traditionally been conceived of as a civilian power in the

IR literature and political debates, this paper aims to fill the lacunae in the existing literature by analytically and empirically focusing on the impact of trade on the creation and display of a civilian foreign policy. There are relatively few studies which focus on the link between trade and its effects on Turkish foreign policy within different geographies even though a flourishing literature focusing on the EU's external policy and trade exists. The main novelty of this paper is to conceptually comprehend the correlation between "civilian" and "trade" in terms of inputs and outputs and second to empirically analyze the specific case of Turkey's African trade policy in the 2000s. Another important novelty of this paper is to use "trade" as a foreign policy tool on empirical grounds by employing different sets of data. Thus, this paper goes beyond the descriptive nature of the existing literature on Turkey's African engagement.

Against this background, the first part of this study will explain the Civilian Power-Trade Nexus on a methodological ground with insights from the civilian power literature in EU studies. Here the paper first provides an explanation of civilian power together with its common characteristics, as well as its associated patterns such as the ideal role of civilian foreign policy. Second, it delves into exploring the civilian-trade nexus through

interactions and interdependence, which serves in constructing states both “civilian” and “trade” powers. In the second part, the driving factors of Turkey’s African engagement since the 2000s will be explained in terms of its foreign policy preferences and trade motives. In the third part, the way in which Turkey engaged in constructing civilian power through trade will be analyzed with reference to empirically grounded research data on trade volumes, mutual diplomatic visits and other complementary figures in the 2000s and on the basis of Maull’s three civilian power characteristics: *cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives; economic means for securing national goals; and the development of supranational structures for international management.*

Civilian Power-Trade Nexus

From “Civilian” to “Civilian Power”: A Contested Term in Nature

As a highly-contested term in the IR literature in general and EU studies in particular, “civilian” signifies a civilian approach to international politics expressed by states’ commitment to democracy, rule of law, material prosperity, multilateralism,

supranational cooperation, development cooperation, respect for human rights, peaceful resolution of conflicts, trade, and democracy promotion. According to François Duchene, who first introduced the term “civilian power” in the 1970s with reference to the European Economic Community, Europe has the ability and capability to “domesticate relations between states” by promoting its own model of political economy and integration to the entire world.¹ Although Duchene’s conceptualization lacks a clear explanation of the means and the nature of “civilian power”,² it introduced a highly and continuously debated topic to IR and European-centric studies and opened up space at the empirical level for future case studies.³ The concept was soon approached by other IR scholars who enriched its conceptual framework. Hanns Maull⁴ reinterpreted the concept and applied it to Germany and Japan, two countries with anti-militarist cultural and political identities⁵. In that article, defining civilian powers as states eager to “take initiatives and exercise influence over events, and which use particular strategies and instruments to achieve their objectives”,⁶ Maull described the three main characteristics of civilian powers as:⁷ i) the acknowledgement of the necessity of *cooperation* with others for pursuing international objectives; ii) the use of *nonmilitary*, particularly

economic means, to secure national goals; and iii) the willingness to *develop supranational structures* to address critical issues of the international environment.

Grounded on these three characteristics of civilian powers, Maull defines three objectives of civilian powers: (i) willingness to civilize international relations; (ii) willingness to transfer sovereignty to supranational institutions as a promoter of collective security; and (iii) willingness to establish a civilized international order based on equality, justice and tolerance.⁸ Maull also attempts to present civilian power as a foreign policy. In that vein, he draws the boundaries of an ideal type of civilian foreign policy role,⁹ a specific national role conception essentially designed on the basis of German and Japanese post-war foreign policies. As introduced by Hanns Maull and categorized by Tewes,¹⁰ three main features characterize this abstract ideal type or prototype of a civilian foreign policy role: *domestic preconditions*; *normative commitments*; and *power instruments*. Under this three-layered classification, trade is also considered one of the power instruments to be used by an ideal type civilian power to strengthen its civilian foreign policy role and identity.

As stated by Ian Manners, Maull's three civilian power objectives

mainly aim to “civilize” international relations by developing international law, international institutions and democracy.¹¹ For Manners, one of the most significant commonalities of the various civilian power definitions is that they prioritize the possession of economic power and/or the use of non-military, especially economic, instruments.¹² Aside from this common acknowledgement of the centrality of “economic power” as a prerequisite of being a civilian power, contradictions and academic debates exist with regards to whether or not the concept also encompasses the use of coercive instruments, including military ones.¹³ Like Hedley Bull's criticism of Duchene's “civilian power Europe”, Stelios Stavridis also rejects the emphasis of the non-military in the definition, arguing that as the output is more important than the choice of military or non-military means used to diffuse human rights and democracy to other countries.¹⁴

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Trade as an Instrument of Civilian Power

Trade has the potential to both construct and legitimize states' power on the world scene. However, states should follow some principles and guidelines in order to create a "civilian" impact through trade. Of course, trade cannot alone increase states' capacity to build up an efficient and multifunctional civilian foreign policy role. In practice however, it has the ability to structurally shape states' foreign policies and can play the role of an accelerator of multilateralism and influence diffuser through commercial deals and diverse multilateral platforms in the long term.¹⁵ Together with the three civilian power determinants, trade can easily be coordinated with the foreign policies of states aiming to pursue "civilian" goals.

On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that all trade powers can be defined as one of Maull's three civilian power types. Departing from this, as a constitutive element of civilian power, trade has a transformative capacity to strengthen political-economic interactions among states.¹⁶ In this sense, if coordinated successfully with foreign policies of states and positively perceived by the international society as a new source of influence in a civilized international system, trade and trade

power can perform as mutually constructing patterns for states' evolving civilian foreign policy role. The trade-civilian nexus can only be truly exploited and merged if they feed each other practically and ideologically. This means that trade power derived from trade is generally expected to act as a force for good and to increase political cooperation among states. Beyond this, trade may also help states increase their credibility and legitimacy as a global "civilian actor", only if other components of civilian actorness such as domestic preconditions, normative commitments and other power instruments including democracy promotion, development cooperation and mediation are included in the construction of the role of civilian power as functioning factors.

In addition, it is difficult for some states lacking an inherent and historical "civilian" orientation in their policies, identities and culture to turn trade power into civilian power. States' efforts to promote trade must also go hand in hand with their civilian appeal and, as explained above, civilian and trade should be juxtaposed with both the historical past and the current situation of countries. Acknowledging that constructing a civil power role requires time and empirical evidence together with supporting discourses, an intertwined trade-civilian approach seems to be indispensable for states to

successfully realize their international political economy engagements in different geographies.

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As a rising power, Turkey tends to use its trade policies as a soft power instrument that boosts the ground on which Turkey's civilian power actorness emerges on the shoulder of NGOs, humanitarian relief and aid volunteers and workers, as well as private businesspeople. In this sense, Africa is one of the most important regions to Turkey's growing and expanding civilian-reach. Turkey's designation of its trade policies in Africa is therefore an apt area to study Turkish civilian power characteristics within a trade-civilian power nexus.

Driving Factors of Turkey's African Trade Policy

There are several factors that drive Turkish engagement with Africa.

Changes in the nature of international politics must first be considered. As the iron cloud of the Cold War was replaced by a multilateral and multi-actor international system, regional and rising powers gained more freedom to set up their own foreign policy priorities and agendas. With advancements in transportation and communication technologies, investment, the globalization of capital and trade, and the economic crisis and slowdowns in the West since the 2008 financial crisis, economic and political engagement with neglected countries and regions has become more relevant and prevalent in the foreign policy terrain of rising powers. In this international climate, Turkey has its own economic, political, cultural and altruistic reasons to engage with Africa. Turkey's geographic proximity to Africa, shared anti-colonial discourse and religious and cultural ties with the region are also driving factors.¹⁷ Rhetorically, Turkey has played the roles of anti-colonial solidarity, natural partner and benevolent protector within Africa to enhance its standing and position.¹⁸ Domestically, as Turkey grew economically and its social structures shifted with an emerging new type of middle class, the Turkish private business sector, to fulfill a need for new markets, extended its interests in Africa much earlier than the Turkish state did. One of the major indicators

of a robust and dynamic economy is the increasing middle class which is also an important catalyzer of changing foreign policy in the Turkish case over the last several years. Turkish governments have cooperated with the so-called “Anatolian tigers” to find new markets in return for their electoral and ideological supports.¹⁹ In a similar way, due to religious, humanitarian, cultural and altruistic sentiments, Turkish civil society brought aid to Africa much earlier than did the state apparatus.

In this international climate, Turkey has its own economic, political, cultural and altruistic reasons to engage with Africa.

Turkey has increased its embassy presence from 12 to 39 over the last decade. In a similar direction, African ambassadorial presence in Turkey has increased from 10 in 2008 to 32 in 2015. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) operates in dozens of countries and has established offices in 15 countries in the Middle East and Africa. Turkish Airlines has become the largest network in Africa among foreign carriers, overtaking Air-France and Emirates by flying to more than 57 destinations across 30 countries on the continent.²⁰ Visa waiver agreements between Turkey

and Botswana, Morocco, South Africa, Libya, Mauritius, Swaziland, Seychelles and Tunisia have been implemented while a visa easing agreement allowed for visa processing at the border gate in Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. Turkey has provided a substantial number of scholarships to African students with the intention of increasing its cultural ties. Religion is also one of the motivating factors and tools of Turkish policy and discourse in Africa.²¹ Turkish civil society has also initiated a number of activities, from providing humanitarian assistance to establishing educational and vocational trainings and orphanage centers. Turkish business people and NGOs have made significant investments in Africa. All of these activities in the form of trade, business relations, investment, humanitarian aid and educational/vocational support in the continent are critical in shaping Turkey's new foreign policy agenda towards Africa. Through these civilian means and tools, Turkey has constructed a new moral enterprise towards Africa drawing upon historical, religious, cultural and identical connections giving way for a new type of Turkish moral, humanitarian and altruistic mission in global affairs.²²

Both state and non-state actors in Turkey focus on humanitarian aid in Africa as a niche diplomacy area and use development and humanitarian

aid as an entry point into African affairs.²³ Africa receives one third of Turkey's official development aid, with Somalia as the biggest recipient.²⁴ However, Turkey generally uses its bilateral development cooperation and its own tools (98% of Turkish aid) to help other countries.²⁵ For instance, through TİKA led programs, Turkey provides development aid in 28 countries in Africa on education, health, infrastructure and agriculture. Since 2011, TİKA has spent more than US\$ 315 million on hundreds of development programs.²⁶ Much of the work done by these state apparatuses follow and replicate non-state actors' operations in the continent. For example, TİKA and the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) have programs on drilling water wells in Africa.²⁷ Yet, it is assumed that Turkish non-state entities have drilled thousands of water wells in Africa to provide clean water.²⁸ In this sense, state actors augment in various ways what the non-state actors do in Africa on a larger and more effective scale. Turkish NGOs work on health and education issues and Turkey also provides for the

construction of schools and hospitals through joint projects with state entities such as TİKA and the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ).²⁹ Moreover, Turkey's civilian non-governmental organizations, in addition to the government agencies, are very active in humanitarian relief programs in Africa. In the 1990s, starting with foundations sending meat for the Islamic Sacrifice Feast to Africa, Turkish civilian humanitarian relief foundations began to deal with problems in education, health, water sanitation and vocational training, etc. Africa is known as home to the world's highest and fastest-growing number of orphans due to AIDS and conflicts. To provide care and support to thousands of African orphans, Turkish civilian relief foundations have opened a number of orphanages in the region. All in all, Turkey's humanitarian and development aid offers a new model compared to other countries' effort on the continent³⁰ and the Turkish model depends more on the extensive and intensive work done by Turkish civil society and NGOs.

Table 1: Turkey's Africa Opening in Focus

Country	HLSCC	ACDRM	TECA	FTA	Visa	Embassy	E_Ankara	TEOCC	TCCA	FERB	THY	TS
Angola			x			2010	2012	x		2011	x	
Benin			x			2014	2013		x	2015	x	x
Botswana					x	2014						x
Burkina Faso									x		x	
Burundi							2014		x			x
Algeria						x	x	x	xx	1990	x	x
Djibouti			x			2013	2012		xx	2015	x	x
Chad			x			2013	2014		xx	2015	x	
Equatorial Guinea			x							2014	x	
Eritrea			x			2013			x		x	
Ethiopia			x			1926	2006	x	xx	2008	x	x
Morocco	2013	x		2006	x	x	x	x	x	1990		
Cote d'Ivoire						2009	2013	x	x	2014	x	
Gabon		x				2012	2015		x			
Gambia		x				2011	2011		x	2011		
Ghana			x	2015		2010	2012		x	2011	x	x
Guinea			x			2013	2016		xx	2016		
Guinea Bissau									x			
South Africa						1994	1993	x	x	1997	x	
Cameroon						x		x	xx	2014	x	x
Kenya						1968	2012	x	xx	2010	x	x
Congo		x	x			2014	2013	x	x	2015	x	
Dem. Rep. of Congo						1974	2011	x	x	2015	x	
Lesotho									x			x
Liberia									x			x
Libya		x			x	x	x		xx	2007	x	
Madagascar			x						x	1990	x	x
Malawi			x			2011			x	2016	x	
Mali		x	x			2010	2014		x	2015	x	
Mauritius			x	2013	x					2014		x
Egypt	2011		x	2007		x	x	x	xx	1992	x	
Mauritania		x				x	x		x	2011	x	
Mozambique						2010		x	x	2015	x	
Namibia						2012			x			x
Niger						2012	2012		xx	2015	x	

Nigeria			x			1960	x	x	x	2011	x	
Rwanda						2014	2013		x	2012	x	x
Senegal		x	x			1960	2006		xx	2015	x	x
Seychelles					x				x		x	x
Sierra Leone									x			x
Somalia		x				2011	x		xx	2015	x	x
Sudan			x			x	x	x	xx	2008	x	x
Tanzania						2009		x	xx	2011	x	
Togo									x		x	x
Tunisia	2012		x	2005	x	x	x	x	xx	1990	x	
Uganda			x			2010	2011		x	2011	x	x
Zambia			x			2011	2013		x		x	x
Zimbabwe			x			2011			x		x	X

HLSCC: High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, ACDRM: Agreement on Cooperation in Defense Related Matters, TECA: Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, FTA: Free Trade Agreements, UFR: Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, TEOCC: Turkish Embassy Office of the Commercial Counsellor, FEBR: Foreign Economic Relation Boards (DEİK), THY: Turkish Airlines, TS: Turkish Scholarship, TCCA: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), E_Ankara: Embassy opened by the given country in Ankara
X: Active, operational, exist, Xx: Active, operational, exist and there is TIKA office in the country

Source: The data is collected from various institutions and the table is made upon these data by the authors.

Turkey has also attached great importance for peace and stability in Africa and has provided personnel and contributed financially to seven UN Peace Missions in Africa (MONUSCO/DRC, MINUSMA/Mali, MINUSCA/CAR, UNAMID/Darfur, UNMISS/South Sudan, UNOCI/Cote d'Ivoire and UNMIL/Liberia).³¹

In addition to political, cultural and altruistic sentiments, trade is one of the main reasons driving Turkey's Africa opening. Indeed, trade has always been an important part of Turkish foreign

policy towards Africa as the country needs new markets for its growing industry. As a state body, the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) is the most important body enhancing bilateral trade and economic relations with Africa. DEİK has established Business Councils with African counterparts in 31 countries. As of 2015, Turkey has signed 39 trade and economic cooperation agreements with African countries. While in 2003 there were no free trade agreements (FTAs), five agreements have come into force as of 2015 (Tunisia 2005, Morocco 2006, Egypt 2007, Mauritius 2013,

Ghana 2015). In addition, four FTA negotiations are ongoing (Democratic Republic of Congo, Kameron, Seychelles, Libya) and discussions for the opening of FTA negotiations are ongoing (Algeria and South Africa).³² FTAs are important as, along with trade and economic relations, political relations become more intense and meetings are scheduled regularly. Increasing cultural, humanitarian and business activities across the continent are all interlinked in terms of their outcomes. The expansion of bilateral aid and NGOs' activities play a catalyzer role in Turkey's increasing exports to the region. The fact that Turkey's trade volume increased six-fold between 2003 and 2015 to \$19.5 billion, which equals 8.7% of Turkey's total trade, also proves the existing interdependence between humanitarian activities and trade. A further look at the data suggests that during this period Turkey has also succeeded to increase its trade relations with almost every African country.

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Given Turkey's account deficits, finding new markets for Turkish products

is one of the immediate solutions to overcoming Turkey's economic difficulties. In this sense, the growing trade relations between Turkey and Africa are driven by both economic necessities and other aforementioned sentiments. One of the most important aspects of Turkish businesspeople in Africa is that most of them are Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) without any international experience. In this sense, the increase in the civilian influence in Turkish trade policies did not just originate from formal cooperation or established mechanisms between state and non-state actors but from civilian expertise, networks and mobilization capacities.³³

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Africa has one of the highest potentials for Turkey as an export destination. The Turkish garment and textile industries and construction sector have

Table 2: Transformation of Turkey's Trade with the African Countries (Millions USD)

Country	Trade 2005	Trade 2010	Trade 2015	Change in 10years (%)
Angola	\$35,93	\$109,39	\$196,04	446%
Benin	\$7,30	\$119,91	\$82,83	1035%
Botswana	\$0,26	\$0,62	\$1,51	482%
Burkina Faso	\$4,17	\$55,17	\$68,22	1537%
Burundi	\$2,03	\$4,39	\$2,55	26%
Algeria	\$1.668,95	\$2.572,97	\$2.566,42	54%
Djibouti	\$7,23	\$31,17	\$98,36	1261%
Chad	\$1,14	\$3,44	\$39,07	3323%
Ecuadorian Guinea	\$10,77	\$32,80	\$45,84	326%
Eritrea	\$12,23	\$6,84	\$13,88	13%
Ethiopia	\$139,67	\$215,78	\$419,31	200%
Morocco	\$514,06	\$1.020,76	\$2.048,19	298%
Cote D'Ivoire	\$59,66	\$145,14	\$389,85	553%
Gabon	\$27,45	\$23,87	\$69,38	153%
Gambia	\$10,53	\$20,71	\$16,00	52%
Ghana	\$104,81	\$290,84	\$388,51	271%
Guinea	\$12,34	\$30,34	\$68,86	458%
Guinea Bissau	\$0,18	\$2,51	\$6,98	3693%
South Africa	\$1.575,72	\$1.258,87	\$1.407,70	-11%
Cameron	\$52,39	\$88,52	\$118,63	126%
Kenya	\$52,32	\$99,74	\$144,51	176%
Congo	\$29,50	\$56,66	\$131,51	346%
Democratic Rep. Of Congo	\$2,24	\$17,04	\$162,67	7161%
Lesotho	\$0,54	\$0,70	\$0,28	-48%
Liberia	\$58,75	\$75,06	\$81,75	39%
Libya	\$578,70	\$2.358,02	\$1.615,56	179%
Madagascar	\$9,46	\$28,93	\$59,58	530%
Malawi	\$18,56	\$23,62	\$32,05	73%
Mali	\$12,89	\$11,32	\$32,64	153%
Mauritius	\$15,67	\$29,07	\$40,97	162%
Egypt	\$954,55	\$3.177,05	\$4.340,78	355%
Mauritania	\$11,05	\$38,88	\$110,03	896%
Mozambique	\$18,73	\$89,38	\$116,22	521%
Namibia	\$0,93	\$3,70	\$85,44	9064%
Niger	\$4,01	\$14,75	\$31,35	681%
Nigeria	\$129,98	\$471,15	\$503,97	288%
Ruanda	\$0,36	\$7,99	\$30,44	8430%
Senegal	\$35,41	\$84,76	\$133,72	278%
Seychelles	\$5,90	\$4,69	\$16,65	182%
Sierra Leone	\$5,42	\$35,07	\$45,77	745%
Somalia	\$3,05	\$6,17	\$72,38	2277%
Sudan	\$153,19	\$232,96	\$449,16	193%
Tanzania	\$33,05	\$103,65	\$150,94	357%
Togo	\$7,60	\$37,51	\$53,75	607%

the largest export potential.³⁴ Turkey mainly exports furniture, appliances, construction materials, iron and steel, machinery and garment and textile products to Africa while importing oil, gas, gold and other raw materials. Turkey aims to reach US\$ 50 billion in trade with Africa as of 2023, yet Turkey's trade with African countries is asymmetric in nature. Even though Turkish exports are mostly goods and services that can help Africa to build up a scale of economy to be competitive in the long run, Turkey should focus more on direct investments, especially in infrastructure. Indeed, African leaders are worried about the unequal positioning in their bilateral relations which refrains them from engaging with Turkey in a more substantial way. However, at the second Turkey-Africa Summit in 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, Turkey underlined equality in Turkish-African relations and a full-fledged Turkey-Africa partnership strategy.³⁵ In this sense, Turkish commitments in Somalia and trade relations with countries such as Ethiopia, where Turkey is the leading country with US\$ 2.5 billion direct investment and where Turkish-origin companies are the single largest foreign employer in the country, showed Turkey's benevolent intentions. Turkish companies have made US\$ 6 billion in direct investments in Africa, especially in the horn of Africa, which

is the largest recipient of Turkish FDI to date.³⁶ In addition, Turkish construction companies and their construction projects in Africa serve to enhance trade relations. Indeed, there is a steady increase in Turkish contracting firms' projects carried out in Africa. Turkish firms undertake mass housing, transport infrastructure and petrochemical facility projects, all of which are important for African development and growth.

Overall, Turkey has managed to move beyond state-to-state dealings in implementing its foreign policy and increasingly relies on the cooperation of non-state actors in Africa.³⁷ In this sense, Turkish non-state actors, mainly aid workers and private business sector representatives, influence Turkish trade policies in Africa through agenda setting and lobbying.³⁸ Turkish state bodies help these self-oriented private endeavors through diplomatic and logistic support, trade deals and establishing flight routes via Turkish Airlines. Turkish politicians have also raised awareness on Africa and relations with Africa. Social, cultural and political contacts, scholarships, technical assistance, aid, trade and investment are all elements of Turkey's soft power base in Africa. Upon this soft power base, Turkey displays the behavior of civilian foreign policy.

Assessing the Role of Trade in Turkey's Attempt to Construct a Civilian Power in Africa

Having outlined the principal driving factors of Turkey's economic relations with African countries, Turkey's emerging presence in the continent needs to be further assessed to understand to what extent trade, one of the most fundamental tools of engagement in Africa, adds to the construction of Turkey's civilian power on the continent. As already explained in the introduction, the degree to which Turkey can construct its civilian power through its existing trade policies could be analytically tracked with the application of Maull's three-faceted civilian power prototype: "i) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; ii) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals...; and iii) a willingness to develop a supranational structures to address critical issues of international management".³⁹

Cooperation With Others in the Pursuit of International Objectives

While the means and aims of Turkish foreign policy have moved smoothly

towards a civilian role starting from the late 1990s and early 2000s, this new orientation prompted Turkey to develop itself a functioning role in various branches of international cooperation in an attempt to pursue and attain its national interests.⁴⁰ Indeed, this new civilian attitude for obtaining visible outcomes found a solid ground in Turkey's political-economic engagement with African countries. To this end, particularly from 2005 onwards, Turkey has initiated a wide-ranging international political cooperation with African countries from a civilian approach, which has allowed Turkey to not only increase its economic presence on the continent but also overcome some of the deadlocks in its attempts to gain leverage in global affairs.⁴¹ Turkey's election to the non-permanent member seat in the United Nations Security Council for 2009-2010 with the striking support of 51 votes from 53 African countries can be seen as one of the best illustrations of Turkey's appeal to this civilian understanding through cooperation with African countries to gain global leverage. This prompt and visible output of the international objective oriented civilian cooperation with African countries has also been encouraged by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who recently linked the country's desire to open embassies in each African country to the fact that the continent

as a whole holds 54 votes in the United Nations.⁴² In fact, Turkey mobilized this cooperation-objective nexus in Africa in pursuit of creating a civilian impact just before the 2008 UNSC non-permanent seat elections. Two months before the election in August 2008, Turkey initiated and hosted the first Turkey-African Partnership Summit with the participation of 49 African countries and together revealed the İstanbul Declaration which set the ground for future cooperation.

Although this apparent success in 2008 represents the first characteristic of the civilian type of foreign policy engagement, trade also allows for cooperation and objective seeking. Herein, the diplomatic visits paid by Turkish leaders to African countries and the consequent increase in trade volume provide important clues as to how this civilian characteristic of engagement was mobilized. In this regard, unusual to Turkish foreign policy tradition, Turkish leaders began diplomatic visits to various sub-Saharan Africa countries in pursuit of laying a more solid ground for cooperation, resulting in a relative boom in trade volume. As Table 3 illustrates, high-level visits by then President Abdullah Gül and then Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to African countries attempted to lay the ground for cooperation based on a civilian approach. Countries like Gabon, Ghana, Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya and

Senegal attracted greater than usual attention as Turkish leaders visited these countries more than once in a short period. Almost all declarations made following these high-level visits proposed more integrated cooperation for the agenda of Turkish-African relations by highlighting issues such as visa-free travel, cooperation on higher education, military cooperation and, of course, the need for increased trade relations.⁴³ However, the most important characteristics of these visits are the fact that these are designed to smooth the ground for Turkish NGOs, private humanitarian aid workers, and businesspeople working already in this region. That is, there is a significant correlation between leaders' visits and locations where business and civil society groups work. Indeed, these places are those where Turkish private NGOs such as IHH, the Turkish Red Crescent, World Doctors, or state associations such as TİKA, TOKİ, Diyanet or Turkish businesspeople are substantially present.

The diplomatic visits paid by Turkish leaders to African countries and the consequent increase in trade volume provide important clues as to how this civilian characteristic of engagement was mobilized.

Table 3: Sub-Saharan African Countries Visited by Turkish Presidents and Prime Ministers between 2009-2016

2009	Kenya (President Abdullah Gül)	Tanzania (President Abdullah Gül)	-	-	-	-	-	-
2010	Congo Democratic Republic (President Abdullah Gül)	Cameroon (President Abdullah Gül)	Nigeria (President Abdullah Gül)	-	-	-	-	-
2011	Ghana (President Abdullah Gül)	Gabon (President Abdullah Gül)	Somali (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	South Africa (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	-	-	-	-
2012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2013	Gabon (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Niger (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Senegal (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	-	-	-	-	-
2014	Equatorial Guinea (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2015	Ethiopia (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Somalia (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Djibouti (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	-	-	-	-	-
2016	Nigeria (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Ivory Coast (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Ghana (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Guinea (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Uganda (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Senegal (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Somalia (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Kenya (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)


Source: Prepared by drawing largely on the data from various official websites:

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa>;

<http://www.tcgb.gov.tr/receptayyip Erdogan/yurtdisiziyaretler/>;

<http://kdk.gov.tr/sayilarla/turkiye-afrika-ulkeleriyle-iliskilerini-guclendiriyor/11>

Figure 1: Turkey's Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa Countries Visited by Turkish Leaders between 2009 and 2015



Source: "Exports by Countries", *Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK)*, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=624 (last visited 18 January 2018).

Indeed, these visits had a profound impact on Turkey's trade relations with African countries. An analysis based on the cause and effect relationship between these visits and the increase in trade volumes demonstrates the role of trade in the civilian characteristic of cooperation. For instance, assessing Table 3 and Figure 1 in an integrative way, it is much easier to make sense of the increase in Turkey's export volumes between 2009 and 2011 with Kenya and Tanzania following President Gül's 2009 visit. This civilian cooperative agenda produced a visible impact in Turkey's trade relations with these countries. It is possible to take this argument further by linking the increase in Turkey's export volumes

with Gabon and Ghana between 2010 and 2013 to the visits paid by Turkish leaders in the same period. Again, it is possible to observe how then President Gül's visit to Nigeria in 2010 came into play in the sharp increase in Turkey's exports to Nigeria between 2010 and 2014 following the decrease in 2009 and 2010.

By the same token, the influence of official visits on increasing trade volumes can also be observed in African countries, where Turkey had decreasing trade volumes prior to Prime Ministerial visits. For instance, following a sharp decrease in Turkey's exports to South Africa between 2009 and 2010 (Figure 1), Prime Minister

Erdoğan paid a visit to South Africa in 2011. Likewise, the same trend can be observed with Erdoğan's visit to Ethiopia in 2015 following decreasing exports in 2013 and 2014. Indeed, after Erdoğan's visit, Turkey's exports to Ethiopia began to increase again. Thus, these figures illustrate that Turkey's civilian cooperative agenda has found an operational backdrop for its trade relations.

Drawing largely on the above-mentioned argumentation, it would not be wrong to argue that starting with Turkey's adoption of a more civilian approach in its foreign engagements, this civilian cooperative agenda has found an operational backdrop in its trade relations with African countries. Having realized that its political cooperation with African countries can result in a win-win situation and increase Turkey's global leverage, Turkish leaders began to accommodate the tool of trade in this causal civilian relationship in the cooperation-objective nexus to create mutual benefits while laying the ground for further civilian cooperation with African countries.

Economic Means to Secure National Goals

Turkey's civilian path in Africa in pursuing its national goals is inherently

based upon economic motives and business-focused interactions rather than military means. This trajectory of the civilian character and priority given to economic means in Turkey's opening towards African countries began in the mid-2000s. Within this scope, trade has also become one of the key influential factors in Turkey's attempt to make use of economic means to pursue its national economic goals.⁴⁴ In this sense, Turkey launched "A Strategy on the Development of the Economic Relations with African Countries" prepared by the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade in 2003⁴⁵ and began working on the targets outlined in this document. This document aimed mainly at a doubling of the trade volume with African countries and an increasing presence of Turkish companies on the continent.⁴⁶ Departing from this strategy, Turkey has begun to operationalize its economic tools in Africa on two grounds: legal and institutional.

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
To this end, Turkey has initiated the implementation of legal steps aimed at catalyzing the use of economic tools in African countries. The main aim of these legal implementations was to create solid economic means that would strengthen Turkey's ability to obtain its national goals. Although these legal steps have not been operationalized for the most part in Africa, they included the signing of the Agreements on Reciprocal Promotion, Protection of Investments with 22 African countries, the Agreements on the Avoidance of Double Taxation with 11 African countries, and Free Trade Agreements with four African countries.⁴⁷ Although these early legal initiatives to create and establish robust economic means for easily engaging in economic relations with the African countries have not been expanded to the majority of African countries, they sowed the seeds of economic engagement for trade relations between Turkey and countries in Africa.

In addition to these legal initiatives, Turkey has attempted to undertake institutional programs to ensure that its economic means are securely grounded to allow the pursuit of its national goals when engaging in economic relations in Africa. Apart

from the opening of commercial consulates in 26 African countries,⁴⁸ Turkey's relations with the African Development Bank serve as a model for these institutional undertakings. The African Development Bank accepted Turkey as a member in 2008. Özkan argues that Turkey has begun to intensify its engagements with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa and the Economic Community of West African States as well.⁴⁹

It is important to note that these institutional accessions facilitated advantageous economic tools, allowing Turkish enterprises to make use of funds allocated for various projects. Another important development on the institutional level is related to the continent's regional economic communities. Within this scope, some Turkish missions in Africa have registered in important regional economic communities such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum, the Economic Community of West African States, the East African Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Economic Community of Central African States.⁵⁰

Figure 2: Turkey’s Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa and its Share in Total Exports (2006-2016)



Source: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=1547 (last visited 20 January 2018).

Moreover, the most recent initiative, the “Turkey-Africa Economy and Business Forum,” held in İstanbul in November 2016, helped economic relations reach another important dimension at which the economic relations between Turkey and African countries are discussed collectively by governmental and non-governmental organizations and business actors in both regions. This is important in the sense that the civilian emphasis on economic tools has moved to the core of the Turkish-African agenda, allowing for the topics, issues and new projects in the civilian sphere to be openly discussed among all the partners involved.

This civilian approach to the establishment of secure economic tools for the pursuit of national goals in the continent has had a profound impact on Turkey’s trade relations with African countries. Overall, as suggested in Figure 2, the share of exports to African countries in Turkey’s total exports has increased from 1.7 % to 2.7 % between 2006 and 2016. Although these figures are not satisfactory within the scope of Turkey’s strategic opening towards Africa, it gives important clues about the civilian impact of these economic tools. It is worth noting that this civilian approach has also produced results on a win-win basis.

Turkish companies and investors have begun to invest and acquire important companies in Africa (for instance Arçelik purchased one of the leading South African manufacturing firms, Defy⁵¹). In addition, Turkish companies engaging in trade in African countries have created thousands of jobs throughout the continent (for instance more than 10,000 in Ethiopia).⁵²

Turkey invests heavily on creating economic tools that would ease and trigger trade and business relations with African countries. The legal and institutional steps taken by the Turkish government prove Turkey's desire to prioritize economic means as a solid ground for its relations with African countries. Although far from being firmly established, the results also prove that these early attempts to establish economic tools from a civilian perspective not only help Turkey's national interests but in return serve a favorable purpose for its trade partners.

Supranational Structures to Address Critical Issues of International Management

Turkey's appeal to the civilian type of foreign policy in its political-economic engagements with African countries has also been linked to another important characteristic of civilian powers and highlights the eagerness to

create and work with bilateral networks and collective supranational structures for dealing with the challenges faced. In addition to its strategic partnership with the African Union as the largest supranational umbrella organization for African countries, Turkey makes financial donations to this union as well as to various supranational funds such as the World Food Program.⁵³ In line with the emerging cosmopolitan identity resulting in an increasing willingness to work with and contribute to such global structures, Turkey's civilian motivation to help African countries in solving their problems has also been reflected in various initiatives launched jointly by Turkey and its African partners.⁵⁴ As Table 4 indicates, starting from 2008 Turkey has worked to launch joint conferences and programs laying the ground for international cooperation with the continent that create mutual benefits and at the same time addressing the problems the continent faces.

While calling for more intensified trade relations between the two sides, the framework emphasized the role of international structures in the economic relations between Turkey and Africa.

Table 4: Intergovernmental and International Initiatives Between Turkey and African Countries Organized to Address Critical Issues

18-21 August 2008	I. Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit in İstanbul
2008	The İstanbul Declaration on Turkey Africa Partnership: Cooperation and Solidarity for a Common Future
2008	Cooperation Framework for Turkey-Africa Partnership
15 December 2010	High-Level Official Meetings in İstanbul
16 December 2010	Ministerial Level Reviewing Conference in İstanbul
21-23 May 2010	I. International Donor's Conference for the Reconstruction and Development of Darfur, with Egypt in Cairo
09-13 May 2011	IV. United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, in İstanbul
31 May - 01 June 2012	II. International Donor's Conference for the Reconstruction and Development of Darfur, co-chaired with Egypt in Cairo
19 June 2013	II. Turkey-Africa Partnership High Level Officials Meeting in Addis Ababa
19-21 November 2014	II. Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit in Malabo
19-21 November 2014	Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership 2015-2019
2015	Mid-Term Review Conference of the İstanbul Programme of Action 2015
23-24 February 2016	High Level Partnership Forum for Somalia

Source: Turkey-Africa Relations, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa> (last visited 10 February 2018).

These civilian efforts to establish international frameworks between Turkey and African countries for coping with challenges have touched upon the role of trade as a facilitator in this civilian-based relationship. For instance, the “İstanbul Declaration”, accepted in the first Turkey-Africa

Partnership Summit in 2008 in İstanbul emphasizing a robust commitment to international norms, makes a clear reference to the role of economic relations and addresses trade and investment as one of the most essential of nine areas in which Turkey and African countries need to work

together more comprehensively.⁵⁵ The “Cooperation Framework for Turkey Africa Partnership” accepted at the same Summit in 2008 expanded in more detail how these international structures can be operationalized to strengthen trade and investment relations between Turkey and African countries. In this sense, while calling for more intensified trade relations between the two sides, the framework emphasized the role of international structures in the economic relations between Turkey and Africa. It did so by making reference to the need for the establishment of a comprehensive legal groundwork enhancing the role of international financial institutions and the foundation of business councils in pursuit of transforming the existing trade relations into a more institutionalized structure.⁵⁶

With the institutionalization of this intergovernmental process between 2008 and 2016 and the various conferences and roadmaps during this period, Turkey and the African countries began to ground their relations on an international basis. The growing role of trade in enhancing these relationships was in parallel emphasized much more in these framework documents. Building on the previous background, the “Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership 2015-2019”⁵⁷ declared after the Second Africa-Turkey Summit held on 19 to

21 November 2014 in Malabo called for a more expanded understanding of the trade and investment relations between Turkey and African countries and proposed more institutionalized implementations of an integrated approach to establish an inter-sectoral understanding including political and social domains. Drawing on this integrated approach, the 2015-2019 implementation plan included more concrete recommendations than its processor. Among the objectives of this plan the creation of a joint database, the integration to the global network of various international/transnational African commissions, the proliferation of trade meetings and the creation of various councils that would regulate Turkish-African business relations may be cited.

Already engaged in trade relations with African countries but not under a collective framework, Turkey's evolving relations based on this new civilian approach to institutionalize and collectivize trade relations with the continent is also important in the sense that both parties' international efforts to create operational frameworks to find solutions to the deadlocks in the evolving relations have all, in some way, touched upon the role of trade as an accelerating factor. These new attempts have the potential to transform the existing loose bilateral relations into a collaborative international framework

that in turn would boost Turkey's civilian power role on the continent.

Acknowledging trade as one of the elements constructing civilian powers, these findings prove that Turkey has the desire to operationalize trade in its trajectory towards emphasizing civilian power in its relations with African countries. Indeed, it is possible to track the role and impact of trade in Turkey's construction of the three characteristics of civilian power, *cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives*, *economic means for securing national goals* and the *development of international/transnational structures for international management* in Africa.

Far from being complete, Turkey has shaped its relations with African countries on a civilian ground and wisely looked to engage the role of trade in this civilian foreign policy implementation starting from the mid-2000s. Although Turkey has begun to create the legal and institutional infrastructure for trade's bigger role in this three-faceted civilian trajectory, Turkey needs to create more comprehensive frameworks for its relations with African countries to properly operationalize this infrastructure and create more profound results. One of the most important steps to be taken by Turkish policy makers is to more clearly link the role of trade as a power maximizer to its

civilian foreign policy implementations in Africa. For instance, while Turkey cooperates eagerly with African leaders, the role of trade between Turkey and African countries has not been fully institutionalized and still depends on the individual efforts of the leaders. In addition, although Turkey works to create international/transnational structures to address the critical issues, so far trade has been unable to settle into its well-deserved place in these structures. Again, even though Turkey works to create economic means that can be utilized in its relations with its African partners, the number of free trade agreements remains below the target. It seems clear to Turkish policy makers that there is a solid ground for merging trade and the civilian components of foreign policy implementations in Turkey's relations with African countries. Yet, the link between these two remains far from completely connected.

Turkey has shaped its relations with African countries on a civilian ground and wisely looked to engage the role of trade in this civilian foreign policy implementation starting from the mid-2000s.

Conclusion

As a central and constitutive element of civilian power, trade has both the capacity and potential to gradually construct civilian power if used strategically and effectively as a surrogate for, as well as a complement to, states' foreign and security policies. This study verifies this argument, albeit partially, in the sense that Turkey's increasing trade volume with African countries since 2000s has simultaneously contributed to the making of Turkey's civilian power on the continent in the three levels of *cooperation for pursuing international objectives, use of economic means to secure national goals and development of international structures/organizations*. An in-depth analysis of the role of trade in each of the above-mentioned Maullian "civilian power" characteristics indicates that in the pursuit of Turkey's emerging "civilian power" objectives, trade plays a larger role in the *use of economic means for securing national goals and the cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives* levels than in the *development of international structures for international management*.

Trade powers can enact a civilian foreign policy role if all of the three characteristics of civilian power are proportionally embedded in states' political economic orientations.

It can also be argued that trade powers can enact a civilian foreign policy role if all of the three characteristics of civilian power are proportionally embedded in states' political economic orientations. This study confirms this argument by the relatively low performance of Turkey at the levels of international cooperation and development of international structures. Despite Turkey's increasing capacity and willingness to develop international cooperation with African states over the last decade through African summits, mutual diplomatic and business visits, and opening of embassies, Turkey's efforts in this field seem not to have created a high impact in terms of results. This has been proven by the lower number of votes by African states for Turkey's 2015-2016 candidacy for the UNSC's non-permanent membership than in 2009-2010. Taken together with the general volatile character of the votes of African states in international organizations, this result is a good indicator of the limits and fragility of Turkey's cooperation with Africa. Another segment under which Turkey shows lower performance, the development of international/transnational structures, is also far from having a high impact, mainly due to Turkey's lack of a comprehensive international organization strategy for the African continent. Turkey's efforts at this level need to be restructured

both strategically and institutionally. The weak institutionalization and the dispersed character of Turkey's political economy towards Africa makes it hard for Turkey to achieve effective results in the short term. The present study clearly illustrates that there is still room for Turkey to take further steps in reinforcing cooperation and multilateralism with the African states. Regarding the use of economic means as the civilian power layer, despite being its strongest area, Turkey lags behind the other emerging powers actively engaged in Africa such as China, India and Brazil in terms of trade volume, number of free trade and tax exemption agreements, and direct investment volume. Here it also appears clear that Turkey's trade power in Africa is increasing fast. However, a significant trade potential remains between Turkey and Africa that has not been totally explored. In addition, as detailed in section 3, despite its increasing effectiveness as a civilian power instrument in recent years, trade still does not remain a primary vehicle for the construction of Turkey's civilian power in Africa. The merging of a trade power role with a civilian power role depends heavily on Turkey's ability to effectively operationalize its trade power instruments with the aim of creating "a civilian power impact" in foreign policy.

Last but not least, the more Turkey constructs favorable relations with African countries, the more Turkey increases its global leverage, as experienced before in the UNSC elections. In the last decade, Turkey seems to have made significant efforts to lay a solid ground by strengthening diplomatic connections and creating transnational networks for a sustainable Turkish-African partnership. However, the lack of a comprehensive and institutionalized approach to Africa constitutes the main limitation for Turkey's ability to turn into a civilian power in the region. Here it must also be acknowledged that a gradually evolving civilian power actorness in the Africa region would certainly help Turkey expand this role outside Africa, to both its neighboring regions and the global arena. Regional and global civilian power actorness are of course mutually constructed and strongly interdependent. Turkey's increasing political economic engagement with African countries now gives the impression of being a more trade-focused diplomacy rather than being an international/transnational-focused one and this makes this policy incomplete and weak as a way to render Turkey an effective regional civilian actor.

Endnotes

- * This study has been supported by the Scientific Research and Technological Council of Turkey's (TUBITAK) 1001 Project [TUBITAK-SOBAG project no: 114K783] titled 'The Contribution of Rising Turkey and the BRICS Countries to Global Governance: A Comparative Analysis'.
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