

PERCEPTIONS

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Japan's Security Policy towards East Asia

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Russia's East Asia Policy:
New Opportunities and Challenges

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Facing Beijing and Washington

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Book Reviews



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PERCEPTIONS - Winter 2012

Editorial

Perceptions continues to publish special issues on subjects and debates in international relations, and this issue and the next will focus on the international politics of East Asia. Member of our Editorial Board Selçuk Çolakoglu, managing editor Engin Karaca and I, have worked closely to collect valuable analyses on different dimensions of this topic. East Asia is at the centre of the scholarly debate and occupies a great deal of policy makers' time in different parts of the globe. The US's Asia pivot policy is a visible example of the policy interest in the region. The scholarly debate examines intra-regional relations and relations with outside actors. There is also a new debate on the role of East Asia in a new multilateral world order.

We will touch upon almost all of these topics in these two special issues on East Asia. The geographical distribution of the contributors is also representative of the subjects of these special issues. This first issue consists of six articles on the international politics of East Asia. Based on the historical evolution of the US becoming a major player in the Pacific region, Joel Campbell discusses the US's relations with the Asian countries of Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan. Concerning Sino-American relations,

the author identifies a transformation from the reintegration of China into the global political economy to increased tensions, especially in strategic and economic issue areas, and also from America's unofficial relationship with Taiwan. Kaseda Yoshinori discusses Japan's realist foreign policy towards East Asia and looks at how Japan is strengthening its own missile capability, enhancing its alliance, and building new security ties with states that have similar security concerns.

Anna Kireeva discusses Russia's relations with China, examining how relations both relate to creating a new axis of power in the region and to Russia's policy in its own East Asian region. Kireeva argues that ASEAN's desire to welcome Russia as a balancer in the region which provides new opportunities for Russia to intensify its cooperation with East Asian countries. Considering the recent political developments in Taiwan, including the development of a weaker ruling party, Wan-Chin Tai discusses the major issues concerning Taiwan's relations with the United States, Japan and China. Chong Jin Oh discusses how the North Korean nuclear problem, the revision of the South Korean-US alliance, Japanese militarisation, and the

rise of China have overshadowed South Korea's emergence as an international player. Selçuk Çolakoğlu discusses the main determinants of Turkey's foreign policy towards East Asia with a focus on security concerns and economic interests, examining Turkish-East Asian relations in four historical periods, highlighting the basic characteristics of relations in each period.

In addition to the articles focusing on East Asia, there are two on Turkish foreign policy and one on Afghanistan. Ali Aslan uses post- foundational/post-structural analytical tools to study the nexus between hegemony and foreign policy in his article. He examines the transformation in Turkish-American relations in the two main periods since the AK Party came to power: the era of a "lack of understanding" between the years 2002 and 2006, and the era after the parties had come to a "new understanding" in 2006. Marianna Charountaki discusses the increasing importance of northern Iraq in regional politics and examines Turkey's recent foreign policy towards the Kurdistan

Regional Government (KRG). On Afghanistan, Imtiyaz Gul Khan presents a comprehensive record of the impact of the conflicts on the country's human capital from the Soviet occupation up to the US invasion. Khan also examines how civilians have been affected from US and NATO operations.

The Center for Strategic Research (SAM) organises conferences, expert meetings and lectures with the participation of academics, experts and policy makers. SAM also publishes two other series, namely Vision Papers and SAM Papers. Vision Papers present primary information on Turkish foreign policy through the writings of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu. SAM Papers present high-quality analysis by academics and policy makers. These publications and activities are accessible on our website, sam.gov.tr

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Bülent ARAS
Editor-in-Chief

US Foreign Policy towards Northeast Asia

Joel R. CAMPBELL*

Abstract

Since the mid-19th century, the US has been a Pacific power. Through three wars and the Cold War, America became a major regional player. Modern Japanese-American relations were shaped by the Cold War, and a strong political-military alliance served the geopolitical needs of both countries. As Japan's economy matured and its politics transformed in the 1990s, Tokyo sought greater political independence, and used an upgrading of the alliance as part of its effort to achieve the more "normal" status as a great power. US relations with South Korea have been driven by a shared perception of threat from North Korea. Since the Cold War, the nature of this threat has shifted from immediate concern about conflict to danger from an essentially failed state. Sino-American relations centre on the interaction of two great powers. China's quasi-alliance with the US and market-oriented reforms meant that the relationship in the 1980s centred on reintegration of China into the global political economy. Since the mid-1990s, China's "rise" has led to increased tensions, especially in strategic and economic issue areas. America's close but unofficial relationship with Taiwan remains an irritant to overall Chinese-American ties.

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Key Words

Japanese-American relations, Japanese-American alliance, Korean-American relations, North Korea, Sino-American relations, Taiwan Strait issue.

Introduction

The date 7 December 2011 was the 70th anniversary of the surprise Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. That "day of infamy" long ago not only brought America into a global war, but propelled the US towards becoming the dominant military and political power in East Asia. US foreign policy in Asia was shaped by four wars, three hot and one cold. The outcome of the Second World War created a permanent American military presence in the region and transformed Japan into a key ally. The Korean War, America's first war fought entirely on the Asian mainland, saved South Korea, which became another US ally. It also created a defensive perimeter for the Cold War, in which the US faced down both the Soviet Union and the

newly communist China. The Vietnam War, which has been perceived as a US loss, inserted America into Southeast Asian politics, with Japan as a key staging area. Two more recent wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, relied on Japanese bases for supply and training.

The outcome of the Second World War created a permanent American military presence in the region and transformed Japan into a key ally.

Post-Vietnam US foreign policy downplayed East Asia. America withdrew from mainland Southeast Asia in the 1970s, and lost its Philippine bases by 1991. China aligned itself with America in the latter days of the Cold War, while it introduced economic reforms and opened up to foreign trade and investment. The end of the Cold War eased regional tensions, with only the Korean peninsula remaining a flashpoint. Japan continued to rely on American defence guarantees as a foundation of its own foreign policy, but its outsized economic presence in the 1980s seemed on the wane by the mid-1990s.

America has long seen itself as a Pacific power, and a key goal of US foreign policy has been to prevent any major

power or combination of powers gaining control of Eurasia.¹ Much was made of the Obama administration's "pivot" from South Asia and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific in 2011. The President spent most of last November bolstering US trade, political, and military ties in the region. The US hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) summit in Hawaii. Obama's opening address noted that "the Asia Pacific region is absolutely critical to America's economic growth... we consider it a top priority."² He promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade area that would span the Pacific, which is in preliminary negotiations and has been signed up to by Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam (Japan, Canada, and Mexico have expressed interest in joining the talks). Visiting Australia, Obama joined with Prime Minister Julia Gillard to reaffirm their alliance, and both agreed that 2,500 US Marines would begin rotating through an Australian base near Darwin. His speech to the Australian parliament focused on freedom, some observers viewing this as an obvious contrast with China. He then attended the East Asia Summit in Indonesia, where he announced that the US was considering normalising relations with Burma/Myanmar, based on the military government's recent preliminary reforms. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton quickly visited Yangon,

and met with both the leaders of the ruling junta and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.³

The first week of 2012, accompanied by Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, Obama announced a new military strategy to support this Asia pivot. America would draw down forces stationed in Europe and reduce its overall military strength, while maintaining force levels in East Asia and deploying US Marines to the Philippines and Thailand.

America has long seen itself as a Pacific power, and a key goal of US foreign policy has been to prevent any major power or combination of powers gaining control of Eurasia.

This article surveys American foreign policy in Northeast Asia since the Cold War, focusing on shared history and current issues. It discusses relations with four key states or entities: Japan, the Republic of Korea (hereafter called Korea), China, and Taiwan. It suggests that Asia is once again becoming central to US policy. The Obama administration's recent "pivot" to Asia is only the latest manifestation of American preoccupation with the region, and heralds an enhanced role for Asia in American thinking over the next decade.

US-Japanese Relations

A History of Mutual Dependence

The United States and Japan first encountered each other as mid-19th century rising Pacific powers. The US sought to open Japan ostensibly to establish ports of call for American whaling ships, and to promote Asian trade. It was also a way to insert itself into the imperialistic politics of Asia. Japan was perhaps fortunate that a relatively small power like the US came to call in 1853, rather than the hegemonic Great Britain, which was preoccupied with its efforts to dominate India and China. It took the Japanese 15 years to fully decide how to respond to Western encroachment, but the Meiji Restoration in 1868 thrust Japan into the modern world along a path of economic and political modernisation. At first, America viewed Japan's transformation positively, as a nation replicating the Anglo-Saxon model, and as a counter to Russia and a collapsing China.⁴

America's positive view gradually changed as Japan aggressively entered the Asia imperialism game. Unlike European powers, Japan's colonial efforts were mostly contiguous, creating immediate tension with other Asian countries. America protested Japan's moves into China in the 1930s, and rising bilateral tension culminated in the attack on Pearl

Harbor. Japan greatly miscalculated American willingness to fight, and paid dearly for it. The subsequent Pacific War (1941-1945) was marked by intense brutality, and ended in Japan's overwhelming defeat. The crushing nature of the victory, followed by the benevolence of the occupation, helped make Japan's political and economic transformation relatively smooth.⁵

Unlike European powers, Japan's colonial efforts were mostly contiguous, creating immediate tension with other Asian countries.

Japan emerged as America's key Asian ally in the 1950s. The first key event that shaped the relationship was the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 which restored Japan's sovereignty after the American occupation; along with the later Mutual Security Treaty, it made Japan America's junior partner in East Asia.⁶ The alliance was based on three implicit understandings: Japan would accept an inferior position in return for an American guarantee of its security, Japan would concentrate on economic development and gain access to the US market, and Japan could have a degree of independence in its foreign policy but would do nothing that would challenge the new regional order in Asia or US

hegemonic leadership.⁷ This trade-off became known as the Yoshida Doctrine after Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, and which stated that the US would lead in the security area, and Japan would concentrate on developing its economy. A second key event was the 1960 renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty which, despite anti-treaty riots, put security ties on a more permanent basis.⁸ The relationship held through a number of challenges, notably the drawn out reversion of Okinawa, popular opposition to the Vietnam War, and the "Nixon Shocks" of the early 1970s (Nixon slapped punitive tariffs on Japanese exports, and decided to forge a quasi-alliance with China without informing Japanese leaders).

As Japan became one of the world's largest economies in the 1970s, the bifurcated nature of the relationship became painfully clear. While Japan continued to defer to the US on regional and global security, and remained a steadfast Cold War ally, Japanese neo-mercantilist exports and predatory business behaviour created huge trade surpluses with the US, helped destroy several key American industries, and led to a number of high-profile takeovers of American companies. "Trade friction" reached a peak in the mid-1980s, as American calls for appreciation of the undervalued yen led to the Plaza Accord in 1985. Japanese banks and industrial

firms began to recycle export earnings to the US economy, and Japan became America's leading creditor.

The alliance faced its greatest post-Cold War test (and third key event) not in East Asia but in the Middle East. During the 1991 Gulf War, Japan was roundly criticised by American lawmakers and pundits for its failure to robustly support the American-led alliance. Tokyo belatedly pledged US \$4 billion (with an additional US \$9 billion later) to help defray the US \$500 million daily war costs, and dispatched a mine sweeper to the Persian Gulf after the war had ended. Responding to international criticism, Japan within two years undertook two major changes: it markedly increased financial support for US forces in Japan, and committed to joining UN peacekeeping operations. After its first successful postwar overseas troop deployment in Cambodia (1992-1993), it participated in UN operations in several other countries.⁹

Upgrading the Partnership

A fourth key episode was the drafting of bilateral defence guidelines in 1997. Earlier agreements from the 1970s stated that Japan would build up sufficient forces to provide its own self-defence, though the Japanese Self-Defence Force (SDF) would carry out most of its operations within the land and territorial

waters of Japan, and would only work with American forces in functional areas such as operations, logistics, and intelligence. After a three-year process, Tokyo and Washington specified conditions under which the two nations would jointly operate in future conflicts. The two militaries would now cooperate in peacetime conditions, would work together to thwart attacks on the Japanese homeland, and would react to regional threats that could affect Japan's security. They also listed new areas of cooperation, such as relief operations of US forces, support in rear areas, and joint work on operations.¹⁰

As Japan became one of the world's largest economies in the 1970s, the bifurcated nature of the relationship became painfully clear.

Beginning in the 1960s, various leaders in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the governing party at the time, sought ways to achieve two goals: greater independence for Japanese foreign policy and more equality in Japanese-American relations. Comprehensive security was an effort in the 1970s to give Japan more breathing room in an era of oil shortages. Meanwhile, Tokyo became a more active partner with America. By the 1970s, Japan funded 75 % of the costs of the US

bases in Japan, and had enacted a range of legal measures to support US forces. Japan's fading economic pre-eminence and China's rising economic power meant that Japan received less attention from American political leaders, and "Japan bashing" gave way to "Japan passing" in recent years. Domestic political changes in Japan in the 1990s, including the meltdown of the pacifist Socialist Party, allowed conservative leaders to promote the notion of Japan as a "normal nation," in other words one that could project its own military might as a great power. The ascent of Koizumi Junichiro to the premiership was a game-changer in that it brought a full upgrading of the Japanese-American relationship. Koizumi believed that the 9/11 attacks created a new global security reality, and that participation in the US-led coalition in Afghanistan would provide an opportunity for Japan to attain both greater independence and equality with America. Koizumi was one of the first allies to pledge support for the US campaign. He pushed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law through the Diet, the Japanese parliament, in October 2001, and then sent Maritime Self-Defence ships to the Indian Ocean in support of the war.¹¹

The Iraq War two years later provided an even more potent opportunity for Koizumi to boost ties with Washington. One of the few American allies to

pledge support in this war, Koizumi agreed to send an SDF force to do humanitarian and reconstruction work in Iraq. Koizumi was lucky that there were no casualties, and the two-year deployment took place with only mild protests in Japan.¹² Koizumi and US President George W. Bush also generally agreed about the need to put pressure on North Korea about its nuclear weapons programme, and both were equally alarmed about the Chinese military build up. As long as Bush, Koizumi, and Koizumi's LDP successors were in office, the relationship remained fairly close, though disagreements over North Korea surfaced when the US's hard-line stance did not produce tangible results (Japanese leaders were encouraged when Bush's team made some temporary progress with Pyongyang during his last 18 months in office). The two governments made headway on realignment of US bases to limit their impact on Okinawa, the creation of a ballistic missile defence system for Japan, and on allowing Japanese SDF a stronger role in national defence.¹³ The two governments also worked together on a range of security issues, such as ballistic missile defence, maritime security, and inter-operability of defence systems.¹⁴

Perhaps the biggest recent challenge to the bilateral relationship was the landslide victory of the Japanese opposition party, the Democratic Party

of Japan (DPJ), in September 2009. The DPJ platform called for major changes in the alliance, such as gaining more equality in the relationship, promoting stronger regional ties, and lessening the impact of American bases on Okinawa. Once Hatoyama Yukio took office as prime minister, bilateral tensions mounted.¹⁵ However, Japanese people gave the LDP a landslide victory, ejecting the DPJ from power after three years during the general election on 16 December 2012. Japan's recently elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with President Barack Obama on 22 February 2013 in Washington, seeking to reinforce US-Japanese relations in a time of high tensions for Japan, caused by a territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China sea, and a North Korean nuclear test. At the summit with Abe, Obama called the alliance with Japan the central foundation of U.S. policy on Asia.¹⁶

Futenma

The Futenma issue encapsulates those unresolved tensions in Japanese-American relations. Sixty years after the postwar occupation of Japan ended, Japan still depends on American security guarantees, and a large American military presence remains, but it does not sit easily there. Unwilling to accept large numbers of American military

personnel in mainland Japan, Tokyo prefers basing in the southern island prefecture of Okinawa. Over 70 % of US forces stationed in Japan are based there, and bases take up around 30 % of land on the tiny island. Due in part to a string of crimes and various accidents involving US service personnel, there is significant opposition to the bases on the island. While many Okinawans work on the bases, large numbers of people would like to reduce the impact of US operations, and eventually move American bases off the island. After a 1995 rape of a 12 year-old girl by three US servicemen, which sparked mass protests throughout the country, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro promised to reduce the American "footprint" on the island. Tokyo and Washington later agreed to move 8,000 US Marines to Guam, and to relocate the Futenma Marine Air Station from its urban location to Henoko in northern Okinawa.¹⁷

The Okinawan prefectural government, along with local environmental activists, has long pressed for the closing of Futenma without relocation to Henoko. LDP leaders were committed to the agreement, but in 2009 the DPJ came to power promising to reopen the issue. The Obama administration dug in its heels, and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates insisted that the agreement would not be renegotiated. Prime Minister Hatoyama

was unable to convince the prefectural leaders to accept the agreement, his position became politically untenable, and he resigned after only nine months in office. The fiasco indicated a clear political failure by the DPJ to transform the incident: attempting to follow public opinion on the issue, it politicised security policymaking, but was not able to come up with coherent policy alternatives, and bilateral security policy outcomes remained largely unchanged.¹⁸ Curtis, for one, suggests that the Obama administration deserves much of the blame for the crisis, especially for Secretary of Defence Robert Gates putting pressure on Hatoyama's government immediately after the election, and then Obama's reluctance to help the prime minister as he began to flounder.¹⁹ The Futenma agreement remains in place but, 16 years after the rape incident, it is uncertain when the base will be moved.

Recent Issues

The 11 March 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster precipitated the worst humanitarian and political crisis in Japan of the postwar era. The impact on an already struggling Japanese economy was incalculable, and the sluggish handling of the crisis led to the downfall of Kan Naoto, Hatoyama's successor as prime minister. Ironically, the

disaster's aftermath marked an upswing in US-Japanese relations as American military units stationed in Japan assisted in relief operations in the Tohoku region (called Operation Tomodachi, or "friend"), and US government agencies advised their Japanese counterparts on dealing with the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. Overall relations had been improving since mid-2010, when a Chinese fishing trawler rammed a Japan Coast Guard vessel in the East China Sea. A mini-crisis over Japan's holding of the boat's captain was averted when Kan agreed to return him to China, but this hurt the prime minister's public approval. Suddenly, Tokyo's old fear of a rising China trumped any desire to equalise relations with America, and the DPJ government began to realise the value of the alliance.²⁰

Tokyo and Washington have discussed new frameworks for cooperation, including agreement to take bilateral issues to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), drafting new sector-specific agreements, and creating a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA).

Japanese and American policymakers have worked to reduce economic

friction over the past decade, and have cooperated on economic recovery since the 2008-2009 global recession. Gone were the high-profile trade disputes of the 1980s and 1990s, despite continued Japanese trade surpluses, and Tokyo did not protest the Obama administration's efforts to revive the American automobile industry. Japan has attempted no major devaluation of its currency to take advantage of the recession, and continued its conservative monetary and fiscal policy. Tokyo and Washington have discussed new frameworks for cooperation, including agreement to take bilateral issues to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), drafting new sector-specific agreements, and creating a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA).²¹

Obama's policy pivot to Asia was taken in part to reassure Japanese leaders, especially DPJ leaders who felt that the US had sabotaged Hatoyama over the Futenma issue. Obama sees the Japan alliance as bedrock for his Asia policy, since American forces will continue to be based in Japan for the long term. For their part, Japan's DPJ leadership by 2011 seemed much more willing to cooperate with the US on Asia-Pacific regional and security issues. Japan's January 2012 announcement that it wished to join multilateral negotiations on the TPP indicated that the DPJ had embraced the LDP policy to link efforts towards regional integration to continued strong

trade ties with the US. The need to keep diversified trade relations became manifest in late 2011 and early 2012, as increased energy imports due to a post-tsunami nuclear shutdown combined with softness in the Chinese market caused Japan to run its first general trade deficits in a generation.

US-South Korean Relations *A Shared Threat Relationship*

America's relations with South Korea are a bond forged in blood, and are dominated by one issue: the threat to the South from North Korea. US troops occupied the southern half of the peninsula at the end of the Second World War, while the Soviet army took the northern half. The wartime allies agreed that the two halves would be reunited into a democratic Korea, but they could never agree on the terms under which an election would take place. In 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) under the Soviet-installed leader Kim Il Sung, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) under the authoritarian Syngman Rhee (Lee Sung Man) began as separate states. Soviet and American forces withdrew from the peninsula, and the Americans unintentionally signalled that they would not defend the South if it was attacked. North Korea invaded the ROK in June 1950 and the Truman administration quickly intervened in

the conflict. The ensuing Korean War lasted over three years, taking the lives of over one million Koreans, perhaps 300,000 Chinese, and more than 33,000 Americans.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea lost its most important source of foreign aid and trade, and its economy cratered.

When the war ended in the stalemate of an armistice, American troops remained in the impoverished South, which was incorporated into the US-East Asian alliance. Like Japan, the ROK signed a mutual security treaty with Washington, and America provided heavy military and economic aid to the struggling country. Since the 1950s, the primary motivation of the Korean-American alliance has been to prevent another North Korean attack on the South. Unlike Japan, South Korea faced an antagonistic state bound on its destruction across a heavily fortified border, the ironically named Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). Outside threats to the country were more immediate, and the American role in the defence of the country more heavy handed and direct. American forces were intended as a “trip-wire,” i.e., sufficiently large that Pyongyang would always know that, in the event of

another Korean war, they would again face overwhelming American firepower. This deterrence has apparently worked. Despite various attempts to destabilise the South with infiltration, assassination attempts and terrorist acts, North Korea has never mounted a sustained breach of the armistice, at least until two serious incidents in 2010.

Also unlike Japan, Korean politics remained authoritarian under Rhee’s traditional strong-man government until 1960, and then under the military governments of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan from 1961 until 1987. However, Korea followed a Japanese-style state-led, export-oriented growth path, and its economy took off in the 1960s, achieving very high growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s and becoming one of the prosperous East Asian “Tiger” economies (or newly industrialising economies). As with Japan before it, bilateral trade issues emerged as sources of friction from the 1980s onward. Trade disputes have been generally more muted than those with Japan, and the two allies concluded a free trade agreement in 2007 (see below).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea lost its most important source of foreign aid and trade, and its economy cratered. The nature of the northern threat now shifted, as the DPRK was now trapped in its own self-

reliance (*Juche*) ideology and seemed like a dangerous wounded animal. It was at this point that the North began to develop nuclear weapons, leading to the first nuclear crisis in 1994. This was defused with the Agreed Framework, by which Pyongyang would give up its weapons programme in return for a non-weapons grade reactor and a supply of fuel oil. In the midst of the crisis, Kim Il Sung died, leaving the country in the hands of his son, Kim Jong Il. A subsequent crisis over missile development led to another deal in 1998. Due to poor agricultural practices, the country descended into a prolonged famine, but the Clinton administration made progress towards normalisation of relations in its last year. The South Korean governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun tried to engage the North through their “Sunshine Policy,” but it produced limited results.²²

The George W. Bush administration was uninterested in accommodation with Pyongyang, and saw North Korea as regional threat equal to that of Iraq or Iran in the Middle East. The North’s admission that it was refining uranium sparked a long-running second nuclear dispute. The DPRK claimed that it tested its first nuclear device in 2006, and experts debated over whether the country might already possess several weapons. Bush’s insistence that the communist regime agree to give up

nuclear development as a precondition for bilateral talks accomplished little, and so American negotiators tried informal bilateral talks, leading to the North’s agreeing to dismantle its nuclear facilities. The Obama administration refused to follow what it viewed as largely reactive approaches of Clinton and Bush. North Korea reacted to perceived US indifference by going back on the nuclear deal, and a series of provocations, including another nuclear test in 2009, the sinking of the ROK corvette *Cheonan* in early 2010, and shelling of ROK-controlled Yeongpyeong Island off the west coast at the end of the year.²³

Current US-Korean Issues

The Bush administration concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with Korea in June 2007. Despite significant opposition in both countries, the agreement was ratified by the US Congress in October 2011 and by the Korean National Assembly the next month. The FTA is the largest for the US outside North America, and significantly lowers tariffs and encourages lessened regulation of key sectors such as automobiles and beef. Within five years, the agreement will eliminate tariffs on 95 % of traded goods, and both sides committed to opening up trade in services.²⁴ Implementing the agreement in ways that avoid protectionism on

either side will test the agreement going forward.

North Korea remains the most important concern between the two allies. While liberals Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun publicly opposed Bush's hard-line approach, Lee Myung Bak has been eager to work with both Republican and Democratic administrations, and his approach to Pyongyang parallels that of the Obama administration. Both leaders have insisted that they will not reward the North for provocations, and will insist on good-faith negotiations through established north-south and six-party talks mechanisms. Since the Youngpyoung Island incident, Lee has maintained a hard-line stance towards North Korea, but support for his ruling Grand National Party (renamed the *Saenuri*, or New Frontier, Party in February 2012) has fallen.²⁵

According to a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) task force, the North's nuclear stockpile represents the "gravest threat" in the region, and this includes multiple problems: the nuclear devices themselves, their relationship with advanced missile technology, and chances that nuclear technology or materials might be given to other nations or groups, especially in the Middle East. The task force noted that these issues have become more difficult due to an "unpredictable" and "reclusive" regime

whose future is uncertain, and progress in persuading that regime to give up its nuclear programme has been "elusive," as the six-party talks have remained stalled since 2008. The CFR called on the Obama administration to use a combination of sanctions, incentives, "sustained political pressure," and cooperation with China to achieve the goal of denuclearisation.²⁶

Both leaders have insisted that they will not reward the North for provocations, and will insist on good-faith negotiations through established north-south and six-party talks mechanisms.

North Korea's medium and long-range missiles also remain a concern to both allies. Pyongyang has substantially upgraded its missile arsenal since an earlier agreement with the Clinton administration in 1998 to curb development. The DPRK may have 800-1,000 medium-range missiles, including 600-plus Scud-types and 200 Nodongs, which were developed by the North on its own. It has made progress with its long-range Taepodong-2 missile, tests for which were only partially successful in 2006 and 2008. Most worrying for the US, the North tested the very long-range Unha-2 missile, which could reach the western half of the continental US

in 2009. The North has also exported its Nodong technology, and Pakistani Ghauri and Iranian Shahab rockets are based on it.²⁷

Ultimately, many observers note, comprehensive negotiations with Pyongyang may be needed. Perhaps the most effective approach would be a “package deal” in which the DPRK would trade its nuclear weapons (and maybe missile development and a basket of market-oriented reforms) for recognition, aid, and non-aggression pledges from South Korea, Japan, and the US. The North’s desire for regime survival may be key to its embrace of such an approach, and China’s involvement in such negotiations could help reassure Pyongyang of continued political support during implementation.²⁸

US-Chinese Relations

Love and Loathing Between Two Great Powers

For 2,000 years of its long history, China was the predominant East Asian power, and most countries on China’s borders acknowledged the “Middle Kingdom” and its emperor as their suzerain. Due to population pressures, economic stagnation, and gradual encroachment of Western powers, that dominance waned during the “century of shame” from 1839 to 1949. The

1911-1912 revolution easily swept aside the Qing dynasty, but the successor republican government was unable to consolidate political power until the 1930s. Just as that was happening, Japan conquered much of the industrial and agricultural heartland of the country, eventually plunging China into the Second World War.

Most worrying for the US, the North tested the very long-range Unha-2 missile, which could reach the western half of the continental US in 2009.

By contrast, the young and dynamic United States expanded across the North American continent, enjoyed heady economic growth averaging roughly 4 % per year, built the world’s largest industrial structure, became the world’s leading economic and military power by 1945, and led the Western allies to victory in the Second World War. Unlike the other Western powers, America never made any territorial claims in China. Benefiting from the “China trade,” it pushed for an even-handed “Open Door” policy in China. During the Second World War, US air and ground forces fought alongside the Chinese army, American aid propped up the Chinese economy, and US advisors assisted Communist forces in the north.

The sudden triumph of Mao Zedong's Communists in the civil war (1947-1949) shocked the Americans and, in the tense climate of the early Cold War, conservatives questioned "who lost China?" The massive corruption and ineptitude of the ruling Guomindang party (the Nationalist party) virtually guaranteed their ousting, but the "fall" of China seemed like a major defeat in the developing global struggle. There were then two Chinas: the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and ruled by the Communist Party, and the Republic of China on Taiwan ruled by the Guomindang. American and Chinese forces battled each other in the Korean War and, as a result, the two countries had no formal relations for over 20 years and the US fully embraced Guomindang-ruled Taiwan. A low point in Sino-American ties came at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, when US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reportedly refused to shake hands with Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai. The two countries also faced off in two crises in the 1950s over the Taiwan Strait. American elites and public viewed China as part of a Communist monolith, and were slow to grasp a growing rift between the Soviets and Chinese. The John F. Kennedy administration even contemplated bombing China's nuclear weapons facilities.²⁹

The election of Richard Nixon as US president changed everything. Nixon

had been one of the most ardent Cold Warriors, often lambasting "Red China," during the 1950s. By 1968, the realist Nixon saw an opportunity to exploit a growing Sino-Soviet rift and create a triangular diplomacy that would allow the US to manage great power relations, nudge the Soviets towards negotiation in the superpower arms race, and allow a political settlement of the Vietnam War, which had become a US quagmire. For China's leaders, re-establishing relations with Washington could gain valuable manoeuvring room and relieve Soviet pressure (the two Communist giants fought a brief border war in 1969, and Nixon insisted that the Soviets back off from a full-blown attack on China). Beijing and Washington cautiously edged towards rapprochement, culminating in Nixon's visit to China in 1972. On the trip's final day, the two sides issued the Shanghai Communiqué, which became the basis for all subsequent Sino-American relations. It called for the two sides to work towards normalised relations, for the US to accept Beijing's One China concept (i.e., that the PRC allows for only one China, either in Beijing or Taipei, to have diplomatic recognition), and for Taiwan's status to be resolved peacefully. Americans now viewed China quite favourably, business ties began to grow, and bilateral good feelings lasted well into the 1980s.

Jimmy Carter took the next step by formally recognising the People's Republic of China in 1979, and ending formal ties with Taiwan. China quickly became a quasi-ally of the US, and the two nations' militaries shared intelligence. Ronald Reagan, who had been one of Taiwan's staunchest defenders, as president accepted the alliance with China in the interest of defeating the Soviets in the Cold War. Trade and other bilateral tensions emerged, and the Communist Party remained determined to hold onto its political power monopoly.

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Both powers gained significantly from rapprochement. The US got China to abandon the path of revolutionary change abroad, and to focus on trade-friendly, market-friendly economic development. Beijing also obtained US assistance to re-enter the global economy. Deng Xiaoping's "reform and opening" policies created a hybrid socialist-capitalist economy that became a major trading nation and one of the world's largest economies. The quasi-alliance also helped bolster America's

"weakened position" in Asia, and to step up containment of the Soviet Union in the wake of the perceived loss in Vietnam War. China got to be taken seriously as America's partner in the Cold War, and the Chinese pressure on the Soviets may have hastened the end of the global conflict.³⁰

The 1989 bloody crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Beijing was a major turning point, as it forced a reassessment on both sides of the Pacific. George H.W. Bush, another realist, tried to continue the relationship, but high-level contacts remained largely frozen. His successor, Bill Clinton, came to office with promises to get tough on human rights but, in his second term, moved to create a "strategic partnership" on trade and security and pushed for Chinese membership in the WTO. George W. Bush faced a mini-crisis only three months into his term when a US spy plane was forced to land on Hainan Island. The issue was hastily defused, and bilateral relations quickly warmed up after the 9/11 attacks. China was one of the first countries to support the Bush administration's "Global War on Terrorism". In return for support of American efforts in South Asia and the Middle East, the US took no action against China for its suppression of Uighur nationalists in the western Xinjiang province, and issued relatively mild condemnations of a 2008 Chinese

crackdown in Tibet. During the Bush years, there was a good deal of discussion of the implications of the “rise of China”. Much of the American elite reacted negatively to China’s semi-official notion of a “peaceful rise”, which Hu Jintao then reformulated as a “harmonious international society”. A number of bilateral strains began to surface in 2004-2005, including American concern over China’s overtures to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries and Latin America.³¹

Current and Emerging Bilateral Issues

The Obama administration has taken a harder line with China since early 2011. China has done a “range of things,” asserted Obama in his press conference after the APEC meeting, “that disadvantage not just the United States but a whole host of their trading partners in the region... enough is enough.”³² The US has been particularly concerned by China’s assertion of territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, and its refusal to condemn its North Korean ally after Pyongyang’s 2010 provocations. American officials also have expressed alarm over China’s military build-up and double-digit spending increases since the early 1990s,³³ while concern about Chinese suppression of human rights

and religious freedom is never far from the surface.

Despite these recent strains, China has generally adopted a conciliatory foreign policy line over the past 20 years, focused on improving relations with both regional neighbours and the US, and robust multilateralism. China now cooperates more completely with international non-proliferation initiatives.³⁴ It has also resorted to use of “positive nationalism,” which is much more pragmatically and is economically oriented, yet is more harshly reactive and defensive than its ideological Maoist counterpart.³⁵ This nationalism has often impacted relations with other major powers, most notably in the anti-American protests after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia during the Kosovo War (1999).

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China’s “peaceful rise” has enhanced its ability to use soft power and economic power to reassure neighbours and make friends in both developing and developed countries.³⁶ The “unrestricted” nature of China’s economic aid and loans, i.e.,

with no political conditions attached, has gained it many potential allies in Africa and Latin America. China's huge state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds, with vast funds and no shareholder accountability, can sustain losses for extended periods. Even so, China may not yet be completely competitive with the US and its Western allies, since it has a "narrower base" and limited experience abroad. The latter has led to various socio-cultural conflicts and misunderstandings, especially in Africa.³⁷

America's China policy is continually constrained by economic interdependence. US officials upbraid China on a range of issues beyond China's growing trade surplus, such as its undervalued currency, the yuan, limited intellectual property protection, curbs on rare earth exports, and various forms of protectionism. For its part, China accuses the US of heightened protectionism since the financial crisis. However, America cannot afford to alienate the Middle Kingdom, due to continued reliance on China to fund its budget deficits and to fuel its stock markets. American companies depend on China as a manufacturing platform and market. The 2008 financial crisis was a chance to get China to partially coordinate its economic policies with the US.³⁸ The centrality of the Sino-American economic relationship has led various pundits to suggest that the two

countries would shape the management of the globalised economy through a "G-2" arrangement. Given obviously diverging interests on such matters as climate change and global governance, that is probably fanciful, but the notion underlines the importance of bilateral economic ties.

The centrality of the Sino-American economic relationship has led various pundits to suggest that the two countries would shape the management of the globalised economy through a "G-2" arrangement.

A recent Beijing foreign policy white paper noted that the external environment is becoming more challenging and, like America, sees the Korean peninsula as one of the most troublesome. To be sure, 21st century great power competition in East Asia will be largely shaped by Sino-American competition. The question is whether this will result in a second Cold War, or even military conflict. China clearly seeks a return to its traditional dominance of East Asia, and this could undoubtedly create tensions with three other regional powers, namely the US, Japan, and India. Beijing hopes gradually to push the US out of what it calls the first island chain (the Ryukyus), to the second chain (the Marianas), and

eventually the third chain (Hawaii). As a Pacific power, America has no intention of pulling back from the Ryukyus for the foreseeable future, and it would never leave US territories in the Marianas. Obama announced at the 2009 ASEAN Regional Forum a return to Southeast Asia, and has opposed Chinese moves in the South China Sea.³⁹ The challenge for China is to improve its constrained geostrategic position while not openly threatening either neighbours or America, and the challenge for America is to maintain its forward position in East Asia and robust economic ties with China while avoiding great power conflict in the region or globally.

America and Taiwan: A Special Relationship

The thorniest issue between the US and the PRC has always been Taiwan. Though it has had no diplomatic relations with the US since 1979, the island enjoys a particularly close informal relationship with the US that shares similarities with the even closer but formal Israeli-American relationship. Both Taiwan and Israel are small, politically isolated, embattled states facing larger hostile powers within their respective regions. Both countries have been, to varying degrees, shunned by some of the international community, in Taiwan's case maintaining diplomatic

recognition with only 23 nations, mostly aid-seeking states in Central America, the Caribbean, and West Africa. Both countries have depended on US military aid and economic assistance (access to US markets and investment, along with sales of military equipment for Taiwan). Both have long been protected by powerful political lobbies and bipartisan political coalitions in Washington, the longstanding "China lobby" and conservative Republicans in Taiwan's case.

The Taiwan relationship traces its roots to Americans' sentimental attachment to "Free China" before 1949. American traders, missionaries, and writers presented the Chinese as a noble people that needed to be saved from war and poverty. During the Second World War, the Guomindang regime of Chiang Kai-shek appeared in American propaganda as a stalwart ally, and the Truman administration outraged conservatives by cutting off military aid during the subsequent civil war, but quickly embraced the Guomindang during the Korean War.

With US support, Taiwan retained China's seat on the UN Security Council for a generation. US forces were stationed in Taiwan, and the Seventh Fleet patrolled the Taiwan Strait. All this suddenly changed in 1971, when America did not oppose a resolution to

give China's seat to the PRC (Taiwan walked out of the General Assembly before the vote). As the price for US recognition of the PRC in 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. This legislation specified that America would continue informal relations with Taiwan, and guaranteed that the island would continue to be supplied with the latest military hardware so that it could keep up with the mainland. Military sales to the Taiwan have been a constant source of strain with Beijing. Approving a moderate US \$5.85 billion sales package in September 2011, Obama attempted to satisfy Taiwan while not antagonising China.⁴⁰

Like Korea, Taiwan became a dynamo industrial and high tech economy, and its IT industry was heavily tied to America's Silicon Valley.

As Sino-American relations warmed, American interest in Taiwan cooled only slightly. Like Korea, Taiwan became a dynamo industrial and high tech economy, and its IT industry was heavily tied to America's Silicon Valley. The island gained much legitimacy with Americans by becoming (also like Korea) a full-fledged democracy in the 1990s. The Taiwanese issue came to the fore again in 1995, when the Clinton

administration permitted Taiwan's President Lee Teng Hui to visit his alma mater, Cornell University. Beijing was outraged, since it seemed like an American acknowledgement of Taiwan officialdom, and this led directly to the third Taiwan Strait crisis the next year: China tested missiles and conducted war games, as two US aircraft carrier groups patrolled north and south of the island. Both countries backed away from the brink, but Chinese leadership was determined to erase its military disadvantage in the Strait, and so accelerated its military build up.

The US-Taiwanese relationship was strained with the election of Chen Shui Bian, leader of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, in 2000. A Taiwanese nationalist, Chen wanted to push towards eventual independence from China by creating a Republic of Taiwan that would replace the Taiwanese Republic of China. China became increasingly angered by Chen's moves, which they viewed as violations of the One China principle. The Bush administration found Chen irritating, as his actions distracted from Washington's efforts to cultivate China as a partner in the Global War on Terror. Under US pressure and suffering from personal scandals, Chen moderated his rhetoric in his last years in office. Guomindang leader Ma Ying-jeou, who won the presidency back in 2008, and was subsequently re-

elected in 2012, has begun to build a more cooperative relationship with the mainland. His efforts have been viewed more positively by US officials. Taiwan's government seeks to upgrade relations with Washington by concluding a free trade agreement, a visa waiver programme, and an extradition treaty, while resuming cabinet-level visits to the US. So far, none of these has been concluded.⁴¹

Conclusion

China's recent assertiveness has encouraged various Asian countries to upgrade relations with the US. Openings to Vietnam and Burma have been applauded by both realists and liberals as a "new paradigm in international relations": a judicious application of balance of power politics that can advance human rights and democracy.⁴² However, intractable conflicts remain, and the pivot is unlikely to have any immediate effects on regional hot-spots, such as the Korean peninsula. America may only be able to make gains there to the extent that it is able to work with other parties, especially China.⁴³

Is America's pivot to Asia likely to remain a long-lasting development? So far, Obama has had more room to manoeuvre than his two predecessors, who also sought to shift to Asia but were diverted by events elsewhere.⁴⁴

Hillary Clinton insists that the future of global politics will be decided in Asia. Asia, she declares, is the "key driver of global politics," and that is "misguided" to merely "come home" as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars wind down. "Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests".⁴⁵ From a realist perspective, America naturally will stay in Asia as it tries to check the rise of China as a strategic competitor.⁴⁶

The importance of trade and economic development naturally suppresses age-old natural strategic rivalries in the region, and assists East Asia's multilayered regional integration centred on ASEAN.

Assessments of Obama's foreign policy have been mixed in political circles, but many media and academic assessments have been fairly positive, one noting that "on balance, Obama has proved tough, disciplined and, overall, reasonably successful."⁴⁷ For the short term, much will be determined by, among other things, the state of the American economy. Observers have questioned the sustainability of an Asia-centred strategy, and the pivot could be more like an Indian summer of American power in

the region.⁴⁸ However, given East Asia's centrality in the global economy, any Republican successors are unlikely to completely abandon this Pacific shift.⁴⁹

Despite periodic crises over North Korean missiles and nuclear weapons, and concerns about Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, there are many reasons to be optimistic about Asia's future. First, as the most economically dynamic region in the world, Asia generates perhaps a third of global production and trade. Second, the importance of trade and economic development naturally suppresses age-old natural strategic rivalries in the region, and assists East Asia's multilayered regional integration

centred on ASEAN. Third, Japan has played generally constructive regional economic and political roles, and Asian suspicions about its history and possible re-militarisation make it a quite cautious power. Fourth, China has proved a fairly cooperative international player since the mid-1990s, and has committed itself to working with other East Asian countries, the US, and the wider international community.⁵⁰ America has clearly signalled that it intends to perform its traditional role as a major power in East Asia, and that it intends to upgrade its regional presence for the foreseeable future. And that constitutes a fifth reason: America will continue to act as East Asian stabiliser.

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Japan's Security Policy towards East Asia

Kaseda YOSHINORI*

Abstract

After the Second World War, Japan was occupied by the United States, regaining its sovereignty in 1952 with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-US Security Treaty. During the Cold War, Japan maintained a low military profile, refraining from developing strong military forces and from deploying them overseas. Its security relations with East Asian countries were not very tense. However, Japan's security policy has undergone significant transformation after the Cold War. This change was prompted by the weakening of the left in Japanese domestic politics, North Korea's missile and nuclear development programmes, and the rise of China's power. Instead of making active efforts at improving its relations with its neighbouring states, Japan has taken a realist policy of strengthening its own military capability, enhancing its alliance, and building new security ties with states that have similar security concerns.

Key Words

Japan, the United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Australia, India.

Introduction

Japan was the first Asian country in modern history to become an imperial power. However, its devastating defeat in the Second World War and subsequent occupation by the United States (US) transformed the country. In 1946, during that occupation, Japan adopted a constitution that prohibited the country from possessing military forces, relinquished the right of belligerency, and adopted a policy of refraining from developing, or deploying, a strong military. In 1954, Japan established the Self-Defence Forces (SDF), regarding them as exclusively defensive, rather than military, forces. Japan has kept a low military profile ever since, even though it rose to become the second biggest economy in the world. During the Cold War, Japan never engaged directly in military conflicts with other countries, but its military policy underwent a significant transformation immediately afterwards, as the Soviet Union collapsed, North Korea developed militarily, and China's rise to economic and military power became evident.

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This paper examines Japan's security policy, with particular focus on relations with East Asian countries and the US. More specifically, it presents an overview of the transformation of Japan's security policy in response to the change in the security environment in East Asia, particularly North Korea's military development and the rise in China's power. For this purpose, the paper pays particular attention to change in the content of its basic policy document, the *National Defense Program Guidelines* (NDPG), compiled in 1976 and subsequently revised three times, in 1995, 2004, and 2010.

The 1976 NDPG

In October 1976, Japan adopted the first *National Defense Program Guidelines* (1976 NDPG) to take effect from the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 1977. It remained in effect until 1995. It expressed a view on the international situation that “[w]ithin the general neighborhood of Japan, an equilibrium exists, involving the three major powers of the United States, the Soviet Union and China” although “[t]ension still persists on the Korean Peninsula” and “military buildups continue in several countries nearby Japan.”¹ The NDPG considered it unlikely that a major military conflict, one that would seriously threaten Japan's security, would arise.

The military posture and capability advocated by the 1976 NDPG was “the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small-scale aggression.”² With regard to its alliance with the US, it acknowledged the importance of “maintaining the credibility of the Japan-US security arrangement and insuring the smooth functioning of that system”³ but did not stress the need for strengthening the alliance.

Japan acknowledged the importance of “maintaining the credibility of the Japan-US security arrangement and insuring the smooth functioning of that system”.

The 1976 NDPG made a very short reference to the tension on the Korean peninsula as cited above, but made no specific references to North Korea (also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) or China. Apparently, Japan was not very concerned about either, as North Korea had a limited power projection capability, and China not only had limited military power, but also enjoyed generally friendly relations with Japan.⁴

Developments after the Adoption of the 1976 NDPG

During the Cold War, Japan's security policy was rather simple. The hostility between the US and the Soviet Union prompted Japan, which had its own tension with the Soviet Union, to maintain an alliance with the US. Soviet attacks on Japan were sufficiently unlikely, however, to allow it to continue a passive, limited military stance after the adoption of the 1976 NDPG. In November 1978, Tokyo and Washington compiled the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation to clarify the roles each should play during military contingencies, thus ensuring the smooth functioning of their joint military operations. These guidelines endured without revision for the rest of the Cold War.

Japan reviewed its security policy when the Soviet Union collapsed after the end of the Cold War because the alliance with the US, premised on the presence of the Soviet Union as a common enemy, had been undermined. However, the Gulf War (August 1990- April 1991), as well as North Korea's nuclear and missile developments, prompted Japan to reconsolidate the alliance and change its passive, limited defence posture. During the Gulf War, Washington demanded that Japan contribute to the allied action

against Iraq on the grounds that it was a major beneficiary of a secure supply of oil from the Gulf region. Unable to make a military contribution, Japan made a financial contribution instead, providing as much as US\$13 billion, most of which went to the US. After a formal truce was reached in April 1991, Tokyo dispatched minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. It was the first overseas military operation of the SDF.⁵ Then, in June 1992, Tokyo enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law (the PKO Law), allowing the SDF to take part in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs), but limited its participation to non-combatant operations. The SDF first participated in a UN PKO in Cambodia, starting in September 1992.⁶

During the Gulf War, Washington demanded that Japan contribute to the allied action against Iraq on the grounds that it was a major beneficiary of a secure supply of oil from the Gulf region.

North Korea started operating its first experimental, graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in around 1986, and by late 1988 American satellite surveillance had detected construction of a spent-fuel reprocessing facility. This generated international suspicion of North Korea's

plutonium extraction. However, in March 1989, a joint delegation from Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the largest opposition party, visited Pyongyang and agreed to make efforts at normalising diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea. This meeting was followed by official normalisation talks that started in January 1991. These were suspended in November 1992, largely because of the mounting US-DPRK tension over the nuclear issue, and partly because of lack of support from South Korea (also known as the Republic of Korea, or ROK). Against this backdrop, Japan and the United States held a summit in January 1992 in Tokyo, issuing the Tokyo Declaration on the US-Japan Global Partnership, reaffirming their commitment to their alliance, and expressing their recognition that their alliance remained important to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan's security concerns about North Korea increased in May 1993 when the DPRK test-launched its first medium-range ballistic missile, the Nodong, and showed that Japan had come within the reach of North Korean missiles. While North Korea's missile capability became a new concern, the nuclear issue was

resolved, if not conclusively, through a US-DPRK agreement, the Agreed Framework (AF), in October 1994. That did not lead to Japan-DPRK diplomatic normalisation, however, partly because of the lack of progress toward US-DPRK diplomatic normalisation, and partly because of the lack of support from South Korea's Kim Young-sam administration whose relations with Pyongyang were very bad. Unlike North Korea, post-Cold War China did not become a major security concern for Japan, although Tokyo was alarmed by

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated North Korea's nuclear and missile development programmes.

Beijing's enactment of the Law of Territorial Waters in February 1992, in which their disputed islands, known as Senkaku in Japanese, were clearly stated to be Chinese territory.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated North Korea's nuclear and missile development programmes. Both events also had a significant impact on Japan's domestic politics, weakening the left led by the JSP and strengthening the right led by the LDP that had advocated easing constitutional constraints on Japan's military activities. As of 1990, it had 136 seats out of 512 seats in the more powerful lower house. Yet, its presence dropped to 70 out of 511 in 1993.

The 1995 NDPG

The rise of the right prompted Japan to compile a new NDPG in November 1995 (the 1995 NDPG), to take effect from the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 1996. The NDPG stressed the international expectations for Japan's contribution to building a more stable security environment through participation in international peace cooperation activities, and expressed its willingness to “[c]ontribute to efforts for international peace through participation in international peace cooperation activities.”⁷ This reflected new international military activities, such as the US-led war against Iraq (the Gulf War) and UN peacekeeping operations.⁸

The 1995 NDPG looked upon North Korea as the primary destabilising factor in the security of Northeast Asia that increased the importance of the Japan-US alliance.

The new NDPG still made no specific reference to North Korea, but strongly suggested Japan's particular concern about the DPRK's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, as can be seen from the statement that “new kinds of dangers, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, including nuclear arms and of missiles, are on the increase,”⁹ and from the following passage: “There remain uncertainty and unpredictability, such as continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and a stable security environment has not been fully established. Under these circumstances, the possibility of a situation in this region, which could seriously affect the security of Japan, cannot be excluded.”¹⁰

The 1995 NDPG made no reference or allusion to China. As far as Japan-US alliance is concerned, the NDPG stressed its importance, regarding it as “indispensable” to Japan's security and key to “achieving peace and stability in the region surrounding Japan and establishing a more stable security environment.”¹¹ Apparently, the 1995 NDPG looked upon North Korea as the primary destabilising factor in the security of Northeast Asia that increased the importance of the Japan-US alliance.

Developments after the Adoption of the 1995 NDPG

After the adoption of the new NDPG in 1995, the presence of the left in Japanese politics declined further. In January 1996, the JSP changed its name to the Social Democratic Party (SDP), but about the half of its members left, due mainly to their concern about

being re-elected in the next lower house election to be held under a new electoral system, adopted in 1994, combining the plurality and proportional representation systems, with 300 seats elected by the former and 200 seats by the latter. The new system was more advantageous to big parties. The first election to the lower house under the new system was held in October 1996 and gave victory to the LDP, increasing its seats by 28 to 239, while the SDP's were reduced by 15 to a mere 30. The weakening of the left made it easier for those on the right to realise their long-held desire to ease the restrictions posed on Japan's military activities by the constitution, and they lost no time in doing so.

After the Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996, on 15 April 1996, Tokyo and Washington signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) under which Tokyo would contribute to the smooth and effective operation of US forces. Two days later, Prime Minister Hashimoto held a summit meeting with President Clinton in Tokyo and issued a Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security, in which the two countries stressed the importance of the alliance to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their intention to strengthen the alliance. Tokyo and Washington then revised the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation in September 1997, with the aim of improving their cooperation in order to deal with any

situations in the areas surrounding Japan that could seriously affect Japan's national security.

The new guidelines raised China's concern about the possibility of Japan's assistance in a US intervention in China's military actions against Taiwan. Japan's relations with China deteriorated further because of Tokyo's rejection of Beijing's request that Tokyo provide a formal, written apology for its past military aggression toward China to President Jiang Zemin during his visit to Japan in 1999, as it had done for South Korea's President Kim Dae-jung in 1998. In this context, in May 1999 Tokyo enacted a series of laws to strengthen the Japan-US alliance, namely the Law on the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, the revised SDF Law, the revised ACSA, and the Ship Inspection Operations Law.

The legal changes were also spurred on by two developments involving North Korea. One was its launch of a rocket, allegedly for putting a satellite into orbit, on 31 August 1998. The rocket, called Taepodong-1 by Washington and others, flew over Japan and fell into the seas off the coast of Alaska, proving that North Korean missiles could now reach any part of Japan. The other development was Japan's detection of suspicious vessels, apparently North Korean, in Japanese territorial waters on 23 March 1999, an event that led to unprecedented mobilisation of SDF warships and airplanes to chase them.

The Hashimoto administration and conservative media regarded the rocket launch and the ship incursion as serious threats to Japan's national security, and thereby heightened anti-North Korean public sentiment, already strong as a result of the February 1997 media report of suspicion that a Japanese junior high school girl, Yokota Megumi, had been abducted by the DPRK.

In effect, the conservatives used the North Korean "threat" as an excuse to strengthen the Japan-US alliance and weaken the constitutional constraints on Japan's military activities. In response to the launch of a Taepodong-1, in December 1998 Tokyo decided to conduct joint research with Washington on ballistic missile defence (BMD). In the same month, the Japanese government also decided to introduce "Information Gathering Satellites" (IGS), *de facto* spy satellites, discarding the long-standing policy of the non-military use of space based on a resolution in the Diet, the parliament, in 1969 on the peaceful development of space.

Japan's hard-line stance towards North Korea was temporarily eased by South Korea's "Sunshine Policy", a conciliatory policy of President Kim Dae-jung who came to power in February 1998. Kim Dae-jung was eager to improve inter-Korean relations and urged Washington and Tokyo to improve their relations with Pyongyang. This led to the first DPRK-ROK summit in June 2000, the

visit of Secretary General Kim Jong-il's aide, Cho Myong-rok, to Washington in October 2000, and the reciprocal visit to Pyongyang of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright later in the month. The first Japan-DPRK summit, between Prime Minister Koizumi (April 2001-September 2006) and Kim Jong-il, took place in September 2002 and resulted an agreement to make every possible effort for early diplomatic normalisation.

However, it became difficult for them to realise it because of the Bush administration's revelation of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment programme in October 2002 and the subsequent collapse of the Agreed Framework of 1994. The resurgence of the nuclear issue reduced Japan's domestic support for diplomatic normalisation with North Korea and strengthened the voice for hard-line policy toward it. Tokyo largely followed the Bush administration's hard-line policy, although South Korea's Kim Dae-jung administration and the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which succeeded it in 2003, continued a conciliatory policy toward Pyongyang. Koizumi held a second summit with Kim Jong-il in May 2004, but his primary objective was to bring to Japan the children of those Japanese citizens who had been abducted by North Korea and had returned to Japan in October 2002, not to make any breakthrough on the nuclear or missile issues.

In contrast, Koizumi showed eagerness to strengthen military ties with Washington. He supported the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by Bush in May 2003, while Seoul distanced itself from it. Japan actively participated in the first and succeeding meetings and exercises of the PSI, hosting two exercises in October 2004 and October 2007. Japan was also eager to follow Bush's policy of constructing a BMD system despite doubts that it could be effective, while South Korea showed little interest. In December 2003, Tokyo decided to construct a BMD system by purchasing SM-3 surface-to-air missiles and PAC-3 ground-to-air missiles from Washington.

Tokyo's decision to strengthen its security ties with Washington seems to have had a negative impact on its relations with Moscow and Beijing.

Besides its cooperation with Washington on the PSI and BMD, Tokyo enhanced the Japan-US alliance by enacting the Law on Measures against Military Attacks in June 2003 and the Law for Smooth Operations of US Forces in June 2004. Tokyo also strengthened security ties with Washington by enacting the Special Law on the Iraq War in July 2003, and then

dispatching the SDF to Iraq to assist with the US occupation of Iraq. Koizumi argued that it would be necessary to meet Washington's request for assistance so that Washington would be ready to support Tokyo should the need arise (He apparently had contingencies on the Korean peninsula in mind).¹²

Tokyo's decision to strengthen its security ties with Washington seems to have had a negative impact on its relations with Moscow and Beijing. In December 2001, President Bush antagonised Moscow by withdrawing from the ABM treaty with Russia and starting to deploy BMD systems. Moscow was presumably unhappy with Tokyo's joint development of more effective BMD systems with Washington. In the case of China, the unilateral stance of the Bush administration and its policy of strengthening security ties with its allies and other countries prompted Beijing and Moscow to strengthen their relations with each other. Japan's relations with China and South Korea both deteriorated, too, because of Koizumi's visit during his 2001-2006 tenure to the Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates dead Japanese military personnel and class-A war criminals, despite repeated criticism from Beijing and Seoul.¹³ In August 2003, the Six-Party Talks (SPT) to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue started. In essence, Tokyo followed Washington's lead and exerted little influence at the talks.

While Japan's relations with North Korea saw little improvement, its relations with China deteriorated even further. This was triggered partly by China's development of a gas field close to the bilateral demarcation line of their exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a line that Japan regarded as valid but China did not. China announced a plan to develop the gas field in August 2003, and Japan expressed strong concern, arguing that the gas field spread over the line onto its side. The bilateral relations deteriorated again in November 2004, when a Chinese submarine passed through Japanese territorial waters without surfacing. The incursion prompted Tokyo to order the Maritime SDF (MSDF) to go on alert, for only the second time in history after its mobilisation in 1999 (the first had been for the incursion, mentioned above, by the suspicious vessels widely deemed North Korean).

The 2004 NDPG

In December 2004, in the context of Tokyo's strained relations with Pyongyang and Beijing, Tokyo adopted a new NDPG, the 2004 NDPG, which took effect in FY2005. The new guidelines clearly stated that their adoption was prompted by Japan's December 2003 decision to introduce BMD systems. In December 2004, Tokyo also decided to ease its long-standing policy of not exporting weapons so that it could export

BMD-related weaponry to the US. The new NDPG regarded the introduction of BMD systems as a measure to "adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons"¹⁴ and supplementary to the extended US nuclear deterrence.

The 2004 NDPG made a clear reference to North Korea for the first time and identified it as a major destabilising factor to regional and international security: "North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts."¹⁵ The 2004 NDPG was compiled after the collapse of the Agreed Framework of 1994, following Washington's October 2002 announcement of Pyongyang's possession of a uranium enrichment programme and its November 2002 decision to terminate its provision of heavy fuel oil to North Korea as agreed in the Agreed Framework.

The 2004 NDPG is also notable in that it made a (very brief) reference to the tension between China and Taiwan for the first time: "The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and

cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain.”¹⁶ Also for the first time, the new NDPG named China as a security concern: “China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernise its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea.”¹⁷ The new NDPG stressed the importance of the security of sea lanes as “indispensable to the country’s prosperity and growth,”¹⁸ implying its concern about China’s extended maritime operation.

The 2004 NDPG proposed to develop military capability as an effective response to new threats and diverse situations, particularly “ballistic missile attacks” (apparently with North Korea in mind), “guerrillas and special operations forces attacks” (also apparently with North Korea in mind), “the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands” (apparently with the territorial dispute with China in mind), “the intrusion of armed special-purpose ships operating in waters surrounding Japan” (apparently with North Korea in mind) and “submerged foreign submarines in Japan’s territorial waters” (apparently with China in mind).¹⁹

The 2004 NDPG regarded the US military presence as “critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue.”²⁰ It expressed

Japan’s need “to improve the international environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place” in cooperation particularly with the US, and stated its intention to strengthen the alliance with the US and harmonise “perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives.”²¹

In short, the 2004 NDPG regarded North Korea and China as Japan’s primary security concerns, proposing to strengthen security ties with the US and to enhance its own military capability.

Developments after the Adoption of the 2004 NDPG

After the adoption of the 2004 NDPG, Japan’s relations with North Korea and China deteriorated further, while ties were strengthened with the US, South Korea, Australia, and India. Japanese-DPRK relations became more hostile because of the DPRK’s July 2006 missile tests and its first nuclear test in October 2006, both triggered by Washington’s imposition of financial sanctions on North Korea on 16 September 2005, just before the first joint statement of 19 September at the SPT (the 9.19 joint statement). Tokyo responded particularly strongly to the missile and nuclear tests, imposing unilateral sanctions. Against

this backdrop, in December 2006 Tokyo decided to elevate its Defence Agency to a Defence Ministry and legalise international peace cooperation activities as one of the primary duties of the SDF.

After the nuclear test, the Bush administration softened its stance toward the DPRK. That led to two agreements at the SPT on 13 February 2007 (the 2.13 agreement) and on 3 October 2007 (the 10.3 agreement), establishing concrete steps to realise the denuclearisation of the DPRK. Following the agreements, Pyongyang froze its nuclear facilities and proceeded with their dismantlement. Washington eased its economic sanctions and provided heavy fuel oil along with Seoul, Beijing, and Moscow, though Tokyo refused to take part on the grounds of insufficient progress on the abduction issue. Maintaining a hard-line policy, Tokyo established, in March 2007, a new mobile unit for rapid deployment in the Ground SDF and deployed its first unit of PAC-3 missiles as part of its BMD systems. Japan also hosted a PSI drill in October 2007, when Seoul held a second summit with Pyongyang in which the two Koreas agreed to improve their relations. The denuclearisation process came to a deadlock when Pyongyang rejected Washington's demand to accept inspections to verify the content of the documents on nuclear activities, submitted by Pyongyang in May 2008, on the grounds that verification should

come at the final stage of normalisation of Pyongyang's relations with Washington.²² The rejection hardened Washington's stance toward Pyongyang again and reduced policy difference between Washington and Tokyo.

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Japan's relations with China worsened as well. In April 2005, anti-Japan demonstrations took place in parts of China over their strained bilateral relations on historical and territorial issues. In turn, the demonstrations aggravated Japan's anti-China sentiments and concerns about China. In addition, in an apparent response to the deepening Japan-US alliance and Washington's efforts at forging stronger security ties with other allies and friendly countries, China held its first joint military exercise with Russia in August 2005. The Abe administration that started in September 2006 tried to mend Japanese-PRC relations, in stark contrast with his tough stance toward North Korea. In fact, Abe and his successors refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. Tokyo's appeasing stance toward Beijing could be

attributed to the business circle's strong preference not to antagonise China. Abe visited Beijing and held a summit with President Hu Jintao in October 2006, the first of its kind since October 2001, agreeing to build "strategic, mutually beneficial relations."

However, the bilateral relations did not improve very much. Apparently in response to Washington's development of BMD systems with Tokyo, Beijing conducted a test in January 2007 to destroy a satellite with a ballistic missile. In October 2007, Tokyo decided to deploy 20 F-15 fighter jets to Okinawa in order to strengthen its defence of the southern part of its territory close to China. In June 2008, Tokyo and Beijing agreed to jointly develop the disputed gas field near their EEZ demarcation line, but little progress was made after that. Meanwhile, Tokyo became sensitive to China's growing maritime activities, such as the first passage of Chinese warships through the Tsugaru Strait in October 2008, and the incursion into Japanese waters of two Chinese maritime surveillance ships in December 2008.

The historic 2009 power shift from the LDP to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) appeared to improve Japan-PRC relations because the DPJ, led by Hatoyama, advocated the creation of an East Asian community and was eager to improve relations. Those hopes were

dashed, however, by an incident on 7 September 2010 that severely hurt relations. Japan's Maritime Security Agency (MSA) patrol ships found Chinese fishing vessels in Japanese territorial waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands. They ordered them to leave the waters, but one ship refused and collided with two MSA ships. The MSA arrested its crew. Beijing was angered by the action and demanded their immediate release, but instead of doing so, Tokyo prosecuted the captain. Beijing's retaliatory actions included a *de facto* embargo of its rare earth metals to Japan that crippled production of high-tech equipment because more than 90 % of those resources had come from China. In the end, Tokyo accepted Beijing's demand for the captain's release, but the incident made the Japanese very bitter toward China.

As its relations with Pyongyang and Beijing deteriorated, Tokyo's relations with Washington deepened further under the leadership of LDP Prime Ministers Koizumi (April 2001-September 2006), Abe (September 2006-September 2007), Fukuda (September 2007-September 2008), and Aso (September 2008-September 2009). Tokyo and Washington held meetings of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) consisting of foreign and defence ministers (2+2 meetings)

in February and October 2005, May 2006, and May 2007. At the February 2005 meeting, they confirmed their common strategic objectives, which included ensuring the security of Japan, strengthening peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, supporting the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, seeking the peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, encouraging the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue, and encouraging China to improve transparency in its military affairs. At the following meetings, they discussed measures to achieve their common strategic objectives. At the 2007 meeting, they reviewed the common objectives and adopted new ones that included strengthening security and defence cooperation with Australia, and enhancing partnership with India.

Tokyo's relations with Washington became somewhat unstable after the victory of the DPJ in the July 2007 upper house elections and the resultant loss of the LDP-led ruling coalition's majority. The DPJ's political altitude tended to the right with more rightist members than leftist ones. Even so, it was critical of Japan's support for the US war against Iraq, the continuation of the SDF's refuelling activities in the Indian Ocean for the US-led military operations in Afghanistan, the effectiveness of the BMD systems, and the massive host

nation support costs for US forces in Japan despite its huge public debt of more than 900 trillion yen. The DPJ called for a close but more equal and independent alliance with the US. The party won a landslide victory in the August 2009 lower house elections and formed a coalition government with the SDP and the People's New Party (PNP) in the next month.

In January 2010, the DPJ-led coalition government headed by Prime Minister Hatoyama (September 2009-June 2010) ended the refuelling activity that had started in December 2001, despite Washington's request for its continuation. It also tried to lessen the concentration of US forces in Okinawa by reducing the presence of US Marines there. Yet the implementation was so difficult that Hatoyama eventually gave up. Whether it was an excuse or not is unclear, but Hatoyama referred to the sinking of the South Korean warship *Cheonan* in March 2010- South Korea's conservative Lee Myung-bak administration had attributed it to a North Korean torpedo attack in its report of May 2010- and justified his policy reversal on the grounds that the North Korean threat necessitated the presence of US Marines in Okinawa at the current level.

The DPJ virtually gave up on the idea of building a more independent alliance with the US and came to adopt

a security policy very similar to that of the LDP. For instance, in December 2005 Tokyo decided to upgrade its joint BMD research with Washington to actual development. Also, with the help of Washington, Tokyo conducted tests of shooting down missiles with its SM-3 missiles from Japanese Aegis destroyers, first in December 2007 and then in November 2008, October 2009, and October 2010. Meanwhile, Washington conducted a test to destroy a dysfunctional satellite, using a US SM-3 missile, in February 2008.

In response to its aggravated relations with North Korea and China, Japan also developed closer security ties, bilaterally with Australia, India, and South Korea, and multilaterally with Washington. Tokyo and Canberra held a summit in Tokyo on 13 March 2007, issuing a Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in which they agreed to strengthen their security cooperation. Australia became the second country (after the US) with which Japan had issued a bilateral security declaration. They held two more summit meetings in September 2007 and December 2009, agreeing to compile an action plan to

substantiate the joint declaration at the 2007 meeting and to revise the plan at the 2009 meeting. They also started a defence and foreign ministers' meeting (2+2 meeting) in June 2007, held again in December 2008 and May 2010. At the 2010 meeting, they signed an ACSA, making Australia the second country to sign such a treaty with Japan. Tokyo and Canberra also held defence ministers' meetings in May 2009, May 2010, and October 2010. To substantiate their talks and agreements, they have conducted military exercises.

The SDF took part in a multilateral maritime exercise, Kakadu IX, hosted by Australia in July and August 2008, and conducted three bilateral exercises in September 2009,

May 2010, and August 2010. Japan and Australia also held security talks and conducted exercises with the US, starting director-level trilateral security talks called the Security and Defence Cooperation Forum (SDCF) in April 2007. Their first trilateral defence ministers' meeting was held in June 2007, and two more SDCF meetings followed in April 2008 and November 2009. Trilateral exercises were held in October 2007, September 2009, and June 2010.

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Tokyo also expanded its security relations with New Delhi. They held summit meetings in December 2006, August 2007, October 2008, and December 2009, agreeing to strengthen their security cooperation. At the 2006 meeting, they agreed to establish a strategic global partnership. At the 2008 meeting, they signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, making India the third country with which Japan signed such a declaration. At the 2009 meetings, they compiled an action plan to strengthen their security cooperation. The two countries also held defence ministers' meetings in August 2007, November 2009, and April 2010. Tokyo and New Delhi did not hold bilateral military exercises but held multilateral ones. In April 2007 they held their first trilateral maritime exercise with Washington. Tokyo took part in Malabar 07-2 in September 2007 and Malabar 09 in April 2009. Malabar is traditionally a bilateral exercise between the US and Indian navies, but Malabar 07-2 included Japan, Australia, and Singapore, and Malabar 09 included Japan.

Tokyo's bilateral security cooperation with Seoul has been limited, due largely to unsettled historical issues associated with Japan's invasion and colonisation of Korea. The only bilateral military drills were joint search and rescue exercises (SAREX), started in 1998 and held again in 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007,

and 2009. Tokyo and Seoul also held a SAREX with Washington in August 2008. Although their bilateral exercises went no further than SAREX, there were some notable developments. At their April 2009 meeting, their defence ministers agreed to expand their military exchanges, including talks between top ranking officers and interactions between the two military forces, such as the dispatch of observers to each other's military exercises.

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Washington was eager to facilitate greater security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul, for instance, by holding a first trilateral defence ministerial meeting with them in May 2009, and a second in June 2010. In July 2010, for the first time, Japan sent observers to a US-ROK exercise (Invincible Spirit), and South Korean observers took part for the first time in a Japan-US exercise (Keen Sword) in December 2010. In between, two Japanese warships, with some US warships, took part in the

first PSI drill hosted by South Korea in October 2010. These developments were prompted by the conservative Lee Myong-bak administration that adopted a North Korea policy more in line with Washington's and Tokyo's since its inception in February 2008.

The 2010 NDPG

In December 2010, Tokyo adopted the 2010 NDPG, which took effect in FY 2011. The new NDPG takes particular note of unstable security situations in the Asia-Pacific region, citing disputes over territories and issues over the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. It also makes special reference to the apparent shift in the region's balance of power and designates prevention of "threats from emerging by further stabilizing the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region"²³ as a security policy objective, apparently with China in mind. To achieve this and other security objectives, it stresses Japan's intention to facilitate cooperation not only with the US but also with countries in the Asia-Pacific. The new NDPG identifies North Korea's military activities as serious security concerns, just like the preceding NDPG. Yet, it differs from its predecessor in that it regards North Korea's military activities as not only grave but also immediate destabilizing factor to regional security.²⁴

More significant difference between the 2004 and 2010 NDPG is a much greater attention to China by the latter. References to China have tripled, exceeding, for the first time, references to North Korea, indicating a shift in Japan's primary security concern: "China, a growing major power, is beginning to play an important role for regional and global security. On the other hand, China is steadily increasing its defense expenditure. China is widely and rapidly modernizing its military force, mainly its nuclear and missile force as well as navy and air force, and is strengthening its capability for extended-range power projection. In addition, China has been expanding and intensifying its maritime activities in the surrounding waters. These trends, together with insufficient transparency over China's military forces and its security policy, are of concern for the regional and global community."²⁵ The 2010 NDPG for the first time refers to China's military stance as a security concern. Apparently out of its concern about China's maritime activities, the new NDPG stresses that "securing maritime security and international order is essential for [Japan's] prosperity."²⁶

Having expressed concerns with North Korea and China, the 2010 NDPG regards the strengthening of US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and US efforts to enhance security ties with its allies and partners, as "important

contributions to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region”.²⁷ It then says that Japan intends to “actively tackle both regional and global security challenges in cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned,” particularly South Korea, Australia, member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and India and to “actively engage in encouraging China to take responsible actions in the international community,” with those countries.²⁸ The new NDPG argues that “the military presence of the US armed forces in Japan allows countries in the Asia-Pacific region to have a strong sense of security by functioning as deterrence against and response to contingencies in this region.”²⁹ It regards the extended deterrence provided by the US as “indispensable” as long as nuclear weapons exist, and expresses Japan’s intention to cooperate closely with the US to maintain and improve the credibility of the extended deterrence, as well as to “take active measures for the smooth and effective stationing of US forces in Japan, including Host Nation Support” and to study other measures to enhance its bilateral cooperation with the US to “strengthen the U.S. forces’ deterrent and response capability to regional contingencies” apparently having North Korea and China in mind.³⁰

Besides stressing the importance of Japan’s alliance with the US, the new NDPG announces Japan’s new security policy of building a “dynamic defense force” as well as “raising levels of equipment use and increasing operations tempo.”³¹ It argues that “[c]lear demonstration of national will and strong defense capabilities...., not just maintaining a certain level of defense force, is a critical element for ensuring credible deterrence and will contribute to stability in the region surrounding Japan.”³² As an initial step toward a dynamic defence force, the new NDPG expresses Japan’s plans to “permanently station the minimum necessary units on off-shore islands where the SDF is not currently stationed” and to augment submarine units, apparently to show China Japan’s will to defend its territorial integrity. The 2010 NDPG also states Japan’s intention to enhance the capability of its BMD system by developing a multi-layered defence posture, in order to “respond effectively to ballistic missiles capable of evading interceptors.”³³ This policy may indicate a shift in Japan’s concern from less sophisticated North Korean missiles to more sophisticated Chinese ones.

The 2010 NDPG also expresses Japan’s determination to participate more actively in, and to enhance its capabilities for, international peace cooperation

activities and shows an eagerness to ease existing restrictions on the use of firearms when participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Besides, for the first time, the NDPG expresses the need to consider participating in international joint development and production of defence equipment, thereby indicating Tokyo's willingness to ease the long-held policy of strict restrictions on weapons exports.

In sum, the 2010 NDPG expresses Tokyo's greater security concerns about Pyongyang and Beijing and advocates deepening the Japan-US alliance and strengthening security ties with Seoul, Canberra, and New Delhi, while developing a dynamic defence force.

Developments after the Adoption of the 2010 NDPG

In January 2011 the DPJ-led coalition government headed by Prime Minister Kan (June 2010-September 2011) decided to maintain the current level of the host nation support for US forces in Japan (188 billion yen in 2010) for the next five years, although the DPJ used to advocate its reduction, and signed a new pact with Washington. Tokyo and Washington held 2+2 meetings in June 2011 and April 2012. At the former meeting, they renewed their common strategic objectives. Newly

stated objectives included strengthening trilateral security and defence cooperation with South Korea. At the latter meeting, they expressed their intention to enhance bilateral security cooperation and to strengthen engagement with countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

References to China have tripled, exceeding, for the first time, references to North Korea, indicating a shift in Japan's primary security concern.

Japanese and South Korean defence ministers met in Seoul in January 2011. It was the first visit to South Korea by a Japanese defence chief since 2005. The two ministers agreed to start discussions on concluding an ACSA and a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). It was reported that the Japanese side showed greater enthusiasm for stronger security ties and conclusion of the two pacts.³⁴ The two ministers met again in June 2011, which was followed by another meeting in a trilateral setting with their US counterpart in June 2012. Tokyo and Seoul also held a SAREX in November 2011 and another one with Washington in August 2012, while conducting their first extensive trilateral maritime exercise with Washington in June 2012, in which the USS George Washington

aircraft carrier took part. Yet, it became difficult to Tokyo to improve its security relations with Seoul because the bilateral relations were soured due particularly to their territorial dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo islands that was rekindled by President Lee's visit there in August 2012.

Tokyo also continued efforts to strengthen security relations with Canberra and New Delhi. In June 2011 Japan and Australia held defence ministers' meetings in June 2011 and May 2012 and a 2+2 meeting in September 2012. In May 2012 the two countries concluded a GSOMIA, while in September 2012 they agreed on their common security vision and objectives. The SDF sent observers to an Australian army military exercise in November 2011, while in January-February 2012 Australia, for the first time, sent observers to a Japan-US bilateral command post exercise, Yamasakura-61. Then, in February 2012, Tokyo, Canberra, and Washington held joint military exercises in July 2011, February 2012, and June 2012. With regard to India, Tokyo and New Delhi held a defence ministers' meeting in November 2011 and a summit meeting in December 2011 and confirmed their commitment to strengthening their security relations. Then, in June 2012, they held their first joint maritime military exercise.

With regard to Japan's relations with China and North Korea, they

deteriorated further. Its relations with China were strained severely by the purchase by the Noda administration (September 2011- December 2012) of three of the five Senkaku islands from their private owner on 11 September 2012 and the subsequent violent demonstrations in many parts of China that accompanied attacks on Japanese companies and products particularly cars. The demonstrations were even bigger and more damaging than those in 2005. The escalation of anti-Japan sentiments resulted in sharp decline in sales of Japanese products in China. Besides the demonstrations, it became more frequent for Chinese government vessels and aircraft to enter into Japanese territorial waters and airspace around and over the Senkaku islands. Tokyo's relations with Pyongyang worsened because of Pyongyang's satellite launch on 12 December 2012 that Tokyo regarded a *de facto* long-range ballistic missile test and because of Pyongyang's third nuclear test on February 2013.

In response to the increased tension with Beijing and Pyongyang, the Abe administration, which was formed after the LDP's landslide victory in the lower house election on 16 December 2012, has given the priority to strengthening Japan's alliance with the US. Also, it has expressed its intention to ease constitutional restrictions on Japan's military activities and revise the NDPG.

Conclusion

Tokyo has described Japan as peace loving and pacifist. However, the transformation of its security policy, described above, makes one doubt this self-description. Japan does not seem to be an idealist state that actively tries to foster peace through peaceful means. Rather, it is more like a realist state, focusing on the change in military capabilities of neighbouring countries and pursuing countermeasures of strengthening military capability, enhancing alliances, and building new security ties with states that have similar security concerns.

Military countermeasures may be necessary and effective in dealing with some cases. However, it is questionable whether such measures are effective vis-à-vis North Korea and China. Japan's lopsided focus on military countermeasures carries a serious risk of undermining its security by triggering a spiralling military competition with the two countries. It would be too optimistic for Japan to assume that it can out-compete China, considering its serious weaknesses such as population decline

and the resultant further economic decline. To reduce the security threat posed by North Korea and China, Japan needs to improve relations with them. Yet, its diplomatic effort to do so has been limited. In a way, Japan's nationalistic, hard-line policy has helped undemocratic, hostile forces in the two countries to retain power, and has undermined those who support the policy of improving relations with Japan.

It is questionable that the Japanese government has tried to maximise the security and well-being of the Japanese people as a whole. Improving Japan's relations with China and North Korea could bring more benefit to the security and well-being, not only of the Japanese as a whole, but also of the Chinese, the North Koreans, and other peoples in East Asia and beyond. However, it requires a strong political leadership to abandon a nationalistic, hard-line policy and adopt a compromising policy in the face of strong criticism from hard-liners. Unfortunately, leadership of that calibre is particularly lacking in Japan. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that Japan's current security policy toward East Asia will change significantly in the foreseeable future.

Endnotes

- 1 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) (Official translation presented in Defense of Japan 1989), "Section 2: International Situation". NDPO and NDPG refer to the same document; the government currently uses NDPG.
- 2 NDPO, "Section 3: Basic Defense Concept, (2) Countering Aggression".
- 3 NDPO, "Section 3: Basic Defense Concept, (1) Prevention of Armed Invasion".
- 4 Japan and China normalised relations in 1972 and then signed a peace treaty in 1978.
- 5 Excluding overseas military exercises.
- 6 Since then, the SDF has participated in several UN peacekeeping operations, in Mozambique (1993), Golan Heights (1996), East Timor (1999, 2002), Nepal (2007), Sudan (2008), Haiti (2010), and South Sudan (2012). For a detailed review of Japan's involvement in UN PKOs, see, Gunjishi gakkai (Military History Association) (ed.), *PKO no shiteki kensho (Historical Investigation of PKO)*, Tokyo, Kinseisha, 2007.
- 7 National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996 (NDPO FY1996) (Official translation presented in Defense of Japan 2000), "III: Security of Japan and Roles of Defense Capabilities, (Role of defense capability), (3) Contribution to Creation of a More Stable Security Environment".
- 8 In Japan's definition, both US-led activities and UN peacekeeping operations fall into the category of international peace cooperation activities.
- 9 NDPO FY1996, "II. International Situation, 1".
- 10 Ibid., "II. International Situation, 3".
- 11 Ibid., "III. Security of Japan and Roles of Defense Capabilities (Japan-US Security Arrangements)".
- 12 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 20 March 2003, evening edition, p. 1.
- 13 President Roh Moo-hyun (February 2003–February 2008) came to Japan only twice, in June 2003 and December 2004.
- 14 National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005- (NDPG FY2005) (Official translation presented in Defense of Japan 2008), "V. Future Defense Forces, 1. Role of the Defense Forces, (1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations, a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks".
- 15 Ibid., "II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan, 2".
- 16 Ibid.
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- 22 “Foreign Ministry’s Spokesman on DPRK’s Decision to Suspend Activities to Disable Nuclear Facilities”, *KCNA*, 27 August 2008.
- 23 “II. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security”, *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond (NDPG FY2011)* (Provisional translation, presented at the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/pdfs/h23_ndpg_en.pdf [last visited 22 February 2013]).
- 24 NDPG FY2011, “III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan, 2”.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid., “III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan, 3”.
- 27 Ibid., “III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan, 2”.
- 28 Ibid., “V. Basic Policies to Ensure Japan’s Security, 3. Multi-layered Security Cooperation with the International Community, (1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, I”.
- 29 Ibid., “IV. Basic Policies to Ensure Japan’s Security, 2. Cooperation with its Ally”.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid., “IV. Basic Policies to Ensure Japan’s Security, 1. Japan’s Own Efforts (3) Japan’s defense force -Dynamic Defense Force”.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Ibid., “V. Future Defense Forces, 1. Roles of Defense Forces, (1) Effective deterrence and response, e. Response to ballistic missile attacks”.
- 34 Furukawa Hajime, “Japan, ROK to Push Defense Cooperation”, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 12 January 2011.

Russia's East Asia Policy: New Opportunities and Challenges*

Anna KIREEVA**

Abstract

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia's foreign policy has evolved from a Western-oriented one to a multi-dimensional one, with substantial focus on East Asia. Russia's East Asian policy is stimulated by its bid for great power status in the region. Russian-Chinese relations have been the axis of Russia's East Asian foreign policy, though the relations have not been without their challenges. Overdependence on China threatens Russia's independent policy in the region and encourages Russia to search for ways to diversify its ties. The rise of China and the US counter-offensive have resulted in a changing strategic environment in East Asia. A need for balancing between the US and China has brought about ASEAN countries' desire to welcome Russia as a "balancer" in the region. It

corresponds with Russia's course on intensifying cooperation with East Asian countries in order to facilitate the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East.

Key Words

Russia, East Asia, Foreign Policy, Security.

Introduction

Asia has every reason to view Russia as a crucial element of military and political stability as well as of sustainable development... We may effectively contribute to solving the region's energy, transport, scientific, technological and environmental problems, and our partners are well aware of that. Regional military and political stability, collective efforts to counter international terrorism, emergency response cooperation, or dialogue between civilizations are unimaginable without Russia... We accord priority to the development of economic cooperation focusing on the areas where we have distinct advantages. I am primarily referring to the energy sector, including atomic energy, transport and space exploration.¹

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

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A need for balancing between the US and China brings about ASEAN's desire to welcome Russia as a "balancer" in the region.

As incumbent Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted, Russia is not a newcomer in East Asia. Russia has enjoyed contacts with the countries there since the 17th century, and played an important role in international relations in the region in the 19th and 20th centuries. Although it might be a disputed point, one cannot deny the role of the Soviet Union in the victory of the national liberation movements in Asia.² Not to be overlooked is the fact that though a vast Russian empire was made up of numerous peripheral territories situated in Asia, including Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia, they cannot be regarded as classical colonies for a number of reasons. Firstly, Russia's expansion was supported, or at least not opposed, by the local elites. Secondly, Russia's periphery, which was integrated into the empire, was not plundered, as in classical colonial model, but on the contrary subsidised. Thirdly, the peripheral elites were not discriminated against, but incorporated into the national elite.³

Since Russia has never been a classical colonial power and has been significantly

influenced by both the West and the East, in domestic discourse there has never been clarity about what kind of a country Russia actually is. One school of thought believes that Russia is a European power, and President Medvedev described Russia as one of the three main pillars of the European civilisation, alongside the European Union and the United States. As two thirds of its territory lies in Asia and one third in Europe, Russia throughout its history has been under the influence of both Eastern and Western civilisations. The Russian political system has differed considerably from those in Europe, while Russian culture has been notably distinct from Asian ones. Hence, according to another long-standing tradition, Russia is often regarded as both a Western and Eastern country, a Eurasian one, whereas outside it is mostly perceived as neither a Western country nor an Eastern one. There is a school of thought that holds that Russia is an Asian power, although this point of view is mostly rejected by the majority of the Russians. The 2000s witnessed an attempt to overcome this dilemma of Russia's ambivalence. A newly emerging concept of Russian geopolitical positioning being discussed at the moment argues that Russia is a Euro-Pacific power, which means it has both European and Asia-Pacific dimensions in geographical terms, but in terms of its political characteristics is a European power.⁴

The existence of so many contradictory perceptions makes Russian foreign policy very complicated. Moreover, the Soviet legacy has imposed certain limitations upon it. The Soviet bloc, which also included many Asian and African countries, served as a self-contained military, political and economic system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the main foreign policy goal of the Russian elite was to gain recognition and support from the developed Western world. The logic of this strategic course was quite justified: with the collapse of the bipolar system the basic aim of those which “had lost” was to join the “winners” in order to become a part of the international political and economic system. However, practical implementation of this Western-oriented policy in the mid-1990s clearly demonstrated its imbalances and contributed to re-launching the Eastern dimension of Russia's foreign policy. Although such regions as the Middle East, North and South Africa and others are of great importance to Russian foreign policy, its primary focus has been on East Asia. Dwelling on the reasons for such a decision, it could be argued that a number of East Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and others, which are now perceived as sources of economic growth, have quite successfully managed to integrate Eastern and Western political and economic models and represent

a desirable model of development for Russia.⁵

However, before exploring the nature of Russia's East Asia policy, it is necessary to establish some conceptual clarity in the use of the key concept, namely that of a “great power”. The meaning of this concept in Russia's foreign policymaking cannot be underestimated, because aspiring to a great power status has been a unifying theme for the Russian ruling elite from Yeltsin to Putin and to Medvedev.⁶ There have been a number of studies concerning great powers in history, but for the aims of this article only the term itself and its criteria are of actual importance, and it is worth dwelling on the approaches to define a great power. Paul Kennedy defines a great power as a state which is able to stand up to any other state in war.⁷ Robert Gilpin characterises great powers as countries that are able to establish and enforce the basic rules that influence their behaviour and that of inferior states in the system hierarchy.⁸ Kenneth Waltz lays down five criteria for being a great power: population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, political stability and competence, and military strength.⁹

Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver offer a more coherent definition for and criteria of a great power, which can be explained by the fact that their regional

security complex theory (RSCT)¹⁰ has constructivist roots and is quite operable both in the realist and liberal perspectives. According to them, classifying any actor as a great power requires a combination of material capability (as understood by Waltz), formal recognition of that status by others, and a response by the other great powers on the basis of system-level calculations about the present and future distribution of power in world politics. The last criterion is behavioural in nature and means that great powers are taken into consideration not only when dealing with the countries of the region they belong to, but also when operating in different regions and on the global political system level.¹¹ This understanding of a great power concept will serve as the methodological basis of the article.

During the early 1990s the primary direction of Russian foreign policy was the Western one, and the Eastern was subordinate to the former.

The objective of this article is to provide an account of Russia's foreign policy evolution towards East Asia, its relations with key partners, and the prospects of its role as one of the new poles in the region. This article is structured around three issues. The first part examines the evolution of Russia's foreign policy from

Yeltsin to Putin and to Medvedev, with special reference to competing visions on Russia's strategic goals within the political elite. The second part concentrates on the achievements and blemishes of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership as well as Russian relations with other East Asian states and Russia's accession to regional multilateral organisations. The third part is devoted to the analysis of the Russia's new bid for great power status in the East Asia region-the impediments to, and prospects of-its implementation.

An Evolution of Russia's East Asian Policy from Yeltsin to Putin and Medvedev

After the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a democratic but considerably weaker Russian Federation a new foreign policy course was proclaimed by the political elite. In the early 1990s this course was put forward by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin's (1991-1999) first team, which had little experience in foreign policymaking in a democratising country. Moreover, they could not rely on any historical experiences. Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who appeared to be an advocate of a Western-oriented foreign policy, and the President believed that good relations with Europe and the USA were important for Russia to become a part of the international community. This

idea in fact corresponded with Mikhail Gorbachev's concept of building a common "European house". The main goal of this policy was quite pragmatic, however, and entailed enjoying Western support not only in the political sphere, but also in gaining access to financial assistance and credit lines in order to ensure a Western-oriented development. Consequently, such a foreign policy course left little room for other dimensions. However, it is instructive to note that East Asia was not completely forgotten during this period. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) viewed major Asian countries as the rear of Russia's relations with the West. Above all China was considered a key country, and good neighbourly and pragmatic relations, most notably border trade, were emphasised.¹² A reliable partner was of vital importance for Russia in its bid to ensure security through good relations with NATO and the USA, which was seen as the only way to stabilize Russia after the collapse of the USSR.¹³ Therefore, we can conclude that during the early 1990s the primary direction of Russian foreign policy was the Western one, and the East was subordinate to the former. Russian leaders were preoccupied with the internal agenda, including reforming the political system and establishing a market-based economy. As Russia's GDP roughly declined in Yeltsin's period (by

60 % compared with 1990), by 1998 Russia had lost its erstwhile role and almost all influence in East Asia.¹⁴

Primakov voiced out a strategic triangle of three states: Russia, China and India with a stress on a multipolar world, aimed at counterbalancing American unilateralism in world politics.

The mid-1990s saw a new figure in Russian foreign policy, Yevgeny Primakov, who epitomised an urgent need for altering the strategic course following Russia's economic troubles, political turbulence, and reduced influence in the international arena. But one of the most important factors that contributed to a change in the foreign policy course was the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the West's unilateral decision to agree to the emergence of new states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By 1994 President Yeltsin had begun reconsidering Russia's lean towards the West, and partnership with China was regarded as the centrepiece of Russian diplomacy. Primakov argued that there was a strategic triangle of three states, Russia, China and India, and stressed a multipolar world, which was aimed at counterbalancing American unilateralism in world politics.¹⁵ However, as the changes took some time

to implement, the 1990s are usually characterised as a decade of degradation in Russia's role in East Asia.

In 2010 Asia was named as an additional source for Russian modernization, while previously these sources included only the EU and the USA.

The late 1990s and the early 2000s witnessed a shift in Russian foreign policy to a more pragmatic and balanced stance, better aimed at realising the country's national interests. It was aimed in general at providing the necessary safeguards on Russia's borders in order to pay attention to domestic concerns, preventing conflicts in the proximity of Russian territory, facilitating economic cooperation with all Eastern countries notwithstanding their ideological standing if it proves profitable to Russia, and ensuring the territorial integrity and control over the Russian Far East (RFE).¹⁶ Under President Vladimir Putin (2000-2008) Russia managed to stop internal political and economic chaos, to reduce armed conflicts inside the country, and to restore a decent level of social and economic development. As Russia has returned as a strong state,¹⁷ many foreign policy experts called this phenomenon Russia's resurgence.¹⁸ As a result, Russia's foreign policy

abandoned its pro-Western stance and under Foreign Ministers Igor Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov its Eastern dimension gained momentum. It became especially clear after the 2007 Munich speech by Putin, which demonstrated divergence in positions with the West and Russia's more assertive foreign policy¹⁹. Emphasis has mostly been put on the Asia-Pacific region, as only these countries could provide resources for the development of Siberia and the RFE.²⁰ In 2008's *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation's* list of regional priorities Asia-Pacific held the fourth position after the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Europe and the USA. In addition to the region's role in developing Siberia and the RFE the government's concept of 2008 highlights "the need for strengthening regional cooperation in the fields of countering terrorism, ensuring security and maintaining a dialogue between civilizations".²¹

President Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012), Putin's successor, proposed a modernisation agenda as the strategy for Russia's development.²² Some experts believe that despite the differences in the foreign policy strategies of the three leaders- Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev- the main goal has been to restore Russia's status as one of the main actors in the world, a status it had lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the end of the 2000s highlighted a

definite shift in Russia's foreign policy priorities towards Asia. In 2010 Asia was named as an additional source for Russian modernisation, while previously these sources included only the EU and the USA.²³ As the "centre of gravity" of economic growth and geopolitics is shifting to East Asia, Russia's MFA sees its priority in taking proactive measures to establish favourable external conditions for the modernisation and innovative development of Russia. The East Asia region is described as one of the key priorities in Russia's foreign policy. Moreover, the economic and technological rise of the region should be used in order to facilitate economic and social development of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Two main tracks in this process include improving bilateral relations and participation in multilateral organisations.²⁴ This is called multivector cooperation in Russian foreign policy discourse, and reflects a necessity to foster economic ties and take part in shaping a new security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.²⁵

Analysing the effects of Russia's foreign policy, one can state that while there was a consensus over the main foreign policy goals in the 1990s, there were many difficulties in shaping policies and taking practical actions to attain these goals.²⁶ Along with this, underestimating economic security and "great-power overzealousness" has been viewed by

many scholars as the main impediments to a successful Russian foreign policy in the region.²⁷ However, the latter is a rather controversial point. There has been a plethora of more recent studies that have cast doubt on the idea that aspiring to great power status has had a negative impact on Russia's policy towards the region. Thus, the view that Putin's aim of restoring Russia's great power status has led to a more coherent policy in East Asia seems to be more reasonable.²⁸

In this respect, special reference should be made to the key actors in Russia's East Asia policymaking. Determining the actual influence of various factions in Russia's foreign policymaking would be a very thorny way, because the actual process highly depends on personal contacts, which are difficult to define and can differ considerably from those roles outlined in the constitution. Finally, although the president has a final say in foreign policy, the entities that influence his decisions remain obscure. This has led to a scarcity of literature on this topic, as researchers focus on more accessible subjects. Moreover, a bulk of Western works are dominated either by the stereotypes of imperialistic thinking in Russia's foreign policy or, in contrast, by the perceptions of genuine democratic transition in policymaking.²⁹ However, this issue is of significant importance, because only a thorough insight into who the Russian

foreign policy elite are can one make a substantiated assessment of this or that policy and grasp the idea of who are the proponents and opponents of this or that decision. The most influential actors comprise the President, the Presidential Administration (PA), the Security Council (SB), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), the intelligence services, both internal (FSB) and external (SVR, and the GRU), the Defence Ministry (MO), and the Russian Armed Forces.³⁰

Different factions competed over the influence on the President, which turned out to be one of the reasons of Russia's incoherent policy in the 1990s.

As Russia is a presidential republic and a federation, it comes as no great surprise that the apex of executive authority lies within the institute of the president, with all the ministers and agencies directors reporting directly to him. The functions of the Security Council seem to be quite significant since it is in charge of responding to security challenges and oversees national security.³¹ While there is a view that it primarily acts as a forum and has no real influence,³² another outlook argues that it serves as a kind of president's private council, where major foreign policy decisions are discussed and decided upon.³³ The president also has a

foreign policy aide and there is a special foreign policy division in the PA.³⁴

Nevertheless the role of these institutions was different during the terms of Presidents Yeltsin and Putin. Some scholars argue that the profile of relations with East Asia was low in the 1990s as under Yeltsin there was a marked dichotomy between aspirations to assert a great power role in the region, to participate in the regional decision-making process and regional fora on the one hand, and economic and political chaos in the country, resulting in confusion in foreign policy decision making on the other. During that period the role of Russia's MFA was frequently sidelined because other domestic actors, such as individual ministries and agencies, acted independently and without any central control.³⁵ As a result, different factions competed over influence on the President, which turned out to be one of the reasons for Russia's incoherent policy in the 1990s. Vladimir Putin, in contrast, began by building his own team around him with his own people, mostly his colleagues from St. Petersburg, including former President Dmitry Medvedev. Under Putin and Medvedev the bureaucratic rivalry became covert and the PA and foreign policy aide Sergey Prihod'ko enjoyed primacy in a more centralised foreign policymaking process. However, the PA staff is relatively small and there

are few experts on East Asia, and their scope of responsibility is mostly limited to organisation and protocol work. The relationship between the PA and MFA can be depicted in the following way: the president and the PA set out the overall East Asia agenda, whereas the MFA proposes more detailed initiatives to be discussed with the PA.³⁶ In addition to that, the prime minister can be quite influential in the foreign policy hierarchy, taking concrete measures and steps, as was epitomised by Putin when he was the prime minister under President Medvedev.

As far as the other “traditional” foreign policymakers are concerned, the main function of the intelligence services, especially of the SVR, is to provide the president with information and advice on all major foreign policy security decisions, including on East Asia. Its role as the key source of information was especially valued by President Yeltsin, and is still relatively high under Putin. The functions of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs are much more numerous and it can be regarded as the core foreign policy body, coordinating, initiating and implementing foreign policy in East Asia in practically all spheres. It is characterised as the most influential body in terms of resources, experience and specialists. Though its role as a foreign policy coordinator was frequently undermined under Yeltsin,

the MFA was, and still is, considered to be the main actor in Russia's East Asian policy.³⁷ Practically, the MFA enjoys almost undisputable authority over specific foreign policy issues, for example, Russia's “strategic partnership” with China.³⁸

As for sectoral actors, which include economic and energy ministries, state companies like Rosoboronekспорт³⁹ and Rostekhnologii⁴⁰ and others, they have enjoyed some kind of authority over the issues within their scope of responsibility, but mostly have had to coordinate their actions with the MFA.⁴¹ The Russian parliament's role in foreign policymaking was reduced to a minimum under the 1993 Constitution and includes the ratification of international treaties. Under Putin it became a “mouthpiece for views which Putin would like the outside world to ponder, but which he would prefer not to express himself”.⁴² Academic institutions and think-tanks specialising on Africa and Asia have been playing quite a marginal role in foreign policymaking, and they diminished over time because they receive less state support now. Most of the academic influence on Russian initiatives is considered to be wielded through personal contacts with elites rather than through institutional methods.⁴³ Deprived from any significant influence on Russia's foreign policy as a whole, the Russian Far East elite did have some

impact on the resolution of the border issues, especially as there was strong opposition to a border resolution with Japan and China.⁴⁴

Summarising the above, Yeltsin mostly employed the “divide and rule” attitude to foreign policymaking, which resulted in chaos and factional rivalry, led to an incoherent foreign policy course, and the absence of a clear strategy at re-establishing a great power status. Russian policy during the 1990s is often described as reactive, ad hoc, and often contradictory. On the contrary, power consolidation under Putin resulted in a more comprehensive and proactive approach towards the region. A bid for great power status made Russian foreign policy elite better define its interests and goals in East Asia and understand that a substantial economic presence in the region as well as internal strength are of vital importance in this respect.⁴⁵

China and Beyond: Bilateral and Multilateral Dimensions of Russia’s Foreign Policy

As China has been the core East Asian country in Russia’s foreign policy towards the region, a special mention should be made of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership as the “axis” of Russian policy in the East. Russian-Chinese relations managed to overcome

a confrontational period in the 1960-1980s, and have now created a strategic partnership. Their foundation was laid down by Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to China in 1989, and the 1990s saw the beginning of political and military-technical cooperation between the states. In 1996 a strategic partnership aimed at promoting cooperation in the 21st century was proclaimed. In 2001 a Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation was signed, which paved the way for enhanced political, economic and military cooperation. In 2004 a border dispute was finally settled after long negotiations and there were a number of border agreements. Russian and Chinese leaders voiced a vision of a “new world order” in 2005 and a joint initiative on strengthening security in the Asia-Pacific in 2010. The 2000s saw advanced energy cooperation, in particular in 2010 when a spur from the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline was completed from Russian Skovordino to Chinese Daqing. As far as regional framework is concerned, 1996 saw the creation of Shanghai Five, including Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the basis of Treaty of Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions. It laid foundations for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, formed in 2001 after Uzbekistan’s accedence, which comprises security and economic agenda.

It is instructive to note that the rationale for the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership included opposition to unilateral actions and support for a polycentric world order, based on respect for mutual sovereignty. The concept of a polycentric world was originally proposed by Chinese policymakers and was then supported by Russian leaders.⁴⁶ In this respect America's unilateral actions in Kosovo and Iraq objectively strengthened this partnership. There is a divergence of opinions whether the strategic partnership has an ultimate aim to curb American unipolar preeminence or has a pragmatic, non-confrontational side, which helps contain Western global politics.⁴⁷ China's rapid economic development and Russia's relative economic weakness in the 1990s stimulated Russia's favourable policy towards China as it was seen as best serving Russia's national interests. As far as the economic rationale is concerned, China was in need of Russia's high-tech exports, including arms, and there was no distinguished asymmetry in the trade balance in the 1990s. Trade ties, military exchanges and diplomatic support vis-a-vis the West was used in both countries to underpin their standing in the world, as direct competition with it would have been difficult for both countries if they acted separately. However, as Russian scholar Alexei Bogaturov notes, China has been considered as both "a sea of potentials" and "an ocean of

fears".⁴⁸ While some experts emphasize the benefits of Russian-Chinese cooperation, based on distinguishing non-Western political systems, others maintain that such policy could lead to a more archaic and authoritarian regime in Russia, subordinate to Chinese strategic, political and economic interests. China's rise facilitated the discussion in Russia's political elite whether to pursue a policy aimed to foster a common political space with Europe and the USA in cooperation with China or to create a common anti-American, anti-Western and pro-authoritarian Chinese-centered economic, political and security space⁴⁹. Nevertheless, present Russian-Chinese relations should be distinguished from an anti-US alliance, as both sides value their relations with the world leader too much to start such a rivalry. Even if despite all the problems such an alliance emerged, Russia would be likely to play a subordinate role in it, which does not correspond to its national interests.⁵⁰

A number of blemishes and challenges within Russian-Chinese relations should also be touched upon. First of all, at issue here is the imbalanced trade structure: though the 1990s saw a different situation, since the beginning of the 2000s Russian exports have mostly consisted of energy, raw materials, fishery and timber, while Chinese exports have been to a large degree composed of machinery and manufactured goods. The Chinese economic orientation generates

a threat of Russia becoming a resource appendix, leaving it on the “other side of the barricades” from the leading world, including China itself.⁵¹ In this sense experts argue that China cannot serve as a “beacon of innovation-based model of development” or supply Russia with high-tech equipment, as it is interested only in Russia’s resources (except military know-how to a certain extent) and itself uses second-hand Western technologies purchased or copied outright from the West.⁵² Secondly, there is a threat to Russia’s independent policy in East Asia due to the concept of the “Beijing consensus”, which entails restructuring the world order with China in the lead⁵³ and, inevitably, accepting Chinese interests as priorities.⁵⁴ Thirdly, many experts believe that China is trying to “squeeze Russia out of” Central Asia, wielding “soft power” and enhancing energy cooperation through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).⁵⁵ Fourthly, the development of the RFE should be regarded as the most important issue and goal, as far as Russia’s East Asian policy is concerned. Only 7 million people live to the east of Lake Baikal, while the Chinese population in the neighbouring provinces totals more than 280 million people. Such circumstances provide a breeding ground for perceptions of the so-called “yellow peril” (*zheltaya ugroza*), which is manifested in the fear of uncontrolled

Chinese migration and Chinese business control over the RFE’s and Siberia’s natural resources.⁵⁶

Russia’s relations with Japan were a top priority in Russia’s Asian policy in the beginning of the 1990s as Japan was considered as one of the leaders of the developed world.

In this context special reference should be made to the development problems in the Russian Far East. Despite several economic plans to foster development in the RFE and to present the region as Russia’s gate to the Asia-Pacific region, the reality falls short of this idea. A new model of its development has not been devised yet, and the region is currently facing an array of problems: dwindling population, de-industrialisation, deforestation (due to a vast export to China), large-scale corruption, “black market” trading schemes, and general degradation.⁵⁷ Some experts maintain that a Chinese takeover of the region is likely to take forms not of migration, but of trade and investment domination and that Russia is already increasingly showing signs of economic dependence on China.⁵⁸

The Programme for Cooperation between the Regions of the Far East and Eastern Siberia and the Provinces of

Northeast China up to 2018, adopted in 2009, is aimed at constructing new border crossings, boosting cooperation in transportation, and developing “cooperation zones” and other spheres of bilateral relations. Many Russian scholars have been especially critical of it since most of the projects planned are connected with either developing raw materials, timber harvesting and agriculture on the Russian territory with increasing Chinese staff, or with producing final products on Chinese territory. Labelled This in turn is likely to lead only to the economic and ecological deterioration of the RFE.⁵⁹ The illegal Russia-China trade is estimated at large sums, from one forth to a half of official trade turnover, and only contributes to underdevelopment in the RFE.⁶⁰ Moreover, in exchange for US \$15 and US \$10 billion Chinese credits for, respectively, Russian oil companies Rosneft and Transneft to complete the ESPO oil pipeline, Russia guaranteed the supply of 300 million tons of oil over the next 20 years at a fixed price (lower than the average price level in recent years).⁶¹ This means that despite proclaiming Russian-Chinese relations in the political sphere as strategic and enjoying convergent opinions on building a “new world order”, economic disparity, aggravated by China’s lack of interest in buying more highly processed Russian goods, and ambivalent perceptions that

Russia “still owes” the Chinese part of the Far Eastern territories threaten the status of this partnership.⁶²

Yet there is a strong belief that a strategic partnership with China is a major safeguard against Russia’s diminishing position in East Asia, and that despite all the imbalances China is the most likely country to facilitate modernisation and development in the RFE since it enjoys priority in the region’s investment list. Russia’s ability to promote multipolar world order is heavily dependent on its cooperation with China, which can be regarded as a kind of force multiplier for Russia’s foreign policy. The strong point of Russian-Chinese relations is that if a way to overcome their drawbacks is found, they will significantly contribute to the development of both countries and their standing in East Asia.⁶³ The new quality of China’s role and place in world politics and global economy has made many Russian scholars suggest that Russian-Chinese relations need a complete restructuring and even a “reload” in order to form a mutually beneficial pragmatic strategic partnership.⁶⁴

It would also be unfair to say that Russia’s government does not realise the urgent need to develop the RFE. For instance, even on the energy issue Russia has been trying to diversify its directions: despite China’s lobbying that the ESPO

pipeline should end in Chinese Daqing, the main pipeline extends to the Sea of Japan without passing through Chinese territory, thus giving access to other consumers in the Asia-Pacific region (Japan, Korea, etc) and making it impossible for the Chinese to dictate oil prices.⁶⁵ The Russian government also adopted a Federal Target Programme of Economic and Social Development of the Far East and Transbaikalia 2008-2013, which entails allocating large sums of money on development of the RFE, especially on developing Vladivostok's infrastructure in the run-up to the 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit there. The plan drew substantial criticism because although it implied pouring extensive funds into several grandiose projects, such as building a bridge to Russky island, it was believed to do little to promote good governance and tackle corruption and bureaucratic impediments to developing business in the region.⁶⁶ However, APEC Summit proved to be quite a success for Russia's bid to present Vladivostok as Russian gates to the Asia-Pacific and Russia's seriousness in becoming an integral part of the region, although President Putin's concept of Russia's role in the integration of Eurasian common space was not widely appreciated.⁶⁷ About 650 billion rubbles (US \$ 21 billion) were spent on developing the region's infrastructure due to the summit.⁶⁸

In addition to that, a recent decision to create a state-owned corporation in charge of development in Siberia and the RFE with approximately US \$60 billion in funds up to 2020⁶⁹ and the creation of Ministry for Development of Russian Far East in May, 2012 in charge of the region's development⁷⁰ raises hopes of a new strategic course for the modernisation of RFE.

Russia's official position is primarily concerned with North Korea abandoning nuclear tests, constructing a new security architecture in the region and securing a place in the North Korean talks.

As for other countries of East Asia, Russia's relations with Japan were a top priority in Russia's Asian policy in the beginning of the 1990s as Japan was considered one of the leaders of the developed world. Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan in 1991 was considered a breakthrough, as it inaugurated the beginning of a new era of normalisation in Russian-Japanese relations with a hope of signing a peace treaty and settling the territorial dispute, remnants from the end of the Second World War. The dispute over the Kuril Islands resulted from the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin being passed from Japan to the Soviet

Union under the terms that ended the Second World War. However, Japan does not recognise it owing to the fact that the Soviet Union was not a signatory state to the 1951 San Francisco Treaty.

Japan's ambition to settle the territorial dispute with an emerged democratic Russia promptly and on its terms turned out to be unsuccessful, as Japan failed to connect this issue with economic cooperation and financial assistance for Russian reforms.⁷¹ The Tokyo Declaration of 1993 brought out divergent positions on the border issue and, in spite of numerous top-level meetings in 1997 and 1998, where a goal was proclaimed to sign a peace treaty by 2000, nothing has been achieved on this matter. Economic and technical cooperation stagnated despite the enormous potential of its development, reaching a new low in 2002. This was mainly due to Japan's reluctance to invest in a Russia lacking economic transparency and having numerous bureaucratic impediments. In 2003 a joint action plan was signed, aimed at a comprehensive development of political, economic and cultural relations.⁷² In 2005 additional agreements were concluded, adding momentum to economic cooperation between Russia and Japan, and resulting in Japanese business entering the Russian market (especially the automobile industry). Japan also took an active part in energy

cooperation in the Sakhalin-2 project, and is a major consumer of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). Japan is Russia's second largest trading partner in the region after China and ranks eighth as far as investment in Russia is concerned.⁷³

Nevertheless, despite the fact that economic cooperation has been on the rise, no progress has been made on settling the territorial dispute so far and President Medvedev's visit to the Kuril Islands in 2010 evoked fierce criticism from Japan's leaders, exacerbating mutual perceptions of bilateral relations. The territorial dispute is constantly raised as a domestic issue in Japan, serving the goals of gaining internal support pending another forthcoming election.⁷⁴ Despite this, Russian-Japanese relations have been progressing constructively and have a huge potential for development.

The Soviet imbalance towards North Korea shifted in favour of South Korea in the 1990s. After recognising South Korea in 1990, Moscow put an emphasis on developing economic relations and technical cooperation with this country, which is currently Russia's third largest trading partner in East Asia after China and Japan, and a promising source of high technology. This had negative impact on Russian-North Korean relations as Russia became marginalised in Korean affairs despite its valid claim

of having a direct interest in the issue. Moscow was completely left out of the US-negotiated Agreed Framework in 1994, and negotiations in 1996, in which the USA, China and both Koreas took part. Despite Russian initiatives to promote multilateral talks on the North Korean issue, its earlier disengagement from North Korea mainly for economic reasons reduced its clout on the Korean peninsula. However, as Moscow supported the South Korean “sunshine policy” and took steps to improve relations with North Korea, including Putin’s visit and the signing of the Russian-North Korean friendship treaty in 2000, Russia has tried to create the image of an active mediator in the nuclear issue. The friendship treaty replaced the 1961 Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty, although the provisions of Russia’s military assistance in the case of military attack were removed from the new agreement. However, despite these successful steps and some improvements time had already been lost.⁷⁵

The second Korean nuclear crisis (2002-2006) gave Russia an opportunity to exercise its influence over North Korea and to convene a multilateral organisation, namely the six-party talks. Russia’s unofficial aim was also to prevent the breakdown or collapse of the North Korean regime as that would have unpredictable consequences for Russian security with Russia’s 19-kilometer

border with North Korea. Russia’s participation in the six-party talks was mainly perceived as an acknowledgement of its great power status by the major northeast Asian players and that it had an ability to maintain the current balance in the region between the US alliance system and China.⁷⁶ Russia’s official position is primarily concerned with North Korea abandoning nuclear tests, constructing a new security architecture in the region, and securing a place in the North Korean talks. The latter is of utmost importance for Russia, since a place in the talks is perceived as a way to wield its influence in the region and to establish itself as a reliable economic partner for both Koreas. The breakdown of the talks owing to the third nuclear crisis in 2009 is considered a major loss for Russia from this perspective, and stimulates Russia to promote the revival of the talks on North Korea.⁷⁷ Russia made efforts to improve its position on the Korean peninsula in the absence of the talks as the only available mechanism to make its words heard. In 2009-2010, Russia took steps to improve its relations with North Korea (such as debt rescheduling and food aid in 2011), and proposed a number of major trilateral economic projects including the linking of the Trans-Siberian railway to the Korean railroad infrastructure, constructing powerlines through North Korea to South Korea, and a natural

gas pipeline throughout the Korean peninsula. Given the political risks of their implementation, these projects present a real opportunity to transform South-North Korean relations into constructive ones and thus strengthen Russia's standing on the Korean peninsula.⁷⁸ In October 2011 a railway road connecting Russian Khasan with North Korean Rajin port was completed with Russia developing a container pier in Rajin.⁷⁹

Russia's relations with East Asian states vary from strategic partnership and closer economic ties with China to developing economic cooperation with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN states.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union augmented Taiwan's interest in a new democratic country not merely as an export market but as a potential ally against China. Despite Taiwan's attempts to create a powerful lobby in favour of establishing official diplomatic relations, it seemed a desperate goal because of a history of fierce political antagonism, lack in pro-Taiwanese politicians, and Russia's objective interest in the vast potential of the Chinese market. In 1992 Taiwan successfully erected the

institutional foundations for quasi-official relations with Russia: the Moscow-Taipei Economic and Cultural Coordination Commission and the Taipei-Moscow Economic and Cultural Coordination Commission, which remain the main channels. Presumably, the decision to focus on China in its East Asian policy made the Russian government reject the Taiwan Relations Act, proposed by a marginal populist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), and possible arms sales to Taiwan. Russia has officially expressed "firm support" for the "one China" principle since the early 1990s, and publicly adopted it in 2001 strategic partnership treaty with China. This did not prevent Russia from enjoying economic cooperation, mostly in importing Taiwanese machinery and electronics. It should also be noted that a complete resolution of the "Taiwanese issue" is not beneficial to Russia in terms of geopolitics, as it would boost China's might dramatically, and thus have an unpredictable impact on Russia's role in the region.⁸⁰

Though Russia became a dialogue partner with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1996 and in 2004 signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Russia's regional role was initially perceived mostly with great scepticism owing to its inability to project economic and military power in the region. It was

not until 2005 that the first ASEAN-Russia summit took place. The main problem, however, was that Russian-ASEAN relations were far from being characterised as “substantive” because of poor trade turnover as well as a low investment rate. On these grounds in 2005 Russia was rejected for both making these meetings regular and joining the East Asia Summit (EAS).⁸¹ Above all, Vietnam is considered to be a reliable traditional friend in Southeast Asia, making it one of Russia’s strategic partners in East Asia.⁸² Besides joint projects on oil and gas exploration with Vietnam and other Southeast Asian states, Russia is also enjoying growing cooperation in the arms trade (for instance with Indonesia and Vietnam), biotechnologies, pharmaceuticals, information and education technologies, space exploration, natural disaster relief, tourism, civil aviation, and in implementing a number of infrastructure projects, including the construction of electric power plants (for example with Cambodia) and nuclear power stations (for example with Vietnam and Myanmar).⁸³

A prior analysis of Russia’s foreign policy in East Asia shows that Russia’s aspirations to become a great power have been manifested through establishing the country as an indispensable and unalienable part of the region, and in strengthening existing bilateral relations

while forging new ones. Russia also took steps to assure that it acceded to all regional multilateral institutions. Russia has been a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its establishment in 1993, promoting preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms and a multipolarity vision. In 1998 Russia joined APEC and hosted its 2012 summit, with an aim to make Vladivostok Russia’s economic outpost in the Asia-Pacific region.⁸⁴ In 2010 Russia joined the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and in 2011 the newly established East Asia Summit (EAS) to integrate itself into the world economy and to take part in building the regional security architecture.

Strategic partnership with China gives Russia opportunities to influence China by means of bilateral contacts more successfully than any agreements or negotiations in the China-US relations can.

Taking all the aforesaid into consideration, Russia has worked hard on joining virtually all regional fora and has become an ASEAN dialogue partner. Russia’s relations with East Asian states vary from the strategic partnership and close economic ties with China,

to developing economic cooperation with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN states. Despite various impediments, Russia is currently implementing large-scale projects with regional partners and Russia's economic relations with East Asia will undoubtedly have a huge potential.

Russia's New Role as a Balancer in East Asia: Perils and Prospects

All in all, Russia's relations with East Asia have improved steadily over the last decade, not only in political, but also in economic and industrial domains. For instance, successful joint projects, such as Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, are being implemented.⁸⁵ In the 1990s Russia's trade with East Asian countries (see Table 1) amounted to approximately one fifth of Russia's total turnover, but Russia's share in the total trade of the region was absurdly small, less than 1 %. Experts consider weak infrastructure and unfavourable legal conditions as the major reason for limited economic links. Another distinguishing feature of this period was overdependence on exporting raw materials and natural resources, labelled the "primitivisation" of trade. The late 1990s witnessed a consensus over the necessity to boost economic engagement with the region. Putin launched a more pragmatic

economic policy, aimed at pursuing achievable goals reflecting the national interests of Russia. Moreover, developing economic ties were perceived as a means of matching words with deeds in Russia's foreign policy.⁸⁶

Trade dynamics in the 2000s (See Table 2) show that Putin's course to improve investment conditions, legal protection, and developing infrastructure did have a positive effect as far as economic relations with East Asia are concerned. Japan, South Korea, China and other states initiated substantial investment projects in Russia in the late 2000s,⁸⁷ President Medvedev's modernisation agenda also contributed to advancing economic ties, as the emphasis has been put on developing high-tech production. Though Russia's trade turnover with East Asia significantly decreased in 2009 on account of the global economic crisis, it managed to restore its pre-crisis level in 2010 and achieved new heights in 2011. In the 12 years since 2000 Russia's trade figures with East Asia have grown more than tenfold, although East Asia's share still roughly equals one fifth of the total Russian trade turnover. An interesting fact is that the Russian trade with East Asia saw faster restoration rates than that with other countries. It should also be noted that during the economic crisis Western investment in Russian economy dropped by 20 %, while investment from East Asia tripled over the last two

years.⁸⁸ However, despite this favourable dynamics it should be taken into consideration that Russia still ranks low in East Asian countries' external trade and investment list.

Those pursuing pragmatic economic policies stress energy supply or energy interdependence or arms export as principal means to enhance Russia's standing in the region.

Hence, here arises a question: why has Russia been recognised as a regional actor and invited into regional institutions, such as ASEM and the EAS, despite the fact that relations with the region were not regarded as “substantive” a little more than half a decade ago, when Russia's application into the EAS was politely rejected? Apparently, enhanced economic cooperation was not a reason, because, for example, while Russia's total trade turnover with the ASEAN countries has more than doubled since 2005, from about US\$5 billion dollars to about US\$12.5 billion dollars in 2010 in sheer numbers, this accounts for less than 1 % of ASEAN's total trade turnover, which is not meaningful at all.⁸⁹ The answer is that the regional balance of power changed dramatically at the beginning of the 21st century. If just recently Japan was East Asia's economic leader and the main source of investment and economic trends, China's vibrant

economic growth has made it the new centre of economic gravity and turned it into a regional superpower as well, especially given the fact that China has become the main trade partner of the majority of regional economies.⁹⁰ The economic rise of China has contributed to its political rise and its more assertive foreign policy in East Asia.⁹¹ This in turn has provoked the US counter-offensive, namely the US ambition to strengthen its alliances with key partners and to remain an inherent part of the region, its self-proclaimed “back to Asia” strategy.⁹²

These circumstances have created a new environment in East Asia: a need for balancing between a rising China and the US. A strategic partnership with China gives Russia opportunities to influence China by means of bilateral contacts more successfully than any agreements or negotiations in the Chinese-US relations can. Russia, whose foreign policy towards the region has always been a peaceful one due to the fact that it is a relatively weak regional player and any conflict in the region is able to downplay Russia's role in the region even more, was regarded by the ASEAN and the other countries in the region as a good power, capable of counterbalancing Chinese and the American influence. In other words, a change in the balance of power in the region brought about the need for Russia's more vigorous participation as a balancer (in other words as a counterweight).⁹³

ASEAN countries find it beneficial to sustain competition among China,

the US and other major actors, since it helps them develop economically and retain political autonomy as well.⁹⁴ This trend coincides with Russia's desire to play a "balancer role": the Russian political elite believes that despite its reduced influence in the world arena, it still possesses "assets for exerting influence" as a "variable force" or "honest intermediary" when addressing regional conflicts (especially the Korean crisis), the China-Japan-US strategic triangle, and ASEAN's response to China's rise.⁹⁵ Surprisingly, at first sight Russia's options in East Asia resemble that of ASEAN: if Russia is to play a substantial role in the politics and security in East Asia and develop economic cooperation with dynamically growing economies, under no circumstances should it take sides between the US and China. If Russia or ASEAN decided to choose between these two centres, the region would be seriously polarised and would spiral into chaos.⁹⁶

To elaborate on this point, it can be added that Russia and ASEAN are also facing the same problems of the so-called unfinished modernisation, which defines their subordinate position in the world economy. Creating a more stable regional security architecture will definitely foster economic cooperation as well.⁹⁷ Moreover, Russia is a very advantageous partner for ASEAN, because as a strong modernising military state and a weak economic one it possesses military capability but does not wield an economic influence equal to

that of the Chinese or the American, and it is seriously interested in broadening its economic presence. Thus, ASEAN countries feel freer in economic relations with Russia than they do with China or the USA, which makes them natural partners.

Russia is facing many challenges in its bid for a great power status in East Asia. Some of them are quite objective: Russia has not got enough resources to alone boost the RFE in the long term. Though the MFA sees East Asian states as potential means for the development of the RFE, it remains only a future possibility and prospects remain unclear.⁹⁸ Internal challenges to Russia's policy towards East Asia also include competing schools of thought and ideological perspectives. They comprise liberal and balance-of-power approaches, Russia's identity as a European or a Eurasian country as well as many others. A challenge to Russian foreign policy has been to navigate among competing perceptions of East Asia, including a free-for-all competition among the great powers and the consequent need to play the balance of power game; East Asia as a "field of dreams", ripe for economic integration and cooperation; and misgivings that sparse population and economic deterioration in Asiatic Russia may lead to grave consequences and that the best strategy would be to shield itself behind a "fortress mentality". The latter has its manifestation in an alarmist worldview. Firstly, it is directed at the USA, which is perceived to be masterminding an

assault on Russia's great power standing and aiming at turning the Asian part of Russia into a cheap source of raw materials and energy supplies. Secondly, it is aimed at China, which is seen as scheming for a quiet expansion into Siberia and the Far East, masquerading the seizure of Russian territory with its resources and massive migration as border trade, and thirdly at Japan, which is believed to be reiterating its territorial demands in order to take control of Russian resources and venting its revived nationalism.⁹⁹

Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that there is a consensus both within Russian society and the political elite that Russia actually is a great power and should act accordingly, there has been no consent as to what characteristics this great power should possess and what means should be employed to realise this goal. For instance, the advocates of Russia as a Eurasian power place emphasis on Russia's role as a bridge between the East and the West in both civilisational and economic aspects, though this is not clearly defined. Those pursuing pragmatic economic policies stress energy supply or energy interdependence or arms export as principal means to enhance Russia's standing in the region.¹⁰⁰

The abovementioned factors present a challenge to Russia's foreign policy in East Asia. It is instructive to note that given stable political and economic development and active participation in the regional agenda, Russia's role in

East Asia is likely to increase gradually, although the forms of this increase are still under discussion. In any way, it rests upon Russia's ability to foster the development of Siberia and the Far East.

Conclusion

Drawing on statistical evidence and the above analysis, we can conclude that Russia still cannot be regarded as a full-fledged great power in East Asia, though its presence in the region has stabilised and gained prominence if compared to the 1990s.¹⁰¹ The reason for this is primarily economic: of all the criteria proposed by Buzan and Weaver, Russia undoubtedly satisfies all the material criteria, if taking into consideration Russia's largest territory, ample resources, considerable political stability under Putin and Medvedev, and military strength as Russia is one of the five official nuclear states. Russia also meets the criterion of formal recognition of its status, which can be seen from Russia's successful accession to ASEM in 2010 and the EAS in 2011. The Russian-Chinese strategic partnership can be considered an issue of system-level calculations in international relations, though its influence on the existing world order is still unclear. However, Russia's economic involvement in the region still leaves much to be desired. Russia fails to actively participate in banking and investment cooperation and the number of joint ventures is still relatively small. This is primarily due to the fact

that the Russian business community is relatively weak in the world and cannot boast a freedom of functioning as it is still controlled by the government in many respects. The Russian Federation accounts for 0-1 % of East Asian countries' exports and 0-3 % of their imports, except for Mongolia and North Korea.¹⁰² Despite its economic weakness, Russia can still aspire to a great power status in East Asia since recent events have demonstrated that it is taken into consideration by the regional powers. Thus, fostering economic cooperation is the most logical way to increase Russia's influence in the region.

Consequently, it is no exaggeration to say that Russia's involvement in the region needs to be amplified and strengthened. Russia's future rests upon its standing in East Asia, both in security and economy. Its political standing in East Asia should be well secured, which implies that Russia must be a member of all prominent regional organisations and conduct a flexible policy on multiple regional fora. As contemporary Russia's economic positions in East Asia are considerably weak and Russia is far from being characterised as a systemic factor in the region, it is evident that a too strong focus on the Chinese vector in its Asian policy is a major threat to independence of Russia's relations with East Asia. In this respect developing multi-vector network diplomacy in East Asia, proposed by

Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, which implies flexible and mutually beneficial interaction of different states to promote coinciding interests,¹⁰³ can be regarded as a reasonable course.

However, one has to bear in mind the fact that in order to qualify as a great power a country has to possess considerable economic might in the first place, as economic factor comes to the fore when defining core actors in world politics. There is an ongoing debate whether Russia should concentrate on relations with key partners like China, Japan, Vietnam and others, or develop economic relations with relatively new partners. Some scholars view a more vibrant economic cooperation between ASEAN and Russia as a good opportunity to improve Russia's standing in the region. Not without its problems due to geographical remoteness and often called fragile as far as trade turnover is concerned, Russian-ASEAN cooperation could be advanced through joint projects and mutual investment.¹⁰⁴ Others put a premium on selective partnerships with key regional actors in the most promising spheres, such as the debt problem and its historic legacy with Vietnam, military and technical cooperation with Malaysia, tourism with Thailand, high-tech cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and joint ventures with China.¹⁰⁵

Table 1: Russia's Total Trade Turnover with East Asia (1996-2012) (US\$ million)

Country	1996	1999	2000	2005	2012
China	5,724.5	4,495	6,335	20,664	89,008.4
Japan	3,890.7	2,564	3,336	9,581	31,220
North Korea	64.8	55.7	46	233	81
South Korea	1,984	1,142	1,330.8	6,363	24,880.4
Taiwan	568	325.3	492.6	1,931	5,338.2
Indonesia	135.6	57.3	108	551	2,871.8
Malaysia	167.3	475.2	388	823	1,745.6
Vietnam	154	183	204.7	913	3,660.6
Singapore	798.7	220	520.5	626	2,004.1
Thailand	274.8	163	170	998	3,381
Philippines	155.3	77.3	58.4	271	1,647.2
Laos	68.8	2.2	1.6	11	n/a
Cambodia	19.4	n/a	1.5	8	n/a
Myanmar	13.4	n/a	3.8	3	146
Total trade with East Asia	14,019.3	9,760.7	12,997	42,976	165,984.3
Total trade with the World	131,141	102,003	136,971	339,857	837,294.9

Source: Figures compiled from: Paradorn Rangsimaporn, *Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 62 and p. 66; *Russian Federal Custom Service Statistics*, at http://www.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_newsfts&view=category&id=125&Itemid=1976 [last visited 29 April 2012]; Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, *Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo so stranami Azii i Afriki (Economic Cooperation with Asian and African Countries)*, at <http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/foreignEconomicActivity/cooperation/economicAA/> [last visited 30 April 2012].

*Total Trade with East Asia has to be larger in fact, as trade turnover figures with a number of countries (North Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar) are currently unavailable.

Table 2: Russia's Total Trade Turnover with East Asia (2000-2012) (US\$ million)

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
China	6,335	7,292.7	9,432	11,875	15,180	20,664	29,108	40,744	56,344	40,251.4	60,160.6	84,560.7	89,008.4
Japan	3,336	3,219	2,783	4,296	7,345	9,581	12,244	20,094	28,913.5	14,515.6	23,120.8	29,705	31,220
North Korea	46	78.3	79.6	113.6	210	233	210	159.8	110.8	49.4	95.2	113.7	81
South Korea	1,330.8	1,593	2,201	2,650	3,989	6,363	9,515	14,986	18,383.4	10,554.3	17,694.6	24,979.6	24,880.4
Taiwan	492.6	418.6	672	1,099	2,330	1,931	1,687	2,109	2,859.5	1,712.5	3,332	4,159.5	5,338.2
Indonesia	108	125.8	193	418	366	551	607	916	1,409.7	974.2	1,912.3	2,166.5	2,871.8
Malaysia	388	424.6	577	725	537	823	1,134	1,903	2,442.6	1,632.6	1,711.5	1,935.1	1,745.6
Vietnam	204.7	241	403	433	808	913	653	1,092	1,432.9	1,561.8	2,445.1	3,061.0	3,660.6
Singapore	520.5	682.5	610	248	351	626	1,227	1,540	1,655.2	2,019.6	2,340.2	2,636.1	2,004.1
Thailand	170	177	323	431	728	998	907	1,336	2,729.5	1,369.8	2,904.5	4,117.3	3,381
Philippines	58.4	67	128.6	222.5	267	271	167	241	414.4	573	1,067.6	1,643.2	1,647.2
Laos	1.6	3.8	4.2	2.4	6.7	11	4	3.2	6.8	11.4	8.7	45.9	n/a
Cambodia	1.5	4.8	3.6	1.6	4	8	10	29	34.1	38.5	36.3	73.5	n/a
Myanmar	3.8	33.5	100.8	11	25	3	9.5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	146
Total trade with East Asia	12,997	14,362	17,510.8	22,526	32,146.7	42,976	57,482	84,993.2	116,733.4	65,754.1	116,829.4	159,197.4*	165,984.3
Total trade with the World	136,971	140,725	152,885	190,713	257,232	339,857	439,051	552,181	734,681.3	469,014.5	625,395.1	821,353.1	837,294.9

Source: Figures compiled from: Paradorrn Rangsimaporn, *Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 66; *Russian Federal Custom Service Statistics*, at http://www.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_newsfs&view=category&id=125&Itemid=1976 [last visited 29 April 2012]; Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, *Ekonomicheskie sotrudnichestvo so stranami Azii i Afriki (Economic Cooperation with Asian and African Countries)*, at <http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/foreignEconomicActivity/cooperation/economicAA/> [last visited 30 April 2012].

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Recent Political Developments in Taiwan: Facing Beijing and Washington

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Abstract

In 2012, political developments in Taiwan were somewhat different from what observers predicted at the beginning of the year. The ruling party is now weaker than what it appeared earlier. The United States and mainland China are the two most crucial factors which will determine the future of Taiwan, and at the moment the US's influence on the political landscape and political orientation in Taiwan is, in general, larger than that of mainland China. This chapter will discuss the major issues in current cross-strait relations and analyse Taiwan's relations with the United States, China and Japan.

Key Words

Future of Taiwan, Cross-strait Relations, US Policy towards Taiwan.

The 2012 Presidential Election

President Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected president of Taiwan on 14 February 2012. The turnout in the presidential

election was lower than previous ones, with around 13.2 million voters, about 74 % of eligible voters, casting ballots. It was widely considered a greater-than-expected victory as before the balloting, the ruling party, the Kuomintang, was confronted with mounting pressures. The Kuomintang captured 6.89 million votes, accounting for 51.6 % of the total ballots cast, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) received 6.09 million votes, about 45.6 %, a difference of 790,000 votes. The decline in the turnout was also interpreted as a reflection that democracy in Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC), had got more mature. It is hoped that Taiwan can demonstrate that a democratic system can work in an ethnically Chinese society.

The election of the parliament, known as the Legislative Yuan, was held simultaneously with the presidential election. While the Kuomintang retained the majority in the Legislative Yuan, its strength there declined. The Kuomintang won 64 seats out of a total

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of 113. The number of parliamentary seats captured by the DPP increased to 40, a marked rise from the previous 27. Additionally, a pro-independence party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, led by former president Lee Teng-hui, unexpectedly won three seats.

The US Factor in the Presidential Election

In Taiwan's previous presidential election in 2008, the United States did not openly side with the Kuomintang. Then, the DPP was in its most difficult period as the corruption of former president Chen Shui-bien had resulted in very severe criticism. But in February 2012, the gap between the strengths of President Ma and DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen was seen by most observers as very narrow. Deeply worried about instability which would likely arise in the Taiwan Straits if Tsai got elected, the Obama administration in 2012 actively involved itself in the presidential election by supporting Ma.

About a week before the election, the Taipei Office of the American Institute in Taiwan (the *de facto* US embassy) held a press conference with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, jointly announcing that a visa-waiver programme would soon be applicable to Taiwanese citizens. It was an unusual move by the United States,

and was interpreted by some observers as an open expression of US preference in favour of the re-election of Ma.¹

Deeply worried about instability which would likely arise in the Taiwan Straits if Tsai got elected, the Obama administration in 2012 actively involved itself in the presidential election by supporting Ma.

Douglas Paal, a former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, was known to have had disputes with the DPP when he headed the US mission. The unfavourable remarks he made with reference to the DPP in a TV interview in Taipei on the eve of the presidential election provoked anger from the DPP. Some observers in Taiwan saw the unusual remarks made by Paal as being influenced by the Obama administration. Former US Senator and former governor of Alaska Frank Murkowski, then observing the election in Taiwan, was also very unhappy with Paal's conduct.

The preference for Ma over Tsai Ing-wen by the Obama administration was taken by the DPP as an injury to Tsai's presidential campaign, but it was certainly not the primary factor for Tsai's defeat. The Obama administration must

have rationally weighed the merits of offending the DPP by siding with Ma, and it had been assessed to be less costly for the Obama administration than to face resentment from the defeated DPP.

A Sino-US Co-Management?

There were opposing views in Taiwan over the existence of a “Sino-US co-management” of the Taiwan Strait in the presidential election. Some scholars in Taiwan, such as Chen Yi-shen, who is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Modern History under the Academia Sinica, believe that a “Sino-US co-management” was apparent. Chen says that a “Sino-US co-management” can even be dated back to the meeting between then-Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and Henry S. Kissinger in 1971.² In his inaugural speech on 20 May 2000, Chen Shui-bian gave a pledge of “four noes and one without” in his policy for cross-strait relations, a pledge was guided by the US. The then-Director of the American Institute in Taiwan Raymond Burghardt helped Chen in his drafting of the pledge. The United States then wanted to intervene in order to assuage the nervousness on the part of Beijing.

Director Wang Yi of Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office visited Washington, DC in July 2011. There were unconfirmed reports that Wang asked the Obama administration to grant Taiwan visa-waiver status before the election so as to

be helpful to Ma’s campaign.³ It is easy to lead observers to accept the view that some kind of a tacit agreement over the visa-waiver announcement might exist.

Today, Beijing no longer uses the term “Sino-US co-management” of the Taiwan Strait. In the period from 2004 through 2007, Beijing believed that it was practical to rely on a “Sino-US co-management” to restrain the Chen Shui-bian administration from seeking the *de jure* independence of Taiwan. However, after Ma got elected as president in 2008, Beijing no longer talked about the need for a “Sino-US co-management.” Yet in the recent Taiwanese presidential election, the overlapping apprehension between Washington and Beijing vis-à-vis the DPP might have been more than “a tacit agreement.” It seemed that Beijing was happy with the position of the Obama administration.

The Ban on US Beef Imports Containing the Drug Ractopamine

Following his re-election victory in January and before the inauguration of his second presidential term, Ma encountered difficulties in overcoming the protests on his policy of allowing the importation of US beef that contains residue of ractopamine, a drug that promotes leanness in cows. In the US beef import issue, the Ma administration

was attacked by the opposition party as lacking transparency, wavering and backtracking. Even some Kuomintang legislators also stepped in and criticised the government of misrepresenting the US beef issue and misleading the public in general.⁴ One argument employed by many of those who were critical of the Ma administration was “how could it be appropriate for a government to promote meat products containing residues of the animal feed additive ractopamine, when an existing administrative order specifically prohibits its use?”⁵

Even though Premier Sean Chen said that the Ma administration has no timetable set for when the ban on ractopamine-laced beef imports would be lifted, word spread that President Ma already gave an instruction that the issue must be solved by 20 May- the very day on which President Ma would be inaugurated for his second term.

Part of the defence the Kuomintang employs over its ractopamine position is that the dispute has resulted in blocking the resumption of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) negotiations between Taiwan and the United States for five years.⁶ The Kuomintang stressed the importance of the negotiations for both the economic transformation of the country and for improving Taiwanese-US relations. It emphasised that the solution of

the ractopamine issue would help Taiwan secure the consent from the United States to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade region within a decade.⁷ President Ma said on 22 March that he was concerned with the economic challenge confronting Taiwan, particularly after a free-trade agreement (FTA) between South Korea and the United States had already entered into force in mid-March. Ma believed that the ractopamine issue is a matter of national interest and not just public health. At a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Committee on 21 March, President Ma reiterated that Taiwan must avoid becoming marginalised amid regional economic integration. Ma specifically noted that it is a pressing task for Taiwan to resume the negotiations over the TIFA and to sign not only the FTA with the United States but also economic pacts with other countries.

In addition to the ractopamine controversy, Ma was confronted with charges that the outbreaks of avian influenza were not disclosed to the public in Taiwan before his re-election. The DPP claimed that the cover-up was intentional. Seeing Ma’s predicament, Paal commented in Washington, DC on 22 March that the United States cannot push too hard for the exports of US beef containing ractopamine to Taiwan. Paal suggested that the Obama

administration must be more patient.⁸ Actually, the United States aims at selling its beef containing ractopamine in mainland China markets after Taiwan gives in to the US demand. It is expected by some circles in mainland China that soon after Taiwan lifts its ban on US beef containing ractopamine, the United States will exert pressure on Beijing to do the same.

The People's First Party along with the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union have adopted an overlapping position against the US beef import issue. They have joined hands in criticising the Kuomintang for having tried to import US beef containing ractopamine simply by an executive order instead of by legislation.

The Republic of Korea is now the only country which has concluded FTAs with the European Union, the United States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and India.

It is widely known to the citizens in Taiwan about the US insistence and pressure. Therefore, it was not the best strategy for the Ma administration to keep categorically denying the existence of pressure confronting Ma from the

Obama administration. The US beef issue, among several other issues, has contributed to the shortening the “honeymoon” Ma could have had at the start of his second presidential term.

The South Korean-PRC FTA and ECFA

The FTA between the United States and the Republic of Korea became effective on 15 March 2012. The Republic of Korea is now the only country which has concluded FTAs with the European Union, the United States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and India. In May, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea held a summit meeting in Beijing to lay the groundwork for their trilateral FTA negotiations.

Taiwan and mainland China signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010, an agreement that aims to reduce trade barriers between mainland China and Taiwan. The “early harvest” programme for tariff reductions or exemptions under the ECFA took effect on 1 January 2011. The newspaper *China Times*, which is based in Taiwan, believed that it is a great challenge to Taiwan if it does not conclude ECFA follow-up agreements before an FTA is signed between China and the Republic of Korea. In such a

scenario, South Korean exports to China will get tariff cuts. As a consequence, Taiwanese investors on the mainland are expected to turn to South Korean suppliers for needed parts. It will greatly increase the market share of South Korean manufacturers in mainland China. Taiwan is urged not only to expedite the negotiations with Beijing over the four ECFA follow-up agreements but also to enlarge its scope of application.⁹ On 6 April, Ma stated publicly that he targets completing negotiations on the ECFA with Beijing within the next two years. But some experts have expressed doubts over the probability of success. Their doubts are well founded and the progress in the negotiations over the ECFA follow-up agreements is now stalled.

Actually, the United States had a certain degree of displeasure with the Ma administration over its insufficient transparency in the process of negotiating the ECFA with Beijing. An effective reform in the problems of taxation and finance is one of the gravest challenges confronting the Ma administration.¹⁰

The DPP's Refusal to Accept the "1992 Consensus"

In the analysis of the latest presidential election, it was found that the "1992 consensus" was one of the important factors that determined the result. The

factor was particularly influential at the last stage of the election. The term "1992 consensus" was invented by Su Chi, who served as the former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman in the Lee Teng-hui administration, following the inauguration of Chen Shui-bian as president.¹¹ Despite what Su originally claimed, the term did not exist in any governmental archive when Lee was president. But very importantly, in the presidential election in 2012, the term became not only an issue but seemed to be a symbol of peaceful development and trade between Taiwan and China. A refusal to accept the "1992 consensus" was essentially one of the important causes leading to the defeat of Tsai by Ma.

During the presidential campaign, Tsai downplayed or avoided the importance of facing the challenges emanating from the "1992 consensus." She just randomly commented on it as "historical fiction" without forcefully arguing against it. In general, the DPP did not think this refusal would have any damaging effects. Among many DPP elites, the avoidance by the DPP during the campaign to strongly counter the Kuomintang appeal to the "1992 consensus" was as a critical cause of failure. Beyond that, Tsai adopted a campaign strategy of avoiding arguments about cross-strait relations and the DPP did not put forward any policies on cross-strait relations. It is

not an exaggeration to say that the DPP inadvertently underestimated the Kuomintang's powerful emphasis on the "1992 consensus".

A Peace Treaty and a Political Arrangement

As soon as Ma won re-election, some policy elites on the mainland wasted no time in expressing their hope that the Kuomintang would seize the opportunity to start to negotiate for a political arrangement between Taiwan and Beijing. Among the Taiwanese media, some relevant questions, such as the following two, immediately arose: How can President Ma greatly accelerate the process of reunification with mainland China? More specifically, how fast can he propel Taiwan to move towards negotiations with mainland China on political and security issues?

Richard Bush, the director of Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute, believes that such expectations are unrealistic. Bush holds that Beijing and Taipei made progress in cross-strait relations in the previous four years largely because they had agreed to focus on "easy" issues, mainly economic ones. In his view, any political issue that Taipei and Beijing may bring up will be "hard" to reach an agreement on. Bush said that this is even true of outstanding

economic issues, such as the liberalisation of trade in goods and service, investment protection, and dispute settlement. On political issues, he predicts, Beijing will continue to insist that negotiations must be conducted on the basis of the "One China principle." But he noted that it will be difficult for the Kuomintang to budge from the "1992 consensus",¹² Bush is by no means alone in voicing such reservations or doubts on Ma's new departure in his mainland policy at the beginning of his second presidential term.

But some policy elites and scholars in Taiwan tend to believe that the *status quo* across the Taiwan Strait will not be easily sustained. Accordingly, they emphasise the importance of making preparations for political negotiation. In their view, it will be better to get prepared against the likelihood that pressure increases suddenly from Beijing. Lin Wen-cheng is one such scholar who takes such a position.¹³

The DPP's Modification to its China Policy

Following Ma's re-election, quite a few important figures within the DPP began to talk openly about the necessity of reviewing the DPP's hard-line policies towards the cross-strait issues. Even Tsai herself made some remarks about the

need to be relatively more flexible in engaging with Beijing.

Chen Chu, Kaohsiung City mayor, said on 24 February before she became the acting chairwoman of the DPP in the wake of Tsai's resignation, that the DPP will seek to improve its ties with Beijing. Chen, who will lead the party until May when a new party chairman will be inaugurated, emphasised that "we hope this situation will change in the future through our increased interaction and engagement with China." Chen's remarks on improving ties with Beijing fell in line with an earlier DPP report on the party's defeat in the recent presidential campaign. Indeed, the report advocates revisions to the party's policy towards mainland China. Chen gave these remarks upon her return from a visit to Cuba, which had denied her entry at the Havana Airport.¹⁴ Chen had led a group of Kaohsiung City government officials to arrive in Cuba on 20 February in order to study Cuba's organic farming development. Chen then responded that she would not speculate about the real reasons behind the incident in Cuba.¹⁵

Su Huan-chih, who was the former Tainan County magistrate, also echoed Tsai's advocacy of more engagement with China on 4 February. Having declared his intention to run for the DPP's chairmanship, Su promised that if he got elected, he would create DPP

representative offices in the United States, Japan, India and China in particular. But Su qualified his statement by adding that the party's representatives in these countries should be "solidly pro-independent" people with good character.¹⁶

In the meantime, Lo Chih-cheng's visit to China to attend a two-day academic forum on cross-strait relations received wide attention. His visit was seen in some circles as rather symbolic as Lo was the DPP spokesperson and he was the first incumbent DPP party official to visit mainland China since 2008. Coinciding with Lo's visit to the mainland, Wu Po-hsiung, emeritus president of the Kuomintang, commented in Beijing that the Kuomintang welcomed the efforts of all parties in Taiwan to promote a cross-strait exchange.¹⁷

Despite this development, the DPP is still quite divided on how to modify its policy towards Beijing. Also among those DPP elites who argue for a substantive modification of its China policy are Tuan Yi-kang, Kuo Cheng-liang, Tung Chen-yuan, Chen Sung-shan and Tung Lih-wen. At a forum organised by the *China Times* on 23 March, they discussed new perspectives on how to adapt their Beijing policies. Tuan, a current DPP parliamentarian, indicated his surprise at the misperception among some DPP supporters about its China policy. Tuan

believed that it will be important for the DPP to emphasise that it does not intend to pursue the *de jure* independence of Taiwan.

Following Ma's re-election, quite a few important figures within the DPP began to talk openly about the necessity of reviewing the DPP's hard-line policies towards the cross-strait issues.

Kuo Cheng-liang, a former DPP parliamentarian, pointed out the necessity for the DPP to readjust its China policy as there will be more voters who give primary concern to economic issues in the 2016 presidential election. In Kuo's view, the Kuomintang will accumulate more benefits in the economic interaction across the strait when 2016 comes. He warned that the Kuomintang by then will have achieved more economic interaction than at the beginning stage of the ECFA. Kuo moved to urge DPP supporters to make a compromise by recognising the ROC national flag, which was originally a derivative of the Kuomintang party flag.

Tung Chen-yuan, a former deputy chairman of the ROC Mainland Affairs Council, said that the DPP must have a thoroughly new strategy

for China. Tung argued that the DPP must now take an initiative to conduct a dialogue with mainland China. He stressed the importance of working out a compromise with the mainland by putting forward a new interpretation of the DPP's constitutional positioning. In his view, constructive ambiguities are something the DPP will have to create in regard to the cross-strait relations.

Tung Lih-wen, the former head of the Chinese Affairs Department under the DPP, called on the DPP to revive its Chinese Affairs Department. Frustrated with the damage as a result of underestimating the issue of the "1992 consensus," Tung advocated that the DPP must attach importance to exposing the weakness and danger of the "1992 consensus." Additionally, Tung called upon the next chairman, whom the DPP will elect, to take a "new centrist line" on cross-strait relations. Tung shared Kuo's argument that the DPP must restore the Chinese Affairs Department as a party organ so as to actively and efficiently handle policy issues related to mainland China.¹⁸

Even so, in contrast to the views of these DPP moderates, many hardliners within the DPP still emphasise the significance of having a marked distinction from the Kuomintang in its mainland policy. Wu Zhao-hsieh, who served as the former chairman of the Mainland

Affairs Council in the Chen Shui-bien administration and subsequently became the former *de facto* ambassador assigned by the same administration to the United States, is one of those who is strongly opposed to a revision of the DPP's fundamental policy towards mainland China. He expressed worries against plunging into a "trap" devised by both Beijing and the Kuomintang.

One may say that up to now it seems to have been a delicate division of labour vis-à-vis Beijing between the Kuomintang and the DPP. While the Kuomintang is inclined to improve ties with Beijing, the DPP is keen to resist pressure from Beijing. On 24 March, an editorial in the *China Times* said that through such unintentional collaboration amid rivalry between the two major parties, Taiwan has subtly got the optimal benefits. Beijing, according to the editorial, yielded more benefits to Taiwan through the Kuomintang's positioning.¹⁹

A New Controversy: "One Country, Two Areas"

A new controversy arose from the latest annual forum between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Leading a party delegation, Wu Poh-hsiung, a former chairman of the Kuomintang, called on Chinese President Hu Jintao on 22 March in Beijing.²⁰ Both

Wu and Hu emphasised the importance of continued cross-strait relations under the "One China" principle. Yet, to the surprise of some Taiwanese, Wu proposed that cross-strait matters be tackled under the so-called principle of "One Country, Two Areas." Clarifying that the Ma administration's current policy is based on the "Act Governing Relations between the Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area," Wu raised the importance of improving cross-strait ties on the basis of the concept of "One Country, Two Areas." He added that cross-strait relations are not undertaken on a nation-to-nation basis but rather on a special relationship one.²¹ Wu also claimed that he got authorisation from President Ma for the words he employed with reference to the concept of "One Country, Two Areas" before he had departed for Beijing. He hinted that he was Ma's messenger.

Wu's pronouncement drew immediate criticism from the DPP. For years, President Ma has emphasised that his cross-strait policy is based on the principle of "No Reunification, No Independence and No War." Wu's remarks about "One Country, Two Areas" were criticised by the DPP as deviations from the policy set by the Ma administration. Kao Lingyun, a reporter at the reunification-leaning *United Evening News*, attributed Wu's sudden announcement to a decision by the Ma administration to reduce

Beijing's displeasure of the ROC after the Mainland Affairs Council rebuffed Beijing's Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone initiative on the grounds that Taiwan has not accepted Beijing's long-held principle of "One Country, Two Systems." Kao commented that the policy shift to declare the principle of "One Country, Two Areas" was an imprudent move.²²

To the DPP, the "One Country, Two Areas" formula is a violation of Ma's re-election campaign pledge, which held that the essence of the "1992 consensus" represents the premises of "one China, with different interpretations." It sees "One Country, Two Areas" statement made by Wu as a change from the Kuomintang's self-proclaimed policy of maintaining the status quo in cross-straits relations.

Among others, Tsai Ing-wen sharply criticised the "One Country, Two Areas" formula as a "dangerous" concept when requested by the media for comments. Huang Kun-heui, the chairman of the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union, compared the formula voiced by Wu to "the Treaty of Shimonoseki in the 21st century", Huang argued that

the "Act Governing Relations between the Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area" had been enacted "with the implication of a state-to-state legal framework." In his view, the concept of "One Country, Two Areas" is exactly identical with the formula "One Country, Two Systems" which has long been insisted on by Beijing but persistently rejected by Taiwan. Huang compared Wu's words to opening a Pandora's Box.²³

In the view of a former Tainan County magistrate Su Huan-chih, the concept

of "One Country, Two Areas" relegated the status of Taiwan and the status of the ROC president.²⁴

Other criticisms made by the DPP against Wu included that Wu should have specified that by "One Country" he

meant the Republic of China so as to avoid being interpreted as the People's Republic of China (PRC). A protest march was planned by the DPP for 20 May, the day Ma was inaugurated for his second presidential term.

On 23 March, Fan Chiang Tai-chi, ROC Presidential Office spokesman, clarified Wu's statements by saying that the stance taken by the Ma administration on defending Taiwan's sovereignty under the principle of "One China, With Each

In contrast to the views of these DPP moderates, many hardliners within the DPP still emphasise the significance of having a marked distinction from the Kuomintang in its mainland policy.

Side Having Its Own Interpretation” remains unchanged. Premier Sean Chen echoed Fan’s statement. Chen said that the “One Country, Two Areas” formula is in line with the intent behind Article 11 of the Additional Articles of the ROC Constitution.²⁵ But Chen’s words still differed from those of Wu. Wu referred simply to the constitution, but Chen made mention of the Additional Articles (the amendments) of the constitution. Chen’s supplementary words were better received by the media.

Yang Kai-huang, an expert on cross-strait relations and a professor of political science at Mingchuan University, argued on 24 March that the operability of the concept “One Country, Two Areas” may require a revision to the ROC constitution. A breakthrough in the constitutional framework, in his opinion, is needed so as to launch the new concept as a basis to push forward political negotiation with Beijing.²⁶ To some experts, Wu’s disclosure of the principle of “One Country, Two Areas” has relevance to the Ma administration in preparing for political negotiation.

Present at a joint hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee and National Defence Committee at the parliament on 26 March, Tsai Teh-sheng, director of the National Security Bureau, testified that he did not hear the concept “One

Country, Two Areas” at any previous meeting of the National Security Council. He emphasised that he had not been informed of the concept until the disclosure by Wu. In his testimony, Tsai added that “he does not support the arguments for the concept at this particular moment.” He went on to predict that the concept will not move further as it had already caused a heated controversy.²⁷

The official media organs in mainland China did not immediately report the concept of “One Country, Two Areas” soon after Wu had openly stated it. It is apparent that Beijing was being prudent in evaluating the new legal concept.²⁸ Just as the concept of “One Country, Two Areas” aroused severe criticism from the public, so it is likely that the Ma administration will be more scrupulous in evaluating the launch of political negotiations.

Actually, the Obama administration said that it was not informed of the “One Country, Two Areas” formula before Wu conveyed it to Hu. It was very likely that the Obama administration showed its displeasure for being uninformed in advance. Attending President Ma’s second inauguration, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the chairwoman of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, even asked President Ma to give

clarification on the “One Country, Two Areas” formula.

Encountering criticisms from both the Pan-Green opposition parties in Taiwan and the Obama administration, President Ma in his second inaugural address modified the above-mentioned concept as “One Country, Two Areas under the Republic of China.” More than a week later, Beijing gave its sympathy to President Ma’s revision in light of the internal and external difficulties confronting Ma. Beijing seems to be more sophisticated now than ever before in understanding the political entanglements in Taiwan.

The US’s Attitude on a Peace Treaty or a Modus Vivendi

Some quarters in Taiwan are of the opinion that the *status quo* on the Taiwan Strait will not be easily sustained. As a result, they advocate the importance of making preparations for political negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party. To them, it would be better to be prepared against the likelihood that pressure suddenly increases from Beijing.

There is no indication that the Obama administration is encouraging the Ma government to initiate political negotiations with Beijing. Instead, a

negative attitude to negotiations on the part of the Obama administration has been indicated from time to time. Some people at major think tanks in the US predict that very little substantive progress on political negotiations across the Taiwan Straits can be foreseen in Ma’s second presidential term.

As countermeasures to China’s espionage attempts, the United States now not only withholds sensitive information from Taiwan, but equips highly classified electronic components with anti-tamper devices.

Nor has the Obama administration given blessings to talks over military confidence-building measures (CBMs) between Taiwan and Beijing. It welcomes the relaxation of military tension across the Taiwan Straits, but it does not see the removal of Beijing’s missiles targeting on Taiwan as a precondition for US restraint on its arms sales to Taiwan. The Obama administration is concerned about the espionage activities of some military officers, in active service or retired, in Taiwan for Beijing. In short, the Obama administration is very keen on political contacts across the Taiwan Straits.

The US on Chinese Espionage

In less than two years, more than six Taiwanese citizens have been charged with spying for China. Among the most noteworthy was Major General Lo Hsieh-che, who was charged with providing information on Taiwan's US-designed command and control system. Despite the lowering of tensions across the Taiwan Straits, China has not relaxed its efforts to steal Taiwan's most vital military secrets. The two main targets of China's military espionage efforts are the Lockheed Martin- and Raytheon-built Patriot missile defence system and the Lockheed-designed Po Sheng command and control system. As countermeasures to China's espionage attempts, the United States now not only withholds sensitive information from Taiwan, but equips highly classified electronic components with anti-tamper devices.²⁹

The F-16C/D Sale

It seems unlikely that President Obama will approve the sale of F-16C/D aircraft to Taiwan. For years, Taiwan has been seeking to purchase 66 of the fighters. The delaying position adopted by the Obama administration has in turn led to delays in the US Senate's confirmation of Mark Lippert, nominated in October 2011, for the position of US Assistant

Secretary of Defence for the Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. But his confirmation was put on hold by Senator John McCain, and now the nomination is being held up by Senator John Cornyn. Despite a letter to Obama to demand clarity on the issue, the White House has made no attempt to negotiate with Cornyn.³⁰ Interestingly, some doubts have been reported in Taiwan about the intention of the Ma administration over its budgetary preparations in purchasing the F-16C/D fighters. Besides, some military experts in Taiwan now argue for the purchase of even more advanced fighters.

Taiwan's International Space

Some people in Taiwan want the country to participate as more than an observer in the annual meeting of the World Health Assembly. Additionally, Taiwan wants to conclude trade liberalisation agreements with foreign countries which do not recognise Taiwan's statehood. The Ma administration initiated a "diplomatic truce" following his victory in his first presidential election. Yet, Beijing has never employed the same term. It is true that Beijing has since then exercised self-restraint by refraining from taking away diplomatic recognition from any country which recognises the Republic of China (essentially Taiwan) as the regime representing the entire

Chinese territory. But other than that, Beijing still adopts a policy in restricting Taiwan's international space. In February 2011, the Chinese foreign ministry reacted very strongly to remarks made by Taiwan's *de facto* ambassador to the United Kingdom, Lu-shun Shen, about his intention to make Taiwan's relations with the United Kingdom as official as possible. Beijing continues to push the United States to stop selling arms to Taiwan. On many occasions, Beijing has obstructed Taiwan's efforts in expanding its participation in international NGO activities. There have been several instances where Beijing has tried to downgrade Taiwan's participation or cooperation within international NGOs, specifically with regard to Taiwan's official designation and status.

A case in point is as follows. The International Federation of Asian and West Pacific Contractors Associations (IFAWPCA) is an association which aims to promote relationships between governments and contractors in the region on civil and building construction projects. Taiwan, as a founding member, has actively participated in the organisation. Last year, the China International Contractors Association, which is under the supervision of the Beijing government, took active steps towards joining the regional federation. In a memorandum to the secretariat of the federation and the Taiwan General

Contractors Association, the Chinese association set a pre-condition prior to its officially filing an application for membership. It demanded that there be no presence of the ROC national flag, national emblem or national anthem at any future activity and meetings of the federation. In addition, it asked that no Taiwanese officials could attend the meetings of the regional federation in any capacity. Beijing was reported to have even asked the regional federation to remove the Taiwanese association from the lists of nations in all its meetings, events, documents, websites and paperwork so as to avoid an impression that there are "two Chinas", or "one China and one Taiwan". In specific terms, the memorandum demanded that all references to the "Republic of China" be removed from the regional federation's website. Unusually, it required that all members of the regional federation sign and accept the memorandum with the secretariat before China would send in official membership application. At the same time this controversy was unfolding, the Ma administration was criticised by the DPP for having announced that public infrastructure construction in Taiwan would be opened to Chinese investment.³¹ This was, indeed, an illustrative case reflecting both Beijing's mindset and position.

Some academics in Taiwan, including Bau Tzong-ho, vice president of

National Taiwan University, argued at a meeting on 24 March that Beijing still has placed obstacles for Taiwan in its efforts to negotiate free-trade agreements with other countries.³² The hardliners in Beijing assert that the conclusion of an FTA involves the question of sovereignty. The establishment of a mechanism for FTA negotiations within Taiwan was suggested by some of the scholars present at the meeting as way of effectively dealing with Beijing's future attempts to further reduce Taiwan's international space.

They even moved to call for making efforts to dispel the misunderstanding that UN Resolution 2758 specifically states that Beijing has sovereignty over Taiwan. In other words, even some of

the elite supporters of the ruling party also voiced their frustration over the isolated status of Taiwan. They showed concern with Taiwan's need to seek more room in its international space.

The Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone

The Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone in Fujian Province is Beijing's China's newest proposal to

Taiwan for the sake of reunification. The zone is 68 nautical miles (125 km) from Taiwan's Hsinchu County. Beijing says that in order to deepen cross-strait ties, the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone is aiming at attracting investments from Taiwan to host high-tech companies and factories. Doubtlessly, the Ma administration is wary of the proposal. Premier Chen even told legislators in mid-March that China has "ulterior motives." Chen straightforwardly said that the zone proposal is not as simple

Beijing says that in order to deepen cross-strait ties, the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone is aiming at attracting investments from Taiwan to host high-tech companies and factories.

as it may look. Many analysts expressed concern that Taiwan's economy would hollow out further if large numbers of Taiwanese businesses were attracted and moved their investments there.³³ The Ma

administration has stopped short of endorsing the zone initiative while having an intense interest in deepening economic ties with Beijing.

The DPP and the US

Following Tsai Ing-wen's resignation from the chairmanship of the DPP, the party was confronted with the problem of taming its wild factions. The DPP has internal weaknesses and it needs to

promote reform and transformation within the party. Many contradictions within the DPP were hidden during the election campaigning, and it is believed by some DPP elites that now is the time to resolve some of the contradictions.³⁴

The DPP seems to be fighting a war on three fronts. Some hardcore members of the DPP still harbour resentments against the Obama administration over its unusual measures to support President Ma in his re-election. The tough position maintained by the DPP over US imports of ractopamine-containing beef is a reflection of the DPP's resentment. Is there a necessity for the DPP to improve its communication with the United States?

Nancy Tucker, a professor at Georgetown University, in July 2011 called on the Obama administration to openly state that the United States would cooperate with either of the two major Taiwan presidential candidates no matter which party turns out to be the winner. Despite her appeal, the Obama administration took decisive action. Some DPP members today still resent the interference by the Obama administration in the presidential election. Several DPP members even appealed to their Taiwanese supporters residing in the United States to lend their support to the Republican Party in the presidential and congressional

elections in the United States. The appeal has had some repercussions. For instance, Li Thian-hok, living in Pennsylvania, wrote a letter to the editor of the *Taipei Times*, calling for people to support Republican Senator Richard Lugar in his bid to become chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on the grounds that Lugar will be better than Democratic Senator John Kerry in looking after the interests of Taiwan. Li criticised Senator Kerry for having said that Taiwan's future should be settled based on China's "One Country, Two Systems" formula.³⁵ Following Obama's election victory, it is important for the DPP to reconcile with the Obama administration. Some people in the DPP, like Wu, have already spoke of the importance of enhancing communication with the US Congress.

The US and China and the South China Sea Disputes

Taiwan definitely is closer to the United States than Beijing. The United States has long been a protector of Taiwan against Beijing's ambition for incorporation. The subtle mixture of cooperation and competition between Beijing and the United States will continue to greatly bear on Taiwan's relations with Beijing and Washington. While the relationship between Beijing and the United States has not been a zero-sum game for Taiwan

for some time, Taiwan must be very keen to the subtlety of the bilateral relations of the two superpowers.

The US's emphasis on its traditional alliances in the Asia-Pacific region will not help maintain regional security as those alliances were forged during the Cold War with an aim of restraining Beijing.

The position of the Ma administration towards the South China Sea disputes is not to seek cooperation with Beijing in order not to offend the United States. The Obama administration has precautions against the possibility of cooperation between Taiwan and Beijing over the disputes regarding the South China Sea. In Taiwan there are some that call on the Ma administration to coordinate its position with Beijing over Beijing's heightened territorial dispute with the Philippines and not to accept the claim made by the Philippines.

The United States does not accept China's claims over the South China Sea. It is very vigilant against conceding the Asia-Pacific region to Beijing as its strategic space. Some scholars in the United States compare Beijing's position to that of a Monroe Doctrine

for the Asia-Pacific region. In his book *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, Aaron Friedberg states that Beijing's goal is "to displace the United States as the dominant player in East Asia, and perhaps to extrude it from the region altogether." Yet, Friedberg adds that "China presently has neither the capacity nor the desire to launch a frontal assault on the U.S.-dominated order in Asia."³⁶ His observation does not conflict with the mainstream view.

Since the inauguration of the Obama administration, both Beijing and the United States have launched a strategic security dialogue and consultations on Asia-Pacific affairs in the Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue. But the new Asia-Pacific strategy adopted by the Obama administration in July 2009 has sounded alarm in Beijing. In November 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton published an article in *Foreign Policy* magazine. In her article, Clinton laid out the terms of what she called "America's Pacific Century". Wu Chunsi, a senior research fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, commented that the US's new Asia-Pacific strategy will negatively influence Sino-US relations even though it does not advocate a strategic containment of China. She noted that "U.S. attempts to boost its profile in the Asia-Pacific by interfering in disputes

between China and its neighbouring countries are not conducive to a positive Sino-U.S. relationship.” Wu went on to say that the US’s emphasis on its traditional alliances in the Asia-Pacific region will not help maintain regional security as those alliances were forged during the Cold War with an aim of restraining Beijing. Instead, she argued that the two major powers must build an inclusive mechanism for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. She said that the stance taken by the Obama administration on such Chinese interests as US arms sales to Taiwan will be detrimental to Chinese core interests.³⁷ Wu’s views are, indeed, in line with the mainstream foreign policy elites in mainland China. Actually, the Sino-Russian joint military exercise in the Yellow Sea in late April was widely taken as a counter to the US’s reemphasis of its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 2 June, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta stated that the United States will shift the bulk of its naval fleet to the Pacific as part of a new strategic focus on Asia. According to Panetta, the US Navy by 2020 will re-posture its forces from today’s roughly 50/50 split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between the two oceans with a focus on the Pacific.

On the one hand, Panetta demonstrated the determination of the Obama administration to oppose any attempt by Beijing to unilaterally take military action to defend its territorial claims in the South China Sea. But on the other, Panetta asserted that there is “no other alternative” for the United States and Beijing but to boost military-to-military relations to manage disputes. In Panetta’s view, there will be “ups and downs” along the way, yet it is still vital for both superpowers to keep the lines of communication open. In response to Panetta’s statements, China’s Xinhua News Agency immediately warned the Obama administration that it was no time to “make waves” in the disputed South China Sea.

Kissinger on US-PRC Relations

In March of this year, Henry A. Kissinger argued that the American left and the American right have a consensus that tension and conflict with China has grown out of China’s domestic structure. In his view, while the United States, if challenged, is sure to do what it must to preserve its security, the United States should not choose to adopt a strategy of confrontation. He argues that the emergence of a prosperous and powerful China must not be assumed to be in itself an American strategic defeat. He

tends to believe that crisis management will not be enough to sustain the relationship between Washington and Beijing, and he stresses the importance of maintaining harmonious relations with Beijing. He supports the concept of a Pacific Community, an idea he has advocated before. He believes that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is an arrangement that could be a significant step towards a Pacific Community.³⁸

Xi Jinping is now not only the Chinese vice president but also its highest leader-in-waiting. His official visit to the United States in February 2012 attracted worldwide attention. One of Xi's primary goals in his visit was assumed to be to soften China's image with regard to its regional posturing. Despite his attempts, the Obama administration has continued to refuse to recognise Beijing's privileged position in the region. Actually, Beijing did not target the visit by Xi to the United States to be a "breakthrough"; neither did Beijing intend to make Xi's visit a basis for Beijing-Washington relations in the next decade. But Xi's visit was largely successful. It provided a kind of stability and continuity to the current Washington-Beijing engagement.

A Closer Relationship between Japan and Taiwan

Japan is the second most important friend to Taiwan. The grassroots friendship between Taiwan and Japan is both profound and extensive. When the Fukushima tsunami catastrophe occurred in Japan in March 2011, the people in Taiwan were the most generous in the world in giving money to the relief. The grassroots friendship between the two peoples is not only deep but is also widely recognised. Taiwan is

With the rise of Beijing, an increasing number of Japanese foreign and security policy elites have become, indeed, more concerned with the preservation of military stability in the Taiwan Straits.

now negotiating an Open-Sky Treaty with Japan. There have been many signs of the improvement of relations between the two countries. In 2005, Japan decided to give visa-free tourist status to Taiwanese visitors, a significant milestone. The exchanges between the visitors of the two countries further rose thereafter. The people in Taiwan are not emotional about the Diaoyutai (also known as the Sengaku islands) territorial disputes with Japan.

The current Noda government in Japan has revised the policies of its predecessor by again recognising the US-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty as

the basis of Japan's diplomacy. Noda visited Washington in early May 2012, a visit that was considered a success in the United States. Tadashi Ikeda, the former *de-facto* Japanese ambassador to Taiwan, believes that the mutual treaty defence between Japan and the US is in essence the basis of Japan's policy toward the question of Taiwan's security.³⁹ Japan in 2005 stated that any armed conflict in the periphery of Japan's territory falls within the scope of the US-Japan Mutual Defence Treaty. With such a formulation, Japan expressed its concern over the security of Taiwan.

In March of this year, Masahiro Miyazaki, a Japanese freelance commentator, pointed out in an article that "Taiwan is the lifeline of Japan" in the eyes of certain Japanese conservative politicians.⁴⁰ With the rise of Beijing, an increasing number of Japanese foreign and security policy elites have become, indeed, more concerned with the preservation of military stability in the Taiwan Straits.

The 2014 Local Election

The next major election in Taiwan will come in 2014. Chang Po-ya, the chairwoman of the Central Election Commission of Taiwan, said on 19 March that the commission is planning a combined local election in 2014 in

which voters may be given up to five ballots. More specifically, voters in the five special municipalities will be given three ballots, while those in counties and county-level cities will cast five votes.⁴¹ The forthcoming election is very significant as it involves not only the mayoralty of the five special municipalities but also the local elected positions throughout the country. The DPP considers this election to be an opportunity for the party's revitalisation. To the Kuomintang, it will be both an opportunity and a challenge for the implementation of its earlier presidential campaign platform. The recent bribery scandal of Lin Yi-shih, the secretary general of the Executive Yuan, will force the Kuomintang to augment its image of good governance by the election of 2014.

Unfavourable Views on the Intermediate-Term Future of Taiwan

While the Obama administration favours maintaining the *status quo* across the Taiwan Straits, there have arisen views in favour of a political solution in the intermediate term for Taiwan's status by some strategists in the United States. In the wake of some arguments for the "Finlandisation of Taiwan," advocacy for "abandonment" of Taiwan was crafted by Charles Glazer among others.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, in an article published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in January 2012, says that Deng Xiaoping's formula of "one country, two systems" should be redefined as "one country, several systems." He believes that such a redefinition may provide the basis for China to eventually get reunification with Taiwan. Most importantly, Brzezinski thinks that time is on the side of China. He takes note of China's ascending power and the expanding social links between Taiwan and China. In his view, "it is doubtful that Taiwan can indefinitely avoid a more formal connection with China."⁴² Such a statement by Brzezinski is sure to influence some foreign policy elites in the United States. It poses a severe challenge to the competence of Taiwan's government. It is particularly alarming to Taiwan as Brzezinski also argues that indefinitely continuing US arms sales will provoke intensifying Beijing's hostility to the United States and he specifically states that "any long-term U.S.-Chinese accommodation will have to address" the question.⁴³ Similar

views harmful or unfavourable to the status quo with Taiwan will continue to emerge in the United States. But in the presidential election, neither Obama nor Mitt Romney showed any sign of weakness in their rhetoric over the US's policy toward Taiwan.

Conclusion

On the one side, the challenges facing Taiwan are by no means debilitating. But on the other, democracy in Taiwan has become more liberal and mellower. It is healthier now that the polemics between the two major parties are less dogmatic. Most importantly, there has been an increase in the number of swing voters in Taiwan. The chances for fair competition among major political parties are likely to continue to steadily grow. In the next decade, it is conceivable that the Kuomintang may not accept a kind of "federation" as the formula under which Taiwan will rejoin mainland China. Interestingly, the DPP may not oppose such a sort of confederacy.

Endnotes

- 1 At one point of time, the application of the visa-waiver programme to Taiwan was delayed partly because the passage of the Taiwan Policy Act in the United States was blocked by the Judiciary Committee of the US House of Representatives. There, some Republican Congressmen voiced their doubts over the handling of safety issues related to the visa-waiver programme. The act was introduced by Republican Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen in 2011 in order to help ensure that Taiwan's peace, prosperity and security will be maintained following the decision by the Obama administration not to sell Taiwan F-16C/D aircraft fighter jets.
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- 3 Winston Dang, "China and US Cannot Co-manage Taiwan", *Taipei Times*, 5 February 2012.
- 4 The Liberty Times Editorial, "Government's True Nature Exposed", *Taipei Times*, 18 March 2012. The controversy over beef products containing ractopamine residues mainly involves US beef, as opposed to that from other sources.
- 5 "Government Disregarding the Law", *Taipei Times*, 22 March 2012. An outspoken writer, historian and former legislator Li Ao criticised Ma on 1 April as "the most pro-US president in Taiwan's history", see, Chris Wang, "Ma Involved in Traitorous Acts: Li Ao", *Taipei Times*, 2 April 2012.
- 6 The George W. Bush administration suspended the TIFA negotiation with Taiwan in order to penalise the Chen Shui-bian administration for its refusal to lift the ban on the imports of US beef.
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Security Conditions and Regional Competition in East Asia after the New Millennium: A South Korean Perspective

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Abstract

Even after the new millennium, the Korean peninsula still remains not only the heart of the Northeast Asian security discourse, but also as the centre of global security concerns. The absence of visionary leadership in East Asia and North Korea's self-destructive survival strategy make it difficult to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula. Looking back at the last two decades of globalisation, the South Korean people have been embarrassed by the fact that although the country has been extending its reach as a meaningful global player economically, it has been struggling to contend with security issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem, revision of the South Korean-US alliance, Japanese militarisation, the rise of China, and so on. Thus, there continues to be many security concerns remaining for South Korea (also known as the Republic of Korea, or ROK) in the new millennium.

Key Words

South Korean foreign policy, Inter-Korean Relations, Northeast Asia.

Introduction

East Asia is perhaps the world's greatest military spending area; it is "ripe for rivalry" according to some experts on East Asian issues.¹ East Asian states are competitively building up military resources with which to coerce others and engaging in "head-to-head" economic competition. With economic and energy resources, they are coercing or inducing others to achieve their desired outcomes.² However, the incentives for cooperation among states have been growing since the new millennium. Recently, due to dramatic increases in trade and investment ties within the region, East Asia has come close to the European Union and North America not only in the size of its economy but also in its level of integration. These developments have led national leaders to realise that East Asia is becoming a crucial power, and that their fate is closely associated with the prosperity of the region. In the duality that the region presents, rivals compete over how to cooperate. While promoting cooperation in a regional

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institutional framework, they advocate different alliances, ideas, and role allocations. Each state is architecting a regional institution that would best position itself in the regional leadership stakes.³

Due to dramatic increases in trade and investment ties within the region, East Asia has come close to the European Union and North America not only in the size of its economy but also in its level of integration.

The upshot is that different regions have been selected by different states. For example, China has worked to embrace Southeast Asia under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three (APT: China, Japan, Korea), as well as Central Asia under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Japan is racing to connect the countries of East Asia under the proposed East Asian Community (EAC) that includes the APT countries plus Australia, New Zealand, and India. The United States has attempted to enlarge the functions of the economically oriented APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). Finally, South Korea has pursued a Northeast Asian Community composed mainly of China, Japan, and South Korea. Many

of these groupings are incompatible with one another, and they compete for primacy. Thus, the conditions for projecting power have been dramatically changing recently as these powers play a soft power game. Accordingly, the resources that provide the best basis for power are changing these days.

Considering these development, this article examines the security conditions of South Korea in the new millennium, and will discuss the security conditions surrounding the Korean peninsula both internally and regionally. The security implication of the Six-Party Talks will be analysed. Lastly, this work will explore the competitive dynamics of pursuing soft power among the key regional states in East Asia. By doing so, it will try to provide an empirical account of regional competition from a soft power perspective.

The Security Conditions and Environment of Korea in the New Millennium

With the end of the Cold War the meaning of security started to differ from region to region, and the change in security conditions brought about by globalisation has also been different in places as a result of regional political and social restrictions. Compared to Europe or the North American region,

the East Asian international order has experienced a distinctly unique process of formation. Unlike the European case in which countries of similar economic development, social stability, etc., formed Europe's regional security order through a process of reciprocity, the state of international relations among East Asian countries could be seen as a result of the proliferation of the Western way of diplomatic relations. This sort of historical characteristic has influenced the uniqueness of the regional security order in East Asia. In East Asia, there still remains the Cold War tradition of resolving major security issues bilaterally.⁴ Such traditions have been institutionalised in the form of a "fragmented array of bilateral relationships" of which the United States is the centre of these relationships.⁵

The rise of China has forced South Korea to ask itself two security questions.

In addition, the astonishing economic development in East Asia is ushering in growing regional interdependence. Due to the outcomes of globalisation in the field of communication, transportation, networking, and civilian activity, distances are shrinking and the economies of the region's countries are becoming ever more dependent on

the well being of each other. To this new sense of regionalism, the so-called interdependence allows for a certainty of security aspects. Interdependence may reduce the risks of any serious troubles. Unfortunately, however, the development of economic interdependence does not easily bring any meaningful spill over effect into the security area.

The major limitation in East Asian regional security is fairly straightforward. The differences in power among different nation-states, unresolved historical issues, the existence of largely autonomous cultures unaccustomed to long-term habits of association and interaction with their neighbours, and the extraordinarily rapid economic and social change in recent years have all constrained the development of a more mature and stable regional order.⁶ South Korea, in particular, needs to pay greater attention to these factors more than any other country in the region due to its confrontation with North Korea. As previously mentioned, South Korea symbolises the security confrontation of the East Asian region in the new millennium. It is still a divided nation and also the neighbour to one of the most bizarre and unpredictable regimes in the world, North Korea. Regarding the security conditions of the Korean peninsula in the new millennium, the rise of China draws striking attention. China favours maintaining a peaceful

security environment in order to advance its own industrialisation. However, the rise of China has forced South Korea to ask itself two security questions. First, South Korea has to consider its relations with the United States, China, and Japan along with each state's status in the region. The United States is the regional stabiliser in a distance, and its security alliance with South Korea and Japan has been strengthened and transformed to suit the 21st century international security environment. However, as a consequence of increased Chinese power, maritime territorial disputes and historical territorial disputes continue to occur among China, Japan, and Korea. Thus, South Korea is more likely to pursue a balance-of-power approach in this region.

Problems with North Korea have become the most symbolic and significant issue among any other Northeast Asian regional security issues, primarily due to North Korea's continuous resistance to cooperate in the East Asian regional order.

The second security question is concerned with the G-2's (the US and China) global leadership in the region. There are contending arguments on

continuity and disparity between global and regional hegemonic influence. Since the new millennium, the United States and China have been contending for regional hegemony in East Asia. Although the United States asks for a harmonious partnership with China in order to maintain a more efficient leadership in the region, there are many unrevealed competitions and behind-the-scenes manoeuvring between the G-2 countries. Thus, South Korea's choices, regarding its security issues, are becoming more limited and complicated. To be sure, the full-scale rise of China and the beginning of the G-2 accelerated a new stage of international relations in East Asia. The East Asian security structure is characterised by the co-existence of strategic conflict and realistic cooperation. However, because the conflict between the United States and China has not yet intensified, and neither is it an open conflict, now would be an appropriate time to maximise South Korea's national interest, including issues concerning North Korea.

Thirdly, the most salient and enduring security subject in the East Asian region is how to handle North Korea. Although there have been many efforts made by the United States and South Korea to engage with North Korea over the last 20 years, the North Korean regime continues to pursue a nuclear weapons programme. Offers by the United States to North

Korea for its disarmament cannot credibly reduce the regime's fear for its survival. In dealing with North Korea, both the United States and South Korea have moved back and forth between policies of engagement and coercion, occasionally leading to contradictory policies and a lack of consistency on the part of both the United States and North Korea. Problems with North Korea have become the most symbolic and significant issue among any other Northeast Asian regional security issues, primarily due to North Korea's continuous resistance to cooperate in the East Asian regional order. As a result, many regional security difficulties, such as the US-Chinese conflict over the Korean peninsula, the underdevelopment of multilateralism in the region, and the arms race among East Asian countries, are far beyond solutions for peace in the East Asian region.

As mentioned earlier, the North Korean nuclear problem has lasted for almost two decades, filling the pages of East Asia's post-Cold War stories on security. Living under this nuclear threat has become a part of daily life for many South Koreans. As the problem continues to go unresolved, more and more of the general public as well as the policymakers in South Korea and the United States are beginning to become pessimistic about whether North Korea will ever give up its reckless pursuit of becoming a nuclear state. Such pessimism has led to the so-

called "South-South conflict" in South Korea, which has placed South Koreans into one of the two different camps: the pro-engagement camp that favours engaging with North Korea to bring about gradual reform and openness in the country; and the pro-regime-change camp, which advocates regime change in North Korea to completely stop Pyongyang's irrational behaviour.

Kim Jong-il might have believed that pursuing nuclear weapons is North Korea's only option for defending itself against security threats and for avoiding any loss of control over domestic politics. If North Korea is actually determined to be a nuclear state, then there is not much the international community can do. In short, the international community may simply sit and wait until North Korea reveals their nuclear weapons to the world and try to trade the weapons at an appropriate price. To avoid this worst-case scenario, two options are available. First, it is extremely important that both Seoul and Washington share the goal of completely denuclearising North Korea. However, since the Barack Obama administration came to power in the United States, there have been several indications that the United States may accept North Korea as a *de facto* nuclear power under the condition that Pyongyang does not attempt to proliferate.⁷ Although this indication may not reflect the US government's official

position, many Koreans are worried that Washington may compromise and complete a nuclear deal with Pyongyang due to other US security priorities.

However, the role of China has become the most crucial factor in the subject of the North Korean nuclear issue, China is critical in the negotiation process of the North Korean nuclear problem since it has the most leverage over North Korea. Due to the nuclear issue, both South Korea and China have been caught between the United States and North Korea. China has continued to emphasise economic relations with North Korea over the years, although there has been intense debate within China about the best way to deal with North Korea. Although an inseparable relation between the two countries exists, China must participate more actively in the international community to deal with the denuclearisation of North Korea. For a more prosperous and stabilised East Asia, South Korea, China, and the United States must find common ground to better understand each other's intentions in a constructive way.

Under such circumstances, a strategic alliance with the United States has become one of the important ways South Korea can maintain its security. The US-South Korean alliance spans a period of 60 years, and it is a valuable diplomatic asset for South Korea since it

allows it to pursue its national interests separately on the East Asian level as well as on the global level.⁸ As far as Korea's national security interests are concerned, the US-Korean alliance is the highest priority in the country's national security strategy. The future international order has been characterised as a complex network or complex transformation. In such an environment, a country like South Korea, surrounded by stronger neighbours, must pursue a strategy that exploits the benefits of the rich, diverse, and complex networks in all areas of national security. In that sense, the relationship with the United States takes top priority. However, Korea and the United States must work to reduce the negative implications associated with the term "strategic alliance", especially for China. Its alliance must not be seen as if it were preventing a rise of Chinese power in the region. Rather, both South Korea and the United States need to explain to their neighbours, especially to China, that their aim is to cope with the comprehensive security threats of East Asia in the future.

Considering South Korea's national security and national interest, stable multilateral diplomatic relations in East Asia is one of the most critical conditions for its security.

In this perspective, handling East Asian security issues in terms of the regional context has been carefully considered since the end of the last millennium. Institutionalised cooperation in the region is urgently needed for the long-term prosperity and peace in East Asia. However, the absence of an emergent collective identity in East Asia is a big obstacle. Moreover, East Asia has survived without any permanent multilateral security mechanism. The region apparently lacks a more or less enduring multilateral mechanism like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, people in the region view the emergence of linkages in East Asia as being beneath the level of state actions. In recent years, East Asian countries have become considerably more interdependent, connected, and cohesive. This increased cohesiveness has been driven by developments in, among other things, trade and investment, cross-border production, banking, technology sharing, popular culture, transportation, communication, and environmental cooperation, as well as in crime, drug, and disease control. Previous South Korean governments all endeavoured to contribute to the creation of more or less lasting multilateral security arrangements in East Asia. The Kim Young-sam government proposed to create a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue

(NEASED) at the first ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Official's Meeting. The Kim Dae-jung administration has emphasised the importance of multilateral security cooperation in East Asia on many occasions.⁹ Truly, a long and hard way exists in order to accomplish such a mechanism in the region. However, in order for these efforts to succeed, there must be a region-wide consensus on the ideas and interests among the East Asian states. Thus, creating institutions for a multilateral security framework is crucial groundwork for future long-term cooperation.

Considering South Korea's national security and national interest, stable multilateral diplomatic relations in East Asia is one of the most critical conditions for its security. Thus, the South Korean government is supporting the development of a collective identity among East Asians which would be the base of a regional multilateral framework. However, countries in the region differ in their domestic values on many security issues, such as Japan's military build-up, China's rising power, North Korea's nuclear programme, and the US-centric bilateral alliance system. Regarding these subjects, different domestic security values among the East Asian countries are known as the most significant barriers to the emergence of a sense of collective identity. Thus, these barriers should be overcome by active interdependence

and convergence of each state's domestic values through multilateral dialogue. We may consider the creation of multilateral security dialogue, region-wide collective military exercises, and civilian discussion channels on East Asian military issues in order to create a permanent multilateral security mechanism in the region.

Regarding the security concerns of Korea, it is highly probable that the United States, China, and Japan will adhere to the policies of maintaining the status quo on the North-South Korean division. As a result, to remain as a meaningful actor in East Asia is not an easy task for South Korea. The Korean peninsula is a place of strategic importance, where territorial and marine forces collide, and Western and non-Western civilisations adjoin. Thus, there should be a consistent emphasis that, without peace and prosperity on the peninsula, East Asian regional security cannot be guaranteed. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the international relations of East Asia have developed into a complex security structure that depends on the following competing elements: the role of the United States as a balancer, the possibility of a hegemonic war between China and the United States, the US-Japanese alliance, and finding resolutions to the division of the Korean peninsula. Considering the change in the balance of power among the surrounding states,

continuous attention must be paid to South Korea's national interests.

The Security Implications of the Six-Party Talks

The Six-Party process has been in recession since 2008. Hence there is scepticism on whether the Six-Party framework can succeed in denuclearising North Korea. However, it seems crucial to explore the security implication of the Six-Party Talks, since the North Korean issue can be regarded as a good example of how security is being organised in East Asia in the post-Cold War era. According to Hemmer and Katzenstein, it appears to be highly unlikely that the East Asian region can easily establish a cooperative security regime because the region lacks both a collective regional identity and multilateral institutional experience due to its bipolar structure during the Cold War.¹⁰ However, the North Korean issue engendered the major regional actors to establish a multilateral security dialogue, the Six-Party Talks, to manage East Asia's regional security challenge.

The security implications of the Six-Party Talks are often analysed in terms of a concert of powers. Ness characterises the Six-Party Talks as "a four-plus-two security consortium" which can create a long-term security institution to remove instability in East Asia.¹¹ He adds

that if the major powers of East Asia, China, Japan, Russia, and the US, could commit themselves to cooperation, the Six-Party framework can generate “a security consortium” or “a formal concert of powers” for the region. Likewise, it is important to consider the long-term perspective of the Six-Party framework in tackling the issue of a security guarantee for North Korea. In this regards, the Six-Party framework can play the role of a concert-like diplomacy to build up regional cooperation for both the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear programme and North Korea’s re-engagement with the international community.¹²

At this point, it is critical to examine China’s perception of the Six-Party Talks, since China has largely contributed to establishing and maintaining it. China also sees the Six-Party framework as a concert of powers system.¹³ Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing emphasised the role of the Six-Party Talks as “concert efforts” in arriving at peaceful resolutions of the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula. Chinese State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan even went further, saying that the “implication of the Six-Party framework is the handling of regional security matters through dialogue to build a mutual trust when tackling disputes emerging in East Asia”. Compared with the earlier stage of the nuclear issue, it is apparent that

the Six-Party process now shows one significant difference from what it did at the beginning: the Six-Party framework now allows all of the major actors in the East Asian region to have a voice in dealing with a particular security issue. Specifically, the particular pattern of a multilateral forum is accepted by all of the countries involved. Despite the absence of any formal institutionalisation, it is clear that the Six-Party Talks has operated as an engine to solve common security concerns in the region.

It seems crucial to explore the security implication of the Six-Party Talks, since the North Korean issue can be regarded as a good example of how security is being organised in East Asia in the post-Cold War era.

Recently, it seems fair to say that the Six-Party Talks basically resembles a concert of powers system since the key elements of the Six-Party framework can be examined in the same way a concert of powers would be. Also, China’s proactive engagement in the North Korean nuclear issue showed that a concert of powers system was valuable in preventing the breakout of major war between the members. China’s proactive engagement policy can be understood as

the attempt of a great power to prevent war. Ever since March 2003, when the United States intervened in Iraq, China has radically changed its stance from a “hands-off” attitude to an “engagement policy” on North Korean issues. Definitely, China doesn’t want a similar situation to play out in its backyard.

Although the Six-Party Talks was not a formal institution, it continued to play its role as holding a regular pattern of conferences dealing with particular security issues. Its establishment and maintenance showed that it has paved the way for a concert-like diplomacy not only by providing opportunities for regional actors such as the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea to take part in managing the nuclear issue, but also by offering a regular pattern of forums to discuss regional security issues. Nevertheless, there still remains a question of why the Six-Party process has not been functioning in recent years. In this respect, it is important to understand that despite its resemblance of a concert of powers system, the Six-Party Talks has some limitations. More or less, a concert of powers is a permanent framework for managing a broad range of international affairs rather than an *ad hoc* vehicle for solving a particular problem. The Concert of Europe sought to manage European politics in general. However, the Six-Party Talks was not born for the purpose of establishing

a permanent security architecture in the region, but instead established to deal with the nuclear proliferation issue. Thus, the Six-Party Talks has a limitation in providing a long-term general framework for governing East Asia’s security issues. Also, creating the common regional identity and political value in East Asia are still secondary to the balance-of-power political practice in the region. Nonetheless, it has somehow demonstrated the basic foundation for the creation of the multilateral security dialogue in East Asia. Although its process has been slow and marginal, its progress can be developed into a regional security organisation. As East Asian states have achieved remarkable economic growth and have played an increasingly important role as a trading partner in today’s world economy, many economic discussions, e.g., APEC, APT, and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM),¹⁴ have begun to extend their scope to security issues.

The Six-Party Talks has a limitation in providing a long-term general framework for governing East Asia’s security issues.

Consequently, its security implication and the meaning in the region of the Six-

Party Talks cannot be ignored, because all the member states are directly involved in the regional stability in East Asia. The Six-Party Talks can play the role of a permanent channel for communication, while the member states maintain their existing bilateral relations with neighbouring states. The duality of the communication channels is essential given the complexity of each member state's political and diplomatic interests. The permanent establishment of the Six-Party Talks could promote both bilateral and multilateral relations which could enhance reciprocal communication among the member states. This can eventually stabilise regional security as a whole. In this sense, it seems to be better to have a leading group such as China, Japan, and South Korea to take the initiative in providing the new regional system with a sense of direction and objective.

Soft Power Competition in East Asia: A Korean Perspective

The economic crisis in 1997 made East Asian countries realise that they should protect themselves.¹⁵ Starting in the post-Cold War period, a series of multilateral institutions came into existence in East Asia: APEC was founded in 1989, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held in 1993, and the first ASEM was held

in 1996. Most of them were designed to discuss economic cooperation which is less sensitive than politics or security. However, these institutions have often faced criticism due to their failure to meet earlier expectations. Some countries had not achieved full democratisation, and, moreover, some newly industrialised countries were not free from their government's protective policies and hence they could not take initiatives in regional cooperation without considering their national policies. Therefore, East Asian countries could not easily come to a conclusion on a common cause at the expense of their national interests. As Hemmer and Katzenstein mentioned, it was very difficult to expect a smooth operation of international organisations in this region.¹⁶ However, East Asian countries have been showing a slow but gradual progress in the development of a regional cooperation organisation since the new millennium. Also, leading countries in the region, such as China, Japan, and South Korea, are taking the initiative in providing a new regional system with a different direction and objective.

As mentioned earlier, the incentives for cooperation among the East Asian states have been growing since the new millennium. Rapid increases in trade along with investment ties within the region are making East Asia similar to the European Union not only in the

size of its economy but also in the level of integration. Thus, the conditions for projecting power have been dramatically changing as major East Asian powers start playing a soft power game. By the beginning of the new millennium, a new China had emerged on Asia's strategic horizon, shifting gears in foreign policy. China toned down its previous strategy of using military strength to intimidate its Asian neighbours through aggressive moves and calling on others to abandon their alliances, mostly with the United States. Instead, the Chinese leadership has focused on a proactive diplomacy in shaping a regional environment conducive to domestic economic development. China has tried to maintain peace and stability on its borders and has portrayed itself to others as a benign and constructive actor.¹⁷ China has also embraced regional multilateral institutions and pursued free trade agreements (FTA) with neighbours, and it aims to improve its image and influence through these new strategies.¹⁸ These new concepts and strategies were all devised to increase China's soft power.

By the early millennium, the term "peaceful rise", developed by Zheng Bijian, an important advisor to the Chinese leadership, provided the most important guiding principle of China's foreign policy. By claiming that China will not rise at the expense of others, it purports to allow the Chinese economy

to continue growing, undermining the perception of China as a threat. Additionally, China portrays itself as a benign, peaceful, and constructive actor in the world. A peaceful rise is a carefully constructed concept that would allow China to become a global power.¹⁹ Thus, China's soft power strategies aim at a larger national goal: leadership in Asia. While the response to China's soft power extends beyond Asia, for example it includes nations from Venezuela to Nigeria, its soft power strategies have focused on Asia, shifting influence away from the United States and Japan, and creating China's own sphere of influence in the region.²⁰

Given the rise of regionalism among the East Asian states, China believed that its future would depend on the stability and prosperity of the region, and decided to take the lead in constructing regional cooperative frameworks. Since the new millennium, China has developed subtle strategies to achieve this goal. One is establishing a leadership position in East Asia through proactive involvement in the APT. The other focuses on Central Asia through an initiative to develop the SCO. Accordingly, China has begun to enunciate a doctrine of "win-win" relations, emphasising that participants would benefit from their relationships with China. It also proclaimed a doctrine of non-interference, saying that it would listen to the needs and desires of other

nations without asking for anything in return.²¹ Both were in line with the broader strategy of a peaceful rise.

By claiming that China will not rise at the expense of others, it purports to allow the Chinese economy to continue growing, undermining the perception of China as a threat.

On the economic perspective, China has pursued a soft power strategy in using FTAs as a strategic engagement tool. Sensitive to the fear of China's economic rise, the Chinese leadership reassured ASEAN countries by signing an FTA and making substantial trade concessions. To the surprise of many ASEAN partners, China offered a trade deal including an "early harvest package" that, even before the FTA came into effect, would reduce China's tariffs on some Southeast Asian goods. Apparently, this was a conscious strategy for earning goodwill from its ASEAN neighbours.²² It was also a strategy of engagement that uses economic means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behaviour.²³ Backing up its trade and investment promises, China has also developed a substantial foreign aid programme. It now competes with the United States and Japan in the Southeast Asia and Central Asia regions. Again, the

way in which Beijing assists others is quite noticeable. Assistance is not explicitly targeted for economic development, but also for the cultural and language promotion, and aims to improve friendly cooperation between China and the other developing countries.²⁴

In addition to the economic perspective, China's cultural promotion is part of a broader effort at public diplomacy. China has made an effort to increase cultural exchanges with its neighbours, expand the international reach of its media, increase networks of informal summits such as a Davos-style world economic forum, and promote Chinese culture and language studies abroad. In particular, the establishment of Confucius Institutes (*Kongzi xueyuan*),²⁵ a "Chinese cultural-cum-language centre" responsible for creating enthusiasm about learning Chinese, is a case in point. In fact, Chinese language and cultural studies have soared in popularity around the world. South Korea is a good example. As China has become South Korea's largest trading partner, there has been a boom in interest in China. Since the establishment of the first Confucius Institute in Seoul in November 2004, 322 institutes had been set up worldwide as of October 2010. The number of Korean students studying in Chinese universities has also increased rapidly. The number of Koreans travelling to China have

skyrocketed and overtaken the number of Japanese visitors.

In short, China's subtle but persistent pursuit of a good neighbour policy, proactive economic engagement, and systematic promotion and dissemination of its own cultural values have all increased its soft power. By skilfully combining this with its rapidly increasing economic and military capabilities, China has successfully increased its influence in East Asia as well as in Southeast and Central Asia. China's central position in both the APT and the SCO proves its successful

efforts. The response to China's soft power now extends to South Korea and to the rest of the world. Indeed, China's soft power diplomacy has been impressive.

As Shambaugh says, "bilaterally and multilaterally, China's diplomacy has been remarkably adept and nuanced, earning praise around the region." As a result, many nations in the region now see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power.²⁶ Kurlantzick calls the Chinese approach a "charm offensive".²⁷ However, China has yet to prepare an elaborate ideational or institutional framework under which Asians can get together. Also, a recent critical observation describes China's

limitation: "China's charming image might recede as the honeymoon period ends; the world will focus more intensely and critically on what China says as it becomes powerful".²⁸

The increase in China's soft power has had the greatest impact on Japan. Japan is also a country that has great soft power resources in the region. Japan was the first non-Western country to achieve modernisation and industrialisation in Asia. Thus, its economic and development model have been welcomed as an alternative model to the Western course

Japan's economic and development model have been welcomed as an alternative model to the Western course of development by many Asian states.

of development by many Asian states. There is no doubt that an East Asian brand of modernisation and capitalism was created by Japan, and was then followed by

South Korea and other Asian countries. Japan has also used its soft power and organised its strategic importance. In attempting to implement soft power strategies, Japan made the most of its cultural traditions and assets. Japanese arts, music, design, fashion, and food have long served as global cultural magnets. In particular, Japanese popular culture, such as J-pop, manga, and animation, have become extremely popular among Asian youth. One Japanese scholar argued that Japan has been playing a key role in creating an East Asian middle-class

culture in Asia.²⁹ However, when there was a massive opportunity for Japan to take advantage of its overseas investment and aid, Japan walked away from Asia due to its self-defeating politics and economic management.³⁰ Japan's long recession since the 1990s has led Japan to focus on its own problems and its own economy. Also, Japan's political scandals and a society-wide decline in morality made its foreign policy passive; it became a secondary concern. Where foreign policy was concerned, strengthening its hard alliance with the United States was the primary goal.³¹

It was precisely in this context that China aggressively made inroads into Southeast Asia. When China signed the 2001 Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation with ASEAN and the China-ASEAN FTA, the Japanese government was astonished. In 2006, the Japanese government proposed a broader East Asian Community (EAC). Within this framework, Japan proposed to hold an East Asian Summit (EAS) to pursue a community-based identity, as in the case of postwar Europe, that emphasises peace and democracy as its ideals. Japan suggested that East Asia should shape an identity that was directed towards freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy, so-called Western and universal values. By doing so, Japan tried to create the EAC by including the existing APT membership

plus Australia, New Zealand, and India. Japan thought that these countries could easily be identified as regional members since they share those universal values.³² However, in attracting the East Asian people to take part in the EAC, Japan defined its role in the EAC as a leader. Just as China has attempted to establish its sphere of influence beyond the scope of East Asia, Japan seems to have similar aims.

Japan's EAC proposal of open regionalism seems realistic and persuasive, given the presence of the United States as well as Australia and India as important stakeholders in the region.³³ Also, Japan's functionalist approach seems realistic, given the diverse, unequal, and often conflictual nature of the East Asian region, which renders the creation of an institutional whole, such as the European Union, almost impossible. In addition, an EAC based on the concept of a community was attractive because of the community's importance in the Asian tradition. In particular, the idea of the Chinese/Confucian civilisation, which idealises a *Gemeinschaft*-like world of obligation and harmony, was welcomed by many East Asians. The contents of the Japanese message seemed persuasive based on a realistic judgment of regional conditions as well as the use of knowledge, potentially attractive to the people in the region.

Given the resurgence of nationalism in both societies, which leads to their striving for leadership in Asia, any attempt to assume the leading role in the creation of a regional community is hardly trustworthy.

Japan's dilemma, however, was that the attraction of the message was likely to decrease when the source of the message was from Japan. For Asians, Japan's promotion of the community concept reminds them of Japanese's earlier attempt at establishing the "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" during the time of Japanese imperialism, an idea that was also embedded in traditional Asian values at the time.³⁴ Thus, given its imperialistic heritage, Japan is not a credible source for such message. In order to avoid Asians' doubt or fear, Japan has attempted to claim that a community's identity should be based on universal values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and the market economy.³⁵ The Japanese government labelled this as value diplomacy and promoted it as a key pillar of its diplomacy for the beginning of the new millennium.³⁶ However, when viewed in the Asian context, this message was not so appealing. The message sounds too American and, especially to

China, it suggests that Japan is too close to an American ally.³⁷

By far, the greatest challenge both China and Japan have had to face and will face is the question of nationalism. The credibility of a source is undermined when the source promotes an international position that clearly furthers its interests. Given the resurgence of nationalism in both societies, which leads to their striving for leadership in Asia, any attempt to assume the leading role in the creation of a regional community is hardly trustworthy. China's setback in the EAS proves this. Despite repeated commitments to multilateralism, when China's aspiration for a leadership role in an exclusive regional setting became apparent, Asians turned away. They warned that China seems to be using this multilateral institution as a cover, aiming to deter Japanese and American influence in East Asia.³⁸ Likewise, when Japan's drive for regionalism was seen as a clear balancing act against China's rise, its attractiveness declined. In addition, inherent in both Chinese and Japanese domestic politics is the problem that frequently their messages are for their domestic popularity, legitimacy, and even regime survival, which undermines their soft power in creating multilateralism in East Asia.

The best example is the historical dispute. Just as Japan has never fully

repudiated its past aggression, China also has not fully come to terms with its own imperial past. Both countries have been engaged in historical disputes with their neighbours.³⁹ For example, South Korea's recent dispute with China over the history of the Koguryo Kingdom has generated a sharp decline of China's popularity among Koreans.⁴⁰ The territorial disputes over the Tokdo islands, increased by the Japanese prime minister's official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, created massive popular resentment, putting Japan's popularity at its lowest in postwar history. These historical disputes and suspicions that remain in Korea and other post-colonial states in Asia limit Chinese and Japanese soft power to create multilateralism in the region.⁴¹

In the midst of these soft power contests between China and Japan, what are South Korea's options? What can South Korea learn from their practices? Situated at the crossroads of great powers, South Korea absolutely faces an apparent deficit in hard power. Therefore, a wise strategy for South Korea would be to fill this void by fortifying its soft power.⁴² This differs from a great power's strategy in which soft power complements military and economic might. South Korea should make greater investments in soft power than the great powers. Since South Korean foreign policy is struggling to solve the peninsula question, almost all of

its diplomatic tools and foreign assistance have been directed toward North Korea and the four great powers (the US, Russia, China, Japan).⁴³ Diplomacy and foreign assistance efforts outside the peninsula are largely understaffed, underfunded, and underused. They are neglected in part because of the difficulty of demonstrating their short-term effect on progress toward a peaceful peninsula. South Korean foreign policy has tended to view soft power as a cultural phenomenon. In this perspective, South Korea's soft power strategy lies in the field of cultural diplomacy. Recently, the South Korean government has been promoting Korean popular culture, the so-called "Korean wave", in the region in the name of public diplomacy. Korea is using the appeal of its popular culture to play a role in inspiring other Asian neighbours and to develop common Asian values. Thus, cultivating political ideas and values as well as performing skilful diplomacy are, perhaps, the crucial mission for the South Korean government at this point. In order to achieve this, decision makers in the South Korean government should understand what soft power means and what it can achieve on its own.

Despite its status as a latecomer in the region, South Korea has potential. Both China and Japan have recently created problems that undercut their own soft power. China has demonstrated an

increasingly offensive posture in the case of several territorial disputes (such as on the Senkaku islands and South China Sea) that contradicts its previously cautious charm offensive. China's suppression of human rights also undercuts its soft power. In a different way, indecisive and frequent changes in the Japanese leadership in its recent efforts to create an "Asian Shift" as well as its pursuit of an equal relationship with the United States are caught up with its internal political debate. It is not only hindering Japan's further progress in the region, but also weakening the Japanese voice in the international arena.

South Korea can take advantage of these two countries' mistakes to develop a strategy based on four principles. First, South Korea's soft power strategy must be appropriate to its position as a middle power in the global system. Judged from a hard power perspective, South Korea will not be able to determine the regional order. However, the biggest challenge is to decide between China and Japan/the United States. By improving its soft power, South Korea can play a constructive role as an arbiter or broker who helps to avoid a zero-sum game, or possibly a collision course, among the great powers in the region.

Secondly, South Korea's success in the arbiter's role will turn on its ability to win credibility from others. Both China and

Japan fall short in their credibility and ability to inspire hope and optimism. The core of the problem is that they are self-centred and nationalistic. In this sense, the key to gaining credibility is overcoming self-centred nationalism and establishing consistency in words and action.

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Thirdly, overcoming a myopic, inward-looking, short-term mindset is extremely important. Efforts that are only spent on the Korean peninsula (e.g., regarding North Korea or the Six-Party Talks) will not necessarily bring comparable improvement in South Korea's security and peace. South Korea's bargaining power with neighbouring states can be increased by efforts outside the peninsula. To be sure, this may not produce the desired outcomes immediately, and such efforts often work indirectly and may take years to bear fruit. Given South Korea's limited budget and the need for trade-offs among policies, it is difficult to invest for the good of the

region and the world. However, it would be wise to consider seriously such an option. The South Korean foreign policy should broaden its perspective to include regional and global dimensions.

Different domestic security values among East Asian countries on these subjects are known as the most significant barriers to the emergence of a sense of collective identity.

Lastly, South Korea should learn lessons from the Japanese and Chinese cases. The soft power strategies of both China and Japan have been very much government driven. As a result, governments have always taken the initiative in creating and disseminating soft power. However, many critical soft power resources are private. The key to success is to think of a soft power increase in terms of a connection of activities, linked through flows of potential resources into networks. Here, the role of the government is in providing an infrastructure and environment that allows creative experimentation by private individuals and groups, and establishing networks that constitute relational structures and processes in which creative actors interact.

South Korea was once the weakest nation in the East Asian region. However, today South Korea is categorised as a “middle power” that can assume initiative in international matters that are too sensitive or impossible for stronger states to engage in.⁴⁴ Moreover, compared to any of its neighbours, South Korea has achieved a dynamic and participatory democracy. Due to such democracy, South Korea has experienced amazingly rapid development as well as the development of a highly professional civil society. In addition, South Korea is at a contact point of continental powers (China) and maritime powers (Japan), and thus, South Korea is relatively better situated to develop a collective identity of East Asia. South Korea’s networking power will gain a competitive edge in the East Asian region.⁴⁵

Different domestic security values among East Asian countries on these subjects are known as the most significant barriers to the emergence of a sense of collective identity.⁴⁶ The systemic process should move forward the interdependence and convergence of each state’s domestic values. As the specific conduct of such systemic processes, we may consider a creation of multilateral security dialogue, region-wide collective military exercises, and civilian discussion channels on various issues.

Conclusion

This article explored the security conditions in East Asia in the new millennium, particularly focusing on the South Korean perspective. As a result, it discussed the security conditions surrounding the Korean peninsula both internally and regionally. Moreover, the research examined regional competition in East Asia from a soft power perspective.

Despite East Asian states' rivalry in political and military sectors, the degree of their interdependence is likely to be strengthened in East Asia. The major bilateral relations in the Asia-Pacific are mostly prosperous, although historical bitterness still remains in Japanese-Chinese and the Japanese-Korean relations, regardless of the increasing degree of economic interactions and cultural contacts. As mentioned throughout the paper, while maintaining the existing bilateral relations, multilateral relations should be developed. The establishment of security institutions with dense networking would lessen the tense rivalry among the key states.⁴⁷ Thus, the article has suggested the possibility of the current Six-Party Talks playing a crucial role in creating a multilateral institution in East Asia. It has been argued that this seems quite sustainable because the parties that are concerned are the US, China, Japan, Russia, plus the two Koreas. They are

directly involved in regional stability in East Asia, and therefore they should all be engaged in a regular contact point. More specifically, the Six-Party Talks can play a key role as a permanent channel of communication, whilst the member states maintain their existing bilateral relations with neighbouring states. The article emphasised that the duality of communication channels is essential given the complexity of each member state's political and diplomatic interests. Any possible deadlock in one channel can be dealt with by the other one. The permanent establishment of the Six-Party Talks would promote bilateral relations and vice versa. In this way, the reciprocal communication would stabilise regional security as a whole.

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Regarding the security concerns of South Korea, it is apparent that the United States, China, and Japan will hold on to its policies of maintaining the status quo of the North-South Korean division. If the North Korean nuclear problem is not resolved smoothly, this perspective will probably increase. In

this vein, to remain as a meaningful player in East Asia is not an easy task for Korea. The Korean peninsula is a place of strategic importance, where territorial and marine forces collide, and Western and non-Western civilisations border. Consequently, there should be a continuous emphasis on the phrase “without peace and prosperity on the peninsula, East Asian regional security cannot be guaranteed”.

Since the new millennium, East Asian international relations have developed a complex security structure that depends

on the following competing elements: the role of the United States as a balancer, the possibility of a hegemonic war between China and the United States, the US-Japanese alliance, and the discovery of resolutions to the division of the Korean peninsula as well as the Taiwan Strait issue. The course of history has a definite meaning. Considering the change in the balance of power among the surrounding states, South Korea should follow and understand the dynamic changes in the region in order to secure its own national interests.

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Turkey's East Asian Policy: From Security Concerns to Trade Partnerships*

Selçuk ÇOLAKOĞLU**

Abstract

Turkey's Asian policy entered a new period after the Second World War as Ankara began to establish relations with East Asian countries,¹ based upon its own foreign policy vision and economic capacity. Either security concerns or economic interests, or sometimes both, have been the main determinants in Ankara's policy for East Asia from 1945 to the present. This article examines Turkish-East Asian relations in four main periods, highlighting the basic characteristics of relations.

Key Words

Foreign Policy Analysis, Turkey, China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan.

Introduction

The most important factors that determined Turkey's Asian policy in the first period covering the years 1950-1970 were security concerns and the Cold War balance of power. Though the Cold

War continued in the second period of 1971-1990, the normalisation of Sino-American relations led to changes in the balance of power in East Asia. Turkey began to shift its East Asian policy orientation from security to economics. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union led Ankara to develop a broader vision of Asia during the 1990s. In the period between 2002-2012, long-planned partnerships with East Asian countries began to be established due to the increase in Turkey's political and economic capacity.

The Cold War Structure in Asia and Turkey's Anti-Communist Solidarity with Japan, South Korea and Nationalist China (1950-1970)

In the first period of the Cold War, Turkey's East Asia policy was shaped by its security policies and by the East-West

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balance. During this period, which lasted until the period of *détente* in the early 1970s, Turkey was in a kind of political solidarity with the pro-Western countries in East Asia, namely Japan, South Korea and Nationalist China, against the communist threat. Within this period, there were two important points that show how Turkey's Asian policy was a security-oriented one. Firstly, Turkey supported the pro-Western South Korea against communist North Korea both militarily and politically by sending troops to the Korean War, which took place between 1950-53. Furthermore, Turkey, like other Western countries, continued to recognise the Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan instead of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate representative of China, despite the Chinese Communist Party dominating the entire mainland in 1949.

Turkey could not establish economically meaningful relations with the region despite its intense political interest in East Asia. Only Japan was seen as an economic model and as a source of financing for large infrastructure projects in Turkey. During this period, Turkey could not even establish diplomatic relations with the communist countries of East Asia, namely the PRC and North Korea. Ankara virtually ignored these two countries until the 1970s. However, Turkey began to give a signal of change its

policy towards the PRC in parallel with the overall softening in the world during the 1960s and to seek a relationship model with the PRC. The key point of Ankara's stance was the acceptance of the PRC as a UN member without the dismissal of the ROC (Taiwan).

The Korean peninsula, which was freed from Japanese occupation after the Second World War, was divided into two zones of occupation by the Soviet Union and the United States (US). Immediately after the war with the outbreak of the Cold War, the pro-Soviet Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north and the pro-US Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south were established in 1948. Turkey entered East Asian politics by sending troops under UN command to the Korean War, which broke out in 1950.

In these years, during which the impact of the Cold War was felt very strongly, Turkey had as security agreements only alliance agreements signed with the United Kingdom (UK) and France in 1939. Though Turkey became a member of the UN, it was not possible for the UN to eliminate the Soviet threat to Turkey because of the structure of the organisation. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes argued that the absence of a positive response to Turkey's application for NATO membership as of August 1950 led to a further increase in the threats towards Turkey.²

It was argued that the decision to send troops to the Korean War would be a concrete indication of Turkey's solidarity with the Western bloc. Thus Turkey sent the Turkish Brigade, a force of 4,500, to Korea in 1950. During the Korean War, about 1,000 Turkish soldiers were killed and another 2,000 were wounded. Sending Turkish soldiers to the Korean War had a facilitating impact on NATO membership, given the fact that the UK was not sympathetic to the Turkey's NATO membership in this period.³ In this respect, it was a natural result of this process that Turkey and Greece, both of which had sent troops to the Korean War, were admitted into NATO in 1952.

After joining the Korean War, Turkey's visibility increased in the international arena. Turkey, with support from the Western states, obtained a temporary seat in the UN Security Council, elected from the Middle East region in the vote in the UN General Assembly in October 1950.⁴ Turkey participated in the Geneva Conference held on 26 April 1954 and supported South Korea's argument that free elections should be used to unify the Korean peninsula.⁵ However, Turkey, which did not hesitate to participate in the Korean War in 1950, preferred to remain outside the Vietnam War that began to escalate in 1967. During his visit to the US, President Cevdet Sunay stated that Turkey was in favour of peacefully solving the problem in Vietnam.⁶

A relationship based on very solid foundations between Turkey and South Korea became possible thanks to the Korean War. The Ankara School and Orphanage, created within the Turkish Brigade in Korea for Korean orphans, operated until the 1960s, and led to close relations between Turkish and Korean societies.⁷ The Turkish Brigade in Korea existed until 1960, but in June 1960 it was reduced to a squadron level.⁸ Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel announced that the Turkish squadron in Korea with its 180 soldiers would withdraw in May 1966 and a squad of Turkish soldiers would remain on the peninsula.⁹ The 15 people in the last troop withdrew from South Korea in January 1971.¹⁰

Turkey was one of those countries preferring to recognise the ROC over the PRC, aiming to develop a positive policy of developing economic and cultural relations with Taiwan.

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes' East Asian tour in April 1958 was important because at the time it was the highest-level visit from Turkey to the region. During this visit, Turkey and South Korea stressed their solidarity against communism.¹¹ In contrast to the visit of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to Japan, economic issues were not on the

agenda in the South Korean visit, which showed the absence of the capacity for bilateral economic cooperation. Despite all the rhetoric of solidarity in bilateral relations, the only visit from South Korea to Turkey during this period was the visit of Defence Minister Yul Kim Cung in January 1959.¹²

The military coups first in Turkey in May 1960 and then in South Korea in May 1961 established a remarkable partnership between the two countries and provided mutual sympathy between the military regimes in both countries. The first government that recognised the government of General Park Chung-hee in South Korea was the Turkish Military Council under the leadership of the retired General Cemal Gürsel.¹³

Until 1971, the ROC in Taiwan was recognised by all Western countries and occupied a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Turkey was one of those countries preferring to recognise the ROC over the PRC, aiming to develop a positive policy of developing economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. Thus, in the period between 1949 and 1971, the “One China” for Turkey was the ROC in Taiwan.¹⁴ Turkey as a NATO member, and as Taiwan was an ally of the US, had strong solidarity against the communist world.

In 1956, there was a significant bilat-

eral exchange of visits and an expansion of relations with the aim of strengthening ties between Turkey and the ROC. In November 1956, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu visited Taiwan to strengthen political and economic relations, and to cooperate against communist expansion.¹⁵ In February 1957, Taiwanese Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative to the UN Yeh visited Ankara and signed an agreement to promote cultural exchanges between the two countries.¹⁶

Unlike other regional countries, relations with Japan shifted from a security-oriented relationship to an economic-oriented one.

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes also paid a historical visit to the ROC as a part of his East Asian tour in April 1958, and he made several contacts for economic and cultural collaboration and military cooperation against communism.¹⁷ Within the framework of flourishing relations between Turkey and the ROC in 1959, a Turkish parliamentary delegation chaired by Refik Koraltan visited Taiwan and expressed Turkey’s support for “Nationalist China” against “Communist China”.¹⁸ However, during this period, economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries remained relatively weak.

During the 1960s, it was observed that Turkey sought to build relations with the formally unrecognised PRC. Indeed, a trade delegation from the PRC visited Istanbul in November 1966.¹⁹ The Turkish Ministry of Commerce signed a trade agreement both with Communist and Nationalist China at the same time in December 1969.²⁰ Despite increasing contacts between Ankara and Beijing, Turkey, together with the US, voted against the draft resolution of the UN General Assembly in November 1970 that proposed transferring UN membership to the PRC and the dismissal of Nationalist China. Haluk Bayülken, the permanent representative of Turkey to the UN, stated that Turkey in fact supported the UN membership of the PRC but refused to vote for the resolution since it proposed the dismissal of Nationalist China from the UN.²¹ One of the problems between Turkey and the PRC in the period after 1949 was in Xinjiang. There were groups of Kazakhs and Uyghurs who had escaped from Communist China to Turkey through Afghanistan during the period of 1949-71 and they affected potential relations.²² With the start of the normalisation in Sino-American relations, Turkey and PRC began talks to establish diplomatic relations in May 1971, and assigned their ambassadors in Paris to work on this process.²³

During this period, Turkey had better relations with Japan among the East Asian countries. The Japanese development miracle attracted much interest in Turkey and Japan was seen as a model of development, being the first modernising non-Western country in Asia.²⁴ Thus, unlike other regional countries, relations with Japan shifted from a security-oriented relationship to an economic-oriented one. Japan's first visit to Turkey was carried out by Minister of Development Matsuda Seishin in October 1950.²⁵ The first agreement between Turkey and Japan was a trade agreement, signed in March 1954.²⁶

The visit of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in April 1958 was Turkey's highest-level visit ever to Japan at that time. Prime Minister Menderes met with Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, and they emphasised the mutual friendship and cooperation between the two countries.²⁷ Minister of Foreign Affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, together with Undersecretary of State Planning Turgut Özal, visited Japan in March 1970 and discussed bilateral economic cooperation as a priority. While the Japanese firms gave the highest credit for the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul,²⁸ they were also interested in the construction and acquisition of iron and steel, petro-chemical and shipyard facilities in Turkey.²⁹

Sino-American Rapprochement and the Normalisation of Asian Affairs (1971-1990)

In the second period of the Cold War that started in the 1970s, Ankara began to normalise its East Asia policy politically and developed an economic-centred perspective. The normalisation of Sino-American relations and the transfer to the PRC of UN membership from Taiwan in 1971 contributed quite considerably to this shift. The US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 also contributed to softening East-West tension in Asia.

The period of *détente* that started in the 1970s between the Eastern and Western blocs also reduced the strength of the bipolar structure in international politics. China started to be presented during this period as a third way. In addition, Turkey's relations with the US and European Economic Community (EEC) countries began to deteriorate because of the Cyprus issue and this led Ankara to look for a more independent policy. Following the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, the US Congress implemented an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975, and Ankara sought to develop its relations with its Arab neighbours, the socialist countries, and the non-aligned countries.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Turkey began to see East Asia as an opportunity for economic expansion. Economic cooperation with Japan developed rapidly in the 1970s and economic-based contacts increased with the four Asian Tigers, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, in the 1980s. Ankara began closely to monitor the economic reforms in China, which started in 1978, and investigated ways to improve relations with China as a potential trading partner. However, because of the unstable governments and economic crises during the 1970s, Turkey could not develop close relations with East Asian countries. In the 1980s, the military regime, led by Kenan Evren, started an expansion strategy towards the countries in East Asia and this strategy continued with the civilian government under Turgut Özal.

At that time, Japan was the country that came to the fore on economic cooperation in East Asia. In the 1970s, Japanese companies constructed the Golden Horn Bridge in Istanbul and sold many freighters and tankers to Turkey.³⁰ Rapidly improving economic relations with Japan started to slow down due to the economic downturn in Turkey, which was experienced in the second half of the 1970s.³¹ Turkey, with its economic downturn, considered Japan to be among the big economies that could provide foreign financial resources to Turkey.³²

After the military coup of 12 September 1980, Japan became also one of the most important countries in terms of both financial support and foreign investment.³³ Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe visited Turkey in August 1983, in the last months of the temporary military government. He did not make commitments on economic aid and export credits while supporting Ankara against the Armenian ASALA terrorism group which had targeted Turkish diplomatic missions.³⁴ Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who had visited Japan when he was vice prime minister, gave more importance to trade cooperation with Japan. It was a Japanese company that won the tender for the second Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul. In this respect, Prime Minister Özal's visit to Japan in May 1985 was very important in order to attract Japanese capital.³⁵

Prince Mikasa Takahito's visit to Turkey in May 1986 showed the density of high-level relations between the two countries.³⁶ In the 1980s, due to the problems in Turkish-European Community (EC) relations, Japan presented an economic alternative to Turkey within the Western bloc.³⁷ Turkey began to see Japan as an attractive centre for finance, direct investment and technology transfer. Even establishing a direct shipping line from Japan to Turkey through the Soviet Union, by using the trans-Siberian railway line,

was seriously considered in this period.³⁸ Prime Minister Özal went to Japan again in February 1989 to attend the funeral of Emperor Hirohito, and during the visit he also held talks on the development of trade cooperation.³⁹ In line with the improved relations during this period, in 1990 Turkey became among the top ten countries to receive Japanese aid.⁴⁰

At a time when other foreign airline companies flying to Iran gave priority to their own citizens and refused to carry Japanese citizens, Ankara assigned Turkish Airlines aircraft for the evacuation of the 215 Japanese citizens.

During the Özal period, it might be said that relations between Turkey and Japan were at their highest level. Turgut Özal visited Japan four times in ten years, first in 1981 as vice prime minister, in 1985 and 1989 as prime minister, and in 1990 as president. Turgut Özal won the admiration of Japan due to his help in evacuating Japanese nationals stranded in Tehran. In 1985, when the Iraqi government started to reject any restrictions on bombing the territory of Iran, many states began to evacuate their citizens from Tehran. At a time when other foreign airline companies flying to Iran gave priority to their own citizens

and refused to carry Japanese citizens, Ankara assigned Turkish Airlines aircraft for the evacuation of the 215 Japanese citizens, an act which was met by Tokyo with a deep gratitude.⁴¹

The first visit from Japan to Turkey at the prime ministerial level was made in 1990. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu visited Turkey in October 1990 during the crisis that began with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. During this period, Japan was among one of the countries that provided financial support to Turkey, which was affected by the embargo on Iraq. However, Ankara considered Japan's aid inadequate compared to the aid of other donor countries.⁴²

In the 1970s, Turkish-South Korean relations remained at a low level. The withdrawal of the last Turkish squad in South Korea under UN command in 1971 might also be interpreted as a decline in terms of bilateral relations. Though the US based its withdrawal on economic grounds, Turkey stated that the decision to withdraw the Turkish troops was politically motivated. Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil reported that the normalisation of relations between Turkey and the PRC and the insistence of the Soviet Union were the reasons for the military withdrawal. Ankara took this step also as a response to the South Korean delegation's meeting only with the Greek

authorities during its visit to Cyprus and not also with Fazıl Küçük, the leader of the Turkish community, despite Turkey's insistence on the meeting.⁴³ Seoul's request that 15 people from the Turkish squad be left in South Korea as a symbol of Turkish support did not change the Turkish decision.⁴⁴ The first visit from South Korea to Turkey at the prime ministerial level was held in May 1977 by Prime Minister Choi Kyu Hah, but until the 1980s, there was no change in the course of bilateral relations.⁴⁵

The deterioration in relations with the US and Western European countries after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 led Turkey to improve relations with the Eastern bloc and third world countries.

President Kenan Evren paid a visit to South Korea as it was one of the countries targeted in the Turkish expansion strategy to Asia in December 1982.⁴⁶ Immediately after his visit in May 1983, Industry and Trade Minister Mehmet Turgut also paid a visit to South Korea.⁴⁷ After the visit of the South Korean speaker of the parliament, Chre Mun Shich, to Turkey in February 1984,⁴⁸ Necmettin Karaduman, speaker of the Turkish parliament, paid a visit to South Korea in September 1984. In the meeting with

President Chun Doo Hwan, Karaduman supported the South Korean policy on the unification of Koreas and cooperation against international terrorism (meaning ASALA terrorism) was discussed.⁴⁹

In October 1986, Prime Minister Turgut Özal conducted an Asian tour covering Bahrain, Bangladesh, South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Oman. Among the countries visited, the country with the highest economic potential was South Korea. During his visit to Seoul, Prime Minister Özal signed an agreement concerning the reciprocal promotion of investments. During the talks, South Korea indicated that their position on a quick end to the Iran-Iraq War was similar to Turkey's, and stated their solidarity on finding a solution to the Turkish minority's problems in Bulgaria.⁵⁰ Prime Minister of South Korea Kang Young Hoon paid a visit to Turkey in July 1990.⁵¹ The South Korean government was also one of the countries that provided economic aid to Turkey during the 1990 Gulf Crisis.⁵²

Also after the Korean War, Turkey, together with the US, has always continued to support South Korea's official stance. Thus, neither diplomatic relations nor any official contact between Ankara and Pyongyang became possible until the 1970s. Throughout the 1970s, North Korea made various unsuccessful attempts through the PRC and Eastern European countries to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey.

However, the deterioration in relations with the US and Western European countries after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 led Turkey to improve relations with the Eastern bloc and third world countries. In such an environment, a foreign trade protocol was signed between Turkey and North Korea in August 1977. This protocol remained in effect for about six years and was dissolved by Turkey in October 1983 because of the attempt by North Korean agents to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan during his visit to Rangoon, the capital of Burma.⁵³ Ankara also harshly condemned the crash of a Korean Airlines passenger plane during its Abu Dhabi-Bangkok flight by North Korean agents in November 1987. Although Deputy Prime Minister of North Korea Gi Ju Chong clearly indicated in a statement in July 1987⁵⁴ that North Korea would like to establish good relations with Turkey at all levels, it did not become possible to establish a healthy relationship between Ankara and Pyongyang during the 1980s.

Relations between Turkey and PRC were established in 1971. From this period on, international security concerns and the economy have been among the factors that shaped Turkish-Chinese relations. During the period between 1971-1990, a rhetoric of solidarity against the danger of Soviet expansionism also became effective in

relations between the PRC and Turkey as with NATO. However, relations between the two countries did not improve to the desired level in the 1970s.

The military regime was marginalised by the EEC after the military coup of 12 September 1980 and the new government sought new political equilibriums. In this respect, the PRC, as one of the UN Security Council's permanent members and as a country newly opened to the capitalist world economy, was regarded by Ankara as an area for political expansion. The first top-level visit from Turkey to China was

held in May 1981 by Trade Minister Kemal Cantürk. The visit of Foreign Minister Ilter Türkmen to China in

December 1981 was of great importance in terms of bilateral relations. During this visit, it was understood that Beijing saw the military coup of 12 September positively on the grounds that it provided political stability against the spread of Soviet expansion. China supported solving the Aegean and Cyprus issues through diplomatic channels between the parties. This visit also paved the way to conclude an economic and technical cooperation agreement, which prepared the background for trade cooperation between Turkey and China.⁵⁵

Turkey recognised the PRC as the sole legal representative of China on 5 August 1971, and pursued a “One China” policy.

President Kenan Evren initiated a kind of Asian expansion in the early 1980s. In December 1982, he visited China, South Korea, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan.⁵⁶ Although each of these visits was very important, the visit to China became a milestone in bilateral relations as this was the highest-level visit to this country from Turkey.⁵⁷ Following Evren's visit, Minister of Culture Zhu Muzhi visited Turkey in April 1983,⁵⁸ and Foreign Minister Wu Chuochiang visited Turkey in October 1983.⁵⁹

Chinese President Li Xiannian paid a return visit to Turkey in March 1984, 15 months after President Evren's visit.⁶⁰ During President Li's visit, he praised Turkey's

balanced stance in the Iran-Iraq War and emphasised that the Cyprus issue should be solved through inter-communal dialogue between the Greeks and Turkish Cypriots. During the visit, Turkey and China agreed to pursue a common international attitude. President Li's visit was followed by Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoğlu's visit to China in October 1984.⁶¹

Prime Minister Turgut Özal visited the PRC in July 1985.⁶² In the 1980s, the Chinese government encouraged Turkey to invest in Xinjiang Uyghur

Autonomous Region (XUAR), and Xinjiang Prime Minister İsmail Amat and his accompanying delegation visited various cities in Turkey in July 1985.⁶³

Just one year after the visit of Prime Minister Özal to China, Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang visited Turkey in July 1986. As in the previous high-level visits, the two Prime Ministers discussed the possibilities of further development in bilateral political and especially economic relations.⁶⁴ Deputy Foreign Minister Huai Yuan Ci stated in an interview in October 1987 that problems which Turkey was a party, such as the problems of the Aegean, Cyprus and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, should be solved through diplomatic channels.⁶⁵

The Chinese side continued its high-level visits until 1991. Minister of Culture Wang Meng visited Turkey in March 1988⁶⁶ and China's National People's Congress Vice-President Seyfettin Azizi visited Turkey in April 1990.⁶⁷ Foreign Minister Qian Qichen came to Turkey in September, 1990 to assess the developments in the Gulf crisis.⁶⁸ These mutual visits became a clear indication of the importance given by both parties to each other.

While the good bilateral relations were continuing, a development increased the tension. A commercial counsellor of the PRC embassy in Ankara, Muhammed Niyazi, who had Uyghur descent, sought

asylum in Turkey in September 1986 on the grounds that he was concerned about his personal safety.⁶⁹ This development became a beacon for the end of Chinese policy of using Uyghurs to connect with Turkey. The activities of Isa Yusuf Alptekin, the opposition leader from East Turkestan (Xinjiang), in Turkey in the 1980s also caused problems between Turkey and China.⁷⁰ Xinjiang was already reconsidering its minority policies in the 1990s following the Tiananmen incident in 1989 and the independence of the Central Asian republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this respect, bearing in mind that there were many high-level visits from China to Turkey in the 1980s, the absence of any Chinese visits even at the ministerial level between 1990-2000 shows the negative change in Beijing's perception towards Ankara.

Turkey recognised the PRC as the sole legal representative of China on 5 August 1971, and pursued a "One China" policy.⁷¹ In this new period, Turkey began to use the word Taiwan instead of "Republic of China" or "Nationalist China" as a sign of its acceptance of Taiwan as an integral part of China. Still, Turkey politically supported the reunification of China by way of peaceful negotiations. The Taiwanese continued its diplomatic mission to Ankara and bilateral relations have continued only in terms of economic, trade, and cultural

relations.⁷² During this period, Turkey pursued a policy that ignored Taiwan completely.

Turkey's Economic- Oriented Asian Policy (1991-2001)

The year 1991 produced great changes both in the international system and in the balance of power in Asia. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, independent Turkic republics emerged in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Ankara's new political, economic and cultural relations with the Central Asian states facilitated Turkey's expansion towards East Asia.

In the 1990s, the improved economic capacities of East Asian countries increased Turkey's desire to cooperate with the major economies, especially China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Problematic discourses in Turkish-EU relations in the 1990s also forced Ankara to take balancing steps.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the sudden emergence of five independent Turkic states enormously increased interest in Central Asia among Turkish society. Turkey showed great interest in the newly independent states, and it had the hope of overcoming its loneliness in the international arena. However, this interest was perceived by the outside world as a pan-Turkish

policy and particularly disturbed Russia and China.

However, it could not be argued that Turkey's strategy of expansion into Asia in the 1990s was very successful. Firstly, Turkey was ruled by politically weak coalition governments between 1991-2001, and this prevented the effective implementation of foreign policy strategies. Secondly, alongside the political instability, the Turkish economy experienced a serious weakness because of financial crises in 1994 and in 2001 and the great damage caused by the Marmara earthquake in 1999. In this period, Turkey could continue strong economic relations only with Japan and South Korea.

At the beginning of the 1990s, a new basis for cooperation between Ankara and Tokyo became possible with the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, and especially the Soviet Union. It was also desirable for Washington that the power gap in the region be filled by Japan and Turkey instead of Russia and China. Japan would rather contribute economically, through development aid, capital and technology, and Turkey would present the model of a democratic and secular country to the Muslim people of the region by using the advantage of its historical and cultural ties.⁷³ During this process, Japan entered the Central Asian market with a low political profile

and became involved with a few large projects. Japan was keen not to come into conflict with Russia and China in its expansion in the region. Turkey's project of being a model to Central Asia was a failure.⁷⁴

Despite the cyclical opportunities, Turkish-Japanese relations stagnated in the 1990s. It was observed that Turkey aimed to attract financial support and investment from Japan during the 1990s. However, Japanese investors and the banks were reluctant because of the Turkey's political and economic instability.⁷⁵ In addition, a long-lasting recession in the Japanese economy since 1991 reduced the attention of Tokyo towards Ankara.

Despite the visit of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in December 1992⁷⁶ and of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller in February 1995,⁷⁷ there were no visits from Japan to Turkey at the prime ministerial level in the 1990s. In the second half of the 1990s, high-level political relations were kept at the level of foreign ministers. Foreign ministers Yukihiko Ikeda in May 1996⁷⁸ and Masahiko Komura in August 1999 visited Turkey, and Ismail Cem visited Japan in April 2000.⁷⁹

In the first half of the 1990s, Sino-Turkish relations also seriously stagnated. Although there were many high level visits from China during the 1980s, Chinese concerns about Ankara's

Xinjiang policy was decisive in stopping these visits in the 1990s.

During this period, officials from various levels met with the Uyghur opposition leaders in Turkey. In November 1991, one week before he became prime minister, Süleyman Demirel,⁸⁰ as well as Turgut Özal in February 1992,⁸¹ met with the Eastern Turkestan opposition leader İsa Yusuf Alptekin. In August 1995 the Ambassador of China to Turkey Wu Koming protested when Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan named a park after İsa Yusuf Alptekin.⁸²

In the 1990s, energy-dependent China, Japan and South Korea became Turkey's competitors in the transportation of Caspian energy resources. China especially developed projects to connect with Caspian oil and natural gas directly through the eastern corridor instead of the western corridor, in which Turkey was also included.⁸³

Turkey revised its Central Asia policy in the mid-1990s and developed a strategy of cooperating with Russia and China in the region. President Süleyman Demirel went on an Asian tour in May 1995, including China, Hong Kong and Indonesia. In China, President Demirel tried to gain Chinese support on the Turkish stance on the Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Nagorno-Karabakh issues as well as to increase economic

cooperation.⁸⁴ In September 1996, State Minister Ayfer Yılmaz also went to China to increase economic cooperation.⁸⁵

Military cooperation with China gained a new momentum with the visit of Chief of General Staff Geneneral İsmail Hakkı Karadayı to China in October 1996.⁸⁶ The most important step in military cooperation was the agreement to start producing a common missile in December 1996. According to this agreement, Turkey would produce short-range ground-to-ground missiles in partnership with China.⁸⁷

Defence Minister Turhan Tayan criticised the violent suppression of protests in the Xinjiang city of Yining (Gulja) in February 1997. Beijing responded by warning Turkey not to get involved in China's internal affairs.⁸⁸ This statement did not disrupt the overall progress in bilateral relations. China's Ambassador to Turkey Koming made a statement in February 1997 that Sino-Turkish relations were going very well.⁸⁹

Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit visited China in May 1998 and met with President Jiang Zemin. Though economic issues were dominated the agenda, Ecevit was reminded on the demonstrations in Turkey in support the Uyghurs and the Chinese emphasised the importance of China's territorial integrity.⁹⁰

In February 1999, Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz issued a secret circular about Xinjiang, which created a serious problem between Turkey and China. In the circular, it was pointed out that the region should be considered within the framework of the China's territorial integrity and ordered strictly that government officers should not attend any activity of East Turkestani NGOs.⁹¹ In February 2000, Minister for Internal Affairs Sadettin Tantan paid a visit to China and signed the "Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Crime" with Chinese Public Security Minister Jia Chunwang.⁹² Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Turkey in April 2000 resulted in a new axis in Ankara-Beijing relations. During the visit, agreements on economy, energy and political issues were signed.⁹³

Beginning in the early 1990s, Turkey began to take initiatives to increase its trade cooperation with Taiwan, which had already developed into an important economy. In June 1992, Minister of Public Works and Settlement Onur Kumbaracıbaşı conducted the first unofficial visit to Taiwan for many years. Right after this visit, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations in Taiwan Chang Hsio-Yen meet Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in Turkey.⁹⁴ During this visit, Demirel stated that it was still possible to develop economic cooperation with Taiwan without recognising it as

an independent state. Indeed, economic relations between Turkey and Taiwan witnessed considerable expansion during the 1990s.

Relations between Ankara and Seoul stabilised in the 1990s. High-level contacts between the two countries and the bilateral trade volume regularly increased. During this period, Korean firms also increased investments in Turkey. Prime Minister Yıldıırım Akbulut paid a visit to South Korea in May 1991.⁹⁵ Two months later, in July 1991, Prime Minister Kang Young Hoon visited Turkey.⁹⁶ During the visit of Prime Minister Lee Soo Sung to Turkey in May 1996, it was decided that the Hyundai Company would produce automobiles in Turkey.⁹⁷ Foreign Minister Hong Soon-Yong also came to Turkey to attend the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul. During this period, Turkey and South Korea had increasingly improved cooperation in the defence industry. In 2001, an agreement for about US \$1 billion on fire-control systems was signed between the Turkish Land Forces Command and the Korean Samsung Company.⁹⁸

The 1990s were a very painful period of great change and transformation for North Korea. Those years saw the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its biggest ally, and as its other major ally, the PRC, made a rapid shift towards the capitalist world

and the established good relations with the Western world. Above all, the death of North Korea's founder Kim Il-Sung in 1994, and the deterioration of the overall economy, brought North Korea to face major challenges to its continued existence.

However in the second the half of the 1990s, North Korea dealt largely with its huge political, economic and military problems and proved that it would not leave the stage of history so easily. Thus, many states, particularly East Asian countries, felt the need to establish a long-term relationship with North Korea.

For the first time since 1950, Turkey's Asian policy became multi-dimensional and strong partnerships started to emerge after 2002.

North Korea's first official visit to Turkey took place in 1993. The delegation of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea had official contacts in Turkey in December 1993 and proposed to develop bilateral relations in all areas, including the establishment of diplomatic relations.⁹⁹ Turkey entered into the process of normalising relations with North Korea in June 2000, after the historic Pyongyang summit between

North Korean President Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Kim Dae-Sung. In 2001, Turkey established diplomatic relations with North Korea.¹⁰⁰

Turkey's Sophisticated Relations with East Asia After 2002

For the first time since 1950, Turkey's Asian policy became multi-dimensional and strong partnerships started to emerge after 2002. A rapid recovery from the 2001 financial crisis, the rapid growth of the Turkish economy and its foreign

trade volume were important for this development. In this process, Turkey has aimed to transform itself from a security-oriented state to a trading state. The G-20, founded in 1999 and includes the world's largest economies, has also made it easier for Turkey to have a say in global economic policies. In this sense, Turkey wanted to develop a new policy in the Asia-Pacific, centred on Japan, China, South Korea, India, Indonesia and Australia, within the framework of the G-20 platform.¹⁰¹ The trade figures of Turkey with the countries in the region in 2000s show clear differences compared to the previous period (See Table 1).

Table 1: Turkey's Trade with East Asian Countries

Countries	Exports (Million US \$)			Imports (Million US \$)			Total (Million US \$)		
	1990	2000	2012	1990	2000	2012	1990	2000	2012
Japan	239	149	332	1,120	1,621	3,601	1,359	1,770	3,933
China	37	96	2,833	246	1,345	21,295	283	1,441	24,128
S. Korea	109	130	528	302	1,181	5,660	411	1,311	6,188
Taiwan	110	69	120	192	563	2,059	302	632	2,179
N. Korea	26	2	0	1	9	3	27	11	3
Hong Kong	35	114	337	77	152	112	112	266	449
Macau	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	4	0
Total	556	562	4,150	1,938	4,873	32,730	2,920	4,835	36,880

Source: The Ministry of Economy of Turkey

Turkey's total trade with the countries in the region totalled US \$2.9 billion in 1990. The total trade increased to US \$4.8 billion in 2000 and to US \$36.9 billion in 2012. These figures clearly show the increase in the importance of Turkey in the region. In the 2000s, China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have become important trading partners with Turkey. While Japan was Turkey's largest trading partner in the region in the 1990s, starting in 2001, China became the largest, with South Korea second. Moreover, it should be stressed that Turkey's trade with China was US \$283 million in 1990, increased to US \$1.4 billion in 2000 and finally to US \$24.1 billion in 2012. Taiwan and Hong Kong were highlighted as important trade partners for Turkey, though North Korea and Macau, the Special Administrative Region of China, did not have economic importance to Ankara. However, the figures in this table also highlight the weaknesses of Turkey. From the beginning, Turkey has had large trade deficits in favour of East Asian countries. Looking at the figures for 2012, Turkey exported US \$4.2 billion in the region, compared to US \$32.7 billion in imports, and thus it had a US \$28.5 billion trade deficit.

In the 2000s, Tokyo ceased to be Turkey's most important trading partner in East Asia, despite intense high-level contacts. Foreign Minister Makiko

Tanaka visited Turkey in January 2002 and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül had official meetings in Japan in December 2003. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Japan in April 2004 with a large delegation led to a revival of bilateral relations. In the post-1990 period, the first visit at the prime ministerial level was by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in January 2006. President Abdullah Gül also visited Japan with a large delegation of businessmen in June 2008.¹⁰²

Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada issued a joint declaration on 3 January 2010 at the start of "Year of Japan in Turkey" in 2010. In the declaration, it was stated that the tragic sinking of the frigate *Ertuğrul* in the Pacific Ocean, sent to Japan on a friendship mission by the Ottoman Empire, started relations between Japan and Turkey and became the symbol of Turkish-Japanese friendship.¹⁰³ A "Turkish-Japanese Friendship Celebration Ceremony" was held in Istanbul in May 2010 under the auspices of President Gül and Prince Tomohito Mikasa.¹⁰⁴

Japan has continued its policy of understanding the sensitivities of Turkey's foreign policy in recent years. The Ambassador of Japan to Turkey, Nobuaki Tanaka, supported the Turkish claim on the Israeli attack on the Gaza-

bound aid ship in May 2010, which led to the deaths of nine Turkish citizens and attracted a strong reaction in Turkey.¹⁰⁵

One of the most important reasons for Turkey's rapprochement with China was for Turkish businessmen to benefit from China's economic opportunities.

An important partnership was also realised on investment in nuclear energy, which has been on the state and public agenda for a long time. Turkey signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan in December 2010, following another agreement it had already signed with Russia.¹⁰⁶ However, in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster in March 2011, Japan stopped the project in Sinop in August 2011 because of the accident at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima.¹⁰⁷

In the 2000s, Sino-Turkish relations began to enjoy their most brilliant period in its history. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan in January 2001 and Prime Minister Zhu Rongjin visited Turkey in April 2002 and ensured the survival of high-level political relations through their visits.¹⁰⁸ The leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, visited

China in January 2003 and held talks on enhancing bilateral cooperation.¹⁰⁹

Alongside the visit of Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Şahin to China in April 2007,¹¹⁰ the state minister responsible for foreign trade, Kürşat Tüzmen, conducted three official visits to China in 2006, 2007 and 2008. During these visits, the priority of the Turkish delegation was on the increasing bilateral trade deficit in favour of China and on how Turkish businessmen could more efficiently enter the Chinese market.¹¹¹

In 2009, it was seen that Turkey's relations with China had not improved as much as Turkey expected. One of the most important reasons for Turkey's rapprochement with China was for Turkish businessmen to benefit from China's economic opportunities. In recent times, however, Turkey has had a large trade deficit with China. Ankara's defence cooperation with Beijing also failed to provide the expected benefits. At this point, Turkey's expectation was to diminish the dependency on Western arms through Turkish-Chinese military cooperation, including technology transfers.¹¹²

China pursued opposite policies to Turkey in the international arena, including on the Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh issues. Immediately after the beginning of the American invasion in 2003, the Chinese administration established a

close relationship with the Kurdistan regional government, with which Ankara had problems.¹¹³ In June 2007, Beijing clearly stated that it was against the military action of the Turkish armed forces in preventing PKK activities in northern Iraq.¹¹⁴ China was again against Turkish membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as an observer member while Russia was in favour.¹¹⁵ In June 2012, this matter was solved through Turkey being made a Dialogue Partner in the SCO.¹¹⁶

President Gül's visit to China in June 2009 was a good opportunity for discussing all aspects of bilateral relations. Regarding the economic sphere, Ankara requested compensation for the foreign trade deficit through more Chinese investment in Turkey, the promotion of Turkey to Chinese tourists, and Turkish-Chinese partnerships in third countries. In the political field, the priority of the Turkish delegation's agenda was on increasing cooperation as much as possible on regional and international issues. At this point, the emphasis that the Uyghurs should be a bridge of friendship was stressed at the highest level during President Gül's visits in both Beijing and Urumqi.¹¹⁷ The visit of a Turkish president to the Xinjiang region for the first time also had a great symbolic value.¹¹⁸

However, the outbreak of the incidents in Urumqi on 5 July 2009 damaged Turkish-Chinese relations. Turkey's ruling and opposition parties held the Chinese government responsible for the incidents in Urumqi, and they condemned the Chinese security forces for bloodily suppressing the incidents.¹¹⁹

China reacted to the Turkish responses to the Urumqi incidents calmly and refrained from statements that would increase tension. Considering this positive attitude in Beijing, Ankara intensified its contacts with China again. Turkey's main concern at this point was not to be alone in not having relations with China because of the Urumqi incidents, as no country in the world wanted to spoil its relations with China.¹²⁰ Turkey's Ambassador to China, Murat Esenli, stressed that Turkey would not interfere in the internal affairs of China and stated the Turkish desire to develop bilateral relations. Additionally, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu called his counterpart Yang Jiechi and discussed the issue of normalisation of relations, which were strained by Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement that the Urumqi incidents were "Almost genocide. If necessary, we'll take it to the UN Security Council."¹²¹

State Minister Zafer Çağlayan went to China to attend the Turkey-China Joint Economic Council meeting in September

2009, and he met with Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Deming to discuss the bilateral commercial relations. In a meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan, Çağlayan stressed that the Turkish government would always follow the “One China” policy and would not intervene in the internal affairs of China.¹²²

In addition to the Xinjiang visits of President Gül and Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu in previous years, Prime Minister Erdoğan began his Chinese tour in Urumqi in April 2012.

Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu during his visit to Istanbul to attend the conference on Afghanistan in January 2010. The two ministers agreed on a common strategic cooperation agreement on issues such as Afghanistan, the Middle East, Iraq, the global economic crisis and climate change, as well as giving their consent for more extensive work on economic issues.¹²³

Culture and Tourism Minister Ertuğrul Günay and Vice Minister of Culture of China Li Hong Feng attended the Shanghai Expo 2010 on 15 June 2010. During the meeting, an

agreement was signed making 2012 “the Year of China” in Turkey and 2013 “the Year of Turkey” in China.¹²⁴ A request for Chinese warplanes’ participation in the Turkish Air Force’s annual Anatolian Eagle exercise in September 2010 in Konya was denied by the Chinese Air Forces themselves.¹²⁵

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao came to Turkey in September 2010 and signed agreements which would upgrade bilateral relations to the “strategic partnership” level. It was agreed that Turkey and China would cooperate on energy, particularly in the field of nuclear energy, and that bilateral trade would be made in the Chinese yuan and the Turkish lira. The goal was to increase the annual foreign trade volume from US \$17 billion to US \$50 billion in five years, and to US \$100 billion within 10 years.¹²⁶ A “Silk railway” construction, consisting of high-speed train lines between Edirne and Kars, which would be constructed by a Turkish-Chinese joint venture, was also agreed.¹²⁷ Uyghur dissidents protested when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made his visit to Istanbul. At the protest, Vice President of World Uyghur Congress Seyit Tümtürk made a statement claiming that Prime Minister Wen was responsible for the events of 5 July.¹²⁸

During the visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu to China between

28 October and 2 November 2010, the objectives set out by the two prime ministers in September 2010 were followed up. Davutoğlu visited the Xinjiang's cities of Urumqi and Kashgar, as well as Beijing, Shanghai and Xian, which was interpreted as a gesture from the Chinese side.¹²⁹

Turkey is acting with NATO-allied countries to prevent an increase in global tension, though China has been coming out against Western policies together with Russia.

Vice President of China Xi Jinping's visit to Turkey in February 2012 and Prime Minister Erdoğan's China visit in April 2012 clearly showed a historical turning point in bilateral relations. Those visits were the last of the top-level meetings between the two countries and could be interpreted as a sign of great developments in the Turkish-Chinese relations.¹³⁰

Beijing also made a gesture by letting the Turkish leaders visit cities in Xinjiang. In addition to the Xinjiang visits of President Gül and Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu in previous years, Prime Minister Erdoğan began his Chinese tour in Urumqi in April 2012. Allowing Hainan Airlines to start Urumqi-Istanbul direct flights in 2011

was a considerable development for an easier opening of Xinjiang to Turkey.

In the last few years, some differences of opinion between Ankara and Beijing on global issues have started to appear. Evaluating the "Arab Spring" that had occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria as the internal affairs of those countries, though with destabilising effects, China preferred to support the incumbent Arab regimes. Conversely, Turkey advocated non-violence and soft power as well as supporting the democratic demands of the societies.

As recent events have indicated, Turkey is acting with NATO-allied countries to prevent an increase in global tension, though China has been coming out against Western policies together with Russia. It is possible that Turkey and China would develop completely opposite policies under these conditions, which may prevent them establishing any strategic cooperation. The most obvious economic problem between Turkey and China appears to be the trade deficit. With the membership of China in the World Trade Organisation, the deficit in the bilateral trade is getting worse against Turkey's favour.

Throughout the 2000s, Ankara has searched for ways to develop its trade relations with Taipei. Similarly, Taiwan has sought opportunities to increase its cooperation with Turkey. However, without the PRC's consent, it has been

difficult for both countries to increase their economic relations. Thus, in last decade, Turkey has tried to find ways to further economic cooperation with Taiwan without evoking any reaction from the PRC.

As a result of the rise in bilateral trade, the Turkish-Taiwanese Business Council, which was first established in 1993, came into action again in 2005 after the reorganisation of the Turkish Executive Committee.

For example, in 2010, the expected ratification of an agreement for direct flights from Istanbul to Taipei received a negative reaction from Beijing, and China protested the draft of the agreement with a diplomatic note.¹³¹ Two deputies from the ruling AK Party visited Taiwan in March 2010, which also bothered China, and Chinese Embassy officials in Ankara visited China-Turkey Parliamentary Friendship Group Chairman İhsan Arslan and stated their dissatisfaction.¹³²

As a result of the rise in bilateral trade, the Turkish-Taiwanese Business Council, which was first established in 1993, came into action again in 2005 after the reorganisation of the Turkish Executive Committee. Redirecting Taiwanese capital towards investing in Turkey became the main function of the council.¹³³

For further development of cooperation between the two countries, Taiwanese Vice Minister of Economy Sheng-Chung Lin visited Turkey in April 2011.¹³⁴ At this point, it can be noted that economic relations between Taiwan and Turkey may advance further if Chinese objections can be overcome. Even though taking steps in these matters would not mean that the “One China” policy is being ignored, Beijing has been warning Ankara to not exaggerate its relations with Taiwan. However, Hong Kong is a legal part of China with an autonomous political administration, and it has its own flag and currency. Therefore, Turkey should consider Taiwan just like Hong Kong in order to develop trade and economic relations.

In the 2000s, relations between Turkey and South Korea have developed further. The main agenda item on the visit, paid by Prime Minister Erdoğan to South Korea in February 2004, was to prepare the ground for Korean companies to invest in Turkey.¹³⁵ Then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ban Ki-moon’s visit to Turkey in April 2004 aimed to follow up the objectives set out previously.¹³⁶ President Roh Moo-Hyun’s visit to Turkey in April 2005 had also great importance for the development of bilateral relations. This visit was also the first visit from South Korea to Turkey at the presidential level.¹³⁷

The visit of President Gül to South Korea in June 2010 had two main

objectives. The timing of the visit, on the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, emphasised the friendship between the two countries.¹³⁸ The second major item on the agenda of the visit was for negotiations with the South Korean state-owned company KEPCO to build a nuclear power plant in Sinop.¹³⁹

Considering the current political and economic situation in Pyongyang, it would not be realistic to expect Turkish-North Korean relations to develop much further.

Prime Minister Erdoğan held a summit with President Lee Myung-Bak when he visited South Korea to attend the G-20 Summit in November 2010. Minister of Energy Taner Yıldız also attended to the meeting, though an agreement on the construction of the nuclear power plant in Sinop could not be reached.¹⁴⁰

The second visit from South Korea to Turkey at the presidential level was conducted by Lee Myung-bak in February 2012.¹⁴¹ During the visit a further deepening of the partnership between Turkey and South Korea was agreed, and there was an agreement made to restart the negotiations on the Sinop nuclear power plant.

In the 2000s, there has been little progress in Turkish-North Korean

relations. In November 2004, a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed between Turkey and North Korea in Ankara.¹⁴² Despite this agreement, the expected development in bilateral relations has not happened. In the 2000s, Ankara has continued its Seoul-based North Korean policy.¹⁴³ Turkey took the side of South Korea in two cases that occurred in 2010 between North and South Korea. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned North Korea's artillery fire on the island of Yeongpyeong on 23 November 2010, and when North Korea sunk a warship, which led to the deaths of 46 South Korean sailors, on 26 March 2010.¹⁴⁴ While Turkey was on the UN Security Council, it was the chair of the "UNSC Sanctions Committee on North Korea" in 2009 and 2010.¹⁴⁵

Considering the current political and economic situation in Pyongyang, it would not be realistic to expect Turkish-North Korean relations to develop much further. The most positive development in this process would be to open mutually diplomatic representations in the capitals of Turkey and North Korea.

Conclusion

From 1945 until today, Turkey's relations with East Asia can be divided into four periods. In the first period covering 1945-1970, Ankara was influenced by security policies within

the East-West balance and took an active stance in favour of South Korea by sending troops to the Korean War. Ankara also continued to recognise the ROC government in Taiwan instead of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China.

The normalisation of Sino-American relations and Beijing's gaining of China's seat in the UN in 1971 changed the balance of power in Asia considerably. Ankara also recognised the PRC as the legitimate representative of China and began to pursue an economic-based policy in East Asia. The 1980s also witnessed Turkey's Asian expansion to Japan, China and South Korea. Improved political and economic ties with these countries prepared the background for eventually more intensive relations.

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 created an opportunity for Ankara to expand towards East Asia through Central Asia. In the 1990s, Ankara had a close interest in the largest economies in Asia but it could not properly develop relations with Asian countries because of political instability and economic crises.

In the 2000s, domestic political stability and regular economic growth increased Turkey's capacity in the international arena. This increase in capacity allowed Turkey's relations with East Asian countries to considerably improve.

Among the countries that Turkey has enjoyed strong political and economic relations in East Asia have been Japan, the PRC and South Korea. Thus, based on current conditions, relations between Ankara, Tokyo and Seoul will continue to develop. In terms of Turkey's relations with China, Xinjiang and Taiwan might cause political issues. Ankara and Beijing have developed a policy that takes into account the sensitivity of each other on the issues especially related to Xinjiang. Consequently, Turkey and China have enjoyed the opportunity to become closely acquainted with each other in recent years. If both countries could develop a proper policy to overcome the existing problems, it might be possible to achieve a "strategic partnership" in Turkish-Chinese relations.

Turkey has only continued its relation with Taiwan at the economic level since 1971. However, the intensity of the Turkish-Taiwanese economic cooperation continues to be an issue in the Ankara-Beijing-Taipei triangle. Turkey's relations with North Korea are almost negligible. Considering South Korea as an ally, Turkey gives full support to Seoul claims and Ankara-Pyongyang relations will only develop as long as Seoul-Pyongyang relations also improve. However, it is not realistic to expect a considerable improvement in Ankara-Pyongyang relations given North Korea's current economic situation.

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The Foreign Policy- Hegemony Nexus: Turkey's Search for a "New" Subjectivity in World Politics and Its Implications for US-Turkish Relations

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Abstract

The linkage between foreign policy and hegemony is admitted but has not been systematically analysed in the study of Turkish foreign policy. One of the key reasons for this is the absence of analytical tools that conceptualise the linkage between foreign policy and hegemony. In response to this gap, this study presents post-foundational/post-structural analytical tools to study the linkage. In addition, it applies those tools to analyse the far-reaching transformation in Turkish-American relations in the context of Turkey's search for a new subjectivity in world politics. It argues there have been two main periods in Turkish-American relations since the AK Party came to power: an era of "lack of understanding" between the years 2002 and 2006, and the era after the parties had come to a "new understanding" since 2006.

Key Words

Post-structuralism, foreign policy, hegemony, AK Party, Turkish-American relations.

Introduction

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu on one occasion bashed the European Union (EU) for not understanding the "new" Turkey by comparing it with the United States' (US) agility in perceiving Turkey's "new" reality: "They [the EU] are still far away from understanding Turkey, which is a rising power. But the United States, as Turkey's strategic ally, understands this very well."¹ This demonstrates, inter alia, an ongoing "structural" transformation in US-Turkish relations, or at least underlines the fact that Turkey desires to carry out far-reaching changes in bilateral relations as a result of its search for a new subjectivity in world politics. This shift is often described by state officials in such a way that the two countries have evolved from being "strategic allies" to "model partners." These descriptions reveal the presence of various "modes of relations" between the two countries. And they are in general defined in terms of changes in the relative importance of the two

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countries to each other, and the coming together around a “common” identity and interests or falling apart.

Turkey desires to carry out far-reaching changes in bilateral relations as a result of its search for a new subjectivity in world politics.

As implied by Davutoğlu’s statement, the issue of coming together under an overarching identity and falling apart in effect reveals that states struggle to produce structures-overarching identities or “international states”²- within which they identify with differential (subject) positions. This points at the problem of *overdetermination* since the process of identity/interest formation involves a degree of hegemonic power relations among parties. Accordingly, with respect to Turkey’s relations with the West, some scholars contend that Turkish foreign policy under the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*’s (the Justice and Development Party, AK Party) reign serves Turkey and its desire to be co-opted by the Western-dominated world system.³ In contrast, some commentators argue that Turkey under the AK Party has taken a counter-hegemonic, anti-Western (Islamist) foreign policy attitude; it has abandoned the “Western axis” some claim.⁴ Similarly, it is discussed whether

Turkey is in search of building up an empire in the East.⁵ Other scholars stress that current Turkish foreign policy cannot be described as anti-Western or subservient to the West, and that Turkey, it is argued, is seeking more room to define its foreign policies as a result of a change in its leadership and strategic doctrine.⁶ Thus, they indicate that this has led to convergence and divergence between the West and Turkey over various international issues.⁷

This study, too, argues that Turkey is striving to define its foreign policies independent from the West. It argues that the current Turkish foreign policy is in a way counter-hegemonic but it does not indulge in antagonising the West in carrying out this goal. Turkey’s disassociation from the West does not have to be called anti-Westernism. In order to shed light on this problem, this article attempts to develop heuristic analytical tools by deploying post-structural discourse theory. It has two main sections. The first develops a post-structural/post-foundational account of foreign policy that highlights the interaction between the hegemonic political practices in domestic and international realms. The second applies this framework to the study of US-Turkish relations since 2002, relations that can be divided into two periods: the years of a “lack of understanding,” 2002-2006; and the years when there has been

an evolution of a “new understanding” between the two countries, namely from 2006 onwards.

Agent, Structure and Power in Foreign Policy Analysis

Despite the differences among mainstream approaches in international relations (IR) over the relative importance of agent and structures (individualism vs. structuralism) and the nature of structures (materialism vs. idealism), there is a striking common denominator over the problem of agent-structure relations: agent and structures are conceptualised as pre-existing totalities which are counter-posed to each other.⁸

Post-structuralists oppose this view of agent-structure relations and they seek to deconstruct the opposition between agent and structure in which one of them is prioritised over the other, and at the same time they strive to revise this binary division within a new conceptual ground that offers each element its due consideration.⁹ This does not make structure and agent disappear; they are rather intertwined on a new conceptual ground.

Here the issue of subjectivity appears to be crucial because the mainstream view of agent-structure relations is mainly driven by the reduction of subjectivity to individuality. According to this conception of subjectivity, the subject is, first of all, believed to be both rational and transparent to itself; secondly, the ensemble of its positions is united and homogenous; and finally it is the origin and basis of social relations.¹⁰

Post- structuralism refutes this view and contends that the phenomenon of subjectivity cannot be thought of as independent from the structures. The structures, however, are argued to be lacking any essence and characterised by the impossibility of closure and nonfixity.¹¹ The

absence of an essence furnishes the structures with the characteristic of being undecided, unstable, and contingent. This lack also leads to a similar lack in the subject because the undecidedness and contingency of structures cannot provide the subject an ultimate and fixed identity. The subject therefore cannot exist on its own- it is not self-transparent- as it seeks to identify with the “outside.”

The lack in the subject and the structures offer a particular view of

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politics-*the politics of identification*- which involves an impossible struggle for identity and search for completion on the subject's part.¹² The lacking subject yearns for completeness by identifying with the objective realm, by creating certain structures. This underlies a specific form of relations between the subject and the structures: the moment when the subject succeeds in identifying with the objective realm is the moment of its eclipse, its integration with the structures. This indicates the transition from *political subjectivity* to *subject positions*- two categories of the subjectivity. The former indicates the independence of the subject from the structures and its irreducibility to the structures, particularly at a moment of structural instability and dislocation.¹³ The latter, on the other hand, indicates the necessity of the structures for the subject, and suggests the subject's integration with the structures as a differential position within the structures. This underlines the integral relationship between the subject and the structures: the political actors transform their own identity insofar as they actualise particular structural potentialities and refute others.¹⁴

Thus, post- structuralism proposes to "shift analysis from assumptions about pre-given subjects to the problematic of subjectivity and its political enactment."¹⁵ In the realm of

international relations, the sovereign state is the primary subjectivity/political actor and from a post-structuralist perspective, the activities of the state-*statecraft*- are viewed as creating an effect of completeness. Statecraft functions to represent the state as a finished and objective political unit, as well as produces a *particular* state-centric reality of the global political space.¹⁶ It indicates that "no state is complete and all states struggle against failure."¹⁷ In this regard, post- structural political analysis proposes to focus on examining the boundary-producing activities or practices of the state, which constantly attempts at grounding the sovereign state as the primary subjectivity of world politics.¹⁸

Political forces compete to construct parallel and corresponding objectivities in domestic and international political spaces in order to reproduce a *particular* state-centric reality.

The field of foreign policy is one of the primary sites of statecraft. Resting on a post- foundational view of subjectivity, post-structuralists distinguish "Foreign Policy" from "foreign policy" in the sense that the latter refers to the reactions of pre-given and complete state actors to

their environment whereas the former underscores that the field of foreign policy is all about producing the “other” or “foreign” to achieve complete and stable subjecthood: “the self-identity of a state rests on a prior difference from other states.”¹⁹ Thus, the field of foreign policy is not about linking two complete political systems- domestic and international- but instead is about the production of these political systems or spaces.²⁰

The conservative-democratic political project has displayed Turkey’s will to produce a civilisational difference within the global liberal order.

“Foreign Policy” then contains, first, the production of two political spaces, domestic (self) and international (other); second, the fixation of meaning in each of these political spaces by creating differences and subject positions; and, finally, the maintenance of a degree of correspondence between those objectivities and subject positions in order to generate a particular state-centric reality and an enclosed totality on the basis of *nation*, which currently holds the empty place of “power” or sovereignty, as the primary referent of sovereignty is the people or nation.²¹ The boundaries between inside and outside

are drawn according to this conception of nation and (national) identity. And this supports a particular political position and set of interests within the society since the nation, like all other totalities, is ontologically incomplete, undecided, and constructed- it has to be grounded on the basis of a *political project*.

This dimension highlights the linkage between Foreign Policy and hegemony. Namely, Foreign Policy involves a struggle- the *politics of identification*- among political forces to fill the void in meaning of *the global*, which is symbolised currently around the sovereign states-system. In other words, political forces compete to construct parallel and corresponding objectivities in domestic and international political spaces in order to reproduce a *particular* state-centric reality- such as the East-West or the North-South antagonism- and boost their political interests. This particularity of state-centric reality refers to the fact that those objectivities/ identities in domestic and international political spaces depend on a specific projection of identity and order. In other words, the state-centric reality at any moment rests on a *particular* political project realised by a hegemonic political force.

Indeed, we should note that political forces engage in the production and fixation of meaning in the shared global

political space as they strive to construct a state-centric reality by resorting to boundary-producing activities. These are two integral processes in the construction or capturing of the global. There is only one objective field as the global, political projects pursue hegemonic struggle not only against their domestic contenders over producing a particular state but also against the political forces with particular political projects outside their boundaries for the construction of the global around a particular identity.²² So we have two parallel and highly interrelated hegemonic competitions going on simultaneously: the hegemonic competition among political forces within the domestic realm over gaining a full and complete identity through establishing a *particular* state; and the hegemonic competition among political forces located in different “state spaces” over establishing a *particular* global around a definite identity project.

Turkey’s Search for a New Subjectivity and Its Implications for US- Turkish Relations

The AK Party, as a hegemonic political force, came to the scene with a specific political project, “conservative-democracy.” The conservative-democratic political project has displayed

Turkey’s will to produce a civilisational *difference* within the global liberal order:

“[W]e believe the dialogue between civilisations is a necessary step for world peace and brotherhood in the current time. Respecting civilisational differences and meeting on a common ground are imminent for a democratic world.”²³

This has involved drawing new boundaries between the inside (self) and the outside (other) on the basis of a conservative-democratic identity. The AK Party accordingly has sought to fix the domestic political space around “conservative-democracy” while at the same time it has attempted to oppose liberal Western universalism in the international political space by offering a democratic political ground in world politics which requires the recognition of the plurality of civilisation(s), namely the establishment of a world order based on an equal and just distribution of rights and responsibilities among civilisations.²⁴ In order to structure the global political space as such, the AK Party has strived to identify Turkey with the subject position “centre-state” by replacing it with its long-standing subject position of a “Western state.” This desire of obtaining a new subjectivity has created serious crisis, partly owing to the internal hegemonic competition between the Kemalists and the AK Party, especially in the 2002-2006 period, with the global centre, the US in particular. However, after 2006,

the US has gradually admitted Turkey's new subjectivity as a "centre-state."

The Dislocation of the Structures and the Implications for US-Turkish Relations

As noted, the system structures are formed by differential subject positions and they are contingent and undecided. The contingency and undecidedness of the structures becomes more acute and obvious in time of structural dislocation. In such a period, the established identities are shattered and the social actors find themselves in a vacuum of meaning. However, the dislocation also furnishes actors with political subjectivity, and therefore provides an opportunity for new discursive constructions. As a result and in response to the collapse of structures or established identities, social actors engage in rebuilding the dislocated structures.

In the early 2000s, US-Turkish relations were dislocated. The relations between the two countries had been grounded on the premise that the US accepted Turkey as a secular-democratic "Western" polity, whereas Turkey contributed by not acting independently and opposing the Western projects in the global political space as long as they did not conflict with Turkey's secular-national integrity, such as with the Cyprus and Armenian

problems. This equilibrium was upset by two key developments. One of them was the events of 11 September, which made more visible the void of meaning that had engulfed the international system since the collapse and dislocation of the Cold War identities and structures. After 11 September, the Bush government embarked on fixing the meaning of the international political space around the antagonism between the subject position of "free world" and the subject position of "global terrorism." The *National Security Strategy* (NSS) document of the Bush government stated: "[T]here are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD."²⁵ Resorting to a logic of difference, which engages in weakening sharp antagonistic polarity in a political space and expanding and increasing the complexity of political space, the Bush government attempted to expand the "free world" by using any means including military power. Accordingly, the Bush government (and other G-8 countries in the global centre) carved out a discourse on the Islamic world through a project, the *Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa*. This project states: "We the leaders of the G-8 are mindful of peace, political, economic and social development, prosperity and stability in the countries of the Broader Middle East and North Africa represent a challenge

which concerns us and the international community as a whole.”²⁶ In parallel with this, another document, prepared by the RAND Corporation and submitted to the US government, categorised countries and political forces in the Islamic world into four different groups: radicals, traditionalists, modernists, and secularists.²⁷ This document advised that the US should back the modernists (or moderates).

Accordingly, Turkey, in the foreign policy discourse of the Bush government, began to be presented as a “moderate Islamic” country, a (political) model to be followed by countries in the Muslim world. This was an overt existential threat to the Kemalist hegemony, which had strictly forbidden Turkey’s affiliation with Islam and the Islamic world. Therefore, the “secularist” Kemalists sharply refuted this label. General İlker Başbuğ, for instance, stated to journalists in Turkey after his visit to Washington in March 2004 that:

In the context of the Greater Middle East Project, in some circles Turkey is presented as a model. Turkey does not have a claim to be a model. From its establishment, the Turkish Republic has been a secular, democratic, and social state, governed by the rule of law. Some talk of Turkey being an Islamic state. Secularism and a moderate Islamic state cannot coexist.²⁸

In the same vein, Faruk Loğoğlu, the Turkish Ambassador to the US (and now a deputy of the Republican People’s

Party, the CHP), reacted to US Secretary of State Colin Powell, who described Turkey as an Islamic republic, and said that “Turkey is a democratic and secular republic.”²⁹

AK Party has attempted to revise relations between the US and Turkey in accordance with its projected subject position, the “centre-state.”

Another key factor contributing to the fluctuation in US-Turkish relations was the dislocation of Turkish domestic structures. The Kemalist identity that had been determining the Turkish discursive field and representing the metaphoric totality of Turkish society since the outset of the republic was dislocated by the rise of the conservative (AK Party) elites. Indeed, the relationship between the US and Turkey has been defined as a “strategic alliance” since 1947.³⁰ To reiterate, in the context of Turkey’s “Western” subject position, the “strategic alliance” had been understood in such a way that Turkey would contribute to Western projects at the global and regional levels and not act independently in the international political space so long as the Western projects did not threaten Turkey’s secular-national integrity. Yet now, the AK Party has attempted to identify with a different subject position

in the international realm, the “centre-state,” which proposes to engage in global initiatives independent from the West, but which does not necessarily mean opposing the West on every occasion.³¹ This new subject position in world politics was described- in comparison to the subject position “bridge” which had been frequently used after the late 1980s- by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu (previously the Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister and since 2009 the Minister of Foreign Affairs):

When Turkey’s role in the international system was defined, this was usually the role of “bridge.” In fact, the sole function of a bridge is to connect two entities and carry over one side to the other; an actor defined as a bridge is not regarded as *an independent actor with agency*. Embracing this definition had led us to be perceived as imposing the values of the West when we establish relations with the East and as an Easterner carrying the negative attributes of the East when we establish relations with the West. In this new period, Turkey has to be defined as “centre” state, not a “bridge”³² [emphasis added].

Therefore, what the AK Party officials have understood from the “strategic alliance” is significantly different from the Kemalists understood from it. Accordingly, the AK Party has attempted to revise relations between the US and Turkey in accordance with its projected subject position, the “centre-state.” This has involved redefining the foundation of bilateral relations, which has consisted

of redefining the content of the “strategic alliance”, and a shift from “strategic alliance” to “model partnership.” This attempt to redefine the rules of bilateral relations and the division of political authority has significantly destabilised Turkish-American relations. In addition, the hegemonic competition between the conservative and the Kemalist elites in the domestic realm and the importance of the US’s backing have complicated Turkish-American relations further. In this period, particularly the years between 2002 and 2006, a serious crisis of mutual confidence damaged the relations between the two states.

The Domestic Turmoil

American backing for the AK Party government, which became obvious with the Bush-Erdoğan meeting in Washington in December 2002 (just before the EU’s Copenhagen Summit), dashed the Kemalist hope for averting the counter-hegemonic challenge of the conservative elites with the help of the global centre. The Kemalist elite became uneasy with the Bush government’s support of the AK Party government and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s bid to be the next prime minister.³³ The Kemalists split up into two large discursive groups after the pressure of the crisis of representation³⁴ had become more acute with the EU’s 1999 Helsinki Summit.³⁵ One group

maintained Turkey's Western orientation (for EU membership in particular), while the other group struggled to change Turkey's direction from Europe to Eurasia.³⁶ For the latter group, after the US's backing of the AK Party government, the West completely lost its allure. Due to increasing tension with the counter-hegemonic challenge of the AK Party, it was easy for the ultranationalist Kemalists (the so-called "*ulusalcılar*") to capture the discursive leadership of the Kemalist political force. This shift within the Kemalist bloc significantly altered public opinion in Kemalist circles towards anti-Americanism.³⁷ One of the popular slogans in the republican meetings organised by the *ulusalcılar* in 2007 (conducted against Abdullah Gül's candidacy for president) was "*Ne ABD, ne AB, tam bağımsız Türkiye*" ("Neither the US nor the EU, fully independent Turkey").³⁸

Alongside the rising anti-Americanism among the Kemalists, in the Turkish public in general anti-American sentiments have increased. Turkish novelists and filmmakers went further with novels such as *Metal Fırtına* (*Metal Storm*), which portrays a war between the US and Turkey, and the movie *Kurtlar Vadisi Irak* (*Valley of the Wolves Iraq*) which has a similar theme.³⁹ This was definitely galvanised by the Bush government's unilateral and interventionist foreign policies towards the Middle East.⁴⁰ This

political situation presented a dilemma for the AK Party. On the one hand, it was supposed to revise Turkey's position vis-à-vis the leading actor of the global centre in order to put forward a parallel objectivity in the international realm. Appearing as a proxy of the US would destroy the AK Party's popular support, threaten its political project, and drag it into a serious crisis of representation. On the other hand, having Islamic roots, the AK Party had to secure the backing of the global centre, the US in particular, in order to have legitimacy in the eyes of the international society and tackle the Kemalist hegemony. In short, it had to balance internal and external pressures without falling into a legitimacy crisis and also a crisis of representation. In response, the Kemalists have attempted to force the AK Party into a crisis of legitimacy by either signifying it as a proxy of "imperial" powers to the Turkish domestic audience,⁴¹ or by portraying it as pursuing an anti-Western (and Islamic and non-democratic) Islamist foreign policy to Western power centres.⁴²

Phase I: The Era of "Lack of Understanding", 2002-2006

The relationship between the US and Turkey in the context of the US's Iraq invasion in 2003 was a good example in this respect.⁴³ On 3 December 2002, Deputy Defence Secretary Paul

Wolfowitz visited Ankara and submitted a three-stage plan to Prime Minister Gül.⁴⁴ The first stage involved the US military inspecting communications facilities and bases in Turkey. This would be followed by the improvement of communications and air bases, as required. Finally, US air and land forces would move into southern Turkey to take their place to open the northern front.⁴⁵ Accordingly, *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* (the National Security Council, MGK) met on 28 December 2002. The meeting, which emphasised concern on the developments in northern Iraq, ended with a decision allowing the US only to inspect communications facilities and bases in Turkey (stage one) and emphasising the necessity of a “buffer zone” 60-70 km deep in northern Iraq after the US invades Iraq.⁴⁶ A month later, the MGK reconvened and emphasised that Turkey “backs solving this problem facing the international society through peaceful ways”; however, if an operation would be necessary, Turkey “will take all necessary measures to protect its national interests.”⁴⁷ On 6 February, parliament passed a resolution (*tezkere*) allowing the US to make improvements of communications and bases, as required (stage two).⁴⁸ A week later, US personnel and equipment began to arrive at Turkish ports and airfields.

As these preparations for an operation were carried out, the AK Party

government made a last-ditch attempt to prevent the operation by trying to persuade Saddam Hussein to fully comply with UN disarmament resolutions, or more preferably step down from power. In the context of this endeavour, the Minister of State Kürşat Tüzmen visited Baghdad on 11 January 2003 and delivered Gül’s message to Saddam.⁴⁹ On 23 January, the foreign ministers of Iraq’s neighbouring countries- Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan- met in Istanbul. They called for Saddam to cooperate with the UN and compromise with the Iraqi people.⁵⁰ On 6 February, Saddam’s deputy Taha Yasin Ramadan secretly visited Ankara. In this meeting Gül stated to Ramadan that “it is up to you to prevent the war.”⁵¹

Tezkere was, debated in parliament on 1 March; 264 deputies supported the motion, with 250 opposing and 32 abstentions and absentees.

On 24 February, the cabinet eventually agreed to bring a resolution (*tezkere*) to parliament under Article 92 of the constitution.⁵² A memorandum of understanding with the US was finally agreed on 1 March. According to this, 62,000 US troops, supported by 255 war planes and 65 helicopters, would be allowed into Turkish territory, with

60,000 Turkish troops occupying a 30 km “buffer zone” in northern Iraq.⁵³ Both in the Kemalist and conservative (AK Party) camps, there were groups opposing and supporting the decision.⁵⁴ Neither of the groups wanted to take the responsibility for this decision due to the strong public opposition to the war in Iraq. Therefore, both the Kemalists and the AK Party did not want to appear in the Turkish public’s eyes as if they were leading Turkey into a war. At the same time, neither of the groups was ready to oppose the US and shoulder the responsibility of a possible “no” decision due to the importance of the US in their hegemonic struggle in the domestic realm. Hence, the process of passing the *tezkere* witnessed a series of strategic moves from both sides. For example, the AK Party government decided to delay a parliamentary vote on the *tezkere* until after a meeting of the MGK scheduled for 28 February 2003.⁵⁵ The AK Party wanted the MGK (read the Turkish army) to make the decision. The MGK, in response, refused to do this; it simply said that the proposal had been “evaluated” without issuing a recommendation.⁵⁶ In other words, it returned the bomb to the AK Party’s hands. The *tezkere* was, therefore, debated in parliament on 1 March; 264 deputies supported the motion, with 250 opposing and 32 abstentions and absentees. Despite the fact that there were more “yes” votes

than “no” votes, the motion did not pass since the parliament’s rules requires an absolute majority of the whole house (at least 267 votes).⁵⁷ To look at the results, 100 AK Party deputies had failed to back the motion, with around 68 actually voting against.

The AK Party government and the army sharply reacted against Wolfowitz’s statements by arguing that the decision was a result of democratic procedures.

In effect, this result uncovered a serious discursive divergence within the AK Party. This is especially true regarding one particular criticism levelled against the AK Party after the failure of the *tezkere*. According to this view, Gül should have made support for the motion the subject of a group decision (the Turkish equivalent of a three-line whip) with open voting rather than allowing an anonymous electronic ballot. The most likely explanation is that Gül did not want to advertise this discursive split and subject himself and those close to him in the AK Party with the burden of the decision.⁵⁸ This is due to the fact that despite there being no clear data on who supported and opposed the resolution at the time, it was disclosed later that the AK Party’s leadership cadre in the foreign

ministry, particularly Abdullah Gül and Ahmet Davutoğlu, opposed Turkey's entrance into a war against an Islamic country.⁵⁹

With regards to the Kemalist opposition, the Kemalist parties voted against the resolution. The previous coalition government, which was composed of pro-Kemalist political parties, had not opposed sending Turkish troops to Afghanistan to help the US after 11 September 2001.⁶⁰ Subsequently, Turkey even took over short-term command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan with a contingent of 1,400 soldiers in June 2002.⁶¹ However, the Kemalist forces opposed sending troops to Iraq, alongside its strategic interaction with the AK Party government, this was a result of the emerging discursive split- the pro-West and pro-Eurasia groups- within the Kemalist elite⁶² as the nationalist and anti-Western pro-Eurasia group opposed the decision.

This failure created a fury in Washington. Wolfowitz blamed the Kemalists, the army in particular, of “not playing its leadership role” in passing the motion to the parliament.⁶³ The “strategic alliance,” as US officials understood it, required Turkey to support the decision. The AK Party government and the army sharply reacted against Wolfowitz's statements by arguing that the decision

was a result of democratic procedures.⁶⁴ However, the parliament passed a second resolution allowing coalition air forces to use Turkish air space on 20 March, after the invasion of Iraq had already started.⁶⁵ Later, on 24 June, the government issued a decree allowing the use of İncirlik air base and the nearby port of Mersin for logistical support for US forces in Iraq.⁶⁶ This support was no more than the contributions of other NATO members, many of whom also opposed the war. Furthermore, on 6 October 2003, the Turkish parliament attempted to pass a third *tezkere* allowing Turkish troops (around 10-12,000) to participate in the international stabilisation force in Iraq.⁶⁷ This time the Iraqi Provisional Governing Council and Paul Bremer, administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, rejected the plan.

The failure of the *tezkere* hit the fabric of bilateral relations, which had been articulated as “strategic alliance”. And it deteriorated further with the arrest of 11 Turkish Special Forces soldiers in Süleymaniye who were part of a small detachment which had been stationed in northern Iraq since 1997, originally to monitor a ceasefire between warring Kurdish factions in the region, by US forces for “disturbing activities” on 4 July 2003.⁶⁸ More shocking was that the soldiers were taken off for interrogation with sacks over their heads. Gül called Powell and stated that “it is unacceptable

and improper.”⁶⁹ The Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök, on the other hand, defined the incident as “the biggest crisis of confidence”⁷⁰ between the two countries. The Minister of Justice Cemil Çiçek defined the incident as “one of the breaking points in the 57-year-old relations between two countries.”⁷¹ In order to alleviate the crisis and re-establish confidence between the two countries, a commission composed of Turkish and American officials was established.⁷² However, it was later disclosed that the Turkish army had interpreted the incident as “revenge”

for the rejection of 1 March *tezkere*.⁷³ The war of words intensified after the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in April-May 2004 and the

US attack on Fallujah in November 2004, in which more than 2,000 people were reported to have been killed. Mehmet Elkatmış, a prominent AK Party deputy and the head of Human Rights Commission in the parliament, described the Fallujah incident as “genocide.” The US Embassy in Ankara reacted to Elkatmış by publishing an official statement saying that his claims were “baseless, provocative, and insulting” and drew attention to the so called “Armenian genocide”. Minister

of Foreign Affairs Gül, in response, stressed that “it would be nothing but blackmailing by saying if ‘you blame us with genocide, we will do the same to you’”.⁷⁴

The tension continued the next year. In June 2005, in a Bush-Erdoğan meeting in Washington, Bush described relations between the US and Turkey as “strategic relations”, and it was claimed that he avoided using the word “alliance” on purpose. This disturbed the Turkish side, especially as Bush had called US-Greek relations a “strategic alliance”

in a meeting with his counterpart Costas Karamanlis 20 days before. One Turkish foreign policy bureaucrat interpreted this to mean that the balance of

importance between Greece and Turkey in US foreign policy had shifted at the expense of Turkey.⁷⁵ In the same meeting, a US official stated that upgrading relations to its previous level was in the hands of the Turkish government. The official said that if Turkey did not take “necessary” steps and their national interests diverge, the US “will exclude and disregard [Turkey]. Strategic alliance means overlapping of national interests and allies move in the same direction. At this stage, they do not overlap on some issues and therefore we cannot

Although Turkey’s search for a new subjectivity generated fluctuations in relations, bilateral relations by no means went up to the point of collapse.

cooperate.”⁷⁶ This attitude contradicted Turkish officials’ articulation of “strategic alliance” that the concept of “strategic alliance” “should not be interpreted as Turkey embracing American policies faithfully”.⁷⁷

Phase II: Towards a New “Understanding”, 2006-2012

Despite these intractable statements, the AK Party and the Bush government needed each other. Therefore, although Turkey’s search for a new subjectivity generated fluctuations in relations, bilateral relations by no means went up to the point of collapse. The preliminary sign of a new period in bilateral relations came about in the summer of 2006. In July 2006, the US’s new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül met in Washington and declared that they had reached a mutual agreement on a “shared vision document,” which emphasised their common agenda on the development of democracy and shared values.⁷⁸ This initiative basically aimed at establishing a mechanism to communicate views and the positions of each side on such issues as Iraq, the PKK, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, energy, and Iran, and it would therefore stop the mutual misunderstandings that had strained relations since 1 March 2003.⁷⁹ It was titled “A common

vision and structured dialogue in order to improve the strategic partnership between Turkey and the US.”⁸⁰ This was a historical development in the history of the bilateral relationship in the sense that relations were now based on mutually agreed values, not merely on strategic power calculations, and the sides were equal partners agreeing to understand each others’ position on crucial issues.⁸¹ Rice, accordingly, depicted the relations as “a powerful strategic relationship based on common values.” Gül defined the document as “a large-frame agenda instead of an active action plan” and noted that it was prepared “in order to stage more effective cooperation in bilateral, regional and international issues, to put the issues into writing and consider them a reference point.”⁸² The document reads:

We share the same values and ideals in the context of regional and global targets. These targets are developing democracy, freedom and welfare. For this reason, Turkey and the US are face to face with common tests and opportunities that require their common efforts. These tests and opportunities shape the elements of our common agenda based on consultation and cooperation.⁸³

Moreover, in the face of increasing PKK attacks, the AK Party government tabled a motion in the parliament (just after the crisis in domestic politics over Gül’s presidency was over) allowing military operations in northern Iraq

against the PKK militants, which had been carried out from the PKK's main base in the region after it was forced to leave Syria in 1998. The motion was passed with full opposition support on 17 October 2007.⁸⁴ However, the parliament's decision was in practice inoperable without the permission of US, which held practical sovereign power after Saddam's fall. Therefore, Erdoğan paid a long-planned visit to Washington to explain the urgency of the problem to the Bush government in November 2007. President Bush appeared to recognise the urgency of the situation. In his speech, within which he used the phrase "strategic ally" for the first time after the 1 March 2003 crisis, he stated: "The PKK is a terrorist organisation. It is an enemy of Turkey, Iraq and the United States."⁸⁵ He promised that the US would supply the Turkish forces with "real-time" intelligence on PKK bases and movements in Iraq. Thus, he gave a green light to Turkish operations in northern Iraq against the PKK militants. Accordingly, the Turkish air force conducted a series of targeted bombing raids on PKK bases in northern Iraq on 16 and 22-23 December 2007 and on 16 January 2008.⁸⁶ Following that, a major land and air incursion on 21-29 February 2008 was conducted.⁸⁷ With increasing US pressure, military operations came to an end. The military argued that the withdrawal decision had not been

taken under foreign pressures and the operation had fulfilled its objectives.⁸⁸

On 8 January 2008, Gül, as the new president of Turkey, visited Washington. President Bush stated that Turkey was a strategic ally of the United States, and that cooperation between the United States and Turkey would continue against their common enemy, the PKK. Moreover, he expressed his country's support for Turkey's EU membership bid by saying that Turkey had shown that democracy and Islam co-exist and that "Turkey is a bridge between Europe and the Muslim World." Gül, on the other hand, said that he was pleased with cooperation against the PKK, and he argued that "[O]ur relations cannot merely be defined as relations between two countries; our relations contribute significantly to regional and global peace."⁸⁹

The momentum in relations that came with Rice becoming secretary of state continued and developed further after Barack H. Obama was elected US president in November 2008. President Obama, in his speech to the Turkish parliament in April 2009, attempted to upgrade relations to a so-called "model partnership":

I would like to underline Turkey's importance. Turkey is viewed as a bridge between the West and the East. It has an extraordinarily rich heritage. It harbours ancient civilisations and modern nation-states together, gives importance

to democracy and the rule of law, has a dynamic economy, is a NATO member and has a Muslim majority population. Regarding these features, it occupies a special position in world politics. It is an important actor in global and regional politics. As a result, we are excited to work together. Working together will lead to integration between the Muslim and the Western worlds, and will be the path towards peace and prosperity.

This can be achieved only when Turkey and the United States form a *model partnership*. A nation with a dominantly Christian population will meet another nation with a dominantly Muslim population, and this will unite the two continents. Even though we have a dominantly Christian population, we regard ourselves as a nation bound by ideals. Sustaining the promise of attachment to secularism and the rule of law, if we as the West and the East work together, will make an extraordinary impact in world politics [emphasis added].⁹⁰

This new concept has reconfirmed Turkey's bid to be a "centre-state" by first of all underlying its Islamic identity; second, by locating it as a leader of the Muslim world; and third, by emphasising the universality of democratic values and of a democratic world order based on the plurality of civilisations. Relations then have been conceptualised as relations not between two nation-states but rather the two leading polities of two civilisations. This has underlined the fact that the sides might have different views on issues; this should be respected and divergences should be debated and resolved before they lead to a crisis. Moreover, it

envisioned diversification and expansion of bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States.⁹¹

In its endeavour to identify with the subject position "centre-state," Turkey has started to play a more active role in international institutions. For instance, Turkey was elected as a non-permanent member of UN Security Council (UNSC) for the 2009-2010 term in October 2008. After 47 years, Turkey had gained the right to sit on the UNSC. After the results were disclosed, Erdoğan made a statement:

The AK Party government has strived to revise Turkey's (subject) position vis-à-vis the global centre in the context of its search for a new subjectivity.

"Our country has shouldered an increasing responsibility in the realm of peace, security, and stability at regional and global levels. Turkey's election has been a result of its growing weight in international politics and the reflection of confidence the international society has for Turkey."⁹²

Obama's Ankara visit came right after the so-called "Rasmussen crisis". The AK Party government changed its attitude after President Obama took the initiative in solving the crisis.⁹³ In December 2009, Obama and Erdoğan met in Washington. In the meeting President Obama praised the AK Party

government's "democratic initiative",⁹⁴ whereas Erdoğan stated that Obama's description of Turkish-American relations as "model partnership" indicated the start of a new period in bilateral relations and pointed out that Turkey had started to take important steps to fill the content of this new "model partnership."⁹⁵ In June 2010, Obama and Erdoğan met in Toronto at the G-20 Summit. This meeting came after Turkey's "no" vote on the US-led motion that extended sanctions on Iran in the UNSC.⁹⁶ In response, a high-level official in the US State Department made a statement that the US was disappointed by Turkey's decision but that they were still "strategic allies."⁹⁷ In the June 2010 meeting, alongside Turkey's "no" vote to the sanctions, Turkish-Israeli relations were also on the table. Erdoğan stated that Turkey and the US were in agreement that Israel should apologise for those Turkish citizens who had died on the Gaza flotilla raid, pay reparation for their families, and end the embargo on Palestine.⁹⁸ However, Israel denied taking steps on these issues and the US kept silent. The AK Party government has kept pressure on the US. In his meeting with Obama in September 2011, Erdoğan said that the US government "knew very well that we are right in our claims against Israel on this matter; therefore, they cannot tell us 'stop going after Israel.'"⁹⁹

Conclusion

The AK Party government has strived to revise Turkey's (subject) position vis-à-vis the global centre in the context of its search for a new subjectivity. This attempt to upgrade and redefine its bilateral relations has been opposed by the US until Condoleezza Rice became the new Secretary of State in 2006. After 2006, a new understanding has been reached and that gained momentum after Obama got elected US President in November 2008. Hence, despite there being many issues- such as the Israel-Palestine conflict and Iran's nuclear enrichment programme- on which Turkey and the US have different views, the level of relations has not fallen to that of the 1 March 2003 crisis.

In order for Turkey to sustain its new subject position at the global level, it has to lead economic, cultural and political integration in its region.

However, Turkey's new subject position, which locates Turkey both in the Western and Islamic civilisations, sits on a thin ice; it can be sustainable insofar as Turkey does not have to make a choice between the West and its own civilisational basin. The best scenario for Turkey is the lack of conflict between the

West and the Muslim societies. In this respect, the Middle East and Israel are important given the US's unconditional support for Israel. In the crises between Israel and the Muslim societies, such as the Palestinians, Lebanon and Iran, the fragility of Turkey's new subject position is revealed. So far, Turkey has successfully coped with this situation by adopting the "legitimate" political language of international law and human rights- and by not lapsing into culturalist anti-Westernism- in confronting Israel and the West while siding with the Muslim societies. In addition, it has acted to alleviate the conflicts and return to normalcy through diplomacy. However, if the volume of conflict reaches a point transcending the limits of control through diplomatic channels and/or persists for a period of time, the equilibrium Turkey has established between the West and its own civilisational basin might entirely shatter. Avoiding such a situation is crucial for Turkey because it needs time to boost its military and technological capabilities in order to live up to the requirements of its "centre-state" subject position. At this point, Turkey's power capability is behind the level to keep reproducing the subject position "centre-state."

The state is supposed to establish parallel objectivities in its domestic, regional, and global political spaces to enjoy completeness and subjectivity. So,

in order for Turkey to sustain its new subject position at the global level, it has to lead economic, cultural and political integration in its region. The lucrative political atmosphere after the so-called "Arab Spring" has dramatically altered how that objective is served owing to the confrontation with the Assad regime in Syria. As long as it continues, the Syrian crisis will suck up Turkey's power and prestige and put off regional integration in the face of the reluctance of the "international society" to intervene in Syria. This might, as well, instigate Turkey's dependence on the West (NATO and the US) and undercut its search for a new subjectivity.

In order for Turkey to pose a "real" civilisational challenge, it also has to sustain an economic and cultural autonomy that involves fixing the global political space in such a manner anchored in its unique civilisational *Weltanschauung*.

Furthermore, the AK Party also needs to reproduce a parallel objectivity in the domestic political space in order to sustain its "centre-state" subject position in the international realm. This objectivity is the conservative-democratic "society," which claims to represent the metaphorical

totality of the Turkish society. Yet, the secular-nationalist opposition strives to transform Turkey's confrontation with the Assad regime into a new antagonism (around religious sectarianism)¹⁰⁰ in the domestic realm in order to recapture its lost hegemony, or at least block the expansion of the conservative-democratic society. In addition, the Kurdish problem also dislocates the AK Party's conservative-democratic society, revealing its contingency by highlighting its partial character. If these dislocatory processes gain weight and the conservative hegemony enervates, Turkey will have trouble backing up its subject position at the global level. It may face a crisis of representation as a result if the objectivities do not correspond to each other.

And finally, from a post-structuralist perspective, Turkey's search for a new subjectivity and counter-hegemonic upsurge goes beyond interstate relations. The realm of international politics is merely one of the sectors in global political space, the global "social". Turkey's civilisational politics should also involve carving out alternative models of international political, economic and cultural life. For the time being, Turkey's challenge against the global centre is limited to the sector of international politics- achieving political autonomy vis-à-vis the global centre. In order for Turkey to pose a "real" civilisational challenge, it also has to sustain an economic and cultural autonomy that involves fixing the global political space in such a manner anchored in its unique civilisational *Weltanschauung*.

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Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government

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Abstract

This paper examines the Kurdistan Region's increasing significance for regional politics, including its role in Turkish foreign policy. It also discusses Turkey's foreign policy towards the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) since its creation and describes the stages the relations Ankara and Erbil have undergone since the 1991 Gulf War. Four different phases of Turkey's foreign policy practice towards the KRG are pinpointed in this paper. Conclusions are also drawn concerning the KRG's increasing role in a possible transformed post-Assad political setting and what this means for the regional balance of power, especially if the Kurds of Syria succeed in achieving autonomy. Finally, the study's theoretical implications are also highlighted, considering its relevance in current international relations literature.

Key Words

Turkish foreign policy, KRG, Kurds of Syria, PKK, Baghdad, Sunni-Shia divide.

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Introduction

This paper analyses Turkish foreign policy towards the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and examines the overall importance of the Kurds of Iraq since the establishment of the first Kurdish *de facto* state entity in May 1992 in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War in 1991.¹ A couple of decades earlier, no one could ever have imagined that we would be discussing Turkish foreign policy towards the Kurdistan Region or even a change in favour of the KRG, let alone the current transformation in the regional balance of power with the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis which is currently in progress. The future and the role of Syria are highly important as they are key factors in the creation of the post-Assad environment in Syria, and subsequently the entire regional political setting. Considering the rise of sectarianism in the broader Middle Eastern region, it seems that future alliances will be framed by the Sunni-Shia discourse. Within this context, I will explain the growing importance of

Turkish relations with the Kurds of Iraq since the creation of the KRG in 1992.

The future and the role of Syria are highly important as they are key factors in the creation of the post-Assad environment in Syria, and subsequently the entire regional political setting.

The contribution of this research is not limited to its empirical findings through content analysis of reports and articles on similar subjects- as there are hardly any books addressing this case study- as well as newspapers and interviews with both Turkish and Kurdish political figures in both the Kurdistan Region and Turkey. Furthermore, the dearth of literature on relations between Turkey and the KRG is a very contemporary matter, and the subject's theoretical implications is also of great importance as it is situated within the broader puzzle of the interaction between state and non-state actors in international relations.

The main works on this particular topic that have been published so far concentrate on Turkish foreign policy towards northern Iraq seen through the prism of Turkey's Iraqi foreign policy perspective, Turkey's Kurdish perspectives,² or on Turkish-Iraqi relations in connection to the Kurds

of Iraq.³ Yet there are few up-to-date scholarly works on the bilateral relations between Turkey and KRG.⁴

Consequently, I will demonstrate the changes in this relationship, its regional effects as well as the influence of the KRG's and the PKK's (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, the Kurdistan Workers Party) foreign policies on Turkey's foreign policy, and how these influences have formed the Turkish government's attitude towards the KRG in particular and the region in general. Finally, a theoretical reflection of the study's empirical findings will be also raised.

The Genesis: The Origins of Turkish-KRG Relations

The formation of the KRG as the result of Iraqi withdrawal from the north on account of the "no-fly" zone that prevented Iraqi air forces from operating above the 36th parallel was an accidental outcome of the US, British, French and Turkish collective humanitarian plan to protect Iraq's Kurdish population. The US-backed UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 688 (5 April 1991) which called on Iraq to end the suppression of its Kurdish population, and Turgut Özal's support for the creation of the "Safe Haven" in April 1991 did not only aim at averting a second refugee crisis (following the "Anfal campaign" of

1988 and the Kurdish uprising of March 1991) on the Turkish and Iranian borders on the heels of Second Gulf War, but also to obtain US permission to operate in the north of Iraq and to pursue PKK rebels in exchange, a Turkish policy in place until today.⁵

Özal's Kurdish policy at that time aimed to restore Turkey's external relations as the way out of the country's isolated position and to increase Turkey's economic and cultural domination.

There is thus a certain irony in Turkish foreign policy having contributed to the renaissance of Iraq's Kurds through "Operation Provide Comfort" (renamed "Operation Poised Hammer" in 1997 and later "Operation Northern Watch"). The formation of the KRG not only sowed the seeds for the post-Saddam era, but also facilitated US plans for transforming the Middle East through the Greater Middle East Initiative in November 2003, and signalled the emergence of Iraq's Kurds as a regional equaliser in the democratic change which the Middle East is currently undergoing, especially since the KRG's empowerment after 2005.

This very first stage of Turkish- Kurdish relations, which came about as a result of Turkish support for the creation of the KRG in the early 1990s with the deployment of 100,000 troops along the Iraqi-Turkish border and the approval of the US's plans to attack Saddam from Turkey's Incirlik air base on 18 January 1991,⁶ along with the closure of the Kirkuk Yumurtalik pipeline between Turkey and Iraq on 8 August 1990, and the Turkish embargo on trade with Iraq reflect Turkish policies towards the Kurds of Iraq rather than towards the KRG as an entity, and hence were subsumed within Turkey's overall Iraqi policy.⁷

Likewise, Özal's Kurdish policy at that time aimed to restore Turkey's external relations as the way out of the country's isolated position and to increase Turkey's economic and cultural domination, which was founded on Özal's principle of "Turkism", which had the goal of preventing any negative impact on the agenda of Turkey's Kurds caused by Iraq's Kurdish claims, and on sustaining a strong US- Turkish partnership given the importance of Turkey's integration with the West, as well as to maintain the status quo for fear of the repercussions that potential regional imbalances might have on the Turkish economy and integrity. Turkish policies towards the Kurds of Iraq should also be examined within Özal's foreign policy objectives to control his country's borders with Iraq

and to upgrade Turkey's regional role.⁸ Thus Turkey's intervention in regional politics immediately after the Second Gulf War as a mediator in a search for a solution to Iraq's Kurdish refugee crisis resulted in the strengthening of the geostrategic importance of the state, which is at the crossroads of Asia, the Caucasus and Europe, especially in terms of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War system.

Thus the first phase of the relations between Turkey and the Kurds of Iraq has as its starting point Turkey's *ad hoc* policy of protecting the Kurdish north against Baghdad during the absence of a united Kurdish front in Iraq *vis-à-vis* inter and intra Kurdish conflicts that culminated in a four-year civil war between 1994 and 1998. This shows that we can hardly talk about a structured and institutionalised Turkish foreign policy towards the KRG, at least not until the unification agreement between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on 21 January 2006.

Ankara's determination through its unsuccessful reconciliation efforts in the "Ankara Process" in October 1996 to take on the role of the mediator in the KDP-PUK rivalry between May 1994-September 1998 over tax revenues, power, land and differing opinions as to the most effective policy to deal

with Saddam, a process that ended in the "Washington Agreement" (17 September 1998) between Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, further confirms this argument and also reveals "Ankara's fears that the PKK might have taken advantage of the vacuum of power".⁹ Similarly, Turkey's interest in maximising its regional influence and exerting control in the north, thereby endangering the political monopoly of the United States in the region and finally resolving Iraq's Kurdish issue for its own benefit, reveals the importance of the Kurdistan Region for Turkish foreign policy. This benefit could have been the annexation of the northern oil-rich regions of Iraq or a federation with the Turkmen and the Kurds in Iraq under Turkish auspices based on Özal's policy of "neo-Ottomanism".¹⁰ Similarly, Turkey's first large attack against the PKK on 10 October 1992 was said to have been encouraged by "Saddam supplying the PKK with weapons" and by "the KDP and the PUK- Iraq's main Kurdish parties- fearing that Abdullah Öcalan intended to take control of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq".¹¹ However, this does not imply that all sides were not playing one against the other for the facilitation of their own foreign policy goals. Turkey's then policy towards Iraq's Kurds was identified by instant alliances in the same vein as prior to the 1990s when one Kurdish group was played

against the other, just as it was up to the end of the 1990s.

Indeed, Turkey's relations with KDP was encouraged by an alliance between Syria, Iran, the PUK and the PKK¹² against the KDP, which led to an Iraqi-KDP coalition (31 August 1996)¹³ with a succession of Turkish operations, namely in 1992, 1995 and 14 May 1997 when Turkey stationed 50,000 troops in the north of Iraq against the Syrian-backed PKK.¹⁴

The “PKK Factor” in Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkey's PKK confrontation policy, which has continued until the present time, demonstrates an unaltered Turkish strategy to eliminate the PKK's power on the one hand, and on the other to prevent the PKK from becoming a determining factor in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy, including its strategy towards the Kurds of Iraq, a position Turkey has held since the Özal era.

The emergence of the PKK from 1984 onwards as pivotal agent in the implementation of Turkey's Middle Eastern foreign policy was evident in the “Frontier Security and Cooperation Agreement” (February 1983) between Turkey and Iraq, which provided for operations against armed groups on

each other's territory as well as in a series of other agreements such as the “Border Security and Cooperation Agreement” (October 1984), and a “Security Protocol” between Ankara and Baghdad that allowed raids on the PKK encampments in northern Iraq. The capture of Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya, Nairobi, on 15 February 1999, directly after the “Washington Agreement” was agreed to, which was followed by Ankara's constant disregard of his plea from August 1999 onwards for a political solution to the Kurdish issue,¹⁵ are indicative examples of the increasing importance that the PKK bears in Turkish politics in view of its growing strength in the aftermath of the Third Gulf War (2003) and its further empowerment since the eruption of the crisis in Syria.

Yet, the heart of Turkey's “PKK issue” today lies in the reluctance of the Turkish bureaucracy to find a political solution to the Kurdish issue unless the PKK lays down its arms, as well as the PKK's unwillingness to shift its policy from a militaristic approach towards the politicisation of its struggle unless constitutional guarantees are granted to the Kurds. In a statement regarding his commitment to a new round of talks with PKK, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said “There is a military dimension, a security dimension which is separate and will

continue... but beside this there is [also] a diplomatic, socio-economic and psychological dimension". Thus Ankara's Kurdish policy today appears trapped in a Catch-22 situation.¹⁶

Beyond any doubt, the AKP's (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, the Justice and Development Party) rise to power in 2002 has opened a new page not only for Turkish politics but also for Ankara's Kurdish policies. The "Kurdish Initiative" in 2009 was followed by the Oslo talks the same year between the PKK and Turkey's National Intelligence Organisation (MIT, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*) that "negotiated three protocols on how to settle the Kurdish cause in Turkey as well as the stages for a political solution" had a positive effect on the progress of Turkey's relations with the KRG, as will be discussed further.¹⁷ Nonetheless, "the negotiations were cut suddenly during the 2011 June elections and the arrests of approximately 8,000 BDP [*Partiya Aştî û Demokrasiyê*, Peace and Democracy Party] members that followed" stifled any chance for a political solution henceforth.¹⁸ The AKP seems to have a long way to go in its battle for Turkey's further reformation in view of the stalemate in current Kurdish-Turkish talks, and the institutionalisation of substantial changes still waiting to be fulfilled. Cross-border operations in Iraq and the government's intention to lift the immunity of nine BDP deputies

show the state's resistance to move on with the necessary structural changes so that a compromise can be achieved between both sides.¹⁹ "Turkey's fears for a potential establishment of a *de facto* Kurdish state or the PKK's empowerment in the case of a settlement in Iraq's Kurdish cause"²⁰ has nowadays become an unambiguous reality, especially after the Turkish meddling in the Syrian crisis. Only when this is accepted can Ankara move forwards with the completion of its Europeanisation and democratisation processes.²¹

The Iraqi War in March 2003, following the 9/11 attacks, and the role of Iraq's Kurds as a strategic US ally for the implementation of the US policy of "regime change" in Baghdad, along with the KRG's stabilisation as a semi-independent state entity, found the Kurdish movement at large particularly active, while Turkey's policy on its own Kurdish issue appears connected to developments in the Kurdistan Region *vis-à-vis* the rising power of the KRG as influential regional actor.

Turkey's Foreign Policy towards the KRG (2003-2007)

The aftermath of Saddam's overthrow marks the second stage in Ankara's relations with the KRG, a time identified

by a deep crisis of confidence, the empowerment of the KRG, and the onset of its *de facto* independence that sowed the seeds for the third transformation of Turkey's relations with Iraq's Kurds into an official, direct and institutionalised relationship from 2008 onwards, unlike the occasional Turkish-KDP interactions of the past.

Turkey's refusal to ally with the United States; the "Sulaimaniya incident"²² on 4 July 2003, which has been described as the "worst crisis of confidence [between Turkey and the KRG]"²³ by General Hilmi Özkök; Turkey's parliamentary approval on 17 October 2007 for a military strike against PKK rebels in Iraq (which took place on 2 December 2007); Kurdish demands for the "normalisation" of Kirkuk according to Article 140 (§2) *via* a referendum (initially planned for 15 November 2007); and later on Turkish threats on 27 April 2007 of a potential military intervention into the Kurdistan Region based on a so-called "midnight memorandum" not only reflected Turkey's domestic problems *vis-à-vis* the AKP's struggle to stabilise its power and control the country's military apparatus given an unsuccessful "electronic" coup- among other events- but also Ankara's fears of the further empowerment of the KRG in the event of the potential incorporation of the oil-rich region of Kirkuk immediately after the fall of Saddam and its desperate wish to keep the Kurdish issue in Turkey in check.

Indeed, a series of events that revealed the consolidation of the KRG's autonomous status and even further its independent foreign policy practice alarmed Ankara to the extent that Erdoğan declared in 2007 that;

"I met with the Iraqi President and Prime Minister. I won't meet with any tribe leader... I won't meet with Barzani or someone else", and that the "KDP supports PKK".²⁴

Turkish foreign policy's hostile attitude towards the KRG was stimulated by a US Congressional bill (FY2008, HR 1585, September 2007) that recognised Iraq's federal structure and the Kurdish region as legal entities, and the KRG's independent contracting of oil deals with foreign (including American) companies enshrined into its own Regional Petroleum Law, and ratified on 6 August 2007.

The discovery of new oil fields, such as Tawke, Taq-Taq, and the Barsarin-Sargelu-Alan-Mus (BSAM) reservoir, among others, have today extended the KRG's activities so that we can now speak of about 50 oil and gas contracts signed by the Kurdish government in addition to Baghdad's acceptance of settling oil payment disputes only recently with foreign companies working in the Kurdistan Region,²⁵ whereas the KRG's regional and international recognition- which does not necessarily pass through the UN- has been reflected in

its constant interactions given the US president's first invitation to President Massoud Barzani on 25 October 2005, which are all indicators of the KRG's stable and independent regional role and Iraq's Kurds "self-existence" within international relations.²⁶

Turkey's Foreign Policy towards the KRG versus Baghdad: The Impact of Change

The year 2008 was a breakthrough and momentous time for Turkish-Kurdish relations given the Turkish government's official recognition of the KRG in deeds rather than in words.²⁷ Indeed, the first direct high level meeting (1/05/2008) between the KRG and Turkey was held in Baghdad on 1 May 2008, where KRG's Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and Turkey's Special Envoy for Iraq Murat Özçelik, together with then chief foreign policy adviser Ahmet Davutoğlu, decided to put aside their differences. Both sides discussed areas of cooperation in both economic and political fields, including an agreement to find a peaceful solution to the PKK issue.²⁸ Thereafter, the positive effect of Erdoğan's 2009 Kurdish Initiative on Turkish foreign policy towards the KRG was shown when Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu met with KRG President

Massoud Barzani on 31 October 2009 as well as in the first historic meeting of President Barzani with Turkey's prime minister on 4 June 2010. In turn, "PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the first Turkish premier to visit [the Kurdistan Region]... [on March 2011] since Iraq was created"²⁹; a series of regular visits then followed.³⁰

Turkey, Iraq, the KRG, and the US also established a Trilateral Mechanism to develop cooperation with a view of eradicating the PKK in Iraqi territories.

"This change was not easy" and it took a while to happen as "Turkey might not have been ready to accept that Baghdad would not have full control of the area and was dealing only with Baghdad until 2003. Therefore there was no direct interaction [between Ankara and KRG] for a certain time". "At first, Turkey tried to deal directly with Baghdad through the establishment of consulates in Mosul and Basra [2008-2009]"³¹ and "the signing of 48 various agreements and MOUs (memoranda of understandings) in November 2009 pertaining to energy and other economic issues",³² as part of the effort to establish the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2009, an initiative to expand further bilateral

relations. In 2008, Turkey, Iraq, the KRG, and the US also established a Trilateral Mechanism to develop cooperation with a view of eradicating the PKK in Iraqi territories.

A series of variables explain the shift in Turkish foreign policy in favour of the KRG which seems to override Turkish relations with Baghdad, especially after the US military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, which resulted in the fourth stage of their relationship.

Turkey's Foreign Policy and the KRG Since 2008

The sectarian dispute in Baghdad between Shiite Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and the Sunni opposition from 2011 onwards has diminished Iraq's political role in the region while Al-Maliki's steady approach towards Tehran has probably made "Turkey realize that the Kurdistan Region is a safe place to deal with as part of Iraq because the people who control the borders in terms of trade and commerce were the Kurds" according to the head of the foreign relations of the KRG.³³ The intensification of the disputes between the central government and the KRG over varying issues including differences on how to run foreign policy,³⁴ the management of the hydrocarbon resources in the north of the country,

and the legality of oil contracts awarded by the Kurdish government to major oil companies, such as ExxonMobil (confirmed in February 2012), Chevron, the English Gulf Keystone, Total of France, Gazprom of Russia, and Turkish Genel Energy, which Baghdad rejected as illegal, has brought Ankara closer to Erbil.³⁵ In addition, "the doctrinal approach of Turkey's regional policy"³⁶ based on a sectarian discourse *vis-à-vis* differences between Al-Maliki's Shiite-led government and Erdoğan's Sunni Islamic discourse remind us of the long lasting rivalry between the Ottoman and Safavids empires that seems to be coming to the forefront once again. Ankara's accusations that Al-Maliki monopolises power by suppressing Sunni Arabs and other groups while at the same time protecting Tariq Al-Hashemi, Iraq's Sunni vice president who was charged with terrorism in his own country on 19 November 2011, stands in comparison to Al-Maliki's allegations of Turkey's "hostile" regional policies and its direct interference in Iraqi affairs in view of Davutoğlu's official visit to Erbil and afterwards to Kirkuk on 1-2 August 2012 to discuss Syrian Kurdish affairs with Kurdish leaders, without prior notification to the Iraqi foreign minister, events which led to Devlet Bahçeli (chair of Nationalist Movement Party) being denied a visa to visit Kirkuk by Baghdad.³⁷ All these developments

have brought Ankara closer to the KRG and point to the direction which Iraqi-Turkish relations are currently heading.

The Role of the KRG in AKP's Foreign Policy Strategy

The current volatile political setting in the Middle East *vis-à-vis* the Arab Spring that has swept the Arab world and left few countries unaffected, including “the Kurdish issue which gave it a regional dimension because the Kurds are now collaborating more closely than before”,³⁸ Turkey’s policy of showing that it can play a key role in the formation of the post-Assad era through its meddling into the Syrian crisis and the worsening of Turkish-Iraqi relations from 2012 onwards counter to the exercise of KRG’s *de facto* independence regarding various oil and gas contracts signed by the Kurdish government over Baghdad’s objections not only raises the Kurdistan Region’s importance as an energy hub for oil and gas imports to the Turkish markets, but also signifies Baghdad’s gradual isolation, and the onset of a strategic partnership between the KRG and Ankara that runs in parallel with Turkey’s Iraqi foreign policy.

Significant developments towards the strengthening of relations between Ankara and Erbil can be seen in the Turkish motto for “full social and economic integration with the KRG”,³⁹

the Turkish request for Barzani’s mediation for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey during his visit to the US, which when combined with the Kurdish leader’s meetings with Kurdish representatives from Syria who have recently gained control over Kurdish-populated cities along the Turkish border, as well as with leaders from the main Syrian opposition group (the Syrian National Council, the SNC, on 30 July 2012), plus the recent oil and gas pipeline deals signed in May 2012 between Ankara and the KRG have led to a direct exchange with Turkey for the first time with the aim to build a dedicated oil pipeline with the capacity to transmit 1 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil between KRG and Turkey by August 2013, along with an expansion of the existing Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline shipping crude oil from Basra by 2014.

Indeed, the Kurdistan Region is a major market for Turkish exports.⁴⁰ According to the Turkish Consul General in Erbil,

There are about five Turkish banks, 17 Turkish schools, 600 Turkish construction companies, [and] 17,000 Turkish citizens permanent residents in Erbil, direct flights are also operating daily between the KR and Turkey, a fact which has boosted tourism while the overall trade volume between Turkey and Iraq is about US\$12 billion, while more than 70% is with the KRG, let alone that more than half of the foreign companies registered in the KR are Turkish. Turkey enjoys massive economic benefits from a

closer economic cooperation with the KRG whose current budget approaches US\$13 billion.⁴¹

The Turkish rapprochement with the KRG should be also examined within the scope of the AKP's governance. Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth" doctrine that he developed in 2001 as regards the Turkish role in the Middle East is primarily based on Turkey's strategic interests in peace, stability, security, and prosperity in its neighbourhood, applied through tools of soft power, such as the economy. Undoubtedly, Turkey's influence has grown in the Middle East under the AKP's rule. Ankara's "Strategic Depth" policy "requires [Turkey] to engage with the countries with which [it] share[s] a common past and geography in a way that will promote... shared interests and create a mutually beneficial framework for cooperation and dialogue".⁴² The strengthening of the economic ties between Ankara and the KRG has given rise to Turkish investments of about US \$16 billion dollars in the Kurdistan Region. The opening of the Turkish Consulate in Erbil in 2010, Ankara's realisation of the economic opportunities that a prosperous Kurdistan Region can offer, together with the role the KRG can play in the Kurdish issues of Turkey and Syria, is revealing of the importance of the KRG as a strategic regional player.

"Turkey realized that in order to have good relations with Baghdad you need

to have good relations with KRG. But having good relations with Baghdad does not necessarily mean that you have good relations with the KRG and Turkey has understood the importance of the KR being politically and economically strong", argues Falah Mustafa.⁴³ The KRG's stability, given its oil wealth and the increased foreign investment, against the power struggle between Shia and Sunni Arab political factions in Baghdad, and ultimately the AKP's realisation that the KRG's foreign policy needs to be considered in the coming regional changes in which Ankara is heavily involved, including the need of KRG's cooperation in various regional crises, explain the expansion of the Turkish-KRG security and diplomatic relations and the interaction of strategic and economic interests.⁴⁴

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Thus, Turkey's close cooperation with the KRG appears important as its

foreign policy seems to have been left with not many options, especially after its involvement in the Syrian crisis. The failure of Davutoğlu's "zero problems with the neighbours" policy, which aimed at "the transformation of our neighborhood, into a friendship and cooperation basin"⁴⁵- a traditional goal of Turkish foreign policy- and a desire for an independent foreign policy detached from the US juggernaut given its split with regional strategic allies, i.e. Israel and Iran, as well as with Syria, has raised the Kurdish factor as a guarantor of the regional balance of power considering the Kurdish leadership's close cooperation with the rest of the Kurdish movements.⁴⁶

The AKP's foreign policy that has favoured Erbil at the expense of Baghdad, combined with the latter's fear for the future of the country's oil-rich disputed areas in a post-Assad settlement, is evident in the July 2011 announcement of Iraq's Defence Ministry of the formation of the Tigris Operational Command to be in charge of security issues in the Diyala, Kirkuk and Salahaddin governorates, which include most of the disputed areas.⁴⁷ Baghdad's worries were also highly reflected in the incident of the deployment of the Iraqi army forces on 23 July 2012 at the Rabia border between Syria and Iraq. On its side, KRG officials have also understood Turkey's importance "as protector of the region and a partner country (we) share

the same border with that constitutes the best bridge to build a mutually beneficiary relationship [through which] we can reach Europe *vis-à-vis* the current problematic status in Iran and Syria".⁴⁸

Considering that Ankara's internal politics and its meddling in any regional crisis as part of its foreign policy has left the country with few substantial regional allies, there is a need for a Kurdish policy that runs in parallel with Turkey's Iraqi policy.

Currently, the settlement of Kirkuk's status and the PKK's resorting to violence are considered the chief sticking points in the development of "solid, robust and sincere KRG-Turkish relations" as described by the Turkish Consul General in Erbil.⁴⁹ Yet both sides have agreed to cooperate and "Turkey has understood that the KRG does not facilitate the PKK in the border-controlled areas".⁵⁰ However, there are still voices in the Turkish opposition claiming that "the KRG does not do its utmost toward the eradication of the PKK"⁵¹ and that "the Kirkuk question with its Turkmen population are elements that can be factors of close ties or division".⁵²

Turkey's foreign policy today has to deal with both internal and external open fronts. Internally, incidents such as CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, the Republican People's Party) Deputy Mahmut Tanal's criminal complaint to the top prosecutor's office to close the AKP and open proceedings against the prime minister for interfering in the judiciary,⁵³ and Metropoll's survey showing that 60% of Turkish citizens support Abdullah Gül's candidacy for the presidency and that 51% favour Gül compared to the 23% who prefer Erdoğan reveal domestic tensions and the struggle Erdoğan faces to maintain his power.⁵⁴ Also, the Syrian crisis has definitely created a vacuum of power that the PKK is currently filling. This means that any political settlement of the Kurdish issue in Turkey as a regulatory factor of Kurdish politics in Syria would be for the benefit of Turkish politics. The AKP's Kurdish Initiative in 2009, which constituted the basis of the Kurdish-Turkish dialogue, appears the only green light at the moment that could end the long period of Kurdish waiting.⁵⁵ Only then could Turkey's foreign policy dogma of "peace at home, peace in the world" be achieved. "The idea that Kurdish unity has grown in the region and that President Barzani seeks to lead this process" is general among Turkish political circles. According to CHP's Deputy Chairman, "This tells us

that Turkey should take quicker steps and more consistent ones to resolve its Kurdish issue through democratic means [even though] a perfect solution that meets the needs of all sides does not exist".⁵⁶

Considering that Ankara's internal politics and its meddling in any regional crisis as part of its foreign policy has left the country with few substantial regional allies, there is a need for a Kurdish policy that runs in parallel with Turkey's Iraqi policy. The Kurdistan Region is a bordering neighbour and thus important for Turkish security interests that require a stable Kurdish north for Ankara's economic progress, which is the main instrument of its soft power foreign policy, while the Kurdistan Region's increasing role in a transformed post-Assad political setting could potentially raise the KRG to the status of the only stable Sunni neighbouring ally for Ankara against Iran, Iraq and Syria, especially if the Kurds of Syria succeed in achieving autonomy and thus expand to the Mediterranean Sea.⁵⁷

Turkish-KRG Bilateral Relations in the Context of Regional Conflicts: Towards a Theoretical Framework

Turkish relations with the KRG were initiated at the beginning of the

post-Cold War period. The Turkish contribution to the creation of the first Kurdish *de facto* state entity as the first stage of the Turkish-Kurdish interactions were primarily *ad hoc* policies towards the Kurds of Iraq in the form of humanitarian aid rather than a structured Turkish policy towards the KRG as an entity. This was the case not only because of the lack of a united Kurdish front in Iraq given the inter and intra Kurdish conflicts, but also due to the intention of Turkish foreign policy to control the north of Iraq, to avert any major refugee crisis on the Iraqi-Turkish borders, to stifle Turkey's Kurdish movement's aspirations given the long-lasting struggle of the Kurds in Iraq for self-determination, and finally to find an opportunity to combat PKK rebels by exerting control in the north. In addition, Ankara's objectives favoured Iraq's territorial integrity and stability. Therefore Turkey's policy towards the Kurds of Iraq was subjugated to its Iraqi foreign policy, rather than being allowed to develop relations of mutual respect and interest with the KRG.

Davutoğlu's new and more open foreign policy facilitated this re-orientation and resulted in the recognition of the KRG as a federal unit in Iraq.

The Turkish stance towards the Kurdistan Region remained unaltered throughout the 1990s. Turkey's intervention in solving Iraq's Kurdish crisis in 1998 shows its determination to take on a leading role in regional politics as is the case today, thereby preventing the PKK from taking advantage of a potential power vacuum and keeping at the same time both Iraq's Kurdish issue and its own Kurdish problem in check. Opportunistic alliances with the KDP against other Kurdish groups further explain Turkey's policy towards the Kurds of Iraq at that time.

The AKP's rise to power in 2002 and the consolidation of the Kurdish autonomous status in Iraq as an indispensable US ally- regardless of its non-state status- in its Iraqi policy of "regime change" altered the regional balance of power in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraqi War. The Iraqi War, the official recognition of the KRG in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, and the 2006 unification of the Kurds after the internal conflicts of the past obliged Turkish foreign policy to deal with the KRG as a stable and considerable regional player. Davutoğlu's new and more open foreign policy facilitated this re-orientation and resulted in the recognition of the KRG as a federal unit in Iraq. AKP's invitation to President Barzani to attend its fourth convention on 30 September 2012 is illuminating.

Initially though, Erdoğan's struggle to control the military and maintain his domestic power, together with an instant freeze in US-Turkish relations following the war, eroded relations between Ankara and Erbil. The increasing stabilisation of the KRG and the development of an independent foreign policy did not only raise fears on the Turkish side but also worsened relations to the extent that Turkey threatened the KRG with an intervention in 2007 following Kurdish claims for the settlement of the status of Kirkuk as provisioned by the Iraqi constitution. This second phase of Turkish foreign policy towards the KRG from 2003 to 2007, this time as a solid entity, was marked by Ankara's reluctance to recognise the new status of federal Iraq, and the Kurds were perceived as source of regional instability.

At the beginning of 2012, the US withdrawal from Iraq saw the expansion of relations between Turkey and the KRG into a strategic alliance as the fourth shift of their relations.

From 2008 to 2011, Turkey's relations with the KRG underwent a third rapid transformation. The traditional Turkish foreign policy goal of expanding its political influence regionally through

the use of soft power as dictated by the country's economic interests opened up lines of communication which resulted in an official, direct and institutionalised relationship between Ankara and the KRG from 2008 onwards. Even more, this transformation into an interaction with political and economic dimensions as the third phase of their relations was extended dramatically in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011.

At the beginning of 2012, the US withdrawal from Iraq saw the expansion of relations between Turkey and the KRG into a strategic alliance as the fourth shift of their relations.

There was a marked change in Erdoğan's discourse from his 2007 statement that "I met with the Iraqi President and Prime Minister. I won't meet with any tribe leader... I won't meet with Barzani or someone else"⁵⁸ versus his 2010 speech expressing his determination "That [we] will build a very solid bridge in bilateral relations between Iraq and Turkey and between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey especially. We [Erdoğan and Barzani] will be in touch. The two countries also engage in economic cooperation. We will act together on energy and infrastructure". This change is an example of the transformations that the regional political pattern is currently undergoing.⁵⁹

Turkey's steps to build relations with the KRG were not only the result of the KRG's increasing power as a strategic US ally and that it is an oil-rich region. Turkey's realisation that Baghdad would not have full control of the KRG, the importance for Kurdish foreign policy of having a stable neighbouring country and for a link to Europe, combined with America's interest in encouraging the KRG to "continue improving its relationship and coordination with Turkey" as well as with Baghdad so that "Iraq can take its rightful place as a major oil-producing country"⁶⁰ for the preservation of the regional status quo are among the factors that explain the Turkish-Kurdish rapprochement. The role of Iraq's Kurdish leadership in the negotiations for the political resolution of the Kurdish issue in both Syria and Turkey, not to mention its mediation in alleviating the PKK-Turkish conflict, combined with Erdoğan's preference for a Sunni leadership against Tehran and Syria, can all effectively explicate Turkish foreign policy's positive reorientation towards the KRG while showing its importance for Turkish politics.

Most importantly, Turkey's large energy demands and its need for the KRG's oil reserves; the failure of Davutoğlu's 'Strategic Depth' doctrine for an independent foreign policy with zero problems with the neighbours; the ambivalent political climate in Baghdad

and the American interest in keeping Ankara and Erbil together as potential allies, apart from Israel, against a Shia axis given the undefined formation of the power relations in a post-Assad era constitute a series of considerable determinants that further show the implications of Turkish relations with the KRG on the regional balance of power.

The KRG is no longer a problem for Ankara and it is now a valuable regional ally in the upcoming transformed regional political setting.

What is noticeable today is the rise of a Turkish policy in favour of the KRG quite independent from Ankara's Iraqi policy. Undoubtedly, the KRG is no longer a problem for Ankara and it is now a valuable regional ally in the upcoming transformed regional political setting. Yet, the stability of Turkey's relations with the KRG will also be determined by a series of factors such as Turkey's internal balance of power; the public's acceptance of this relationship; the role of the KRG as a mediator in the PKK issue; the actual political resolution of Turkey's own Kurdish issue within a certain period of time; and finally whether a potential amelioration in the relations between Baghdad and Ankara

might prove inversely proportional to the Turkish-Kurdish relationship.⁶¹

Traditionally, Turkey has wanted to maintain its regional power and further maximise its regional influence. Ankara seems to have realised that stable relations with the KRG are in its benefit, devoid of the taboos of the past when the Kurdistan Region was perceived as source of instability. Besides that, Erdoğan's decision to meddle in the Syrian crisis has further fired up the Kurdish issue in a sense that a potential overthrow of Assad could empower the Kurdish movement overall, strengthen the Sunni

front in the Middle East, and weaken Tehran's regime. Such developments in combination with Turkey's deteriorating relations with most

of the regional state powers make the Kurdistan Region politically and economically important for Turkey, so a strategic alliance with KRG appears imperative since the road to Baghdad seems to pass through there. Thus, the PKK's strengthening after the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, the rise of the KRG's importance as a stable regional ally, the American interest in keeping the regional *status quo* in its favour, Turkey's hostile relations with Israel and Syria as well as its antagonistic relations with Iran, the rising of the Kurds and the

institutionalisation of their status are key factors in Turkish and US foreign policies against a Shia-led coalition in the region.

Finally, the interaction between Turkey and the KRG also has a theoretical dimension. Inadequate attention by the international relations discipline to the interaction between states and newly emergent non-state actors adds a conceptual reason for addressing this particular case study. This interaction clearly shows that non-state actors have an increasingly important and direct

role in international relations (and not just on states' foreign policies), as seen by the impact of the KRG's foreign policy practices on this

interaction, but also on regional politics within the KRG's operations with state entities on regional and international levels since 1992.⁶² Thus, foreign policy no longer seems to be among a state's privileges as the very concept of power has been expanded. The same can be also argued about non-state groups such as the PKK.

On this basis, I would argue that current theories are unable to explain the subject of this paper given their unilateral overemphasis either on the role of structural factors or on international

Foreign policy no longer seems to be among a state's privileges as the very concept of power has been expanded.

actors, such as the states, at the expense of non-state actors in interpreting the function of the international system, and subsequently there is a satisfy scholarly demand for a coherent theory that takes into account not only the role of structures and agents in the formation of the foreign policy decisions, but also for a theory that elevates the relations between state and non-state actors in international relations.⁶³

Whereas most international relations theories have been useful in explaining specific international phenomena and offering solutions to various problems that arose during the era of their emergence, their main inadequacy is the lack of consideration of the interaction between state and non-state actors as they argue in favour of the superiority of states while ignoring the dramatic role that non-state actors can play.⁶⁴ For instance, realists and liberals focus on state actors, the effect of the structures and national interests, while constructivists emphasise the role of ideas and how actors, in particular states, affect and are affected by the structures. Likewise, even though neoclassical realism can explain the interaction between the internal and the external that is seen in foreign policy making, still it is confined to state actors following the tradition of the earlier realist schools of thought.⁶⁵ Similarly, both liberals, who overemphasise the role of non-state actors but are still

limited to transnational corporations and international institutions of an economic nature, and neo-liberals appear to be restricted to structural explanations of the states' policies.

Conclusion

Thus the existing paradigms cannot provide an adequate explanatory framework since the constitutive element of such frameworks is the state. They have also fallen into the same trap of either being constrained by particular premises and thus applying their ideas everywhere regardless of context, time or space and confining themselves to endless critiques.⁶⁶ Indeed, critical theories and meta-theories have posed important challenges to mainstream international relations, but the often excessive zeal for contradicting orthodoxy and structural and state-centric explanations, meant they failed to transform International Relations into a coherent and applicable theory.⁶⁷

On the other hand, while the literature on non-state actors has increased considerably in the past decade, most of it seems focused on accounts of their status rather than on their relations. Neither current literature nor the main schools of thought within the international relations seem to go far enough to be able to cover relations between states (such as, for instance, Turkey and non-

state actors such as the KRG or PKK) either empirically or theoretically. If and when they do so, their focus is confined to the role played by non-state actors and specifically to their increasing importance in international relations, according to scholarly narratives of their status and perspectives.⁶⁸ Thus, international relations remains constrained by the way they focus either on one or another agency, rather than viewing such interactions as a two-way process.⁶⁹ Thus far, the analyses of the interplay between state and non-state actors that exist today have either remained at a general level or have limited themselves to how states perceive and behave towards non-state actors, or occasionally the other way around.⁷⁰

I have therefore raised the need for a more general analysis instigated by the subject matter under scrutiny and to this end suggested a model that conceives of international relations as a complex field of multidimensional interrelations between and among actors at the local, sub-state, trans-state, state, regional and global spheres. In particular, it draws attention to the role-both direct and indirect-that is played by non-state

actors, though without *a priori* favouring either type of actor. The model also recognises the interactive importance of the material and the ideational in the mutual shaping of structures and agents in this multidimensional interactive set of dynamics. In my theoretical “map”, then, I have used a conceptual “model”, which could be further elaborated in detail in another paper that views international relations as “multidimensional inter-relations”, takes into account the triptych of IR, foreign policy and politics as parts of a unified whole, and stresses the need for international relations to move away from mere inter-state explanations whereas the role of structures (whether ideational or material) is central to the interplay between state and non-state entities (other than the economic actors overemphasised by the current literature) that are pursuing their own interests.⁷¹

The article has demonstrated thus on the one hand the impact that non-state actors, such as the KRG, have on Turkey’s foreign policy, and on the other, showed that states’ foreign policy can also be affected by, and interacts with, non-state entities.

Endnotes

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Afghanistan: Human Cost of Armed Conflict since the Soviet Invasion

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Abstract

The Afghan wars present a good example of contemporary conflicts, often described as “complex political emergencies” (CPEs). These are the offshoots of diverse factors related to ethno-national, ethno-geographic, ethno-economic, ethno-religious and ethno-sectarian manifestations. In order to comprehend these conflicts in entirety, one needs to examine Afghanistan’s historico-cultural and linguistic dynamics, socio-economic structure, religio-tribal ideologies, and geo-strategic and geo-political stereotypes. The aim of the article is to furnish a comprehensive record of the impact on the country’s human capital from the Soviet occupation up to the US invasion. The US invasion in the post-9/11 environment, however, brought no let up to the miseries of the Afghan people. Importantly, the current Afghan conflict embodies horrendous consequences for the country’s survival on the one hand, and regional and global security on the other. The article examines how civilians have increasingly borne the brunt of the US and NATO air war against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. It examines air strike and casualty data to analyse trends and identify problems that cause civilian casualties in US air operations.

In addition, the social and psychological effects and violations of human rights associated with assassinations are more devastating than a body count. Moreover, the lack of security, economic development, effective rule of law, and coordination of effort stand in the way of sustainable progress in the country. Against the failing socio-economic system, opium cultivation has developed as an alternative to country’s poor economic base and quite limited sources of proper food, clothing, housing, and employment.

Key Words

Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Shura, Durrani, Jihad, Afghan, Capitalist Bloc, villages.

Pauperised Afghanistan: An Appraisal

Afghanistan has been strategically important since ancient times and it has played a vital role in regional, economic and cultural integration. Following a long history, it assumed the status of a nation-state under Ahmad Shah Abdali (Durrani).¹ It was he who ensured

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homogenisation by welding together the divergent ethnic Afghan factions into a single centralised political system.² Its national character was first challenged by the British in the 19th century, which had the goal of increasing its imperial designs, checkmating Russia, and extending their sphere of influence into Central Asia. Nevertheless, the natives offered stubborn resistance, culminating in the three dreadful Anglo-Afghan Wars in the 19th and 20th century. In the process, however, the whole country experienced periods of killings, looting, plundering, and damage to traditional systems and structures. The three Anglo-Afghan Wars were quite catastrophic, bearing horrific “retribution” on the Afghans and their livelihoods in the cities, towns and whole countryside.³ The British strived to reduce resistance by unleashing a reign of terror, execution, exploitation, resulting in a large amount of deaths.⁴ The Afghans’ sordid story did not end there, but instead continued with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1978. Since the development was neither strategically nor ideologically heartening to the capitalist bloc, the USA, in the garb of friendship and reconstruction, offered logistical support to the resistant Afghans. The US conveniently roped in Pakistan as a conduit for the arms and equipment supply, thereby assigning it the status of a “frontline state.”⁵ Quite well thought-out strategies were woven to fulfil the purpose. These included

the indoctrination of the Afghans in religious fundamentalism as an effective tool to fight against the Soviets. Frenzied by religion, these Afghans fought in the name of *jihad* and offered unprecedented resistance to the Soviets, just as they had earlier done against the English. But during this entire struggle, tens and thousands died. An equal number became homeless, maimed, and sick. In addition, wholesale destruction was caused to infrastructure, some older than two centuries, due to continued gun battles, bomb blasts, air strikes and missile attacks.

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The destructiveness of modern war is widely understood, but the wars in Afghanistan have been uniquely and comprehensively destructive. For the last 30 years, the country has been marked by appalling episodes of violence, war and genocide. Given the long history of war in Afghanistan, one may reasonably conjecture that Afghans have no history but that of incessant conflict for power, regional hegemony, tribal and ideological supremacy and territorial possession,

with horrendous effects on the human psyche, mental makeup and individual and collective behaviour.⁶ The vast extent of the violence and suffering has been muffled by the stoicism of the Afghans as the threshold of pain individually and collectively is almost unbelievably high. At present, Afghans live in a fragile state of affairs impacted by endless armed conflicts and wars. Sounds of guns firing, bombs, helicopters, machine guns and rockets are a daily routine for them.⁷ Violence, destruction, expulsion, displacement, looting, and every other element of the litany of suffering have become the fate of the Afghans. Non-combatants, including women, children and the elderly, have suffered considerably.

Historically speaking, Afghanistan has been the victim of its history and geography: the region has been subjected to countless invasions and incursions.⁸ In the more than 30 years since the Soviet invasion of December 1979, it has been exposed to the impact of political and ideological forces that are far beyond the capacity of the bulk of its own people to control.⁹ The Soviet invasion made it a Cold War battleground, and the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union turned Afghanistan into a new theatre of competition, this time between regional actors determined that their competitors should not obtain a foothold in the shadows of the Hindu Kush. In the post-Soviet turmoil, there

was no end to the sorry state of Afghan affairs. The country soon plunged into a dreaded civil war following its failure to create a state, common national leadership, centralised army, and sound economy. Regional and sub-regional powers, especially Pakistan, private networks, smugglers, drug dealers and fundamentalists, used the failing state system for their own vested interest.¹⁰ Consequently, the country further sank into anarchy, with a complete breakdown of law and order. Murder, looting, rape, and extortion were rampant. Unprecedented human casualties, irreparable damage to public and private property, and wholesale population displacement were other manifestations of the post-Soviet civil war. Dreaded weaponry was used by local potentates to gain power and to take precedence over one another. Under the circumstances, villages, towns and cities were ravaged, and their leftover socio-economic and politico-administrative structures were obliterated to the great suffering of the public at large.¹¹ Men were arrested, humiliated, had their limbs amputated, and killed, and women were molested, tortured, and raped. Children were killed by bomb blasts, missile attacks, air strikes, gun battles, and so on, all of which had a profound impact on their health and mental development.¹² In consequence, the whole country was dotted with human skeletons, scattered here and there, which led to huge

humanitarian crises. Finally, in the post-9/11 environment, the US engineered a punishing Iraq-style embargo of war-ravaged Afghanistan at a time when many of its 20 million people were starving and homeless. People's sufferings and miseries have multiplied, and the US exercises its writ to deal with Afghanistan in the name of the "war against terror". However, under President Obama's new Afghan stabilisation strategy, the scale of the tragedy has further widened with the deployment of the additional NATO forces and the direct confrontation of the Pakistani army with the Taliban groups in Pakistan and the Pak-Afghan borders.

The Human Cost of Armed Conflict in the Last 30 Years of Endless War

As discussed above, the Afghan wars and conflicts have caused enormous human suffering and migration over the years. The Soviet policy of subjugation and Sovietisation was based on physical extermination with a totalitarian ideology that intended to rupture Afghanistan's economic, social, cultural and religious legacy. The policy was conducted through the indiscriminate bombing of villages. The estimates of the physical damage suffice to prove the comprehensiveness of the destruction: tens and thousands of people killed, injured and rendered homeless in the process. To quote a report on the extent of the refugees:

"in Afghanistan virtually everyone is a victim."¹³ Consequently, the Afghan wars created the biggest refugee problem ever in the world. Virtually the whole population has been displaced from cities, towns and villages. In the end, more than 6 million civilians became refugees in neighbouring countries, requiring international agencies to pump in billions of dollars for their relief and rehabilitation. With the elimination of the Taliban, the refugee problem was thought to be over as more than 2-3 million had returned home by 2003.¹⁴ But it increased quickly thereafter. The tale of human deaths was no less pathetic. According to a report, the "Soviet-Afghan war has killed at least a million Afghans, maimed and disabled many more, [it] created an army of orphans and widows, turned half the population into internally displaced persons and refugees, including six million outside the country."¹⁵ One report indicates that 1.0 million people became disabled during the Soviet-Afghan war.¹⁶ The migration and the human killings together kept the country's population always decreasing. The 1979 census estimated the country's pre-war population at 13.05 million, though other reports suggested it to be between 15-17 millions, including the nomadic population.¹⁷ Noor Ahmed Khalidi calculated that 876,825 Afghans, constituting 7% of the total Afghan population, were killed during 10-year war (1978-1987).¹⁸ Martin Ewan and

Marek Sliwinski estimate the figure at 1.25 million war deaths, or 9% of the pre-war population.¹⁹ However, Siddieq Noorzoy presents an even higher figure of 1.71 million deaths for the same decade.²⁰ Other report says that the (1980-1990) decade of Afghan wars brought about marked demographic changes in Afghanistan. About 6.2 million Afghans, constituting 32% of the projected population, emigrated into refugee camps in Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere, and more than 1.5 million

were killed, bringing the total to 7.7 millions, well over 40% of the total projected population in 1990. Of this total, over 5 million, or 47% of the rural population, were affected in the process. In this period 2.2 million from the rural areas migrated to the cities to escape Soviet bombing which added further to the miseries of Afghans.²¹ Indeed, the magnitude and intensity of demographic damages during 1980-1990 has been unprecedented, which can be readily seen in Table 1.

Table 1: Demographic Damage due to Soviet War, 1980-1990 (in millions)

	1977 population actual	1990 projected population	Total killed	Total emigration	Internal migration
Total	14.2	19.1	1.5	6.2	2.2
Urban	2.2	2.9	0.15	0.60	0.0
Rural	10.5	14.4	1.27	3.90	2.2
Nomads	1.5	1.8	0.08	1.72	N/A

Reports suggest that from 1.5 million to more than 2 million war deaths have occurred in Afghanistan since 1978, with an average of 350 combat deaths per month in 1997.²² This high level of mortality was accompanied by shocking and extensive war crimes and human rights violations. Human Rights Watch says that by 2000 some 1.5 million people had died as a direct result of the conflict²³ and some 2 million people had become permanently disabled.²⁴ Though the level of deaths reduced with Soviet

withdrawal in 1989, it did not end. This is proved by the deaths that followed the ethnic cleansing with the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamiyan to the Taliban in August 1998.²⁵ Over 2,000 “civilians” were brutally and gruesomely massacred from the Hazara ethnic minority within three days. The Taliban’s treatment of women was often horrific as they were tortured and raped.²⁶ The magnitude of the number of wounded was also on the rise due to the Afghan wars. To quote Rasul Baksh in 1994, “the proportion

of those incapacitated by the war is 31 per-thousand of the entire population of the country.”²⁷ Tens and thousands left due to the fear of the Taliban. This was particularly true of the ethnic minority groups on the Shomali Plains in the north of Kabul. Reportedly, some 180,000 civilians fled the country as “men were boiled or asphyxiated to death, wells were poisoned, land was mined, and traditional irrigation canals and dams were bombed” by the Taliban during their conflict with the Northern Alliance, particularly in 1999 and 2000.²⁸ The immediate victims of this widespread uprooting were children, the elderly, and war widows. While Afghanistan has the highest number of refugees in 1990, with 6.2 million, it also has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the same period with 2 million. There was a substantial repartition of refugees after the fall of the Communist government in 1992, though 2.7 millions continued to remain refugees in Pakistan and Iran. The level of Afghan refugees was such that Pakistan had to close its borders with Afghanistan in 1994.²⁹ More than 1.5 million IDP were registered in Afghanistan between 1992 and 1997 alone. By late 1998, approximately 3.7 million Afghans were reluctant to return to their war-ravaged country under the Taliban regime. During this period 2 million refugees lived in Pakistan, 1.5 million in Iran, and about 10,000 on

the border of Tajikistan.³⁰ In 1997-2000 the Taliban pushed into northern Afghanistan, and this together with the 2000 drought prompted several hundred thousand of Afghans to flee the country.³¹ During the United States’ bombing of Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan in 2001, tens of thousands of Afghan civilians also left the country as they had no food or shelter.³²

The Post-11 September Era

In the post-11 September era, the US declared a “war on terror” and launched an offensive in Afghanistan to punish the Taliban for harbouring and collaborating with the 9/11 attackers and to coerce the regime into bringing those involved to justice. Subsequently, it was aimed at toppling the Taliban regime and instituting a pro-US regime in Afghanistan, though the US finally ended the Taliban regime as an act of punishment.³³ The operation began on 7 October 2001 with air strikes against selected military targets, and later expanded to political and infrastructures to weaken the Taliban war effort.³⁴ In that, the US and NATO forces killed up to 5,000 Afghan civilians- almost double the number of civilians killed in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.³⁵ One report says that between 7 October 2001 and January 2002, at least 1,300 civilians were directly killed by the US-led aerial bombing campaign. In

addition, some 3,200 Afghans lost their life due to starvation, exposure, illness, and injury as a result of war and air strikes in that time. However, a 2002 analysis by the *Guardian* newspaper estimated a higher figure of 20,000 civilian deaths in 2001 as an indirect result of the US's air strikes and ground invasion.³⁶

While Afghanistan has the highest number of refugees in 1990, with 6.2 million, it also has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the same period with 2 million.

Meanwhile, the massive US bombardment with the support of the regional powers resulted in the replacement of the Taliban regime with a new interim government after a United Nations' decision at a conference in Bonn, Germany in December 2001.³⁷ As a result a new Afghan government under Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai was set up on 5 December 2001.³⁸ However, the writ of President Karzai till date has been confined largely to Kabul proper. In the countryside, the regional power brokers (the warlords) and their provincial troops are restive,³⁹ and are bent on throwing Karzai's government out of power.⁴⁰ Most alarming has been the increasing ability in recent years of the Taliban to strike

back with greater vigour than before, thereby causing immense human losses and damage to infrastructure.⁴¹ In 2006 alone, over 4,000 deaths were registered in Afghanistan, including those of the civilians and foreign soldiers. It is reported that some 769 Afghan civilians were directly killed by US- and NATO-led actions in Afghanistan.⁴² In addition, the southern part of Afghanistan around Helmand and Kandahar, the heartland of the Taliban, saw a great deal of fighting and damage to infrastructure in the same year. Moreover, suicide attacks have been on the rise despite constant US and Pakistan army strikes.⁴³ In a wave of violence in 2006, Taliban-led militants carried out about 140 suicide attacks, more than five times the 2005 number, with another 35 suicide attacks in 2007.⁴⁴ In 2007, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) estimated that some 629 Afghans were killed directly by US-led coalition and Afghan forces, and 700 Afghans died through insurgency-related actions.⁴⁵

The US and NATO forces killed up to 5,000 Afghan civilians—almost double the number of civilians killed in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.

In the summer of 2008, the situation worsened to the extent that some 2,118

Afghans were killed by US- and NATO-led military and anti-government forces in Afghanistan. About 1,160 civilians were killed in various areas by insurgent-led attacks, accounting for 55% of the total deaths, while 828 were directly killed by international-led military forces, 39% of the 2008 total. The remaining 130 people, 6%, died as a result of crossfire or unexploded ordnance. Going into further detail, Afghan Rights Monitor, a Kabul-based rights watchdog, has an even higher figure of 3,917 deaths, 6,800 wounded, and around 120,000 displaced persons in the same period. The report further says that insurgents killed over 2,300 civilians, including 930 in suicide bombings, and that US- and NATO-led military operations killed over 1,620 civilians, with 520 civilians killed by Afghan military forces. Out of these, 680 Afghan civilians were killed in air strikes by US-led forces in various parts of Afghanistan.⁴⁶ However, on the security side over 530 Afghan soldiers and 1,100 Afghan policemen lost their lives. These figures are far higher than those from the UN and international military forces. In addition, a Taliban-led assault on a Kandahar prison in 2008, freed 1,200 inmates, including 350 Taliban members. Violence in Afghanistan was generally 40% higher in 2008 as compared to 2007. Ambushes, suicide attacks, and targeted assassinations rose sharply. NATO reports that the Taliban's presence was strongest in the Helmand,

Kandahar, Zabol, and Oruzgan provinces in southern Afghanistan, and is either significant or conspicuous in the Paktia, Khowst, Nangarhar, Konar, and Nuristan provinces in eastern Afghanistan.

The combination of light ground forces and overwhelming air power has become the dominant doctrine of war for the US in Afghanistan.

The year 2009 was again the most lethal year for Afghans in the US-led war that had been going on since September 2001, with over 2,412 civilians killed and 3,566 wounded.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, in 2010, the human cost of the conflict again grew and some 2,777 civilian deaths were recorded, an increase of 15% compared to the previous year, and over 102,658 individuals were displaced due to the conflict.⁴⁸ The year 2011, brought yet another record number of civilian deaths as the violence intensified and security spiralled downward. The United Nations reported that over 3,021 Afghan civilians were killed, 4,507 wounded and many more displaced in 2011.⁴⁹ In the last three years, the armed conflict in Afghanistan has intensified, with daily fighting between the Taliban and other anti-government insurgents against Afghan government forces and its international military supporters. The US, which

operates in Afghanistan through its counter-insurgency forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), has increasingly relied on air power in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. The combination of light ground forces and overwhelming air power has become the dominant doctrine of war for the US in Afghanistan. The net result has been large numbers of civilian casualties. Moreover, the harm caused by air strikes is not limited to immediate civilian casualties, but includes significant destruction of civilian property, forced migration of civilians and the abandoning of their villages, thus further adding to the internally displaced population of Afghanistan. In every case investigated by Human Rights Watch where air strikes hit villages, many civilians left the village because of the damage done to their homes and of fear of further strikes. People from neighbouring villages also sometimes fled in fear of future strikes on their villages. They have also had significant political impact, outraging public opinion in Afghanistan and undermining public confidence in both the Afghan government and its international backers.

Conclusion

In short, the direct effect of the Afghan wars on the population has been

stunning. More than 50% of population has been directly harmed by the war through death, injury, and displacement. There is hardly any Afghan family that has not been affected, and the effect has been invariably felt in the cities, towns and villages: houses, mosques, minarets, schools, hospitals, industrial structures, roads, bridges, orchards, and fields have all been damaged. Soviet tactics were designed to destroy the rural base of popular support for secessionism,⁵⁰ and the attacks were directed at destroying agricultural areas, water facilities, and livestock. Violating the Geneva protocols, the Soviets used various nerve gases, mustard gases, and other chemical/biological weapons in several provinces.⁵¹ Consequently, the massive bombings and the allied food shortages drove millions of peasants out of their villages. More than half of Afghanistan's 36,000 villages and hamlets⁵² were turned into ghost towns, and millions of anti-personnel mines, especially the little "butterfly mines", fixed by the Soviets⁵³ maimed millions in the countryside.⁵⁴ A few reports suggest that 20 to 25 people every day were either maimed or killed by landmines, and by 1996, some 20,000 civilians were killed and another 400,000 disabled as a result.⁵⁵ Kabul has been the world's most heavily mined city and mines were fitted in houses, walls of buildings, roads and streets,⁵⁶ leading to numerous deaths and displacements. The impact is markedly worse as most

of Afghanistan looks primitive, with farmers struggling to provide food for their families. Many of them try growing the opium poppy as it requires less water than most food crops and fetches good returns on the international market. This lucrative crop was enthusiastically promoted by the Taliban to re-energise their feeble economy.

Instead of a viable economic base, the country is characterised by illegal or quasi-legal activities related to narcotics, arms trafficking, and the smuggling of duty-free goods.

For most of the time the country and its people have been dependent on foreign aid for sustenance. However, most of the support has been in the form of military aid and relief for refugees. Little aid has come in for institutional re-building and reconstruction. A recent study by the American non-governmental agency Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the Centre on International Cooperation (CIC) of New York University suggested that only 1% of Afghanistan's reconstruction needs have been met so far.⁵⁷ The fact of the matter is that only one dollar is officially spent on "reconstruction" for every US \$10 spent on achieving US geo-political objectives.⁵⁸ Furthermore, "donor fatigue" is a significant problem

in Afghanistan, and the UN has been unable even to meet its relief targets. For example, the 1999 UN appeal for US \$112 million from the international community garnered only US \$29 million as of late June 1999, with a further US \$12 million pledged for relief efforts outside the appeal; previous appeals never met 75% of the targets.⁵⁹

The wars have miserably affected the sustainable economic development of the country. Existing industries have been destroyed. In consequence, the most vibrant economic activities were the transit trade, opium growing, heroin manufacturing, and the smuggling of duty-free goods into Pakistan. The value of the transit trade was estimated at US \$2.5 billion in 1997, half of Afghanistan's gross domestic product (GDP) of US \$5 billion.⁶⁰ The Taliban regime in Herat earned US \$30,000 every day on customs duties prior to the closing of the border with Iran in early 1997.⁶¹ The overall annual value of Afghanistan's legal exports declined steadily during the 1990s to a value of well under US \$100 million, whereas the illegal narcotics industry grew to the extent that Afghanistan in 1999 produced 4,581 tons of opium, 75% of the world's total.⁶² As of today, the only significant domestically produced exports are narcotics and some timber and gemstones. Instead of a viable economic base, the country is characterised by illegal or quasi-legal activities related to narcotics, arms trafficking, and

the smuggling of duty-free goods.⁶³ However, little industrial infrastructure has survived as it has been blown up by mines and other unexploded ordnance. Although mine clearing has been under way for over a decade, there are still an estimated 10 million mines scattered throughout the country,⁶⁴ a deterrent to traditional economic growth and repatriation of thousands of refugees. In addition, no Marshall Plan has been provided to rebuild Afghanistan, which has exposed the poor Afghan population to death and starvation, though economic development and human security is claimed to be the hallmark of the US-backed Karzai government in Afghanistan.

The Afghan transitional government under Karzai has questionable legitimacy among the people, is subject to coercion by better-armed entities, and is dependent on international forces in every way.

The overall security condition since September 2001 across the country has remained volatile with an increase in the number of suicide attacks, ambushes, and targeted assassinations. On the whole, “the security at present is out of control, governance is limited and development is slow as a sequel of intermittent bomb explosions, suicide attacks and military encounters.”⁶⁵

Consequently, the population as a whole is in a deplorable lot as regards their resources, psyche, education, healthcare, economy, social organisation, political culture, etc. Moreover, the agony and discomfort to the Afghan population, especially in southern and northern Afghanistan, is not yet over. The hugely expensive process of reconstruction has not yielded the desired results. It has correspondingly hampered institutional growth of the country, and badly impacted human security, healthcare, education, and public utilities. The spill over of Taliban actions has even reached Pakistan proper with bomb and suicide attacks killing tens and thousands and damaging invaluable property assets. To restrict the Taliban, the Pakistan government has geared up all its forces in the North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Waziristan, and other strong holds of the Taliban. Under a new Afghan stabilisation strategy, President Obama, among other things, has sent 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan, reinforcing the 68,000 US and 40,000 allied forces already in the theatre⁶⁶ in order to tackle the mounting violence and to uproot Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other militant safe havens, though it seems to be a billion dollar question if it will be successful. Moreover, the US has funnelled well over US \$10 billion in military aid to bolster Pakistan’s counter-terrorism capabilities in the volatile border regions with Afghanistan.⁶⁷ In summary, the Afghan transitional government under

Karzai has questionable legitimacy among the people, is subject to coercion by better-armed entities, and is dependent on international forces in every way. Without security, there can be no reconstruction, and without reconstruction there can be no nation-building, thus leaving Afghanistan susceptible to continued instability and penetration by international terrorism. The lack of security, economic development, effective rule of law, and coordination of effort stand in the way of the sustainable progress of the country.

The social and psychological effects and the violations of human rights associated with assassinations are more devastating than a body count.

The above discussion amply demonstrates that the decade-long war in Afghanistan since 11 September 2001 has caused the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians from insurgents and foreign military actions, as well as the deaths of possibly tens of thousands of Afghan civilians indirectly as a consequence of displacement, starvation, disease, exposure, lack of medical care, crime, lawlessness, and the destruction of their homes, property, and personal assets. In addition, the social and psychological effects and the violations

of human rights associated with assassinations are more devastating than a body count. An individual deciding to join a district *shura*, to campaign for a particular candidate, to take a job with a development organisation, or to speak freely about a new Taliban commander in the area often knows that their decision may have life or death consequences. Assassinations aim to deter individuals from exercising their basic human rights and freedom of expression, political participation, association, work and education. This suppression of individual rights also has political, economic, psychological and social consequences as it impedes governance and development efforts. Neither Afghan national security nor international military forces have been able to protect civilians from assassinations. In addition, the abductions of civilians increased by 83% compared to 2009, from 137 in 2009 to 251 in 2010. Added to this, insecurity, continuing violence and the pervasive atmosphere of intimidation and fear has caused a large displacement to urban centres. Those civilians who have stayed in conflict-affected areas, particularly women, children and the elderly, have seen their quality of life significantly deteriorate. Moreover, the civilian losses at present are a continuation of the extremely high civilian losses occurred during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, and the three periods of dreadful civil war from 1989-2001.

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The International Human Rights Movement - A History

By Aryeh Neier

Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012, 357 pages,
ISBN: 9780691135151.

The history of international human rights law and the human rights movement has been an attractive topic for many authors writing in this field. Aryeh Neier's recent publication, *The International Human Rights Movement – A History*, stands out from the others, largely due to his background. Having been trained as a lawyer in America, Neier worked for many years as an executive director of Human Rights Watch. He was also the president of the Open Society Foundation and the national director of the American Civil Liberties Union. In addition to his administrative tasks, he teaches human rights at leading universities. His approach to the field utilizes a combination of legal knowledge and substantial experience.

The first chapter sets out the underlying theme of the book: “the driving force behind the protection of human rights worldwide, today and for roughly the past thirty-five years, has been the nongovernmental human rights movement” (p. 7). The author examines the campaigns of nongovernmental organizations and human rights activists for the adoption of major treaties, such

as the 1997 Treaty to Ban Landmines and the 1998 Rome Statute. Throughout the book the author addresses the accomplishments of the human rights movement up until now, the issues at present, and the challenges in the upcoming years.

The author's personal observations are one of the book's strengths, particularly concerning the relationships between dominant countries during the Cold War. His informative depiction of the history of the human rights movement demonstrates that although many were the victims of persecution, the Cold War magnified the importance of citizen efforts to promote human rights.

The book has a total of 13 chapters, two of which them center on the leading human rights organizations in the world: Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Neier argues that the Cold War context played a crucial role in the establishment of Amnesty International in 1961. Great credit is given to Amnesty International due to its capacity to survive through the help of its supporters and its impact on human

rights policies globally. As the founder of Human Rights Watch in the 1970s, the author notes that the new organization came into being because of the weak presence of Amnesty International in the United States, and it filled the gap of Amnesty's own narrow mandate in the field. Many other human rights organizations operating worldwide are discussed in another chapter. Neier lists only a few countries (including North Korea, Burma, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan) where authorities do not tolerate the emergence of human rights organizations.

It is not only nongovernmental organizations that have pushed states to promote and protect human rights, but also international organizations and national and supranational judiciaries. To underline this fact, Neier pinpoints the influence of the European Union on human rights practices in countries that aspire to full membership. As the author notes, the rulings of the American Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have played an important role in the application of human rights standards at the local level.

The establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court to prosecute and punish those accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide is covered in detail in

the section "Accountability". The author once more shares his personal experience concerning the efforts of some states to undermine the legitimacy and the authority of the International Criminal Court. Even though he is a strong defendant of the International Criminal Court, he expresses doubts about its future capability to carry-out investigations against the leaders of powerful countries.

Neier's book is about the tireless history of the human rights movement. The author carefully analyzes the role the movement has played in protecting the basic human rights of those accused of terror crimes in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the significant role of human rights activists during the Arab revolutions. Moreover, in the final pages of the book, the author points out future challenges that the movement will face in the coming decades.

All in all, one should not assume that the book is only about the development of the international human rights movement. Neier takes the opportunity to use his legal knowledge to comment on certain disputed concepts and subjects in international human rights law, such as "self-determination", "independence", "universal jurisdiction", "humanitarian intervention", "the responsibility to protect", "preventive detention", "enforcing second generation rights

by courts”, “the connection between developments and rights”, “suspending *habeas corpus* when countering terrorism”, and “the application of international humanitarian law to asymmetric conflicts”.

I would like to conclude with my sole critical remark, which is that, although the title suggests that the book is about the international human rights movement, more than half of the information provided in each chapter concerns developments that took place in the United States. Even a quick look

at the index pages demonstrates that the majority of the names of individuals, institutions, and cases that are listed have American affiliation. Nevertheless, this in no way undercuts the value of the work in contributing to the field of human rights.

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Küyerel Dönüşümler: Küreselleşme, Zihniyet, Siyaset (Glocal Transformations: Globalisation, Mentality, Politics)

By Nurullah Ardiç and Sevinç Alkan Özcan (eds.)

İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2012, 253 pages, ISBN: 9786055383190.

Globalisation has become the central point of world politics. Developments in technology and communication have made it easier and faster for people to be in contact with each other and to engage in cultural interaction. Globalisation is often described as the interaction of people living in different regions of the world in the context of a social, economic and cultural circulation of goods, labour and services. It can thus be argued that the globalisation process

has started to affect every field. However, the concept of globalisation has become cloudy because it has been used as an explanatory tool for incongruous processes. Conversely, academia has tried to define the globalisation process in order to prevent the concept from being used to explain everything. This book, *Küyerel Dönüşümler: Küreselleşme, Zihniyet, Siyaset (Glocal Transformations: Globalisation, Mentality, Politics)*, edited by Nurullah Ardiç and Sevinç

Alkan Özcan, develops new viewpoints on the globalisation process with an emphasis on its multi-dimensionality. The book analyses not only the effects of the globalisation process on countries, sectors, groups and individuals, but also reactions and arguments against it.

The book takes the concept of “glocal” to examine the interaction between global processes and local dynamics. The book consists of nine chapters, each a separate article that originally came from the symposium entitled “Globalisation” that was held by the Foundation for the Sciences and Arts’ Center for Global Studies (KAM) in Istanbul in 2004. In the first chapter, “Globalisation and the Crisis of Individual and Civilisation Crisis”, Ahmet Davutoğlu discusses globalisation from three perspectives- stoicism, cynicism and Epicureanism. Stoicism tries to legitimate the current international system by using the arguments of the “end of history”, “clash of civilisations” and “new world order”. Cynicism focuses on postmodern relativities, and Epicureanism looks to maximise individual pleasure instead of the normative happiness that is formulated as Mcworldism. In this context Davutoğlu calls for a new approach in the globalisation process which will connect globalosity and pluralism, inter-civilisational dialogue and intra-civilisational unity, metaphysics and moral happiness.

Kazım Baycar seeks to place globalisation in a historical frame in his chapter “To Globalise the History: Turkey’s Position in the Context of Discussion of the Ottoman Empire and the Nation-State”. He asks fundamental questions regarding globalisation: How do historians perceive the globalisation concept? When did globalisation start? What are the differences between current and past globalisation processes? And how can the Ottoman Empire’s history in the context of globalisation be dealt with? He identifies two approaches to investigate the globalisation process: the historical and the actual approaches. According to the historical approach, the globalisation process dates back to very early in time and has had distinct characteristics at different times. The actual approach on the other hand claims that globalisation has consisted of two waves. The first wave ran from the mid-19th century to the First World War, and the second wave emerged with neo-liberal politics in the 1970s and lasted until the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Although both waves involved the mobility of goods, services and labour, the actual approach seems to be more economics based in its handling of the globalisation process. Baycar examines Ottoman history in the context of these two approaches and emphasises the economic perspective in particular.

Nurullah Ardiç, in the next chapter, “Turkey’s Position in the context of Globalisation and Nation-State Discussions”, discusses the relationship between globalisation and the nation-state and Turkey’s position. Ardiç argues that globalisation has hindered the nation-state in some areas but in other areas it has strengthened it. According to Ardiç, Turkey has been affected by globalisation in social, economic, cultural and communication fields, and especially in the city of Istanbul. Mehmet Fatih Aysan also claims that it is useless to ignore the demographic and social elements by exclusively focusing on the economic challenges of globalisation to the welfare state. Aysan, in his chapter “Globalisation, Crisis and Welfare State”, tells of health and other social security cuts and the problems that immigration poses on welfare states. In the globalisation process, these problems also reveal themselves in matters related to the state, the family and the market which will shape the future of welfare states.

Immigration is also one of the outcomes of globalisation, and Turkey is a country located in the immigration flows. Özge Aktaş analyses immigration and Turkey’s role in global immigration in his chapter “1960-2000 Global Immigration and Turkey’s Position in the Immigration Area”. Aktaş sees global immigration databases as fundamental

sources for quantitative analysis, and in this chapter, she examines the links between the historical continuity and changes in global immigration during the years of 1960 and 2000. Yunus Kaya and Ekrem Karakoç in their chapters look to answer the question of “does globalisation raise anti-immigrant sentiments?” Their findings show that unemployment especially triggers anti-immigration sentiments.

Sevinç Alkan Özcan researches the cultural dimension of globalisation in the context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the chapter “Globalisation and Nationalism: The Former Soviet Area”, in which she examines the reform efforts of the Soviet Union and the nationalist movements. In the next chapter, “The Spectre of Subaltern Globalisation”, Imtiaz Ahmad gives details about “globalisation from below” and “inverse globalisation”. Ahmad focuses on transnational crime and the economics of the process. The internet is definitely the most important development of the 21st century as it facilitates the transmission of information and improves communication. Relying on this, Bünyamin Atıcı examines the effects of the internet in international cooperation in the chapter entitled “Internet as an Effect Area of Transnational Actors”. The author emphasises that the internet has become a dominant element of international organisations such as the

UN, NATO, the EU, and Amnesty International.

Overall, the book presents useful viewpoints about globalisation in different fields. At the same time it gives new approaches in the study of the globalisation process. As such the book

contributes to the existing literature and is therefore strongly recommended for readers and researchers.

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Türkiye’de Militarist Devlet Söylemi (The Militarist State Discourse in Turkey)

By Ali Balcı

Ankara: Kadim Yayınları, 2011, 168 pages, ISBN: 9789759000240.

Militarist State Discourse in Turkey by Ali Balcı is a survey of the period between 1960 and 1983 in Turkey, a period which encompasses three military coups. Utilizing Michel Foucault’s concept of discourse, Balcı analyses the militaristic discourse that thoroughly dominated the state discourse between 1960 and 1983. The main argument of the study is that the militarist discourse dominated every sphere in Turkey, from the state apparatus to society and to the economy, at this time. Although the book can be read as part of the growing critical literature on civilian-military relations in today’s Turkey, it differs from other studies by situating the militaristic discourse at the centre of its analysis.

The first part of the book defines the term “militarism” and sets the global context where this militarism spread, namely during the Cold War. “Militarisation” and “militarism” are used interchangeably to denote the intervention of the armed forces in politics and the prevalent military-inspired practices in state institutions and society (pp. 20-1). Both terms are also accompanied by a “militarist discourse” which refers, rather ambiguously though, to a comprehensive set of discursive practices embodying the military effect(s) in politics and society. Therefore, Balcı uses the term militarist discursive period (*militarist söylemsel dönem*) to refer to a specific time span

in the political history of Turkey when militarism, militarisation, and militarist discourses were not challenged by any notable civic oppositional discourse. The book also challenges the existing analyses of military takeovers in Turkey which view them either as inevitable results of an evolutionary political process or historical characteristics of Turkish society. The author argues that the militarist discourse of the period can only be understood by looking at concomitant conditions of the time and their fusion in Turkey and the world (p. 11; pp. 33-41).

The rivalry between the US and Russia and its ramifications on global politics set the historical ground for the emergence and spread of militarist discourse all over the world. Examples of military takeovers from Third World countries provide evidence for the comprehensive effects of this rivalry in the Cold War era (pp. 19-32). Therefore, the militarist discourse prevailing in Turkey in this period is contextualised in the global context of the Cold War. And the increased power of the military is not independent of global power relations of the time. Especially, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and Turkey's entry in the NATO in 1952 were conducive to the proliferation and institutionalisation of the Turkish army in Turkish politics (p. 44). In this section of the book, an extensive body of literature is also

surveyed that shows this relationship. For example, the book quotes some examples from other studies to reveal the direct involvement of US intelligence in the formation of paramilitary groups in Turkey against the so-called threat of Communism as it did in other NATO countries (p. 45).

In the second part, which is the main body of the book, Balcı provides a thorough account of the historical incidents that led to the toppling of the Democrat Party, Turkey's ruling party in in the 1950s. This, indeed, is where the strengths and weaknesses of the book lie. In this section, Balcı argues that the period under question poses an inconspicuously distinct character from other periods of modern Turkey as all dissident voices were silenced and all aspects of political and social life were militarised. Yet, at the same time, the author concedes that the very conditions that led to this period were also inseparable from the previous conditions. In support of his argument, the author takes on board a considerable amount of literature and examples from various texts that are critically analysed.

The foundation of the National Security Council and the OYAK Bank (the bank of the Turkish armed forces) are analysed to emphasise the political and economic aspects of militarisation. The legal adjustments that intensified the silence imposed by the army, for example

by banning any criticism of the Turkish Armed Forces, are duly exemplified. More significantly, what Balcı brings to the fore consistently is that the deferential attitude of the political parties of the time did not only contribute to the legitimacy of the presence of militarism, but also exacerbated it with their hostile stances towards the Communist movements of the day. This argument is vital because it challenges the image of political parties as subordinate entities and puts them under scrutiny as active agents of this silent period, which Feroz Ahmad famously termed “democracy of political tutelage” (cited on p. 75). The silence that cuts across boundaries within the trajectories of different political groups in Turkey, the leftists, rightists and Islamists, amounts to the internalisation of the army’s role as the protector of the

country not only against foreign enemies but against the country itself (p. 56).

Balcı concludes that despite the fact that the predominance of the militarist discourse has diminished over time, it still remains a debilitating sub-category of the state discourse in Turkey. Without a doubt, this book is key to understanding today’s Turkish politics in which the remnants of this military discourse are deeply ingrained in all aspects of life. And more importantly, the author’s invariable emphasis on “silence” subtly illuminates the suppression imposed through the militarist discourse; however, this topic needs to be developed further as an analytical category.

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Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History

By Thomas Barfield

New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010, 389 pages,
ISBN: 9780691154411.

Since the war against the Taliban and the intervention in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the academic approach to studying the country has mainly centred on the fields of international politics and

geostrategy studies, both of which have mainly looked at Afghanistan’s role in the international system or its economic and strategic position. In a psychological environment shaped by the mainstream media’s strong views, a

reliable evaluation about Afghanistan has been limited, as evidenced by the proliferation of Orientalist articles. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, written by Thomas Barfield, however, has a different perspective with a robust argument that makes it easy to understand the circumstances which have brought modern Afghanistan into existence.

Barfield, as an archaeologist and anthropologist, firstly addresses the issue of culture for an in-depth comprehension of Afghan people and politics. He questions the unique aspects of Afghan politics and the common myths pertaining to the country's political history. He challenges some deep-seated assessments attributed to Afghanistan, such as it being "ungovernable" or "the graveyard of empires", which do not always correspond to the realities of Afghan history. He points out that stable governments have been established in Afghanistan, especially during the period starting from the Mongol invasion in the 13th century to the collapse of Safavid Dynasty in the 18th century, or during the Durrani Empire, which lasted from 1747 to the Saur revolution two centuries later (p. 51; p. 225). His analysis examines long-term trends with a more historical perspective irrespective of short-term perspectives or daily changes. Undoubtedly the numerous trips he has taken to the region since the 1970s and

his 40 years of field experience have also played a role.

In his historical analysis on Afghanistan, Barfield analyses the tension between the *asabiya* (desert) and the *umran* (urban), and adapts it to Afghanistan brilliantly even though he is not a historian (pp. 82-84). The contribution of ibn Khaldun, whom he takes as a reference, in his comments that integrate the current conditions with a long-term historical perspective is clearly visible. It may be considered an appealing feature for Turkish readers. Additionally his approach, which stays clear of Orientalist clichés and focuses on the Turkish dynasties that mark the history of Afghanistan, offers a different perspective to Turkish readers and shows the deep-rooted ties between Turkey and Afghanistan, rediscovering the strong traditional character of Turkish politics and ruling.

While the tradition of Turkish rule in Afghanistan gradually disappeared after 1747 when the Pashtun-dominated dynasties took over, Barfield considers that development the embodiment of an unstable, non-permanent ruling attitude and an elusive political culture. This gives the impression that Barfield does not focus on Pashtun identity and policies in certain parts of the book. He also does not adequately use sources published in local languages which may

be considered a shortcoming in his study. But for all that his book is a stimulating introduction for many people who are interested in Afghanistan's history and political culture due to the book's clear writing, interesting and thought-provoking examples and avoidance of clichés.

As he questions the clichés about Afghanistan Barfield firstly addresses the argument that "the country has never been occupied" and brings that into question, stating that Afghanistan was seized by many conquerors, including Chinggis Khan and Alexander the Great. Analysing the successful strategy which has resulted in Afghanistan being called "the graveyard of empires", Barfield argues that Afghanistan can be occupied but that it reacts to invaders with a strong "autoimmune disorder" and even if it were occupied it would make the country ungovernable. And he adds that this strategy, which functions efficiently against external conquerors, would harm the country when directed towards the Afghan people themselves as it is today (p. 255). However, the author states that despite a quite fragmented political-social identity which consists of diverse ethnic and religious groups, what secures the integrity of Afghanistan and the legitimacy of the government are the Afghan people's faith and traditions, and that civil war is considered *fitna* (sedition) in the country, and therefore the rulers

who have taken the lead in Afghanistan could build up their legitimacy easily. He emphasises that the Afghan people would even prefer a poor ruler instead of *fitna*. According to Barfield "the students of Western political science would note that this line of reasoning closely parallels that of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*, in which he justified the need for absolute rulers" (pp. 73-74).

Furthermore, in pointing out that Afghanistan is a country full of paradoxes Barfield mentions that the Afghan people have learned how to turn any such paradox into an advantage. Commenting that it is necessary to know the strategies pursued by those dynasties that have successfully ruled Afghanistan, the author compares the attitudes pertaining to those regimes with the current Western perspective. Barfield compares Afghanistan to cheese, arguing that there are different perception about cheese in the East and West. He says that Westerners perceive Afghanistan as a quite smooth and standard American cheese, whereas the former Eastern dynasties, which had succeeded in ruling the country, especially the Turko-Persian ruling tradition, perceived the country as Swiss cheese with holes on it; in other words those regimes used to take for granted any gap where it was not possible to dominate in ruling the country. He suggests that the Turkish and Persian rulers were successful because they had

never thought of dominating the entire country except for certain trade routes and some important strategic corridors, or worried themselves about filling in every gap or directly ruling every area. The message he gives is as follows: “Ignore the holes, rule the cheese” (pp. 67-70). He argues that the Turko-Persian ruling pattern was more effective as such flexibility ensured that they governed by adopting different rules for different regions rather than trying to impose the same rules and laws on every region. He mentions a similar pattern was implemented in the region by the British who did not try to exercise control beyond the Hindu Kush Mountains even during the great imperial expansion in the Victorian period. According to Barfield the fact that it is not possible to capture and govern a large part of Afghanistan must be recognised.

Suggesting that contemporary Afghan history starts with the Durrani who established Pashtun dominance in 1747, the author underlines that the Pashtuns have long considered themselves a privileged ethnic group for this reason. However, the author argues that Afghanistan had been ruled by Turks, Mongolians or Persians for hundreds of years and there was more stable periods in the country prior to 1747 and the rise of the Pashtun dominance. Highlighting the strong historical ties between Afghanistan and the Central

Asia, the author states that in this context the connection between Pakistan and Afghanistan was established on the basis of a common Pashtun identity, but that this Pashtun predominance remains insufficient to understanding the country on its own. Giving detailed information about the ethnic groups in Afghanistan (pp. 23-31), Barfield underlines that only the Turkish dynasties and the hierarchical Turko-Mongolian ruling traditions have demonstrated the capability of joining together the different tribes in a stable manner in the past. He says that such dynasties created an inherited hierarchy once established and the ruler would be faced with no representational or legitimacy issues despite the egalitarian lineage system in Bedouin or Pashtun tribes where each tribe could become the leader through power or influence rather than a certain descent. He argues that this egalitarian system is a quite unstable and troublesome system as the leader is forced to persuade the masses every day to make them follow him and everyone steps up as a chief with a desire to become the leader (pp. 78-82). He argues that the reason the Pashtun dynasties ruled over Afghanistan successfully for 230 years, from 1740 to 1978, was thanks to the Turko-Mongolian system, and that the Durrani founded a royal dynasty rather than a ruling pattern based upon an egalitarian assembly (Loja Jirga) after they had come into power in the early

18th century. He emphasises that after this system was removed by non-royalist communists in 1978, stability could never be regained and it was not possible to eliminate the disorder resulting from Pashtuns' traditional egalitarian system.

Remarking that Afghanistan is not a failed nation even if it is a failed state, Barfield addresses this issue in chapter five, saying there are four good reasons for this. Firstly, "the persistence of the old central Asian view of political order that never linked ethnicity with nationalism". Secondly, "each ethnic group in Afghanistan felt secure enough in its own region to cooperate with others as partners at the national level". Thirdly, "the negative consequences of disunion outweighed internal frictions" and fourthly, "Afghans had few illusions about the nature of state politics, and the compromises necessary to engage in them" (pp. 277-280). Today different groups in Afghanistan define the central government as "an arranged marriage, not a love match".

According to Barfield in addition to those components which would

facilitate the transformation process in Afghanistan the experiences that the Afghan people have had as refugees in recent history has given them diverse expectations, resulting in a country which is more integrated with the "Turko-Persian" identity thanks to the new access routes opening to the Central Asia. Furthermore, while Afghanistan has regained its geopolitical importance thanks to the strategic mineral resources that exist in the country. Although the transformation process is slow, Afghanistan will not disintegrate over ethnic identities like Yugoslavia (p. 252; p. 278). In this context Barfield's book can be considered as an interesting work about the latest developments and which questions Western clichés as well as a reminder of the shared ties between Turkey and Afghanistan. Additionally Barfield's comments on developments, which have a distinct humanitarian sensitivity as a result of him being an academic who has spent many years in the region, are praiseworthy.

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No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest and the Coming Global Turn

By Charles A. Kupchan

New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 258 pages, ISBN 9780199739394.

The World America Made

By Robert Kagan

New York: Random House, 2012, 160 pages, ISBN 9780307961327.

There have been a number of volumes published in the last six months regarding world politics and heralding a multi-polar global order, such as Friedman and Mandelbaum's *It Used to be Us: How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back* (2011) and Joseph Nye's *The Future of Power* (2011). The two volumes under review here, by Charles Kupchan (of the Council on Foreign Relations and a veteran of the Clinton White House) and Robert Kagan (senior fellow in Brookings Institute and top foreign policy advisor to Governor Mitt Romney), continue this theme. These are both works that claim to be cool-headed diagnoses, offering advice for the American government before 2012 elections.

In the past year the two authors have been duelling in US foreign policy

journals articles where Kupchan has referred to Kagan as a neo-con (though not by name). The war of pens between Kupchan and Kagan was intensified when President Obama told the foreign policy press that his thinking has been influenced by Kagan's latest book. It is not often that a president praises his chief rival's foreign policy advisor just before an election.

Robert Kagan contends in the first chapter of *The World that America Made* that the US's primacy will remain robust, as long as it remains committed to its international military commitments and its share of global economic output remains unchanged. In the following chapters, Kagan argues that the American order is a fusion of the important and the desirable features of the current international world order. Kagan remarks that some of the

emerging powers that would challenge the US's primacy have made important advances, such as Brazil and Turkey plus with the usual suspects of China and India. Nations who are classified as "democracies with an attitude" in Kupchan's words (p. 141), such as India and Turkey (incidentally, he forgets to add Brazil to this list), are either strategic partners of the US or will not be able to realise their regional ambitions any time soon. He argues that "just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not mean it is a rising great power" (p. 69). He speculates that the biggest threat to the US's hegemony is the loss of self-belief, which started in the days of President Wilson, in its primacy in global economics and politics, as historical comparisons to the Romans would show (pp. 81-82). To provide evidence that America is not in decline as a benevolent force in the world, but only in a temporary retreat, Kagan cites some significant examples of other such temporary retreats, especially during the Cold War by US allies. But again, although past successes in bouncing back from temporary hindrances do not guarantee future successes, Kagan declares that "the American system, for all its often stultifying qualities, has also shown a greater capacity to adapt and recover from difficulties than many other nations, including its geopolitical competitors" (p. 93).

Kagan in his final chapter concludes that the US cannot afford to be the "Greta Garbo" of nations, referring to the American self-perception of being the reluctant sheriff who only goes to war when someone else calls them to. While Kagan points out the inaccuracies of this self-perception, he also states that neither the US nor the rest of the world could afford to have American power recede. Kagan does not acknowledge any potential effects of a possible decline in power in the pillars of US power, Germany and the EU. And he is ready to gloss over the consequences of the West's diminishing clout because he thinks that most emerging nations will cast their lot in with the United States rather than challenge American hegemony. "Only the growth of China's economy," he writes, "can be said to have implications for American power in the future" (pp. 119-126). Kagan reassures Americans that even rising powers, such as China, will not attempt to challenge the US's hegemony and will align nicely with the US in important security and defence issues. Moreover, the US will only benefit from the strength of its new allies.

Unlike Kagan and the neoconservative brain trust to which he belongs, Charles Kupchan's volume neither celebrates nor bemoans the decline of the US's superpower status as he assesses the possibilities for power sharing and co-existence. He states that in a multi-polar

world there will be striking diversity and that alternative conceptions of domestic and international order will compete and co-exist on the global stage. Kupchan advises that before long, the US should start focusing on managing the transition (p. 183).

Kupchan claims to peer from the lens of the *longue durée* (Ferdinand Braudel); however, he really does not have a long-term view in his book. In chapters one and two, Kupchan explains with broad strokes the rise and fall of the West as a product of its circumstances, looking at its readiness to countenance change and welcome a religious and political diversity that overturned the economic, political and ideological status quo. The rising Rest (as the first example of the rising Rest, the Ottoman Empire is given special attention), according to Kupchan, do not quite cut it.

The third chapter of the book is endemic of both the main strengths and the weaknesses of the book. Kupchan as a foreign policy analyst shines in the policy advice sections, but his whole civilisational analysis takes him into comparative politics territory, where he simply lacks the methodology and a systemic approach. His overreliance on public opinion polls is symptomatic of this.

Kupchan manages to give the global view and he picks through larger trends in the realist vein, a school of thought which acknowledges how power relations are shaped by interdependence. Though being comprehensive, his comparison of the rising powers lacks the focus and discipline of comparative politics. Kupchan, in more than one place, references Kagan's earlier work, *Return to History*, in which he wrote that a nation's form of government, not its civilisation, is the best predictor of its geopolitical alignment. Kupchan disagrees strongly with Kagan. He claims that a nation's geopolitical location and its strategic interests, its socioeconomic make up, its place in the international hierarchy, and its religious orientation are as important in shaping its foreign policy as its form of government (p. 144).

In the fourth and fifth chapters, Kupchan lists the potential rivals to the West's power and dismisses each of them for not having what it takes. Several references are made to Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries that experienced the Arab Spring. Turkey is characterised as a democracy with an attitude, along with Brazil and India, as Kupchan explains that recent developments in Turkey underscore yet another way in which Muslim countries are taking their own path to modernity. According to him, these rising stars, even if they share some of the West's liberal

values, will clash over status and prestige with the West because they may feel it is their turn for a place in the sun. The Arab reawakening is referred to as the rising of the middle classes. He warns that religion and politics have become more intertwined and that Western observers should stop assuming that the spread of democracy would mean the spread of more Western values as the clamour for more democracy could mean standing up more to the US, Europe and Israel.

Chapters six and seven are the foreign policy advice chapters and are the strongest in the book. According to Kupchan, the transition to multi-polarity should be managed on two fronts: cohesion in the West, and consensus seeking between the West and the Rest. Team work between those sharing the same values such as the US and EU is advised. And, contrary to Kagan's view, this team should cooperate with the next world and have modest goals because the US has neither the economic means nor the political will to be the world hegemon any more (pp. 146-187).

Kupchan's final section is devoted to the rise of China. He adopts a historical comparison of the Sino-American struggle to the Monroe Doctrine when the UK let the US prevail in its immediate sphere of influence. Similar to the US in the 1890s, as China's naval strength grows, it will challenge the US in western Pacific. Yet, Kupchan thinks that

the US should not totally accommodate Chinese ambitions as the UK mistakenly accommodated Germany preceding the First World War.

Kupchan advises the next president to embrace "progressive populism at home" and strategic restraint for US foreign policy, guided by a mix of containment and deterrence (p. 71). He acknowledges that the US's power is in decline, but rather than fight against it, he thinks the US should re-entrench strategically to let the rising powers shoulder their share of the burden. Kupchan's diagnosis about American politics is quite apt: a sluggish, ineffective response is fuelling support for partisan nationalist policies by intensifying popular discontent, and the collapse of the middle. His diagnosis about the EU and the European states is less accurate. While Kupchan bemoans the "renationalization of Europe" (p. 152), one could not help ask when was Europe ever de-/post-national? Most of the EU institutions and policy making has been intergovernmental. In order for European Union members to be able to act decisively in the conflicts in their immediate Mediterranean neighbourhood, they need to aggregate strength and overcome inward looking tendencies.

Both authors seem to miss two important developments on both sides of the Atlantic. When Kagan says the US decline is bunk and that the US

cannot afford to let go of the hegemonic order that is set its image, Kagan as well as Kupchan overlook the rise of a new wave of isolationism in the US. How would the rise to power of the Tea Partiers and libertarians go hand in hand with protecting US supremacy in global politics? Similarly, when Kupchan advises Europeans to increase their collective means if they are to make credible their ambitions to become a more capable actor on the global stage, he seems to dismiss the debilitating effects of the deep structural and economic crisis Europe is in.

The key limitation of these works is that they are written for a specific

audience, i.e. an American domestic audience, and aim to provide an overview of where things stand and what is to come. Despite its methodological shortcomings, Kupchan's book is a superior account of the challenges of multipolarity and provides a more realistic recipe for managing diversity for a new/old team of American policy makers after the election. Yet, both volumes manage to give foreign policy analysts an update on which kind of thinking (academic and policy oriented) is reigning in the capitol of the world's current superpower.

Deniz Bingöl,
Ph.D., ACCENT Int.

Arab Spring, Libyan Winter

By Vijay Prashad

Oakland: AK Press, 2012, 255 pages, ISBN: 9781849351126.

The wave of social and political change that has been blowing through the Middle East and North Africa regions has been identified by some as “the Arab Revolution”, “the Arab Awakening” and by the author of this book, Vijay Prashad, as “the Arab Spring”. The fruits of the Arab Spring have been seen as the initiatives taken by

countries previously ruled by dictatorial regimes to build democratic systems and institutions following free and fair elections. Following the recent events in Libya that ended with the killing of the American ambassador, attention was brought once again to the hardships seen in political and social settings that are going through democratisation.

The aim of Vijay Prashad's book, *Arab Spring, Libyan Winter*, is to examine the consequences of the Arab Spring, and to make predictions regarding Libya's future through describing the state of the country before the revolution and then after. The book is made up of two parts. The first part explores the Arab Spring in general, while the second identifies the transformation of the process in Libya.

The first part of the book argues that the Arab Spring was completely influenced by the inner dynamics of the different Arab countries, and that the changes were not either unprecedented or without motives. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the Arab Spring's underlying historical events and processes. In the introductory section, the author—who has explored Marxist literature on the organisational schemes and discipline of opposition parties and bodies—uses a “mole” metaphor to stress the necessity of movements within the Arab Spring of addressing public demands and organising effectively in order to become strong and successful revolutionary bodies.

The author uses a comparative analysis approach to examine the factors and dynamics that caused the Arab Spring to happen in Libya, as well as in Tunisia and Egypt, countries that have gone through the same path. The author stresses that the Egyptian and Tunisian cases are

different than the Libyan case due to the different nature of military involvement. When the protests and the unrest started in Egypt and Tunisia, the armed forces of these countries first took a step back, and then began moving in a parallel direction with the public. The author argues that in Libya the situation was very different since the armed forces loyal to Gaddafi were very cruel to the public (p. 18). This point is one to remember, especially in the case of the new Mohamed Mursi government in Egypt and the Egyptian military's continued desire to be involved in state matters, as well as its initiatives that are apparently trying to preserve the remnants of the guardianship regime.

A particularly interesting part of the book consists of Vijay Prashad's thoughts on how the revolution was “hijacked” by the West and how the West was involved in the revolution. Prashad, who is from South Asia, has differing views on this when compared to other authors. The author explores post-Arab Spring developments in the region and the inconsistent policies adopted by the Atlantic powers. The fact that NATO showed no desire to intervene in other countries influenced by the Arab Spring, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen, while it wasted no time in intervening in Libya and stabilising the situation there, is also pointed out by the author. The reason for pointing out this particular fact is also the author's main

thesis. The author argues that the Western countries intervened in Libya because they saw that a possible deterioration in the oil-trading relationships could be a risk for them. Accordingly with this line of thinking, the West hijacked this revolution through intervening in oil-rich Libya.

Many separate sections examining primary causes and the dynamics of the Arab Spring are covered in the first part of the book. For example in the section titled “Bread”, the economic factors of the events in North Africa are explored. The title is related to the economic systems of the region and looks at the “Bread Problem” through giving historical examples. “Bread Democracy”, as Tunisian intellectual Larbi Sadiki defines it, led to uprisings against the governments of Tunisia and Egypt as a result of a decline in the bread subsidies to the people. Another perspective on the economic state of the public is that the oil revenues in Libya were actually causing starvation and inequality in the country. The argument is that the oil wealth in Libya did not reach the public. The author then looks at how the Arab world can use these oil resources to build and strengthen its own prosperity (pp. 24-25).

Another factor that triggered the Arab Spring is explored under the section titled “Dignity”. The inequality created by having only a small minority getting

wealthier from oil revenues caused the majority to feel that they were second class citizens and not treated justly. These feelings increased people’s longing for dignity and honour. In this section particular attention is brought to the fact that most of the slogans in the Arab world have been about honour and dignity. The role of Islamic groups previously held in check by dictatorial regimes is also discussed. These movements, after having been forcibly contained for many years, rose to prominence after the Arab Spring and have become important actors in the transition period, especially in Tunisia and Egypt. Classified by the author as “Allah Parties”, these parties are being seen as a legitimate part of the political process and as parties that must have their own place in the system. However, the author has some concerns regarding the loyalty Islamic parties have to democracy, especially when forming democratic institutions and devising social policies (p. 43). As also illustrated in the first section of the book, and in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, there has always been unrest among the people fuelled by anti-government sentiments. In fact, the author argues, the Arab Spring didn’t just erupt after Bouazizi in Tunisia lit himself on fire. These unrests are not history in the making, but rather the continuation of a struggle in a region that has long been the playground for outside powers. In order for a real

spring to come to Tunisia and Egypt, the remnants of the military guardianship mechanisms must be completely removed from the governments.

The author draws attention to the attitude of the United States regarding the uprisings and pursuit of democracy in the Arab world. He focuses on the Egyptian case to say that the maltreatment of the public, the torture and the violations of human rights by the previous regime were completely ignored by the US government (p. 53). The author then goes on to explain the four major foreign policy questions that can shape the United States' outlook towards the Arab Spring. These concerns are: maintaining stability and the flow of oil to the United States, making sure the governments of these countries align with the United States against terrorism, ensuring that radical groups don't take a negative attitude towards Israel, and keeping Iran in check (pp. 57-58).

In the second part of the book, Libya's history, present situation and its future are discussed with a focus on the NATO intervention that came with the Arab Spring. Through a comprehensive research of relevant literature and statements made by interested parties, the author shows how the NATO intervention was encouraged and even called upon. The author doesn't relate the outbreak of uprisings in Libya to

economic depression or social injustice but rather to the Gaddafi government's ruthlessly crushing any demands of democracy. Also, the author indicates that unlike in Egypt and Tunisia the people filling the squares in Libya were from various different socioeconomic classes. Here he reinforces his thesis about oil and its facilitating effect on a NATO intervention.

The author evaluates the uprising which began on 15 February 2011, and makes a particularly interesting point that the Western countries changed their attitudes towards the Arab Spring once the regimes in oil-producing countries were in danger. According to the author, Western countries went from approving of the changes brought about by the Arab Spring, to trying to modify the changes, and finally to directly intervening in the process and guiding the changes to fit their own interests. The author argues that in Libya the main goal of the Atlantic countries was to deflect all possible attention that could be brought on the Gulf countries to Libya, which US and Western interests didn't depend on as dearly. As a result the UN and NATO representatives wasted no time in classifying Gaddafi's acts against his people as genocide. These statements were highlighted in the international media (p. 164). The United Nations resolution on 19 March creating a no-fly zone was followed by air attacks by France

and the United States. At this point the author makes another point that is worth paying attention to when he argues that the debate the Atlantic nations went through between either allowing massacres or about intervening caused them to ignore any diplomatic efforts that could have resulted in a ceasefire and made Libya go straight to the winter without experiencing the spring. The author believes that this debate was to guise what the intervention really was-a move solely to protect Western interests.

In the conclusion the author stresses once again that after the Arab Spring nothing will be the same in the Arab world. He connects the roots of the Arab Spring to events that took place long ago, as well as to the oil hegemony the West wants to establish in the region. The author argues that the NATO intervention in Libya was conducted as a result of the oil and energy interests of

the West. This book is very important in understanding how the Arab Spring changed the political and social structures in Libya, a country where a government still can't be established. In the introduction the causes of the Arab Spring and its development are analysed, which connects to the second part of the book titled "Libyan Winter". In this second part statements from related parties are analysed and light is shed on the attempts to legitimate the NATO intervention in the eyes of the international community. The book clearly shows that the Western powers got involved in the process and manipulated it out of its natural course in order to secure their own interests in the region. It is a vital resource to understand the past and present of the Arab Spring and the reaction of the international community.

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Articles in Journals

John Smith, "Article Title", *Journal Name*, Vol. #, No. # (Month Year), p. #.

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Articles in Edited Books

John Smith, "Article Title", in Mary Jones (ed.), *Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Company, 1999, p.100.

Official Papers

Parliamentary Papers: Select Committee on Manufacturers (Parl. Papers, 1833, VI), 0.456. Subsequent references as:

SC on ... (PP, 1839, VII), 00.2347.

Hansard (Commons), 4th ser. XXXVI, 641-2, 22 Aug. 1895.

Theses

For titles of published and unpublished theses use italics:

John E. Smith, *Title of Thesis*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Name of the University, Year, Chapter #, p. #

Internet References

Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "A Global Spring- Why NATO needs to go Global", at <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/volume13/autumn/DustinDehEz.pdf> [last visited 21 October 09]

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Numbers

Numbers under 10 should be spelled out.

Use numerical values (14, 233) to express numbers 10 and above.


Figures should be used to express numbers under 10 that are grouped for comparison with figures 10 and above: *The results showed that 2 out of 20 recipients disagreed with the proposal.*

Use figures and the percentage sign to represent percentages: *A significant majority, 62%, said they would support the fundraising campaign.*

Use the word "percentage" when a number is not given: *Researchers determined the percentage of rats...*

Dates, ages, and money should be represented by figures: *2 weeks ago, She was a 2-year old, The workers were paid \$5 each.*

Common fractions should be written out: *One fifth of the respondents...*



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