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Humanitarian Diplomacy in Theory and Practice

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Not a single day passes by that we do not hear of a humanitarian crisis around the world. In every corner of our planet political and military conflicts and environmental disasters produce scores of human tragedies. Nowadays, the majority of the troubling scenes involve asylum seekers running away from shattered countries like Libya and Syria.

The source of the most recent and the most dramatic human crises- since World War II- has been the conflict in Syria, as a result of a stalemate between the Assad regime and the opposition. Millions of people have left their homes for neighboring countries like Turkey, Jordan and Iraq; in addition millions of others have been displaced within Syria. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Egypt and other African countries only intensify the human plight across the region.

Other devastating and dramatic scenes- which repeat often- take place in the Mediterranean Sea, either in the form of sinking boats full of asylum seekers or boats surrounded by security guards and those inside being arrested and deported back.[1]

It seems that security measures are not going to be enough to deter those who have lost everything that they possessed, including a tiny hope of possibility that they might continue living a decent life or remaining alive at home.

Despite strict rules and policies against flocks of uninvited asylum seekers, European countries, especially over the last few months, have started to face waves of mass migrations on their borders as a spillover effect of the crisis in Syria.[2] Borders between France and the United Kingdom, Serbia and Hungary, along with the borders between Greece and Macedonia, are sites of the most recent scenes where thousands wait for acceptance around the fences, a situation which declares to the world that the conflict in Syria deserves more attention from the international community.

European countries prepare- albeit unwillingly- for the continuing of migration. Strict regulations, more policing, more fences and tear gas do not

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seem to deter those who flee from chaos for hope. As the number one target country in the last migrant flow, Germany called for comprehensive reform in Europe's approach to the crises: if it is not taken care of now collectively it will have grave consequences for Europe.[3] Let us hope that while Europeans try to find a proper solution to the migrant crises from Syria it will not be too late. With winter approaching and hundreds of thousands of people on the move, a lack of food or shelter will mean life or dead for many civilians. It seems that, at least for now, migrants and their troubled stories have persuaded European leaders to revisit their migration policies.

Although Europe started to feel the humanitarian pressure of the conflict in Syria in the summer of 2015, the neighboring countries have been silently taking the heat of this wave of migrants since the crisis started in 2011. Current UNHCR data indicate[4] that a great majority of displaced Syrians have been hosted by Turkey (1,900,000), Lebanon (1,100,000), Jordan (630,000) and Iraq (250,000), whereas asylum applications for European countries since 2011 is around 350,000, a miniscule number compared to the ever increasing flood of civilians from Syria.

On a relevant note one might want to invite the United States and the Gulf Countries to step up and contribute more financially and coordinate better humanitarian policies towards the easing of the plight of Syrian migrants. President Obama's call for acceptance of 10,000 Syrians[5] to the US is symbolic in nature but encouraging for other actors.

It seems that refugees and their humanitarian plights are going to be one of the major issues that the free and stable world has to deal with and try to find sustainable solutions for.

Due to the persistent nature of the refugee problems around the world, humanitarian diplomacy has to re-emerge stronger from its negligence in the field of international affairs. Several aspects of humanitarian diplomacy await visitation from the scholars in the field including, but not limited to, negotiating across different cultures for human cause, protecting children, women and the vulnerable through diplomacy, state and non-state actors in humanitarian relief efforts, considering the increasingly politicized context of humanitarian aid, access of non-state actors to conflict zones, and the relevance (or irrelevance thereof) of the Geneva Convention of 1856 and relevant international law.[6]

In 2013, a group of scholars gathered together to address some of the issues that humanitarian diplomacy endeavors to cover. Hoping that it would be a small step to trigger several other big ones, an international conference was held on 6 December 2013 in Istanbul, Turkey: *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Theory and Perspectives from the Field*. The

contributions that appear in this issue are edited and peer reviewed versions of selected presentations from that conference.

Mojtaba Mahdavi's article deals with one of the most pressing issues in international relations, the responsibility to protect (R2P). In his article, the "responsibility to protect in the Middle East: A Postcolonial Critique," Mahdavi argues that the "hegemonic neo-liberal discourse of Humanitarianism and paternalistic legacy of Orientalism" cause an expansion of the rift between ethical norms and their practice in international relations. He draws our attention to the conflicting attitudes developed by international actors towards the crises in Libya during the Arab Spring, and Syria. In order to save international ethical norms from the "hegemonic discourse of the neo-liberal order" he proposes a radical reform in the United Nations system and democratization of the world order. In sum, Mahdavi argues this will be possible only with the accomplishment of a just implementation of the R2P doctrine in international affairs.

Bruce Gilley's article, "Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism," focuses on Turkey's humanitarian policies. As one of the new emerging economies, Turkey has risen to third position, in terms of foreign humanitarian aid, after the United States and the United Kingdom. Gilley highlights some of the political motivations involved in the new humanitarian efforts of Turkey's official and non-official NGOs. In his analysis, Bruce Gilley uses the lens of "middle power activism" to better contextualize Turkey's rising humanitarian efforts. He states that Turkey's approach to humanitarian aid might appeal to other emerging actors.

Işıl Acehan's study deals with the formation of the Turkish Red Crescent Societies in the United States. Several studies dealt earlier with the diaspora efforts of Greeks and Armenians in America during World War I and/or during the War of Independence in Turkey after the occupation of the country in 1918. Acehan tries to fill this gap by focusing on the mobilization of the Ottoman diaspora in the United States and their role in providing humanitarian aid to the post-war reconstruction efforts in Turkey. Acehan highlights the heroic efforts of Turkish laborers in the New England region of the United States to raise money for the nationalist struggle against the occupying powers and later reconstruction efforts in the young republic. However modest the results of their efforts might have been, Turkish Americans contributed through their societies in cash and by other means, including an iron lung, which was a much needed medical supply in 1939.

In terms of humanitarian crises, one of the most enduring issues in the world has been the plight of Palestinian refugees. After the Ottoman defeat in World

War I, the partitioning of its Middle Eastern provinces produced several new states and new borders. The Jewish settlements in Palestine following World War I and subsequent wars with Israel after the declaration of its independence (especially in 1948 and 1967) produced huge numbers of displaced Palestinians. Many still live in camps in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria under terrible conditions, and millions of others left their home to seek livelihood in other countries. Jinan Bastaki's article takes on this enduring issue of almost 10 million Palestinian refugees, and discusses problems with their right to return and/ or compensation.

Mark Wild's contribution concerns the humanitarian efforts of China, especially in Africa. Its rapid and continuous development led China to expand its markets around the world. Despite its reception as a powerful rival by the Western world, Wild asserts, China was able to establish new cordial relations with several countries. He argues that China adopted a humanitarian aid policy by supplying credits and financing infrastructural facilities in return for oil and mining rights. "The New Face of Humanitarian Aid and Intervention: China and Its Growing Role in the Realm of African Development" suggests that the conventional style of Western aid operating under the "guise of solving human rights issues,"

and democratization may not be so appealing for several nations, as China's style of humanitarian aid provides an alternative.

In this issue we have two more contributions; one concerns the rapid economic growth in China and the other the EU's democracy promotion in Africa.

Samirataou Dipama and Emel Parlar Dal's article, "The effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger," takes on the issue of effectiveness when political conditions are attached to foreign aid. The authors examine the EU's decision of discontinuation of development aid towards three states, namely Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger based on violations of human rights.

K. Ali Akkemik's "Rapid Economic Growth and Its Sustainability," deals with the question of whether China can sustain its rapid economic growth and if so, under what conditions. He argues that the decline in China's growth may continue primarily because of high investment rates and much needed reform in the financial sector.

This issue of *Perceptions* presents three book reviews: Yusuf Turan Çetiner's *Turkey and the West: From Neutrality to Commitment* (Maryland: University Press of America, 2014) reviewed by İbrahim Erdoğan of Balıkesir University.

Turkey and the European Union: Processes of Europeanization edited by Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer (Ashgate, 2012) is reviewed by Nevra Esentürk of Yalova University.

Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia and Turkey by Şener Aktürk (Cambridge University Press, 2012) is reviewed by Gloria Shkurti from Sakarya University.

Last but not least, the *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Theory and Perspectives from the Field* conference was organized and co-sponsored by the following institutions: the Ankara Center for Political and Economic Research (ASEM), the Center for Strategic Research of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SAM), the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), the Department of Political Science and International Relations and the Center for Modern Turkish Studies of İstanbul Şehir University. I thank all these institutions for their support. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to Ali Resul Usul, the editor in chief, and Birgül Demirtaş, deputy editor of *Perceptions*.

Endnotes

1   Robert Young Pelton, "How Much for a Spot on a Rubber Raft and a Slim Chance at a Better Life?", at http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/09/02/attempts-to-deter-migrants-dont-work-why-europe-should-embrace-them-instead/ (Last visited 2 September 2015).

2   "Migrants in the Balkans, Funneling Them Forward", *The Economist*, Vol. 416, No. 8947, (18- 24 July 2015), pp. 24–25.

3   "Europe's Migrant Crisis, Merkel the Bold", *The Economist*, Vol. 416, No. 8954, (5-11 September), p. 16.

4   See for details, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html (last visited 30 August 2015).

5   "President Obama directs administration to accept at least 10,000 Syrian refugees in the next fiscal year", *Washington Post*, 10 September 2015.

6   See for further details, Hazel Smith and Larry Minear, *Humanitarian Diplomacy Practitioners and Their Craft*, United Nations University, 2007; Philippe Regnier, The Emerging Concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy, Identification of a Community of Practice and Prospects for International Recognition, *International Review of the Red Cross,* Vol. 93. No. 884 (December 2011), pp. 1211-1237, Michael OFlaherty, Zdzislaw Kedzia, Amrei Müller and George Ulrich (eds.), *Human Rights Diplomacy: Contemporary Perspectives*, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011.

A Postcolonial Critique of Responsibility to Protect in the Middle East[1]

Mojtaba MAHDAVI*

Abstract

This article is a postcolonial critique of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the Middle East. It problematizes a selective, arbitrary and punitive implementation of international law in Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Libya and Syria. It proposes that the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse of Humanitarianism and a paternalistic legacy of Orientalism have reinforced policing language of human rights and widened the gap between the ethical norms and their practice in global politics. A postcolonial critique of R2P calls for decolonizing and emancipating global ethical norms from the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberal order; striving for a consistent, just, people-centered, and fair implementation of norms; pushing for radical reforms in the UN; empowering regional and subaltern organizations; mobilizing world public opinion; and democratizing the world order. It suggests that a just implementation of the R2P doctrine is pending on the accomplishment of R4J: Responsibility for Justice.

Key Words

Responsibility to Protect (R2P), postcolonialism, orientalism, Middle East, geopolitics, realpolitik, global war on terror.

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"They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented."[2]

Karl Marx

Introduction

A selective and arbitrary enforcement of international law in the region has reinforced the perception of Middle East Exceptionalism. In this context Edward Said's concept of *Orientalism* and his postcolonial approach are applied to the international politics of the Middle East, where people of the Orient are perceived as passive recipients of Western charity, not active agents of their own grassroots, bottom-up emancipation. The Orient lacks internal dynamism for a sustainable progressive change from within; it cannot represent its own interests; it must be represented by the *Other*.[3] It is in this context that this paper is a postcolonial critique of R2P. It attempts to problematize the implementation of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the Middle East. It aims to examine and answer the following key questions: To what extent is the enforcement of the R2P doctrine in

the Middle East just, fair, consistent and constructive? To what degree has a selective, arbitrary, paternalistic and punitive enforcement of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention turned the Middle East into "the underclass of the international legal order"? Whether and how does the implementation of the R2P doctrine within the current structure of neo-liberal global order exacerbate or improve the people's position, help or hinder improving human rights in the region?

> A postcolonial critique of R2P calls for decolonizing and emancipating global ethical norms from the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberal order; striving for a consistent, just, people-centered, and fair implementation of norms; pushing for radical reforms in the UN; empowering regional and subaltern organizations; mobilizing world public opinion; and democratizing the world order.

The paper is divided into two parts. First, it will conceptualize and outline the origins of R2P at three phases, followed by a brief examination of the connotations of the R2P doctrine/norms

in practice. Second, it will problematize the implication of the R2P doctrine/ norms in the context of the Middle East. The conclusion suggests that the question is not to act or not to act; inaction is not an option. Rather, the question remains "*who* has the responsibility to protect *whom* under *what conditions* and toward *what end*?"[4] It examines whether and how the norms and practice of R2P in the region "puts people first" and is capable of transforming "promise into practice and words into deeds."[5]

Conceptualizing the R2P Doctrine

The R2P doctrine is the latest phase and a new face of the old liberal discourse of humanitarian intervention. It is inspired by the liberal theory of "democratic peace." More importantly, it is ontologically rooted in Immanuel Kant's idea of "perpetual peace,"[6] in which the civilized, liberal and peace-loving world is obliged to bring in peace to the uncivilized and non-liberal world plagued by wars and conflicts. *Kantian cosmopolitanism* underlines the Western superior right and universal moral responsibility to save and civilize the *Other*.

A postcolonial critique of humanitarian intervention challenges the objectivity and neutrality of such doctrines. It suggests that "liberal and neoliberal institutionalist discourses often appear

as rationalization of hegemony disguised as universal humanism."[7] Further, "echoes of Orientalism" can be detected from such discourses as they "reiterate today yesterday's images of 'Oriental despotism' and of the everyday of Bedouins and others as cave-dwelling."[8] More importantly,

> It is near fictitious to maintain an opposition between 'total European virtue' and 'total Oriental barbarism'. For this opposition to hold, one would have to negate that Nazism and fascism were manifestations of modern European ideologies and practices. The photographs taken of Abu Ghraib provide sufficient evidence that techniques of torture and 'barbarism' are not the sole province of Middle East states.[9]

But before we problematize the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, we will first conceptualize R2P and then contextualize its practice in the Middle East.

The R2P doctrine is probably the third phase in the development of the liberal discourse of humanitarian intervention: in the first phase, the UN General Assembly adopted the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide* in 1948 and put it into practice in January 1951.[10] Further, in November 1968, the UN General Assembly resolution 2391 acknowledged *war crimes* and *crimes against humanity* as two major legally binding crimes in international law.[11] In the second phase, the UN Security Council recognized the use of *humanitarian intervention* in reference to

Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[12] This new period coincided with the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and in response to structural changes in global politics, ranging from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the escalation of mass killings in Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, among others. In the third phase, the UN World Summit in 2005 adopted the R2P doctrine. In theory, the R2P doctrine differs, argues Gareth Evans, from *Humanitarian Intervention* in that the latter "remained so inherently one-sided, not in any way acknowledging the anxieties of those in the global South who had too often been the beneficiaries of *missions civilisatrices* in the past."[13] It has been argued that R2P has challenged certain key assumptions/norms in international ethics and redefined the relationship between state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.

The following three principles probably capture best the main features of the R2P doctrine. First, in theory it replaces a realist, militant and state-centric conception of security with a new concept of "human security".[14] R2P norms imply a people-centered approach in international politics. It attempts to 'put people first'.

Second, it introduces a new concept of "sovereignty as responsibility," meaning that states are responsible to their people; the people are the real sovereigns and the state is their delegate.[15] "Sovereignty

as responsibility" has internal and external dimensions. It entails that Sovereignty becomes a joint function of states, to be protected and shared when necessary.[16] In other words, sovereignty is a joint function by the state and the international community. The latter is responsible to protect human rights of citizens of other states should a state be unable or unwilling to protect the rights of its citizens. Moreover, R2P norms propose a discursive shift from the alleged "right" of humanitarian intervention to the "responsibility" of the international community at large to protect people at risk.[17]

Postcolonialism begins with the dictum that it is both unethical and dysfunctional to maintain hegemonic concepts of international order, international morality, and international law.

Third, the R2P doctrine is built on three inseparable pillars of *Responsibility to Prevent*, *Responsibility to React*, and *Responsibility to Rebuild*. In theory, it distinctly distances itself from a one-dimensional military doctrine of *humanitarian intervention*. It clearly underlines the responsibility of the international community before, during and after a case.

The first pillar of R2P, *Responsibility to Prevent*, aims at tackling "both root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting a population at risk."[18] This refers to Article 55 of the UN Charter, which calls for respect for human rights and higher standards of political, economic and social welfare.[19] The second pillar, *Responsibility to React*, implies that the UNSC is the primary international body to mandate political, economic, legal and military intervention in accordance with Article 41 and 42 of the UN Charter under Chapter VII. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report suggests that political measures such as travel sanctions, economic sanctions and legal measures through ICC trials are first options and military measures are the last resort mandated by the UNSC. The third pillar, *Responsibility to Rebuild*, indicates that the international community is responsible for post-conflict rebuilding through socio-economic development, brokering of national reconciliation and stabilizing of political institutions. In sum, the R2P doctrine, in theory, is an attempt to move away from a military humanitarianism towards a comprehensive, multidimensional and humanist approach to tackle structural and non-structural causes of violations of human rights before, during and after the crime.

Nonetheless, the question is to what extent this doctrine is capable of

transforming "promise into practice and words into deeds.[20] One must problematize the implementation of the R2P norms and the limitations of the theory in practice. What does the R2P doctrine mean in *practice*? Is it a paradigm shift in the discourse of global ethics and global justice? The following section contextualizes the concept of R2P in the Middle East.[21]

Norms in Practice: Problematizing R2P in the Middle East

Postcolonialism begins with the dictum that it is both unethical and dysfunctional to maintain hegemonic concepts of international order, international morality, and international law. More importantly, international order, morality and law are "more practical than purely theoretical contestations" due to the fact that "the experiences of the conquered and colonized contrast with those of conquerors and colonizers."[22] An illustration of such experiences is best represented in the words of Ramesh Thakur, one of the twelve high profile individual authors of ICISS. In his remarks, Ramesh Thakur demonstrates how the R2P doctrine is often perceived in the Global South including the Middle East:

> "They" (the European colonizers) came to liberate "us" (the colonized natives) from our local tyrants and stayed to rule as benevolent despots. In the name of enlightenment, they defiled our lands, plundered our resources and expanded their empires…. Should they be surprised that their fine talk of humanitarian intervention translates in our consciousness into efforts to resurrect and perpetuate rule by foreigners? That we look for the ugly reality of geostrategic and commercial calculations camouflaged in lofty rhetoric? Should we be mute accomplices when they substitute their mythology of humanitarian intervention for our narratives of colonial oppression? Do they think we do not remember or do not care, or is it simply that they themselves do not care?[23]

Similarly, in his background note of 2009, then UN General Assembly President Father Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann of Nicaragua, described R2P as "redecorated colonialism," to "justify arbitrary and selective interventions against the weakest states." He also raised his serious concern over the double standard in the implication of R2P and the absence of enforceable accountability on the abusers of the R2P doctrine.[24] The 2009 UN General Assembly debates on R2P, in sum, revealed differences between some members of the Global South and Global North on the implementation of the R2P doctrine.[25]

Mahmood Mamdani echoes Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann's critique of the R2P doctrine. He argues that the end of the Cold War brought a new "systematic shift" in international politics. Such a shift signaled "an international

humanitarian order that promises to hold state sovereignty accountable to an international 'human rights' standards."[26] There is nothing entirely new to this international humanitarian order; rather, "it draws on the history of modern western colonialism."[27] Although in theory, it differs from old forms of interventions, in practice it is not. The R2P doctrine, Mamdani argues, "is not an antidote to international power relations but its latest product." We must problematize the *politics* of this order. More specifically, "the discourse on 'rights' emerged historically as a language that claimed to define limits of power. Their political ambition was to turn victims into *agents of resistance*. Today, the overwhelming tendency is for the language of rights to enable power…. It seeks to turn victims into so many proxies. It justifies intervention by big powers as an antidote to malpractices by newly independent small states."[28] According to Mamdani, this new language of international humanitarian order

> refers to its subjects not as bearers of rights – and thus active agents in their own emancipation- but as passive beneficiaries of an external 'responsibility to protect.' Rather than right-bearing citizens, beneficiaries of humanitarian order are akin to *recipients of charity*. Humanitarianism does not claim to reinforce agency, only to sustain bare life. If anything, its tendency is to promote dependency. Humanitarianism heralds a system of *trusteeship*.[29]

The Ugly Reality of Geostrategic: Geopolitics Prevails over Norms?

For decades, the well-known statement about Somoza, dictator of Nicaragua, and generally attributed to President Franklin Roosevelt, set the agenda for US foreign policy towards Third World dictators during the Cold War: "[he] might be a son of a bitch but at least he's our son of a bitch." When neo-conservatives came to the White House in the early 2000s, then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, argued that "now, we are taking a different course; we are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people."[30] And President Obama in his Middle East Speech in May 2011argued that "it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy." He also suggested "today I want to make it clear that it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions, and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal."[31] However, the question is whether ethical norms remain "a top priority" in international politics and they actually "translated into concrete actions."

As discussed earlier, the R2P doctrine constitutes three inseparable pillars of responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. Responsibility to react is often

used at the cost of the other two pillars. Most often the dominant structure of international politics and the logic of *realpolitik* deter and discourage international community from assuming the responsibilities to prevent and rebuild.[32] Moreover, it is often difficult to prevent crimes if there is no consensus over the *root causes* of conflicts/crimes.[33] Interests of strong powers often hinder the international community tackling the root causes of crimes/conflicts. Rather, interests and policies of strong powers feed into the root causes of crimes/conflicts. Western intervention in the region during the Cold War and the policy of the Global War on Terror in the post-Cold War/post-9/11 era fostered and cultivated the root causes of violent extremism and terror in the region. The policy of prioritizing stability over democracy, and geopolitics over human rights, together with supporting the *friendly tyrants*, and pursuing the policy of containment and free flood of cheap oil nourished people's anger, frustration and violent extremism. Advocates of the R2P doctrine would simply reject this argument because the R2P norms put people first. However, there is an old history, live memory/perception, and clear evidence of neocolonialism in the region. History together with the current double-standard policies reinforces the idea that the R2P doctrine is a new intellectual, legal and political product of the unjust hegemonic global order.[34]

Afghanistan is a case in point: the crisis of democratic nation building and the instability and corruption, together with a lack of a comprehensive policy toward *human security* contributed to the resurgence of the Taliban. The Bush administration played a major role in installing President Hamid Karzai in 2002 and he is in office as a result of a rigged election in 2009. For many Afghans, Karzai is no more than a mayor of Kabul – a president of a "corrupt", ineffective," and "illegitimate" government. Hence the government, "the keystone of American strategy" is in a deep legitimacy crisis. "As long as victory is defined as the defeat of the Taliban insurgency, the war in Afghanistan is not winnable." This is an unwinnable war because the U.S. has no "credible Afghan partner and there is no prospect that one will emerge," and "the center of gravity in counterinsurgency is the people."[35]

Similarly, in the current context of the Arab Spring, the cases of Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria demonstrate that geopolitics prevails over norms in international politics. Inspired by the Egyptian and Tunisian movements, Bahrainis' "Day of Rage" began on 14 February 2011. The regime's harsh response was followed by foreign intervention in support of the regime on 14 March 2011. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sent troops to protect the Bahraini regime, home to the

US fifth fleet in the region. The military intervention of Saudi Arabia, America's closest ally in the region, in Bahrain and its full support to the Yemeni regime exacerbated the systematic violation of human rights in both countries. Likewise, it is now evident that the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad has killed tens of thousands of Syrians since 2011. The argument here is not to advocate the implementation of R2P in the abovementioned cases. Rather, the point is that geopolitics/*realpolitik* most often prevail over abstract norms/ethics in international politics.

Iraq? It's "Power Politics", Stupid![36]

The following cases took place before the adoption of the R2P doctrine at the UN World Summit in 2005. Nonetheless, they clearly identify a live memory/perception in the region that the international community either has failed to act, or act properly because both inaction and a type of action have been determined by *realpolitik*. Take the case of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), one of the longest wars since World War II. Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980 but UNSCR 589 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter only enforced a ceasefire in 1988. Post-revolutionary Iran was hostile to US policies in the region and Saddam Hussein was

instrumental in stopping its neighbor. The same passive policy applied to the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon (1982-2000) as the UNSC failed to enforce Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, the UNSC quickly authorized the United States and its allies to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 while Southern Lebanon remained occupied by Israel during the same time. Moreover, the act of genocide in March 1988, which cost the lives of some 5,000 Kurds in Halabja, a Kurdish city in Iraq, went unpunished by Saddam Hussein's allies. Russia, France and the United States continued to support the Iraqi regime in its war against Iran and its own people. In the wake of the Halabja genocide, the U.S. administration under George H. W. Bush "did everything possible to squelch American outrage and block congressional sanctions against Iraq."[37] Indeed the number of American licenses for exporting dual-use chemical technology to Iraq was increased by 50%.[38]

The sanctions, weakened the regime but at the cost of killing its people. Moreover, the sanctions weakened Iraqi civil society and destroyed the Iraqi middle class, the main agents for change from within.

Equally problematic is a type of action determined by certain interests. UNSCR 661 imposed a comprehensive sanctions regime against Iraq that remained in place for a decade. Two years after the Halabja genocide, the sanctions maintained mainly by Britain and United States were responsible for the deaths of half a million to one million Iraqi citizens, mostly children.[39] According to the most conservative account, the sanctions regime cost the lives of 227,000 children under five and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths.[40] The 1991 war and the sanctions regime together transformed Iraq "to a pre-industrial age."[41] The sanctions regime did not promote or protect human rights; rather it punished the Iraqi people. It caused "great suffering, serious injury to body or to mental or physical health" of the entire population and as such it was a *crime against humanity.*[42] Such a humanitarian catastrophe "resembled the crime against humanity known as 'extermination';" in other words "a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population" as elaborated in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The sanctions, in sum, weakened the regime but at the cost of killing its people. Moreover, the sanctions weakened Iraqi civil society and destroyed the Iraqi middle class, the main agents for change from *within*. Hence, it paved the way for another destructive reaction against the

Saddam Hussein regime, meaning the US-led military invasion of 2003. The cycle of inactions and bad actions thus reinforced each other.[43]

According to Kenneth Roth, there was not a "humanitarian motivation" in the 2003 Iraq war for a number of reasons: The Bush administration was not willing to approach the International Criminal Court and rushed to wage a war on some unfounded allegations; the war was not the "last reasonable option." The war did not maximize protection for Iraqi civilians because "several hundred thousand troops were needed to avoid postwar chaos." This was not clearly a concern for the Bush administration. "Rumsfeld liked the Afghanistan war- a handful of special forces on the ground and a lot of very high-tech bombing." Moreover, the war in many important respects "did not comply with international humanitarian law, the laws of war, and the Geneva Conventions." For example, in southern Iraq the US army used cluster munitions, which explode in the sky and scatter over a wide area, and cost the lives of some 1,000 people." Furthermore, the U.N. Security Council did not approve of the war. It was much easier to justify humanitarian intervention to stop the massacre of the Kurds in 1988, or to stop the suppression of the uprising in 1991. However, "there was nothing even close to that level of killing taking place in March 2003."[44] The efforts to

justify the Iraq war "in humanitarian terms has been a disaster for the concept of humanitarian intervention." This was not a just war.[45] It is evident that the U.S. and its allies waged the war based on a few unfounded claims, including the possession of WMDs, and the regime's alleged links with Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks.

Moreover, the former chief U.N. nuclear inspector and Nobel Peace Prize-winner Mohamed El-Baradei suggests in his memoir that Bush administration officials should face international criminal investigation for their "deliberate deception" or "grotesque distortion" on the issue of weapons of mass destruction, despite contrary evidence collected by U.N. arms inspectors, leading up to the Iraq invasion in 2003. According to El-Baradei, the invasion was no less than "aggression where there was no imminent threat," and thus Bush administration officials should face international criminal investigation for the "shame of a needless war" in Iraq. This might well be the case for a possible *war crime* to be investigated by international courts.[46]

The action of private security contractors such as Blackwater in Iraq is another point of contention about war crimes committed by US forces in Iraq. There are three incidents involving Blackwater that are particularly controversial: The Fallujah ambush on 31 March 2004; the Najaf shoot-out on April 4, 2004; and the Nisour Square shootings on 16 September 2007.[47] Due to the allegations against Blackwater, primarily regarding Nisour Square, the Iraqi Government banned Blackwater from Iraq in January 2009. However, Blackwater has since changed its name to Xe Services LLC and received a new contract with the US government in October 2010.[48]

The human costs of war are immense. According to a conservative estimates, the Iraqi civilian death toll was close to 100,000 by January 2009. According to the "Iraq Body Count" organization, "the documented civilian deaths from violence" between the US-led invasion in March 2003 and January 2009 were between 90,554 and 90,846.[49] In December 2008, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) "estimates more than 4.7 million Iraqis have left their homes, many in dire humanitarian care. Of these, more than 2.7 million Iraqis are displaced internally, while more than 2 million have fled to neighboring states, particularly Syria and Jordan…. In 2006, Iraqis became the leading nationality seeking asylum in Europe."[50] The sanctions regime and war weakened Iraqi civil society and national identity. Hence, after the invasion the Iraqis organized along ethno-sectarian lines and politicized their religio-ethnic identities. The war

and post-war policies did more harm to national cohesion.

The responsibility to rebuild in post-conflict Iraq was not remarkably successful either. The war in fact brought Al-Qaeda to Iraq, intensified civil war and sectarianism, and did not put an end to torture and corruption in Iraq. Thousands of civilians were killed and hundreds of thousands were displaced. The welfare of the Iraqi society was kept at bay. For example, Iraqis received only six hours electricity per day for the first three years post-invasion.[51]

> Disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force such as sniper and tank fire in civilian neighborhoods aimed at provoking massive public outrage against Hamas.

The Iraqi case, in sum, suggests that both the local dictator and the global hegemon committed crimes against humanity and war crimes. The local dictator and the victims (the Iraqi people) were punished, but the global hegemon remains immune from prosecution. The main victims of the sanctions regime and the war were people whose lives, prosperity, dignity and agency evaporated through a new system of semi-trusteeship.[52]

Palestine/Israel: Right to Punish?[53]

It is true that the R2P doctrine is an emerging norm developed in 2005; however, as will be shown, the international community has missed a few particular occasions to act properly, and to protect and put people first in the Israel/Palestine context.

Clear evidence suggests that Israel has failed to live up to its legal obligations as an occupying force to protect civilians in the occupied territories. The USA has constantly vetoed all UNSC resolutions asking Israel to stop illegal settlements and/or condemning Israel's illegal military operations.[54]And the international community has failed to prevent, react, and rebuild properly in this case.

The Richard Goldstone Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (Operation Cast Lead) in December 2008 to January 2009 concludes that both Israel and Hamas committed serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to *war crimes* and possibly crimes against humanity.[55] Israel's goal was to implement the doctrine of deterrence against Hamas in 2008. Disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force such as sniper and tank fire in civilian neighborhoods aimed at provoking massive public

outrage against Hamas. Amnesty International confirmed the death of 1,400 Palestinian civilians, including women and children, in such a highly asymmetrical war.[56] Moreover, in the summer of 2014, a 50-day war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza "left at least 2,189 Palestinians dead, including more than 1,486 civilians, according to the UN, and 11,000 injured. On the Israeli side, 67 soldiers and six civilians were killed, with scores more wounded."[57] According to Philip Luther, Middle East and African Director of Amnesty International, "All the evidence we have shows this large-scale destruction was carried out deliberately and with no military justification." He adds "the attacks were a collective punishment against the people of Gaza and were designed to destroy their already precarious livelihoods."[58]

The Gaza Strip still is not free. After the Israel's disengagement policy in 2005, the Israeli troops were withdrawn from the Gaza strip but the occupation was never fully ended. Even if we accept the end of occupation, the blockade is illegal because the Gaza strip is not a sovereign state and it has no sovereignty over its aerial and sea borders. UN Human Rights Chief, Navi Pillay, argues that Israel's blockade on Gaza strip is illegal and has accused Israel of violating international humanitarian law. Likewise, the head of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

in the Near East (UNRWA) operation in Gaza, John Ging, called on the UN itself to deliver humanitarian assistance because the blockade is a direct violation of Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention that prohibits "collective punishment".[59] The Gaza blockade is probably a strong case for a *crime against humanity*. Although, the blockade might not fall into a legal definition/category of a mass atrocity as defined by the R2P doctrine, the Gaza blockade is clearly a collective punishment, which exacerbates anger and further violence. Hence, the international community is obliged to act and fulfill its responsibility to prevent crimes in this context. The best action to prevent further violence is to recognize Palestine as a sovereign state.[60]

Libya: Right to Prevail?[61]

It is evident that "vast majorities of Africans variously subscribe to the *notion* of protection of populations and punishment of war criminals."[62] Nonetheless, the implementation of R2P in Libya has paradoxically undermined "the spirit and practice of participatory global governance."[63]

The Libyan case deserves a careful and critical examination. It is known that Colonel Qadhafi's response to the civic popular demands in the Libyan Spring was harsh and brutal; the regime bombarded civilian demonstrations.[64]

The response from the United Nations was relatively quick: UNSCR 1973 was adopted by a vote of ten in favor to none against. Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia were the five abstention votes. The resolution called for an "immediate ceasefire", a "no-fly zone" and "sanctions" on the Qadhafi regime. The resolution suggested that the international community should take "all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi." It also explicitly "excludes a foreign occupation force of any kind," or "in any part of Libyan territory."[65]

The Libyan case was the first occasion where no member of the UNSC objected to the implementation of the R2P doctrine, since it came into existence in 2005. Moreover, regional support was instrumental in the adoption of the resolution. The Arab League, an important regional organization, gave its initial support to UNSCR 1973. Three African Union members (Nigeria, Gabon and South Africa) who were non-permanent members of the UN Security Council voted in favor of the resolution. And the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)- a regional organization of conservative Arab countries in Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain)- also supported the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya.[66]

We need to make a clear distinction between justification of reaction and the execution of reaction.

One should not, however, ignore that the five absenting governments (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia) represent the majority of the international community and they *did not vote in favor* of the resolution. This is probably a good indication of why/how the global community has serious concerns over the *implementation* of the doctrine. Furthermore, once air strikes began the Arab League voiced skepticism over the way the resolution was being exercised. Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa argued that "what has happened in Libya differs from the goal of imposing a no-fly zone and what we want is the protection of civilians and not bombing other civilians."[67] Likewise, the African Union, the largest regional organization in Africa, condemned "the disproportionate use of force" by the Libyan government but it also criticized the idea of a no-fly zone: "The council reaffirms its firm commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of any form of foreign military intervention."[68]

Moreover, it has been argued that UNSCR 1973 will probably set a *precedent* for future foreign involvements and it is not quite clear whether/how such a use of force would benefit the current and future grassroots, authentic and non-violent pro-democracy movement in the region. In Mamdani's words, "the irony is that the invasion mounted to save civilian lives in Libya is likely to end up making the world more insecure." [69]

More importantly, public opinion has raised the question of the double standard policy to the implementation of R2P in this region. The question is why R2P was implemented in Libya and not in Bahrain, the American ally in the region? Is Libya another Iraq and Afghanistan with a legal mandate? The skepticism over the intentions of the West/NATO forces in Libya is a fact in the global south: shortly after bombs were dropped on Libya, the Arab League, Nigeria and South Africa openly opposed the broad scope of the coalition bombing.[70] Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, Morales of Bolivia, Castro of Cuba, among others, condemned the use of force by the international community.[71] There is skepticism, in short, over *how* and *who* will do *what* in the implementation of the doctrine. There is also a serious concern over the *unintended consequences* of using force in each particular case.

It is clear that the NATO aerial bombing protected the people of Benghazi from Qadhafi's attack. However, as Richard Falk argues, building a united

constitutional democracy in Libya is not easy because Libya has no "constitutional experience with citizen participation, an independent judiciary, or the rule of law."[72] Moreover, let's not forget that both Iraq and Afghanistan "teach us that humanitarian intervention does not end with the removal of the danger it purports to target. It only begins with it. Having removed the target, the intervention grows and turns into real problem."[73]

Furthermore, we need to make a clear distinction between *justification* of reaction and the *execution* of reaction. The UNSC is central to the justification process but remains marginal to the process of execution. In practice, the most powerful forces (i.e. the USA, EU, NATO) exercise the resolutions. Although, the doctrine/legal justification might be neutral, the execution process is not; the UN has not much leverage over the implementation of the doctrine.[74] This brings us to three points of contention about politics and people's perception of foreign intervention in Libya: First, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that the political unrest in Bahrain had a political solution. Although, it is not clear how Saudi Arabia's military intervention in Bahrain can be described as a political solution, the question here is did Libya have a political solution? According to Phyllis Benis, the West/NATO was probably not interested in

a political solution in Libya because the African Union delegation to Libya was denied permission to fly over Tripoli by the NATO forces.[75] Moreover, the *New York Times* reported that the Libyan tanks on the road to Benghazi were bombed when they were retreating and not when they were advancing. For Mamdani, this resembles US war strategy in Iraq in 2003 when the neo-conservatives had already planned to invade Iraq.[76] Moreover, why would the Libya National Transition Council, the opposing supported by the West, negotiate with Qaddafi "when the largest armies in the world are committed to the destruction of the one obstacle to their own path to power?"[77]

Each war is a laboratory for testing the next generation of weapons…. the objective is to destroy physical assets within minimum cost in human lives.

Second, UNSCR 1973 called on the Secretary-General to freeze Libya's assets. The Libyan assets in the USA and Europe amounted to hundreds of billions dollars. The USA Treasury froze US$ 30 billion of liquid assets and the USA banks froze US$ 18 billion. The point is that these assets were "turned into a booty, an interest-free loan, in this instance, to US Treasury and US banks." The real issue is, "money trail" not humanitarianism.[78] According to Richard Falk, the fact that the United States, France and the UK "are pulling strings to release" billions of dollars of frozen assets of the Libyan state suggests that "oil companies and their government sponsors are scrambling to get an inside track" in a post-Gadhafi regime. Of course, by enabling "the new Libyan leadership to embark upon financial recovery and reconstruction" these actions "come as part of a package containing undisclosed political conditions and economic expectations."[79]

Third, one bitter and harsh reality of modern/post-modern politics of war is that "war furthers many interests. Each war is a laboratory for testing the next generation of weapons…. the objective is to destroy physical assets within minimum cost in human lives." This is one aspect of NATO involvement in Libya. The cruel consequence of such a policy is that "the more physical assets are destroyed, the less sovereign will be the next government in Libya."[80]

It is probably in this context that one should read the Malian President's remarks: Asked by the interviewer why he would not join the West to remove Qadhafi from office, the President of Mali replied: "We are asked to promote democracy in Libya against a man who holds power at the barrel of the gun

and you want me to unseat him at the barrel of the gun and seat another group in his place. If Qadhafi's unwillingness to negotiate and compromise is the problem today why is the other side relying on forced removal."[81]

The Syrian Tragedy: The Limits of R2P in an Ugly Proxy/Civil War?

The Syrian tragedy is indicative of the limits of the R2P doctrine. Today Syria is a war of destiny for a number of international and regional actors. Each actor seeks to shift the regional balance of power in order to maximize its interests. Syria provides a *strategic depth* for both Russia and Iran. The geopolitics and geostrategic significance of Syria include, but are not limited to, its access to the Mediterranean Sea, its proximity to Israel and Lebanon, and its political influence over the Lebanese Hezbollah. Moreover, Russia (and to a lesser extent China) is deeply skeptical of the Western humanitarian intervention in Syria because it feels that the West/NATO betrayed Russia in the implementation of R2P in Libya in 2011. While the UNSC Resolution authorized the implementation of a "no-fly zone" to protect the civilian population in the city of Benghazi, NATO turned such a limited mandate into a regime change under the rubric of R2P. Syria has thus gained more significance for Russia

after the overthrow of Qaddafi in Libya. Syria probably remains Russia's war of destiny.

Furthermore; Iran, Hezbollah of Lebanon, Russia, and to a lesser degree China support the Syrian regime. On the other hand; the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have supported their proxies in this conflict, as they would like to contain Iran's regional influence. A post-Assad Syria would shift the regional balance of power against Iran, and in favor of the West and its regional allies.

> The international community has missed the opportunity to put an end to crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Assad regime and sections of the opposition forces.

The West and its regional allies support rebels of the Free Syrian Army with military assistance. Some of these countries support Al-Qaeda and its Syrian offshoot, *Jabhat al-Nusra*, and the radical Salafis of the "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham." The sad reality is that such military assistance has turned the Syrian Spring into a proxy war, and exacerbated an ugly and bloody civil war among ethnic and religious minorities.

The fear of war and instability, and the horror of the rise of an Islamist state ruled by radical Salafis have forced some Christian, Druze and Alawite minorities to choose the lesser evil and side with the Assad regime.

The international community has missed the opportunity to put an end to crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Assad regime and sections of the opposition forces. With more than two hundred thousand dead, some two million refugees, thousands of people tortured and imprisoned in jail, several million internally displaced, and numerous victims of chemical weapons, Syria clearly represents a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Given the complexity of the Syrian case, a *military* intervention to implement the R2P would most likely deteriorate the situation and lead to a greater humanitarian crisis. Instead, inclusive negotiations among all the parties and tough diplomacy seem a more viable *humanitarian* intervention.

The choice is not between supporting the brutal Assad regime and a military intervention. This is a false dichotomy. Supplying arms to the opposition will not benefit the Syrian civil rights movement for democracy. Militarism and sectarianism exacerbate more violence and undermine the future of democracy in Syria. The global society,

international community and states such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), among others should support a genuine and inclusive international attempt for tough dialogue and serious diplomacy to stop the civil and proxy war and give a boost to the Syrian Spring.

In sum, the "post" in postcolonialism does not simply refer to "the *period* after the colonial era;" more importantly, it signals "the *effects* of this era" in sharing the contemporary global (dis) order.[82] One must contextualize the implementation of the R2P doctrine in light of the *effects* of postcolonialism in shaping global politics. As such, the live memory/perception from the old history of colonialism, and clear evidence of neocolonialism as well as double-standard policies in the region have reinforced the idea of Middle Eastern exceptionalism where people of the Orient are perceived as passive recipients of Western charity, or subject of the hegemonic imperial agenda, not active agents of their own grassroots movements.

The R2P doctrine in theory provides a minimum normative agenda and, to a lesser degree, a minimum institutional framework for global justice.

Conclusion: Towards Responsibility for Justice (R4J)?[83]

Postcolonialism "is a broad commentary on present models of politics, economy, and ethics."[84] A postcolonial order envisaged by postcolonialism advocates just and inclusive democracy both in national and global politics. It would "maintain consistent positions on politics that do not distinguish the domestic, national, and international spheres."[85] It vigorously denounces, "the failure of postcolonial elites to integrate co-citizens- and/or domestic social and cultural formations- into democratic structures of governance within the state."[86] It is also "mindful of the failure of hegemonic powers to integrate post-colonial states into the decision-making process of international system."[87]

The politics and discourse of R2P capture the postcolonial critiques of contemporary global (dis)order. The paradox of R2P in practice is that "humanitarian concerns come once again to serve as pretext for widening the global democratic deficit and, in the case of the Middle East, re-inscribing the term of past imperial relations under new guises."[88]

The R2P doctrine in theory provides a minimum *normative* agenda and, to a lesser degree, a minimum *institutional* framework for global justice. However, the reality of unequal power relations, both at the individual, state, and global politics levels, has created serious structural constraints for the UN, the most legitimate and relevant international institutional framework, to transform "promise into practice and words into deeds", to "put people first," and to implement norms of justice with a fair, just, and consistent manner. The structure of the UNSC and the veto system, for example, offer little room for the international community to enforce and/or prevent the use of force if the case does not meet the interests of the veto power holders. The structure of the UNSC gives little chance to the international community, and the UN in particular, to prevent crimes by giving early warning to states and/or taking into consideration the socio-economic and political root causes of human wrongs.

The US-led invasion of Iraq on false pretenses in 2003, and the bitter story of the chaos and violence in post-Saddam Iraq, is an eye-opening example of non-democratized global world (dis)order. In February 2002, then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated: "As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also the unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know we don't know."[89] But Rumsfeld,

to use Slavoj Zizek's argument, never mentioned the "unknown knowns"- that is to say, "the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about."[90] A few "unknown knowns" in the discourse of humanitarian intervention probably include the following.

R2P is a political discourse and therefore it is an invention of the complex networks of power relations. We should also note that the (neo) liberal language of Rights and Humanitarianism has enabled the powerful. The reality of the international structure has reinforced the militarized/policing language of human rights. A paternalistic legacy of Orientalism is also evident in the language, and more so in the practice, of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, the global structure and interests of powerful states have hampered a consistent, just, and fair implementation of the R2P doctrine. The responsibility to react, and military intervention in particular, is often determined by who has the means to intervene and the UN is hardly capable of overcoming the double-standard policy in using or not using force. This has resembled a *Cinderella Shoe* approach to react, meaning unless the case fits certain interests of the strong parties, it will not be considered. More specifically, there is arguably little that is actually international about the military intervention or implementing sanctions regime. "The international

process is no more than a legitimating exercise." In other words, "legitimation is international, implementation is privatized, passing initiative to the strongest of member states. The end result is a self-constituted coalition of the willing."[91] We also know that one major, intended or unintended, consequence of war and military intervention is less sovereignty and more dependency of the future regime.

The R2P doctrine in theory emphasizes three inseparable pillars of responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild. In practice, however, it has often acted as an instrument of *inconsistent* coercive intervention. There is no clear-cut division in reality between the implementation of the three inseparable pillars of R2P. There is also confusion and ambiguity over *how* and *who* should implement those three core components of R2P. In this context, the power relations/the powerful often determine the priorities, agendas and agents of who should do what at a specific time.

The responsibility to prevent "is the least developed of the concept's three pillars."[92] The responsibility to prevent requires strong "political will" and a commitment to allocate resources in the form of development aids and comprehensive socio-economic plans.[93] For example, Canada is the architect of the R2P doctrine but its "development aid is lagging behind the standard 0.7 % target of gross national product (GNP) established in 1969."

In 2005 Canada gave approximately 0.3%,[94] which helped lead to the "drastic downsizing" of developmental programs in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon. Political will to prevent crimes and to tackle the root causes of conflicts requires a serious commitment and action to prevail over short-term policies supported by strong domestic lobbies and the international power structure. Canada has, surprisingly, removed the countries of the Middle East from its list of development partners, which has minimized Canada's acts to prevent the crisis.[95]Ironically, Canada, under the Conservative government was the first country to suspend all aid to the Palestinian Authority following Hamas's electoral victory in 2006. Moreover, Canada modified its stance at the UN, abstaining on resolutions that reaffirmed the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the importance of Israel acceding to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and refraining from exploiting natural resources in the occupied territories.[96] Canada's reaction to the war between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in July 2006 is another example of how much power relations prevail over norms. In this six-week war Israel lost 122 citizens and soldiers, while Lebanon lost over 1,000 civilians-including among these some Canadian citizens- and saw 25% of its population displaced. Canadian Prime Minister Harper refused to put pressure on Israel or to question the

asymmetrical indiscriminate and illegal use of force and weaponry, including cluster munitions in civilian areas by Israel. Instead, he described Israel's response as "measured."[97] Likewise, for the Liberal Michael Ignatieff, "this is the kind of dirty war you're in when you have to do this and I'm not losing sleep about that."[98]

On some occasions, policy makers might take critical advice seriously and appreciate that the promotion of human rights and long-term constructive comprehensive policies is not mutually exclusive.

There is, in sum, a clear gap between the discourse and practice, between norms/doctrine and actions; this gap needs to be addressed, examined and problematized. We need to find a practical solution to protect human dignity and to stop crimes against humanity when ordinary people are often caught between a rock and a hard place- between local autocratic politics and a hegemonic self-interested global politics. We need to problematize and strive for practical answers to empower people and protect *people's position* in the context of unjust *power relations*. This is not easy.

Easy solutions are often illusions. One illusion is to simply preach to the local and global powerful to choose human rights over power politics, and ethics over material interests. On some occasions, policy makers might take critical advice seriously and appreciate that the promotion of human rights and long-term constructive comprehensive policies is not mutually exclusive. However, power relations most often prevails over abstract norms/ethics in the context of individual states and global politics. Preaching to the powerful is not *the* solution. Another illusion is that there is absolutely no chance to protect human rights within the current unjust global structure. Total disengagement with the international institutions is not the solution either. Neither the vulgar voluntarism of the first illusion nor the determinist structuralism of the second illusion captures the complexity of international politics. A realistic (not realist) examination of what has been achieved and what remains to be accomplished is warranted. A third approach, i.e. a *postcolonial critique* strives for such a critical task.

It is true that the (neo) liberal language of Rights and Humanitarianism and a paternalistic legacy of Orientalism in the discourse of R2P, and more so in its practice, have reinforced the policing language of human rights; that the global structure has hampered a consistent, just, and fair implementation

of the norms; and that the UN is hardly capable of challenging a Cinderella Shoe approach in international politics. But it is also true that R2P asks a simple and important question summed up by then UN secretary general, Kofi Annan: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica- to gross and systematic violations of human rights?"[99] However, the challenge is to find a practical answer to this key and critical question: "*who* has the responsibility to protect *whom* under *what conditions* and toward *what end*?"[100] A postcolonial approach is an attempt to acknowledge and answer the legitimate concerns over a just, inclusive and consistent implementation of international human rights and global ethics while striving for practical solution. It calls for empowering global civil society- a world social forum- to protect and promote human rights while at the same time working within the current unjust global structure, striving for *radical* reform and change of the system, and minimizing the violation of human rights by using/improving the existing unjust structure. This includes emancipating global ethical norms from the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberal order; decolonizing and acknowledging the core values of "human security," "sovereignty as responsibility," "putting people first"; striving for a consistent, just, and fair implementation of norms;

pushing for radical reforms in the UN; empowering regional and subaltern organizations; mobilizing world public opinion; and democratizing the world order. A postcolonial critique of the hegemonic global order requires us to de-colonize and redefine peace, security, humanitarianism, order, and democracy, among others. This task is contingent on, to use Walter Mingolo's concept, an "epistemic disobedience."[101]

Martin Luther King, Jr. once argued that "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly." Likewise, a twelfth century Iranian poet Sa'adi wrote this poem:

> Human beings are members of a whole/ In creation of one essence and soul If one member is afflicted with pain/ Other members uneasy will remain If you have no sympathy for human pain/ The name of human you cannot retain.

Martin Luther King's concern for cosmopolitan justice and Sa'adi's poem on *Oneness of Mankind* capture the core value of our ethical responsibility and obligation to our fellow human beings. A just implementation of the R2P doctrine is, in sum, *pending* on the accomplishment of R4J: *Responsibility for Justice*. *Justice* is where the West meets the East. This is where Sa'adi's message of *cosmopolitan existence* encounters Martin Luther King's call for *cosmopolitan justice*.[102]

Postcolonialism "favors an ethos of egalitarianism, social justice, and solidarity." It "aspires to a different kind of universalism, one based on deliberation and contestation among diverse political entities, with the aim of reaching functional agreement on questions of global concern. This kind of universalism differs from one resulting from universal injunctions by self-assured subjects."[103] I have called this "universalism from below."[104]

Endnotes

1   An earlier version of some sections of this article has been published in the following book chapter: Mojtaba Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?", in W. Andy Knight and Frazer Egerton (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, pp. 257-275. Also, another version of this paper was presented at the following conference: "Humanitarian Diplomacy: Theory and Perspectives from the Field", İstanbul Şehir University, Istanbul, Turkey, 6-7 December 2013.

2   Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, New York, International Publishers, 1987, p. 124.

3   Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York, Vintage Books, 1979.

4   Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviros and Survivors*: *Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*. New York, Pantheon Books, 2009, p. 276.

5   UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations, Secretary General Office, Secretary General Defends, Clarifies "Responsibility to Protect"' at Berlin Event on 'Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed Word', SG/SM/11701i New York, Department of Public Information, 15 July 2008. See, Mojtaba Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?" in W. Andy Knight and Frazer Egerton (eds.),*Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, pp. 257-258.

6   Immanuel Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace", in M. J. Gregor, trans. M. J. Gregor (eds.), *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 311-352.

7   Siba N. Grovogui, "Postcolonialism", in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Disciplines and Diversity*, 3rd ed.,Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 252.

8   Ibid., p. 254.

9   Ibid., p. 255.

10   Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277, at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm (last visited 15 September 2015). The Genocide Convention was a legal act to acknowledge genocide as a major crime against humanity. The Polish-Jewish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, originally coined the term genocide in 1943 in response to the Holocaust. According to the Genocide Convention, article 2, the term includes crimes "committed with the intent of destroying, in whole or in part, an entire national, ethical, racial, or religious group." See, Raphael Limkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Analysis, Proposals for Redress*, Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994, pp. 79-95.

11   The UN General Assembly resolution 2391 adopted *The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity;* adopted 26 December

1968, 754 UNTS 73, at http://www2ohchr.org/english/law/warcrimes.htm (last visited 3 May 2015).

12 Humanitarian interventions were defined as "coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants." See, Adam Roberts, "The So-called 'Right' of Humanitarian Intervention", *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, Vol. 3(2001), pp. 3-51. The introduction of the *Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court* was an equally important step in the second phase. The Draft Code of Crimes before the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals contributed to the development of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, which created the first permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in Rome, Italy, in June 1998. The Rome Stature provided a legal authority to ICC to tackle with *core* crimes, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. See *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, adopted 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS.

13 Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All* (2008), p. 5; see, Mojtaba Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?", p. 258.

14 Canada's then Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy contributed to the development of a key concept in the R2P doctrine: "Human Security." This concept "puts people first and recognizes that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. The security of state is essential, but not sufficient, to fully ensure the safety and well-being of the world's peoples." See, Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First", *Global Governance,* Vol. 7, No. 1 (2001), pp. 19-23. It is worth noting that *Human Development Report* of UN Development Program (UNDP) in 1994 introduced the concept of Human Security.

15 Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng introduced the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility." This concept implies that both states and the international community have a responsibility to protect and promote human rights. The sovereign state is responsible to protect its own citizens from the violation of human rights. However, if the state is unwilling or unable to do so, the international community is equally responsible to protect universal human rights inside the boundaries of failed states. See, Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, *Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement,* Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1998. Francis Deng argues "I don't see sovereignty in a negative light as a barricade;" "I see sovereignty positively as a concept of state responsibility for its people, if need be with the support of the international community. And the subtext is that if you don't discharge that responsibility and your people are suffering, the world will not leave you alone." See, Francis Deng, "Preventing Genocide: Interview with Francis Deng", Conducted by David A. Hamburg, New York, Stanford University, Libraries & Academic Information Resources, 20 March 2008, at https://lib.stanford.edu/files/PG_Deng.pdf (last visited 5 June 2015).

16 Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan introduced "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," making a distinction between *individual sovereignty* and *popular sovereignty*. Annan calls for

a reconciliation of sovereignty and human rights. More specifically, "state sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined…. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, not vice versa." For Annan, individual sovereignty, or "fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading conciseness of human rights." As such, he moves beyond an absolute, supreme, and independent concept towards a contingent and relational concept of sovereignty. See, Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", *The Economist*, No. 352 (18 September 1999), pp. 49-50.

17   R2P norms were developed through the "International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" (ICISS), a Canadian initiative by Canada's then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy – who organized an international commission of twelve distinguished individuals from global North and global South, and co-chaired by Gareth Evans, former minister of Australia, and Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General – to debate and draft the R2P doctrine. The goal and guiding principle of ICISS was to shift the debates from the purported "right" of potential interveners to the "responsibility" of the international community at large to protect the people at risk. See, Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007, pp. 100-118.

18   ICISS Report, "The Responsibility to Protect", *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS), xi.

19   United Nations Charter, Chapter IX, at www.un.org/aboutun/charter (last visited 10 September 2015).

20   UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations, Secretary General Office, Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies "Responsibility to Protect'" at Berlin Event on 'Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed Word', SG/SM/11701, New York, Department of Public Information, 15 July 2008.

21   Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?", pp. 258-259.

22   Grovogui, "Postcolonialism," p. 256.

23   Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 267.

24   Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, "General Assembly Agrees to Hold More Talks on Responsibility to Protect", *UN News Services*, 2009; also Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, "At the Opening of the Thematic Dialogue of the General Assembly on the Responsibility to Protect", *UN Headquarters*, New York, 2009. Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann's critique of the R2P doctrine illustrates the uneasiness many delegates from Asia, Latin America and Africa feel towards the implementation of the doctrine. Although most delegates supported the *general thrust* of the three pillars of R2P, a few explicitly rejected the use of force in any circumstances. States such as Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, and Sudan sought to roll back the 2005 World Summit consensus. Many expressed their concern over double standards and arbitrary implementation of R2P due to the dominant veto system in the UNSC.

25   See Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?" p. 260.

26   Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*: *Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*, p. 273.

27   Ibid., p. 276.

28   Ibid., p. 282. Italics added.

29   Ibid., p. 275. Italics added.

30   Rice calls for Mid-East democracy, *BBC News*, 20 June 2005.

31   "Obama's Mideast Speech,-", *The New York Times*, 19 May 2011.

32   However, it should be noted that Kenya in the wake of the disputed December 2007 presidential election is a case in point where responsibility to prevent was applied. In early 2008 a peaceful diplomatic and swift response by the international community prevented further crimes, which would have escalated to the level of crimes against humanity. Kenya revealed how non-coercive tools, such as mediation, can help halt atrocities when employed early, with sufficient resources and international support. See, "The Responsibility to Protect and Kenya: Past Successes and Current Challenges", *Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect*, at http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/The_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_Kenya_Past_Successes_and_Current_Challenges.pdf (last visited 6 July 2015).

33   W. Andy Knight, "The Development of the Responsibility to Protect- From Evolving Norms to Practice", *Global Responsibility to Protect*, Vol. 3 (2011), pp. 3-36.

34   Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?", pp. 260-61.

35   Peter Galbraith, *The Economist*, 17 May 2010. According to Tariq Ali, the Afghan war could have had a different outcome had the NATO forces introduced "a massive New Deal" program by rebuilding the Afghan social infrastructure. However, the post-invasion socioeconomic structure of Afghanistan made "a tiny group of people very rich." Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, became the "richest man in Kabul," while the poor living in the slums "grew by half a million within the first two years of the occupation". Thanks to insecurity, poverty and ongoing occupation, the insurgents have received more support from the large segment of the population who had previously been indifferent to them. Tariq Ali, "Afghanistan: 'Obama's War'" at http://links.org.au/node/1756 (last visited 28 June 2015); Also see, Tariq Ali, *The Obama Syndrome: Surrender at Home, War Abroad*, London, Verso, 2010.

36   Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?", pp. 261-263.

37   Barry Lando, *Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush*, New York, Other Press, 2007, p. 83.

38   Ibid., p. 98.

39   Ibid., p. 185.

40   D. Cortright and G. Lopez, *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 46. The number of the children death ranges from a quarter million to half a million in different sources.

41   UNSC Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis Environment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, UN Doc.S/22366, 20 March 1991.

42   Rome Stature, Article 7(2); see also Core Crimes prepared by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-CICC-CoreCrimesinRS.pdf (last visited 8 July 2015).

43   For an interesting collection on this issue, see, Mokhtar Lamani and Bessma Momani, (eds.), *From Desolation to Reconstruction: Iraq's Troubled Journey*, Waterloo, Wilfrid University Press, 2010.

44   Kenneth Roth, Fernando R. Tesón and Paige Arthur, "Ending Tyranny in Iraq: A Debate", at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5268.html (last visited 10 July 2015).

45   For an interesting analysis, see, Craig M. White, *Iraq the Moral Reckoning: Applying Just War Theory to the 2003 War Decision*, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2010.

46   Mohamed El-Baradei, *The Age of Deception*, Henry Holt and Company, 2011. The U.S. and allies committed war crimes in Abu-Ghraib by torturing prisoners and in Fallujah by killing civilians and using bombs in civilian neighborhood. The US military used cluster bombs and white phosphorus in Fallujah. Hundreds of children and women have come across cluster bombs in Fallujah and have been physically maimed for the rest of their lives. Moreover, a US soldier executed a wounded Iraqi in a Fallujah mosque. Some have even been killed. The execution of an unarmed prisoner is identical to killing a civilian and both are in clear violation of the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention also requires that you cannot deport people from occupied territory, but the United States has been deporting people out of Iraq. See, Amy Goodman conversation with Jules Lobel, "U.S. War Crimes in Fallujah", at http://www.democracynow.org/2004/11/19/u_s_war_crimes_in_fallujah (last visited 6 May 2015).

47   Jeremy Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army*, New York, Nation Books, 2007, pp. 91-104 and 117-139.

48   On 22 April 2011, a US federal appeals court reopened the criminal case against 4 members of Blackwater involved in the Nisour Square shooting. However, justice is still not done.

49   "Iraq Body Count: Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence", *Iraq Body Count*, at http://www.iraqbodycount.org (last visited 6 May 2015).

50   "The Iraq Situation", at http://www.unhcr.org/iraq.html (last visited 6 May 2015); Ms. Parker is President of the San-Francisco-based Association of Humanitarian Lawyers (www.humanlaw.org) and Chief Delegate to the United Nations for the Los Angeles-based International Educational Development/Humanitarian Law Project (IED/AHL), an accredited non-governmental organization on the U.N. Secretary-General's list; See www.consumersforpeace.org (last visited 7 May 2015).

51   http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/07/iraq-electricity-idUSL6E7J707Q20110807

52   Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?" pp. 261-263.

53   Ibid., pp. 263-64.

54   For example, USA vetoed UNSC resolution, which asked for the condemnation of Israel for killing 18 Palestinians, mostly children, in Beit Hanoun in 11 November 2006.

55   Final Report of theGoldstone Fact Finding Mission at http://www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=3134 (last visited 6 May 2015).

56   Amnesty International, "Gaza Accountability Campaign - Background Information", at http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/gaza-accountability-campaign-backgro (last visited 8 July 2015).

57   "Amnesty: Israeli strikes on Gaza buildings 'war crimes'," at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30393540 (last visited 26 March 2015).

58   Ibid.

59   Statement by John Ging, UNRWA Director of Operations in Gaza, at http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=357 (last visited 5 July 2015).

60   Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?", pp. 263-264.

61   Ibid., pp. 265-267.

62   Grovogui, "Postcolonialism", p. 256; italics added.

63   Ibid.

64   It is worth noting that Libya under King Edris was a rural and backward country until the early 1960s. Libya under Qadhafi, especially in the first two decades of his rule, was transformed into a model of a successful welfare state in Africa. "The 2010 Human Development Index, which is a composite measure of health, education, and income ranked Libya 53rd in the world and 1st in Africa", http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/LBY.html (last visited 5 June 2015). In the second part of Qadhafi's rule, the regime degenerated into a tribal administration. Since 2003 the regime improved its relations with the West in return for dismantling nuclear facilities and inviting US, UK and Italian companies to Libya. Mahmood Mamdani, "Libya after the NATO Invasion", at http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/04/201148174154213745.html (last visited 6 June 2015).

65   http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm (last visited 15 June 2015).

66   http://parliamentflagpost.blogspot.com/2011/03/libya-and-united-nations-security.html (last visited 10 June 2015).

67   Ibid.

68   Ibid.

69   Mahmood Mamdani, "Libya after the NATO Invasion", at http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/04/201148174154213745.html (last visited 26 June 2015).

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74   Ibid.

75   Phyllis Bennis, "Libya and the Limits to the R2P", at http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/libya_and_the_limits_to_the_r2p (last visited 12 June 2015).

76   Ibid.

77   Grovogui, "Postcolonialism", p. 259.

78   Ibid. The oil reserve in Libya is also a point of contention. It is worth noting that Libya holds one of the finest, largest, and cheapest oil reserves in the region.

79   Richard Falk, "In Libya, Decoding an uncertain future", at http://aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/201182885646839710.html (last visited 15 December 2014).

80   Mahmood Mamdani, "Libya: Politics of Humanitarian Intervention", at http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201133111277476962.html (last visited 11 April 2015); Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?" pp. 265-67.

81   Grovogui, "Postcolonialism",p. 259.

82   S. Seth, "Postcolonial theory and the critique of International Relations", *Millennium*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2011), p. 174. Italics added.

83   Mahdavi, "R2P in the Middle East and North Africa?" pp. 267-69.

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87   Ibid., p. 263.

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104   See, Mojtaba Mahdavi, "Muslims and Modernities: From Islamism to Post-Islamism", *Religious Studies and Theology*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013), pp. 57-71.

Turkey, Middle Powers, and the New Humanitarianism

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Abstract

This article traces the evolution of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy as an example of the new humanitarianism associated with emerging countries. It discusses both the promise as well as the challenges of the new humanitarianism. It then introduces the idea of "middle power activism" in international affairs as one way to understand Turkey's behavior. This lens is then used to identify the aspects of Turkey's behavior that are more likely to endure as contributions to global humanitarian affairs. It identifies state-centered humanitarian aid, regional approaches, and the supplementing of humanitarian aid with political and economic goals as aspects of the Turkish approach likely to endure and to appeal to other emerging actors.

Key Words

Humanitarianism, humanitarian diplomacy, emerging powers, middle powers.

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Introduction

The emergence of Turkey as a major actor in humanitarian diplomacy and assistance raises new and important questions for both Turkey and humanitarianism. This paper will consider how the Turkish engagement with humanitarianism can be understood as a form of "middle power activism" in international affairs. The middle power approach serves as a useful framework to explain Turkey's behavior and to predict the emergence of a "new humanitarianism" that is resulting from the efforts of Turkey and other middle powers such as South Korea.

The paper begins with a narrative review of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy and assistance and the controversial issues it has raised. This is followed by a consideration of humanitarianism and the current issues it faces as a result of the emergence of non-Western states as prominent actors in the field. The middle power lens is then introduced as a means of sorting out several unresolved questions about the new humanitarianism. Theoretical and policy implications follow.

> The turning point in Turkey's rise as a global humanitarian superpower came in 2011 when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan decided to launch a major assistance mission to war-torn Somalia after a visit to the country in August with his wife and six cabinet members.

Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy

The sudden emergence of Turkey "from dwarf to giant"[1] in international humanitarian assistance has raised a host of new issues. In 2013, Turkey gave US$ 1.6 billion in official humanitarian aid, making it the third largest donor after the U.S. and UK. This giving has been accompanied by parallel diplomatic efforts to create humanitarian space and by an expansion of non-official giving. Between 2007 and 2012, the Turkish Red Crescent provided humanitarian aid to 70 countries, delivering US$ 2.5 billion worth of humanitarian aid in 2012 alone.

Much of this aid has involved assistance to the more than 1.6 million refugees from Syria living in Turkey by early 2015, either in camps or in urban areas. If in-kind contributions for the Syria crisis are included, Turkey's humanitarian assistance would likely double. But the Syria crisis only accelerated a trend in Turkey's rising humanitarian status that had been taking shape since the end of the Cold War. In the aftermath of the US-led war in Afghanistan in particular, Turkey launched the İstanbul Initiative to provide a combination of humanitarian aid and infrastructure rebuilding to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most of the early assistance was centered on the subsequent regional crises in the Middle East, especially in Pakistan, Iraq, and Libya. Turkey's NGOs became active in Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt during and after their political revolutions, providing humanitarian assistance and assisting migrant populations.

The turning point in Turkey's rise as a *global* humanitarian superpower came in 2011 when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan decided to launch a major assistance mission to war-torn Somalia after a visit to the country in August with his wife and six cabinet members. The visit, intended to highlight the plight of drought victims, ended a 20 year period where no major foreign leader had visited the capital. The one-day visit was prosaic at the time- the airplane carrying the businessmen, journalists, and NGOs damaged its wing on landing while the government barred the local press from attending- but has since loomed larger in Turkey's own historical imagination as the emblem of its new humanitarianism.

The effective mobilization of government, university, NGO, and private sector partners in Somalia allowed a nation-building exercise without force. "With its unrivaled on-the-ground rebuilding effort and generous scholarship program, Turkey is using Somalia as the first great display of "virtuous power," wrote Harte.[2] The Somalia initiative attracted wide attention because it eschewed pure humanitarianism and instead embraced business ties, peacebuilding initiatives, education, infrastructure and development aid, and even military aid. Turkey has cited the Somalia example as a model for its engagement with Africa.[3]

> Humanitarian diplomacy and assistance is a policy instrument involving the use of non-coercive organization (communication, negotiation, advocacy, mobilization, persuasion, etc.) and material provision by external actors with the intention of assisting vulnerable populations with basic human needs in target countries.

Beyond the Middle East and Africa, Turkey has taken actions that spread its footprint even wider. The Philippines typhoon of 2013 provided an early opportunity for Ankara to show that it was interested in humanitarianism beyond its own region or nearby Muslim populations. Erdoğan despatched his deputy prime minister, Beşir Atalay, and the president of the Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (AFAD), Fuat Oktay, to the Philippines to coordinate Turkey's relief works on the ground. Turkey even gave US$ 200,000 in 2014 for the construction of a water tank to serve an elementary school on an Indian reservation in Oregon in the United States. In 2016, Turkey will host the first UN World Humanitarian Summit, which Davutoğlu has described it as "the most important international summit ever held in Turkey."[4]

Historical Drivers

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, European powers variously negotiated and intervened in the Ottoman Empire in the name of the saving humans (mainly Christians).[5] Arguably, the whole idea of humanitarian diplomacy and, if necessary, intervention, arose in European relations with the Ottomans. Turkey itself also dealt with the humanitarian implications of Caucasus migrants of the 1860s and 1870s and then the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the non-governmental activism that plays such a prominent role in contemporary humanitarianism, including the nursing advances associated with the British social reformer Florence Nightingale,

arose in European dealings with the Ottoman Empire. The forerunner of the Turkish Red Crescent Society was formed in 1868 as the Society in Aid of Ill and Wounded Ottoman Soldiers.

Democratization in Turkey after 1983 unleashed a wave of civil society organization, spurred on by rapid economic growth. The end of the Cold War also put new external demands on Turkish foreign policy, beginning with the needs of populations in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was established for this purpose in 1992. An almost constant rumble of war on Turkey's borders- the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the Balkan and Armenia-Azerbaijan conflicts of the 1990s, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars of the 2000s, and the Syrian crisis of the 2010s- led to rising demands on its humanitarian capacity. This combination of internal reforms and external pressures has forced Turkey into a more active humanitarian stance.[6]

By the second term of the AKP government (2007 to 2011) under Erdoğan, the foreign ministry was already noting the rising importance of humanitarian assistance in Turkey's foreign policy. This unlocked a genuine enthusiasm for humanitarianism in Turkish society. Some local media have linked the sudden enthusiasm for humanitarian diplomacy and assistance to Turkey's successful bid for a United

Nations Security Council non-permanent seat in 2009-10. However, it is better to see both agendas as linked to common underlying structural conditions, internal and external, that have made Turkey both able and willing to play a larger role on the international stage.

With rising influence, however, has come rising scrutiny of Turkey's humanitarian practices. These issues can be essentially grouped into three categories: political neutrality, pro-Islamic bias, and professionalism.

Issue 1: Political Neutrality

The question of political neutrality has arisen because of the assumptions long made about the nature of humanitarian assistance and diplomacy. Humanitarian diplomacy and assistance is a policy instrument involving the use of non-coercive organization (communication, negotiation, advocacy, mobilization, persuasion, etc.) and material provision by external actors with the intention of assisting vulnerable populations with basic human needs in target countries. It differs from traditional foreign policy in that it steers clear of political issues and avoids coercive methods (threat, sanction, intervention). Many actors such as the ICRC's (full name, abbreviation in parenthesis) Régnier insist that humanitarian diplomacy must be "politically-neutral" and "value-free" in order to be classified as such.[7]

This has meant that the rise of "new humanitarian powers" like Turkey has attracted scrutiny from that community. Turkey's close integration of its official aid with its political goals- the head of the Turkish Intelligence Organization (MİT) from 2010, Hakan Fidan, was the head the Turkish Cooperation and Development Organization (TİKA) from 2003 to 2007- has raised eyebrows. The Western humanitarian aid community has grown up with the High Liberal assumption that an explicit or barely-concealed political agenda is inconsistent with humanitarian principles.

In the case of Somalia, Turkey's "political stand", for instance, has involved not asking questions to the host government about the uses of aid or about conditionality in the form of governance reforms. As a Turkish journalist put it, quoting a discussion with the Somalian ambassador to Turkey, "Turkish aid… does not come with many strings attached."[8] This political choice has given the assistance operation a *de facto* bias for the state and the sitting government, one reason why Turkish diplomats and aid workers have been the targets of attacks by radical Islamists who claim that the country is a front for Western "invaders". Indeed, Turkey has explicitly made the combatting of Islamic extremism a key justification for its humanitarian giving in Muslim countries. It has also prompted speculation in the local media that Ankara has broader designs on the

region. "Turkey's humanitarian interests in Somalia over the past years are not enough to explain why Turkey has become one of the main actors in the country," wrote a Somalian newspaper.[9] A journalist in Turkey, meanwhile, commented: "While Turkey's soft power approach seems so far to have won the hearts and minds of some Africans, the rhetoric Turkish officials use is disturbing to many others. A phrase I often hear punted around by Turkish officials, 'Whatever we are doing in Africa, we are not expecting anything in return', undermines their aid. The recipients do not want to be considered so naïve they would believe such self-sacrificial claims."[10]

Such political questions also extend to Turkey's key INGOs. The politicization of Turkey's humanitarian INGOs began when the Turkish Red Crescent Society was a big fund-raiser in the U.S. for the Turkish War of independence in the 1920s. In recent times, attention has centered on the Humanitarian Aid Organization (İHH), which operates in over 100 countries. In 2010, İHH led an ill-fated "freedom flotilla" to provide humanitarian relief and construction supplies to Gaza in 2010, which had been under an Israeli blockade since 2006. Israeli commandos stormed the boat, killing nine (another later died of injuries). The mission was planned shortly after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan walked out of a panel meeting that

included Israeli president Shimon Peres at the annual Davos Summit in 2009 after making several barbed comments about Israel. While Ankara tried to dissuade the group from carrying out the mission, and while İHH had negotiated in good faith with Syria and Israel to open official aid corridors to Gaza, the mission was clearly designed as an act of protest rather than humanitarianism. In 2014, an İstanbul court started prosecuting in absentia the four Israeli military commanders who led the raid.

Elsewhere, the İHH has issued highly charged political statements on the status of Turkic-speaking Uighurs in China's far western Xinjiang territory, calling for a statement of humanitarian concern on the issue from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).[11]

In 2003, Turkish military intelligence was claimed to be using the Turkish Red Crescent as cover to move weapons from Turkey to Turkmens in Iraq. US military members detained eleven Turkish military officers for their involvement in the operation and led them off in hoods (hence it is known as the "hood event"). And in three kidnapping cases- a kidnapped Turkish journalist in Syria who was released in Iran, the rescue of two Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers from Syria, and the release of two Turkish Airlines pilots by Hezbollah in Lebanon in return for nine members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard- İHH seems to have coordinated closely with

the Iranian government as a de facto official representative of Turkey.

Turkey's difficulties in embracing the principle of political neutrality may stem from its own past. For many years, Turkish disagreements with foreign powers on humanitarian assistance to its own Kurdish populations has reflected the ineffably politicized nature of humanitarian aid. However, as expectations of political neutrality have become commonplace, Turkey finds itself out of step with the Western humanitarian community, which expects at least some degree of separation between political agendas and humanitarian needs. As the *Cihan News Agency* concluded: "There are humanitarian organizations…that act less like aid groups and more like the tools of intelligence services. Such 'humanitarian' organizations may help intelligence agencies cover up their operations in foreign territories. However, they severely damage the credibility of Turkish citizens as the friends of those in need."[12]

Still, two factors mitigate the charge of politicization. One is the simple point that humanitarianism is a type of *public* policy. As the former UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland puts it: "Blankets and food rations are provided when inadequate political and security measures fail to address the root causes of the crisis."[13] That is, *all* actors engaged in humanitarian diplomacy or assistance are

pursuing "political" or "public" agendas – whatever mixture of self-interest, commitment, and sympathy that entails. Several scholars have questioned the notion that humanitarianism should be separated from political and developmental goals.[14]

Secondly, the issue of the "narrow" political interests Turkey sometimes pursues as part of its humanitarian assistance needs to be separated from the "broader" political interests it is pursuing. These latter concern normative attempts to build a more cooperative and inclusive international order, a question we return to below. Turkey has made humanitarianism a key dimension of its foreign policy, with explicitly political goals of transforming the international order. Such broader political interests do not discredit its humanitarianism, given their normative underpinnings.

Issue 2: Islamic Bias

The second issue that has been raised about Turkey's emergence as a global humanitarian actor is the role of Islamic foundations and cultural linkages. The concern is that humanitarianism may be delivered in a manner that promotes a regressive version of Islam or which favors Muslim over non-Muslim populations. This is especially the case since the Turkish model of humanitarianism involves a close linkage between official giving and actions by the state and the integration into that effort of civil society and business organizations. And since the trend has been growing influence of Islamic civil society and business organizations- the traditional secular Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) is today challenged by the Islamic Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD)- this translates into more Islamic pressures on Ankara's humanitarian foreign policy.

There is an irony here since the origins of Western humanitarianism were in caring for Christian groups at risk in the decaying Ottoman Empire.[15] However, there is little evidence thus far that the Islamic orientation undermines the delivery of humanitarian aid and much evidence that it inspires it and makes it more effective and durable. Islamic-inspired İHH and partly state sponsored the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), founded in 1868, have a cultural inroad in many of the countries where Turkey operates such as Afghanistan and Somalia, allowing them to provide education and healthcare in an effective manner. It has also given Ankara more influence in encouraging peace and humanitarian space among Sunni groups. The search and rescue team of the TRCS was one of the first to reach afflicted areas in Pakistan following a 2005 earthquake because of its cultural ties. The İHH has even been put in charge of developing a code of conduct for Islamic humanitarian organizations for the OIC.

> Turkish model of humanitarianism involves a close linkage between official giving and actions by the state and the integration into that effort of civil society and business organizations.

Also, secularists in Turkey, despite avowedly being more internationalist than the "parochial" Islamists, lack the motivations for carrying it out. As Tabak puts it: "Why have nationalists, liberals or socialists, while having the frames of international engagement, not developed cross-border institutional humanitarian action, while Islamic groups have?"[16] He argues that the AKP has unlocked not only a revived Muslim sensibility and civil society space but has also encouraged a globalist rather than exclusionary Islamic sensibility. "The idea of *ummah* has, in this sense, been replaced by an Islamic internationalism that suggests having cross-border humanitarian engagement as a holder of Islamic religious identity, yet without having a focus exclusively on Muslims."

Moreover, the attention to humanitarian needs of Islamic populations may remedy a blind spot in Western countries. As Binder and Erten put it: "It is worth noting that the key crises that…[define] Turkish humanitarian assistance- Bosnia, the Kashmir earthquake, the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar, Somalia and Syria- all are crisis situations that were and are marked by limited Western efforts to find effective political solutions or sufficient humanitarian assistance to predominantly Muslim populations. The…[lack of] Western attention thus provides a credible justification for the Turkish government to fill the gap and focus on Muslim populations affected by war and disaster."[17] In other words, Turkey's INGOs have both a functional advantage and a normative justification for paying particular attention to humanitarian crises involving Muslim populations.

Issue 3: Professionalism, Effectiveness, and Sustainability

The third line of critique of Turkey's humanitarianism revolves around its various departures from "best practice" as developed primarily among Western INGOs, the Western-dominated United Nations humanitarian system, and Western governments. As Akpinar has noted in her study of Turkey's Somalia foray, despite the political payoffs, the effort has been constrained by Turkey's lack of capacity and expertise, its focus on personalistic and one-off actions, and its lack of public support at home and regional support abroad.[18]

The financing and political support of Turkey's various humanitarian endeavors

raises issues of both transparency and sustainability. Because Turkey is still a developing country, the government has not made its external spending a high profile issue and thus reliable and consistent figures are not always easy to come by. In addition, since up to 75% of spending on major crises has come not from budgetary allocations but from government-organized telethons, there are questions about how "donor fatigue" could more easily undermine the sustainability of Turkish efforts. The question of the domestic political support for an enlarged international giving campaign is crucial. Whether the idea of a "grand restoration" of Turkish identity through humanitarianism is enough to motivate everyday support remains to be seen.

"If I request computers from the UN, they will take months and require a number of assessments. They will spend US$ 50,000 to give me US$ 7,000 of equipment. If I request computers from Turkey, they will show up next week."

Turkey has also raised eyebrows by its broadening of the definition of humanitarianism to include development assistance, peacebuilding, and much else, as in Somalia. After announcing the 2016

humanitarian summit, foreign minister Davutoğlu stated: «Hopefully, İstanbul will become a UN hub of international mediation, development, peace activities, humanitarian and women issues.»[19] While this blurs the boundary between humanitarian assistance and other forms of foreign policy, this critique is odd coming at a time when the global foreign assistance agenda is being reorganized around the principles of *resilience* and *national ownership*, both of which put a premium on long-term integrated aid and on aid that is defined by the affected national community itself (which may want bridges instead of blankets). In that sense, Turkey's broadening of the humanitarian agenda is consistent with emerging trends.

In addition, Turkey's humanitarian assistance has been seen as personalistic and uncoordinated, working as it does mainly from the prime minister's office rather than from an autonomous and professionalized agency and lacking any institutionalized status, such as a line item in the budget. Turkey is not a member of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC- although it has been offered membership). It has resisted attempts by the UNHCR to co-manage its Syrian migrant camps (although six UN agencies were involved in helping it serve the camps) and has also rejected a role in the camps for Western INGOs. Its officials insist that broader coordination with the DAC or the UN system would

hamper its rapid response to crises such as that in Syria. "Here at the MFA, we can either respond to the Syrian refugee crisis or discuss with other donors on how to engage more closely," Binder and Erten quote one official saying.[20] The mayor of Mogadishu is more blunt: "If I request computers from the UN, they will take months and require a number of assessments. They will spend US$ 50,000 to give me US$ 7,000 of equipment. If I request computers from Turkey, they will show up next week."[21]

Ankara sees multilateral coordination on humanitarian diplomacy and assistance as imposing unnecessary costs on its rapid actions and broader foreign policy aims. The Ministry of Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) argues that the UN and EU procedures for doing humanitarian reconstruction projects are too cumbersome and prevent rapid responses. At the same time, Turkey touts its attainment of a high-level of "interoperability"- its systems can easily work with those of others- which is a basic aid principle long-espoused by the aid community but difficult to implement because each has its own internal system designed to ensure accountability to its own stakeholders. It can get UNICEF workers into the field far faster than rival countries even though it lacks official coordination systems.

The lack of official coordination with regional and Western actors means that it is difficult for partners to scale with Turkish efforts, potentially reducing overall impact. Yet much of this is simply a reflection of the newness of Turkey's efforts. The quick scaling up of its international engagement and thus professionalism- which the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) provides a strong driver for given the 2-year process of consultations leading up the summit- suggests that these transitional issues will decline in importance. More fundamental differences about the purposes and design of aid are likely to remain.

Emerging States and Humanitarianism

The issues raised by Turkey's humanitarianism can be usefully framed in two different contexts: emerging states and middle powers. Despite recent interest in the role of emerging states, to date most scholarship on humanitarian diplomacy and assistance has focused on INGOs and international and regional institutions, especially the UN system. This seems to reflect the normative bias mentioned above that excludes state behavior from the field by definitional fiat. Minear, for example, writes that states "instrumentalize assistance and protection activities."[22] Smith insists that

"state diplomats pursue a multifarious set of interests responding to a specific national interest [while]…humanitarian officials pursue an international interest in respect of a narrowly focused mission, which is to respond to humanitarian need."[23]

Yet beyond the obvious point that every humanitarian operation run by INGOs or UN agencies depends critically for funding and support on sovereign states, sovereign states may act more morally and ethically than INGOs and international institutions in given crises precisely because they have a choice of policy instruments. The term "humanitarian diplomacy" originated in a book that asked how the U.S. *government* could be more effective in securing basic human rights for vulnerable populations.[24]

Even if it was possible or desirable to exclude sovereign states from the definition of humanitarian actors in the past, that position is untenable today in an era of emerging powers that aspire to make their own contributions to global humanitarianism *in the name of the state*. "The South continues to voice that humanitarian assistance should transcend the concept of relief and be linked with national priorities," asserts the former head of the OIC's humanitarian operations in a briefing paper.[25] The reason why UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appears to have

chosen Turkey over Switzerland as the site for the first UN humanitarian conference in 2016 is an awareness that the rules of the game are being redefined by the states of the "global South" and that without engaging them directly there is a danger that humanitarianism as a universal enterprise will fall apart.

The emergence of new economic powers in humanitarianism can be seen, and foreseen, visually by looking at national contributions to the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) from its launch in 2006 to 2014. As can be seen from Figure 1, there is a significant relationship between a country's development level (GDP per capita) and its contributions to the CERF. In effect, richer countries give more because they can afford to. It may be that domestic resistance to "foreign aid" declines once a country's economy reaches a point where the basic needs of the population have been met. What is important to note is all of the so-called emerging powers-of which Turkey, South Korea, South Africa, Brazil, and Indonesia are shown here- are large over-contributors. These countries make humanitarian assistance a priority because it fits well with their active diplomatic agendas that seek to increase influence through such good international citizenship. These countries have both the capacity and the will to reshape the global humanitarian agenda.

Figure 1: Contributions to CERF Relative to Development Levels

Binder and Meier's survey of Turkey, India, Brazil, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China shows that non-Western states differ systematically from Western ones in their approaches to humanitarian assistance and diplomacy. As we have seen with Turkey, they find that these nations have a broader conception of humanitarianism; are more likely to embrace state-to-state cooperation rather than by-passing the host-nation state; are more often motivated by immediate crises in their own regions; prefer in-kind assistance using their own national goods; do not closely track internally nor require transparency and monitoring of the funds from host nations ("hands off approach"); prefer to align their practices with regional organizations such as ASEAN or OIC rather than with the UN-led system; and prefer to funnel aid through their own national INGOs rather than through others. Turkey in particular has stressed that it has a boots-on-the-ground approach to humanitarianism. It is willing to put its aid workers, teachers, doctors, and volunteers in harm's way as part of their

mission. "We don't just unload aid at the airport and leave the scene," AFAD Director General Fuat Oktay said in 2015.[26]

> As the ranks of humanitarian actors become more non-Western, the substantive nature of humanitarian diplomacy and assistance may change.

This has opened up a wide chasm with the DAC-centered approach of the West. Of the 40 members of the Western-backed Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, only four (South Korea, Japan, Mexico, and Brazil) are non-Western, which means its aim of the "development of consensus around a comprehensive agenda for good humanitarian donor policy" will remain elusive. As Binder and Meier conclude, this growing disconnect between emerging state humanitarianism and Western humanitarianism threatens to undo decades of painstaking work to create coordinated and well-informed policies. "Without dialogue, non-Western donors may systematically repeat the errors that traditional donors made in the past."[27] As the ranks of humanitarian actors become more non-Western, the substantive nature of humanitarian diplomacy and assistance may change. This makes it imperative for the two groups to coordinate on setting principles and operative approaches. As

Egeland puts it: "The emerging and de facto economic powers outside of the Western hemisphere must be engaged to promote and protect humanitarian operations."[28]

Just as important, it may be that there is an opportunity to learn from non-Western powers. A practical and engaged learning from non-Western countries may yield lessons and opportunities especially as humanitarianism moves into unfamiliar terrain and complex situations. As Egeland puts it: "The danger is that humanitarianism, a universal imperative and shared inter-cultural system of principles, become so Westernized in its funding, staffing, organizational structure, and political profile, that it risks long-term adversity in many non-Western settings."

The problem, then, is how to separate the wheat from the chaff in engaging non-Western humanitarianism. How can existing humanitarian actors ensure that engagement with emerging non-Western actors is leading to *better* policies and outcomes rather than entrenching new regressive and repressive forms of aid? The problem arises because of the assumption that authoritarian states like Russia and China, which do not hold themselves to account in their domestic politics, are unlikely to be held to account in their foreign politics. Alongside this, other major powers like India and Japan, despite their democratic credentials domestically, are too burdened by great power concerns

to be trusted with defining a people-centered humanitarianism. There is a need for *credible* non-Western actors to emerge who can serve both to innovate and to represent an increasingly complex field. Here it is necessary to switch to the second frame of reference.

Middle Powers and Humanitarianism

Both Turkey and South Korea as new humanitarian actors share the feature of being democratic middle powers in the international system. Middle powers are the 20 or so countries that rank immediately below the eight countries generally acknowledged as established or new great powers (in today's world: the United States, China, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and India). They consist of the states with rankings roughly in the 10th to 30th range across a range of capability indicators. This group includes Brazil and South Korea at the high end of the capabilities scale to Malaysia and South Africa at the lower end. Those firmly in the center of the category include Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, and Australia, along with EU-middle powers like Poland and Spain. Middle powers, on this view, belong to the set of all "primary states" in the world system when contrasted to the "secondary states" category to which the other 160-odd states belong.

> **Middle powers enjoy a strong hand in wielding influence in discrete areas in which they have task-specific capabilities- either by acting as catalyst, facilitator, or manager.**

Democratic middle powers have several advantages as entrepreneurs in the international system in an area like humanitarianism. One, most obvious, is that they are not great powers and thus bring a unpresumptuous sensibility to their role. For instance, Binder notes that India finds the term "emerging donor" beneath its dignity as a presumptive great power. But Turkey warmly embraces the term as signaling its rising global significance.[29] Middle powers are willing to accept that they are one of many actors and this creates a capacity for consensus-based leadership. Middle powers also enjoy a strong hand in wielding influence in discrete areas in which they have task-specific capabilities-either by acting as catalyst, facilitator, or manager. This generates a pro-active diplomacy that has been variously described as "niche diplomacy"[30] or "middle power activism".[31] It is because of these systemic incentives to engage in consensus-building, rule-creation, norm entrepreneurship, and multilateralism that the "new humanitarianism" of a country like Turkey should be taken seriously. New principles of

humanitarianism emanating from Beijing, New Delhi, or Moscow are inherently non-credible, both because these states are positionally located as great powers where the national interest and the global interest are less likely to converge (especially acute for Beijing and Moscow since their national interests are not defined through democratic politics) and because followership is unlikely to emerge from their regional rivals in any case.

> Humanitarian diplomacy commands widespread normative consent within the international system; creates opportunities for good international citizenship, multipolarity, and institution-building by middle powers; and may be important to promoting peace.

By contrast, a credible humanitarianism is a natural behavior for middle powers like Turkey. Substantively, middle power populations, acting through democratic politics, have repeatedly generated foreign policies that put a premium on good international citizenship. This perhaps explains why three of the four non-Western states that belong to the Good Donorship Initiative are middle powers and the fourth, Japan, variously seeks

to define a middle power-like foreign policy.[32] Procedurally, middle powers have the unique ability to broker coalitions and achieve consensus in cases where great power approaches fail. President Bush's ill-fated "core group" (U.S., Japan, India, and Australia) that was announced to deal with the 2004 Asian tsunami was abandoned after just eight days in the face of pressure from states that wanted the effort centered on the UN.

By contrast, middle powers can easily assemble similar core groups in dealing with crises in their regions (Turkey in the case of Syria, South Africa in the case of Zimbabwe, Indonesia in the case of the Asian tsunami) without raising similar concerns. Such actions require the "soft" capabilities, such as coalition-building and network leadership,[33] that are middle powers' strengths. They fit into the peace-building and conflict-mediation role that comports with middle power interests and ideals. They also manifest a cosmopolitan moral dimension to foreign policy that middle powers often take as central to their self-identity. In particular, humanitarian diplomacy commands widespread normative consent within the international system; creates opportunities for good international citizenship, multipolarity, and institution-building by middle powers; and may be important to promoting peace. In other words, middle powers like Turkey are natural humanitarian actors.

In particular, democracy is the key factor that makes middle powers like Turkey credible in a way that Iran, say, is not. Turkey, along with South Korea, Indonesia, and South Africa, are emblematic of new democratic non-Western middle powers that will define the humanitarian agenda.[34] As democratic states, they have a credibility as humanitarian actors, yet they do not bring a High Liberal cosmopolitanism to their work, instead bringing a distinctive Global South sensibility that respects state institutions, maintains the integrity of nationality laws, and links humanitarian work with the quest for regionally-owned political solutions. In Mogadishu in 2011, Erdoğan did not seek to snub or shame the West but rather to uphold its values: "The tragedy in Somalia is testing modern values. What we want to emphasize is that contemporary world should successfully pass this test to prove that Western values are not hollow rhetoric," he said.[35] It is notable that just three days after his visit, the first British cabinet-level official to visit the country for 18 years- International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell- arrived with promises of additional aid and a stronger effort. As Tank writes about Turkey's role in Somalia: "[T]he guiding vision is one of establishing Turkey as an emerging center of power with an alternative global vision of how to conduct international affairs."[36]

Turkey thus is both a quintessential emerging power and a quintessential new middle power that is using humanitarianism to build its "national brand". In articulating the motivation to be a global leader in reshaping world order through humanitarianism, Ankara has emphasized both its comity with UN General Assembly sentiments (thus emphasizing its representativeness) and its great power-like power capabilities (thus emphasizing its capabilities).[37] The middle power ambitions of Turkey are articulated by Çevik, a political science professor at Ankara University, who writes:

> Through these institutions and organizations, Turkey is not only trying to establish herself as a humanitarian assistance provider, but also as mediator in regional conflicts by operating with regional partners and gradually building trust through local partners. One can argue that Turkey is providing an example of niche diplomacy through humanitarian value-based policies. Indeed, Turkey's humanitarian rhetoric and value-based policy resembles the notion of 'niche diplomacy' that is commonly associated with middle powers. Goodwill supporting good works and performing good deeds pay off in terms of international prestige where a country is rewarded for its goodness.[38]

Thus, Turkey is able to promote a broader political agenda through its humanitarianism linked to the normative goals of good international citizenship by itself and a more cooperative, rules-based, and inclusive world order for others. As Hasimi puts it: "Rather than disputing or rejecting the relationship, Turkey has claimed to relocate the connection between politics

and aid activities in a way that allows the relationship to become part of the discussion in forming a responsive new international order."[39]

The case of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy and assistance contributes to a rethink of the nature of humanitarianism, emphasizing the centrality of states to this field as well as the ways that it cannot and should not be divorced from the complex political and developmental context in which it arises.

The middle power lens implies that we should expect some distinctive traits to emerge from the new humanitarianism. One is a preference for regional approaches and regional institutions as the center of humanitarian response in place of the UN system or a globalized DAC.[40] Turkey has shown in its work with the OIC and the İstanbul Initiative that institutionalization will be directed not at global institutions but at regional ones. A second dimension likely to emerge from new middle powers is an emphasis on sovereignty-respecting and state-centered humanitarianism that emphasizes state-to-state relationships (departing from the "people-centered" sensibility of existing humanitarian principles). In this new approach, both

donors and beneficiaries will be organized through the offices of states. In the wake of the 2004 Asian tsunami, for instance, Germany suggested that its aid to victims in Indonesia would be dependent on the resolution of ethnic conflicts, which Asian countries criticized. Turkey's emphasis on good neighbors' policies as part of promoting peace in Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt suggests that the high-tide of interventionist humanitarianism is over. Again, this jibes with the emerging emphasis on *national ownership* in all aid activities.

Returning then to the distinctive humanitarianism of all non-Western countries mapped by Binder and Meier, it is likely that only some of this will translate into enduring change. In addition to the aspects mentioned above, the broadening of humanitarianism to include development and peacebuilding is likely to continue given that it jibes with emerging best practices within the aid community under the concept of *resilience*.

Turkey is important then, because it is emblematic of what to look for in the emerging new humanitarianism. Alongside its spending on the Syrian humanitarian crisis, Ankara has worked assiduously to broker the political deal to end the crisis, using its influence over Russia (main supplier of arms) and Iran (main supplier of manpower) to force leaders there to accept the humanitarian nature of the crisis and broker a

political solution. In this and other ways, as a Japanese researcher writes, "Turkey has actively adopted the liberal understanding of middle power under the AKP government."[41]

Theoretically, the case of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy and assistance contributes to a rethink of the nature of humanitarianism, emphasizing the centrality of states to this field as well as the ways that it cannot and should not be divorced from the complex political and developmental context in which it arises. The case of Turkey is also an important data point for middle power theory insofar as it provides grist for the mill in asking why it makes sense for a non-Western middle power to behave in this way.

Practically, Ankara's inclination to "act first, ask questions later" is a policy disposition that will likely continue in the near future in dealing with regional humanitarian needs. Humanitarian actors need to understand that the UN-centered and OECD-centered humanitarian systems are no longer the only games in town. Humanitarianism is decentralizing and a new consensus is needed to redefine best practice and then put it into effect. Cevik, who is the most articulate observer of Turkey's new humanitarianism concludes: "It is probably not realistic to expect that all these issues be taken care of in a limited time. However coming to terms with the nation's actual capacity and the expectations raised by the political narrative can be highly productive in terms of humanitarian diplomacy efforts and where the nation stands in terms of power."[42]

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Ottoman Immigrants and the Formation of Turkish Red Crescent Societies in the United States

Işıl ACEHAN*

Abstract

The role of the Turkish Red Crescent Society and its humanitarian work during World War I and the Turkish War of Independence by delivering healthcare and assistance to tens of thousands of wounded or sick soldiers is well known. However, the humanitarian work of Turkish Red Crescent societies abroad, established in various locations extending from South America to the Far East, still remains an understudied subject. This article aims at exploring the Ottoman diaspora mobilization and the humanitarian role of the Turkish Red Crescent societies in the United States in the post-war reconstruction of Turkey after WWI and the Turkish War of Independence. It argues that the Turkish War of Independence witnessed a tremendous transformation of humanitarian relief work by the Ottoman government and Ottoman diaspora in the U.S. The work of the Turkish Red Crescent Societies in WWI and its aftermath is an example of humanitarian policy in the making.

Key Words

Ottoman Empire, United States, immigrants, the Turkish Red Crescent, humanitarian relief, World War I, the Turkish War of National Independence.

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Ottoman Migration to the U.S.

At the end of the 19th century and during the early years of the 20th, thousands of Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Albanians, Greeks, and Sephardic Jews left the Ottoman Empire for economic as well as political reasons.[1] Their migration had been in part fostered by American charitable and philanthropic work, particularly in regions, such as Harput, with a considerable Christian population. The circulation of information about life and opportunities in the United States started the process of an Ottoman migration, particularly to the East Coast. The first departures were seen among Armenians who made their way to America with missionaries. Immigrant networks, letters to friends, and immigrants going back and forth would provide rich sources of practical information about jobs and opportunities in American industries, and lead immigrants to the American cities where members of their groups had already established themselves. Those letters attracted not only other Armenians but also other Ottoman

peoples living in close proximity to one another in Anatolian villages.

A number of Ottoman migration agents, fostering and coordinating the migration process for profit had been established in Turkish and European ports of departures.

Additionally, a number of Ottoman migration agents, fostering and coordinating the migration process for profit had been established in Turkish and European ports of departures. Consequently, immigrants from Anatolia, many of whom migrated from Harput, a large Ottoman province which at the end of the 19th century included today's Elazığ, Tunceli, and Malatya, migrated to industrial New England cities and towns, including Lynn, Peabody, Salem, Worcester and Lawrence. In 1891, for example, an Armenian from Worcester, MA sent a letter to the Ottoman Legation in Washington, D.C. warning the Ottoman government about an individual, Gaspar Nahigyan from Harput's Huseynik Village, who had established agents not only in Harput, but also in İstanbul and the United States. Nahigyan had been encouraging Harput's residents, both Muslims as well as Armenians, to migrate to the U.S.[2]

The peak years for migration from the Harput area was after the 1909 law that rendered Ottoman Christians eligible for military service.[3] However, it was not just Christian males who left the province in order to avoid conscription; the Muslim population, who were suspicious of the Committee of Union and Progress, were also reluctant for many years to serve in the army. Consequently, Turkish migration to the United States reached its peak just before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. Thus, both economic and political factors created a massive demographic change in the region by stimulating outmigration to the United States. Additionally, the creation and development of informal immigrant networks facilitated the process and persistence of migrations from particular villages and regions. Immigrant networks, which assisted the journeys and arrivals of new co-ethnics or co-villagers, would determine the settlement as well as employment patterns of the immigrants.

Early Years

In their early years, Turkish immigrants in the U.S., who had mainly focused on adaptation to the new country, were not interested in the homeland affairs at all. However, their indifference to the homeland changed gradually as a response to the political developments in Turkey and the change in the attitude of the government towards immigrants. There were three crucial events which

shaped the nationalizing endeavours of the Ottoman and later Turkish government.

The first sign of Ottoman government's interest in its citizens in the United States was seen as a part of the Young Turk Revolution and proclamation of the Second Constitution. The government policy of curbing emigration alone was not sufficient enough to address the economic and social problems of the immigrants. By the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire changed its attitude of indifference towards its subjects in the United States, a vast majority of whom had migrated clandestinely. Thus, along with the desire to curb the outmigration, a policy of encouraging the return of immigrants was adopted. The most important attempt of the Ottoman political elite to convince its subjects to return to Turkey was in 1908, when Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) proclaimed general amnesty to all political fugitives from Turkey, regardless of ethnicity. The amnesty was part of the Young Turk "Revolution" and the proclamation of the Second Constitution in 1908, which restored the 1876 Ottoman Constitution with the hope of creating a strong state and protecting freedom of speech and the press. Furthermore, the Second Constitution would mark an end to the religious community (*millet*) and its all-pervading influence, except in the sphere of religion.[4] Many ethnic and religious

groups under Ottoman rule, including Arabs, Turks, Greeks and Armenians, rejoiced with the events of 1908.[5]

Proclamation of the Second Constitution and the *Tanzimat*'s ideal of reconciliation of Ottoman nationalities, *Ittihad-ı Anasır* [Unity of the Elements], also found its way to the United States and the Ottoman ethnics. On July 30, 1908 the general amnesty was declared by the Turkish Consul Münci Bey in New York. This amnesty targeted about 200,000 Armenians and other Ottoman ethnics in the United States. The message from the Sultan to the Turkish consul was:

> Inform all the fugitive Turkish citizens in New York City and in all the United States, including political fugitives without regard to race or nationality-whether Greek, Armenian, Turkish, Albanian, everything that after promulgation of a constitution for the Turkish Empire, his majesty the Sultan, upon request of the government, has granted general amnesty, and all political fugitives may go back to Turkey after having the necessary passports verified at the office of the Turkish Consul General, 59 Pearl street, New York City.[6]

According to the Turkish Consul General Münci Bey, at the time of the proclamation of the general amnesty, there were 400,000 Turkish citizens in the United States, of whom more than 200,000 were political fugitives. They had often longed to return to their old homes, he noted, but feared to do so. He assured these political fugitives, as well as other Turkish citizens in the United States,

that they could return to their old homes without any fear. Although the amnesty included political, not criminal, fugitives, it prompted great hope for the return of Ottomans in the United States to "help in the work of constructing a united nation" as Turkey was expected to be "as free as the United States." To encourage return of the immigrants, Münci Bey contrasted the new era in the Ottoman Empire with the period after the Russian revolution of 1905, which resulted in a failure of constitutional democracy. He assured that the proclamation was made in good faith and that there would be "no repetition of the Czar's fiasco in regard to the Russian duma." With the Second Constitutional Era, he believed, Turkey would "now take its former place among the nations of the world." The Consul noted that he would be "surprised if at least 100,000 Turkish subjects did not return to their native lands within the next month or so." He estimated that at least 5,000 out of the 50,000 Armenians, and Syrians would depart in a very short time after the proclamation. Furthermore, the Turkish refugees, the Turkish Consul noted, did not constitute a large number in New York City but had settled in Providence, Rhode Island as a large colony which was also expected to return.[7]

After the proclamation of general amnesty, the Armenians and Syrians of New York City were consulted with respect to their thoughts about the Sultan's call for return. Mihran Bohgelian,

an Armenian spokesperson, said "I feel absolutely certain that the Sultan is acting in good faith I trust implicitly in the proclamation." Moreover, F.M. Faddoll, a Syrian Jeweler and an important figure in the Syrian community in New York City, noted "we Syrians, of course, are greatly pleased at what the Sultan has done." Regarding the situation of the Armenian and Syrian immigrants in the United States, he observed that "the Armenian is a political refugee, where Syrian is not; the Syrian has come to America because the conditions of life, business and industry there do not offer the possibility for progress that America does." He believed that "the advance in the cause of freedom may mean a new era for Syria."[8] The proclamation also found its voice in Turkish newspapers. *Sabah*, one of the most prominent newspapers of the time, noted that many of the Muslim and Armenian refugees were preparing to return to their homeland.[9]

As a part of the unification program carried out by the Ottoman government, Mehmed Ali Bey, the Turkish minister to the United States was recalled by the government and was replaced by Münci Bey, the Consul General in New York. After the minister was recalled, Münci Bey made his way to Washington as Chargé d'Affaires. His first step towards the unification of all the Ottoman citizens in the U.S. was holding a mass meeting of Turks, Armenians, Syrians, and Greeks, and all persons interested in the Ottoman

Empire at Carnegie Hall, New York City, on 23 August 1908. He conveyed that he would "preside and assist in the discussion of the best means of getting a permanent good government for Turkey, so that the people would be free to go ahead and develop the resources of the country."[10] However, when all hope for the reunification of Ottoman ethnic elements under one umbrella disappeared and the government eventually came to terms with the impossibility of achieving the ideal of *Ittihad-ı Anasır*, these efforts turned out to be in vain. Moreover, the failure of the programs could be due to economic opportunities that the U.S. offered as well as the suspicion over the government's intentions about the political fugitives.

The Balkan Wars

The second crucial element in nationalizing the Ottoman diaspora in U.S. was the Balkan Wars. Although the earliest nationalizing efforts of the Ottoman government covered all Ottoman subjects in the U.S., by the time of the Balkan Wars these efforts targeted only Muslim citizens. During the Balkan Wars, a number of governmental and non-governmental figures visited Peabody and the other towns and cities where the Turks lived, in order to foster national consciousness as well as to raise money for the families of soldiers killed in the Balkan Wars. By 1913, the Turkish immigrants'

ignorance had been broken in terms of the old country as well as the newly adopted country. When Ahmed Emin Yalman, who was doctoral student of journalism at Columbia, visited Peabody in 1911, he was disappointed with the ignorance of the Anatolian workers as well as the wages and conditions under which they were working. However, when he visited Peabody for a second time in 1913, he was surprised by the progress that had been made by the Anatolian workers. Yalman observed that the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) had resulted in ending their indifference to the homeland. They had subscribed to the İstanbul newspapers and they had been gathering in the coffeehouses in order to read the newspapers and discuss the situation at home. Discussions were followed by fundraising efforts for the homeland. Moreover, two Turks from Midilli (a former Ottoman island which was left to Greece at the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913), who had lived for a period within the Turkish community of Peabody, had started publishing a Turkish newspaper which contributed to the intellectual development of the Turkish workers to a great extent by introducing new ideas.[11]

Kemal Karpat notes that the Turks in the United States lacked an enlightened leadership like the ones that Armenians and Greeks had, that would allow them to set up permanent foundations in the United States. He explains this reason for the lack of such leadership as:

The mass-elite division of the Turks was their worst enemy, for the elite looked down upon their own lower classes as ignorant beasts of exploitation rather than as kin to be helped. Members of the Ottoman intelligentsia, like many modernist Turks, were trained to serve not their people and society but the state and thus were unable to establish their own viable, independent ethnic community. Lacking a communal foundation to provide continuity, each wave of immigrants had to start a new process of adjustment to the unfamiliar environment but ultimately abandoned its efforts, either by returning home or by disappearing within the American society.[12]

Although Karpat's observation about the Turkish immigrants' failure of establishing foundations in the United States for a permanent presence is true to some extent, a deeper look into the Turkish society on the North Shore will prove that they neither lacked leadership nor were they ignored by the elites who fostered the process of nationalization and adaptation of Turkish immigrants in the U.S.

With the proclamation of the Second Constitution, Turks, as well as the Ottoman millets were expected to return to the homeland in order to take part in the formation of a new nation.

One of the early attempts for Turkish nationalization was marked by the Turkish Consul of Boston, Abraham Effendi's visit to Peabody with his clerk Faik Bey in 1911, which created much excitement among the Turkish residents of Peabody. A large number of Turks, about 250, gathered at the O'Shea building in Peabody Square to see the Consul. His address, which was one of the first attempts at nationalization among the Turkish immigrants, was on the topic "The progress and the education of a nation."[13]

While conditions worsened due to the Balkan Wars, Turkish nationalism was built up among the Turkish immigrants in the United States. As was noted before, with the proclamation of the Second Constitution, Turks, as well as the Ottoman *millet*s were expected to return to the homeland in order to take part in the formation of a new nation. However, Balkan Wars had started a process of no return for the Ottoman *millet*s that would emerge as nationals by the end of World War I. During and after this process, not only government representatives visited Peabody in order to tell about conditions in the home country, but also leading figures among the Turkish immigrants updated their countrymen about the conditions in Turkey while also trying to make the immigrants' assimilation into the host community easier.

One of these leading figures among the Turkish residents of Peabody was Joe Hussien, who had acted as both an

interpreter and arbitrator for the Turks in legal matters and as a mouthpiece for the Turkish community on the North Shore. Another figure, as was mentioned before, was Mamad Efendi, a Turkish resident in Peabody since 1902 and a storekeeper since 1905. Knowing the customs of the newly adopted country, he also counselled the Turks when they encountered difficulties.[14] There were also other prominent figures who advised the Turkish community on the North Shore and tried to ease the difficulties stemming from being in a foreign land. One of the earliest examples of the consciousness among the Turkish immigrants was seen after the Turks and Greeks had a "miniature battle" on 19 October 1912. It was claimed that the fight had started after an assault on a Turk by a Greek on Wallis Street, Peabody where they lived in adjoining houses. Wallis St. 82-84 was a double house on Wallis Street, with the front part occupied by Turks and parts in the rear occupied by Greeks. It was noted that the Turks and Greeks "evidently sought to import the war of their several countries and fight it out with knives." The fight came to an end with the arrival of police officers who took two Turks and a Greek into custody while the severely wounded were taken to hospital. The fight was perhaps one of the most important events that led to a rising Turkish and Greek antipathy on the North Shore. Police Chief Grady "cautioned them against meeting each

other and fighting over their war." Moreover, he also noted that "they could go back to their native lands and get all the real fighting they wanted, but they must keep out of it here."[15]

> Following WWI, the Turkish War of Independence strengthened the ties that Turkish and Kurdish immigrants in the U.S. had with the homeland, as it became a test of allegiance.

The following day after that event, 20 October 1912, a mass meeting of around 1,000 Turks from Peabody, Haverhill, and Lowell, was called by Mehmed Efendi. Besides raising US$ 1,000 for the war cause and expecting to send US$ 7,000 from Peabody to be forwarded to the Sultan, leading Turkish individuals raised a sense of nationalism and suggested ways to the Turks to make their lives easier in the United States. Moreover, a call to arms had been awakened among the Turks, as about 30 of them left the U.S. to fight in the Balkan Wars. Mamad Efendi, one of the most prominent figures among the Turks on the North Shore, counselled the Turks to "obey the laws of the country in which they reside" and resented the fight which was taking place between the Greeks and Turks of Peabody. Another Turk, Huseyin Efendi of Lynn, gave a talk on religion and loyalty to

the native land, which left many of the Turks in tears. Another speaker at the meeting was Mehmed Suleyman Efendi, 18 years old, who addressed the meeting on the Mohammedan religion; a talk that aroused great enthusiasm. Moreover, Huseyin Efendi, another Turkish individual, advised the Turks "not to engage in combat with the local Greeks," and if assaulted by them to "inform the police authorities."[16]

The Great War

For the Ottoman immigrant ethnics in the United States, the wake of World War I would lead to a tremendous transformation in terms of identity. The Ottoman Empire was now crumbling and turning into a new entity which would lead to the immigrant's transformation of identity from thousand miles away. By the time of Turkey's entrance into World War I, one of the Turkish immigrants, a man named Mehmed from the Diyarbakır village of "Aşağı Çanakçı," established the *Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i İslâmiye* (Islamic Benevolence Society) in Peabody. The Society had been founded in an effort to raise money for the orphans of Muslims who lost their lives during World War I. He had also secured a license for the Society, which was composed at the beginning of seven Turkish business owners in Peabody. After founding the Society, he had begun the work of

registering new members to the Society by gathering the Turks on Sundays in the Society building and giving lectures on the conditions in the homeland and on their duty for the welfare of their own country. Mehmed also started visiting the Turkish coffee houses in Peabody and its vicinity, such as Salem and Worcester, and giving lectures. He was collecting at least 25 cents from each person. He told about all his efforts in a letter to the Turkish Consul in Boston.[17] By 30 November 1919, he had collected around US$ 6,700 to be sent to İstanbul for contribution to the war effort.[18] By 13 December 1919, the amount of the money raised among the Turkish immigrants had reached US$ 7,010.55, and they had decided to give the money to the Turkish Red Crescent Society.[19]

Although the Balkan Wars and World War I had seen early attempts of humanitarian efforts by societies established by Turkish and Kurdish Ottoman immigrants, the Turkish War of National Independence transformed humanitarian relief due to the magnitude of the civilian suffering, particularly for the orphans of deceased soldiers.

The Turkish War of Independence

Following WWI, the Turkish War of Independence strengthened the ties that Turkish and Kurdish immigrants in the U.S. had with the homeland, as it became a test of allegiance. Although they had always retained their contact with the homeland and kept tabs on their farms and families left behind, their interest in the homeland affairs intensified in this period. Turkish and Kurdish immigrants, who were usually ignored or disregarded by the Ottoman government for a long time, became the centre of interest for the new Ankara government as their value as a source of revenue to fund the reconstruction of the war-torn country as well as to take care of the orphans of war became more evident.

Although the Balkan Wars and World War I had seen early attempts of humanitarian efforts by societies established by Turkish and Kurdish Ottoman immigrants, the Turkish War of National Independence transformed humanitarian relief due to the magnitude of the civilian suffering, particularly for the orphans of deceased soldiers. Moreover, the establishment of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 1919, would change the whole structure of fundraising efforts by making the flow of funds from the U.S. to the Ottoman Empire much more convenient.

As a part of the fundraising process, by 21 August 1921, US\$ 150,000 had already been raised among the Turks and Kurds residing in the United States and the amount was given to the Turkish representative, Abdülhak Hüseyin, in Washington. It was stated that the amount would be sent to the Turkish Red Crescent Society in Turkey through Guarantee Trust Co. in İstanbul. [20] The Turkish-American Information Bureau, located at 18 West Street, NYC, noted that through the newspapers they were informing the Turkish immigrants in the United States about the success of the Second Battle of İnönü (*II. İnönü Muharebesi*, 26-31 March 1921). They also wanted the Turkish Red Crescent Society to prepare a documentary film about the Battles of İnönü to promote raising funds for the Turkish Red Crescent Society. It was suggested the film should also include beautiful sights of İstanbul and Anatolia as well as the views of beautifully dressed ladies in their homes and on the streets. The Bureau believed that the film would help improve the image of Turkish society among the American people. Moreover, the Bureau would contribute to the film in all ways possible and wanted the film rolls to be mailed to the Turkish-American Information Bureau in New York City.[21]

On 21 March 1923, Dr. Mehmed Fuad (Umay) Bey was granted permission from the Grand National Assembly of

Turkey to go the United States in order to raise funds among the Ottoman immigrants for immediate war relief. For the first time, humanitarian action became an organized effort by fostering diaspora mobilization. Dr. Mehmed Fuad, the founder of *Himaye-i Etfal* (Society for the Protection of Orphans), a society that was established in 1921 to provide orphanages to children of the deceased soldiers in the Turkish War for Independence, began visiting many of the Turkish colonies in the United States, giving lectures and raising a considerable amount of money for the establishment of orphanages in Turkey. Dr. Fuad Bey arrived in Ellis Island on 6 April 1923 on a ship named S.S. Aquitania, and headed to the Ottoman Welfare Association at 35 Rivington Street.[22] In the first meeting held by the Ottoman Welfare Association for the benefit of Turkish Orphan Society, Dr. Fuad Bey notes that a total of US$ 17,500 was raised in just six hours. To those who donated over US$ 1,000, a personally autographed picture of Mustafa Kemal was given by Dr. Fuad Bey. He visited the Turkish colonies in Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. He lectured about the Turkish War of Independence and the success of the struggle, and many Turkish and Kurdish workers residing in these cities donated their life savings to support the construction of orphanages and the reconstruction of the country.

Dr. Mehmed Fuad (Umay)'s visit to Peabody, Massachusetts aroused great excitement among the Turkish and Kurdish immigrants. It was one of the first chances for the Muslim Anatolian immigrants to manifest their national pride and attachment to the homeland. At the same time their socioeconomic achievement was evidenced with the arrival of Mehmed Fuad in Peabody "in an auto decorated with a large American flag and followed by a dozen autos filled with Turks, the machines decorated with American and Turkish flags." A day before his arrival, the Turks refrained from work and "went around with badges in honor of his coming."[23]

Mehmed Fuad noted that there were around 600 Turks when he visited Peabody in 1923. Despite their small number, they had established the Red Crescent society. The next day, after being shown some of the tanneries in Peabody and Salem, Fuad gave an address to the Turks and Kurds at the Peabody Institute. The scene was described as:

> All the Turks in town were present. They made much of the doctor's coming, many of them taking a day off. They wore badges in his honor and displayed in front of the Institute the American and Turkish flags. Much enthusiasm prevailed. Baskets of roses were carried down the aisles and the flowers were bought at any price, bunches of money being put in the baskets. It was said that $8,000 was raised among the Turks of this city for Dr. Bey to take back with him.[24]

Fuad Bey visited Peabody for a second time on 14 August 1925, as he came for the National Conference of Social workers held in Denver, Colorado in June, 1925. When he arrived in Massachusetts, he was met by a delegation of Turkish people from Peabody and escorted to the Moose Hall in Peabody to deliver an address. When interviewed by *The Salem Evening News*, Fuad Bey noted that American people were "more friendly towards the Turkish people." He gave an example of an American Senator, William H. King from Utah, who was visiting Turkey at that time. The Senator's ideas before leaving this country were rather unfavorable" but he had changed his old opinion as was proved by his statements he had made to the Turkish papers during his visit. Fuad Bey concluded his interview by noting "as the time passes, the American people will be even more friendly toward the Turkish people."[25] Mehmet Fuad's two visits to the Turkish community in Peabody had contributed to the maintaining of a better image of the Turkish society in the city by showing enthusiasm over their homeland while manifesting their concern over becoming part of American society. Moreover, Mehmed Fuad's interview with *The Salem Evening News* and his expression of his faith in the prospect of better Turkish and American international and intergroup relations based on trust and cooperation enhanced the Turkish immigrants' individual and

collective self-esteem and weakened the preexisting negative views about the Turkish immigrants.

Even the depiction of the Turkish people in the newspapers had considerably changed by the time Fuad arrived in Peabody. Previously, Turks in the U.S. had been criticized several times in American newspapers for channeling money to the homeland. Regarding Fuad's second visit to Peabody, it was noted:

> The meeting of the Turkish residents of this city held in the City hall for the purpose of raising funds for welfare work among Turkish children, Sunday afternoon, was a huge success financially and a total amount of US$ 6,960 was raised for this purpose. The meeting was addressed by Dr. Fuad Bey of Constantinople, who is in this country to secure financial assistance for the work done in his native land. There were about 160 present and the donations ranged from US$ 5 to US$ 260 or an average contribution of US$ 43.50 per person from those who attended the meeting. The affair typifies the liberality of the men of that race in this city and is conclusive evidence that the men of that race in this city are industrious and thrifty.[26]

The fundraising had been done under the supervision of Joe Hussein, the Turkish spokesperson, who was a resident of Peabody for many years and well known there. The Turks, who had long been criticized for their channeling money to the homeland, maintaining their native language, and intending to return to their homeland, turned out to be described as "industrious and thrifty" by 1925, which

indicates a better image of the Turks as well as better relations with the rest of Peabody's community. Moreover, as the result of an intensified nationalism as well as adaptation to the host country, the earliest attempt of lobbying efforts among Turkish immigrants was seen during this period. With the sponsorship of the Turkish Welfare Society in New York, a memorandum was prepared by the Turkish immigrants and addressed to the U.S. Congress calling for working in collaboration with the new Turkish Republic.[27] Dr. Fuad's son, Tunç Umay, notes that a sum of US$ 100,000 had already been forwarded to Turkey before Dr. Umay's departure and the total of the funds raised was over US$ 400,000. With the money raised, six buildings were acquired in Turkey, the Orphan Society headquarters in Anafartalar, Ankara were established, two movie theatres were built and the Turkish Orphan Society's orphanage in Keçiören, Ankara was founded. Turkish immigrants continued donating for the Turkish Children until the 1950s.[28]

Later Years

In the late 1930s, the Red Crescent Society in Peabody, the "Anatolian Club" in other words, had become the gathering place for the Turkish immigrants in Peabody, Lynn, Salem and nearby areas. They would come at least once a week for meetings and prayers. The Anatolian

Club, which also had been established in Chicago, Detroit, New York, and Worcester, became a device for Turkish transnationalism in their later years in the United States. It was where funds were raised to be sent to Turkey through the Red Cross, who turned it over to the Red Crescent. According to the American Red Cross, the sum of $3,500 was forwarded to Turkey for the victim of flood in Adana on 17 December 1930. For the Erzincan earthquake victims in December 1939, over 10,000 canvasses for tents and 25,000 blankets as well as a large amount of medical supplies were dispatched to Turkey.[29]

As the world has become more globalized and the world's humanitarian challenges have become more complex and transnational, the role of humanitarian diplomacy has become a salient feature of international organizations.

The Turkish transnational activities became also instrumental in showing those back home the immigrants' success as well as their continuing concern for their homeland. Frank Ahmed recalls in 1939 sitting with the Turks and a representative of the General Electric Corporation for contemplation over the

purchase of an iron lung to be sent to Elazığ. The Turks in Peabody and Salem had paid in cash for the iron lung and the shipping expenses for Elazığ. When he asked "why an iron lung and not other types of medical supplies?" the reply was that "Turkey does not have an iron lung, not one in the entire country, that's why!" Then, Ahmed concluded that "these Turks living on the North Shore of Massachusetts wanted to send a positive message of their interest and success to Turkey." The message was "we have not forgotten you, do not forget us." Sending an iron lung was a way "to show that they were still Turks and very much cared for Turkey but, nevertheless, had done well in the United States."[30]

Conclusion

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies defines humanitarian diplomacy as "persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles."[31] As the world has become more globalized and the world's humanitarian challenges have become more complex and transnational, the role of humanitarian diplomacy has become a salient feature of international organizations. However, a thorough analysis of the history of humanitarian organizations and post-war reconstruction of the world after the

Great War, will fill a gap in the history of humanitarian diplomacy. Although the unique role of the Turkish Red Crescent Society is one the first examples of humanitarian diplomacy in action, its history has not been studied extensively yet. This has partly been due to the unavailability of the archival materials that would provide resources to uncover the history of the Turkish Red Crescent Society and also due to a lack of interest in the subject. In the past ten years, however, the Turkish Red Crescent Society Archives has shown a rapid progress and now a considerable number of archival materials has been indexed and is searchable online. The Turkish Red Crescent archives provide a rich collection to study the humanitarian relief work by the Turkish government and a good example of diaspora mobilization.

As the view of the government about Ottoman immigrants in the U.S. changed from negative to positive, the potential power of the Ottoman diaspora in the country's post-war reconstruction was realized.

Also, as has been discussed in the article, in the early years, the Ottoman diaspora's engagement in homeland affairs was not institutionalized at all. This did not change until the arrival of Dr. Fuad

in the last months of the Turkish War of Independence. As the view of the government about Ottoman immigrants in the U.S. changed from negative to positive, the potential power of the Ottoman diaspora in the country's post-war reconstruction was realized. Dr. Fuad's initiative sets a good example of consolidating a diaspora abroad and integrating them into humanitarian relief work in postwar and post-conflict societies.

Endnotes

1 The numbers of each Ottoman religious group migrating to the United States are imprecise because of the fact that the Ottomans kept few official figures of immigration. Furthermore, the large numbers of clandestine migrations, as was noted, also added complexity to Ottoman statistical figures, so they must be treated with caution. Thus, United States immigration statistics, despite their flaws, give us much more precise information about the numbers and characteristics of the Ottoman immigrants in the United States. Ottoman subjects migrating to the Americas totaled 1.2 million. During the period 1869-1892, 178,000 persons migrated from "Turkey-in-Asia" to the United States; 120,000 migrants from "Turkey-in-Europe" and another 150,000 from the Asian provinces arrived in the United States between 1895 and 1914. The most considerable leap in the population movement from "Turkey in Asia," was seen in the 1910 census with a total of 23,533 immigrants from Turkey in Asia, an increase around twice the number of immigrants in 1909. In 1911 and 1912, after a decline in the number of migration from "Turkey in Asia" to 10,229 and 12,788 respectively, another rise was observed in 1913. 23,955 immigrated probably due to the devastating effects of the Balkan Wars on the socioeconomic conditions in Turkey and the decline in the prospect of a better life at home. After the outbreak of World War I, Ottoman immigrant arrivals into the United States abruptly came to a halt. See, Susan B. Carter et al., *Historical Statistics of the United States,* Millennial Edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006. For a more comprehensive discussion on the numbers and identities of the Ottoman immigrants in the U.S., see, Kemal Çiçek, "Amerika'da Türk Ermeni Çatışması ve Harry the Turk Cinayeti", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Vol. 5-6, No. 20-21 (2005-2006), pp. 65-86; John J. Grabowski, "Forging New Links in the Early Turkish Migration Chain: The U.S. Census and Early Twentieth Century Ships' Manifests", in Kemal Karpat and Deniz A. Balgamış (eds.), *Turkish Migration to the United States: From Ottoman Times to the Present*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2008, pp. 15-28; Thomas Archdeacon, *Becoming American: An Ethnic History*, New York, Free Press, 1983; Kemal Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860-1914", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1985), pp. 176-7; Kemal Karpat, "The Turks in America", *Les Annales d L'Autre Islam*, No. 3 (1995), pp. 231-252.

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7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 "Amerika'daki Osmanlılar", *Sabah*, 4 August 1908.

10 *Ibid.*

11 Ahmed Emin Yalman, "Amerika'da Türk Muhacirler", *Darülfünun Edebiyat Mecmuası*, No. 2 (1332-1334), pp. 179-188.

12 Karpat, "The Turks in America", pp. 236-237.

13 "Visit by Turkish Consul", *The Salem Evening News*, 18 December 1911.

14 "For Turkish Labor", *The Peabody Enterprise*, 17 May 1912.

15 "Peabody Greeks and Turks had a Miniature Battle", *The Salem Evening News*, 21 October 1912.

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Who Represents Palestinian Refugees? The Sidelining of the Core of the Palestine Question

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Abstract

Palestinian refugees make up the largest refugee population in the world, yet humanitarian diplomacy with regards to these refugees has been lacking since the start of the creation of the refugee problem. Even early on, many Western countries preferred to resettle the Palestinians in neighboring countries. While this proved to be unsuccessful, there was still no representation of Palestinian refugees or negotiation on their behalf because the early goal was the liberation of the whole of Palestine, which would consequently mean the return of the refugees. While there were some efforts on the part of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine to convince Israel to readmit some refugees, this proved to be fruitless. Moreover, in current times, the refugee issue is overshadowed by Israel's actions in the Occupied Territories. Statehood in the Occupied Territories has also sidelined the refugees, many of whom are from within the borders of present-day Israel. Thus, it is the academics, activists, non-governmental organizations and, most recently, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement which are the main actors that preserve and advocate for the refugees' major demands: the right to return to their homes and to be compensated for their losses.

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Key Words

On the 10th of December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[1] was adopted by the UN General Assembly. Remarkably, the Declaration was not met with any dissent. It came in the wake of the end of the Second World War, and the international community was determined never to allow the atrocities that had occurred during the war to be repeated again. In Article 13 (2), the Declaration states that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." Thus it is ironic that a mere few months after the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, Palestinian refugees who were displaced, forcibly or in the course of the hostilities, were prevented from returning to their former homes.

Despite the UN General Assembly's passing of Resolution 194 in December 1948, which states that "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours

should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,"[2] Palestinians 65 years later are still prevented from returning home. Diplomacy, humanitarian or otherwise, has been a resounding failure in the case of the Palestine refugees. The two major causes are the lack of an international body representing the refugees, as well as a lack of a powerful state willing to take on the plight of the refugees. By the end of the 1948 war, there was no state called 'Palestine'. While Resolution 194 also created the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) in order to "to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation"[3] in essence, to employ humanitarian diplomacy- its role was severely limited by 1952 due to the lack of cooperation from states. The occupation of the remainder of historic Palestine (the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem) in 1967, as well as the Syrian Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai, saw greater support for guerilla activities against Israel,[4] which overshadowed any negotiations or pressure that could be put on Israel with regards to refugees. Thus the years leading up to the 1987 Palestinian *intifada* or uprising saw very little humanitarian diplomacy with regards to the refugee issue. The Oslo Accords during the 1990s further relegated the topic of the refugees to 'final status' talks.

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This paper will describe the position of Palestinian refugees since 1948 vis-à-vis negotiations for the protection of their rights. As will be seen, there has been a noted absence of humanitarian diplomacy. The main issues are Israel's refusal to accept any responsibility for the refugee issue and therefore its position not to allow the refugees to return (except a very limited number as part of a larger peace deal),[5] as well as seemingly more pertinent issues related to the Palestine question that came up later, such as the occupation, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories and the separation wall. Furthermore, to this day, there has still not been any real pressure on Israel from states, and negotiations have only pushed the right of return farther away. Without a specific body to promote the protection of refugees, it is easy to see why refugee rights have not been treated as a priority. Moreover, the lack of a unified position on the part of the Arab states has further exacerbated this.

In recent times, much work on Palestinian refugees pertains to improving their conditions in host countries. It is now the grassroots organizations, such as BADIL and Al-Awda, as well as academics and lawyers

who are advocating for the refugee right of return; and most importantly since 2005, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

The Role of Humanitarian Diplomacy

Humanitarian diplomacy, as defined by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, is "persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles."[6] Humanitarianism, therefore, is at the very root of humanitarian diplomacy. Specific to the context of military occupation, Jonathan Whitall defines humanitarian diplomacy as "the use of International Law and the humanitarian imperative as complimentary levers to facilitate the delivery of assistance or to promote the protection of civilians in a complex political emergency,"[7] This diplomacy, however, is not confined to NGOs. Turkey, for example, has stated that one of the explanatory principles of its foreign policy is humanitarian diplomacy, which it defines as an "equilibrium" between power and conscience.[8]

For humanitarian diplomacy to work, there must be a decision-maker willing to negotiate. While powerful states can exert some pressure on decision-makers,

when this aspect is absent as well, the project of humanitarian diplomacy becomes difficult to sustain. The case of Palestinian refugees is a vivid example of this. There have been some successes in terms of the improvement of living conditions in refugee camps, but even that has been limited due to the varying restrictions in the different host countries.

The Refugee Crisis, Mediation Efforts of the UNCCP, and the Role of UNRWA

On 14 May 1948, the State of Israel was declared. The creation of Israel was born out of a war with its Arab neighbors, which intensified with the end of the British Mandate over Palestine. However, the hostilities began before then. While there were sporadic attacks in 1947, which succeeded in expelling some 75,000 Palestinians, Jewish troops emptied five Palestinian villages in one day in the middle of February 1948.[9] From early March 1948, about 250,000 Palestinians were uprooted, and this was accompanied by several massacres.[10] By the end of the war in 1949, there were approximately 750,000 refugees from Mandatory Palestine registered with the UN.[11] This number does not include the approximately 150,000 Palestinians who were displaced inside what became Israel.

> For humanitarian diplomacy to work, there must be a decision-maker willing to negotiate. While powerful states can exert some pressure on decision-makers, when this aspect is absent as well, the project of humanitarian diplomacy becomes difficult to sustain.

UN General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) created the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to "carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees".[12] It had no protective function. Since there has been no solution to the refugee problem, the mandate has been renewed repeatedly.[13] UNRWA services "encompass primary and vocational education, primary health care, relief and social services, infrastructure and camp improvement, microfinance and emergency response, including in situations of armed conflict."[14] In places like Lebanon, UNRWA services are crucial as Palestinian refugees are barred from moving freely around the country or even working in certain professions.

UN General Assembly Resolution 194, on the other hand, created the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP). The UNCCP was created specifically with the protection function that UNRWA lacks, and when it was created:

The UNCCP attempted to intervene with state parties to promote and protect the internationally-recognized rights of the refugees; promote measures to improve the situation of refugees; preserve and promote the restitution of refugee properties, and; promote durable solutions for refugees, including repatriation, resettlement, restitution, and compensation based on the unconditional principle of refugee choice.[15]

Palestine refugees are defined by UNRWA as "people whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict."[16] This special regime, with two UN Agencies created to deal specifically with the Palestinian refugees, was meant to be an aid to the Palestinians. However, the role of the UNCCP was severely limited by states that wanted to resettle the refugees as opposed to repatriate them.

The structure of the UNCCP was such that three member states -France, Turkey and the USA- were responsible to the General Assembly. According to Michael Fischbach, who was able to examine all of the UNCCP documents, the American seat on the UNCCP in particular served to guarantee that the body never strayed too far from overall US policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in general.[17] The Americans insisted on resettling the majority of refugees.[18] As for the Israeli position, in 1951, Israel stated in an

internal memo it was only willing to pay for compensation if it were used to resettle refugees in Arab countries, and only if it released Israel from any further payment to refugees.[19] Upon pressure from the UNCCP, Israel agreed to readmit 100,000 refugees, but it quickly rescinded the offer, especially as the Arab states rejected the meager proposal.[20] Yet the 17,000 Palestinian Jews who were displaced by the fighting in 1948 were allowed to return to their homes.[21] Thus Israel's main issue was not with the right of refugees to return, but with the ethnicity of the refugees.

The UNCCP's role was finally confined by 1952 to gathering information on refugee property.[22] By late 1966 the UNCCP had closed down its Technical office and merely existed on paper.[23] After the UNCCP ceased its protective function it resulted in a legal lacuna whereby the recognized refugees do not have basic protection.[24] The problem persists to this day.

Palestinian political organization was initially very limited because of the dispersal of Palestinian refugees across the Arab world.

Arab Nationalism, the PLO and Armed Struggle

Since the UN body created to protect Palestinian rights and facilitate their fulfillment had failed very soon after it was created, what of humanitarian negotiations between states? Palestinian political organization was initially very limited because of the dispersal of Palestinian refugees across the Arab world. Moreover, the domestic laws of some of the countries they found themselves in prevented them from effective mobilization. The leadership of the Arab states have not been consistent in their support for the Palestinians, and it can be argued that they sometimes even worked against the interests and desires of the Palestinians. Even before the 1948 Arab-Israel War, in November of 1947, there was an unwritten agreement between King Abdullah of Jordan and the Jewish Agency to divide Palestine between themselves.[25] In Syria in 1949, after a military coup by Colonel Husni Zaim, an offer was made to the Israelis that in exchange for permanent access with Israel to the Jordan River and Lake Tiberius, Syria would resettle 300,000 of the 700,000 refugees. Israel refused to discuss the offer.[26] After the war, King Abdullah of Jordan and King Farouk of Egypt both proposed political settlements with Israel, but David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, rejected them because he did not want to make any concessions, no matter how minute, on refugees or on borders.[27]

Yet the Palestine issue was very much discussed within the Arab League. In 1952, the Council recommended the resettling of Palestinian refugees in the Arab states, while emphasizing that this would not affect their right of return. Moreover, a "Palestine department" was established in the secretariat to deal with Palestinian affairs. However, negotiations were difficult because of the official boycott of "all regional organizations and conferences in which Israel participated".[28] Furthermore, most of the resolutions regarding Palestinians were not implemented. The Casablanca Protocol, for example, outlines the treatment of Palestinians residing in Arab states pending their return,[29] but the application has been inconsistent.[30] In 1956, UK Prime Minister Anthony Eden attempted to assist with a peace settlement between the Arab countries and Israel. It was reported that Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser welcomed the efforts. Israel, however, viewed these efforts as unacceptable because they included the re-admittance of refugees and ceding some territories.[31]

In the period after the first Arab-Israeli war, Arab nationalist sentiment was high. Most Palestinians saw that the recovery of their homeland was part of a wider Arab movement, and thus they identified with pan-Arab parties, which they believed to be committed to their cause.[32] In Beirut in the early 1950s, Palestinian and Arab students founded the Movement of

Arab Nationalists (MAN, *harakat al-qawmiyyin al-ʿarab*), whose ideology was Arab nationalism and its early method for defeating the Zionists was revenge.[33] With the rise of the charismatic Nasser of Egypt in 1955, it was seen that the liberation of Palestine would occur after the achievement of Arab unity.[34] The refugee issue was subsumed within these larger goals. However, another movement was formed in 1959: Fatah. It was founded mostly by the refugees of 1948 and thus the refugee issue was at its core. The return of the refugees was also seen as part of the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.[35] In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded with the goal of the liberation of Palestine.[36] Between 1964 and 1967, the PLO established itself through diplomacy by representing Palestine at Arab Summit Conferences.

Yet the June 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors was seen to be the final blow against Arab nationalism.[37] The occupation of the rest of Palestine (the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem) meant that action had to be taken at least to retrieve those areas, independent of Arab unity. In 1968, the Palestine National Charter was revised. Article 9 stated:

> Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to

work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.[38]

Thus from 1968, the Palestinian resistance groups were engaged in guerilla warfare.[39] However, the PLO suffered a severe plow with Israel's attack on them in Lebanon in 1982. Although there was fierce criticism of Israel from the international community due to their use of cluster bombs and the horrific Sabra and Shatila massacre,[40] the PLO was considerably weakened and had to leave their base in Lebanon to Tunisia.

From the Declaration of a Palestinian State to Oslo

In 1984, PLO leader Yasser Arafat stated his willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict with the Israelis, but nothing came of it.[41] Yet something major happened in December of 1987: The Palestinian *intifada*, or popular uprising. This shifted the focus from the struggle for Palestine from those who were exiled to the struggle of those within against the occupation, and the assertion of sovereignty over what remained of Palestine. The 19th session of the Palestine National Council in November of 1988, held in Algiers, was called the "The Intifada Session", and Arafat declared a Palestinian state, and agreed on a peaceful resolution of

the conflict based on UN Resolutions 181 (the partition resolution), 242 (withdrawal of Israeli forces from the 1967 Occupied Territories and return of displaced people from those Territories), and 338 (ceasefire and negotiations between the parties). The PLO entered into negotiations with the United States at the end of 1988. The Madrid conference was held in 1991 between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The Refugee Working Group (RWG) was established as one of the working groups of the peace process. While the RWG did not address any sensitive political issues, such as the right of return or compensation, it focused on refugee conditions and mobilized to address them. It was able to raise funds in order to improve the situation in the refugee camps.

The Oslo Accords were the most significant negotiations of this period. The Oslo Accords were a series of agreements starting from 1993 to 1999. They reflected the imbalance of power, as they offered the Palestinians much less than they are legally entitled to.[42] The main focus of these agreements was interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza until the conclusion of a final agreement. The Declaration of Principles (DOP), which was produced at the negotiations in Oslo in 1993, provided the framework for negotiations. Yet it is completely silent on the most vital of issues, namely: the right of return

of the 1948 refugees, borders, and the status of Jerusalem. As historian Avi Shlaim notes, "if these issues had been addressed, there would have been no accord".[43] More importantly, the DOP does not even commit Israel to stopping its illegal activities such as the building of settlements in Occupied Territory.[44] Between 1967-1977, more than ninety settlements were established in the Occupied Territories (including the Golan Heights and Gaza).[45] As of late 2012, 125 settlements that are officially recognized by the Israeli government were established in the West Bank. This number does not include the over 100 'outposts' (these are settlements built without official authorization but which nonetheless receive support from government ministries) in the West Bank. The settler population is currently estimated to be over half a million people.[46] What Oslo did establish was a committee for the return of those displaced during the 1967 War, as they would be returning to the Occupied Territories. One achievement of the committee, as well as Oslo II in 1995, was the return of 80,000 Palestinians to the Territories.[47] The refugees of 1948, however, seem to be left out of any sort of political or humanitarian diplomacy.

Unfortunately, this highlights the very real issue that there is no powerful state that is willing to exert pressure on Israel. On the contrary, the most powerful state, the United States, is actively aiding the violation of humanitarian principles and international law by vetoing Security Council resolutions that are critical of Israel.[48] Although the United States had promised during negotiations to be an "honest broker", it has proved to be anything but. In the 1970s, in a letter from then US President Gerald Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the US agreed that it would not propose anything that Israel would find unsatisfactory.[49] The US has only been willing to overrule Israeli preferences when it came to US foreign policy interests, especially during the Cold War.[50] This has continued until today, with no pressure on Israel to comply with international law.

These groups do not engage in humanitarian diplomacy. Thus to fill this void of diplomacy on behalf of the refugees, as well as to counter Israel's repeated violation of Palestinian rights and international law, Palestinian civil society gave birth to the 2005 Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

In November of 2012, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to upgrade Palestine to Non-Member

Observer State status at the UN. Full membership was denied because of the threat of a United States veto. However, this upgrade did very little to change the situation on the ground. Moreover, there are related legal issues associated with the upgrade. The PLO represents the Palestinian people as a whole, in the Diaspora as well as within, and thus is not confined to territory. Without addressing the wider issues, particularly the issue of refugees, Guy Goodwin-Gill, international lawyer and expert on refugee law, states that "The interests of the Palestinian people are at risk of prejudice and fragmentation, unless steps are taken to ensure and maintain their representation through the Palestinian Liberation Organization, until such time as there is in place a State competent and fully able to assume these responsibilities towards the people at large."[51] Thus the fate of the refugees remains in limbo.

Palestinian Refugees Today

There are over 5 million registered Palestine refugees with UNRWA today.[52] Approximately 1.5 million live inside the UNRWA registered camps that are scattered throughout Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza. However, this number does not include the almost 1.6 million 1948 non-registered[53] refugees or those who are internally displaced within Israel or the Occupied Territories. It is estimated that there are some 7.3 million Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons out of a global population of 9.7 million persons.[54] Jordan is the only Arab country to give Palestinian refugees citizenship on a largescale, and thus there are about 1.9 million Palestinian refugees with full Jordanian citizenship. There are, however, about 120,000 refugees from Gaza who fled to Jordan but remain stateless. The remainder of the total registered refugees are stateless (over 3 million).[55] Since the refugee issue and the right of return has not been the focus of major negotiations since the 1950s, several human rights organization and NGOs have kept the issue alive.

One such organization is the BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugees Rights. BADIL has a campaigns unit and a resource unit, and they issue many publications on the refugee issue, from statistics to legal issues. Al-Awda is another grassroots organization dedicated to wider education on the plight of Palestinian refugees and their associated rights. However, these groups do not engage in humanitarian diplomacy. Thus to fill this void of diplomacy on behalf of the refugees, as well as to counter Israel's repeated violation of Palestinian rights and international law, Palestinian civil society gave birth to the 2005 Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. The call for BDS states that one of the reasons for it is that,

… all forms of international intervention and peace-making have until now failed to convince or force Israel to comply with humanitarian law, to respect fundamental human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine.[56]

The BDS movement calls for Israel to comply with international law with regards to the following three aspects:

- Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall

- Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality;

- Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.[57]

While the Palestinian refugee issue is arguably the core of the Palestine question, as the majority of Palestinians are refugees who are prevented from returning home, there has been very little diplomacy to promote the refugees' rights.

The BDS movement has seen a number of successes since its inception. In 2010, over 100 academics from South Africa, coming from over 13 universities, pledged for ending collaboration with the Israeli occupation. A trade union in the Netherlands, Abvakabo, ended its relationship with the security provider G4S over its activities in the West Bank. A major US pension-fund, TIAA-CREF, divested from Veolia, a company with controversial activities in the West Bank. Recently, in 2013, the American Studies Association endorsed the boycott of Israeli institutions. It is widely seen that the international boycott helped to end Apartheid in South Africa, and thus the importance of the BDS movement in the case of furthering Palestinian rights cannot be underestimated.[58]

Aside from the BDS movement, Palestinian refugees have attempted to claim their right of return by marching to the borders of their respective host countries and Israel. While this was attempted several times in the past, March 15th (Nakba Day) of 2011 saw the most successful marches in terms of numbers. Over 50,000 Palestinians in Lebanon marched to the border with Israel, yet the Israeli army opened fire, killing ten and injuring over 100 people. In Syria, refugees marched across the barbed wire that separated them from the Occupied Golan Heights. There were attempts from refugees in Egypt, the West Bank, as well as the internally displaced inside Israel to march back.[59]

Conclusion

While the Palestinian refugee issue is arguably the core of the Palestine

question, as the majority of Palestinians are refugees who are prevented from returning home, there has been very little diplomacy to promote the refugees' rights. Humanitarian diplomacy in particular has been visibly absent, especially since the demise of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine. For humanitarian diplomacy to work, there must be some willingness on the part of states or relevant non-state actors to negotiate. However, since the beginning, Israel has flatly rejected any re-admittance of the refugees. Even concessions made by Arab states were dismissed. The state most able to put pressure on Israel, the United States, has stood firmly with Israel. And thus in this realm, diplomacy has failed the Palestinians.

> The refugees demand the right to return to the homes from which they were expelled, and to be compensated for their losses. These rights are enshrined in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and have been further strengthened by more recent UN resolutions on the right of return of refugees to their homes.

Currently, it is the UN Relief and Works Agency that tends to the refugees'

everyday needs. But even UNRWA cannot advocate for the refugees' rights as that falls outside of its mandate. Many Arab states who have officially undertaken to support the Palestinian refugees, have also failed to fulfill their promises, either in the international arena or within their borders, and this is evidenced by the number of stateless Palestinians in the host countries, many of whom are denied work.

The demands of the refugees are simple and consistent. The refugees demand the right to return to the homes from which they were expelled, and to be compensated for their losses. These rights are enshrined in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and have been further strengthened by more recent UN resolutions on the right of return of refugees to their homes.[60] Indeed, with the large-scale return of Bosnian refugees to their homes following the devastating war and ethnic cleansing, one needs to ask: why not the Palestinians?

Civil society and the BDS movement seem to be the Palestinian refugees' best hope. As the movement is growing and seeing a number of successes, it is hoped that this pressure can bring about the realization of Palestinian rights just as a similar movement helped to bring down Apartheid in South Africa. Perhaps it is after the pressure comes from the grassroots that diplomacy can find its way to assist Palestinian refugees.

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The New Face of Humanitarian Aid and Intervention:
China and Its Growing Role in the Realm of African Development

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Abstract

Despite being seen by western nations as an adversarial, confrontational and undemocratic nation, the People's Republic of China has been able to forge a large number of beneficial and lasting relationships with many nations, particular those on the African continent. To do so, China has sought not to distance itself from its international detractors by trying to remake their public image as being democratic but rather by using their knowledge and wealth accrued from rapid industrialization and a massive growing economy seeking new markets to create new and mutually advantageous relationships. To manage such a rapport, China has taken the traditional western practice of humanitarian aid and molded it to fit the Chinese government's way of operating; Operating not under the guise of solving human rights issues or exchanges of goods for pro-democratic reforms but rather by offering credit, infrastructure, knowledge and time in exchange for oil, mining rights or new and emerging markets. China's reinvention of the distribution of aid serves as a notice to all states, that traditional western aid might just not be as beneficial or in demand as it once was.

Key Words

Aid, Africa, China, development, diplomacy, humanitarian diplomacy.

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In November of 2013, Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines causing massive amounts of damage in terms of both property and lives. Winds were recorded at 195 mph and waves as high as 5 meters crashed onto shore.[1] In response, the U.S.S. George Washington and the H.M.S. Illustrious, aircraft carriers of two of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members, the United States and the United Kingdom, were deployed to the Philippines with cargo holds full of supplies designated for humanitarian disaster relief.[2] In addition to this force, regional support was promised from Japan, in the form of a large naval force and over US$ 30 million. Yet the world's second largest economy at the time and neighboring country, the People's Republic of China, had initially only offered US$ 100,000.[3] A recent news report released by UNICEF shows that even after China increased its aid package to US$ 1.6 million,[4] the Swedish furniture maker IKEA, was still donating a larger monetary donation to the Philippines relief effort.[5] Why then is the Chinese aid package so small in comparison to the tens of millions of dollars donated by other countries,

especially those countries that have a similar geo-political stake in the region like the United States and Japan? The real answer may never be known but this paper will attempt to shed some light on not only the reason for which the P.R.C. donated such a small amount but also and more significantly on how the P.R.C. determines when and where to use humanitarian assistance.

China's reinvention of the distribution of aid serves as a notice to all states, that traditional western aid might just not be as beneficial or in demand as it once was.

The friction between China and other nations in eastern Asia is well known; over the past few years, territorial disputes over strings of islands have erupted between not only China and the Philippines but also between the Chinese and Japanese. Clashes over the ownership of the Nansha/Spratly archipelago in the South China Sea[6] and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands (Chinese/Anglicized spelling) in the East China Sea are just two examples among the recent tensions between China and its neighbors.[7] China has always been fiercely defensive of its territorial claims, yet this attitude is not necessarily the reason why China gave what was considered a small aid package. The perceived lack of aid to the

Philippines and the ensuing criticism, which eventually lead to an increase, came forth by an international pressure to do so, not as a result of China's willingness. When China does engage in the act of humanitarian aid, it is not out of pressure but rather out of a willingness to engage in a mutualistic agreement with the other nations; unlike the paternalistic agreement so often associated with the western humanitarianism model. They engage not in aid giving but rather in Humanitarian Diplomacy.

Mary Douglas, in the forward to Marcel Mauss' *The Gift* writes, "There should not be any free gifts. What is wrong with the so-called free gift is the donor's intention to be exempt from return gifts coming from the recipient. Refusing requital puts the act of giving outside any mutual ties…. For all the ongoing commitment the free-gift gesture has created it might as well never have happened…A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction".[8] The act of humanitarian aid giving, in the traditional non-Mary Douglas sense, is a selfless act by both individuals and NGOs. It is not often that a quid pro quo arrangement appears in interactions between an NGO and those populations they are trying to help. While the type of aid being delivered can be controlled by both the NGO and the recipients, little is often specifically mandated to be returned as a form of payment or thanks. However, the smaller scale of individual donors and

organizations greatly differs from that of the macro level, the level at which states can act as both as donors or as recipients. It is important to note before going forward that there is a vital distinction between states and governments. The government of a country is a moral body composed of people that have feelings and emotions, while the state is defined by a lack of moral conscious; it has no feelings, and as such, states have the utmost desire to make humanitarian aid into a more reciprocal agreement. Traditionally, states have only used aid as leverage when addressing human rights issues. However, a new form of the reciprocal nature of humanitarian aid has been becoming more prominent and utilized by non-traditional donor states like China, who, in recent years has been on the forefront of economic growth and stability. It is predicated to become the world's largest economy in the next decade, a feat it has met according to some sources, and its growing influence in the developing world has been scaring the traditional economic powerhouses.[9] Parallel to the growth of China, has been the rise in the importance both politically and economically of Africa. After massive colonization and then a period of rapid decolonization, Africa has just recently again begun to see a larger portion of the world's attention, especially due to its abundance of untapped natural resources and industrial potential. Western nations traditionally view most

of Africa as a continent full of failing states needing social reform. China, on the other hand, is outperforming the success of western nations when it comes to aid, gaining both political allies as well as economic partners due to its ability to understand and deliver what Africa needs most. China has begun the process of transitioning the idea of 'aid' from the western norm of non-reciprocal charity donations to the now increasingly more evident and more mutualistic process of reciprocal aid giving and thereby China has become a much larger player in the realm of humanitarian diplomacy. China gave aid to the Philippines because it was what was required of the second largest economy in the world, not as a way of gaining favor from the Philippines. Yet old ways are fading. The new model will show that what dictates China's and increasingly other nations' aid giving, is the idea of what they, can gain- not from giving the gift, but rather from engaging in humanitarian diplomacy, in other words, using aid to increase relations and ties between the countries.

> A new form of the reciprocal nature of humanitarian aid has been becoming more prominent and utilized by non-traditional donor states like China, who, in recent years has been on the forefront of economic growth and stability.

Traditionally the People's Republic of China has held very strong convictions on state sovereignty. Jonathan Davis, in his article "From ideology to Pragmatism China's Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era" argues that China's position is a result of the frequent infringements on China's own sovereignty during the first half of the 20th century. These included U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Straits and in Tibet, which eventually led to the principles included in the Chinese constitution as a part of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence".[10] However, as the author later explains, this policy was not set in stone; "… the PRC also began to develop a nascent policy on permissible foreign interventions including the position that target state consent was a *sine qua non* [an indispensable and essential action] for the legality of any intervention".[11] The policy on non-intervention continued to decline in prominence and support, until Tiananmen Square, when any trace of liberal views on sovereignty was squashed.[12] However, while the actions of the government in response to the protests were summarily expressed by the West as being repressive, African nations quickly supported the acts, ending what had been a decade of neglect between the two.[13] After a decade of little involvement in setting the reach and scope of humanitarian assistance (especially its role in the Gulf War), China became actively involved in the issue of R2P (Responsibility to Protect), arguing against humanitarian intervention and proposing the concept of "humanitarian assistance" as an alternative.[14] While China eventually made concessions on the R2P doctrine, it still held considerable power when dealing with the issue of humanitarian intervention and aid, especially when Africa was involved.

China also uses the peacekeeping missions as a logistical training tool for their army personnel, to acclimate them to working in different environments in a non-simulated setting, and to prepare them for future combat situations.

The crisis in Darfur has been considered one of the worst humanitarian cases in recent years. While intervention seemed inevitable, China ensured that their principles of intervention would not be compromised when military action was ordered. China demanded that Khartoum had to consent before any operation took place and that consent be obtained via "a greater willingness [on the part of China] to use its influence over the Sudanese government to secure that consent".[15] China's firm reluctance to move forward without the support of the Sudanese government not only

reflected their position on the scope and practice of humanitarian intervention but also thereby strengthened their relations with African nations. China's role in intervention has not been limited to political agreements alone however. As of 2007, China has sent more peacekeepers on UN missions than the United States, the UK and Russia combined, with missions in the African countries of Western Sahara (MINURSO), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS) and Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI).[16] China uses its peacekeeping forces not only to foster good international support, but also to show physical support to African nations, in return for support in their 'One China' policy and especially their energy futures.[17] China also uses the peacekeeping missions as a logistical training tool for their army personnel, to acclimate them to working in different environments in a non-simulated setting, and to prepare them for future combat situations.[18] Having Chinese peacekeeping officers in Africa provides African leaders with not only contact to the Chinese military but also serves to strengthen relations between the country and the continent.

The strong rapport between Africa and China stems from the issue concerning the recognition of the PRC as being the legitimate ruling power of mainland China. Chairman Mao was to have said

that the persistence of African states "made possible" the recognition of the P.R.C. by the United Nations, and therefore the opportunity to become a member of the P-5 on the Security Council.[19] In return for this acceptance, China has given a large amount of aid in a variety of forms to Africans states.[20] While China's involvement in humanitarian aid has grown in both scale and investment, the reason for which has not been one of altruism but rather realism. Li writes, "China's main objective in Africa is to develop and nurture its geopolitical influence on the basis of a practical instrumental imperative that underpins its future growth through globalization".[21] This approach, while common in most forms of diplomatic arrangements, is uncommon in the environment of humanitarianism. Little, outside of human rights, has been asked for in return for aid or intervention, but China has decided to capitalize on this opportunity. While potentially seen as morally wrong, states have no use for morality and therefore can proceed to leverage their support for African intervention issues in return for positive relations and therefore growth.

While China mainly seems to use the politics of humanitarian intervention as a means of diplomacy, humanitarian aid serves as an economic tool.

While China mainly seems to use the politics of humanitarian intervention as a means of diplomacy, humanitarian aid serves as an economic tool. However, such a statement is too one-sided; China is not the sole beneficiary of this aid. May Tan-Mullins in her article "Redefining 'Aid' in the China-Africa Context" quotes Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo as being highly in favor of the style of aid China gives, "… the emergence of China is a 'golden opportunity for Africa', offering the continent a 'win-win' alternative to the scenario of an 'aid-dependent economy' by focusing instead on trade and investment and by providing the infrastructure that will enable Africa to 'move up the development curve' ".[22] While Western donors generally give cash, this practice creates, in Moyo's argument, dependency on an influx of currency. China's aid on the other hand is centered on "…discrete projects; the rationale being that projects are less prone to corruption and generally produce quick and tangible results".[23] To outsiders of this arrangement, i.e. western nations, Chinese aid is very hard to distinguish from other forms of economic assistance, as it lacks transparency, thus building on the fuzzy definition of what 'aid' is.[24] Up until the point when China became more active in 'aid' giving, aid or Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) was given a specific definition by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.[25] However, as China does not use OECD definitions, it "…

therefore does not distinguish ODA from economic cooperation or investment as long as the intention is to build local capacity of recipient countries".[26] What does this mean for the notion of humanitarian aid? Potentially it means that the monetary value of aid given as 'humanitarian aid' is over-inflated, or, with economic co-operation now becoming a new form of humanitarian aid, it thus opens the category of 'aid' to entirely new routes of delivery. However, Chinese aid is not given solely for economic gain, or at least not initially. After decades of intense civil war, Angola began moving towards reconstruction in 2002. As financing this project would be impossible for Angola alone, the government turned to the IMF and the West, which agreed to conditionally finance the project as long as Angola "…adopt[ed] a staff-monitored programme (SMP) demonstrating good performance against certain criteria that would lend credibility to Angola's economic policies".[27] Such stringent conditions and a constant big brother overseer would not have suited a project of this capacity and importance, in a war-ravaged county. Pragmatically, China stepped in to negotiate an offer of aid under the conditions that a line of credit would be exchanged for 10,000 barrels of oil per day.[28] The Chinese-Angolan deal offered the best of both worlds to the two nations, Angola received desperately needed cash flow that could be used without too many concessions and, as

discussed later on, China received oil to help meet its growing energy demands.

While the difference between the amount of aid China gives and that given by western nations is large, if one were to include economic investment into the calculation, there would be no large apparent differences. However, what differs between the aid or investment is what makes China's aid all the more unique. Chinese economic assistance to Africa, which is growing rapidly, also has a unique focus. Apathy or in some cases tensions between some African nations and the West have sometimes prevented aid from being delivered. China, however, is not so boxed in by its poor relations in Africa. It "often promotes economic projects in countries, geographic areas and sectors that developed-country governments and multinational corporations have avoided because they have determined them to be unfriendly, too arduous or infeasible".[29] Lum, in his article published in the *Congressional Research Service* notes other impacts of aid to Africa that are relatively unique as compared to comparable levels of western economic assistance. He notes that Chinese aid is available to be used relatively quickly as it lacks most of the constraints that Western or OECD nations impose.[30] He also notes that many of the projects funded by Chinese aid are accompanied by summit meetings that symbolize friendship, and that the Chinese projects, like stadiums and cultural centers, tend to

be very visible, which provides short-term tangible benefits.[31] Lum also makes note of the difficulty of pinpointing the exact value of Chinese aid. It could range from US$ 1-2.7 billion as "aid" alone, but the "infrastructure financing" as estimated by the World Bank could bring the total close to US$ 7 billion, with this additional funding making up the majority of funds spent on railroads, roads and power projects.[32] So why the interest in Africa? In addition to the strengthening of diplomatic ties, China hopes to gain many economic advantages, principal among these are oil and mineral rights.[33] Not only does oil play a key role in the world economy but also it now seems to play a key role in humanitarian aid.

While the search for greener, renewable energy sources is at an all-time high, the demand for oil has not been halted and the need to locate new sources of oil, whether undertaken by unearthing new oil fields or by expanding into untapped markets, is a must for any growing industrialized economy. This is especially the case for China if it hopes to sustain the same amount of economic growth that has propelled it this far in the past half century. The oil need may even have a bearing on issues that do not immediately seem related, such as that of various disputed islands. Both the Senkaku and Spratly islands hold significant military positions, with the Senkaku islands being positioned north east of Taiwan and close to Okinawa

allowing for greater naval monitoring of American, Japanese, and Taiwanese forces as well as lying in the middle of rich fishing grounds.[34] The Spratly islands are even more contested by not only China and the Philippines but also by Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and, Brunei.[35] The Spratly, like the Senkaku sit in the middle of highly trafficked shipping lanes and could provide the Chinese navy with a base from which they could expand their ability to operate away from mainland China.[36] Yet it is not the military access or fish that draw so many nations to these island chains. Rather, both the Spratly[37] and Senkaku islands sit on what is believed to be large untapped undersea oil and gas fields, to which the owner would have access to millions of barrels.[38] However, with so many nations in play and so much potential oil and revenue at stake these territorial disputes are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China has therefore had to turn its sights to other locales, mainly those where oil is known to exist but has yet to be either fully developed or monopolized by other oil hungry powers, mainly the United States and Europe: in other words, Africa.

The West is further disadvantaged in its humanitarian aid and work in Africa by the exchange of people between African nations and China.

In an article published in *International Affairs*, Ian Taylor describes the role oil plays in China's attitude and actions towards Africa. The article, titled "China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa," begins by describing the mutual distrust held by both Africa and China of western nations. This distrust is founded upon the west's intent to promote liberal democracy and human rights.[39] Taylor notes that China uses this distrust to form a wedge between the west and Africa, thereby drawing China and its more similar views on human rights into the mix.[40] The author notes that some take a simple view as to why China had to look to Africa for oil, stating, "Chinese companies must go to place for oil where American and European companies are not present".[41] However, this view can be seen as outdated when the nature of the Sino-African relationship is taken into account. Taylor writes that China is not the only gainer in quest for oil, noting that because Chinese oil companies are state-run, they have the ability to outbid most competitors and in the process increase the profit margin of the African nations.[42] Yet, these trades for oil are not all good (good in the moral western sense). Oil for aid in Angola has helped consolidate the power of the dictatorial elites in Luanda by allowing the siphoning of funds, as China has a policy of 'non-interference'.[43] The situation is worse in Sudan, where China has also been heavily criticized for its extensive arms deal and involvement in the civil war. While it is not the motivating

factor for China's involvement in Sudan (that being greater access to the oil fields), the human right problems associated with the arms deals spoil the uniqueness and brilliance of Chinese 'aid'.[44] Despite such problems, China cannot be overly criticized for their strong relations with 'rogue nations'. In agreement with Lum, Taylor notes that,

> In the short term, China's trade with and investment in Africa are of assistance to the development of the continent, if for no other reason than that little investment is forthcoming from other sources. China's investment in Africa's crumbling infrastructure *is* needed and is welcomed by most. Throughout Africa, Chinese companies are occupied in building hospitals, dams, government offices and stadiums and refurbishing facilities abandoned by western companies. In addition, China's demand for energy resources has inflated prices, bringing a windfall to African states' income.[45]

China's efforts are having a positive spin. As much as China can be condemned for its own human rights issues, not to mention those of the nations' dependent upon Chinese aid, it is still effecting positive change. More traditional humanitarian aid projects are also being undertaken, hospitals are being built and facilities are being constructed in locations where western nations will not work, whether that refusal is based upon safety concerns for western staffs as was the case in South Sudan and Somalia, where in 2013 the Polish Humanitarian Organization (PAH)[46]

and MSF suspended operations[47]or upon principle, like when 10 NGOs including Oxfam, Save the Children UK and Care left southern Sudan in 2000 over the issue of signing a memorandum which "among other things, demands a work plan from all NGO's working in its areas and their budgetary provisions for their respective areas of work".[48]

The West is further disadvantaged in its humanitarian aid and work in Africa by the exchange of people between African nations and China. Brian Sautman and Yan Hairong in their article note the significance the role of aid and development has had in China-Africa migration. They note that it occurs at levels that no western nation has reached; China sent "sixteen thousand medical personnel to Africa to develop hospital and clinics, and 240 million patients have been treated by Chinese health care workers".[49] The migration is not limited to medical staff, agricultural products and factories have been constructed by thousands of Chinese agro technicians, including building a farm that provides a quarter of all the rice eaten by Tanzanians.[50] However, it is not just a one-way street, "Africans go to China to learn how to build the infrastructure themselves or how to work in it as doctors, teachers, and officials. Some sixteen thousand African professionals were trained in China between 2000-2006; fifteen thousand will do so in 2007-9".[51]

This transfer of people is not always temporary in nature. Sautman notes that in 2001 it was estimated that there was 137,000 Chinese people living in Africa.[52] In 2011, that number had ballooned to one million people and that number is still climbing.[53] Those professionals that are temporarily working in Africa are pressured to "live more like their African counterparts… enjoy[ing] the same living conditions as the experts of the recipient country".[54] This approach to a more African style of living goes a long way in creating a less paternalistic relationship and sets the workers at a more equal level. Even compared to their western counterparts, Chinese workers earn less on average, live in more modest housing and work at less prominent jobs, like retail or farming.[55] This requirement to live more like those that one is aiding represents China's approach to aid giving in general, removing the pomp and circumstance and creating the best mutualistic relationship possible.

> China responds to the needs of African nations more appropriately than western nations do as China is more developmentally linked.

Two plausible reasons as to why China acts in these manners vary from one another but are not mutually exclusive.

The first and less substantiated of the two is that China acts solely in its best interests, ensuring that any aid given yields some type of substantive return to the Chinese economy. The loans to Angola were only made to gain access to their oil fields or the pressuring of Sudan to allow in intervention forces was made to suit Chinese national policy. While these may be rational explanations for these events, another reason, used in conjunction or separately might express the justification of Chinese aid practices more thoroughly. China is still considered in the world's socio-economic[56] and political spheres as a developing nation.[57] As a developing nation, it is itself the recipient of large amounts of aid and economic development.[58] A report created for the United States Congress lists United States' foreign aid to China as being over US$ 330 million dollars from 2001 to 2012.[59] Even Japan, China's regional military and economic opponent, gave aid in the form of monetary assistance,[60] nearly US$ 800 million dollars' worth.[61] China places an emphasis on economic growth over economic stability, its standing on social issues is lacking, and politically, it is non-democratic. These characteristics mirror those of many of the countries China sends aid to, a commonality that has not gone unnoticed. Max Rebol notes in his article, "Chinese Aid to Africa: Filling the Gaps that Others Left," that when western nations transitioned to

social based aid from industrial aid, China saw an opportunity and ran with it, establishing 50 special economic zones.[62] Being a developing nation, China did not have to worry about the same issues that concern developed ones. In 1994, USAID prohibited any foreign investment that would lead to U.S. job losses, investments that African nations desperately required to begin to expand their job markets and economy.[63] To confront some of the problems that Western nations were facing with their aid system, they instituted the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness, which called for transparency and aligning donor interest with that of the recipients'.[64] China, not being a developed nation, had no requirement or need to agree to such a declaration and proceeded to operate in the same manner as they had been. To this issue of aligning interests, Rebol quotes Dr. Sesay, a former Sierra Leonean government minister as saying, "The Chinese will simply build a school, a hospital, and then supply a team of doctors to run it. The World Bank will say: 'You must not have so many teachers on your payroll. You must employ some expatriate staff. You must cut down on your wages.' The Chinese will not do this. They will not say 'You must do this, do that, do this!'".[65] Another issue that arises is tied aid, funds that are required to be spent on goods from the donor nation. As a developing country, China understands the pressure of buying

items as cheaply as possible better than developing nations who are more concerned with protecting their own interests. In 2001, 92% and 68% of aid from Italy and Canada was tied, while loans from China were capped at 50%.[66] It comes down to China being in a more similar position to the African problems, so they can better understand the needs and complications that face their nations. The Sierra Leonean Foreign Minister put it best; "There is a difference, and it is huge. What [China] wants to help you with, is what you have identified as your needs. With Britain, America, they identify your needs. They say: 'Look, we think there is a need here.'".[67] China is better suited, better equipped and more able to suit the needs of Africa when it comes to aid giving.

The traditional western perspective on humanitarian aid is that of feeding centers, hospitals and disaster relief. It is this western centric view that has partially allowed China to become such a player in Africa. China responds to the needs of African nations more appropriately than western nations do as China is more developmentally linked. China acts in accordance to the principle set forth by Mary Douglas and Marcel Mauss, gifts are contradictory if not returned by something else, whether it is for oil in the case of Angola or for closer ties that lead to more advantageous trade agreements, as the Chinese-Sudanese trade relations demonstrate. While

the developed western nations and especially the OECD member nations seem shocked at the classification of Chinese economic development in Africa as aid, the question arises that if not aid, what then should it be called? Those that classify aid as being primarily geared towards social issues and disaster relief issues are neglecting the power created by having stable jobs and a growing economy and its effect upon a population. While China is seen as a military threat to many western scholars and nations (a valid view given China's fierce defense and claims to islands in the East and South China Sea), its major confrontational aspect lays primarily in its economic ties and closeness to other developing nations not the size of its military. China offers the alternative to the liberal democracy and human rights agenda that western nations push, offering economic growth with little outside control. The success of China's new 'aid' giving to Africa and it popularity within African states, must give some pause to all western humanitarians as to if they are actually doing their job as they should be. The old age of giving aid is over, and if this method is not researched further by western scholars, than China may corner the market on humanitarian diplomacy and shut out other nations from engaging in the same lucrative and relation building practices that it presently exhibits in Africa.

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The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger

Samiratou DIPAMA[*] and Emel PARLAR DAL[**]

Abstract

This study examines the effectiveness of political conditionality by looking at the European Union's suspension of development cooperation with three African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states (Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger) perceived to have violated the principles of human rights and democratic principles as laid out in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement adopted in 2000. Analyzing the effectiveness of democracy promotion activities raises the question about its impact upon political processes in the recipient countries. This task is complicated, and it is beyond the aim and capacity of this paper to find a complete answer. Therefore, our conclusions will be cautiously assessed since other factors could intervene and undermine or contribute to the changes in the political system of a given country. Our findings reveal that, in most of the cases, political dialogue and appropriate measures have a modest effect on each country's performance on democratic principles.

Key Words

Democracy promotion, European Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, political conditionality, effectiveness.

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Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War the purpose of foreign aid has significantly changed. It has become more dependent upon political progress made within the recipient country. The European Union (EU) which is now the largest aid donor in the world, is no exception to this trend. In the specific context of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Lomé IV-bis Agreement signed in 1989 between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, and its successor, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) signed on 23 June 2000, provide the EU with the legitimisation to publicly condemn violations of "the essential and fundamental elements of Article 9 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement".[1] For example, the EU can decide to adopt "appropriate measures" such as the suspension of direct public funds to the ACP government, or the channel of humanitarian aid through NGOs- and the support of democratic institutions. Furthermore, in cases of democracy and human rights breaches, the EU under the Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CSFP) framework, established by the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), is allowed to impose additional "restrictive measures" including travel bans, weapons embargoes and the freezing of assets on targeted individuals and groups.

> Analyzing the effectiveness of democracy promotion activities raises the question about its impact upon political processes in the recipient countries.

However, since the introduction of political conditionality, there is a general scepticism towards the effectiveness of this instrument of democracy promotion, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Available evidence on the use of political conditionality shows that such cases are largely ineffective except in a limited number of examples. Many scholars including African scholars criticize Western donors for their failure to properly apply development aid conditionality to enhance democracy within the targeted country. Dambisa Moyo, in her most controversial book titled, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa* (2009)[2], says:

> "Aid conditionality has not helped to make politicians adopt growth-promoting policies. It relies on a flawed mechanism of non-credible threats. Despite the tough stance towards

governments not complying with donor conditions, aid is usually disbursed regardless of broken promises" (cited by Emmanuel Frot).[3]

Analyzing the effectiveness of political conditionality in Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast, Selma Roth concludes that "consultation procedures and appropriate measures seem to have (had) no effect at all".[4] Mathias Kamp similarly concludes that "All in all, the case of Cote d'Ivoire shows the limitations of the mechanisms of consultation and aid suspension under Article 96, especially in times of serious violent conflicts in the recipient countries".[5] Catherine Gwin and Joan Nelson argue that "aid is only effective in promoting growth in a good policy environment, and on the whole, it has not succeeded in leveraging good policies".[6]

Yet, it is worth mentioning that the majority of the studies focusing on external democracy promotion investigate the effectiveness in the application of the EU's conditionality policy in Africa without paying too much attention to the external factors that can influence the outcome of their research. This article offers a modest, but hopefully distinctive contribution to this debate by looking at the impact of the EU's decision to open consultations with and/or to adopt appropriate measures toward ACP states perceived to have violated the principles of human rights, respect for the rule of law, democratic principles

and good governance as laid out in the ACP–EU Partnership Agreement. The case selection is crucial in this study because we need to control for various extraneous factors that may affect the outcome of aid suspension in the ACP states. For a complete analysis we would need to look at all cases of invocation of Articles 96 regardless of whether aid was suspended or only negotiations occurred in order to assess the effect of conditionality. Therefore, in the context of this article, we only choose states that all have a common outcome or dependent variable- invocation of Article 96 of CPA (Article 366a of the Lome Convention). The strength of this method is that: "Its true value is in its function to eliminate alternative explanations … no factor can explain an outcome satisfactorily that is not common to all occurrences of that outcome".[7]

In order to give an answer to the central research question, to conduct more in-depth analysis and further to substantiate its findings, the current study subsequently develops the following research sub-questions: What exactly qualify here under the term "democracy promotion" and "political conditonality"? What is the literature writen on aid effectiveness? Why do some consultations and aid suspension cases have positive outcomes and some negative? And finally, what lessons can be drawn from the application of conditionality policy in the selected

three countries in order to enhance the effectiveness of EU democratic conditionality?

This article firstly conceptualizes democracy promotion and political conditionality, and then, secondly, presents a brief literature review on the effectiveness issue of political conditionality and thirdly investigates the history of the gradual inclusion of political conditionality into the EU's development policy towards SSA on one hand and critically examines the three empirical examples of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger on the other hand, in order to assess the broader issues which these examples present regarding the effectiveness of political conditionality as a democracy promotion instrument.

Conceptualizing Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion

In this conceptual part, particular attention is given to the concept of "democracy promotion" and "political conditionality". These concepts have attracted special attention in the post-Cold War era as one of the main features of the new international order. Despite the various definitions given by different authors, it is worth pointing out that almost all authors agree about similar patterns of the concepts of democracy promotion and political conditionality.

Democracy Promotion

Democracy promotion emerged as one of the defining characteristics of the post-Cold War international order. According to Milja and Hobson "democracy promotion" broadly means: "the processes by which an external actor intervenes to install or assist in the institution of democratic government in a target state".[8] Schmitter and Brouwer differentiate between democracy promotion and its protection; unlike democracy promotion, "democracy protection" does not seek to change political regimes, especially democratic ones, but acts to make them more effective and efficient.[9] Furthermore, Antoine Sadia differentiates "direct democracy" promotion- which targets "the building of political and social actors' and institutions- from "indirect democracy" promotion, which "seeks to improve basic conditions to create a favorable context for the transition to and the survival of democracy".[10]

Overall, democracy promotion incorporates a wide range of actions and strategies, ranging from peaceful to forceful means. It involves a variety of strategies, including diplomacy, international dialogue, trade policy, military intervention or threats of it, and foreign aid.[11] It can also be promoted through bottom-up (civil society and individual citizens) and top-down approaches (state and political society) and these approaches should be used simultaneously in order to achieve better results.

Political Conditionality

The term "political conditionality" is used to refer to a situation in which the validity of an international agreement is made dependent upon the partner's mutual respect for certain principles, normally related to human rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law.[12] According to Stokke, aid conditionality is "the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient".[13] It denotes the linking of development cooperation to political considerations such as civil and political rights, accountable and open government.[14] This basically implies that in cases where authoritarian governments and states exist "punitive sanctions might be considered. Conversely, where democratic advances were forthcoming, benefits would flow".[15] To remind us of the evolution of the term "political conditionality" in academic literature, Fierro uses the term "second generation" in reference to political conditionality and distinguishes it from "first generation" conditionality, or economic conditionality, the major aims of which were to impose economic reforms in the countries receiving financial aid.[16]

As regards the types of political conditionality, two main distinctions are generally made. The first distinction is between conditionality "ex-ante" and conditionality "ex-post": conditionality

"ex-ante" means that specific conditions with regard to human rights, democracy and/or good governance have to be fulfilled before the conclusion of an agreement or the establishment of a special relationship. In contrast, conditionality "ex-post" means that a political actor imposes conditions within the framework of an existing contractual relationship, thereby, the relationship becomes dependent on the fulfillment of these conditions.[17] The ex-post approach is generally considered to be more effective in its implemetation than the ex-ante one because a specification of conditions ex-ante would limit the donor's flexibility and capacity to act.[18] Moreover, the fact that conditionality ex-ante is not necessarily supported by any legal instrument[19] could limit the credibility of donors' actions within a given country and its capacity to tie the hands of recipient governments to the reform packages.

The second distinction is between positive and negative conditionalities. Negative conditionality involves reducing, suspending or terminating aid and/or other benefits if the government in question violates the attached conditions. It includes reduction and even suspension of promising benefits when the country violates the prescribed conditions.[20] Shortly, this type of conditionality involves negative measures that may range from simple naming and shaming strategies[21] to the suspension of certain benefits (aid, trade, diplomatic visits)[22] and/or diplomatic sanctions and arms embargoes.[23]

The EU's enlargement strategy is generally used as a clear example of the effectiveness of positive conditionality to boost the democratic space in the Eastern European countries.

Positive conditionality establishes a positive link between aid allocation and a country's performance in democratic terms. İt involves the use of positive means to reward progress towards democracy and human rights. Positive conditionality or 'aid selectivity' also ties aid rewards to the direction of change, rather than to the perceived level of democracy.[24]

Negative conditionality is generally criticized to be ineffective because sanctions imposed as a result of conditionality might hit the poor instead of the targeted government[25] and the recipient country's government might easily find access to alternative funding resources. In contrast, the application of positive conditionality is much less contested in the critical discussion. The EU's enlargement strategy is generally used as a clear example of the effectiveness of positive conditionality to boost the democratic space in the Eastern European countries. In fact, the desirability of EU membership appears to have prompted candidate countries to adhere to a host of conditions contained in the so-called *Acquis Communautaire*. Yet, there are

still problems with the way EU uses positive conditionality: it does not always deliver the incentives promised (extra aid, for example), or at least it does not deliver them quickly. Governments may even pretend progress without actually achieving a policy change.[26]

A Brief Literature Review on the Effectiveness of Political Conditionality

Scholars are generally engaged in explaining under which circumstances the promotion of democracy is successful or, alternatively, under which conditions failures are to be expected. This part will briefly overview the literature on the effectiveness of political conditionality in general and in the specific EU context.

In the International Context

An extensive literature exists on the issue of the effectiveness of western donors' democracy promotion policy. To begin with, Galtung early in the mid-1960s formulated a general theory on the operation of sanctions, which he coined the "naïve" theory of sanctions. It postulates that the economic disruption caused by sanctions is expected to translate into political pressure that will eventually compel the leadership in the target country to change its policies, or will lead to its overthrow.[27] Therefore, the more intense the value-

deprivation, the more widespread the political disintegration. Criticizing this theory, scholars have long established that there is no automatic link between the effectiveness of economic sanctions in inflicting economic pain and in compelling policy changes in the target.[28]

Since the mid-1990s, scholars have presented sophisticated approaches to identifying the determinants of success of sanctions. A number of authors have followed the naïve theory while widening the determinants for success.[29] Scholars have attempted to sharpen the naïve theory by taking a closer look at the internal dynamics of the target society. This approach attempts to explain "why economic sanctions do not manage to harm the societal fabric of the target society in a way that leads to the unseating of the leadership, as posited by the naïve theory".[30] Cortright and Lopez conclude that assessing the efficacy of sanctions requires an examination of "how sanctions affect the ability of opposition groups to challenge the policies of the targeted state".[31]

A second subfield seeks to explain the failure of sanctions on the basis of rational-choice approaches. Drezner formulates what he calls the "sanctions paradox" on the basis of a conflict-expectation model. Departing from the premise that conceding in the face of economic coercion implies a redistribution of political sets between target and sender, Drezner finds that the expectation of future conflict will

render the sender more willing to impose sanctions and the target less willing to concede. Hence sanctions between allies will be less likely but more effective, while sanctions between adversaries will be more likely but less effective.[32]

> In a conditionality setting, credibility refers to the EU's threat to withhold rewards in case of non-compliance with EU conditions and the EU's promise to deliver rewards in case of compliance.

Other scholars suggest that even when sanctions have failed to directly produce policy changes in the targeted country, they are frequently credited with having created the "necessary conditions" for policy change. Hufbauer, Elliot and Schott dissociated the variable 'policy result' from the variable 'sanctions contribution'. The 'policy result' is defined as the extent to which the sanctions objectives were achieved, while the 'sanctions contribution' is defined as the degree to which sanctions contribute to this outcome. Sanctions objectives may range from bringing about change in actions and behavior of the target state or regime' (primary objectives), satisfying public opinion (secondary objectives) and supporting norms and multilateral structures (tertiary objectives).[33]

In the EU Context

In the specific EU case, much has been written on this issue in the attempt to answer the following question: what makes the EU's political conditionality effective or ineffective? Some authors argue that a major condition for the effectiveness of political conditionality is the credibility and consistency in the application in third countries. In a conditionality setting, credibility refers to the EU's threat to withhold rewards in case of non-compliance with EU conditions and the EU's promise to deliver rewards in case of compliance. It means that similar violations of democratic principles or human rights should lead to a similar reaction from the EU towards the targeted third countries. Indeed, if a target government knows that the EU prefers unconditional assistance to no assistance or unconditional enlargement to no enlargement, then conditionality will not work.[34]

Furthermore, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier offer an external incentives model and explain the effects of the conditionality by suggesting that target governments would adopt EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards surpass the domestic adoption costs.[35] Researchers' explanatory framework rests on four sets of factors on which the cost-benefit balance depends: the determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises,

and the size of adoption costs.[36] The empirical findings of the research show the credibility of conditionality and the size of adoption costs to be the key variables of compliance.[37]

Finally, Mattli and Plumper and Plumper et al. focus on the incentives within the domestic political arena of the applicant country to explain the effectiveness of conditionality.[38] Mattli and Plumper conclude that the demand for EU membership is linked to a country's regime type and its readiness to carry out economic reforms. By extension, if a country has a more democratic regime, the national political elites have a bigger incentive to push for reforms and to align their country with the rules and institutions of the EU.[39]

After this brief conceptualization and literature review about the effectiveness of the EU's political conditionality we will now discuss how EU development policy has evolved to include a political conditionality clause in the sub-Saharan African context.

EU's Development Aid Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa and the African Case Studies

This section first presents the history of the EU's development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa through an analysis of the successive agreements concluded under EU-ACP cooperation and, secondly, critically analyses the application of the conditionality policy in Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and Zimbabwe and the conclusions these cases allow with regard to the effectiveness issue.

History of the EU's Aid Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa

The consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (Article 6) establishes the democratic constitution of the EU as follows: "The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member states".[40]

All EU member states are constitutional democracies and share a set of common values based upon the primacy of human rights and democratic principles. Invariably, the principles of democracy and human rights are at the center of the EU's foreign policy and external relations. For instance, in March 1991 the Commission issued the policy entitled: *Communication on Human Rights, Democracy and Development Cooperation.* The Council's Resolution in November 1991 on 'Human Rights, Democracy and Development' made 'the promotion of human rights and democracy both an objective and condition of development co-operation'. Moreover, the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the Madrid

European Council in 1995 established democracy and human rights as the criteria for involvement in the accession process of candidate countries.[41]

Turning to the sub-Saharan African context, before the fourth Lomé Convention (1989) the agreements were neutral with regard to human rights and democracy. Yet, the Uganda crisis in 1977, notorious for its human rights abuses, proved that such a position was untenable. The EU agreed that measures should be taken if any ACP state systematically violated fundamental human rights. However, the attempt to protect human rights through conditionality was met with strong resistance from ACP states during the Lomé II negotiations.[42] The ACP counties were unwilling to endow the EU with the right to unilaterally revoke aid at their discretion, considering it a violation of their sovereignty, but, finally, at the EU's insistence, the Lomé III agreement (1980-1990) contains a joint two declarations reiterating that human dignity is an essential objective of development.[43]

The most important changes in Lomé III were in the field of aid and particularly the introduction of the 'policy dialogue', which created, for the first time, some kind of conditionality in the convention. The fourth and last Lomé convention (1990-2000), signed on 15 December 1989 between the by then 12 European Community member

states and 68 ACP states marked another considerable change in EEC-ACP relations. The development and events of the 1980s, with the ACP states facing a severe debt crisis and consequently a weak bargaining position, led to aid tied to the adherence of international human rights standards.[44] For the first time 'a political element' making 'respect for human rights' a fundamental clause of the agreement was introduced (Article 5).[45] There was however still no clause making human rights an essential element of the Convention, nor one providing for its suspension in the event of human rights violations.

The movement towards conditionality deepened when the Lomé IV, amended in 1995, added to the human rights clause: respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance as "essential elements" of the convention and included a suspension clause (Art 366a). This gave the commission the legal basis to either totally, or partially, suspend the application of the Convention after prior consultation with the ACP governments and the abusing party.[46] Yet, Article 366a did not address which measures should be taken to resume cooperation. The framework established by Lome´ IV allowed the EU complete discretion over when measures could be lifted.[47] The mid-term review further introduced a performance-based aid allocation. Following this review, the amount of money needed to implement

the National Indicative Program (NIP) was split into two allocations. Seventy per cent of the funds were distributed initially, and the remaining 30 per cent were only distributed following a three-year evaluation of the program.[48]

From the Lomé IV convention onwards: development assistance has become conditioned on political issues; the ACP states have to deserve getting development assistance and the EU has the discretionary right to grant aid, in principle, to the "good pupils" showing progress towards democratic principles, and to cut off the tap to the democracy and human rights' detractors.

The Lomé conventions were succeeded by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000- which is valid until 2020. The new Cotonou Partnership Agreement reflected the transition from purely economic cooperation to more inclusive political agreements in development policy. The big area of change concerns the political dimension in that Article 9 not only reiterates the notion of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law introduced in Lomé IV, but also makes reference to good governance, which is stated as a "fundamental element of this agreement". As under the revised Lomé IV, in the case of violation of the essential elements of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law a consultation procedure will be started and if necessary the EU can adopt 'appropriate measures' under Article 96 of the CPA in order to remedy the situation (Article 96). It is often argued that the measures applied under Article 96 generally entail the reformulation of the terms to pay aid to a country, not a suspension *stricto-sensus* of the cooperation. Nonetheless, the lack of objective criteria regulating the consultation process and defining the "appropriate measures" might provide for arbitrary responses at the discretion of the EU, and for general misunderstandings and frictions between the EU and its partners.

In summary, from the Lomé IV convention onwards: development assistance has become conditioned on political issues; the ACP states have to deserve getting development assistance and the EU has the discretionary right to grant aid, in principle, to the "good pupils" showing progress towards democratic principles, and to cut off the tap to the democracy and human rights' detractors. In the context of the EU's political conditionality in SSA, it is therefore essentially an "ex-post" conditionality, which can be positive and /or negative. After having briefly given a historical background about

the EU's aid policy towards the SSA, we will discuss, in the next section, the effectiveness of EU policies in the four African case studies.

The African Case Studies: Applications

This section of the article will use both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The qualitative approach refers to the concrete reaction to the application of the conditionality policy on the part of the target state, and the quantitative one makes use of data provided by the Freedom House polity concerning political rights and civil liberty in each country, as well as the data on institutionalized democracy[49] from the Polity IV project, which aims to determine whether the application or non-application of the EU's political conditionality has had an impact on the political situation of the targeted country.

Zimbabwe

The case of Zimbabwe is a clear example of how political dialogue failed to be effective. In 2000 the EU expressed open criticism of the Zimbabwean government over a number of issues. It condemned the legislation adopted by the Zimbabwe Parliament allowing confiscation of farm land without compensation and called on the government to comply with the court order to end illegal occupations. The EU also reminded the Zimbabwe

Government of its intention to hold free and fair elections in May 2000.[50] Political dialogue was undertaken under Article 8 of the CPA,[51] but consultations opened under Article 96 ended in a stalemate as there was considerable disagreement between the EU and the Zimbabwean leaders.[52] Responding to threats of sanctions by the EU, the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Mudenge informed the EU on 1st February 2002 of his government's decision to invoke the provisions of Article 98 of the Cotonou Agreement, and declared a dispute between the EU and Zimbabwe.[53] Faced with the persisting refusal of the Zimbabwean authorities to comply, the EU decided to close the consultations and to take the appropriate measures, under Article 96(2) d of the Cotonou Agreement.[54] Moreover, targeted sanctions were taken against those responsible for political violence, including the freezing of their assets and a visa ban. Despite the appropriate measures taken under Article 96 and the restrictive measures taken under the CSFP framework, and despite the extension of their period of application[55], Zimbabwe failed to comply and adhere to the essential elements laid down in Article 9 of the CPA, at least until 2009. It is worth noting that the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA)[56] in 2009 opened a new chapter in EU-Zimbabwe relations: the restrictive measures changed with the first delisting

in early 2010.[57] This move also marked the beginning of a considerable progress in political rights, democracy and civil liberties in Zimbabwe, as attested by the 31st July 2013 presidential elections[58], as well as the scores provided in the Tables 1, 2, and 3 (see below). In summary, the EU has predominantly used the ex-post approach and negative type of political conditionality in the Zimbabwean case. The analysis of the case reveals that the application of negative measures did start contributing to the improvement of the democratic and human rights situation in this country after 2009.

Ivory Coast

In the case of Ivory Coast, consultations were opened on 7 February 2000 following the 1999 *coup d'état,* and 'positive' appropriate measures were applied.[59] However, no considerable progress in terms of democracy, political rights and civil liberties were visible during the implementation of these measures (see Table 1, 2 and 3). Moreover, the October 2000 elections were supposed to bring a relatively smooth restoration of democracy, but things went terribly wrong. The openness of the elections was questioned and the results that proclaimed Laurent Gbagbo winner was contested by the party of Alassane Ouattara (which was not allowed to participate) and the party of the putchiste, Robert Guei. The 2000

elections were criticized as unaccountable, and saw violent clashes at the final count between political parties.[60] A second round of consultations were opened and the talks seemed to have some influence on the country's political performance: inclusive and transparent elections were held in March 2001 and the relations with the EU were normalized after the government of Ivory Coast had made progress in national dialogue, electoral arrangements and press freedom, though Gbagbo still needed to deliver on some of the promises made, including the investigation into issues of violence.[61] Despite several peace talks headed by some EU-members (the Linas-Marcousis agreement in 2003) and individual African heads of state (the Ouagadougou Agreement in 2007) the situation in the country remained unstable and the country divided between north and south. In illustration, in March 2004, a demonstration was violently repressed, with over one hundred people wounded or killed, the assassination of a Canadian French journalist, and disappearances and other atrocities. Furthermore, the freedom of the press came under attack as the Young Patriots, a youth militia loyal to President Gbagbo, started attacking opposition newspapers.[62] The authorities and politicians on different sides of the civil war failed to keep the promises they made under the Marcoussis Agreements. The European Commission proposed the opening of consultations.[63] Yet,

the council (France and Germany particularly) rejected the proposal, arguing that the threat of civil war would render Article 96 consultations ineffective[64]. Having been rescheduled several times, presidential elections finally took place in late 2010 and turned into a violent post-election crisis as the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to accept his defeat.

To sum up, in this case, the EU focused on ex-post political conditionality. The "appropriate measures" applied under article 96 of the CPA were much softer than those applied in the Zimbabwean case but they did not have much positive impact on the political situation of Ivory Coast and failed to respect essential elements of Article 9 of the CPA.

Niger

As regards Niger, further to the 1999 *coup d'état*, appropriate measures were taken and relations with the EU were normalized after the return to a constitutional order following the election of President Tandja.[65] The political situation of Niger was relatively successful during the first years of the second term of President Tandja (from 2005 to 2009; see Tables 1, 2 and 3). In the political sphere, political and institutional stability is often touted as the largest success of the Fifth Republic. The political opposition is operating within the institutions, rather than mobilising in the street as

previously.[66] However, this development stopped following Tandja's attempt to stay in power in spite of the impending expiry of his presidential second term.[67] The EU-led talks held in accordance with the dispositions of Article 8 of the CPA failed and did not impede Tandja from going ahead with his referendum project.[68] The political rights and civil liberty situation worsened during that period as opposition parties, the media and members of the civil society were harassed by the party in power. The EU opened consultations in December 2009 after the legislative elections held in October 2009 were boycotted by the opposition, and cooperation with the EU was temporarily suspended.[69] However, these measures failed to prevent the February 2010 coup from happening barely two months after the consultations were closed. A second round of consultations were then held in May 2010. The EU was satisfied with the commitments made by leaders of the coup for a return to a constitutional order[70] and elections were successfully held in 2011.[71] What we see here is the EU's use of ex-post conditionality, and the appropriate measures taken, seeming to have contributed to the improving democratization in Niger, and therefore to the effectiveness of EU political conditionality. This argument is proven correct by the considerable progress made in terms of institutionalized democracy and political rights in Niger since 2011 (see Tables 1 and 2).

Table1: Polity IV institutionalized democracy rate by country and aggregate (2000-2012)

Years 2000-2012	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Zimbabwe	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3
Ivory C.	5	5	-77	-77	-77	-77	-77	-88	-88	-88	-77	5	5
Niger	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	0	4	7	7

Source: Adapted from Polity IV Project: Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2010, *Systemic Peace.org.* Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last visited 5 May 2015).

The institutionalized democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). Countries that score between (-10 and -6) are named "autocracies"; those with score between (-5 and +5), including the three special scores (-66;-77;-88) are "anocracies or mixed regimes"; the countries which score between (+6 and +10) are "democracies".

Table 2. Freedom House political rights score by country (2000-2012)

Years 2000-2012	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Zimbabwe	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
Ivory C	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6
Niger	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	5	5	3

Source: Adapted from Freedom House. Available at www.freedomhouse.org (last visited 5 May 2015).

Table3: Freedom House civil liberty scores by country (2000-2012)

Years 2000-2012	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Zimbabwe	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Ivory C.	5	4	6	5	6	6	6	5	5	5	6	6	6
Niger	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4

Source: Adapted from Freedom House.org. Available at www. freedomhouse.org (last visited 5 May 2015).

The Freedom in the World Survey measures freedom according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of "Free" (1.0 to 2.5) "Partly Free" (3.0 to 5.0) or "Not Free" (5.5 to 7.0).[72]

> The use of political conditionality by the EU in Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast and to a lesser extent in Niger did not have a great impact on the democratic sphere of these countries.

In summary, the use of political conditionality by the EU in Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast and to a lesser extent in Niger did not have a great impact on the democratic sphere of these countries. In Zimbabwe, the application of appropriate and restrictive measures respectively under article 96 of the CPA and under the CSFP framework, have had a very minimal influence on the democratic and human rights situation in this country. Equally, in Ivory Coast, the use of appropriate measures under article 366 of the Lome Convention and later under article 96 of the CPA following the 1999 *coup d'état* for the former and the contested presidential elections of 2000 for the latter, were largely ineffective, as proven by the missed *coup d'état* of 2002, the worsening of the human rights situation and civil liberties, and the post-electoral violence in 2010-2011. However, it was in the Niger case that the application of measures under article 96 of the CPA seem to have had some positive impact on the democratic sphere, as free and fair elections were held peacefully in 2011.

Conclusion

On the basis of these three case studies, we draw several tentative conclusions about the effectiveness of the EU conditionality policy, which partly support the previous findings on this issue in the sub-saharan African context. The findings reveal that except for the case of Niger, political dialogue, consultations and appropriate measures have not created sufficient pressure on Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast for democracy promotion. Yet, these conclusions are only approximative because external factors and other related dynamics (e.g. domestic factors) have not been included in the assessment of the impact of the use of political conditionality in the selected countries. Most often, these external factors, more than the EU's political conditionality, significantly impact on the democratic performance of the targeted sub-Saharan African country, either positively or negatively. Therefore, we must ask the following question: *what is lacking in the selected three sub-Saharan African cases for the effective application of the EU's political condiitonality tool?*

Firstly, one serious obstacle for the effectiveness and appropriateness of conditionality as a democracy promotion tool concerns consistency and coherence. It seems that vague definitions of what constitutes 'democracy and human rights' allow for the selective application of Article 96, which can in turn hinder the effective application of the conditionality clause. A lack of consistency in time and among countries in the application of political conditionality is very likely to damage the EU's credibility and self-image and to decrease the effectiveness of aid conditionality. The analysis of the selected four cases reveals that the EU was more reluctant to impose negative measures on Ivory Coast (2000-2005) and least reluctant to adopt sanctions against Zimbabwe, Niger and Ivory Coast (2010-2011), although violations that occurred were more or less similar. One must wonder why the EU chooses to contradict its own moral stance and undermine the efficacy of conditionality. Whatever the reason behind these inconsistent reactions from the EU, it is clear that aid conditionality needs to be implemented with integrity by the EU, involving the fair and equal treatment of all nations, and non-co-operation with non-democratic regimes. Coherency and credibility in the implementation of political conditionality will enhance the acceptance of political conditionality and its effectiveness.

In addition, in the selected three cases, another main observation is that aid sanctions are only likely to be effective if there is a coordinated action among the international donors. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)'s position has had a considerable impact

on the effectiveness of EU sanctions. For example, in 2007, the SADC mobilised other African countries to boycott the EU-Africa summit unless Mugabe was not allowed to attend.[73] From 2008 onwards, however, the SADC started mediating, which resulted in the signature of the GPA. Zimbabwe has also been able to count on the support of Russia and China. In 2008, these countries blocked a UN resolution to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe.[74] Especially with China, Zimbabwe has been able to build economic relations,[75] despite being under EU sanctions.

Similarly, the USA, the second donor in Niger, denounced the August 2009 referendum, suspended development assistance and imposed travel sanctions on Tandja's supporters in December 2009.[76] Apart from the donors, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took a remarkably strong stance on the 2009 referendum. In May 2009, an ECOWAS Advisory Body warned about possible sanctions if Tandja went ahead with the referendum.[77] In June 2009, ECOWAS deployed a mission to Niger to convince Tandja to step down, and in August, a four-member ad-hoc ministerial committee was sent to Niger.[78] In October 2009, ECOWAS suspended Niger's membership after Tandja ignored a request to postpone the elections.[79]

The findings reveal that except for the case of Niger, political dialogue, consultations and appropriate measures have not created sufficient pressure on Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast for democracy promotion.

Finally, the one-model-fits-all approach commonly used by the EU in the application of political conditionality limits the effectiveness of conditionality policy and can no longer be used. Indeed, in the context of democratizing a country, several factors might infuence the outcome other than just the willingness of the government. These include the presence or absence of a strong opposition and civil society, the degree of development of the country, the socio-economic situation in the country, and the country's history.[80] The complexity of these intervening factors clearly indicates that a country-based democracy promotion's approach appears a must in order to enhance the effectiveness of political aid as an instrument of democracy promotion in SSA. A great step has been made in this sense by the EU in the revised CPA (in 2010), where more attention is given to flexibility and to the individual circumstances of each ACP country.

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Rapid Economic Growth and Its Sustainability in China

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Abstract

China has recorded remarkable growth rates for three and a half decades. Recently, the annual growth rate has slowed down and is projected to decline gradually to 5 % by 2030. This article examines how high economic growth was realized in the past and whether it can be sustained in the future. In doing this, the paper takes into consideration the projections about future growth rates. The article emphasizes that the main reason for the reduction in the future growth rates is the unsustainability of the currently high investment rates in the long run. In addition, the diversification of financial instruments for the already high savings is important. Necessary improvements in the financial sector are discussed in conjunction with the long term sustainability of economic growth rates.

Key Words

China, economic growth, investment, financial sector, savings.

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Introduction

China has recorded unprecedentedly high growth rates since 1978, when the central government undertook significant reforms to industrialize and open up the economy with a dual-track system comprised of "market-economy" and "plan-economy" segments for each market. The central government has also adopted an export-oriented growth strategy. Despite the well-known widening income inequality, China not only grew remarkably in this period but also succeeded in saving about a half billion of its citizens out of absolute poverty, at an unseen scale in the history as we know it.[1] With high growth rates averaging about 10 % since the late 1990s, the size of the Chinese economy surpassed Japan in nominal terms in 2010 to become the second largest economy in the world following the United States. At the same time, China also overtook Germany to become the largest exporter. The London-based journal *The Economist* drew an analogy between China's growing share in total world exports, rising incredibly to more than 10 %, and the heydays of Britain

in the 19th century when Britain as the top exporter in the world directed world trade flows.[2] Economists generally agree that the government's export-led growth and industrialization strategy, accompanying foreign exchange policy, and foreign direct investments attracted into China have facilitated this high growth performance.[3]

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The World Bank has recently reported that China will join the list of high-income countries in 15-20 years.[4] An implication of this statement is that China will be able to overcome the middle-income trap. If this happens, it is likely that China will be a success story to learn from for countries trapped in the middle income levels, such as Turkey is now, and researchers will seek to draw lessons from China's experiences. In the same vein, during the period from the 1960s to the mid-1990s, it was believed that some East and Southeast Asian countries had discovered a recipe for economic development and industrialization different from the one in the West. Many researchers have examined how the East and Southeast Asian economies have developed and industrialized successfully within a short period of time. However, with the slump of the Japanese economy after the bubble burst of the early 1990s and the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, this respect turned into disappointment and harsh criticism of the capitalistic development experiences of these countries. With the declining importance of Japan and the newly industrializing Asian economies in the world economy after the 1990s, the interest in East Asia faded, but the rise of China in the global economic stage attracted the attention again to the eastern part of Asia. This time, researchers were to examine how this country, which produced the concept of a socialist market economy in 1992, grew very fast. The aim of the central government is to turn China into an industrial economy like its neighbours Japan and Korea.

This paper examines this high economic growth and its slowdown in the near future by taking into consideration future projections and political economy considerations along with implications for global rebalancing. Special emphasis is put on the need to transform the

pattern of economic growth from one dominated by capital accumulation to one emphasizing private consumption. To this end, a simple quantitative analysis is employed to discuss the implications of investment-led or consumption-led growth strategies. The accompanying policies and the essential restructuring especially in the financial sector have also been discussed in depth.

Economic Growth in China and Its Sources

The average annual growth rate of real GDP in China during the period 1995-2010 was an incredible 9.9 %. Figure 1 shows that the economic growth rate accelerated after 1999, reached 14.2 % in 2007, and slowed down after 2007 due to the global financial crisis. However, despite the decline, the economic growth rate was still in the vicinity of 9-10 % following the crisis. Thanks to China's high growth performance, the world economy was able to record positive growth rates during this period, effectively raising China to the status of the saviour of the world economy. China was joined by Brazil, Russia, and India as the newly emerging high-growth economies. On the other hand, *the Economist* reported in 2013 that despite their high growth rates compared to the advanced countries, these four countries, commonly called

as the BRICs, reached their limit of rapid growth and they could no longer serve as the growth engine for the world economy.[5] However, this should not be taken negatively. *The Economist* emphasizes an important detail: among the top 100 fastest supercomputers in the world not a single one belonged to the BRICs in 1997, but in 2013 six of them were in China and another six in the rest of the BRICs. The striking fact is that China's Tianhe-2 supercomputer topped the list. It is evident from this comparison that the technological gap between China and the forerunning advanced economies has been closing during the course of rapid growth. Obviously, China has fully exploited the opportunities of rapid growth through technology acquisition and emulation, which were once believed to be important sources of growth. It is now in a position to create new technologies.[6]

With the declining importance of Japan and the newly industrializing Asian economies in the world economy after the 1990s, the interest in East Asia faded, but the rise of China in the global economic stage attracted the attention again to the eastern part of Asia.

Figure 1: Real GDP growth rate in China (1995-2013)

Data source: UN National Accounts Database, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selbasicFast.asp (last visited 15 June 2015).

Understanding the main sources of economic growth is as important as understanding the trends in economic growth. The simplest way to do this is to decompose the growth in real GDP into its expenditure (demand) components, namely, private consumption expenditures of households, public consumption expenditures, fixed capital investments, and net exports, as shown in Table 1. The figures in the table reveal the percentage contribution of the expenditure components to economic growth. The most striking observation is the reduction in the share of private consumption expenditures from 49 % in 1995 to 30 % band after 2001. By no means is this a desirable or healthy situation for economic growth, for the following reason. If we assume that public expenditures do not change much as a share of GDP in the long-run (which

is the case for many countries), if the growth in total expenditures (i.e., GDP) in an economy is not resulting mainly from private consumption, then it has to be either because of investments or net foreign expenditures (i.e., exports), or a combination of the two. The sustainability of either of these two expenditure items in GDP over long periods of time is doubtful. In the case of China, except for certain years, the contribution of fixed investments to economic growth has exceeded 50 % after 2001. To put it differently, it is observed that households in China are not spending much and firms are investing heavily to expand their production capacities and capital stocks. That is to say, Chinese firms have spared about half of their production to add more to their production capacity in order to be able produce more in the future.

Table 1: Sources of economic growth in China as percentage of GDP (1995-2013)

	Private consumption	Public consumption	Fixed investments	Net exports	GDP
1995	49	-3	55	-1	100
1996	48	13	34	5	100
1997	25	13	19	44	100
1998	39	18	27	16	100
1999	52	24	24	0	100
2000	45	23	23	9	100
2001	33	18	50	-1	100
2002	34	12	49	5	100
2003	29	8	64	-1	100
2004	32	9	56	3	100
2005	23	16	40	21	100
2006	28	13	45	14	100
2007	29	12	44	16	100
2008	32	13	48	8	100
2009	33	11	83	-27	100
2010	29	15	54	2	100
2011	39	18	49	-6	100
2012	38	15	50	-3	100
2013	44	12	50	-6	100

Data source: UN National Accounts Database, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selbasicFast.asp) (last visited 15 June 2015).

Fixed investments (i.e., investments in physical capital stocks such as machinery, equipment, vehicles, buildings, and so on) can boost economic growth only if they are profitable enough to attract necessary funds. As long as the returns to investments are high enough for private capital owners who base their expectations mainly on future income streams and profit prospects of given investment projects, additions to capital stock will continue. Investments in China have been undertaken by domestic firms and recently by foreign investors. It is understood that until recently most of the foreign-owned firms aimed to increase exports to the home country. According to the official data published in the China Statistical Yearbook, foreign-owned firms (wholly-foreign-owned and majority-foreign-owned firms altogether) produced about

10 trillion yuan worth of output in 2009, a figure comparable to 15 trillion yuan by state- owned owned enterprises, and accounted for about 50-55 % of total exports from China since 2000. However, as *the Economist* demonstrates, recently, these firms are increasingly becoming interested in expanding their business operations in the Chinese domestic market[7] thanks to the rapidly growing middle-class in China. According to an influential study by Kharas and Gertz, the size of the middle class in China was about 157 million, roughly 12 % of the population, in 2009.[8] They predict the percentage share of the middle class in China to reach 70 % by 2030.

> Improvements in efficiency such as organizational innovations in firms, research and development activities, and advancement of technologies and production techniques are some examples of how to improve the overall productivity of production factors.

Many economists point out that the extraordinarily high share of investments in GDP, as high as 50 %, in China is not sustainable. Their reasoning is based on a technique named "growth accounting". This technique, in its simplest form, postulates that there are two major sources of long-run economic growth. One is the accumulation of inputs (production factors) used in production such as labour, including human capital, and physical capital stock. The former can be accumulated through population growth and extensive education. The latter can be accumulated through expanding production facilities, such as building a new factory, purchasing new machines, and so on. The second source of growth is the improvement in the efficiency of using these inputs, named total factor productivity. Improvements in efficiency such as organizational innovations in firms, research and development activities, and advancement of technologies and production techniques are some examples of how to improve the overall productivity of production factors.[9]

These two sources of growth are also bound by some features of the accumulation of production factors. One is the diminishing returns to the accumulation of physical capital. According to the mainstream economic theory, which dominates economic thinking in the modern world, a country cannot continue accumulating physical capital without facing decreasing returns. At the earlier stages of development, it is reasonable to expect a country to build more industrial facilities during the course of industrialisation. However, the return to physical investments will get lower over time. When capital is scarce, its return will naturally be higher. When

capital becomes abundant (i.e., when the economy reaches a higher or more advanced level of industrialisation), the reverse will hold and returns will get lower. The same argument applies also to labour. In effect, the first source of economic growth based on the accumulation of production factors will be out-dated when the economy matures. This leaves efficiency improvement as the only viable option to increase or sustain economic growth rate in the long run. This is the healthiest way to grow over the long term.

The necessity of the second source of growth, however, does not entirely single out the first source for developing economies like China. A combination of both might work as well. It might be possible for a country to increase its physical capital stock and labour endowment in the long run while improving the efficiency of using these resources. For instance, the experiences of China and Korea have proved that increasing the education level and skills of the labour force pay off well in the long run.[10] Similarly, the physical capital stock of a country can be expanded by mobilizing domestic and foreign sources of entrepreneurship. However, the returns to both labour and physical capital will decrease over time and the contribution of both labour and capital to economic growth will diminish. On the other hand, improving the quality of capital and labour by way of upgrading

technological capabilities may support economic growth. Therefore, investments in new technologies and technology transfer from advanced economies are important. For China this is especially important in the age of the Knowledge Economy, which is characterized by extensive use of knowledge-intensive technologies and techniques in almost every economic activity and the comparative advantages of countries and firms are based on knowledge absorption and creation capacity. This requires an effective design of science and technology policies and national innovation systems for technology creation and diffusion. The government is aware of the essentialness of technological development. In the 12th Five-Year Plan covering the years 2011-2015, scientific development was emphasized as a primary objective and the promotion of innovation via indigenous sources was a focus. The plan had envisaged increasing research and development expenditures as a percentage of GDP beyond 1.75 %.[11] In the preparation of the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), innovation and the promotion of scientific development have been raised as priority issues.[12] Comparing China with advanced economies, China ranked second in 2014 in total research and development spending (about US$ 280 billion) after the US (US$ 460 billion) and ranking above Japan, Germany and the UK.[13]

> Currently, household saving rates are high but with the increase in per capita income in the future, it is reasonable to expect this saving rate to decrease as people will demand higher living standards and readjust their spending accordingly.

Rethinking the economic growth experience of China within mainstream economic theory, productivity improvement and productivity-led growth are highly desirable to sustain growth rates at relatively high levels. China's potential growth rate will decline from 10 % to lower levels (5-7 %) in the near future but even such growth rates are unimaginably high for advanced countries due to the maturity achieved by such economies. On the side of physical capital accumulation, it is also important to consider how this will be financed. Funds for physical capital investments are largely provided by domestic sources, namely households, government, and enterprises, in the form of savings. Like high investment to GDP ratio, China also has high national savings to GDP ratio, around 50 %. National savings are made up of household savings, government savings (roughly equal to budget surplus), corporate savings, and net foreign savings (inflow of foreign capital minus outflow of domestic savings abroad).

Such high national savings rates as 50 % are not sustainable.

There are various reasons for such high savings rates. Ge and Yang have shown that one reason for high household saving rate is the insufficiency of the social security system in China.[14] Since people need to save for their retirement years, a large part of savings may result from old age pension needs. Another important reason is the requirement of down payments when purchasing a house, 30 % of the price for the first house purchased. For many people, purchasing a house for their families is an important target in life. On the other hand, the central government has introduced various measures since 2008 to regulate house prices, and the downpayments have been raised to 40 % of the price of the house for the purchase of the second house.[15] After gradually raising it to 60 %, in late 2014 the government equalized the downpayments for both types of houses, essentially making it easier for people to purchase for investment purposes.[16] Currently, household saving rates are high but with the increase in per capita income in the future, it is reasonable to expect this saving rate to decrease as people will demand higher living standards and readjust their spending accordingly. It is also expected that the Chinese government will improve the social security system in response to the demands from the growing middle class.

On the other hand, there are historical examples from other countries that improvement in social security system may not bring about decline in savings rate. For instance, in the 1970s and 1980s Japan did not experience a significant reduction in the saving rates despite the improvements and adjustments in the social security system.[17]

Using macroeconomics we can trace the relationship between investments, capital stock, and GDP with a simple equation as shown by Kazuo Sato.[18] The equation in the footnote states that investment to GDP ratio increases with higher capital-output ratio and higher efficiency of investments. When the supply of funds (savings) is larger than the demand for these funds, it is necessary to decrease the demand, i.e., investment to GDP ratio. However, policymakers are also concerned about the economic growth rate, which may decline due to slow-down in investment demand. Then, if economic growth will not decline, the capital-output ratio should decline assuming the efficiency of investments remains the same. Using data from Penn World Tables, we can examine the case of China. Figure 2 shows the estimated capital-output ratio in China for the post-reform period of 1978-2011. Capital-output ratio has increased since the late 1990s and this gave rise to increasing investment to GDP ratio. Even to keep this ratio at its current level (since it is not desirable

to increase to higher levels and the government wants this ratio to decline), the only possibility is a decline in the efficiency of investments, which implies a lower economic growth rate.[19] In other words, the cost of a high savings rate and hence high investment rate will manifest itself as lower GDP growth in the near future.[20]

While China is sparing half of its GDP for investments to increase physical capital stock, and given the expectation that the returns to these investments will decline in the future, household consumption expenditures will become important as a source of economic growth. Therefore, domestic demand-led growth is a viable option for China. In fact, recent statements by the Chinese government emphasize the desire of the government to realize a transformation from investment-led economic growth to consumption-led economic growth.[21] It is worth noting here that much of the investments are realized by state-owned-enterprises, which are funded by loans from the domestic banks, and smaller enterprises find it difficult to access to funds and are forced to obtain these funds from the shadow banking system at higher interest rates. Historical statistics for advanced economies reveal that when economies mature, domestic demand becomes the propelling force for economic growth. There are two possible sources of spending, increase in the number of consumers and increase

in consumers' incomes. Then, increase in spending is necessary given the limited population growth in China due to the government's strict population policy. How to increase income levels of consumers is an important policy question. Improvement in the social security system will surely help increase private consumption expenditures because this will reduce savings arising from insufficient social security. The Chinese government already possesses enough funds to be used for this purpose, mostly through large tax revenues collected thanks to high economic growth and through enlarging official reserves thanks to large trade surpluses.

Figure 2: Capital-output ratio in China (1978-2011)

Data source: Penn World Tables, at http://febpwt.webhosting.rug.nl/Dmn/AggregateXs/VariableCodeSelect (last visited 15 June 2015).

Another important variable to consider about investments is the cost of funds channelled towards investments. According to official statistics, the real interest rate in China has remained at significantly low levels. Figure 3 shows the trend in real interest rates in China on an annual basis computed by deducting the inflation rate (calculated using the consumer price index) from the officially announced nominal interest rates. An interpretation of the low real interest rates is that the cost of undertaking investments was relatively low in China. In certain years, the real interest rate was even negative.

Figure 3: Real interest rates in China (2000-2013)

Note: Computed by deducting the Central Bank's official interest rate for deposits from the annual inflation rate.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/AnnualData (last visited 15 June 2015).

Future of Economic Growth in China

Understanding the future of economic growth is important. The World Bank's report *China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society* evaluates prospects for economic growth in China with projections for economic growth until 2030.[22] There is also information about the intentions and projections of the government in the Chinese government's official documents especially those of the five-year plans. Table 2 highlights these projections. It is worth noting here that this report was prepared in cooperation with the Chinese government and most

of the findings in the paper are based on background papers. Therefore, the data in the report should be taken seriously.

Table 2 shows, using the World Bank's projections, that the growth rate of the labour force in China is projected to decrease over time and even turn negative after 2015. In other words, demographic dynamics in China demonstrate that the population growth rate will slow down and the size of the labour force will reach a level of saturation. This is obviously related with the one-child policy of the government implemented since the late 1970s. It is projected that the economic growth rate will not be at the two-digit levels and will drop gradually to around 5 % by 2030. Furthermore, labour

productivity growth rate will surpass economic growth rate after 2015. The meaning of labour productivity growth rates below economic growth rates before 2015 is declining share of labour in national income. Looking at the projections for the post-2015 period, it can safely be assumed that increasing labour productivity should affect real wage and household income positively. In this case, increasing purchasing power of households shall increase private consumption expenditures and their share in GDP. This is one of the top priorities of the Chinese government. The share of private consumption in GDP is projected to rise to over 60 % gradually after 2015, reaching about two thirds of GDP by 2030. This is yet a very ambitious target for the government. On the other hand, the projection for the share of services sector in total consumption to increase in the near future is a positive indicator in favour of this target. Table 2 reveals that

services expenditures will make up about 50 % of GDP after 2015 and slightly above 60 % by 2030. The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) envisaged an average GDP growth for 2011-2015 of 7 %, share of services in GDP to reach 43 %, and research and development expenditures at 2.2 % of the economy.[23] According to the World Bank World Development Indicators Database, annual average growth rate for 2011-2013 was 8.2 %, the share of services in GDP in 2013 was 46 %, research and development expenditures amounted to 2.0 % of GDP in 2013. Based on the projections in the five-year plan and the actual realizations, there is a strong reason to believe that the World Bank's projections in Table 2 may be realized. As economic development progresses, expenditures on services such as education, health, finance, transport, communication, and various other domestic services will naturally increase.

Table 2: Economic growth projections for China (1995-2030)

Unit: %	1995-2010	2011-2015	2016-2020	2021-2025	2026-2030
GDP growth rate	9.9	8.6	7.0	5.9	5.0
Growth rate of the labour force	0.9	0.3	-0.2	-0.2	-0.4
Growth rate of labour productivity	8.9	8.3	7.1	6.2	5.5
Investment to GDP ratio	49	42	38	36	34
Ratio of consumption expenditures in GDP	47	56	60	63	66
Ratio of the industrial sector in GDP	46.7	43.8	41.0	38.0	34.6
Ratio of the services sector in GDP	43.1	47.6	51.6	56.1	61.1

Note: The figures for 1995-2010 refer to actual data and the figures for 2011-2030 refer to projections.
Source: The World Bank and Development Research Centre of the State Council, the People's Republic of China, *China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society*, 2013, p. 9.

It is understood from the analysis of the projections that physical investments in the Chinese economy will attain a level of saturation.

Another important indicator to be evaluated carefully in Table 2 is the share of investments in national income. According to the projections, it is expected to decline to about 34 % by 2030. It is then safe to assume that the capital-output ratio will stay almost steady after some time. If the capital-output ratio stays unchanged, one can find, based on the analysis in the previous section, that investments will grow only at the same rate as the growth rate of the economy.[24] This is a very important finding with strong policy implications. A short-cut interpretation in light of the expressions above, it is understood from an analysis of the projections that physical investments in the Chinese economy will attain a level of saturation. A natural consequence of this is excess capacity in certain industries such as steel.[25] Investments will therefore have to fall in such industries unless demand increases, probably through exports to reduce the demand-supply gap. Yet,

overinvestment and excess capacity are big obstacles to economic growth. This issue has a political dimension as well because most of the largest industrial producers, for instance in the steel industry which is suffering from overcapacity, are linked to the local governments whose main objective is to increase industrial production although the National Development and Reform Commission has been trying to shut down inefficient industrial facilities.[26]

In the case of financing of the physical investments, it is necessary to evaluate the efficiency in the capital markets whose major function in a modern economy is to transfer loanable funds of savers to profitable investment projects. There is a large volume of research examining the causes and consequences of the inefficiencies and imperfectness of capital markets in China.[27] Two of the commonly accepted policy recommendations to improve the efficiency in the financial markets in China are the removal of financial restraint policy adopted by the central government and taking necessary actions to deepen the capital markets, particularly via the provision of incentives to facilitate the diversification of financial assets that the savers can invest their funds in. The next section discusses the structure of the financial markets and their impact on economic growth in China.

Financial Sector and Sustainability of Economic Growth

From the beginning, the role of the financial system in China was to provide the funds needed for the large-scale industrial investments of public and private enterprises in accordance with the central government's industrialization agenda.[28] This is comparable with the role played by the financial systems in latecomer developmentalist or etatist economies in East Asia such as Japan and Korea. However, with the increasing share of China in the world economy, the financial system has evolved into a more market-oriented and competitive one. The financial system in China was able to provide these funds to investors at a relatively low cost. Investments financed this way were instrumental in rapid industrialization and sustaining rapid growth rates. On the other hand, as explained above, due to the expectations that China would follow a different growth path by adopting a different growth strategy and the growth rates would be fairly low, such changes should have important consequences for capital markets and trigger significant changes in the working and organization of these markets.

In 2010 the Chinese government directly (through public banks) and indirectly (through its shares in the joint-stock banks) controlled about 83 % of commercial bank assets in the country.[29] Foreign institutions were allowed only a negligibly small piece of the cake (2 percent of total assets). Loans extended by the banking system, which is dominated by public banks, amounted to about 55 % of the financial sector in 2014, and the shares of stocks traded and corporate and government bonds were about 26 and 19 %, respectively.[30] In short, China has a bank-based financial system. Among the BRIC countries, which China can be compared with, this is peculiar only to China.[31]

Chinese banks, like their Japanese counterparts in the past, are able to collect funds from national savings easily and at fairly low cost and there is an argument that, similar to the Japanese banks, these banks are also weakly structured.

In the rapidly growing Chinese economy, the financial system has been operating basically as follows: households deposit their savings in the banking system (mostly in public banks) whose interest rates are determined and kept artificially low by the central government, and the banking system directs these low-cost funds mostly to private firms and local governments as loans. In a sense,

this is reminiscent of Japanese private banks in their heydays during the high-growth era.[32] The Ministry of Finance in Japan controlled private banks and forced them to direct the savings of households to large manufacturing firms and their subsidiaries under the ministry's guidance. During the course of the liberalization of the banking system in Japan during and after the 1990s, the weak structure of these banks has become apparent.[33] Chinese banks, like their Japanese counterparts in the past, are able to collect funds from national savings easily and at fairly low cost and there is an argument that, similar to the Japanese banks, these banks are also weakly structured. During rapid growth and in the absence of competition in the domestic financial system, common to both countries, these weaknesses are not visible or can be ignored.

The Chinese government seems to be aware of the weaknesses in the Chinese financial system and it has recently initiated reforms to restructure the finance sector, and the banking sector in particular.[34] First, the restrictions on interest rates set by the government have recently been relaxed. Regulations in the financial sector have also been eased and entry into the financial sector has been made easier to enhance competition. In addition, due to the fact that the international transactions of Chinese banks have increased enormously over the last decade in particular, it was necessary for these banks to achieve

international standards such as Basel Accord capital adequacy criteria imposed on banks engaging in international capital transactions. Moreover, bold steps have also been taken to develop the securities markets in the country. The details of such developments in the financial markets can be found elsewhere.[35] While these reforms aim at further financial deepening, their results are yet to be seen.

> The central government in China has naturally and reasonably deemed the financial sector an integral part of its growth and development strategy and is reluctant to leave it largely to market forces.

State control and repression of the financial sector is still continuing and is a matter of concern. The central government in China has naturally and reasonably deemed the financial sector an integral part of its growth and development strategy and is reluctant to leave it largely to market forces. The state-owned banks still control a large part of the banking sector and the economic decision-making process in these banks is based on bureaucratic and political criteria rather than commercial criteria. Many economists argue that the allocation of available funds in such a way leads to inefficient resource allocation in the economy.

> Improvements in the financial sector and diversification of financial instruments are also beneficial for savers whose appetite is currently bound by the low real interest rates controlled by the central government.

Excessive dependence on banks for funds is generally regarded as risky because in the event of a banking crisis the repercussions on the real economy will be extremely harsh. As economic development progresses, the demand for services provided by non-bank financial institutions such as insurance companies, securities companies, pension funds, etc. are also expected to increase. Mainstream economists generally advise deepening the financial system by encouraging the development of non-bank financial markets such as bonds and financial derivative markets. Considering the excessive dependence of local governments on bank loans for investment expenditures and soft budget practices, there are concerns about the role banks play in the economy, which is normally expected to be monitoring of risk and channelling savings to profitable investment projects. For this to happen in China, it is essential to adopt free market principles. In the Third Plenary Meeting of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which

ended on 12 November 2013, the party decided to increase the role of the market and improve the working of the market mechanism in the economy.[36] The World Bank argues in an official report that reform in the financial system in China is needed also because it is important to correct the imperfections in the financial sector along with the development of the real economy.[37] It is implied that the imperfect capital market in China dominated by state-owned banks creates an idiosyncratic risk in itself and the costs arising from this risk may be larger than the benefits obtained from rapid growth and industrialization it facilitates. To put in other words, the weaknesses in the financial system may have been ignored, downgraded or even gone unnoticed.

The World Bank warns that if economic growth continues with the current state of the financial sector characterized by imperfections and risks without any reforms, domestic balances may be hurt severely.[38] This may bear significant costs to the economy in the form of further worsening income inequalities, reduction in productivity, and worsening competitiveness. Therefore, it argues that China urgently needs to undertake financial sector reforms. Relating this with the need to transform long-run economic growth strategy to a productivity-based one with an emphasis on innovation and entrepreneurship, it is reasonable to believe that building a financial sector that rewards such economic activities may

speed up this process. By doing so, efficient allocation of capital among economic activities may be facilitated. Besides, most economists believe that a financial system better capable of risk management in an economy may also stimulate further improvements in corporate governance in the real sector firms.

Improvements in the financial sector and diversification of financial instruments are also beneficial for savers whose appetite is currently bound by the low real interest rates controlled by the central government. No matter how much the volume of transactions in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange markets have expanded, their combined share in the capital market is merely a quarter. The low level of diversification of financial assets and low real interest rates may urge the owners of capital to invest in stocks and real estate with a speculative motive. As a matter of fact, there was a large speculative bubble in China from 2005 to 2007 and at a lower scale later during 2009- 2010. In the former bubble, average stock prices lost about 70 % of their value compared to the peak within only a year and a half.[39] A similar movement also took place in housing and land prices though to a lesser degree. However, this reduction in prices was realized without a financial crisis, which implies that the central government has monitored and governed the process of bringing down these asset prices fairly well.[40]

American economists frequently pronounce their expectations of a sudden crisis for China.[41] They emphasize the structural problems in the Chinese economy that would lead to unsustainability of economic growth and finally a financial crisis. However, it should be reminded that the majority of these economists' descriptions of the mechanism towards a financial crisis are based on theoretical economic work, albeit some few studies look at it from a political economy viewpoint and specific circumstances peculiar to China.

Concluding Remarks and Implications for Political Economy and Global Rebalancing

This article evaluates the economic growth performance of the Chinese economy. An important issue here is the political economy of growth. Some of the important economic decisions of the central government announced in the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2013 were about how to sustain economic growth. The central government announced its desire to reinforce the market mechanism and to deepen the financial market by diversification of financial assets. Even then, the traditionally pragmatic stance of the government can be observed from

the market-enhancing steps, without reducing the role of the state in the economic decision-making process, in measures introduced to improve property rights and relaxation of the one-child policy. Yet, the government's strong hand in the financial sector, as evident from the large amounts of loans extended by the state-owned banks to state-owned enterprises and the resulting bad loans problem, as well as widespread corruption remain as major obstacles and limitations that the central government has to tackle.

An important aspect in conjunction with the global political economy is that national savings are larger than total investments in China because China is running a very large current account surplus by international standards. Excess savings are utilized by lending abroad, making China one of the top creditor countries. The top destination for lending is the US. This excess liquidity financed private consumption expenditures in the US especially before the financial crisis which broke out in 2007. Therefore, many American economists are inclined to blame China at least partially for the financial crisis.[42] After the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, global imbalances have become more apparent. Large current account surpluses by China and Germany, in particular, against the US have become important political issues as well.[43]

China's growth model based on investments was criticized by the advanced economies, which also demanded from China to take the necessary measures to reform its economy to remedy the negative impacts these imbalances impose. Nicholas Lardy points out that the transition from investment-led to consumption-led growth strategy in China will have an adverse effect on the financing of the US current account deficit. This is because the deficit was financed by capital inflows from China. Considering that the major cause of the US current account deficit is the low savings rate, it follows then that the US will have to increase its saving rate during China's transition.[44]

> While a shift towards consumption may ease the pressure on world prices of raw materials, there is still a need to invest in infrastructure in the urban areas in China.

The global imbalances and rebalancing them are important issues for future economic growth in China. As required by the global rebalance, China's role in the global economy needs to emphasize consumption rather than investment. Part of the increasing consumption will be channelled to imports, which may reduce the economic growth rate and employment in China. While the need to shift to consumption-led growth is

admitted by the central government, the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) did not mention how to shift China's growth pattern away from investments, how to liberalize financial markets, or how to shift China's global trade balance.[45]

The rebalancing in the Chinese economy toward consumption-led growth comes with costs to pay. When production was destined to investments and export to foreign markets, there was no need for Chinese companies to pay higher wages to their workers, as domestic consumption was relatively unimportant for the growth of these firms' sales. In the 12th Five-Year Plan, the government emphasized sustainable economic growth in the long run along with increase in the welfare of the citizens, which implicitly assumes an increase in incomes and wages as well as improvements in the "soft" aspects of economic development, such as health and education.[46] Household incomes will have to increase along with the growing middle class, and the social safety system will need to be improved. In addition, the slowdown in the labour force as a result of China's strict population policy may help increase wages in the country and impact private consumption positively.

Rebalancing China's role this way will have global repercussions as well. While a shift towards consumption may ease the pressure on world prices of raw materials, there is still a need to invest in infrastructure in the urban areas in China. Therefore, the expected reduction in the share of investments in GDP may not come that easily. However, this might have a positive impact on developing countries exporting raw materials to China.[47]

The biggest impact on rebalancing China will be on East Asian economies. As Jörg Mayer puts it, these economies benefitted from their position in the global supply chains of American and Japanese multinational firms, especially in labour-intensive processes.[48] Most of this output was exported to the industrial facilities of these foreign corporations in China. Rebalancing China will then affect these economies adversely as the demand for their products and services in the global supply chains will decline. Therefore, rebalancing may affect industrial development strategies in the region. In fact, the effects of rebalancing in East Asia became visible recently. The *Economist* reported in 2014 that a slow-down in investment resulted in lower exports of Asian countries to China especially of commodities and raw materials, as well as machines.[49]

China is slightly losing its comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries as the cost of labour has been rising much faster than that of the neighbouring Asian countries

There are opposing opinions about the future of China's economic growth and its position in the global economy as well. Michael Pettis has foreseen that China's investment boom is unsustainable and this would lead China to a long stagnation as happened in Japan after the burst of the bubble in 1991.[50] In addition, while shifting from the old growth model to the new growth model, it is important to bear in mind the risk of a hard landing. This happens when the engines of growth are fading and there are no new ones to substitute them. Rafael Halpin warns of such signs from some provinces.[51] In addition, China is slightly losing its comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries as the cost of labour has been rising much faster than that of the neighbouring Asian countries. While real wages increased by about 14 % during the 2008-2011 period, this was far more than those in Thailand and Malaysia (4 %), the Philippines (less than 1 %) and Indonesia (about 1 %).[52]

It seems that China will stay at the centre of discussions circumventing the global imbalances and how to achieve sustainable growth at the global scale. This will probably be the main issue to be discussed in the G-20 meetings in the coming years. As the English proverb goes, only time will tell.

Endnotes

1   *China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society*, The World Bank and Development Research Centre of the State Council, the People's Republic of China, 2013, p. xxi.

2   "When Giants Slow Down", *The Economist*, 27 July 2013.

3   For more details see K. C. Fung, Hitomi Iizaka and Sarah Y. Tong, "Foreign Direct Investment in China: Policy, Recent Trend and Impact", *Global Economic Review*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2004), pp. 99-130; Yingqi Wei and Xu Liu, "Productivity Spillovers from R&D, Exports and FDI in China's Manufacturing Sector", *Journal of International Business Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (July 2006), pp. 544-557; Zhongxiu Zhao and Kevin Honglin Zhang, "FDI and Industrial Productivity in China: Evidence from Panel Data in 2001-06", *Review of Development Economics*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (August 2010), pp. 656–665.

4   *China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society.*

5   "When Giants Slow Down".

6   This is evident from major science and technology indicators. According to the latest available OECD official statistics, gross domestic expenditures on research and development in China has reached 2.02 % of GDP in 2012. Comparative data from OECD and UNESCO for other BRICs are as follows: 1.12 % in Russia (2012), 1.21 % in Brazil (2011), and 0.81 % in Brazil (2011). In addition, according to the official statistics by UNESCO, research and development personnel per 1000 total employment is higher in China than in other BRICs as well, excluding Russia: 2.84 in Brazil (2010), 4.23 in China (2012), 0.98 in India (2010), and 11.4 in Russia (2012). According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database, the share of hi-tech products in total exports in China at 27 % in 2013 was at par with Korea (27 %) and France (26 %) and significantly higher than in Japan (17 %), the US (18 %), the UK (16 %), and Germany (16 %).

7   China economy: Quick View - Foreign investment surges, Economist Intelligence Unit, 19 April 2011, at http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1318016316&Country=China (last visited 24 June 2015).

8   Homi Karras and Geoffrey Gertz, "The New Global Middle Class: A Crossover from East to West", in Cheng Li (ed.), *China's Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation*, Washington D.C., Brooking Institution, 2010, Chapter 2.

9   Another way to ensure efficient allocation of productive resources in an economy is to direct resources (capital and labour) to flow to industries where the returns to these resources are higher. The standard economic theory suggests that the market should take on this responsibility. However, it is well known that in fast-growing East Asian economies including Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, governments intervened in markets to ensure resource allocation in accordance with the governments' industrialisation programs. Resource allocation in either way can be expected to yield an additional source of productivity growth,

named "structural bonus". Mainstream economists generally ignore this source of economic growth. For an application of this idea to East Asian economies see, K. Ali Akkemik, "Structural Change and Its Impact on Productivity in Japan, Korea, and Singapore (1970-2000)", *Forum of International Development Studies*, Vol. 28 (March 2005), pp. 35-53.

10 In the case of Korea, high enrolment rates and rapid accumulation of human capital and their contribution to rapid growth can be traced in the World Bank's report titled *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 43-46, and 192-203. In the case of China, Whalley and Zhao found that expansion in education and human capital accumulation account for about 38 % of rapid growth in China over the period 1978-2008. See John Whalley and Xiliang Zhao, "The Contribution of Human Capital to China's Economic Growth", *China Economic Policy Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2013), 1350001.

11 See, Joseph Casey and Katherine Koleski, *Backgrounder: China's 12th Five-Year Plan*, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011.

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13 Juro Osawa and Paul Mozur, "The Rise of China's Innovation Machine", *Wall Street Journal*, 16 January 2014; see also, George Yip and Bruce McKern, "The 'Three Phases' Of Chinese Innovation", *Forbes*, 23 March 2015; Regina M. Abrami, William C. Kirby and F. Warren McFarlan, "Why China Can't Innovate", *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 92, No. 3 (March 2014), pp. 107-111.

14 Suqin Ge and Dennis Tao Yang, "Changes in China's Wage Structure", *Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)*, Discussion Paper No. 6492 (2012); Dennis Tao Yang, "Aggregate Savings and External Imbalances in China", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 26, No. 4, (Fall 2012), pp. 125-146.

15 James R. Barth, Michael Lea and Tong Li, "China's Housing Market: Is a Bubble About to Burst?", *Milken Institute*, October 2012.

16 See, Xinhua, "China lowers down payment requirement for second homes", at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/30/c_133685855.htm (last visited 24 June 2015).

17 For details, see Kazuo Sato, "Saving and Investment", in Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba (eds.), *The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 1: The Domestic Transformation*, Stanford University Press, 1987.

18 Ibid; The equation is as follows: Here, refers to investment in physical capital, refers to output (GDP), refers to net capital stock, and refers to the rate of capital consumption (depreciation rate). is a mathematical operator showing change. This equation implies that investment to GDP ratio of the left hand side of the equation is made up of two components on the right hand side. The first component is the change in the capital-output ratio. That is to say, if capital stock, *K*, is expanding faster than GDP (*Y*) this means that investments are also

expanding faster than output, hence the investment-GDP ratio gets larger in value. The second component is the capital-output ratio multiplied by the sum of the depreciation rate and the efficiency of capital. Part of the investment is made to compensate for the wearing off of the existing capital stock. The term implies the efficiency of capital because it is defined as the increase in GDP divided by the capital stock.

19 Further calculations yield that the first term averaged minus 5.2 % for 1986-1995, but turned positive afterwards, averaging 4.3 % for 1996-2005 and 4.9 % for 2006-2011. On the other hand, the major source of the increase in ratio was the second component, thanks to the rising ratio, which averaged 33.3, 29.4, and 40.3 % for the periods, 1986-1995, 1996-2005, and 2006-2011, respectively.

20 A contrary view was expressed by Xiaodong Zhu who offers a critical perspective in this regard. See Xiaodong Zhu, "Understanding China's Growth: Past, Present, and Future", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 103-124. According to Zhu, productivity growth rate has increased in China and investments follow economic growth. Therefore, as opposed to the argument that economy grows because of large investments, the causal relationship may work the other way around.

21 See, Zhang Monan, "Financial System Reform", China Daily, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-11/04/content_17079140.htm (last visited 24 June 2015).

22 Ibid.

23 The official document for the 12th Five Year Plan is available online at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/dbdhhy/11_4/2011-03/16/content_1647644.htm (last visited 24 June 2015).

24 This is because economic growth in the previous analysis will be equal to the term.

25 According to the IMF's official statistics, industrial capacity utilization rate in China has decreased from about 80 % in 2007 to about 60 % in 2011, and still below 70 % in 2014. See Lingling Wei and Bob Davis, "In China, Beijing Fights Losing Battle to Rein In Factory Production", *Wall Street Journal*, 16 July 2014.

26 Mark Deweaver's article titled "China's Excess-Capacity Nightmare", at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-s-excess-capacity-nightmare (last visited 24 June 2015).

27 See for instance, "China's Stockmarkets: Imperfect Markets", *The Economist*, 5 October 2006; Kam C. Chan, Hung-gay Fung and Qingfeng 'Wilson' Liu (eds.), *China's Capital Markets: Challenges from WTO Membership*, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar (2007); Salih N. Neftci and Michelle Yuan Menager-Xu, *China's Financial Markets: An Insider's Guide to How the Markets Work*, Elsevier (2007).

28 *China 2030.*

29 World Bank, Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), *China – Financial Sector Assessment*, Report No. SecM2011-0492, November 2011.

30 These shares are calculated using the reported data in People's Bank of China, *China Monetary Policy Report, Quarter Three*, 6 November 2014.

31 This is evident from banks' share in total private sector lending. While this ratio was between 30-40 % in the other BRICs, it was more than 60 % in China during the period 2000-2011. See Leonardo Gambacorta, Jing Yang, and Kostas Tsatsaronis, "Financial Structure and Growth", *BIS Quarterly Review*, (March 2014), pp. 21-35.

32 K. Ali Akkemik, "Japonya (1991) ve ABD (2007-2009) Finans Krizlerinin Politik İktisat Perspektifinden Bir Değerlendirmesi", *Doğuş Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2011), pp. 171-186.

33 Ibid.

34 *China 2030;* For a critical analysis of financial sector in China, see also Jia Li, "China's Financial Market Fragmentation, 1978-2004", *Forum of International Development Studies*, Vol. 32 (December 2006), pp. 115-135.

35 See, Yasheng Huang, "How Did China Take Off?", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 147-170; Dennis Tao Yang, "Aggregate Savings and External Imbalances in China", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 125-146.

36 See Xinhua news report for the 18th National Congress, available online: http://www. xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/index.htm (last visited 24 June 2015).

37 *China 2030.*

38 Ibid.

39 K. Ali Akkemik, "Çin'de Hızlı Büyüme ve Balon Etkisi", *Hazar Raporu*, Vol. 4 (June 2013), p. 72.

40 It is helpful to compare with the bitter experience of Japan, where a bubble in asset prices grew in the second half of the 1980s and burst in 1991, leading the country to a "Lost Decade" in the 1990s. Whether there is a bubble economy in China is an interesting question but beyond the scope of this article. For a critical discussion in Turkish, see K. Ali Akkemik, "Çin'de Bir Finans Krizi Beklemeli Miyiz? – Japonya'dan Alınacak Dersler", in K. Ali Akkemik, Sadık Ünay (eds.), *Doğu Asya'nın Politik Ekonomisi: Japonya, Çin ve Güney Kore'de Kalkınma, Siyaset ve Jeostrateji*, Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press (2015), pp. 282-322.

41 Paul Krugman, "Will China Break?" *New York Times*, 18 December 2011.

42 See, for instance, Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, "Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes", CEPR Discussion Papers 7606 (2009); "Bernanke says Foreign Investors Fuelled Crisis", *Financial Times*, 18 February 2011; James A. Dorn, "The Role of China in the U.S. Debt Crisis", *Cato Journal*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 77-89.

43 Jörg Mayer draws attention to the similarities between Japan in the 1980s and China recently in their experiences with trade frictions with the US. In the 1980s the US was blaming Japan for undervaluing the yen and implementing neo-mercantilist policies. However, he argues further that there is a stark difference between the two countries. China is much

poorer than Japan in the 1980s and there are more opportunities for long-term economic development. In other words, China's backwardness may work for the benefit of the country when its economy ails as the Japanese economy stagnated after the 1990s when most of the opportunities for economic growth had been obsolete. See Jörg Mayer, "Global Rebalancing: Effects on Trade Flows and Employment", UNCTAD, Discussion Paper No. 200, September 2010.

44 Nicholas Lardy, *Sustaining China's Economic Growth after the Global Financial Crisis*, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012.

45 See Joseph Casey and Katherine Koleski, *Backgrounder: China's 12th Five-Year Plan*, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011.

46 Ibid.

47 Jörg Mayer, "Global Rebalancing: Effects on Trade Flows and Employment", *UNCTAD*, Discussion Paper No. 200, September 2010.

48 Ibid.

49 "Winners and losers in the great Chinese rebalancing", *The Economist*, 26 July 2014.

50 See, Michael Pettis, *The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013.

51 Rafael Halpin, "China's rebalancing challenge", *Financial Times*, May 22, 2015.

52 David Dollar, "Sino Shift", *Finance and Development*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (June 2014), pp. 10-13.

Turkey and the West: From Neutrality to Commitment

By Yusuf Turan Çetiner
Maryland: University Press of America, 2014, 446 pages, ISBN: 9780761861898

Over the last few decades, as the country, people, culture and many other aspects of Turkey have become ever more popular, much research has been conducted and published on Turkish history as well as on its domestic and foreign policy. *Turkey and the West: From Neutrality to Commitment* is one such academic work. This work attempts to unravel the complexities of world politics (covering regions as diverse as Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Far East) in the post-Atatürk period (1938 to 1958) with special attention given to the formulation of Turkish foreign policy. The primary objective set forth by the book is to analyze and explain Turkey's uneasy shift from neutrality to becoming a member of the Western Alliance. The reasons for doing so are explained as:

- Turkey's decision to ally itself with the Western grouping of states shaped its apprehension of regional and world politics for decades to come.

- Turkey's choice was neither adequately perceived nor fully appreciated in the volatile atmosphere of the 1950s and onwards, and went largely unnoticed on the part of Western democracies.

- A reinterpretation of Turkey's recent history can throw considerable light on the complexities surrounding this strategically important country.

In order to fulfill that objective, the author searched the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (still not open to public access) and compiled relevant materials for this work. These materials include press statements, extracts from correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies abroad as well as between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and foreign missions in Ankara. All of these are utilized to present a chronological flow of events and to contribute new material to the discussion of Turkey's foreign policy in the post-Atatürk era. Gaps left by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives are bridged with information and comments obtained from memoirs and books by various statesmen, officials, soldiers and journalists. In order to provide a more complete picture of Turkey's relations with the West for the relevant period, the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Command and Cabinet Papers, and Keesing's Contemporary Archives

and Documents on International Affairs were also consulted. Additional sources in Russian, Chinese, and Korean were examined, and a number of interviews with diplomats, soldiers and academicians who witnessed developments in the relevant period were conducted.

Going into the detailed plan of the book, the author makes the point in the first chapter that from 1939 onwards, Turkey's foreign policy choices were largely a reflection of the experience inherited from the diplomacy pursued during the War of Independence and the preference of the Turkish governments. In other words, when forced by the conditions of an unpredictable international environment, Turkish governments of the time opted for seeking ways to enhance the country's security; an effort which paved the way to the formation of an alliance with the West.

What it also means is that there were distinctions in the attitudes of consecutive Turkish governments, mainly divided between those run under the Presidency of İsmet İnönü and that of the Democrat Party era. While the former opted for a benevolent neutrality towards the Allied side, the latter, which ascended to power in elections on May 14 1950, abandoned this policy in favour of an active search for security partnership with the West. One of the reasons that compelled the Democrat Party leadership to do so may be found in the fast changing

political climate of the post war period, which culminated in Soviet control of Central and Eastern Europe. As the bloc divisions became ever more discernible and the fate of the Soviet liberated nations in Europe were left in the hands of their liberators, Turkey felt the need to adapt to the fast changing conditions in the balance of power and work out ways to assure its national security. The concessionary demands made by the Soviet leadership in the form of changing the 1936 Montreux Convention that had left control of the Bosphorus Straits in Turkey's hands and saw the return to Turkey of its two eastern provinces, namely Kars and Ardahan, only hastened Turkey's search for security and brought it even closer to the West.

The second chapter focuses on Turkey's responsive neutrality set against the rapid fluctuations in international politics. It is argued that depending on the course of events Turkey's neutrality emerged in the form of benevolent as well as evasive behavior towards the Allies. The primary objective of the Turkish statesman for doing so is explained as an anxious end-result in the search for saving the country from the disasters of World War II. Another important contention raised in this section is the gradual shift in Britain's foreign policy towards Turkey, from a decidedly reserved outlook to a desire for Turkey's active inclusion on the Allied side. This shift emerged following the destruction of the Munich system

in September 1938, at which time Germany's increasing involvement in the Balkans became more apparent.

In the words of the author, the "Allied and Axis relations with a collective movement" is the subject matter scrutinized in the third chapter. The central theme meanwhile revolves around Turkey's constant attempts to enhance its security in the face of an unpredictable international environment as well as the threat perceived from the rivalry between the emerging Soviet and Western blocs, which eventually paved the way for Turkish authorities to build a *sui-generis* crisis management/prevention system of their own.

The fourth chapter focuses on emerging problems in relation to building peace, and complications brought about by the consolidation of rival blocs following World War II. The author suggests that by 1946, when faced with the Kremlin's growing ambitions in different parts of the continent, Turkey become ever more apprehensive about the consequences of Soviet moves and thus focused its efforts on enhancing its relations with the West while accelerating attempts to bring its foreign policy in line with that of the US. In this context, two central developments are examined in detail; namely the Americans' sending of the USS Missouri to the Turkish Straits and the exchange of Turkish-Soviet Notes in 1946 following the Kremlin's irredentist claims.

The transformation of Turkey's political system from one-party rule to a multi-party system as a major landmark change and the implications of such change on its foreign policy (i.e. İnönü's attempt to adopt a more pro-western foreign policy while taking strong anti-communist measures internally) is the principal subject examined in the fifth chapter. A particular emphasis is given to Turkey's inclusion into the US' foreign assistance programs, especially the Truman Doctrine, a result which was not offered automatically and did not emerge without considerable difficulties.

The sixth chapter discusses Turkey's newfound role in the formulation of regional defense and the setting-up of the Middle Eastern Defense Organization between 1948 and 1950. This chapter begins with a discussion of the increasing tensions brought about by the intensification of the Cold War rivalry in Europe, particularly in Germany, and resulting in the Brussels Pact. Signed on March 17, 1948 by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, this pact aimed at facing the increasing Soviet menace and later culminated in the creation of a single North Atlantic Alliance in 1949, with the inclusion of the USA and Canada. Due mainly to its non-involvement in the Second World War, Turkey was initially excluded from the alliance and thus denied the position of founding member, despite pleas of

combining its defense with the rest of Europe. In the meantime, policymakers in Ankara were struggling to resolve an intricate dilemma facing them, between enhancing the security of their vast lands on the crossroads between east and west by joining the defense schemes set forth by London and Washington, and trying not to provoke the Soviet Union for further aggression by being in those very schemes.

Yet another struggle between the Eastern and Western blocs, this one on the Korean Peninsula, and how Turkey reacted to the crisis, is the subject matter discussed in the seventh chapter. Accordingly, despite being viewed as a potential trouble point among several others all around the world, the peninsula had never figured high on anyone's list until the leaders of both blocs tried to force their will onto each other. With the Chinese decision to engage in the Korean War, Western scholars who were strongly influenced by the intensifying Cold War became convinced that a well coordinated communist plot of global expansion under the Kremlin's control was in progress, and that neither Beijing nor Pyongyang had the freedom to make their own policy decisions. Turkey responded to these developments by attempting to combine its policy with that of the US, and decided to assign a brigade of 4,500 soldiers under the UN Command. Turkey's participation in the Korean War and its military/diplomatic

efforts in the Middle East demonstrated Ankara's willingness to combine its security with that of NATO, which eventually led to the backing of Turkey's membership in NATO.

The final part of the book examines both Anglo–American and regional actors' attitudes towards Middle Eastern security, with Ankara and London topping the list of relevant actors. Major developments such as the shift in Anglo–American policy, the Tripartite Declaration, the Four Power Treaty, the formation of the Middle Eastern Defense Organization, the military takeover in Egypt by the Committee of the Free Officers Movement, the shift by the Anglo–American policy makers to the Northern Tier project, the formation of the Baghdad Pact, Gamal Abd'el Nasser's arms deal with the Soviets, and the mounting tensions following the Suez Crisis, which had been precipitated by Nasser's decision to nationalize the Canal, are all given close scrutiny. In the midst of such precarious and volatile events affecting the Middle East, Turkey chose to adopt a more reserved foreign policy, mostly in line with those of the UK and the US, despite the challenges posed against the regional status quo by emerging nationalism and Soviet support.

In the author's own words the conclusions reached by this work include the following:

i) Turkey's balancing act between the major powers especially prior to and during the Second World War had more to do with the course of international affairs rather than the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Turkey, Britain and France signed on 19 October 1939. Ankara's increased responsiveness against the fluctuations in international politics represented a clear change from the former Atatürk era. In contrast to the previous era, the İnönü administration was in favor of maintaining a more flexible foreign policy.

ii) During World War II, President İnönü's conviction never wavered that the Western nations would sooner or later win the war. It was only a matter of time that Turkey would be saved from the damages of the global conflict. Then, following the chromite deliveries of 1941 and the signing of the Turco–German treaty of friendship in the same year, İnönü's second balancing attitude towards the Axis took the stage. In 1942, when the German armies were concentrating their strongholds throughout Europe and were being deployed in key areas, Ankara shifted to implement the "capital tax" on the revenues of non-Muslims. Consecutively, a discriminatory wave affected Turkish citizens of Christian and Jewish origin. Some were subsequently sentenced to serve years in work camps since they could not meet the immense amounts of tax imposed by the Turkish authorities. A wave of propaganda with anti-Semitic undertones and accompanied by claims about non-Muslims, was also increasingly tolerated in the press, on radio and elsewhere. In this move, clearly, İnönü planned to divert the attention of the Axis war machine elsewhere. Arguably these actions by the Turkish administration were taken out of fears of German encroachment. It was rumoured that German-to-Turkish dictionaries were being distributed among the German troops in Bulgaria, and shortly thereafter, in 1943, Bulgaria was pressured by Hitler to send its people of Jewish origin to Poland. This suggests that Ankara's choice for work camps in Van/Aşkale were actually among the most secure and least visible sites, thanks to their proximity to the Turco-Soviet border. Within a year, when İnönü saw that the course of the global conflict was gradually moving Turkey out of the scope of the belligerent powers, he shifted to lift the pressures on non-Muslims in the country, and abolished the work camps. As a continuation of the same policy, in 1944, when the Soviet armies were gaining victories Ankara then turned against the Pan-Turanists, who were found guilty of racist activities. This represented

a message to the Kremlin, which expressed that Turkey not allow ultra-nationalist activities in the country.

iii) The prelude to the post-WWII period was marked by Ankara's suspicions of the Kremlin's intentions and in 1945, the Soviet demands on Turkish territories and over the Turkish Straits culminated in Ankara's search for a definitive alliance with the West. Despite the fact that some Turkish intellectuals, statesmen and ex-military officials proposed that an understanding between Ankara and the Kremlin should be reached- similar to the first Turco-Soviet rapprochement which took place during the Turkish War of Liberation- events proved that the conditions in 1917 and in 1945 were dramatically different, making any agreement almost impossible.

iv) At this juncture, Turkey's embarking upon democracy was closely associated with its wish for joining the Western grouping of states. The first elections in 1946, however, were not a successful attempt between adopting a more liberal attitude towards its opponents and closing ranks against the socialist advance. In his final analysis, having seen that the opposition was mainly formed by some dissident members of the ruling Republican Peoples' Party (RPP) into another party and no socialist would actually be embodied in this,

President İnönü felt a necessity to direct Ankara's foreign policy once again in line with the Western camp and shifted to implement a softer policy towards the rising opposition to allow them to compete with the RPP in a more normal way.

v) In accordance with his perception of international affairs, İnönü thought that in the aftermath of the war, maintaining an alliance with Britain and the US was of tremendous importance. On the other hand, until the Truman Doctrine, Washington had thought that Turkey was in Britain's "area of responsibility". It was the Truman Doctrine that marked a complete change in the US' perception of Turkey and of course, Greece. Against this background, the elections of May 1950, after which the Democrat Party administration decided to push Turkish foreign policy to its limits, marked a turning point. Subsequently, the efforts around the MEDO and the concurrent war effort in Korea, in both of which Turkey had major roles, took place. The first enlargement of NATO with the inclusion of Turkey and Greece coincided with this period. The Soviet moves towards escalating the Cold War continued in the same interval and a bipolar search for balance of power was pursued, which was indeed a contradiction in the original concept of balance.

All in all, when it comes to the question of who should read this book, it is safe to say that anyone who is interested in the policies of such nations as the United Kingdom, the USA, the Soviet Union, France and Germany, which emerged politically and militarily dominant in the time period covered by this work and who is interested in Turkish foreign policy as well as students of Turkish history and the history of the Second World War may find the book interesting.

When it comes to the question of what makes this book so appealing, it is safe to say that it provides a detailed analysis of the political developments that shaped a particular history (both the pre- and post-World War II years) of Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and the far East. The author presents a unique and broad perspective on the subject at hand by paying attention not only to Turkey's domestic politics but also its foreign policy. The wide range of contacts and archival documents accessible by the author in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs place him in the best possible position to provide firsthand knowledge for a complex analysis. The author displays a discerning scholarly ability in exploring intricate and multi-dimensional issues with utmost efficiency.

As to the question of whether this work is still open for improvement, one may argue that the language of the work could have been simplified in such a way that non-native readers or those who are un-familiar with the subject matter could find it easier to follow and understand the analysis set forth so elaborately. The length of the book could have been kept to a level that would have inspired non-expert readers while still remaining within the realm and definition of an academic work. From the outset, the reasons for choosing an analysis involving the period between 1939 to 1950 could have been explained more explicitly.

Nevertheless, all these comments cannot diminish the value of this work, which could be aptly defined as a timely and significant contribution to the study of Turkey, Turkish history and Turkey's foreign policy.

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Turkey and the European Union: Processes of Europeanization

By Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer (eds.)
Surrey: Ashgate, 2012, 286 pages, ISBN 9781409445296 (hbk) / ISBN 9781409445302 (ebk).

Taking its starting point from the idea that Europeanization has since the 1990s been a valuable approach with explanatory power in European studies for analyzing the EU's domestic impact not only on member states but also on the candidate countries (p. 1), this book is a prevailing attempt to provide an analytical overview of various policy areas, actors and issues in Turkey with a view to its EU membership aims since 1999 and the subsequent process of Europeanization. In that regard, this volume, edited by Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer, is composed of 12 distinctive chapters.

Although the book confines itself mainly to the processes of Europeanization in Turkey, the editors' adoption of a broad approach in exploring the trajectory of Europeanization in Turkey via various policy areas and issues makes the volume motivating to read in the midst of Turkey's accession negotiation process. What becomes clear from reading many of the studies included in this collection is that with certain ups and downs in Turkey's long lasting relation with the EU, Europeanization has influenced Turkish politics and society, despite various problems and setbacks.

The editors and some of the leading domestic and international scholars in the field as contributors to the book have addressed very important questions and challenges that underpin the process of Europeanization in Turkey. They offer fresh insights into that process, provide a number of different perspectives to the various policy areas in Turkey related with Europeanization, and come up with new questions for further studies in the field. This argumentative approach is overall the main strength of the book.

The structure of the book is designed around political, social and foreign policy matters, leaving aside economic matters. In that respect, the volume starts with a focus on one of the most important concepts in Europeanization, *conditionality*. Tanja Börzel asks the question why the domestic impact of the EU has differed for the candidate countries, with a specific focus on Turkey. The author asks whether Turkey is a *sui generis* case regarding the domestic impact of the EU. Considering the context of the relations between Turkey and the EU from membership to accession, the author argues that the process of Europeanization appears to

be 'bottom up' and 'indirect' (p. 17). Thus, the chapter concludes that Turkey is not a *sui generis* case and that the EU's transformative power in Turkey has been rather weakened.

The political analysis of the volume is backed up with the third chapter of the volume, which mainly discusses democratization in Turkey. Yonca Özer, starting with the conceptual overview of *conditionality,* regards it as an "an engine of Europeanization of Turkish democracy and human rights regime" (p. 45). The author thus constructs the chapter according to a rationalist institutionalist approach, focusing on EU conditionality to influence the countries concerned. Constructing her analysis on two periods, 1999-2005 and more recent years, this chapter analyses not only the extent of the impact of EU political conditionality on domestic change in Turkey but also sheds light on the conditions and factors that determine the extent of that impact. By analyzing the reform process in Turkey with a view to a rationalist institutionalist external incentives model, it is revealed that while there was a dramatic improvement in Turkish democracy in the first period, there has been a downturn in the second, and the author draws attention to certain problems, particularly in the implementation of the adopted rules. The author's observation of the defect in implementation seems to be the strongest part of the chapter. Although there are

some redundant elements regarding the concept of conditionality with respect to the first chapter, this chapter can be considered as complementary to the Europeanization process in Turkey in the political sphere of analysis.

Going back to the issue of Europeanization in Turkey with respect to social matters, the second chapter of the volume focuses on the specific theme of *identity* with regard to Europeanization. Çiğdem Nas, in the second chapter, traces the Europeanization of national identity in Turkey on the basis of norms and values propagated by the EU, such as democracy, moderation of power, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and non-discrimination (p. 23). While examining the issue, the author asks in a comparative manner how different Turkey's case is from that of the Central and Eastern European countries. The author convincingly argues that despite rejections, Turkey has been undergoing a significant change owing to the EU process, and that a Europeanization of identity is not contrary to a 'regionalization' of Turkish identity, since Turkey's value as a model country in the Middle East is related to its Europeanization (p. 36).

In the same sphere of analysis, even though the reforms in minority rights may represent a tremendous step for Turkey's Europeanization process, Gözde Yılmaz mainly argues that the trend in minority-related policy change

is neither progressive nor smooth. The author analyzes minority related policy change in Turkey between 1999 and 2010 in three phases, and concludes that none of the theoretical frameworks of external Europeanization is capable of explaining minority-related change in Turkey covering the whole time period between 1999 and 2010. The chapter is a significant attempt to draw readers' attention to minority protection issues, which have not been developed as an EU rule and which remain a highly contested issue due to their nature and the implications they carry concerning sovereignty. The author considers the case of Turkey on this issue as "the selective legal approximation of the minority-related rules demanded by the EU" (p. 134). Thus, what is focused on is that minority-related policy change is a result of EU conditionality and government's policy dissatisfaction with previous minority policies. Although these facts have acted as a pioneer for change on this issue with progressive trends in implementation, the author draws our attention not only to the positive impact of EU conditionality but also to the political preferences of the government in line with pro-minority policies, claiming that without one another, policy change remains both limited and selective.

Considering the importance of civil society in the global context, in the fifth chapter Selcen Öner focuses on the EU's influence on the process of transforming Turkish civil society in legal and practical terms. Starting from the historical background of relations between the state and society in Turkey, the author examines changes in the legal framework of Turkish civil society through the EU's application of the 'conditionality' principle and use of an external incentives model. Asking how the behavior of Turkish civil society organizations has been transformed by Europeanization since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the author convincingly argues that the most important obstacle to the development of Turkish civil society is the country's state-centric political culture (p. 100). The EU, which is depicted in this chapter as the most important external actor supporting the strengthening of civil society in Turkey, has transformed the legal framework as well as state-civil society relations in Turkey, still with many deficiencies in Turkey's implementation of the law.

The legal sphere of analysis in terms of Europeanization in Turkey is considered by Bertil Emrah Oder in the fourth chapter of the volume. In this chapter, the author asks whether Turkey represents a model of Europeanization in the sense of respecting values of constitutionalism 'in the right direction' (p. 70). In that respect, the EU's impact on constitutional developments after 1983 are analyzed with respect to chronology, methodology and

implementation patterns. Comparing these respects with the EU impact, it is determined that there have been misfits between Turkey and the EU from the perspective of constitutionalism. The author argues that in the case of Turkey, the realization of constitutionalism and Europeanization does not follow a pattern of 'deliberate' and 'planned' action of political actors. In that respect, the chapter sheds light on today's constitutional transformation in Turkey as upheld by the EU, which would be beneficial for an audience interested in current discussions regarding the judicial and legal reforms in Turkey's accession negotiations process with the EU.

One of the other important strengths of the book is to highlight a much neglected social issue in Turkey's Europeanization process, namely *feminism*. Sevgi Uçan Çubukçu contributes to the volume by analyzing developments in women's struggle for gender equality in Turkey after the 1990s in the framework of the Europeanization process. Manifesting an experience at the intersection of feminism and democratization initiatives and civil society, gender equality lies at the heart of democracy in the Turkish case. The author argues that the women's movement has played a key role, as the most important pressure group on the democratization process of Turkey over the last decade. In addition, women's civil society organizations are considered as essential civil actors, and

Europeanization in the area of gender equality and women's rights should be defined as a fundamental process in Turkey. This striking part of the volume is notable in terms of enhancing the voice of women in the Europeanization process.

Rana İzci in her contribution to the volume seeks to understand the impact of EU-Turkey relations on Turkish environmental policy, with a special emphasis on sustainable development as well as on Turkey's position towards international environmental regimes. It is a widely known fact that environmental concerns have steadily been included in the agenda of Turkey-EU relations since 1995. Focusing on this neglected area of concern, the chapter assumes that the approximation of EU environmental acquis and international developments challenge the notions of sustainability and development in Turkey. It thus questions whether – and to what extent – any change has occurred in the existing development environment link in Turkey due to EU conditionality, both at the declaratory level and in practice. It also asserts that EU conditionality might be a useful tool for analyzing the changes in Turkey's environmental policy at the international level.

Focusing on another neglected area of research in Turkey's Europeanization process, Dimitris Tsarouhas has attracted attention on the importance of social policy in accession negotiations. His

main argument is that there is a weak Europeanization effect on Turkish social policy reform. According to him, 'Europe' is used as a 'legitimization device' for policies concerned and designed at the national level and with domestic political priorities in mind (p. 161). Thus, there are few policy transfer mechanisms at work, resulting in a weak yet explicit impact of 'cognitive Europeanization' acting as a legitimizing device (p. 164). The chapter reveals that there is a neglect of social policy as a major item in pre-accession negotiations and that Europeanization on social policy in Turkey is very limited.

The foreign policy sphere of analysis is explored in the tenth chapter, by Özlem Terzi, in which she analyzes the Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) after more than ten years of EU candidacy. In this highly contested area, the author argues that EU candidacy has definitely changed the way Turkey pursues its foreign policy. According to her, the reason for most of the failures in the completion of the process lies in the fact that EU accession prospects for Turkey have faded away. Despite all the concerns about a shift of axis, TFP continues to be conducted in a European manner that has been well learned. The central argument of the article is that the basic changes in TFP between 1999-2008 are a result of Turkey's desire to display an 'appropriate behavior'. In the same sphere of analysis, Alper Kaliber, in

the penultimate chapter of the volume, considers the Cyprus issue as a case of contextual Europeanization and aims to discuss the impacts of Europeanization as a normative/ political context on Turkey's Cyprus policy. He concludes out that the impact of Europeanization on Turkey's Cyprus policies has been very limited, and that the impact of Europe is better understood if it is conceptualized as contextual and contingent.

In addition to foreign policy matters, Turkish adoption of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) *acquis*, a high politics issue, is the theme of the last chapter of the volume. This issue of concern is said to be relatively slow when compared with that of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). A comparative study of Europeanization and migration and asylum policies in Turkey with that of the CEECs, the chapter can be considered as an attempt to explain the relative lag in the Europeanization of Turkey's migration and asylum policies. Catherine Macmillan argues that the external incentives model can best explain Turkey's rule adoption in the area of asylum and immigration, taking into account the social learning process. Considering the extent of the limitations of Europeanization in Turkey's asylum and immigration policies, with a specific focus on border control, readmission agreements, visa policy and geographical limitation, the author concludes that Europeanization has been slower in

this area in Turkey compared to in the CEECs.[1]

Overall, this volume provides a motivating read, with each chapter exploring thematically Turkey's Europeanization process with respect to the country's relations with the EU, which took a new turn with the start of accession negotiations in 2005. All the chapters of the volume offer coherent and focused accounts of Turkey's candidacy to the EU and its accession negotiations. With the main conceptual framework resting on Europeanization as an explanatory tool to understand EU-induced change, all the contributions of the volume are well written and structured, demonstrate clear arguments, and convincing theoretical assumptions. In that regard, this book is a significant contribution to the literature and an essential reference for policy makers and academics interested in Turkey-EU relations and Europeanization.

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Endnotes

1   It should be noted that Turkey adopted a new law on migration and asylum in 2013 and signed a readmission agreement with the EU in 2014. (Editor's note)

Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia and Turkey

By Şener Aktürk
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 304 pages,
ISBN: 978107021433

Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia and Turkey, by Şener Aktürk, professor of political science at Koç University, deals with a very important problem and the innermost debate of the nationalism, ethnicity, and citizenship literature: how do state policies that regulate the relationship between ethnicity and nationality change? In answering this question, he explains the dynamics of persistence and change in state policies regulating the relationship between ethnicity and nationality, which he conceptualizes as "regimes of ethnicity". Aktürk gives a distinct answer to this question by focusing particularly on three important empirical cases: Germany, the Soviet Union and, after its dissolution, post-Soviet Russia, and Turkey. These

three empirical cases demonstrate significant differences in their dominant religious traditions, ethnic demography, population density, political systems, and levels of economic development. However, Aktürk's methodological logic and three independent variables consisting of the existence of counter-elites, the new discourse on ethnicity and nationality, and hegemonic majority (read the rise of the new hegemonic bloc in the related cases) overcome the difficulties of comparing these diverse cases.

Aktürk gives a rich detailed picture of three main factors, namely the counter-elites, the new discourse and the political hegemony, which contribute to the further development of the typology of "regimes of ethnicity". The main argumentation in this book is based on the changes that have occurred in regimes of ethnicity, taking into consideration Turkey's prohibition on the public use of minority languages, German citizenship law, and the Soviet Union's identification document, on which ethnicity was written. By placing these cases within the framework of three types of regimes (anti-ethnicity, mono-ethnicity and multi-ethnicity respectively) and their changes, Aktürk claims that only when counter-elites, new discourse and political hegemony coincide with each other at the same time is change in the regimes of ethnicity possible.

The book is organized in five main sections, in which the first is devoted to the theoretical framework and the empirical overview on which the book is based. This structure makes it quite simple for the analyses in other chapters to be easily followed and understood. The second, third and fourth sections are focused directly on the cases of Germany, Turkey and the Soviet Union, and the paths toward changes in policies in each is explained. This is followed in the last section with the main conclusions drawn from this study.

The book's theoretical section introduces new ideas to the concept of regimes of ethnicity. In his framework, Aktürk offers a new theory regarding regimes of ethnicity, in which all states may be included in a comparative manner, by separating the regimes into those of 'anti-ethnicity', 'mono-ethnicity' and 'multi-ethnicity'. When looking at other literature on nationhood or ethnicity, different explanations may be found for changes in the regime of ethnicity, such as the state collapse, border change, international actors etc., but unfortunately these generally fail to be applicable in most cases. Considering this gap, Aktürk claims that there are three main elements that are instead applicable in most of cases: counter-elites, new discourse and political hegemony. To make such a generalization, especially in comparative politics, is quite risky but it must be mentioned that the framework introduced by Aktürk is valid not only for the states mentioned in this book.

In the second part of the book Aktürk applies his theory to the first case, that of Germany, and explains how the mono-ethnic regime was transformed into an anti-ethnic one. Considering the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as one of the main counter-elites, he explains that this party lacked a new discourse for approximately 30 years, leading to the failure in changing the ethnic regime. An important aspect mentioned in the book is the fact that this change in Germany, unlike most other places, came from the bottom, where the immigrants were those who made the biggest efforts. The existence of the abovementioned counter-elite followed by a new discourse (Germany as a country of immigration) and a SPD-FDP (Free Democratic Party) coalition, was able to change the German Citizenship Law that restricted immigrants from gaining German citizenship.

Continuing with the second case, that of Turkey, Aktürk explains the change from an anti-ethnic regime toward a multiethnic one; a process that started in 2004 when broadcasting in different minority languages was initiated. The counter-elite that made this change possible is deemed to be the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which changed the conservative ideologies and the existing discourse (for example, in 1980 it was considered a crime to allege the existence of Kurds (Aktürk, 2012, s. 117). In 2002 was it possible for the AK Party to come to power with an almost two thirds majority. Accordingly, considering all these three factors together, multicultural accommodation became achievable.

The last case is that of the Soviet Union, for which Aktürk strongly rejects the idea that "Soviet" has never been a national identity. The Law of Ethnicity obliged all Soviet citizens to declare their ethnicity, which was frequently used as a tool of discrimination, especially towards Jews. However these policies changed when Boris Yeltsin came to power. A hegemonic counter-elite, mostly representing Jews and Germans, was supported by the new discourse of Tishkov's Russian Nation, and in 1997 the law was finally changed so as not to oblige citizens to declare their ethnicity.

Given the deficiency in the landscape of this subject, this book breaks a lot of new ground and should be read by anyone interested in issues of nationhood and changes in ethnicity policies. As mentioned above, the applicability of the theoretical framework introduced in this book is not confined only to these three cases, but has broader usage in terms of other states. This book is a crucial contribution to the literature as it provides a detailed yet simplified, thorough map of some very important yet sometimes overlooked issues in the modern world.

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Books

John Smith, *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100. John E. Smith (ed.), *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, pp. 100-102. John Smith and Mary Jones, *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100. Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, *The Book Title*, p. 100.

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Articles in Journals

John Smith, "Article Title", *Journal Name*, Vol. #, No. # (Month Year), p. #.
Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, "Article Title," p. #.

Articles in Edited Books

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For titles of published and unpublished theses use italics: John E. Smith, *Title of Thesis*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Name of the University, Year, Chapter #, p. #

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Title of Book Reviews

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