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Increasing the Effectiveness of UNHCR's 4Rs Activities in Afghanistan: Compliance, National Capacity and Domestic Actors*

Arzu GÜLER**

Abstract

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has conducted activities in refugee producing countries to provide the sustainability of voluntary repatriation as the most preferred durable solution. The literature on UNHCR's increasing activities of this sort has a rather normative focus, questioning whether UNHCR should be involved in such activities. However, it mainly lacks discussions on how the effectiveness of 4Rs activities may be increased. This article is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan. It argues that increasing Afghanistan's national capacity for compliance through increasing support among domestic actors such as Afghan government officials and the public by persuasion and shared norms is likely to increase the effectiveness of the international refugee regime. The article seeks to identify the factors that are likely to shape the opinions of the domestic actors and to make tentative suggestions for increasing support among them for 4Rs activities.

* This article is a revised version of the PhD Dissertation based on the reviewers' suggestions, submitted by Arzu Güler to the Department of International Relations at İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University in May 2013.

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Key Words

UNHCR, Afghanistan, 4Rs activities, effectiveness, domestic factors.

Introduction

People are forced to flee from their countries due to various reasons such as war, persecution, poverty or environmental disasters. Though these migrants may establish a new life in their host countries, one of the main options is to return to their countries of origin when the conditions are conducive to return. For refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as the lead international organization of the international refugee regime,¹ has increased its activities in refugee producing countries² since the beginning of the 1990s to promote voluntary repatriation as a durable solution, and in 2003 developed its Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (4Rs) approach.

During the Cold War, UNHCR mainly operated in host countries to

Especially after the end of the Cold War, when ideological motivation came to an end, the developed states became reluctant to provide resettlement as a durable solution for refugees and a similar reluctance was also valid for the asylum states on providing local integration.

ensure refugee protection and to find durable solutions for refugees through resettlement or local integration. Especially after the end of the Cold War, when ideological motivation came to an end, the developed states became reluctant to provide resettlement as a durable solution for refugees and a similar reluctance was also valid for the asylum states on providing local integration. For this reason the UNHCR began to focus on voluntary repatriation as a durable solution and increased its activities in the refugee producing countries. The shift of UNHCR's activities from host countries to refugee producing countries has mainly been discussed in the literature with a normative focus, questioning whether UNHCR should be involved in activities like the 4Rs. One strand of the literature supports UNHCR's increased activities in countries of origin, though with

caution. The cautionary side of this strand of the literature argues that UNHCR's direct engagement in country of origin activities during conflict and post-conflict situations would stretch the refugee regime to its limit and could prevent it from concentrating on its original humanitarian protection role.³ Thus, it argues, UNHCR should not have the sole responsibility for such activities, and inter-agency collaboration is needed for responsibility sharing.⁴ The other strand of the literature argues that UNHCR should refrain entirely from country of origin activities like the 4Rs for two main reasons: First, the threat of erosion in the right of asylum and principle of non-refoulement; and second, the lack of institutional and legal basis. Regarding the first point, it is argued that repatriation as the main choice of solution by UNHCR resulted in the erosion of asylum as an institution of international protection and in erosion of the principle of non-refoulement, causing returnees to become internally displaced persons.⁵ For the second point, this strand of the literature argues that UNHCR lacks a firm institutional and legal basis for in-country activities due to its non-political and humanitarian nature.⁶ Goodwin-Gil admits this position, arguing that UNHCR's non-political and neutral nature does not allow for the protection of persons within their own country,

and such politicized and conflict-ridden situations have the risk of jeopardizing UNHCR's independence, neutrality and impartiality.⁷ Since the literature has mainly a normative focus on 4Rs activities, it fails to address the question of how their effectiveness may be increased. This article is an attempt to contribute to the literature on UNHCR and its 4Rs activities by questioning how the effectiveness of 4Rs activities may be increased in Afghanistan, as the country witnessing the largest repatriation operations in UNHCR history.

Throughout its history Afghanistan has produced mass refugee flows, mainly to Pakistan and Iran, and after 1979 became the largest refugee producing country. With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, over 3.5 million Afghan refugees returned to their homes.⁸ After the signing of the Bonn Agreement in 2001, UNHCR and its implementing partners⁹ have conducted 4Rs program in the country and more than 5.8 million additional Afghan refugees returned home by the end of 2015.¹⁰ By the beginning of 2016, there were still 2.7 million Afghan refugees abroad, ranking them the second largest refugee population in the world after Syrian refugees.¹¹ According to key social-economic and political-military indicators, Afghanistan is identified as the top of the list of the high

alert group, and is ranked 9th of 178 countries on the fragile state index.¹² The country has a GDP of US\$ 64.08 billion in 2016, ranked in 104th in the world, and its GDP real growth rate is 2% in 2016, ranked 134th in the world.¹³

Throughout its history Afghanistan has produced mass refugee flows, mainly to Pakistan and Iran, and after 1979 became the largest refugee producing country. With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, over 3.5 million Afghan refugees returned to their homes.

As the site of the largest ever repatriation operation and 4Rs activities by the international community; exploring the effectiveness of those 4Rs activities in Afghanistan is crucial to ensuring the sustainability of refugee returns to Afghanistan. This article argues that Afghanistan's compliance with the legal accords of the 4Rs activities affects the effectiveness of such activities. In order to strengthen compliance in Afghanistan as a fragile state with concerns on its political, legal and administrative capacity, national capacity building is required. To increase national capacity, the article benefits from constructivism

together with neoliberalism and argues that an increase in support among government officials and public opinion in Afghanistan is likely to contribute to the effectiveness of the 4Rs activities.

As the site of the largest ever repatriation operation and 4Rs activities by the international community; exploring the effectiveness of those 4Rs activities in Afghanistan is crucial to ensuring the sustainability of refugee returns to Afghanistan.

This article has four parts. First, it explains the theoretical background and methodology. Second, it provides background information on UNHCR's 4Rs approach. In the last two sections, the article identifies the possible factors that shape the opinions of the Afghan government officials and public on the 4Rs activities and attempts to provide tentative suggestions for the international community to increase its support for 4Rs activities.

Theoretical Background and Methodology

The literature on international regimes defines effectiveness mainly

in two ways: Problem solving and goal attainment. While the first refers to the contributions regime institutions make to solve the problems that motivate actors to create them,¹⁴ the latter has to do with the fulfilment of the goals that the regime sets for itself.¹⁵ Regardless of which definition is adopted, states' compliance with the regime rules is important for the effectiveness of international regimes. In both of the definitions, compliance with the regime rules is important for the effectiveness, though not identical. Because states' adherence to the provisions of international accords and their implementing measures does not guarantee the effectiveness,¹⁶ it is still argued that compliance may be a fair first approximation surrogate for effectiveness.¹⁷

As Young and Levy state, "when specifying the problem addressed by a regime, the one 'that prompts its creation', is explicit institutional goals".¹⁸ This article therefore integrates these two definitions and defines the effectiveness of 4Rs activities as preventing the protracted refugee situations (problem solving), through providing sustainability of repatriations (goal attainment). Thus, 4Rs activities in Afghanistan aim to solve the problem of the protracted Afghan refugee situation mainly in two major host states, Iran and Pakistan, by facilitating sustainable voluntary repatriations to Afghanistan.

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Recalling that the article admits compliance as a necessary component of an effective regime and/or increasing effectiveness, this article attempts to identify factors for increasing the effectiveness of 4Rs activities of the international refugee regime in Afghanistan through increasing Afghanistan's compliance with the regime rules.

As the legal ground of 4Rs activities, UNHCR signed tripartite agreements with the Interim Government of Afghanistan and Iran in 2002 and Pakistan in 2003, having the aim of facilitating voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan in safety and with dignity, and reintegrating them successfully in Afghanistan. These legal accords constitute the basis of the regime rules for compliance in 4Rs activities, and the compliance of all related parties with these agreements is required for the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in

Afghanistan.¹⁹ On the one hand, the compliance of Iran and Pakistan with the rules, such as respecting the voluntary character of the repatriations and safety of the repatriating refugees while on their territory, is important particularly for the effectiveness of the first R (Repatriation). On the other hand, for the effectiveness of the remaining three Rs, it is Afghanistan who should comply with the rules of these legal accords, such as creating conditions conducive to the reintegration of refugees in safety and with dignity, and extending full cooperation with UNHCR and its implementing partners for making repatriations sustainable through rehabilitation and reconstruction phases.

Compliance has two dimensions, one is willingness and the other is capacity to comply. As Chayes and Chayes point out, “[s]hortcomings of compliance do not necessarily mean a lack of will, but are rather attributed to the lack of capacity to comply with the requirements of international agreements”.²⁰ Since the effectiveness of 4Rs activities may increase with the compliance, here the question is how to strengthen Afghanistan's compliance with the rules of 4Rs activities in order to have better effectiveness. There are different theoretical arguments for increasing compliance both in terms of willingness and capacity.

Realist theories emphasize the nature of anarchy in the international system and based on their assumptions on this anarchical nature, Classical Realists focus on the importance of relative gains. According to them, there is a greater probability of states' compliance when the costs are smaller and benefits associated with the international accord are greater.²¹ Hegemonic stability theory contributes to the Realist theories by arguing that states tend to comply with the regime rules when a hegemon also complies.²² According to Neorealists, states make their decisions about compliance with the regime rules based on their power capabilities within the anarchical system.²³ Considering these Realist theories, it may be argued that Realists concentrate on how to increase states' willingness for compliance rather than focusing on how to increase their capacity. They define capacity as a systemic factor in terms of relative power capabilities, rather than national capacity in terms of bureaucratic and institutional capabilities. For example, hegemonic stability theory focuses on coercive capacity to impose sanctions for "inducing others to share costs".²⁴ Thus, for hegemonic stability theory and Neorealism, capacity determines which state may coerce the others to comply.

According to neoliberals, states are concerned with absolute gains rather than relative ones within the anarchic nature of the international

system, and states' compliance may be increased when they have a common interest in cooperation.²⁵ Neoliberal scholars emphasize the importance of domestic variables such as societal ideas, institutions, and the role of elites on states' compliance by shaping state preferences.²⁶ Thus, contrary to Realists, neoliberals also focus on domestic factors for determining states' willingness for compliance. Beside willingness, neoliberal scholars also consider states' national capacity to comply with the regime rules, and argue that capacity building is a necessary condition for effectiveness.²⁷ To increase states' bureaucratic and institutional capacity, they suggest creating interorganizational networks with operational organizations, transferring financial assistance, policy-relevant information and expertise.²⁸

For constructivists, states comply with the regime rules when international regimes' norms and values match with the states' norms and values.

Afghanistan has already expressed its willingness as a state to comply with the foundations of the Bonn and Tripartite Agreements for lasting peace, stability and social and economic progress in Afghanistan.

According to constructivists, state policies are shaped by shared norms and values since the anarchical system is not an objective outside reality.²⁹ Constructivists consider both willingness and capacity as essential for compliance. For willingness, they argue that states tend to adopt institutional rules as long as such rules are regarded as appropriate in light of their internalized identities, values and norms.³⁰ For capacity, constructivists criticize rationalist theories for not problematizing “the capacity of rational actors to engage in optimizing behavior”.³¹ As Chayes and Chayes state, “[q]uite apart from political will, (...), the construction of an effective domestic regulatory apparatus is not a simple or mechanical task”.³²

Afghanistan has already expressed its willingness as a state to comply with the foundations of the Bonn and Tripartite Agreements for lasting peace, stability and social and economic progress in Afghanistan, for safeguarding the right and freedom of all returnees, and to participate in the project of reconstruction, consolidation of peace, democracy and social development.³³ Thus, this article argues that it is the capacity part that may be strengthened to increase compliance, which may in turn lead to a better implementation of 4Rs activities.

While Neorealist theory considers state capacity as a systemic one determined

mainly by relative military power, neoliberal and constructivist theories pay attention to national capacity as well. However, the latter two theories differ in terms of what they consider as the means for increasing national capacity. Neoliberals, in addition to domestic factors, focus on international factors such as interorganizational networks and financial assistance, while constructivists focus on domestic factors such as ideas, norms and values within government and society. Thus, this article counters Neorealist theory by arguing that states’ national capacities do affect states’ compliance with the regime rules, especially in fragile states like Afghanistan, having concerns on their political, legal and administrative capacity. Furthermore, this article benefits from both neoliberal and constructivist theories’ insights to improve national capacity for better compliance, though they


This article benefits from constructivism to improve national capacity for compliance and argues that an increase in support among domestic actors for the activities of the international community is likely to contribute to national capacity building.

focus on different factors: the first one on international and the latter on domestic factors.

Regarding international factors, UNHCR has already initiated capacity building efforts in Afghanistan through 4Rs activities like developing networks with agencies like the World Bank (WB) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and transferring financial assistance and policy expertise, as neoliberals suggest. Thus, it may be argued that international factors for increasing

national capacity for compliance are already at stake in Afghanistan. For this reason, this article benefits from constructivism to improve national capacity for compliance and argues that an increase in support among domestic actors for the activities of the international community is likely to contribute to national capacity building. The article defines the Afghan government officials and public as domestic actors. Their support for 4Rs activities is likely to increase Afghanistan's national capacity for compliance, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Relationship between domestic factors and effectiveness of international regimes



Derived from this argument, this article seeks to examine the factors that affect the ideas, values and norms of the domestic actors to develop tentative suggestions for better effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan.³⁴ For this qualitative analysis, the data

collection requires an extraction from various sources. In this regard, the article uses analyses and field reports published by various UN agencies such as UNHCR, UNDP, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Office on

Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It also benefits from reliable surveys conducted by NGOs and research centers such as the Asia Foundation, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, and the Feinstein International Center. The Asia Foundation, as a non-profit international development organization, has been publishing annual surveys of the Afghan people since 2004 and its surveys are the longest-running and broadest nationwide survey of Afghan attitudes and opinions, gathering the opinions of more than 87,000 Afghan men and women across all 34 provinces through face-to-face interviews by a team of Afghan enumerators.³⁵ Integrity Watch Afghanistan, as an independent civil society organization, dedicates itself to understanding, analysing and acting for transparency, accountability and anti-corruption issues. It has published biannual surveys on national corruption since 2010 by conducting interviews across all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit is an independent research organization

UNHCR has already initiated capacity building efforts in Afghanistan through 4Rs activities.

based in Kabul. Its survey of assessing democracy assistance in Afghanistan collected data from 40 interviews with civil society actors, political parties, NGOs and academics in 2009. Though it provides a limited perspective of the overall picture of assistance, the survey has still valuable indicators for Afghan public opinion on the activities of the international community. Last but not least, the Feinstein International Center, a research and teaching center at Tufts University, conducted a research on the relation between aid and security in Afghanistan in five provinces and Kabul between June 2008 and February 2010, through interviewing 574 respondents including former government officials, tribal and religious leaders and community members. The article also benefits from Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) news as the humanitarian news and analysis service from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, since it provides detailed insights as a reliable field source.

Voluntary Repatriation and 4Rs Activities

The international refugee regime has evolved from temporary agencies with limited mandates to a world-wide refugee organization with a competence of mandate for all actual or potential refugees without any geographical

The international refugee regime has evolved from temporary agencies with limited mandates to a world-wide refugee organization with a competence of mandate for all actual or potential refugees without any geographical or time limitation.

or time limitation. In 1947, the International Refugee Organization was established as a temporary agency of the United Nations (UN) for just three years, since the UN members considered the refugee problem of that time as a temporary problem caused by the Second World War. When it was dissolved in 1951, as scheduled, UNHCR was then reestablished as a temporary agency with a 3 year mandate by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), with a similar belief that refugee problems have a temporary character. Finally, in 2003, the UNGA removed the time limitation and decided to “continue the Office until the refugee problem is solved”.³⁶ As the lead agency for refugees, UNHCR has two main functions derived from its Statute:³⁷ Providing international protection to refugees under the auspices of the UN; and seeking durable solutions for the refugee problem.

Durable solutions are defined as facilitating voluntary repatriation, local integration within new national communities in the country of first asylum, and through resettlement in a third country. UNHCR has promoted voluntary repatriation as a durable solution to refugees since the beginning of the 1990s. However, interestingly enough, voluntary repatriation was not regarded as a viable option when UNHCR was established in 1951. France and the U.S. even objected to its inclusion among the durable solutions as a part of UNHCR’s functions. The reason was mainly Cold War considerations, since repatriation would mean sending refugees back to their communist states.³⁸ However, since the beginning of the 1990s, states have become reluctant to provide resettlement and local integration as durable solutions to refugees. In addition to the dramatic and constant increase in the number of refugees in the 1990s due to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Balkan Wars, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the genocide in Rwanda caused protracted refugee situations.³⁹ As a response to the protracted refugee situation in the absence of asylum countries’ cooperation with UNHCR for providing resettlement and local integration options as durable solutions, UNHCR began to focus on voluntary repatriation as the most preferred solution and stated that its actions for durable solutions to refugee problems

have been oriented in a manner to enable refugee to return home in safety and dignity.⁴⁰

In addition to the dramatic and constant increase in the number of refugees in the 1990s due to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Balkan Wars, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the genocide in Rwanda caused protracted refugee situations.

Though UNHCR began to focus on voluntary repatriation as the most preferred durable solution, it also provided initiatives for the other two durable solutions. The Development through Local Integration approach (DLI) became a renewed focus on finding durable solutions for refugees in 2001. The DLI framework aims to provide for self-reliance and local integration of refugees who are unable to repatriate and who are willing to integrate locally, and to improve burden sharing for host states.⁴¹ UNHCR also initiated and coordinated the Convention Plus initiative in 2003 to find durable solutions for refugees through multilateral special agreements with cash donors, host countries and any country relevant for refugee

protection and solution.⁴² However, the dramatic shift to voluntary repatriation has caused a shift in the understanding of effectiveness of the international refugee regime, requiring increased activities by UNHCR in the countries of origin.

Since the regime mandate was mostly limited to the activities in countries of asylum, its understanding of effectiveness was also reactive. However, the promotion of voluntary repatriation in its nature contains the need for post-repatriation activities. UNHCR admits that securing the sustainability of repatriations as a durable solution “is a long-term undertaking that exceeds the mandate and resources of UNHCR”.⁴³ Thus, focusing on voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution, then High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers (2001-2005) from the Netherlands initiated a new partnership in March 2002 between UNHCR, UNDP and the WB given their clear repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction mandates.⁴⁴

Accordingly, in 2003, Lubbers introduced the concept of repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction, known as the 4Rs approach, with the aim of enhancing the sustainability of repatriation as a durable solution.⁴⁵ Its main reasoning is stated by UNHCR as the lack of a systematic planning of the process from reintegration to longer-term

reconstruction. Being overlooked in development planning, the needs of displaced populations are crucial for the sustainability of repatriations. Thus, UNHCR suggests an integrated and comprehensive approach for durable solutions operations to meet the medium and longer-term needs of the displaced population through system-wide consideration.⁴⁶ Within the framework of 4Rs activities, UNHCR, together with its implementing partners, organizes voluntary repatriation operations, provides reintegration and rehabilitation activities to ensure the sustainability of repatriations, and implements capacity building activities through the reconstruction of governance capacity. Thus, it may be argued that it basically aims to mainstream reintegration activities into national development plans and programs.⁴⁷ Here, the article benefits from neoliberalism to explain the reasoning of maintenance of reintegration activities together with capacity-building ones. As neoliberals argue, national capacity is important for states' compliance, and increasing compliance is likely to increase the effectiveness of international regimes. Neoliberals suggest that the activities of the international community for national capacity building are similar to what UNHCR and its implementing partners attempt to do through 4Rs activities.

Within the framework of 4Rs activities, UNHCR, together with its implementing partners, organizes voluntary repatriation operations, provides reintegration and rehabilitation activities to ensure the sustainability of repatriations, and implements capacity building activities through the reconstruction of governance capacity.

The first R of the 4Rs approach, Repatriation, is defined by UNHCR as “the free and voluntary return of refugees to their country of origin in safety and dignity”.⁴⁸ The second R symbolizes Reintegration, defined as the ability of refugees “to secure the necessary political, economic, legal and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity” upon their return.⁴⁹ The third R is reserved for Rehabilitation, which is defined as “the restoration of social and economic infrastructure destroyed during conflict in areas of return to enable communities to pursue sustainable livelihoods”.⁵⁰ The activities in the context of rehabilitation include “investments in shelter, potable water, schools, primary health care, agricultural activities, income generation opportunities, micro-credit

schemes, and skills training”.⁵¹ The last R indicates Reconstruction, which is defined as “the (re)establishment of political order, institutions and productive capacity to create a base for sustainable development”.⁵² It addresses medium and long term needs of a refugee producing country to prevent the recurrence of forced displacement.

In Afghanistan, UNHCR and its implementing partners began 4Rs activities in March 2002. After the beginning of mass voluntary repatriations from Iran and Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, UNHCR increased its activities in Afghanistan in terms of ensuring sustainable returnee reintegration.⁵³ Decades of conflict had destroyed Afghanistan’s infrastructure such as roads, bridges and crucial buildings including schools and hospitals. Thus, through rehabilitation, UNHCR has attempted to push economic development and reduce poverty by generating employment opportunities and by increasing access to basic services.⁵⁴ In terms of reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, UNHCR mainly aims to rebuild key governance institutions. The ultimate goal is to establish a multi-ethnic, sustainable police service committed to the rule of law, protecting the rights of citizens and maintaining civil order.⁵⁵ All these efforts, as neoliberals argue, aim to contribute to

In Afghanistan, UNHCR and its implementing partners began 4Rs activities in March 2002. After the beginning of mass voluntary repatriations from Iran and Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, UNHCR increased its activities in Afghanistan in terms of ensuring sustainable returnee reintegration.

the national capacity of Afghanistan to comply with the rules of 4Rs activities, which would in return increase the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan. One of the crucial implementing partners of UNHCR in Afghanistan’s reconstruction is UNDP, particularly on disarmament, institution building, security sector reform and rural development.⁵⁶ In Afghan reconstruction efforts, the WB and UNICEF are also essential implementing partners of UNHCR. While the WB aims to expand rural programs in the areas with high returns to create economic outputs and poverty reduction⁵⁷, UNICEF provides teaching and learning materials to instructors and students, works to increase school enrolment, and establishes community based schools, accelerated learning centres and literacy centres.⁵⁸

In Afghan reconstruction efforts, the WB and UNICEF are also essential implementing partners of UNHCR.

Afghanistan has already declared its willingness to comply with the tripartite agreements, which establish the legal rules of 4Rs activities. For explaining the reasons for their willingness for these agreements, this article benefits from neoliberalism and counter the Realist arguments. Contrary to what classical Realists argue, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan have not considered their relative gains while signing these agreements. Their willingness to cooperate has not been based on power capabilities, as Neorealists propose. For example, despite concerns on its capacity, Afghanistan has the willingness to comply with these legal accords, as expressed by Hamid Karzai, as the President of the Afghan Interim Administration and the first elected President of Afghanistan between 2004-2014.⁵⁹ According to this article, neoliberals' explanation for compliance is more relevant for the Afghan case, because Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan decided to sign these tripartite agreements and agreed to comply with them due to their common interests in cooperation. Since all of the three countries had interests in

mass repatriations of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan though with different reasons, they cooperated with voluntary repatriation operations conducted by UNHCR.

In addition to willingness, capacity is also an important asset for states' compliance with the legal rules of international regimes. Countering the Neorealist assumptions, this article argues that states primarily need to have national capacity to comply, because even when a coercive power induces a weak state to comply with the regime rules, without national capacity, this forced compliance will not be effective. Thus, as neoliberals and constructivists argue, states' national capacity need to be improved, especially in fragile states like Afghanistan, for increasing compliance, which would in return increase the effectiveness of international regimes. Since 4Rs activities already include international efforts for national capacity building in Afghanistan, the article examines in the next two parts how national capacity to comply with 4Rs activities may be increased in Afghanistan through increasing support of domestic actors for 4Rs activities.

Opinion of the Afghan Government Officials

This article argues, as do constructivists, that efforts for national capacity

In addition to willingness, capacity is also an important asset for states' compliance with the legal rules of international regimes.

building, which is required for state compliance with the regime rules, need more than material power or political will. Thus, it examines Afghan government officials on 4Rs activities as one of the domestic actors whose support is likely to strengthen the state compliance by increasing national capacity. It identifies two main factors that shape their support on 4Rs activities: the level of support and the authority to use international aid.

Though Afghan officials have been pleased with the support of the international community in reconstruction efforts and improving the security situation in Afghanistan, they are not satisfied with the level of support given to the government. Afghan leaders told the UN Security Council mission to Afghanistan that the international community has failed to provide basic services, governance and security to rural communities. In relation with the Taliban insurgency within Afghanistan, they also criticized the international community for not supporting the government enough to develop its own security forces.⁶⁰

IRIN reports that Qadam Ali Nikpai, Public Information Officer at the Afghan Upper House of Parliament, said that “our government is not even able to pay the salaries of its own employees or train enough police to maintain security, so how is it possible to tackle the problems of corruption and opium without firm support from the international community?”⁶¹ In an interview with IRIN, Barnet Rubin also stated that international actors underinvested in the security sector by funding adequately in the rebuilding of the administration and by delaying the reconstruction and development programs. According to him, such delays prevented the Afghan government from having enough capacity to implement 4Rs programs.⁶² Thus, as neoliberals argue, international factors for capacity building are important in the sense that delays in such efforts of the international community may cause national capacity defects in complying with the rules of 4Rs activities. Furthermore, it may be argued that international factors, emphasized by neoliberals, and domestic factors, stressed by constructivists, for national capacity building, have an interactive character. This is so because an inconvenience with the international efforts of capacity building may cause dissatisfaction among the government officials, which may in return have a diminishing impact on the capacity

Though Afghan officials have been pleased with the support of the international community in reconstruction efforts and improving the security situation in Afghanistan, they are not satisfied with the level of support given to the government.

building efforts through domestic factors.

In terms of the lack of authority to use international aid, Saadia Fayeq Ayubi, the Director of Reproductive Health at the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), has criticized the foreign agencies, arguing that the MoPH has only a symbolic role, with extremely low capacity. She stated that donors give money to NGOs and other implementing agencies, but the MoPH could not even monitor the projects implemented by these agencies due to its extremely low capacity.⁶³ The WB report also confirms that most of the aid for Afghanistan has been outside the government budget and directly delivered by donors. According to the WB, in 2010/11, the core budget of Afghanistan was only \$1.9 billion (12 percent) of the aid budget whereas \$13.8 billion (88 percent of the aid budget) was the

external budget, executed by donors and their implementing partners.⁶⁴ As neoliberals argue, the transfer of policy-relevant information and expertise is important for the international efforts of national capacity building. Thus, it may be argued that bypassing the Afghan government through the absence of authority to use and/or monitor international aid may limit its capacity to build public services and strengthen its governance system.

The article suggests that if the dissatisfaction of the Afghan government officials for 4Rs activities can be overcome and if the international community shared the same/similar ideas, norms and values of the Afghan government officials on the level of support and authority provided to the Afghan government agencies, Afghanistan's capacity for compliance with the rules of 4Rs activities would be likely to increase. Thus, the article tentatively suggests that UNHCR and its implementing partners should increase the level of basic services, governance and security to rural communities or, if that's not possible, should persuade the government officials on the conditions that prevent the international community from doing so. Second, the article proposes increasing government authority on aid spending and monitoring 4Rs projects under the supervision of the international community, instead of

The article tentatively suggests that UNHCR and its implementing partners should increase the level of basic services, governance and security to rural communities or, if that's not possible, should persuade the government officials on the conditions that prevent the international community from doing so.

simply bypassing the government, which is then likely to increase their support for 4Rs activities.

Afghan Public Opinion

Since this article benefits from constructivism to question how the effectiveness of 4Rs activities may be increased through strengthening national capacity for compliance, the Afghan public is regarded as a domestic actor, and persuasion of the public may be an important factor for the effectiveness of 4Rs activities. Thus, the article seeks to examine the factors that shape Afghan public opinion towards the activities of the international community. The article identifies two main domestic factors that may constitute an obstacle for successful implementation of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan: distrust in

the international community; and mismatch in ideas, values and norms of the international community with some segments of Afghan society.

Regarding the first factor, the article finds that confidence in the international community has decreased throughout the years in Afghanistan. According to surveys conducted annually by the Asian Foundation Afghanistan Office, the percentage of people who have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in international and national NGOs was stable at around 65 percent and 60 percent between 2007 and 2009.⁶⁵ However after 2010, a significant fall in confidence in NGOs was identified and in 2013, the confidence of the Afghan people towards international and national NGOs decreased to 51 percent.⁶⁶ In 2016, the confidence towards international and national NGOs was at the lowest level recorded in the 10-year history of the Asian Foundation Afghanistan Office surveys, becoming 44 and 48 percent respectively.⁶⁷

To be able to persuade the Afghan public to support 4Rs activities, the possible reasons of this distrust need to be identified. Derived from the qualitative analyses of data taken from surveys conducted in the field, such as the Police Perception Survey conducted across all 34 provinces of Afghanistan in 2010 by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion

Research for UNDP Afghanistan; the National Corruption Survey conducted across all provinces of Afghanistan in 2013 by Integrity Watch Afghanistan; the research of Antonio Donini⁶⁸ on the local perceptions of assistance to Afghanistan, which collected data through 18 focus group meetings and one-to-one interviews with close to 200 participants in 5 provinces of Afghanistan including Kabul; the Assessing Democracy Assistance Survey: Afghanistan conducted for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, an independent research organization based in Kabul in 2009; and the survey on the relationship between aid and security in Afghanistan conducted via personal interviews by the Feinstein International Center in six provinces including Kabul between June 2008 and February 2010, the article finds out two reasons: First, the belief that the international community serves its own interests when making decisions and policies rather than the interests of the Afghan people and second, Afghan people's concern on the unfair distribution of international aid between the regions.

Regarding the first reason, the UNDP-Afghanistan 2010 survey states that 44 percent of the respondents do not have a favorable view of international aid organizations and 58 percent of them report that international aid organizations do not have a strong

presence in their area.⁶⁹ A 2014 survey on Afghan perceptions and experiences of corruption, conducted by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, also states that “[o]nly 36% of respondents believed that the international community wants to fight corruption in Afghanistan. An even smaller proportion of respondents (roughly 34%) believed that the international community supported honest government officials in their province”.⁷⁰ In his research, Donini finds that the popular view on the international community is that the foreigners come to Afghanistan in order to become rich or find work because they cannot find work at home. According to his research, a minority also feels that they come with some kind of hidden religious or political agenda.⁷¹ Supporting all these findings, the research, conducted by FRIDE finds out that there is suspicion among Afghan people concerning the real agenda of

Regarding the reason for the distrust in UNHCR and its implementing partners, which is the belief about the unfair distribution of international aid, the Feinstein International Center's 2012 report finds that this critique is a widely accepted one.

international donors. According to the findings of this research, there is a widespread belief among Afghans that democracy, peace and stability are only peripheral demands and international community has rather a desire to occupy Afghanistan or exploit its natural resources.⁷²

Regarding the second reason for the distrust in UNHCR and its implementing partners, which is the belief about the unfair distribution of international aid, the Feinstein International Center's 2012 report finds that this critique is a widely accepted one. According to the report, many Afghans viewed aid projects negatively because of injustice in benefiting from the international assistance. A few officials and powerbrokers were perceived as the main beneficiaries of the international assistance at the expense of the majority of Afghans.⁷³ Supporting this finding, the research conducted by Donini also finds out that most people say that the distribution of aid is discriminative, going to those who are rich and well connected with people in power. So, aid is seen as going to those people able to occupy key links in the chain of intermediaries, not to the most needy. According to his research, many Afghans suspect that there are gatekeepers benefiting from the international aid, such as government officials who mediate transactions with the aid community and Afghan aid agency staff who

maintain the contacts with government and local authorities.⁷⁴ Thus, it may be argued that when neoliberals and constructivists' assumptions are implemented together, national capacity for compliance is likely to increase in a more effective way. As seen in the identified reasons of distrust in the international community, any weakness of international efforts for capacity building may reduce the support of public opinion for 4Rs activities. For example, any weak presence shown by the international aid organizations and/or lack of legitimizing the reasons of the activities pursued by the international community may cause distrust among the public. Thus, a problem within the international efforts may cause further problems in the domestic factors of capacity building.

Besides the lack of trust in the international community, this article identifies a second factor that shapes Afghan public opinion towards 4Rs activities: a mismatch in values and norms of some segments of Afghan society with the international community.

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identifies a second factor that shapes Afghan public opinion towards 4Rs activities: a mismatch in values and norms of some segments of Afghan society with the international community. Suhrke states that the vast majority of the Afghan population remains predominantly rural and after 25 years of war possibly even poorer and less educated than before. The Afghan rural population has historically been conservative, and has challenged the central government during previous modernization schemes.⁷⁵ Furthermore, as in many other societies, Afghan people also have the tendency to turn back to more traditional and conservative values in times of insecurity and transition, such as the environment in which the 4Rs activities have been conducted.⁷⁶ For example, some segments of Afghan society do not support education, especially for women. In an IRIN interview, Nadya, a female teacher in the south eastern province of Paktika, said that Afghanistan is a conservative society and there would be more girls at schools only when there are more female teachers.⁷⁷ Similarly, in an interview conducted by Human Rights Watch, an NGO education staff member explained that the lack of female teachers keeps especially older girls from attending school.⁷⁸ There is also a low level of awareness on the benefit of education in the public. In

Education, including investment in schools and skills training, constitutes an essential part of the rehabilitation efforts.

an IRIN interview, a female teacher in Afghanistan explained that “some families still say if their daughters study higher classes they will forget their cultural values. Many parents still prefer their daughters to learn traditional embroidery and handicrafts rather than literacy and other subjects”.⁷⁹ Confirming this observation, Mahmud Omar of Kandahar explained to a journalist the reason why he does not send his daughters to school: “School is not for girls. I don’t let them go. Girls should be at home. If they go to school, girls think that they can go anywhere, that they do not have to wear the hijab (head covering), and that they don’t have to hide their faces.”⁸⁰ Education, including investment in schools and skills training, constitutes an essential part of the rehabilitation efforts and such a negative attitude towards education may be an obstacle to successful implementation of 4Rs activities.

Another area of mismatch may be in the demobilization efforts. Not surprisingly, security is a prerequisite for the successful implementation of

every step of 4Rs activities. Thus, the development efforts of 4R activities cannot be functional in volatile regions like Afghanistan.⁸¹ That's why demobilization of small arms is crucial not only for increasing the security level of returnee and local people but also for the successful implementation of 4Rs activities. However, the lack of security over long years can create a culture of bearing arms to provide security in the absence of trust in the central government and national security forces.⁸² Similarly, the progress of a disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programme, initiated in early 2003 by the government and aimed at disbanding militia groups and helping their members reintegrate into society, was very slow.⁸³ The main reason for this was again the feeling of insecurity, as a commander of the officially disbanded CIP Qaliazal militia told IRIN, "if we hand over weapons now, the Taliban will come and kill us all".⁸⁴

Thus, the international efforts of capacity building through education and demobilization may not be successfully implemented, especially in rural and insecure parts of Afghanistan. This situation seems to support the constructivists' priority of the need for the internalization of identities, values and norms of institutional rules by the public to increase the people's support for the activities of the international community. Without

taking into consideration the domestic actors' identities, values and norms, international efforts are likely to remain ineffective as in these examples of education and demobilization.

For the confidence problem, this article provides two tentative suggestions to shape the ideas, values and norms of the Afghan public. First, information campaigns may be helpful to persuade them on the neutrality of aid agencies for the Afghan people by informing them about the difference between the UN and coalition forces, on the civilian nature of their officials, and on the humanitarian aims of international NGOs. It may be also equally important to inform people about the difficult nature of humanitarian aid and development work in Afghanistan, which would in turn likely help increase trust in the international community. Second, as Giorgio Trombatore, International Medical Corps' Former Country Director in Afghanistan, also recommends, the involvement of the local community in the process of humanitarian work may help to avoid any potential misunderstandings or misbeliefs about what is being done.⁸⁵

For the problem of mismatch in values and norms, the article has three tentative suggestions. First, to persuade the Afghan public about the priority of education for national capacity building, information campaigns and the involvement of religious leaders

Information campaigns may be helpful to persuade on the neutrality of aid agencies for the Afghan people by informing them about the difference between the UN and coalition forces, on the civilian nature of their officials, and on the humanitarian aims of international NGOs.

and tribal elders in such campaigns as key advocates may increase the level of awareness on the importance of education among the Afghan public. Second, conducting trust-building activities in Afghanistan such as locating schools closer to home and increasing the numbers of female teachers in schools may increase girls' enrolment in schools by building trust among parents. Such trust-building activities may persuade conservative parents to allow their daughters to attend the schools, which would then contribute to the international efforts of national capacity development through 4Rs activities. Third, to persuade the owners of small guns for demobilization in Afghanistan, the participants of the Bonn Agreement may request the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishing and training of new Afghan security and

armed forces,⁸⁶ which may decrease the feeling of insecurity among the Afghan public.

Conclusion

Afghanistan has experienced the largest voluntary repatriation operation in UNHCR's history and over 5.8 million refugees have repatriated to Afghanistan since 2002. Accordingly, UNHCR, together with its implementing partners, has conducted 4Rs activities in this refugee producing country to make the repatriations sustainable through national capacity building efforts. The literature on UNHCR's activities in refugee producing countries mainly focuses on whether UNHCR should be involved in such activities. Thus, this article aims to contribute to the literature by instead questioning how the effectiveness of 4Rs activities under the international refugee regime may be increased in Afghanistan. It admits that states' compliance is important for the effectiveness of international regimes and that compliance has two dimensions: willingness and capacity. Since Afghanistan as a state declared and bound by compliance through the Bonn and Tripartite Agreements, this article focuses on the capacity dimension of compliance. Supporting the neoliberal and constructivist theories, the article also admits that

national capacity building is required for fragile states like Afghanistan to increase compliance. The article benefits from constructivism together with neoliberalism on the need to increase national capacity and argues that alongside international factors, domestic factors such as support among government officials and public opinion for the activities of the international community are likely to contribute to national capacity building, which can then increase the compliance for 4Rs activities.

Applying this argument to the case of Afghanistan, the article attempts to identify the factors that shape the opinions of Afghan government officials and public and provides

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tentative suggestions for strengthening Afghanistan's compliance with the rules of 4Rs activities by increasing national capacity. In this research, the article reaches three theoretical findings. First, what UNHCR aims to accomplish through 4Rs activities may be explained by neoliberal assumptions. Neoliberals, in addition to domestic factors, also focus on international factors such as interorganizational networks and financial assistance to increase national capacity for better compliance and better effectiveness. Similarly, UNHCR has developed networks with agencies like the WB and UNDP, and transferred financial assistance and policy expertise, as neoliberals suggest.

Second, the willingness to sign and to be bound by the tripartite agreements signed between UNHCR, Afghanistan and Iran or Pakistan may also be explained by neoliberal arguments about willingness. As neoliberals argue, common interests in cooperation lead the willingness to comply with the tripartite agreements.

Last, the article finds that the international and domestic factors for national capacity building have an interactive character and go hand-in-hand. As seen in the dissatisfaction of the Afghan government officials for the level of support and authority provided by the international community to the

government agencies, an inconvenience experienced with the international efforts of capacity building may cause dissatisfaction among the domestic actors, which may in turn have a diminishing impact on the capacity building efforts through domestic factors. Thus, when neoliberals and constructivists' assumptions are implemented together, national capacity for compliance is likely to increase in a more effective way. Without taking into consideration the domestic actors' identities, values and norms, international efforts are likely to remain ineffective, as shown here in the examples of education and demobilization.

The article provides tentative suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan through increasing the support of domestic actors. For increasing the support of Afghan government officials for the 4Rs activities, the article suggests that the international community increase the

level of basic services, governance and security to rural communities, and the level of governmental authority on aid spending and monitoring aid projects. If this is not applicable, UNHCR and its implementing partners may persuade the government officials through legitimization on the reasons of failure to increase the level of basic services and governmental authority. To increase support among the Afghan public, the article tentatively suggests information campaigns on the neutrality of aid agencies, involvement of the local community in the process of humanitarian work, and trust-building activities.

The article provides tentative suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of 4Rs activities in Afghanistan through increasing the support of domestic actors.

Endnotes

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Rehabilitation and Expansion of Iran's Oil Sector in the Post-Nuclear Deal Era: Programs, Problems and Uncertainties*

Sujata ASHWARYA**

Abstract

In the post-nuclear deal scenario, Iran has reformulated the terms of the oil contract model, called the Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC), to attract international investments and technology in field development. In addition, it has ramped up production and competitively priced its oil to Asia and Europe so as to recapture the market share lost during the sanctions period. Any further enhancement of production capacity, however, requires expansion of green fields and resuscitation of brown fields under the IPC. The success of this effort will depend upon Iran's domestic political stability as much as the international environment, where sanctions are held in abeyance and oil prices continue to rise to a level that unlocks the investment capital of the big oil companies. Nonetheless, in a scenario of increasing global commitment to adopt green energy, whether oil companies would still want to make long-term investments in large hydrocarbon projects in general, remains an open question.

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Key Words

Iranian Nuclear Deal, International Sanctions, Post-Sanctions Dynamics, Iranian Oil Sector, Foreign Investment Scenario, Iran Petroleum Contract, Changing Global Energy.

Introduction

With an estimated 158 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves, representing almost 10 % of the world's crude oil reserves, Iran's return to the global energy scene in the post-nuclear deal era is a big prize for oil companies and an event with long-term consequences for the global energy market. On 14 July 2015, the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany), the European Union (EU), and Iran concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the nuclear deal, to ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be entirely peaceful. Under the JCPOA, Iran accepted curbs on its nuclear program in return for broad relief from international sanctions

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against its energy sector. Amidst the plethora of sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic, an important distinction between the multilateral sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and unilateral sanctions imposed primarily by the US and the EU is immediately discernable. While the UNSC sanction resolutions targeted individuals and organizations associated with Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile programs, sanctions levied by the US and the EU tightened restrictions on Iran's critical oil industry.

Energy-related sanctions emanating from US laws and executive orders placed prohibitions on a third-country (other than the US and Iran) that do business with Iran. Known as secondary sanctions for their 'extra-territorial' effect, these restricted the scope of financial transactions, international

investments, and technology transfer vis-à-vis Iran's petroleum industry. Several provisions of the other energy-related sanctions made the export of Iranian oil difficult by placing restrictions on how much a country could import and how payment for such an import could be made.

One of the earliest energy-related sanctions on Iran was the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, now known as the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). It authorized sanctions on US and non-US businesses investing more than US\$ 20 million a year in Iran's energy projects. Once the contentions over the Iranian nuclear program intensified, the US administration imposed several new secondary sanctions that have had a severe impact on Iran's energy sector. For instance, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), 2010, along with reaffirming the provision of the ISA, expanded the definition of investment to include pipelines to or through Iran as well as contracts that would lead to the construction, upgrading or expansion of energy projects.

An important Congressional measure aimed at restricting Iran's oil sales, which account for 80 % of the country's income, was Section 1245 of the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA), 2012. It authorized

sanctions, such as denial of access to the US financial markets, on foreign banks that conduct oil-related transactions with the Central Bank of Iran, Bank Markazi.¹

One of the earliest energy-related sanctions on Iran was the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, now known as the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). It authorized sanctions on US and non-US businesses investing more than US\$ 20 million a year in Iran's energy projects.

The NDAA, 2013, included provisions that forced countries buying Iranian crude to use only the banks within their own borders to make payments. With this regulation, the consumers' banks were debarred from transferring that money to any bank overseas- in effect, compelling Tehran to buy local products, except precious metals, with the local currency from its crude sales.

Besides the above key legislations, sanctions on Iran were also imposed through executive orders. Executive Order 13608 of 1 May 2012 made violation of US economic sanctions against Iran or Syria a basis for the imposition of a range of sanctions, short of an asset freeze. In addition,

Executive Order 13622 of 30 July 2012, replicated the banking sanctions available under the NDAA to cover a bank's transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or its subsidiaries. Further, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA), enacted on 10 August 2012, forbids underwriting and insurance services for entities owned or controlled by the government of Iran.²

Pursuant to the European Council report on Iran's nuclear programme, in January 2012, the EU outlawed the import of Iranian crude into its zone. A measure that had an extraterritorial impact was the EU's ban on insurance and reinsurance to oil shipments from Iran. It was intended to deter a third country from importing Iranian oil.³ A new set of sanctions in October 2012 prohibited all transactions between European and Iranian banks, hampering the Islamic Republic's oil transactions in Euros. Having already locked Iran out of transactions in dollars, this move was meant to make it more difficult for the Persian Gulf country to receive payments for its oil sales.

At the conclusion of the JCPOA, secondary sanctions imposed on Iran in the context of the nuclear dispute were suspended. The deal also included the waiver and eventual repeal of most sanctions imposed under the ISA. On 16 January 2016, the IAEA certified

that Iran was compliant with all the nuclear-related obligations agreed in the JCPOA, giving a legal bearing to sanctions relief and providing a much-needed lifeline for the recovery of Iran's oil sector. However, most primary sanctions related to the US domestic trade embargo are still effective. US companies and banks are barred from any operation in Iran or with an Iranian entity in any other country.

With most energy-related sanctions under suspension in the post-deal scenario, Iranian authorities have developed a three-pronged program to rebuild and revive Iran's oil production and export potential. These include:

1. Identifying and prioritizing oilfields requiring recovery and development in order to increase production capacity.
2. Reformulating the oil contract model to attract foreign investment, technology, and expertise. For this, the Iranian government approved the new, investor-friendly Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC) to replace the buyback contracts.
3. Regaining global market share in crude oil export lost due to sanctions so as to maximize sales and revenue.

This paper argues that Iran's oil industry cannot reach its full potential without foreign investment and, more

significantly, Western technological expertise, to recover its production capacity. In this situation, the removal of energy-related sanctions has improved the investment climate in Iran and raised investors' confidence. Further, the IPC provides a well-founded opening for Western oil companies to establish business in the Iranian oil industry and can be considered the first step towards the creation of conditions favorable to international investment. Such investments will further depend on Iran's internal challenges to attract investment. Equally, the continued existence of primary American sanctions will have a bearing on oil trade, transfer of technology and smooth operation of the foreign banks. Above all, investment will depend on how oil prices shape up in the near future.

This paper argues that Iran's oil industry cannot reach its full potential without foreign investment and, more significantly, Western technological expertise, to recover its production capacity.

Iran's long-term ability to defend its market share will also be contingent on investment in new capacities that

is not only subject to the appeal of the magnitude of the resource, but also the complex dynamics arising out of national and international politics. With tougher constraints on carbon emissions, Iran, among other oil producers, would face the impact of the global efforts to move away from fossil fuels to renewable energy.

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Identification and Prioritization of Oilfields for Development/Recovery

With an experience of more than a century in oil exploration and production, Iran's oilfields are in various stages of development. There are 102 oilfields and 205 oil reservoirs,⁴ of which at least 15 are supergiant fields, containing more than 10 billion barrels of oil.⁵ Several brown fields in Iran,

producing for more than 50 years, have reached a production plateau or moved to a phase of declining production and, therefore, require advanced technical procedures such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR) for revival.

Given the local companies' lack of financing capacity and limited access to the best technology of the international oil companies (IOCs), mature fields have suffered a high natural decline rate of 8-13 % and low recovery rate of around 20-30 %.⁶ In addition, fields discovered in the past 20 years, or earlier, have not been developed or only partially developed, primarily for the same reasons. Both brown and green fields, if restored or developed to their best capacities, can substantially add to Iran's production volumes in the coming years.

Iran also has cross-border or shared oilfields in both the brown and green field categories, whose reservoirs cross national boundaries. It shares at least 15 such onshore or offshore oilfields with Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia (Tables 1a and 1b). According to the Managing Director of the NIOC, Ali Kardor, the Iranian oil industry requires a US\$ 100 billion investment in the upstream sector during the period of the sixth five-year development plan (2016-2021) for optimal productivity in the coming years.⁷

Iran's Ministry of Petroleum has drawn up a list of upstream oil projects, central to its efforts to boost the country's oil production in the days ahead. The website of the NIOC⁸ identifies 30 oilfields for development under the IPC framework, while the website of the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) lists 28 oilfields.⁹ There is also a discrepancy in the names of the fields: Some fields included by the NIOC do not appear on the MEES' list and vice-versa. Further, the list of MEES is more specific about the phases of the field proposed for development. This work considers both the lists for data as represented in Tables 1a and 1b.

The selected oilfields will be made available through the tendering process under the IPC. Indicating that not every foreign company active in the oil industry can participate in Iranian oil tenders, the NIOC in early January 2017 released a list of 29 foreign firms that pre-qualified to participate in the upcoming first bidding round for 11 oil and gas contracts.¹⁰ According to the NIOC, shared fields and brown fields in need of EOR, are priorities in the oil sector rehabilitation program.¹¹

Iran has lagged behind in the development of shared oil fields as compared to its neighbours, raising the fear of resource depletion. Experts say if one side "continues to develop the

border-straddling resources at a slower pace than its neighbors...it risks losing significant reserves, as the remaining oil and gas in a reservoir naturally move towards the more exploited side."¹² For instance, Iran shares a large number of oilfields with Iraq given the long border between the two neighbors. Iraq has made great strides in the development of shared fields that now account for 50 % of its production increase over the past seven years.¹³ Iranian officials have spoken of plans to increase production at the country's shared fields with Iraq to as high as 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) by March 2019 from the average 225,000 bpd output in July 2016.¹⁴ That goal requires an inflow of capital and advanced oil field technology envisaged under the new contract model.

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A Government Accountability Office Report of the US government sums up the state of Iran's oilfields and their requirements as such:

Table 1a: List of Green Fields Identified for Development under the IPC

Cross-border Fields			Exclusive Fields		
<i>Name of the Field</i>	<i>Offshore/ Onshore</i>	<i>Year of the first production</i>	<i>Name of the Field</i>	<i>Offshore/ Onshore</i>	<i>Year of the first production</i>
Arash (shared with Kuwait)	Offshore	Yet to begin	Band-e-Karkheh	Onshore	Yet to begin
South Pars Oil layer Ph 1 (shared with Qatar)	Offshore	Yet to begin	Jofayr	Onshore	Yet to begin
Esfandiar Ph 1 (shared with Saudi Arabia)	Offshore	Yet to begin	Sepehr	Onshore	Yet to begin
Changuleh (shared with Iraq)	Onshore	Yet to begin	Susangerd	Onshore	Yet to begin
North Azadegan Ph2 (shared with Iraq)	Onshore	Yet to begin	Zagheh	Onshore	Yet to begin
South Azadegan Ph1 (shared with Iraq)	Onshore	2008	Sumar	Onshore	2012
Arvand (shared with Iraq)	Onshore	Yet to begin	Darquain Ph 3	Onshore	2002
Sohrab (shared with Iraq)	Offshore	2012	---	---	---
Yadavaran Ph2 (shared with Iraq)	Onshore	Yet to begin	---	---	---
Aban Ph2 (shared with Iraq)	Onshore	2010	---	---	---

Source: NIOC at <http://en.nioc.ir/>; *Foundation for Defence of Democracies* (Washington, D.C.), at <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/map/> (last visited 8 September 2016).

Iran particularly needs technological assistance to increase the level of oil production in fields where oil

reserves have declined over time ...Iran requires increasingly modern and advanced oil recovery technologies in order

Table 1b: List of Brown Fields Identified for Development under the IPC

Cross-border Fields			Exclusive Fields		
<i>Name of the Field</i>	<i>Offshore/ Onshore</i>	<i>Year of the first production</i>	<i>Name of the Field</i>	<i>Offshore/ Onshore</i>	<i>Year of the first production</i>
Dehloran Ph 2 (shared with Iraq)	Onshore	1978	Danan Ph 2	Onshore	1993
Foroozan (shared with Saudi Arabia)	Offshore	1974	Mansuri Ph2	Onshore	1974
Naft Shahr (shared with Iraq)	Onshore	1947	Ahvaz	Onshore	1961
West Paydar (shared with Iraq)	Onshore	1995	Abuzar	Offshore	1976
Salman (shared with UAE)	Offshore	1968	Chashmeh Khosh	Onshore	1977
---	---	---	Dalpari	Onshore	1999
---	---	---	Reshadat	Offshore	1968
---	---	---	Doroud	Offshore	1965
---	---	---	Norouz	Offshore	1967
---	---	---	Paydar	Onshore	Unknown
---	---	---	Ab-Teymur	Onshore	1967
---	---	---	Soroosh	Offshore	Unknown
---	---	---	Resalat	Offshore	1968

Source: NIOC, <http://en.nioc.ir/>; *Foundation for Defence of Democracies* (Washington, D.C.) at <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/map/> (last visited 8 September 2016).

to stop natural declines of oil production but has found advanced technology difficult to import due to international sanctions and high costs. As a

result, Iran depends upon older methods to maintain oil recovery from its mature oil fields, such as injecting massive quantities of natural gas into oil reservoirs...

Due to lack of investment, the natural decline of oil reserves and other factors [sanctions, for instance], Iran has been unable to continue producing oil at its peak level of over 5 million barrels per day since 1978.¹⁵

Iran Petroleum Contract

The IPC outlines the basic structure of all future petroleum contracts in Iran, replacing the 'buyback model' introduced in the 1990s. The latter was so unpopular with the IOCs that it dissuaded them from the Iranian market even before US and EU sanctions firmed up in 2012. A comparison between the general terms and conditions of the buyback contracts and the IPC reveal the vastly improved terms and conditions of the new model.

Operator and Operation of the Field

The buyback model was a short-term service contract concluded between the NIOC or its subsidiary and an IOC or foreign investor. As the operator of the field, the IOC invested capital and expertise during the exploration and development phases of the project, but at the onset of commercial production or after the completion of an agreed 'scope of work', the field went back to the Iranian partner.¹⁶ In many instances, the NIOC could not provide

minimum standards for field operation and decline set in rather quickly.

On the contrary, the IPC requires the establishment of a joint venture company (JVC) between one or more IOCs and an Iranian entity, where the latter would hold majority stakes.¹⁷ The NIOC has pre-qualified ten Iranian entities who can serve as joint venture partners.¹⁸ The joint venture, as the contractor under the IPC, is not only involved in exploration and development but also the production phases of a project. This modification "aims to rectify issues with field decline rates by including the IOC in the production and recovery phases while optimizing technology and knowledge transfers"¹⁹ in order to develop "fully functional stand-alone entities that can operate fields both domestically and internationally."²⁰

Capital Cost Recovery, Term of Contract and Remuneration

The buyback contract usually set out a ceiling on the capital cost that could be recovered by the foreign investor based on that estimated before the development of the project. There was little flexibility to deal with unanticipated costs, such as those caused by force majeure events or events beyond the control of the foreign investor.²¹

The buyback contract usually set out a ceiling on the capital cost that could be recovered by the foreign investor based on that estimated before the development of the project.

In addition, the term of the contract for both the development phase (2-4 years) and the production phase (5-10 years) was very short, placing a potential limitation on full cost recovery. There was also no provision to allow recovery of costs after the end of the contract term.

Further, the investor could only partake up to a maximum of 50 % of the revenue generated from production to recover its capital costs and receive the remuneration fee. In some contracts, the NIOC adjusted the remuneration fee downwards, if the production from the field dropped rapidly or did not match the estimated production mentioned in the master plan.

In contrast, the IPC does not fix a ceiling on cost recovery. Instead, it will be structured through the “annual work program and budget” approved by a joint venture development committee (JDC) made up of representatives from the partner companies. This is a critical change, as the fixed cost recovery model

“meant that cost for projects going above budget couldn’t be recovered, thus eroding profitability.”²²

The contract term under the IPC will be significantly longer. These terms are expected to be as follows: (i) an exploration and appraisal period (four years with a potential two-year extension) and (ii) a development and production period (20 years plus a likely five-year extension for EOR).²³ By allowing the contracts to last for 20-25 years, the IPC will present foreign firms with greater certainty and increase the prospect for cost recovery, accompanied by an assured return on investment. Capital costs incurred prior to production are amortized over a period of five to seven years from the date of the first production.

As with the buyback contract, the contractor is only entitled to a maximum of 50 percent of revenues generated from total production to recover costs. The remuneration fee would be a fee per barrel of oil produced, which in turn will depend on the applicable ‘R factor’ (the ratio of cumulative revenue to cumulative costs) and production rates. The remuneration fee can be adjusted based on the market price that may be the average annual export oil price from Iran.²⁴ In other words, the investors would be entitled to larger profits in case of oil price rises. The remuneration fee will also be linked

As with the buyback contract, the contractor is only entitled to a maximum of 50 percent of revenues generated from total production to recover costs. The remuneration fee would be a fee per barrel of oil produced, which in turn will depend on the applicable 'R factor' (the ratio of cumulative revenue to cumulative costs) and production rates.

to the complexity of each field. For example, EOR projects and brown field development will be rewarded with a higher rate of remuneration as compared to reservoirs with relatively simple geology and less arduous operating conditions.²⁵

Local Content Requirement and Transfer of Technology

In the IPC, the foreign investor is "obliged to maximize the utilization of the technical, engineering, manufacturing, industrial and operational capabilities of the country" in accordance with the 'Maximization Law' of 2012.²⁶ The said law requires that at least 51 % of the value of the contract, excluding the value of any immovable property, must be allocated

to the works performed by domestic manufacturers inside Iran.²⁷

Local content requirements, increasingly a common feature of oil and gas regimes in the region, were a part of the buyback contract and are retained in the IPC. Although local content requirements range from 51 to 90 %, it is likely that the local content figure would more frequently be on the higher side, given the NIOC's requirements that IOCs deploy the latest field development technology.²⁸ However, given the fact that modern E&P [exploration and production] companies employ copyrighted technology, it is unclear how technology transfer will actually take place in practice.²⁹

Resolution of Disputes

Any dispute arising under the IPC will be "resolved by an escalation dispute resolution clause which provides for arbitration as the final resolution method (which was also the case under the buyback structure)."³⁰ The parties select by mutual agreement an arbitral institution with a seat in Iran and applying Iranian law. It could either be the Arbitration Centre of the Iran Chamber of Commerce or the Tehran Regional Arbitration Centre.³¹ Many IOCs may not feel comfortable with arbitration inside Iran and perhaps prefer international arbitration.

Types of Contracts

Three basic types of contracts are envisaged in the IPC: i) a contract involving exploration, development, and production or Exploration Terms; ii) a contract to develop existing fields or Development Terms; and iii) a contract for improved oil recovery at existing fields or Enhanced Oil Recovery Terms.³² Given Iran's desire to increase production rapidly, the NIOC is more focused on deals based on Development Terms and EOR Terms. This approach is also advantageous for the IOCs, as securing investment for exploration deals in the contemporary low oil price environment can be daunting.³³

IOCs' Interest in Oilfields under the IPC

Several IOCs have signed agreements with the NIOC to conduct field studies in advance, and have an edge in the bidding process. By November 2016, Iran had signed nine confidentiality agreements with France's Total, Indonesia's Pertamina, Russia's Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, Zarubezhneft and Tatneft, Austria's OMV, Germany's Wintershall, Poland's Polish Oil & Gas Company (PGNiG), and Norway's DNO ASA. The agreements grant access to confidential material and information about the fields to the

A majority of the oilfields picked up for the study were the NIOC's priority fields, that is, those shared fields with Iraq, including South Azadegan (Total), Changuleh (DNO ASA and Gazprom), Dehloran (Tatneft), and West Paydar and Aban (Zarubezhneft).

companies, who, in turn, are obliged to present the results to the NIOC. A majority of the oilfields picked up for the study were the NIOC's priority fields, that is, those shared fields with Iraq, including South Azadegan (Total), Changuleh (DNO ASA and Gazprom), Dehloran (Tatneft), and West Paydar and Aban (Zarubezhneft).

Restoring the Market Share

Since the lifting of sanctions on Iran in January 2016, Iran has been aiming to boost production and recover buyers lost to Saudi Arabia and Russia after the US and EU tightened sanctions on oil sales in 2012. Iran has been aiming to increase the volume of its crude oil production to its pre-sanctions level of 3.74 million bpd, and escalate it above 4 million bpd to boost exports.

According to the monthly reports of the International Energy Agency (IEA)

Since the lifting of sanctions on Iran in January 2016, Iran has been aiming to boost production and recover buyers lost to Saudi Arabia and Russia after the US and EU tightened sanctions on oil sales in 2012.

and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Iran was able to ramp up production to 3.56 million bpd in May 2016- a rate last reached in November 2011 (Table 2), before the sanctions were tightened.³⁴ Since then, Iran's crude oil production steadily rose to 3.69 million bpd in October 2016, exceeding the pre-sanctions level (Tables 2 & 3). On the export front, sales that dropped from about 2.10 million bpd in 2011 to almost 1.22 million bpd in 2013, soared to 2.3 million bpd by April 2016, led by strong gains in Asia and Europe.³⁵

From January 2016, when sanctions were lifted, to May 2016, Iran's crude oil exports steadily rose from 1.5 million bpd to 2.6 million bpd, almost tripling from November 2015 (Table 4). Notably, the September exports of 2.8 million bpd were the most since mid-2011.³⁶ The additional supplies from Iran balanced supply disruptions from

the fire in Canada's oil sands, a series of attacks on Nigerian oil facilities, power outages and inclement weather in the Basra Gulf (Iraq), sabotage along the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, and political unrest in Libya in the first half of 2016. Disruptions tied to political disputes or conflicts accounted for nearly 90 percent of unplanned disruptions for the first five months in 2016,³⁷ while unplanned global oil supply disruptions averaged more than 3.6 million bpd in May 2016 alone.³⁸

Table 2: Iran's Crude Oil Production and Export (2011-2016) (million bpd)

Year	Production	Export
2011	3.58	2.54
2012	3.74	2.10
2013	3.58	1.22
2014	3.12	1.11
2015	3.15	1.08
2016 (May)	3.56*	2.3**

Source: OPEC Statistical Bulletin, 2015;

* OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report, August 2016

** "Iran's May Oil Exports Set to Surge Nearly 60 Percent from A Year Ago: Source", Reuters, 18 May 2016.

Table 3: Iran's Crude Oil Production (June-October 2016) (million bpd)

Month (2016)	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct
Production	3.62	3.62	3.65	3.66	3.69

Source: OPEC Monthly Oil Market Reports, August 2016, September 2016, October 2016, and November 2016.

Table 4: Iran's Crude Oil Exports (November 2015-May 2016) (million bpd)

Month	Nov 2015	Dec 2015	Jan 2016	Feb 2016	Mar 2016	Apr 2016	May 2016
Export	0.9	1.1	1.5	1.5	1.9	2.3	2.6

Source: "Iran's Oil Exports have Tripled Since Late 2015", CNN Money, 16 July 2016.

Iran's export strategy to recapture the lost market share has been two-pronged: First, Tehran targeted traditional and voracious energy consumers in Asia, where sales agreements are already in place; and, secondly, it introduced aggressive pricing vis-à-vis other crudes in the market to lock in buyers.

Exports to Asia

Iran's export to China, India, Japan and South Korea went up by a huge margin from January 2016. Overall exports to Asia were 1.7 million bpd out of the total of 2.3 million bpd in April 2016, which was about a third higher than a year before and the highest since

2011.³⁹ The four major buyers in Asia bought 61.1 percent more oil in July 2016, in what was a whopping year-on-year increase, and marked the biggest percentage gain since April 2014. Between January-July 2016, the four

Iran's export to China, India, Japan and South Korea went up by a huge margin from January 2016. Overall exports to Asia were 1.7 million bpd out of the total of 2.3 million bpd in April 2016, which was about a third higher than a year before and the highest since 2011.

Asian consumers bought 33.2 percent more oil than during the same period in 2015.⁴⁰ Iran continued to gain, as export to four major buyers in Asia more than doubled from a year earlier in October 2016. The two largest buyers, India and China, bought nearly 800,000 bpd each. On the whole, the big four in Asia imported 1.99 million bpd in the same month, up 147.9 % year-on-year.⁴¹

Iran's biggest customer, China, imported nearly 840,000 bpd in April 2016 and 619,300 bpd in May.⁴² However, the January-July 2016 period recorded an average import of 595,518 bpd, a year-on-year increase of 1.4 percent, underscoring the fact that China had continued to buy crude from Iran despite the sanctions.⁴³ China's purchase from Iran surged to 773,860 bpd in October 2016, a year-on-year increase of 128.8 %.⁴⁴ During the signing of a long-term MoU on oil cooperation in Tehran in May 2016, Deputy Administrator of China's National Energy Administration Zhang Yuqing emphasized his country's willingness to purchase 50 percent of Iran's oil exports.⁴⁵

Iran's exports to India climbed from 190,000 bpd in January 2016 to 506,000 bpd in March of the same year, overtaking Nigeria as the third-largest oil exporter to the country. India's state-owned and private refiners together

agreed to buy at least 400,000 bpd of Iranian oil starting the fiscal year that began on 1 April 2016, which brought the Iranian overseas sales above its short-term target.⁴⁶ India shipped in 523,100 bpd of Iranian oil in July 2016, nearly 143 % more than the 215,400 bpd imported a year before. For the first seven months of 2016, India imported about 368,300 bpd of oil from Iran, up 71 % from the same period the previous year.⁴⁷ Iran overtook its regional rival Saudi Arabia in oil supply to India, exporting over 789,000 bpd in October 2016 surpassing the Saudi supply of 697,000 bpd. However, over the January-October period, Saudi Arabia remained India's overall top supplier, Iraq was second and Iran came in third.⁴⁸

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Similarly, oil exports to Japan surged by 32.1 % in October 2016, as compared year-on-year to October 2015. The first ten months of 2016 saw Japan take in 224,166 bpd of oil which accounted for a 31.8 % rise over 170,093 bpd in the

same time period in 2015. Iran became Japan's fourth largest oil supplier, behind Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. As the fifth-largest crude oil importer from Iran, South Korean oil imports registered a 124.8 % year-on-year jump between January-October 2016, as compared to the same period in 2015, touching 278,882 bpd from a mere 124,036 bpd. If Korea's October 2016 import is compared to the same month in 2015, oil intake from Iran increased by 73.2 %.⁴⁹

Competitive Pricing

Determined to regain its market share, Iran priced its crude competitively in relation to Saudi and other crudes, especially for the European markets. Tehran had been unable to sell crude to the European region when the EU imposed sanctions over its nuclear program in July 2012, completely depriving it of a market that accounted for one-third of its exports, and making it dependent on limited shipment to Asian buyers. However, while the Asian buyers retained their right to buy Iranian oil, they progressively reduced their purchases to avoid US third-party sanctions and the difficulties in oil trade due to EU sanctions on insuring tankers carrying Iranian oil. Therefore, competition for market share with rival suppliers has been less intense in Asia,

which retained the right to purchase Iranian oil during the period covered by sanctions.

Iran resumed its crude exports to the EU in February 2016 after a four-year (since mid- 2012) hiatus, amidst intense competition from Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq- the traditional suppliers- not counting the US, which started exporting crude in 2015.⁵⁰ In the initial months of the lifting of sanctions, issues related to insurance and banking compounded problems for Iranian oil shipment. International shipping companies found it difficult to secure insurance and reinsurance cover to transport oil from Iran due mainly to some US financial restrictions on Tehran that continued to forbid any trade in dollars or the involvement of US firms, including banks and reinsurers.⁵¹ International shipping of Iranian oil resumed when the International Group of Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club- which represents the world's top 13 ship insurers- raised the reinsurance cover from US\$ 80 million to US\$ 580 million per tanker as 'fallback' protection for the missing US reinsurance cover.⁵²

Again, the prohibition on US banks and financial institutions from providing "credit, deposit, collection, clearing, and payment services" to Iranian entities⁵³ has been a major obstacle to oil trade since sanctions were lifted. Nonetheless, the NIOC's willingness to accept barter

deals such as swap exports of crude oil for imports of refined fuel, along with some transactions in Euros and other currencies eased the situation on the payment front.⁵⁴ The continuous rise in Iran's sale of oil since January 2016 suggests that the country managed to overcome the tanker shortage that threatened to derail attempts to recapture the market.⁵⁵

Iran moved swiftly to reclaim its European customers, securing new sales agreements with big international oil traders such as Swiss-based Vitol and Glencore, besides energy majors, such as Repsol of Spain.⁵⁶ Between January-March, 2016, Tehran sold 14 million barrels of crude oil to European countries. France's Total bought 11 million barrels, while Spain's Cepsa and Russia's Litasco purchased 2 million and 1 million barrels of crude oil respectively.⁵⁷ Growing imports into the Netherlands, France, Turkey, Spain, and Greece showed the arrival of

Between January-March, 2016, Tehran sold 14 million barrels of crude oil to European countries. France's Total bought 11 million barrels, while Spain's Cepsa and Russia's Litasco purchased 2 million and 1 million barrels of crude oil respectively.

Iranian crude grades into the European market. These countries imported about 330,000 bpd in April, 355,000 bpd in May, and close to 450,000 bpd in June 2016- steadily approaching the 800,000 bpd volume of pre-2012.⁵⁸

Iran's NIOC offered deep cuts on oil prices for the European and Asian regions, as compared to other crudes in the battle to corner the largest market share. In one of the deepest cuts, Iranian officials announced that Iran Heavy, one of the country's main export grades, would cost US\$ 1.25 a barrel less than Saudi Arabia's most similar crude in March 2016 for the European region. With Iran's heavy crude selling at US\$ 5.15 a barrel, Saudi comparable Arab Medium grade sold at US\$ 6.40 a barrel. In Asia, the NIOC's offer at US\$ 2.60 a barrel below the average of Oman and Dubai grades for March in the same year set the crude at a discount of 20 cents a barrel to comparable Arab Medium from Saudi Arabia.⁵⁹

By September 2016, Iran had regained its pre-sanctions market share in Europe and Asia, signifying the return of the Iranian economy into the global market.⁶⁰ In a noteworthy development, while OPEC members at the Vienna meeting on 30 November 2016, agreed to drop oil production to shore up falling prices, Iran negotiated an exemption citing losses during sanctions. According to the Vienna Agreement, Tehran's reference

production quota- the base against which production cuts are measured- has been set at just below 4 million bpd, which is effectively the pre-sanctions level.

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Iran will try to defend market share and increase output, as oil prices gain on cuts. However, the Islamic Republic may have reached its production limits, and to boost capacity after producing 3.7 million bpd will require investment in oil field development- a process requiring drilling and reservoir rehabilitation.⁶¹

Problems Facing Foreign Investment in the Iranian Oil Sector

Iran's ability to attract foreign investment in the oil sector will depend on a host of external and internal factors. US restrictions on trade with Iran, together with sanctions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG), pose several difficulties for international

firms to operate comfortably in the Iranian energy market. The Islamic Republic's internal drawbacks relate to the lack of a regulatory framework for commercial transactions, bureaucratic difficulties, corruption risk, and issues with the IPC's terms.

US Domestic Trade Restrictions

US companies and financial institutions "continue to be broadly prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings with Iran or its government."⁶² Although secondary sanctions have been suspended, European banks and companies that also operate in the United States, are concerned that they could still be subject to trade restrictions under the primary sanctions, unless and until they can completely separate the European and American divisions of their business. Further, US domestic trade restrictions debar most transactions with Iran in US dollars – the world's prime business currency and currency of choice in the global oil market. Iranian banks have been severely constrained by the dollar embargo to process international money transfers and finance trade. Since the nuclear deal, Iran has also faced difficulties in repatriating billions of dollars of its oil revenues that were frozen in foreign accounts.⁶³

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Sanctions on the IRG

The IRG is subjected to two types of sanctions:

- First, according to US laws, the IRG is a Specially Designated National (SDN), meaning that US persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions or dealings with the organization. Furthermore, non-US persons are restricted from providing ‘significant’ support to the IRG under the Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act, which authorizes secondary sanctions against persons that provide significant support to SDNs.
- Secondly, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, authorizes secondary sanctions against non-US persons who materially assist or support, or engage in significant transactions with, the IRG or its designated officials, agents, or affiliates.⁶⁴

Washington in a clarification note stated that US statutory sanctions focused on Iran’s support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and missile activities will remain in effect and these will be enforced against certain members and actions of the IRG.⁶⁵ Given the IRG’s overweening influence in several sectors of the petroleum industry, sanctions will complicate the process of import of US-origin machines, equipment, and technology.⁶⁶

Precarious Investment Climate

One of the most fundamental issues in the business climate of any country is the provision of suitable legal conditions to firms and companies. International law firms are not allowed to operate in Iran and the domestic law firms are too small to handle cases involving a large investment. While Iran is open for business, foreign businesses will need qualified legal service for the security of investments.⁶⁷

Another issue is Tehran’s damaged financial sector. Iranian banks face several economic challenges, including a large number of non-performing loans and weak central bank liquidity. An obvious lack of transparency on financial support for military operations abroad has complicated financial disclosure and due diligence process of the banks. The Iranian regime’s

willingness to facilitate money-laundering schemes is another factor discouraging overseas investment, as is the absence of a unified exchange rate that is often manipulated by powerful interests.

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International companies also fear being impeded by the notorious maze of Iranian bureaucracy and high risk of corruption. In the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index (2016), Iran ranks 120th out of 183 countries,⁶⁸ and 130th out of 168 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (2016),⁶⁹ undesirable markers for a country trying to attract major investment for economic development. Since governmental control of the economy is pervasive- from public services, investment, resources, to subsidy, and food rationing- the bureaucracy has become extremely unwieldy. Setting up a business not only involves monumental paperwork and going from one office to another but also small extra payments to civil servants at every level to speed up the

process.⁷⁰ Ahmad Tavakoli, an Iranian conservative politician, anti-corruption activist, and member of Majlis (Iranian Parliament), has warned that the perceived corruption in Iranian society could even lead to the downfall of the political establishment.⁷¹

Problems with IPC Terms

The background of sanctions and the constant threat of them being re-imposed make the IPC less attractive than what it could have been. The IPC does not contain a 'release clause', whereby foreign operators could withdraw from their contractual obligations should Iran once again become the target of international sanctions. Further, foreign companies must partner with local companies from a pre-selected list. This implies that the foreign investors are not free to choose the most profitable and proficient local entity suited to their requirements. In the arrangement for profit sharing under the IPC, the local Iranian partner being the majority stakeholder in the JVC would be potentially entitled to higher profits than the foreign company, notwithstanding the latter's critical inputs such as technology and know-how into the project.

Investment may not start flowing into Iran just because the contractual terms have been improved. Many other energy-rich states from Mexico,

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Russia, and Saudi Arabia to the US are offering attractive terms to foreign participants, and have a more stable political environment to ensure the security of investments than that in Iran. Russia and the US even have a particularly attractive open market for ownership of resources.⁷²

Uncertain Future

Iran's oil sector faces an uncertain future due to at least three factors. First, a low oil price environment since June 2014 has meant that IOCs have put long-term capital investment on hold. While firming up of prices from \$46 per barrel to \$51 per barrel following the Vienna Agreement implies that projects of several large oil companies

could be approved in the near future, US shale producers would easily supply the market, undermining the OPEC's capacity to boost prices.

Secondly, investors are apprehensive of the internal Iranian tension between reformists and hardliners, the latter supported by the IRG that has significant business interests in the petroleum sector and is averse to competition from Western investors. Therefore, the hardliners in conjunction with the IRG have depicted the new model as sell-out of Iran's resources cheaply to the West. This has already stalled the implementation of the IPC for more than a year, making investors wary of the incessant delays stemming from political squabbles in the country.

Thirdly, like other oil producers, Iran is vulnerable to the rapid development of renewable sources of energy. Nations are committing themselves to global climate change agreements, which call for limiting greenhouse gas emissions caused by burning of fossil fuels. This trend does not bode well for oil producers and development of their resources.

Reduction in Capital Investment

Iran has sought to assure the IOCs of profitable contractual terms on their

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investment. Nevertheless, low oil prices have meant that major oil companies are looking to reduce capital costs in the medium term. “Lower prices mean lower profit margins- or even losses. Lower profit margins mean less money for investment in new projects and production methods- and, in some cases, cutting back on existing operations.”⁷³ According to consultant Wood Mackenzie, the oil and gas industry will cut US\$ 1 trillion from planned spending on exploration and development between 2015-2020 because of the slump in oil prices.⁷⁴

Political Difficulties

The IPC has been under attack by the powerful segments of the Iranian political establishment. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and his hardline followers drawn from the

clerics and IRG are highly suspicious of Western businesses.⁷⁵ The dynamics of tension between liberals and hardliners in Iran over the operations of Western companies can stall sharing of international best practices, technology transfer, and public-private partnerships needed to boost the economy’s health.⁷⁶

The hardliners have criticized Rouhani’s outreach to the West in the light of Iran’s continuing difficulties with banking, investment and dollar transactions. Despite the nuclear deal, Washington still maintains a host of financial sanctions- and the potential threat of more restrictions- that continue to deter international investors and constrain business and trade.⁷⁷ Hardliners, backed by the guards who control large portions of the economy and use national resources as a source of patronage, will probably challenge Rouhani in the majlis, construing the issue of petroleum contract as concession to the western companies. Their disapproval of Rouhani’s move to open the country to the West will prolong the climate of uncertainty and exacerbate investors’ anxieties, even as the reformist president gets a strong mandate through the recently concluded elections to go ahead with the much-needed economic reforms.

The Transition away from Fossil Fuels

Like other large energy producers such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, Iran faces a threat of transition away from fossil fuels. As the cost of harvesting renewable energy goes down, oil may not remain the fuel of choice for consumers in many parts of the world. With most countries committed to measures aimed at reducing global warming under the December 2015 Paris Climate Accord, global consumption is expected to reach a peak in 15–20 years and then begin an inexorable decline.

Europe is already on the path of renewable energy, with the former accounting for nearly one-third of the electricity consumed in Germany in 2015.⁷⁸ Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom are leading producers of wind energy in the world.⁷⁹ The

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United States occupies fifth place on the installed solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity global rankings and has the second highest installed wind energy capacity in the world.⁸⁰

Oil consumer giants such as China, India, and South Korea are also taking long strides towards deploying solar power in their respective national grids. China installed 20 gigawatt (GW) of solar power in the first half of 2016 and wants to add 20 GW annually through 2020, to bring the nation's solar power capacity to massive 150 GW.⁸¹ India has 45 GW of clean energy currently but wants to raise it to an ambitious 175 GW by 2022, including 100 GW of solar power generation capacity.⁸² South Korea is fast-growing GW-market for PV. In 2014, the country ranked among the world-leading top-ten installers of PV systems.⁸³

Daniel Esty, a professor of environmental law and policy at Yale University, believes that the drop in prices of fossil fuels will push the developers of wind, solar and other alternative energy to cut costs and make their technologies more cost-competitive and thereby increase demand.⁸⁴ Similarly, a report on solar industry by the Deutsche Bank team asserts that despite the oil price drop, solar electricity will soon “become competitive with retail electricity in an increasing number of markets globally

due to declining solar panel costs as well as improving financing and customer acquisition costs.”⁸⁵

The director of the energy and sustainability program at the University of California (Davis), Amy Jaffe, suggests that growing urbanization combined with technological breakthroughs in renewable energy will dramatically reduce future demand for oil. Jaffe draws attention to the fact that China, the largest consumer of fossil fuels in the world, is “pushing itself to be the world’s major exporter of solar panels and advanced vehicles, including the production of five million electric vehicles a year,” - a note of caution to those who forecast an incessant rise in oil demand.⁸⁶

In a recent trend, big oil companies are backing non-fossil fuels and farming out renewable energy investments that could constitute their future energy portfolios. Major oil companies such as Shell, Total and Statoil have established separate divisions to invest in renewables, hit as they are by low crude prices and tightening climate change regulations. One of Britain’s leading energy experts and fellow at Chatham House, Paul Stephens, has warned that major oil companies face a “nasty, brutish and short” end within a span of 10 years or so, if they do not change their business model and diversify into greener forms of energy.⁸⁷

In this scenario, Former Saudi Oil Minister Zaki Yamani’s famous quip that “the Stone Age did not end for lack of stone, and the Oil Age will end long before the world runs out of oil”,⁸⁸ could ring true before long.

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Conclusion

With the lifting of international sanctions, Iran is focusing on the opportunities for trade and investment, particularly in its oil and gas sector. In order to revive old fields and develop new ones, Iran needs foreign capital and modern Western technology. The Iranian government is actively courting foreign investment with a new model contract that offers lucrative terms

for foreign investments. Several international oil companies have expressed their interest in returning to the Iranian oil market and some have started a preliminary study of oilfields to become better equipped before the bidding rounds. If Iran manages to conclude successful contracts for the development of its oil fields- similar to what Iraq did a decade ago- this would unlock the enormous wealth of its vast natural resources.

With the lifting of international sanctions, Iran is focusing on the opportunities for trade and investment, particularly in its oil and gas sector. In order to revive old fields and develop new ones, Iran needs foreign capital and modern Western technology.

However, one of the major risks of doing business with Iran is linked to the continuing unilateral US sanctions on Iran, which make it difficult for Western banks and companies to rekindle business with Iran without fearing punitive action from the American regulators. Foreign oil companies will also find it extremely difficult to navigate the overweening economic influence of the still-sanctioned

IRG, and operationalize activities that involve the import of advanced technology and equipment required for the development of oilfields. Moreover, in a state-controlled economy with the high level of bureaucratization and alleged corruption, foreign companies may find it more problematic and less profitable to do business in Iran. Finally, a lurking apprehension of the foreign oil companies relate to the snap back of UNSC sanctions if Iran violates the terms of the nuclear deal down the road or the change in the stance of the new US administration towards the nuclear deal; then they stand to face a challenging scenario vis-à-vis their investments.

Iran has been able to circumvent a number of challenges in its efforts to restore oil production to pre-sanctions levels and reclaim its market share. In order to continue producing to the pre-sanctions level and ramp up to an ambitious 6 million bpd target, Iran would require that oil companies invest immediately once they enter into a contract to develop the field. In an era of depressed oil prices, IOCs are holding on to capital investment, so a rapid development of oilfields appears precarious in the near future. While the Vienna agreement over the reduction in OPEC's output could reverse the declining prices trend, it will still not restore prices to the height seen in

early months of 2014, mainly because of the possibility of additional supplies from the production of shale oil. In addition, globally-spreading 'green consciousness' and the constantly declining cost of renewable energy

has started interrogating the very idea of the prevalent use of oil as a source of energy. That would have a telling impact on the fate of global oil industry, and Iran will not be outside the frame of this emerging picture.

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Understanding Turkey's Emerging "Civilian" Foreign Policy Role in the 2000s through Development Cooperation in the Africa Region

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Abstract

This paper attempts to understand the gradual "civilian" shift in Turkish foreign policy in the first decade of the 2000s through its development cooperation activities in the Africa region. To this aim, by applying the "civilian power" role concept developed by François Duchêne, it first investigates how Turkey's 1) domestic democratic and economic preconditions, 2) normative commitments, and 3) power instruments evolved throughout history to make it possible to talk about an emerging "civilian role" in Turkish foreign policy during the first decade of the 2000s. Then it looks more closely at Turkey's civilian foreign policy practice through the "development cooperation" activities of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) across Africa and specifically in Somalia throughout the 2000s. Finally the paper will question whether this specific development cooperation policy has so far been successful in constructing a credible "civilian foreign policy role" for Turkey in the Africa region.

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Key Words

Turkish Foreign Policy, Civilian Power, Civilian Foreign Policy Role, Development Cooperation, Africa, Somalia.

Introduction

The "normative" turn in international relations associated with a "civilizing" discourse through democratization processes has impacted the way Turkish foreign policy decision makers interpreted and conceptualized world politics during the first decade of the 2000s. Faced with systemic as well as agency-based shifts at the international order level, such as the rise of new powers from Asia and Latin America, enhanced regionalism, and a growing focus on issues like development, democracy, human rights and fairness in global governance, Turkish foreign policy makers felt both the necessity and opportunity of linking the country's foreign policy framework to the new trends and approaches in international relations. Accordingly, Turkey witnessed a doctrinal foreign policy change accompanied by renewed or content-enriched diplomacy

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instruments like mediation, trade, humanitarianism and development cooperation in the first decade of the 2000s.

Developments in Turkish foreign policy have become a source of heated debates in academic and political milieus, and widely discussed with reference to Turkey being a “soft power”,¹ “normative power”,² “rising power”³ and “regional power”,⁴ together with both the positive and negative global, regional, and domestic outcomes of those approaches. Yet, compared to other theoretical conceptualizations, the normative-civilian dimension of Turkish foreign policy choices and the challenges that Turkey has confronted in its foreign policy have so far been neglected in Turkish foreign policy scholarship. Furthermore, although there is a rich scholarly debate on Turkish foreign policy towards its

region—and in particular, the Middle East—during the first decade of the JDP era, few serious attempts have been made to theoretically analyse the developments in Turkish foreign policy towards the Africa region in the 2000s.⁵

This study takes the “civilian power” and “civilian foreign policy role” concepts developed respectively by François Duchêne and Hanns Maull as its point of departure for analysing Turkey’s increasing willingness to adopt a “civilian foreign policy role” during the first decade of the 2000s. Furthermore, it specifically looks to question whether this conceptual role fits with Turkey’s “raison d’être” today, as well as its development cooperation strategy towards the Africa region. This paper assumes that the “civilian power” concept that has frequently been employed in EU, German and Japanese studies literature for defining the EU’s foreign policy role and actorness could also be used in conceptualizing other countries engaged in enacting a civilian foreign policy role in world politics. Here it must be acknowledged that performing an “*ideal type civilian foreign policy role*” is a difficult endeavour even for developed Western democracies. In this respect, the enactment of such a role by less developed democracies may be perceived as incomplete and inconsistent, in the sense that the latter are still trying to “civilize” their own democracies at home while

directing "civilizing" missions outside their borders. Regarding the familiar norms/values and interests divide in normative/civilian power literature, this paper considers that since they are mutually constructed, they can not be easily separated from each other.⁶

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This study aims to contribute to both the ongoing debates on normative and civilian issues in international relations and the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy, from conceptual, theoretical, and empirical perspectives. As a modest attempt to apply "civilian power" and "civilian foreign policy role" concepts to Turkish foreign policy, this article also aims to shed light on the foreign policy makers' quest to adopt a more "civilian" role in the 2000s, as well as the limitations of that effort. Ankara frequently used "civilian" foreign policy instruments like mediation, trade, and humanitarian assistance during the

first decade of the 2000s. Among many, Ankara's strong willingness to extend humanitarian assistance to Africa and further develop trade relations has been remarkable. Yet, the civilian dimension of Turkish foreign policy choices and the challenges that Turkey has confronted in its civilian foreign policy choices have so far been neglected in Turkish foreign policy scholarship in general and Turkish foreign policy towards Africa specifically. Therefore, the use of the "civilian power" and "civilian foreign policy role" concepts as an alternative analytical framework to understand Turkey's foreign policy would certainly bring novelty to the Turkish foreign policy literature.

The civilian foreign policy role concept has also been only very rarely applied to cases of developing democracies or rising democracies. This study acknowledges that the use of the concepts of "civilian foreign policy" and "civilian power" should not be restricted to the foreign policy analysis of developed democracies. Placing the "*civilian power*" and the "*civilian foreign policy role*" concepts at the centre of the analysis, this paper aims to understand to what extent the civilian power approach is a plausible means to describe Turkish foreign policy in the first decade of the 2000s and to explain Turkey's motivations in pursuing its "development cooperation" policy towards the "Africa region".

To this end, departing from the “civilian power” concept first developed by Duchêne and building on the “civilian foreign policy role” defined by Hanns Maull, the following analytical framework will be applied: (1) *domestic democratic and economic preconditions*; (2) *normative commitments*; and (3) *power instruments*. It will be applied first to Turkey’s traditional foreign policy to investigate how Turkey’s foreign policy role has gradually evolved towards a more “civilian” context from the Republican era up to the 2000s. Second, Turkish foreign policy during the 2000s, and in particular the first decade of JDP era, will be analysed using the same framework, to distinguish certain types of practices, mechanisms, and platforms in which Turkey’s civilian foreign policy role started to gain visibility. Third, attention will be paid to Turkey’s activism in the Africa region by specifically focusing on the development cooperation activities of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA Turkish Development Agency). Finally, this paper will question whether this particular development cooperation policy has been successful in constructing a credible “civilian foreign policy role” for Turkey in the region, despite limitations.

Setting the Theoretical Framework: From the “Civilian Power” Concept to “Civilian Foreign Policy Role”

Civilian power is a complex, multifaceted and highly contested term which has become the subject of various academic debates, especially in the fields of EU, German and Japanese studies. The concept of “civilian power” was first introduced by François Duchêne in the early 1970s, with a specific reference to the role of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the Cold War years. According to Duchêne, since the European Community is a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force, it would only make the most of its opportunities if it remained true to its inner characteristics, which are civilian ends and means.⁷ Though he did not explicitly offer up a clear definition of either the *essence* or *exercise* of a

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"civilian power" approach, Duchêne's conceptualization has been the main reference point of a rich scholarly debate and of various case studies discussing the "civilian" dimension of states' foreign policy practices.⁸

In his 1999 seminal article, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers" published in *Foreign Affairs*, Hanns Maull was the first to reinterpret the "civilian power" concept by applying it to Germany and Japan.⁹ He defined civilian powers as "states (or other political entities) which are willing to take initiatives and exercise influence over events, and which use particular strategies and instruments to achieve their objectives."¹⁰ Considering Germany and Japan as *prototypes* of a "civilian power", Maull underlines three main characteristics of civilian powers:¹¹

- 1) The acceptance of the necessity of *cooperation* with others in the pursuit of international objectives;
- 2) The concentration on *nonmilitary*, primarily *economic means* to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and
- 3) A willingness to *develop supranational structures* to address critical issues of international management.

Another prominent scholar in EU studies, Ian Manners, suggests that most civilian power formulations place a *specific emphasis* on the importance of being "long on economic power" or "the concentration on non-military, primarily economic instruments."¹² Accordingly, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman depict the differences between civilian power, military power and normative power in terms of their "means of influence" in international politics.¹³ Christopher Hill argues that "civilian powers" rely also on *persuasion* and *negotiation*, and they use their *economic* and *diplomatic* strength in pursuit of their objectives.¹⁴ Similarly Hazel Smith maintains that the word 'civilian' is an essentially *non-military* one, putting strong emphasis on a *peaceful foreign policy*.¹⁵ However, there exists an ambiguity in the literature regarding whether the concept totally excludes the use of coercive instruments, including *military means*. For instance, Hedley Bull criticized Duchêne's concept of "civilian power Europe" and made an appeal for a "military power Europe", arguing that the concept of a civilian power Europe was a contradiction in terms.¹⁶ Likewise Stelios Stavridis criticized the "*non-military*" definitions of the concept and asserted that what matters is the *output*, which is, the *promotion of human rights* and other *democratic principles* in the world.¹⁷ All these various scholars'

competing approaches illustrate the vagueness and flexibility of the concept.

In order to apply civilian power to foreign policy analyses, Maull introduced an ideal “civilian foreign policy role” concept out of his comparison of German and Japanese post-war foreign policies, compared to other role concepts, such as “great power”, “middle power”, “military power”, or “regional power.”¹⁸ Key to the civilian foreign policy role conceptualization introduced by Hanns Maull¹⁹ and later categorized by Tewes²⁰ is the intertwining of the three dimensions of civilian power:

domestic preconditions, normative commitments, and power instruments.

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Figure 1: Ideal-Type Civilian Foreign Policy Role

Domestic Preconditions	Normative Commitments	Power Instruments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy • Material Prosperity • Consensus on supranational cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateralism • Supranational Integration • Rule of Law • Development and diffusion of human rights and democracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts (Diplomatic cooperation, mediation) • Trade • Development cooperation • Humanitarian aid • Democracy promotion

The first precondition of ideal-type civilian foreign policy role concept concerns *domestic prerequisites*. Here

“democracy” appears as the principal *domestic prerequisite* of this civilian role conception and “material prosperity” as

an essential factor for the stability of the domestic democratic order. Domestic *prerequisites* also include a historical learning process that serves to establish a general consensus within the country, of the importance of "supranational cooperation".²¹ The second category, *normative commitments*, encompasses a state's commitment to multilateralism, supranational integration, diplomatic cooperation, rule of law, diffusion of equality, justice, development, democracy, and restriction of the use of force in international politics.²² The third precondition of this ideal-type civilian foreign policy role, *power instruments*, includes the use of *non-military*, primarily economic and also diplomatic instruments such as mediation in conflict resolution, humanitarian aid, democracy promotion, and development cooperation.²³

Building on Maull's ideal type "civilian foreign policy role" framework above, the empirical part of this study specifically looks at the historical evolution of Turkey's *domestic preconditions*, *normative commitments*, and *power instruments* since the Republican era, in order to investigate whether there exists enough empirical evidence supporting the idea of a shift towards the exercise of a more *civilian role* in Turkey's foreign policy in the 2000s, compared to the past. Acknowledging that the ideal-type

civilian foreign policy role model assumes a highly coherent foreign policy,²⁴ the rest of the paper will try to critically assess the civilian credentials and accomplishments in Turkish foreign policy while still recognizing their limitations.

Applying a "Civilian" Foreign Policy Role Framework: Turkish Foreign Policy in Perspective

Like the foreign policies of many other international actors, Turkish foreign policy is marked by some claims and trajectories regarding its civilian features at varying degrees over time. To better understand the continuities and differences between Turkey's "civilian" path both in the past and today in terms of foreign policy and to what extent Turkey has taken a differentiated and relatively more successful path towards acting as a civilian foreign policy actor in the 2000s compared to the past, the civilian references associated with Turkish foreign policy since the Republican era first need to be briefly highlighted. Secondly, specific attention will be paid to the 2000s and most specifically to the JDP era in which the "civilian" concept started to gain ground discursively and empirically in the country's foreign policy. In doing so, the triad of 1) *domestic democratic*

and economic preconditions, 2) normative commitments, and 3) power instruments used by Maull in defining the “civilian foreign policy role” will serve as a basis to understand to what degree present-day Turkey has been enacting a civilian foreign policy role.

The “Civilian” Accomplishments in Turkish Foreign Policy Tradition in the 20th Century

Ever since the early Republican era in Turkey, the country’s foreign policy has been conducted by referring to certain principles, guided by a *normative commitment* to the unchanged ideal of “*peace at home, peace in the world*” as stated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. These include, among many, peaceful resolution of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of third parties, international law and legitimacy, a strong commitment to multilateralism, and supranational integration through European Union membership. In fact, since its entry into the League of Nations in 1932 and later in 1945 to the United Nations, a closer look at the main historical parameters during and after the Cold War era shows that despite some exceptional periods in the 1960s and 1970s, -when Turkey had to intervene militarily in Cyprus due to the growing inter-communitarian

conflicts on the island with reference to the 1959 London and Zurich Agreements.²⁵ Turkey has generally pursued a peaceful diplomatic policy by remaining explicitly attached to the norms and decisions of major international organizations.²⁶

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Although shaped by ups and downs, Turkey’s efforts at supranational integration to become a full member of the European Union (EU) have been an integral part of its normative commitments throughout the 20th century. Of course, an important landmark event that affected the shift in Turkish foreign policy towards a normative approach was the declaration in 1999 of Turkey’s official candidacy for EU membership. This resulted in a rapid Europeanization process by Turkey, which also contributed

to raising Turkish leaders' awareness about the increasing importance of supranational integration for further development of *civil society* and *democracy* as well as for *political reforms* and *economic development* in Turkey.²⁷

Yet, Turkey's road to the establishment of a working democracy with its political and civil society institutions has neither been easy, nor complete. On the contrary, progress has been difficult, along a road beset with obstacles and interrupted by many setbacks.²⁸ On the one hand, since the Republican period there have been numerous efforts for modernizing the country with economic development accompanied by a gradual progress towards a more open society. The basic reason behind this particular evolution has been the fact that modernization was identified with westernization,²⁹ and democracy was viewed as an indispensable component of westernization.³⁰ On the other hand, Turkey's long and difficult journey towards democracy has been interrupted several times, with no fewer than three military coups during and after the Cold War years. Despite frequent regime breakdowns and significant democratic deficits, the history of modern Turkey since the 1950s has been, and today remains as, a process of modernization with democratization.³¹

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Turkey's *domestic economic conditions* have impeded the government's ability to adopt a *civilian role* in its foreign policy during and after the Cold War era. In fact, the Turkish economy was previously identified with recurring crises and a controversial relationship with international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this regard, Turkey's particular *domestic preconditions* with regards to long-lasting *democracy deficiencies*, and also *Turkey's problematic EU accession process*, largely hindered it from pursuing a civilian foreign policy role in the 20th century.³²

Although there exist some important periods in contemporary Turkish history where the Turkish economy flourished and *economic power instruments* gained relative importance, as clearly seen during the Turgut Özal era of the late 1980s, Turkey has largely been identified by low economic growth rates and high government

debts. It was defined as a developing country and was a development aid-receiver state until the 2000s. When Turkey transitioned from single party to multi-party rule in the 1950s, official development assistance (ODA) to Turkey through the Marshall Plan helped it lay the foundation for its economic development during the Cold War years. However, it was not until the 1980s that the country launched its own ODA program as *an instrument* under the Özal government, while at the same time remaining a donor recipient.³³ Bolstering Turkey's *economic strength* by integrating into the world economy and using aid as a *power instrument* to enhance *trade and soft power relations* in developing countries were among Prime Minister Özal's foreign policy priorities.³⁴ By the early 1990s, Turkish leaders began to realize that development assistance efforts would be more effectively administered through the establishment of an official state sponsored agency.³⁵ Accordingly, in 1992, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) was established. However, Turkish ODA during this period was only restricted to Turkic countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Furthermore, political instability due to fragile coalition governments and economic crises

in the country made it difficult to use aid as an effective foreign policy instrument, which could apparently be observed in the sudden increase in the total amount of aid in 1992, followed by a visible decrease and then irregular rise and decline in subsequent years.³⁶

By the early 1990s, Turkish leaders began to realize that development assistance efforts would be more effectively administered through the establishment of an official state sponsored agency.

It can be argued that the systematic and structural change in both *economic development* and use of *economic power instruments* in the form of development cooperation began in the 2000s, especially over the last decade. Within the theoretical framework offered above, in the following section this paper will question how Turkey's *domestic precondition* and *normative commitments* evolved over the last decade to make it possible to talk about an emerging civilian role in Turkish foreign policy based upon new *power instruments*.

Assessing Turkey's Civilian Foreign Policy Role in the 2000s

a. Domestic democratic and economic preconditions

The increasing civilian role in present-day Turkey's foreign policy was made possible as a result of positive developments or relative progress in its *domestic democratic preconditions* and *economic development* in the first decade of the 2000s. First, Turkey's most important *soft power* is defined to be its *democracy*.³⁷ In line with this reasoning, since 1999, when Turkey was attributed official candidate status to the EU, Turkey has implemented a series of reforms on civil liberties and democracy with regards to many issue areas, including the role of the military, the Kurdish question, and civil and social rights. Of course, Turkey's EU accession process has also impacted the way the domestic democratic environment and increased civil liberties have evolved in the country. Still, long-standing public pressure prevails, which is supportive of a new and more democratic and civil constitution.³⁸ Since the 2000s, Turkish leaders have put special emphasis on a *stable and peaceful domestic order*, which is a necessary precondition to building a proactive foreign policy.³⁹

For instance, Foreign Minister of Turkey between 2009-2014, Ahmet Davutoglu, indicated that if there is not a peaceful and democratic environment inside a country, it may not have the political stability required to influence its external environment.⁴⁰

Secondly, it can be argued that Turkey's increasing *material prosperity* and *economic growth* since the 2000s, has also so far provided *favorable domestic conditions* for Turkey to adopt a civilian foreign policy role. In the first years of the 2000s Turkey rapidly recovered from the negative effects of the 2001 financial crisis and reached a steady growth rate in its economic performance. The country also survived the 2008 global economic crisis with minimum damage.⁴¹ The available *systemic conditions* also bolstered the relative growth of the Turkish economy, both in its domestic environment and in global context. In this respect, Turkey took due advantage of the international environment in the 2000s, in which new operational areas were opened for emerging powers in the world system.⁴² The Turkish case also exemplifies what Maull suggested about the existence of a strong correlation between favorable *domestic democratic and economic conditions* and an increasing *civilian foreign policy role of a state, as well as its frequent use of civilian power instruments*.⁴³

b. Normative commitments

During the first decade of the 2000s, Turkish foreign policy moved smoothly towards an increased “civilian” approach. In the first years of the 2000s this “civilian” path of Turkish foreign policy was conceived both as a part and consequence of Turkey’s rapid Europeanization process. When Europeanization started to slow down after 2006, with the EU’s decision of interrupting negotiations with Ankara mainly due to political reasons, the “civilian” orientation of Turkish foreign policy started to gain a new dimension informed by a more “cosmopolitan” commitment rather than being purely “European” as in the past. Turkey’s strong criticism of the EU’s controversial approach to the Egyptian military coup in 2013 is a clear sign of the existing differences between Turkey’s own understanding of “cosmopolitanism”⁴⁴ and those of the EU. In parallel to this, Turkey’s call for international justice in the Syrian case and its harsh critiques regarding the inaction of its Western allies against the Syrian tragedy illustrate the extent to which Turkey’s new “civilian” foreign policy approach goes beyond only having been committed to European values and norms. Rather, Turkey’s new “civilian foreign policy role”—despite its limitations in practice and in the domestic realm—

has been universally constructed. Here it must also be reminded that the first years of the 2000s, especially under İsmail Cem (Foreign Minister of the coalition governments from 1997 to 2002), were marked by an increasing number of normative commitments in Turkish foreign policy. Going beyond the traditional foreign policy traditions and conceptualizations, Cem’s proactive and multidirectional foreign policy informed by a strong historical, cultural and geographical legacy⁴⁵ sought to entail significant civilian dimensions mainly due to its strong commitments to both European and universal norms and values. Cem’s “world state” concept⁴⁶ also points to how Turkey’s foreign policy role was conceived normatively at the global level. Cem’s tenure was also characterized by Turkey’s attachment to multilateralism, supranational integration through

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EU membership, as well as a stronger emphasis on democracy and human right factors in foreign policy.

Turkish foreign policy-making in the era of former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009–2014) also merits special attention for its emphasis on Turkey's "civilizing" role as being not only "a firm defender of universal values such as human rights, democracy, good governance, development and rule of law," but also for showing a strong willingness to "extend its assistance" to the people who 'rise up' and demand such values. Former foreign minister Davutoğlu's foreign policy agenda entails many references to civilian foreign policy instruments such as mediation, trade, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid. Under Davutoğlu's tenure, humanitarian diplomacy was also set as the new objective of Turkish foreign policy.⁴⁷ In practice, Turkey has been a vocal advocate for Palestinians and Syrians in its region. It has also emerged as a major force in addressing the issues of global underdevelopment in general and the humanitarian suffering in Africa specifically. Turkey's quest for an equal, representative and just normative order is best echoed in President Erdogan's discourse of "the world is bigger than five".⁴⁸ Thus, Turkey's civilian foreign policy role has become increasingly more apparent, not only in the leaders' normative rhetoric, but also in practice.

In practice, Turkey has been a vocal advocate for Palestinians and Syrians in its region. It has also emerged as a major force in addressing the issues of global underdevelopment in general and the humanitarian suffering in Africa specifically. Turkey's quest for an equal, representative and just normative order is best echoed in President Erdogan's discourse of "the world is bigger than five".

Regarding Turkey's normative commitment to the EU, the first years of the 2000s were characterized by a strong engagement of Turkish governments, respectively the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government (1999–2002) and the first period of the JDP government (2002–2007). One can argue that the JDP era was marked by a certain degree of fluctuation, in the sense that the first period of 2002–2007 was characterized by a rapid Europeanization process, whereas the second and third stages (respectively 2007–2011 and 2011–to the present day) witnessed a gradual demise in this trend. It may be claimed that in the 2000s, institutionally Turkey has come closer than ever to the European Union,

yet paradoxically, the degree of anti-EU feeling in Turkey has increased.⁴⁹ However, since the West is a long-term ideal for Turkish foreign policy,⁵⁰ and despite a sense of alienation and political deadlock, Turkey still maintains its goal of integrating into the EU as a full member. One of the important points making the JDP's Europeanization different from that of previous periods is the fact that it was informed by a dual process consisting both of "reforms" and "critiques". This duality of the JDP's Europeanization can clearly be seen in Turkish leaders' rising tone of criticism regarding the EU's double standard applications vis-à-vis Turkey's candidacy. The second point relates to the JDP's own normative policy towards the EU, as marked by its aspiration of spreading its own justice and equality-based norms toward the EU while still remaining committed to the EU's own normative framework.⁵¹

c. Power instruments

The first decade of the 2000s was marked by Turkish foreign policy decision makers' willingness to adapt a civilian foreign policy role conception, contributing to the country's diplomatic cooperation, mediation and development efforts both in bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Throughout these years the successive Turkish governments have considered

civic-economic power instruments a more sustainable way to realize objectives and foreign policy goals.⁵² With regards to mediation as a diplomatic tool, Turkey has embarked over the last decade on a variety of mediating missions in its region, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iranian nuclear program.⁵³ Turkey also launched the Friends of Mediation initiative at the UN in 2010 together with Finland, arguing that mediation has become an important component of the new Turkish foreign policy.⁵⁴ Furthermore, Turkey hosted the İstanbul Conference on Mediation in February 2012, bringing together representatives of NGOs, experts, and officials from a variety of countries. As a more broad initiative, the UN Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) was first launched in 2005 by the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Spain. Yet, it would be wrong to argue that all these efforts fostered favorable or optimal outcomes in mediation between the conflicting parties. In fact, among many, the Syrian crisis reflected the limits of Turkey's civilian resources to induce effective reform by putting pressure on Bashar-al-Assad, a leader with whom the JDP leadership was previously on friendly terms.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the increasing numbers of these initiatives prove Turkey's willingness to adopt a civilian role in foreign policy through *civilian instruments* and use of *multilateral platforms*, such as the UN.

Mediation is not the only civilian power tool that Turkish officials have employed in attempting to resolve regional conflicts. Turkey has increasingly tried to channel its resources for "*global development efforts*" in countries affected by conflicts and natural disasters. During the first decade of the 2000s, Turkish assistance to post-conflict countries seems to have shifted dramatically from military missions to *civilian capacity assistance*. Throughout most of the 1990s, Turkey deployed significant military forces to the peacekeeping missions in a diverse range of countries from Bosnia to Somalia, whereas today, while Turkey still remains engaged in these places, the nature of its assistance seems to be *more civilian* than military. Therefore, referred to as "development cooperation efforts", Turkey's Civilian Capacity (CIVCAP) initiatives are increasingly viewed as useful tools to achieve key Turkish foreign policy priorities.⁵⁶

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Since economic factors started to occupy an increasingly important place in the making of Turkey's foreign policy, it has also resorted to a variety of economic instruments. In addition to its growing volume of investments and construction projects in the surrounding regions, Turkey has initiated visa liberalization programs and, where possible, sought to establish free trade regimes.⁵⁷ Another dimension of Turkey's economic activism in external relations has been its opening up to new markets, beyond those in the West and its immediate neighborhood. Turkey has introduced new campaigns to bolster its economic and trade ties with Africa, Latin America, and East Asia. Within these favorable systemic and domestic conditions, development cooperation activities emerged as one of the most active civilian foreign policy instruments to facilitate Turkey's involvement in various regions.⁵⁸ One of the defining aspects of Turkish foreign policy has been the increased role of development cooperation programs, evidenced by an expanding international "aid budget" over recent years. Therefore, Turkey has returned to the scene of global politics as a "rising donor"—and development assistance organizations, such as TİKA, are among the most active agents in Turkey's foreign policy.⁵⁹ The following section will try to look more closely at Turkey's civilian foreign policy practice through

its development cooperation activities in the Africa region, most specifically in Somalia, over the last decade.

Turkey has returned to the scene of global politics as a “rising donor”—and development assistance organizations, such as TİKA, are among the most active agents in Turkey’s foreign policy.

Going Beyond the Rhetoric: Civilian Turkish Foreign Policy Role through Development Cooperation in the Africa Region

Traditionally Turkey’s aid and assistance activities as foreign policy instruments are hardly new. Since the 1950 Korean War, the Turkish Republic has offered assistance in terms of peacekeeping missions and other military initiatives. In the post-Cold War years, Turkey adopted a military leadership role during the UNOSOM II operation in Somalia in 1993 and made significant contributions to the stabilization of Kosovo and Bosnia by deploying both military and civilian police in the 1990s. However, since

the early 2000s, Turkey’s approach to assistance has shifted away from being primarily military to an increasingly “civilian” capacity focus with an increasing emphasis on the Africa region.⁶⁰ Turkey’s “development” ties to Africa can be traced back to its first aid package to the Sahel countries in 1985, under the Özal government.⁶¹ This was followed by the adoption of a document entitled “Opening up to Africa policy” in 1998 by the Foreign Minister of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government, İsmail Cem.⁶² With this policy, the Turkish government aimed at improving the political, economic, development, and cultural ties between Turkey and various African countries. The goals of the Opening up to Africa policy was defined as increasing the number of Turkish diplomatic missions in Africa and high-level diplomatic exchanges with the continent, increasing humanitarian and development assistance towards the region, as well as becoming a donor to the African Development Bank.⁶³

In this regard, The JDP government adopted its predecessor’s African opening up policy to construct a more assertive strategy based on comprehensive cooperation aiming to introduce “development cooperation”⁶⁴ activities towards the region. Accordingly, *development cooperation* has become an increasingly indispensable aspect of Turkey’s arsenal of civilian

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foreign policy "tools" over the last decade. Displaying a systematic uptick, Turkey became the world's 4th largest donor in development cooperation and the 3rd in humanitarian aid relief in 2012, providing assistance to 131 countries listed in 2011 as aid recipients.⁶⁵ In 2015, Turkey's net ODA amounted to US\$3.9 billion. According to the 2016 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, with respect to the international contributions of government donors, Turkey was the second largest donor of humanitarian assistance in 2015, following the United States, a rise of 31% from its reported contributions of the previous year. Turkey's assistance to Syrian refugees on its own territory make it the donor contributing the second largest amount in 2015.⁶⁶

Under the governance of the JDP, TİKA's portfolio has since been diversified and expanded to include the Caucasus, South Asia and, of increasing prominence, Africa.⁶⁷ In concrete numbers, TİKA has implemented development projects in 110 countries, on all continents, displaying the depth of the geographical scope of Turkey's aid activities.⁶⁸ Furthermore, according to statistics collected by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Turkey's ODA in 2012 reached US\$2.5 billion, up from US\$600 million in 2005; a four-fold expansion in a mere seven years.⁶⁹ According to the 2014 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, in terms of Gross National Income rates, Turkey is defined as the most generous country among the top 20 donors in 2013. In the 2014 report, with respect to the rates of "humanitarian assistance" as a percentage of ODA, Turkey is estimated to be the first with its %50 rate priority given to humanitarian assistance.⁷⁰ As the 2016 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report indicates, when considered as a percentage of gross national income, Turkey, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Sweden were the four donors that provided the most in 2015.⁷¹

These numbers reflect the *systematic priority* given to international aid

by the current Turkish government. Turkey's commitment to proactive development assistance and systematic cooperation with international actors is evidenced by its participation in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) South-South Cooperation (SSC) and its initiatives with Least Developed Countries.⁷² Accordingly, Turkey is defined as an emerging and new development partner for Africa, in addition to countries like Brazil, China, India, and the Republic of Korea. Turkey is named as an emerging donor country by the World Food programme.⁷³

The country-based distribution of Turkish aid on the African continent shows that Somalia is prominent among the receiving countries of its development, technical and civilian assistance aid. In this regard, in 2011, Somalia became the fourth highest recipient of Turkey's development assistance, behind Pakistan, Syria, and Afghanistan⁷⁴. Following the severe drought crisis in 2011, Somalia ranked first among the countries who received Turkey's ODA in 2012. In fact, as Özkan puts it, no developments in Africa have appealed to Turkey's responsiveness as much as the 2011 crisis in Somalia, in which Turkey became deeply involved in political and humanitarian efforts.⁷⁵ On 19 August 2011, former Prime Minister and current President Erdoğan visited

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Mogadishu along with a delegation composed of ministers and members of Turkey's cultural and business elite. This was a significant event since it was the first visit to Mogadishu by a head of state or government from outside Africa in almost 20 years. Accordingly, on 31 October 2011, Turkey became the first non-African country to appoint a new ambassador to Somalia in more than two decades, located at an embassy in Mogadishu.⁷⁶ These developments illustrated the deepening of Turkish engagement in Somalia.⁷⁷ One should note here that, in the official discourse of the Turkish government, "humanitarianism" and "humanitarian diplomacy"⁷⁸ have been the main theme of Ankara's foreign policy engagement towards Somalia. According to Turkey's rulers, humanitarianism does not only have the components of emergency aid but also encompasses a broad "development cooperation" vision.⁷⁹ As an emerging donor in the global arena, Turkey's development vision found full expression in Somalia as its efforts there reflect a commitment to mediation,

social justice and peacebuilding. The sharp increase of Turkish aid towards Somalia specifically after 2011 is a clear sign of this involvement.⁸⁰

Turkish efforts in Somalia initially began as emergency humanitarian assistance in response to the famine in 2011 through short term material relief and services, emergency food aid, and relief coordination. Turkey's first visible initiative was organizing a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on 17 August 2011. It ended with a pledge to donate \$350 million of humanitarian aid to Somalia.⁸¹ Not only multilateral or public efforts, but also a widespread campaign led by NGOs in Turkey, made a considerable contribution for relief efforts. Furthermore, these government and NGO activities quickly turned into wider programs to address the essential structural problems in the country, like lack of good governance, and ongoing conflicts. Labelled in Turkey's foreign policy goals as "development cooperation efforts," civilian capacity building programs, such as strengthening infrastructure and encouraging civil society engagement, have become the center of Ankara's development efforts in Somalia. The specific focus on civilian capacity building reveals Turkey's increasing use of civilian power role and civilian foreign policy instruments towards Somalia compared to military - or hard power

- policy instruments.⁸² According to TİKA's 2016 Somalia report, TİKA has initiated many projects in the fields such as education, infrastructure, health, and agriculture in Somalia.⁸³ In this regard, Turkey-Africa relations have marked a new era in Turkish foreign policy since 2011, characterized by intensified sympathy towards the region shown by the Turkish public, the ruling party, and the opposition, as well as NGOs.⁸⁴ Furthermore, as Özkan puts it, Turkey's Somalia policy, as far as it has succeeded in short term, has not only located Turkey as a "political" actor in Africa but also expanded Turkey's Africa policy into a more complicated and multidimensional one.⁸⁵

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One should note here that the increasing role of "development cooperation" activities in Turkish foreign policy has

been made possible to a large extent as a result of the activities of various “civil society initiatives” and of NGOs in and about Africa⁸⁶. Turkey’s NGO community has been growing in size and activism since the mid-1990s after the relaxation of many of the laws and social restrictions that had impeded civil society activity.⁸⁷ In this regard, beyond ODA and TİKA, Turkey’s development cooperation activity also had an “unofficial” dimension. For instance, Turkish civil society organizations had been particularly active in the extension of aid programs in Somalia.⁸⁸ Accounting for Turkish NGOs contributions in the fields of health, education, and capacity building, Turkey’s total humanitarian assistance reaches US\$2 billion per year.⁸⁹ Furthermore, a common aspect of Turkish NGOs and charities across the African continent is that a majority of them have religious backgrounds. This last point might be problematic in the sense that it may create confusion leading to criticism surrounding the ideological roots of Turkey’s development aid and may eventually adversely affect its credibility in the long term.⁹⁰ However, while traditional donors employ the discourse of “democratization” and conditional aid, the use of historical and religious rhetoric by Turkish rulers has served to legitimize Turkey’s presence in Africa, most particularly in its Sub-

Saharan region, as a non-threatening and “benign” actor that can function as an alternative role-model to the development of the least developed African countries.⁹¹

Turkey’s “development activities” were also argued to be motivated to open and build new markets for its rapidly growing and globalizing commercial interests⁹². For instance, The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TÜSİAD) is the most active Turkish business agency in Somalia. On April 7, 2012, the first business forum for Somalia in 20 years was held in Mogadishu with the participation of 25 Turkish businesspeople from various business sectors. The forum concluded with the establishment of the Somali-Turkish Business Association. In line with these developing relations, Turkey’s *trade volume* with the African continent reached US\$23 billion in 2012. Compared to the level of 2005 (which was US\$9 billion), this number represents an increase of almost threefold.⁹³ Somalia appears to be at the forefront of a broader Turkish effort to penetrate Africa’s emerging markets and gain favor among its governments.⁹⁴ Moreover, Turkey’s previous campaign for a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for the 2009-2010 period also seems to have *precipitated* a wave of Turkish aid activism toward Africa in the 2000s.⁹⁵ This was accompanied

by the opening of embassies and the financing of projects in sub-Saharan Africa in order to secure a number of votes for Turkey during its successful bid for a UN Security Council seat.⁹⁶ The support of African countries, with its 54 UN members it represents the biggest regional block in the organization, was vitally important for Turkey's UNSC nomination.⁹⁷

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Above all, Turkey's "development cooperation" activities in the Africa region seem to have a strong "*multilateral*" dimension. Turkey's leaders have remained particularly critical of the international community's ineffectiveness during the famine and its failure to achieve justice and stability in Somalia.⁹⁸ For instance, the current Turkish government acts

in tandem with many multilateral platforms in its development efforts as a part of its increasing civilian foreign policy role. In 2007, as a sign of its interest and support for the developing world, Turkey for the first time hosted in İstanbul a summit of the Least Developed Countries, at which it committed US\$20 million to development assistance.⁹⁹ Similarly, TİKA assists in the coordination of initiatives, such as the "Africa Agricultural Development Program", the "Africa Health Program", and the "Africa Vocational Training Program," which are multi-country efforts specifically designed to meet the needs of African countries. Turkey also provides assistance to Africa through international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the Red Crescent.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, in 2010 Turkey co-chaired with Egypt an "International Donor's Conference for the Reconstruction and Development of Darfur" in Cairo. Also, Turkey hosted the İstanbul Somalia Conference organized within the UN framework in May 2010. In 2011 the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries was also held in İstanbul. Subsequently, in June 2012 the second international conference on Somalia was held in Turkey under the theme: "Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015."

The Least Developed Countries Mid-Term Evaluation Summit was held in Turkey in 2015.¹⁰¹ Turkey held the first UN World Summit on Humanitarian Aid in May 2016, and the High-Level Partnership Forum on Somalia in İstanbul in February 2016.¹⁰²

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However, Turkey’s increasing multilateral engagement towards Africa has had its own limitations. Firstly, Turkey’s preoccupation in differentiating itself from the practices of other main donors has prevented it from closely working and communicating with other international donors.¹⁰³ This of course limits the success and sustainability of its multilateral engagement in those African countries governed by complex clan and kinship alliances that have well-known experience in playing donors against one another.

Yet, without addressing internal institutional issues and engaging with all international actors, the long-term success of Ankara’s policy in Africa seems to be very complicated.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, there has also been some criticism of Turkey’s efforts in Africa in the sense that Turkish aid organized by state institutions has only been concentrated on a limited number of cities in any given African country, while other regions in the same country receive little support.¹⁰⁵

Despite the above limitations regarding the “sustainability” of Turkey’s Africa policy, Turkey has become a much more visible actor in Africa with its official and civilian “development cooperation” activities compared to past years. In this regard, talking before the UN on “21-25 September 2013 Africa Week”, the Head of New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Dr. İbrahim Assane Mayaki, defined Turkey as a “key country in the development of Africa.”¹⁰⁶ Mayaki argued that Turkey’s reputation in Africa has significantly increased in the last couple of years.¹⁰⁷

Turkey’s policy in the African region appears as a multidimensional engagement with implications both on Turkey’s increasing civilian capacity and its changing power status in international affairs. The frequent use of “economic” and “cultural” power instruments in Turkey’s development

cooperation activities towards Africa does not necessarily contradict with its willingness to exercise civilian power role in its foreign policy. In this regard, civilian foreign policy is an "ideal-type construct of a role" in which "interests and values" coexist alongside "cultural" and "economic" power instruments.¹⁰⁸ Clearly, being an ideal type civilian power is a difficult endeavor for all developed states, and Turkey, as a developing state, is no exception here.

The frequent use of "economic" and "cultural" power instruments in Turkey's development cooperation activities towards Africa does not necessarily contradict with its willingness to exercise civilian power role in its foreign policy.

Conclusion

Turkey's foreign policy during the 2002–2012 period and its development cooperation activities in the Africa region clearly reflect its willingness to structurally add a "civilian" dimension to its changing foreign policy in roughly the first decade of the 2000s. Paradoxically, this emerging civilian

posture of Turkish foreign policy seems to contradict, to some extent, the country's ongoing civilianizing process at home, as Turkey faces many security challenges. This "civilian" foreign policy role has, thus, become an ingredient of Turkey's new activist and multidirectional foreign policy orientation. Turkey's gradual "civilian" turn in foreign policy has also been accompanied by its rise as an emerging donor or aid provider.

However, performing a civilian actor role effectively seems to be a difficult endeavor for emerging donor countries like Turkey, since the credibility and consistency of such a role is also dependent on the way and the degree to which they become 'civilianized' internally. Acknowledging Turkey's development cooperation policy as a cross-purpose task, which includes both interest calculations and humanitarian intentions, Turkey's rising "civilian" actorness in its neighboring regions, especially during the first decade of the 2000s, may well be seen as part and consequence of its changing foreign policy approach and regional policies.¹⁰⁹ Here, what is at stake is how well an emerging donor country increasingly engaged in development cooperation succeeds in finding a delicate balance between its humanitarian, value-laden approach to international relations and its utilitarian motivations. The co-existence between interest-based and

humanitarian dynamics necessitates looking at how this connection is reflected in both a country's foreign policy discourse and practice. In the Turkish case, the ruling party's rising ethical and justice-based rhetoric in the first decade of the 2000s seems to fit the country's civilian vocation in foreign policy. This positively contributes to the image of Turkey's development aid policy, aiming to go beyond instrumental rational practices.

This “civilian” foreign policy role has, thus, become an ingredient of Turkey's new activist and multidirectional foreign policy orientation. Turkey's gradual “civilian” turn in foreign policy has also been accompanied by its rise as an emerging donor or aid provider.

Yet, certain limitations regarding Turkey's civilian actorness still prevail and need to be overcome. Turkey's increasing civilian capacity in the first decade of the 2000s also emanates from both its booming economic growth and the changing systemic conditions, as a result of the emergence of an enormous number of humanitarian crises around the world. However, Turkey's material capabilities still show some limitations

in terms of becoming a rising donor, when compared to those of some other rising donors like China, India and Brazil, which have higher economic indicators than Turkey. This also explains how Turkey's rising power status is closely linked to its becoming a rising donor and a rising democracy.¹¹⁰ Turkey's increasing rising power status at the global level would certainly give it more leverage in its efforts to pursue a civilian foreign policy embedded in its emerging cosmopolitan world view.¹¹¹ This would also make Turkey's development cooperation activities in Africa more “systematic” and “durable” rather than reactive to crises.

Among the three conditions of a “civilian foreign policy role” defined by Hanns Maull, Turkey seems to partially cover the first and the second criteria, respectively, *domestic democratic and economic preconditions* and *normative commitments*. The third condition, conceptualized as *power instruments*, seems to be largely fulfilled by Turkish leaders, who made use of humanitarian and development aid, mediation, trade, and democracy promotion as foreign policy tools during the first decade of the 2000s. Regarding the second criteria, namely *normative commitments*, Turkey's rising normative discourse in international affairs centered around its attempt to distribute universal values to third countries, as well as its “more just and equal international order” rhetoric,

show the country's willingness to speak and act normatively in foreign policy. Turkey's relatively decreasing interest in its EU membership bid can also be considered a challenging factor, which makes Turkey's normative commitment of fostering supranational cooperation more problematic.

Turkey's increasing rising power status at the global level would certainly give it more leverage in its efforts to pursue a civilian foreign policy embedded in its emerging cosmopolitan world view.

Despite these limitations, as seen clearly in Turkey's development cooperation policies in Africa, there is strong discursive and empirical evidence supporting the existence of a willingness in Turkey's foreign policy

towards adopting civilian foreign policy role in the first decade of the 2000s. In practical terms, Turkey's foreign policy role during the first decade of the JDP government was based on a distinctive set of normative *principles*, the use of diplomatic rather than coercive *instruments*, increasing visibility on multilateral platforms, the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, a strong commitment to supranational integration, the importance of long-term *economic solutions* to political problems, and finally its willingness to "civilize" international relations by the pursuit of equity, legitimacy, democracy, and economic development. Therefore, evidence suggests that Turkey was enthusiastically "exercising" a civilian foreign policy role during the early 2000s; the question of whether it will construct a credible civilian power role will depend on its domestic conditions as well as on its strong, durable and consistent normative approach to international affairs.

Endnotes

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When Ideology Goes Wrong: Some Recent Books On Turkish-Greek-Armenian Wars, 1915-1923

A Review Article on

Twice A Stranger, How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece & Turkey,

By Bruce Clark

London: Granta Books, 2006, 274 pages,

ISBN: 9781862077522.

Paradise Lost, Smyrna 1922, The Destruction of Islam's City of Tolerance,

By Giles Milton

London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 2008, 426 pages,

ISBN: 9781444731798.

Smyrna September 1922, the American Mission to Rescue Victims of the
20th Century's First Genocide,

By Lou Ureneck

New York: Ecco Paperback edition, 2016, 490 pages,

ISBN: 9780062259899.

There Was And There Was Not,

By Meline Toumani

New York: Metropolitan Books,

Henry Holt & Co, 2014, 286 pages,

ISBN: 9780805097627.

The story of how Modern Turkey was created, a full century later, is still emotional, especially when it is linked with Greek-Turkish-Armenian relations. How the Turks, a defeated nation in 1918, were able to turn defeat

into victory, first over Armenians in the east, and then over Greeks in western Turkey, is miraculous. For the Turks, led by Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), it is glorious.

Glory, however, came with tears and blood. The bloodbath of the Ottoman endgame 1914-1918, in which an estimated three million lives were lost, was a colossal human tragedy. When the Sultanate and its ideology of Ottomanism died, the victorious Allies had already decided on the partition of the Empire. With partition came ethnic cleansing. Competing ideologies took center-stage in the chaotic end of the Sultanate. Modern Greece, Armenia and Turkey emerged out of this shared chaos.

The Greek-Turkish War, 1919-22, was, first and foremost, an existential war, driven by ideology. It all began as an aggression, fueled by an irredentist Greek *Megali Idea* (Great Idea). In mid May 1919, the Greek army, a proxy for Allies, landed in Izmir in pursuit of a new Hellenic Byzantium, or Greater Greece in Asia Minor. It collided head-on with Turkish national awakening.

The Greek-Turkish War cost an estimated one million lives over and above the WWI loss. Yet, that is only a statistic of war casualties. After the war, under a Population Exchange Agreement in 1923, as part of the Treaty of Lausanne, over 400,000 Turks were relocated from Greece to Turkey and 1.2 million Greeks went in the reverse direction.

Why did this huge population exchange take place? Was it a humanitarian

project, or an early case of ethnic cleansing? Or, perhaps it was necessary as a long-range visionary exercise in nation-building? How was it executed? What have been its consequences?

The book by the Irish author Bruce Clark provides answers to these questions. Well-researched, highly readable and very timely, the book is a sad story, remarkably balanced and impartial, based on extensive eye-witness interviews on both sides of the Aegean. It is well worth reading today, if only to understand the shared history and the bitter legacy of Greek-Turkish relations. Bitterness still exists, and extreme ideology today haunts in places like Cyprus. Clark's message (*twice a stranger*) is accurate, and his capacity to enlighten, direct and indirect, are praiseworthy. In Clark's book, history is approached with rare objectivity and fairness.

Whose idea was the Population Exchange in 1923? Clark leaves no doubt: Venizelos was the self-confessed father of the idea (pp. 55-56). And in Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian humanitarian in charge of the League of Nations Refugee Commission, Venizelos had found an influential collaborator to organize and carry out this huge exodus. The two collaborated throughout, from conception to execution, and they must carry the chief

responsibility, in law, in morality as well as in implementation of the policy.

In 1922, Venizelos was a broken man, out of Greek politics temporarily. Earlier, he had been the hero of ENOSIS in his home-island of Crete (union of the island with Greece), and in 1919 he was the architect of the Asia Minor invasion, in which, together with the philhellenic British PM Lloyd George, Venizelos began his biggest ideological project: The rebirth of Greater Greece in Asia Minor, the Second Byzantium. Greeks loved the idea, both those in Greece and in Asia Minor.

Then, in the fall of 1922, Mustafa Kemal's Nationalists, and a grateful Turkish nation, were celebrating total victory. The defeated Venizelos, in exile in London, was still the most influential Greek politician. He worked feverishly, selling his population exchange idea to Nansen. The Norwegian considered it a humanitarian project. Venizelos, as always, dreamt of the long-term: He wanted to "Hellenize" Thrace (p. 50), which had been acquired in the Balkan Wars. In 1919 Venizelos had negotiated a population exchange agreement between Greece and Bulgaria. Now, in 1922, Venizelos was a desperate man: With Greeks in Asia Minor on the run, he needed houses, towns and villages to accommodate the flood of fleeing Greeks, and he would have kicked

the Muslim Turks out of western Thrace, had Ankara rejected his idea of population exchange. Fortunately for Venizelos, Nansen's pleas found a receptive ear at the Congress of Lausanne, in particular with Riza Nur, the deputy to İsmet İnönü, the chief of the Turkish delegation. İnönü was, at the time, engaged in very tough peace negotiations with the British Foreign Minister Curzon and representatives of the Allies. In the end, a comprehensive Population Exchange Agreement was reached, with just two exceptions: Greeks in Istanbul and Turks in Western Thrace were allowed to stay.

For the next year or two, a huge exodus began: 200,000 Turks from Crete and at least an equal number from other parts of Greece were forcibly relocated. A total of 1.2 million Greeks from Asia Minor joined the exodus in the reverse direction.

Why the larger number for the latter? Anatolian Greeks, by and large, had taken part in the Greek invasion and they shared blame in large-scale atrocities against local Turks. In the summer and fall of 1922, the Greek armies burned Turkish towns and villages as they fell back in total disarray. Innocent civilian Turks were massacred by Greek soldiers in a wanton case of revenge killings. These atrocities were on such a scale that the Allies were forced to create a special commission.

The horror stories of Greek war crimes are all documented.

Sadly, Anatolian Greeks played a big part in these war crimes. From the moment of the Greek landing in Izmir on 15 May 1919, the Greek army had carried out a Scorched Earth Policy of killing indiscriminately the local Turkish population, burning homes and mosques, and destroying property. Anatolian Greeks joined the Scorched Earth Policy. For example, the Pontic Greeks on the Black Sea, had joined in active fighting with the invaders. The Orthodox Church and school teachers assumed special responsibility in ethnic cleansing against local Turks. Now in 1922 these Greeks, fearing retaliation, had no choice but to run. In the end, guilty or not, all Anatolian Greeks had become victims of the *Megali Idea* ideology. Even the peaceful Cappadocia Greeks were exchanged.

How did the refugees adjust to their new homeland? On the whole, Clark's evidence shows that Turkish refugees did better adjusting in Turkey than the Greek refugees in Greece. Europe provided financial aid to Greece for refugee settlement. Turkey adopted self-reliance. But the Kemalist nation-building proper did not really start until 1928 when all Turkish citizens, including newcomers, were put into the same melting-pot, learning the Latin alphabet, wearing European dress,

and enjoying the same citizenship rights. By contrast, in Greece, the Greek refugees from Asia Minor came with lots of Turkish customs in food, music, dress and many spoke nothing but Turkish. They faced open hostility and discrimination. In some cases, like the Pontic Greek refugees, newcomers tried to redeem themselves by fighting the Italians in the Second World War. However, many Anatolian Greeks vented their alienation by going Communist during the Greek Civil War in 1946-1949 (p. 231). Venizelos must have turned in his grave!

Venizelos' ideology, successful in Crete, ended up destroying the Asia Minor Greeks, the innocent with the guilty were lumped together, creating the greatest human and moral tragedy of Modern Greece. One thing which all refugees, Greek or Turk shared, was the loss of a homeland, the pain of which, according to evidence in Clark, never disappears.

Reading Clark's interviews with the few remaining survivors and their aging family members, is, to say the least, touching. The book starts with a Turkish poem, *İki Kere Yabancı* (Twice a Stranger), by Prof. Ayşe Lahur Kırtunç, whose family came to Turkey from Crete. Her poem captures the essence of the book. Everyone suffered twice: Those who survived the ordeal of

relocation did not find ideological bliss in their destination. They experienced deprivation and discrimination. Their hurt still haunts many to this day. When ideology goes wrong, people pay the price. And the heaviest price is psychological. There is no material compensation for an ancestral homeland that only exists in memory.

But how much progress has been achieved in healing past wrongs? What has been learnt from bitter history towards Truth & Reconciliation? As the philosopher, Santayana put it: “Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it.” Regretfully, books are still penned more in the style of blaming rather than healing and reconciliation.

The Great Smyrna Fire

Today, in Spring 2017, we live in an age of Post-Truth. Fake news, lies and distortions are common daily servings in the US presidency of Donald Trump. Ethno-nationalist trends are on the rise in Europe. Building walls to keep out unwanted refugees and displaced persons has now become fashionable.

Post-Truth, as distorted historical events, has often long ideological roots. Thus, *Megali Idea* dreams ended

literally in flames in mid-September 1922 when Smyrna went up in smokes. Out of the ashes emerged modern Izmir. Mustafa Kemal, calling the fire “a regrettable incident,” moved on to forge a new nation, a new Republic.

The controversy over the Fire continues to this day. Two recent books, one by the British journalist Giles Milton, the other by the American genocide scholar, Lou Ureneck, are the latest additions to the Post-Truth literature. Apparently, there must be a demand for such writing in the USA and other western markets. One thing is clear: The descendants of the Anatolian Christians in the Diaspora are active in ethnic politics, using money and influence for anti-Turkish motions if only to vent their frustration for a lost homeland.

The Turkish version of the Fire is clear enough. It was the work of Armenians and Greeks, their final act of atrocity in defeat. It was treason in the eyes of local Turks/Muslims. What were the motives of these Christian minorities who had lost with Greece? With all hope vanished, they were fleeing, together with the Greek soldiers, to the harbour in Izmir. Fanatics set everything on fire to destroy the stores of food and supplies in the city before the Turks could acquire it as war booty.

The Greek army, for the previous several weeks, had been retreating

from Dumlupinar. It had already burnt Afyon and other Turkish cities and towns. When the demoralized Greek soldiers reached Izmir, they had one objective in mind: jump on a boat and escape. Fear and insecurity engulfed the civilian population, expecting worse than the atrocities delivered on the local Turks/Muslims in the preceding four years. All flooded into the harbour, instant refugees on the Quay, searching, begging for passage out. It was human tragedy on immense scale. Future literary giants, including Ernest Hemingway, then a young reporter for the *Toronto Star*, wrote moving stories. A literary tradition was born from the chaos and suffering. The Smyrna Fire became an instant anti-Turk tradition. It continues to this day, a one-sided story of ethnic hate.

Sadly, the Turkish version, unfortunately, is largely untold. There are simply not enough books or historical research using archival sources, to document the Great Fire. Newspaper articles, secondary sources are inadequate. The net result of this failure, as Heath Lowry, quoted below, has expressed it in anguish, is this: Turkish history has been hijacked by others.

What is available in archival evidence on who actually started the Izmir Fire? The key non-Turkish source is Grescovich & Prentiss. The Austrian

Grescovich was the Commissioner of the Fire Department, and Prentiss was an American industrial engineer representing the US Near East Relief organization. They were both on the spot, directly involved in the course of the Fire. It burned non-stop from 13–16 September, 1922. The Austrian and the American witnessed it all. Hour by hour, day after day, Grescovich and Prentiss recorded how the Armenian and Greek agents and *cheteci* gangs, led by clergy and fanatic teachers, set houses and buildings ablaze, how, in desperation and in vain, Turkish soldiers tried to stop it. This is all recorded in a Report authored by Prentiss.

In January 1923, Prentiss forwarded a copy of his Report to Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, the US High Commissioner at the American Embassy in Istanbul. A short summary of the Prentiss Report is available on line at <http://www.ataa.org/reference/izmir.html> and a full Report has been published as a paper in the *Journal of Ottoman Studies* IX, Istanbul 1980 by Heath Lowry as “A Case Study on the Burning of Izmir.”

The two recent books by Milton and Ureneck fail to mention, let alone use, Grescovich and Prentiss. Instead, they rely on one-sided, pro-Armenian and pro-Greek, sources. Their work, while interesting reading, is no more than

distorted history, an early exercise in Post-Truth.

With this major limitation, there is much value in Giles Milton, making his book a worthwhile read. The reader gets a good understanding of the Levantine civilization, the great comprador families of the Whittals, Girauds, and de Cramers, and others, in magnificent isolation in *Paradise*, an appropriately named garden suburb of the port city, perhaps the wealthiest class in the Sultan's domains.

The comprador class lived, incredibly, till the Great Fire, quietly celebrating the Greek landing in May 1919, viewing it as a way of cementing existing trade links with the Greek and Armenian networks. It was an enclave society, organically connected only to the Christian minorities, as if they were unaware that they lived in a Muslim-majority land. They remained oblivious to the great Kemalist offensive, underestimating both the Turkish national sentiment and the Kemalist vision of a Turkish national homeland. Finally, when the triumphant Turkish army entered Izmir, the Christian minorities and the Levantines were alarmed. The Turkish army came like a thunderbolt and the Levantine world collapsed overnight. Like the Titanic sinking, a way of life vanished, taking all that wealth and artificial living down with it. Aristotle Onassis, the Greek local

shipping merchant, was wiser than most, taking his wealth out, one way or another.

Milton has chosen to sub-title his book, *The Destruction of Islam's City of Tolerance*. A more misleading choice is difficult to imagine, unless one's idea of tolerance is uni-directional, i.e. Turks tolerating privileged Christian minorities, but not in reverse. There is, in fact, a whole chapter in Milton devoted to what is nowadays called the 'double-standard' in EU-Turkey relations: "Enemy Aliens". It is a fascinating account of British hypocrisy in 1914, a poignant study in contrast¹.

While the Levantine privileged class lived in luxury in Izmir, thanks to the Sultan's hospitality, in Newcastle, England, Captain Raouf Bey and his naval officers, on orders of Churchill, the First Lord of Admiralty, were declared "enemy aliens." The two dreadnoughts built for the Ottoman Navy (the *Reshadieh* and the *Sultan Osman I*), were seized. They had already been paid for by a huge public donation

1 Coincidentally, in Canada, then effectively a British colony, a small group of Ottoman Turks living peacefully in Brantford, Ont., were suddenly arrested as enemy aliens and relocated to a POW Camp in the wilds of Northern Ontario for the duration of WWI. Their story is told in my forthcoming novel RELOCATIONS to be published in England in Fall 2017.

in Turkey. In Istanbul, the Turkish population was furious at the seizure in Newcastle. Halide Edib emerged as a feminist patriot denouncing the British impounding. It was one of the key reasons for the Ottoman entry into WWI on the side of Germany.

In Izmir, the comprador class carried on unconcerned. In their splendid isolation in *Paradise*, the Levantines' life was trade-based, a world purely profit-driven, mirroring a dependency in which the Greeks and Armenians functioned as the associated bourgeoisie. The Turkish/Muslim population were the underclass, mired in poverty, and representing the bottom of a highly rigid socio-economic pyramid.

Five Turkish notables are listed in the book as *persona dramata*: Rahmi Bey, Enver Pasha, Mehmet Talat Bey, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), and Halide Edib. The Ottoman authorities, principally the municipal government, were directly controlled by the Levantine families. Enver Pasha and Mehmet Talat were the leaders of the Young Turk regime, and, that regime's arch-rival, Mustafa Kemal, the victorious hero of the Turkish National Liberation. Halide, by the time of Izmir fire, had become the disillusioned Turkish feminist, though still sharing Mustafa Kemal's vision of a modern Turkey.

Though well-written and highly readable, it is not clear why Giles Milton wrote this book in the first place. He implies in the Acknowledgements that he is moved by a lost Levantine civilization, "the descendants of the Levantine dynasties of Smyrna – now scattered across the globe." It is indeed sad how many of these dynasties ended. In the final pages of the book, Milton quotes Morgenthau describing "once-prosperous families who were now walking around in shoes made of pieces of discarded automobile tyres. Their clothing, cobbled together from flour sacks was a fashion born out of necessity" (p. 373). These Levantines shared the same fate as many other privileged Ottomans. The Sultans had built a multinational empire, founded on tolerance between Islam, Christianity and Judaism, but in the age of nationalism and European imperialism, that Empire was doomed. The Ottoman minorities played their destructive part in the Empire's bloody demise.

The book by Ureneck is altogether different. It begins with a daring statement: "This is a true story." The sentence is incomplete. It should be: "This is a story, according to Greek and Armenian sources." Turkish books and sources are ignored. The bibliography at the end cites a few Turkish books,

such as Andrew Mango's *Atatürk*, and Turgut Özakman's *Şu Çılgın Türkler*, but nowhere in the text are they utilized. Ureneck's book has no Turkish content.

Ureneck writes only about missionaries and Levantines. That they lived in a Muslim-majority country seems irrelevant. The missionaries came and set up schools and charitable organizations in Turkish neighborhoods. Asa Jennings ran the Young Men's Christian Association. Minnie Milles was the director of the American Girls School, which had a whole teaching staff from the USA, Canada and other western countries. Dr. Esther Lovejoy headed the American Women's Hospital Association. A whole army of missionaries run orphanages and clinics and social clubs, funded by charity from churches and relief organizations back home. They did not provide service to Turks and Muslims. Theirs was *conditional* charity, benefits available only to Christians. The missionaries supported the Greeks and Armenians. Most lived prosperous lives in *Paradise*, in the high-rent enclave, linked to business and trade interests, in tobacco and other commodities, in insurance, shipping and banking.

Suddenly, their Levantine and missionary world ended in the flames of the Great Fire as Mustafa Kemal liberated Turkey. The missionaries

lost as much as the refugees and the displaced. Ureneck's book is all about these foreign missionaries and Levantines in Izmir. He documents how they worked and collaborated with the Christian communities. Turks got no help.

Unlike Milton's book, Ureneck makes no attempt to explain or provide the reader with any sense of Turkish/Muslim sentiment. It is irrelevant for him, because the author is writing for the outsider, as an outsider himself looking in, observing the lives and activities of aliens in an enclave in Izmir. Just because it was called Smyrna did not alter the Turkish/Muslim character of the environment. Ureneck takes the position, without any hesitation, that the Fire was all the fault of local Turks/Muslims, and that Christian minorities were all innocent victims.

That is not all. His evidence to back what he calls "Truth" is equally biased. Much of Ureneck's narrative is repetition of secondary, and distorted accounts from missionaries themselves, and Christian victims of the Fire. Of course, innocent victims suffered, but these victims included Turks as well. Ureneck's eyewitness accounts reflect only Christian suffering.

It is the job of an objective scholar to check alternative sources and reconcile conflicting accounts. Ureneck fails on this score miserably. He ignores key

sources such as Grescovich and Prentiss. For example, consider his account of the role of Minnie Milles, the director of the American Girls' School in the story of the Fire: "That morning she had seen Turkish soldiers break into nearby homes, light fires, and spread them with petroleum they poured from tins. The fires flared under the accelerant and drew close to the school...." (p. 200). Strong condemnation indeed, but it is not factual.

Milles' observation from a distance conflicts with the account in Grescovich and Prentiss: "Shortly in the afternoon (Wednesday, Sept. 13th) Grescovich, convinced that the city was doomed, again went to the military authorities to ask help, and again it was not forthcoming. It was not until six o'clock in the evening that he was given a company of 100 soldiers to serve under his direction, and it was not until eight o'clock at night before the soldiers began the destruction of the buildings by bombs, in order to check the spread of fire." In other words, Ureneck's selective referencing, turns truth on its head: fire-fighting Turkish soldiers are made into arsonists!

Ureneck's other sources on the Fire are equally flawed, e.g. on the 1924 London trial (pp. 206-11), only Armenians and Greeks speak, no Turkish voices were present, if only for cross examination. How on earth such a one-sided trial

ever took place is beyond imagination, but that, of course, is applying today's values to a time when Turks were Britain's enemy.

Ureneck's book, and to a lesser extent Milton's as well, written almost a century later, perpetuate, or regenerate a certain brand of ideology. This is ethnic ideology; especially in the Diaspora communities, a long way away from the location of bitter history where the ideological battles of long-ago took place. Arguably, the best pronouncement on the Fire is in the words of Shaw and Shaw: "Perhaps the last atrocity of the war was the suggestion, quickly taken up by the Western press, that the victorious Turkish army was responsible for burning the conquered second city of the old empire" (*History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol II, p. 303, Cambridge University Press, 1977)

Some degree of logic must also prevail in literature. In the month before the entry of the Turkish army into Izmir on 9 September 1922, the Greek army, defeated and demoralized, had put to torch the Turkish towns and villages. There were tons of war crimes. The Turkish army all this time was busy putting out the fires, while chasing out the Greek invaders. Why then would this victorious army suddenly reverse itself and go arsonist, setting

on fire the greatest war booty within its reach? It was well known that Izmir's warehouses and stores were full of food and valuables then desperately in short supply.

Undoubtedly, the Turkish majority resented the wealth and privileges of the Greek and Armenian comprador class, now desperately trying to escape. The missionaries and Allies ran away in panic, here and there, giving a helping hand to the departing Christians, in their last act of charity. It was never enough. Asa Jennings of the YMCA did manage a miracle to evacuate hundreds of thousands of refugees on commercial vessels. From the relative safety of Athens or some other site, when finally, these missionaries and Levantines reached safe harbour, contemporary writers vented their anger and frustration, as much as their moral burdens, in illogical outbursts of anti-Turkish ideology. Ureneck's account follows this bitter ideology in the name of ethnic truth.

In his Preface to *Smyrna, September 1922*, J. R. Russel, Professor of Armenian Studies at Harvard University, has called the book "a masterpiece." He also talked of a "new generation of Turkish scholars." But neither he, nor Ureneck, recognize any Turkish losses or suffering during the period of 1915-23, which witnessed the Ottoman/Levantine world going

up in flames. The Turks, of course, got their reward with the birth of modern Turkey. That birth came however with lots of Turkish pain and sacrifice. Only "my loss counts", as is put forth in Ureneck, is no way to a hopeful future. Books in that style reflect ideological atrocity in an endless blame game.

Ideological atrocity occurs when ethnic bias closes the mind to empathy, others' feelings and emotions. In a bitter ethnic conflict, the task of an objective writer is to stay neutral, documenting *all* loss and suffering, stating the facts and letting the reader draw the moral lessons. Biased writing is intellectual manifestation of ideology gone wrong.

Happily, the final book review is a little more promising for a hopeful future based on healing and reconciliation.

The Armenian Genocide Ideology

How is ethnic ideology created? It starts at home with emotional development and identity formation. Historical memory is the catalyst. Schools and the Church carry on the task, with ideological development turning a captive and impressionable youth into ideological converts to the cause. Out of this long process, ideology as ethnic truth becomes life-long Dogma.

Youth and students, in particular, become ideological warriors, ready to do battle in defence of Dogma. In its most extreme form, ethnic or religious Dogma is the path for the modern suicide bomber and the terrorist.

Meline Toumani's book goes a long way in explaining this process. *There was and There was Not* is a personal account of how Armenian-Americans are raised on genocide ideology. In this Zero-Sum of Love & Hate, love comes with Dogma. Children are raised on Dogma as Truth. Accept it or be condemned as Denialist. No room exists for freedom of expression, academic or otherwise.

Toumani's title is a Turkish metaphor, *Bir Varmış Bir Yokmuş*, once upon a time. But, it is not, as in the original Turkish, of fables and fairy tales of princes and princesses told, as nursery rhymes by mothers and grandmothers. It refers to the dispossessed Armenians of Eastern Anatolia. This area, in Armenian ideology, is Western Armenia, an irredentist idea known as Greater Armenia. It is written into the Armenian Constitution and it is a big deal in American Diaspora politics. Ideologically, just as *Megali Idea* spawned Hellenic Asia Minor, so did Greater Armenia in the east and the entire genocide narrative as an irredentist project, justifying a land claim.

In *There Was And There Was Not* Toumani chooses an alternative path. Unsatisfied with standard brainwashing, the New York Times writer goes to Turkey, twice actually, spending a total of four years on a long search to find her own soul, to liberate the self in a "love thine enemy" experiment. She meets all kinds of people, ordinary citizens, officials, historians and, in particular Hrant Dink the murdered Turkish-Armenian journalist-pacifist dedicated to reconciliation. In the end, significantly due to Dink's influence, she succeeds, but no more than partially.

The author begins her odyssey with a confession. While a university student in Berkley, California, she comes face to face with the injustice of False Assumption. "There are so many layers of confusion in what happened..." she writes (p. 58) of the Algar Hamid affair at UCLA on 24 April 1998, when a British-born academic was assumed by Armenian students to be a Turkish historian and therefore became the target for harassment and a racist attack.

Toumani was revolted by the injustice of the Hamid affair. The unfairness pushed her into self-doubt and analysis. Is it likely that the "genocide" narrative is likewise based on False Assumption? In Armenian workshops and Youth Camps, she started questioning, but only got unpalatable doses of Dogma.

The author is a rare exception, standing against a stifling Armenian Diaspora schooling system designed for ethnic demonization and hate. She documents in vivid and painful detail how young Armenian children are brain-washed in their early years, in schools and youth camps, to hate Turks as a nation of “denialists” of the ultimate evil of genocide in WWI.

In the end, the author prescribes her own medicine for her growing doubts: Go to Turkey and find out for yourself. She prepares herself well, even learning Turkish.

In Turkey, she travelled extensively, and she tried to understand the Turkish mind. However, the book is sadly lacking in detail of the Turkish loss and suffering inflicted by the Armenian side in this conflict. The author’s Turkish friends are carefully selected for their pro-Armenian stance, like Muge Gokcen and Taner Akcam, and she offhandedly dismisses Turkish authorities on the subject, especially those connected, even marginally, with the Turkish government.

Yet, her project of search and self-discovery is still praiseworthy. The author visited Turkey twice, the first trip coinciding with the heinous murder of Hrant Dink. She admits his great influence, his passionate commitment to reconciliation between Turks and

Armenians, but, mysteriously, the author’s commitment to reconciliation is weak compared to Dink’s.

The author’s courage to make a public stand against the Armenian American Diaspora is to be lauded. Correcting wrong ideology begins with self-doubt and soul-searching. Courage is needed to confront historical truth. Hate and brainwashing merely replicate Dogma and reproduce closed minds. Real healing and reconciliation in past human tragedies are only possible with more voices like the author’s.

In conclusion, a few guidelines are in order to deal with ideological rights and wrongs in history.

Firstly, it should be remembered that History is not a monolithic discipline with an agreed upon methodology or norms of study. Nor are history writers always Historians or experts in archival research, competent in differentiating between reliable and unreliable sources. Popular history, like the books reviewed here, are books written by journalists and historical writers who may have more in common with fiction writers. In fiction, the plot and dramatic content are essential ingredients. Cold facts rarely sell books. Dramatic content, polished and embellished at the hand of gifted speech-writers, does. Historical truth, setting the record

straight, can and often does involve dramatic events, but dramatic writing is something other than History.

Official history writing is a State-approved record, subject to rules and regulations set by an authority. Political leaders have one eye on the past, the other on the future. What is legitimate and permissible is often determined with a subject's historical legacy. In the public relations and public opinion arena, popular history is far more significant. Often official history may be dismissed as propaganda. It is, therefore, extremely important that popular history writing is encouraged to ensure and safeguard a nation's historical heritage.

In the case of Turkish popular history writing, the genre is of recent origin. This review article has attempted to demonstrate how, when a vacuum

exists, it is easily filled by ideologically-driven books that represent nothing other than the intellectual hijacking of a national heritage.

In multinational Diaspora societies, there is a special challenge. The silent mainstream majority, including law-makers, often do not know the relevant ethnic history they are called to act upon as judge and jury. It is up to each ethnic group to safeguard its own heritage. For the silent majority, the guiding principle should be this: Each and every ethnic heritage must be held equal in law, and celebrated in peace and harmony without any racial preference.

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European Islamophobia Report

By Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez (Eds.)

Istanbul: SETA Foundation, 2016, 610 pages,

ISBN: 9789752459007.

Following the so-called refugee crisis, terrorist attacks in many European states, and the increasing visibility of far-right movements, a wave of anti-Muslim rhetoric and discourse has begun to dominate European politics. With regard to the developments on this phenomenon, the SETA Foundation, one of the leading think tanks started to publish the annual *European Islamophobia Report* (EIR), which was presented for the first time in 21 March 2016, the international day for the elimination of racial discrimination. It currently comprises nearly 27 national reports written by approximately 35 authors regarding the tendencies of Islamophobia in European countries. The report features the work of a broad group of specialists from different universities, Islamophobia observatories, and human rights activists.

As clearly stated in their introduction by the editors of the EIR, Enes Bayraklı from the Turkish-German University and Farid Hafez from Salzburg University, this long-time project is dedicated to documenting

and analysing trends in the spread of Islamophobia in various European states from a qualitative and not a quantitative research perspective; and aims to continue deepening understanding of the concept as well as funding for inquiry into this increasingly worrying phenomenon.

First of all, the term “Islamophobia” is defined by the editors in the 2015 version as follows: “*When talking about Islamophobia, we mean anti-Muslim racism. Islamophobia is about a dominant group of people aiming at seizing, stabilizing and widening their power by means of defining a scapegoat –real or invented – and excluding this scapegoat from the definition of a constructed we*” (EIR 2015, p.7).

Technically an executive summary at the beginning and a chronology at the end of each year’s report give the readers an overview on the state and the development of Islamophobia in the respective countries. The editors at the beginning and authors at the end of every report offer a couple of policy recommendations for political

bodies, civil society organizations and individuals in Europe. These recommendations include raising awareness in civil society of the problem of Islamophobia, recognition of Islamophobia by state institutions as a type of racism, as well as urging politicians to speak out against Islamophobia.

At the same time, several unique aspects of the EIR make a difference to current Islamophobia studies. For instance, unlike the former and current studies on Islamophobia, which have predominantly concentrated on Western Europe, this report is the first study that covers some Eastern European countries such as Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Serbia. Since the single national reports share the same structure (education, politics, employment, media, internet and the justice system), the EIR offers the possibility to compare Islamophobia in these countries as well.

The two volumes of the EIR in 2015 and in 2016 show that Muslim women are among the most vulnerable direct victims of Islamophobia. The editors explain this situation as follows: *“Women who are visibly Muslim are socially ostracised in many places. The combination of internal community problems, discrimination (education and employment) and hate crimes against*

Muslim women (data show that it is 70% more likely for a Muslim woman to be attacked in the street) are leaving their horrible mark on Muslim women”. Related to this, the editors argue that Islamophobia poses a great risk to the democratic foundations of European constitutions and social peace as well as the coexistence of different cultures throughout Europe. Hence, according to the editors, the protection and the empowerment of Muslim women have to be on the central agenda of states and NGOs. Also, regarding this fact the editors recommend that the response mechanisms should be made more available, accessible and clear while underlining that empowerment of the Muslim community is needed to allow citizenship and help European states deepen their democracies.

On the other hand, the findings of 2015 and 2016 editions of the EIR have been echoed in many international news agencies, including Al Jazeera, BBC, Der Standart, Huffington Post, Makkah Newspaper and Süddeutsche Zeitung. Also, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada used the information based on the 2016 national report of Finland to establish the “religion” section of Finland country profile. Moreover, International Network for Hate Studies (INHS), an internationally respected agency for hate crime studies, provides the whole EIR to its researchers as a useful source

on the field. In addition to this, the EIR has found attention in the European political level as well. For instance, the member of the European Parliament Paul Rübzig gave a question for written answer to the European Commission on 14th July 2016 to clarify whether any Commission expert involved in the writing of the report or not.

The European Islamophobia Report is an exceptional work that covers a broad spectrum of issues and challenges pertaining to the anti-Muslim wave in Europe. The report is very well-produced, the editing and proof-reading are of good quality. It is a welcome addition to the growing literature on an interesting and important issue on the world scene today. Despite the fact that the data in specific fields are not available as the

official bodies of many European states do not share the statistical data with the public, the report still facilitates an impulse for identifying research gaps; and it reshuffles many cards and opens many questions for further studies.

The EIR and its contributors should be congratulated for producing a truly valuable and detailed piece of work using an enormous amount of primary sources as well as providing new perspectives on Islamophobia studies. Hence, I would recommend the EIR series to scholars, policymakers, lawyers and judges who are interested in contemporary Islamophobia studies.

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Peacebuilding and NGOs: State-Civil Society Interactions

By Ryerson Christie

New York: Routledge Pub., 2013, 263 pages,
ISBN: 9780415693967.

This book focuses on the peacebuilding process and challenges in Cambodia by looking at state and civil society interaction. The peacebuilding process is a complicated step of conflict resolution stages to reach a durable peace in a post-conflict period. Christie's book is valuable for exploring in depth the relationship between the state and NGOs in the peacebuilding process. Additionally, a particularly important side of this book is the covering of a study about interaction between an authoritarian state and a civil society that tries to establish a sustainable liberal peace via the peacebuilding process despite the authoritarian regime.

Secondly, the author highlights that many peacebuilding analyses have tended only to look at the period of the UN mission. A durable peace, however, cannot be sustained unless we focus on the post-mission period of efforts to eliminate the socio-political reasons behind the conflict and violence. So, the composition of the interaction between the state and civil society is

vitaly valuable for reaching to the stable and durable peace in the post-mission peacebuilding process by uncovering challenges and difficulties in conflict studies.

The author of the book, Ryerson Christie, is a lecturer at the University of Bristol. His research revolves around critical security studies and analysis of peacebuilding. Especially the relationship between the state, civil society, and the local community stands at the center of his work. Among his recent work is research on the peacebuilding process in Southeast Asia, especially in Cambodia. *Peacebuilding and NGO's: State-civil Society Interactions* is among his publications on this topic. The author's research on Cambodia benefits from having accurate and enriched text from an inside perspective and because it gets around the usual problem of getting reliable information from officials in an autocratic regime. The author has coped with this problem by taking great support from academic and "development workers" in Cambodia.

The result is a tightly woven text of practical information from the field intertwined with theoretical explanations. Therefore this book genuinely contributes to the conflict resolution literature.

The book consists of nine chapters together with the introduction and conclusion. The first three chapters include the introduction and analysis of the peacebuilding process. The author explains the aim of the book in the introduction as being “*to understand how peacebuilding has served to dictate the nature and limits of politics that can take place within the targeted society and how it serves to define the very meaning of society, security and politics*” (p.4). The main purpose of the book is thus to try and develop a critical understanding of peacebuilding and to advance the ways in which CSS can be applied.

The second chapter covers *Critical Analyses of Peacebuilding*. The author reveals a relationship between security and identity by analyzing the political dynamic of country in a peacebuilding process. Hence, civil society and state interaction forms the main body of this chapter. The author has underlined the peacebuilding process by claiming that it’s not only a matter of conciliation between a conflicted dynamic in a society but also a dilemma of reconstruction of a democratic and liberal society. Therefore this chapter explains the

relationship between democratic peace and peacebuilding in the light of liberal theory, while providing a background for the Cambodia peacebuilding case at the same time.

The third section is focused on the criticism of NGOs in the peacebuilding process. Actually there are numerous critiques in the literature against NGOs’ role in the peacebuilding and development process, but this book deals with the potential problems that emerge from the modern practice of civil society-centric reconstruction and rehabilitation. This chapter includes therefore some points of criticism about neoliberalism, local economy, democratization/accountability, state relations and politics. NGOs are at the center of the critiques in this chapter because of their market solution character. Therefore, the results of the NGOs’ activities are argued to sometimes cause a distortion of the local character of the economy. Another criticism is about democratization and accountability, the argument being that NGOs do not often respond to all local needs and wants because their activities more often follow the interest of donors.

The following chapter explores the dynamic of conflict between the post-conflict state and the NGOs in the case of Cambodia. Firstly the author mentions about the brief history of

Cambodia at the beginning of this chapter to understand some challenges of the peacebuilding process in an authoritarian regime. In the way, this chapter also includes some critiques of imperialism in general. According to Christie “*the area of French colonial rule affected much of the social fabric of Cambodian society*” (p.66). Additionally, the author also finds a correlation between the authoritarian character of the Cambodian regime and its communist past. Military coups and political struggles have also demolished social networks and mutual trust in the society. Guerilla wars and external intervention destroyed not only Cambodian society but also the natural environment and resources. All of these negative effects are shown to complicate the peacebuilding process and rehabilitation of society in Cambodia.

The fifth chapter focuses on the conflict of interest between NGOs and economic and political elites in Cambodia and reveals some dynamics of mismanagement and abuse of authority over state resources. It goes on to claim that NGOs may play a leading role in society to resolve and ameliorate failed state syndromes by empowering understanding of democracy and its practices. In this context, Christie draws attention to the reason for state intervention into NGOs as based, in the Cambodian case, on conflicts of

interest. It’s obvious that there is a clear conflict between the needs of the community and the interests of the Cambodian elite especially on the natural resources of the state. Fisheries, lands and forestry have a prominent role in the Cambodian economy. The upper echelons of the business world and politics may manipulate the political and economic system for their advantage and individual interests. Public and private lines become blurred in the state management, at which point civil society and NGOs play an important role for the defense of community rights.

Another serious problem in Cambodian society is shown to be the sex trade. NGOs are seeking to halt or diminish prostitution and individuals who profit from this sector. The Cambodian government supports women rights and stands against the exploitation of women as well also, but Cambodian societal structure and culture complicates the applying of modern standards on women’s rights. Hence, NGOs are also dealing with cultural violation.

The sixth part has been allocated to bureaucratic problems. The authoritarian structure of the Cambodian state was mentioned before. NGOs may work freely and effectively only in a democratic society via the logic of a minimal state of neoliberal

thought. For full effectiveness therefore, the transition of the state also needs more time. According to Christie there are insufficient improvements in the liberalization of the state but many international organizations are working in Cambodia already. Additionally, the state has focused on the development goals to bring stability in Cambodia. Briefly, this chapter describes a “*gradually changing environment where the state is regaining financial and technical capacity and is beginning to reassert itself in some policy area*” (p.115).

The seventh chapter of this book is related with identity. Ethnic and religious diversity may be main sources of conflict in a society, and indeed, a strong Cambodian nationalism has been imbued with a strong anti-Vietnamese and anti-Thai character. Actually, nationalist and some religious characteristics of society were suppressed under the Marxist inspired Khmer Rouge rule, but the current situation on gender, race and religion has been at the heart of the narrative on what it is to be Cambodia now. Hence, some of the very same issues are also affecting the relationship between NGOs and the state.

The eighth chapter explores the dynamics of interaction between NGOs and the state that arise from a conflicting interpretation of what is and is not political. This chapter thus includes

some explanations and critiques about the issue of human rights, freedom of the press, and advocacy. The author reveals the difficulty of conducting a peacebuilding process in a society in which governance and social practices are not consistent with liberal values. In this context, the author mentions the creating of a democratic culture by means of developing associational behavior by peacebuilding practices. Yet, he does not touch on the potential role of the social and cultural character of Cambodians on the building of a democratic society.

In summary, this book focuses on how the peacebuilding process has served “*to dictate the nature and limits of politics that can take place within the targeted society*” (p.4) and how it serves to define the actual meaning of security and politics in a society. Christie tries to reveal how to improve the practices of civil society in Cambodia in this context. The author believes that the practice of peacebuilding theory may solve social and political problems by facilitating the liberalization of Cambodia because effective peacebuilding practices are based on the universalized notion of the nature of liberal civil society. Therefore, the Cambodian case is a peculiar example to expose how the post-conflict peace building process works in an authoritarian regime. The exclusive feature of this book is that it

looks at both sides of the peace building process, criticizing and discussing social and political interaction in a society. The role of the political culture of Cambodia provides an ideal case for discussing this subject. As a result, it can be mentioned frankly that this book is an authentic reference for

peacebuilding researchers and workers who are working on different cultures and other authoritarian regimes as well.

Fikret Birdiřli

Asst. Prof. Dr.

Kahramanmarař Sütçü İmam University

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Style and Format

Articles submitted to the journal should be original contributions. If another version of the article is under consideration by another publication, or has been or will be published elsewhere, authors should clearly indicate this at the time of submission. Manuscripts should be submitted to: e-mail: perceptions@mf.gov.tr. The final decision on whether the manuscript is accepted for publication in the Journal or not is made by the Editorial Board depending on the anonymous referees' review reports.

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Books

John Smith, *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100. John E. Smith (ed.), *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, pp. 100-102. John Smith and Mary Jones, *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100. Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, *The Book Title*, p. 100.

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Articles in Journals

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Articles in Edited Books

John Smith, "Article Title", in Mary Jones, *Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100.

Newspaper Articles

Christopher Hooton, "Japan is turning its abandoned golf courses into solar power plants", *The Independent*, 21 July 2015.

Manuscript References

PRO King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E159/69, m. 78. BM Add. MS 36042, fo.2 (plural fos.).

Four-figure numerals without comma or space: 2572. Titles of other record repositories, and names of collections of papers, in full in first reference: Scottish Record Office (hereafter SRO), Airlie Papers, GD 16, section 38/82, April 5, 1844. Compton Papers, kept at the estate office of the Marquess of Northampton, Castle Ashby (hereafter CA), bdle. 1011, no.29.

Official Papers

Parliamentary Papers: Select Committee on Manufacturers (Parl. Papers, 1833, VI), 0.456.

Subsequent references as: SC on ... (PP, 1839, VII), 00.2347.

Hansard (Commons), 4th ser. XXXVI, 641-2, 22 Aug. 1895.

Theses

For titles of published and unpublished theses use italics: John E. Smith, *Title of Thesis*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Name of the University, Year, Chapter #, p. #

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Azam Ahmed and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "U.S. and Cuba Reopen Long-Closed Embassies", *The New York Times*, 20 July 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/americas/cuba-us-embassy-diplomatic-relations.html?ref=world&r=0> (last visited 21 July 2015).

Title of Book Reviews

Türk Basınında Dış Habercilik (Foreign News Reporting in the Turkish Media), by M. Mücahit Küçükylmaz and Hakan Çopur. Ankara: SETA, 2010, 168 pages, ISBN 9786054023073.



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