

PERCEPTIONS

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Introduction: Celebrating the 25th Anniversary
of the Independence of the Turkic-Speaking
States

Oktay F. TANRISEVER

Trade Relations Between Turkey and Kazakhstan
on the 25th Anniversary of Kazakhstan's
Independence

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Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking
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Ercan DURDULAR



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Introduction: Celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the Independence of the Turkic-Speaking States

Oktay F. TANRISEVER*

When the Turkic-speaking states gained their independence from the Soviet Union, which disintegrated largely peacefully towards the end of 1991, few international experts realized the significance of the newly independent Turkic-speaking states for the international system. Today, it is a widely shared belief that the independence of the Turkic-speaking states has substantially transformed not only the regional makeup of the Caucasus and Central Asia but also the interactions between the post-Soviet space and its neighbouring regions.

The independence declarations of the Turkic-speaking states in the Caucasus and Central Asia; namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, were enthusiastically recognized first by Turkey in early 1992. Turkey recognized these independence declarations without any hesitation.

Ankara welcomed these declarations as a positive move that could contribute to regional peace and stability as well as development. Turkey also provided strong diplomatic support and generous technical and economic assistance to these Turkic-speaking states.

The re-entry of the Turkic-speaking states into the international system was also a welcome development for all countries of the world since it eliminated the artificial barriers created by the Soviet Union and the Cold War practices and allowed for further international cooperation. Likewise, the development of socio-economic as well as cultural relations among the Turkic-speaking peoples was also expected to contribute to the advancement of interactions between the Turkic-speaking states and other countries globally. In this context, Turkey's lead in recognizing the independence of the Turkic-speaking states was followed by the other members of the United Nations in 1992, when they also realized the importance of welcoming the Turkic-speaking countries into the international community.

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This special issue of *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* is devoted to marking the 25th anniversary of Turkey's recognition of the independence declarations by the Turkic-speaking states. It seems that this anniversary is an appropriate time to assess both the performance of the Turkic-speaking states in strengthening their independence and the development of bilateral and multilateral relations among Turkey and the other Turkic-speaking countries. Not surprisingly, the diplomatic issues and international challenges facing the Turkic states after 25 years of independence have been widely studied by a wide range of academics, experts, and diplomats.

In response to the call for papers to this special issue of *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, many authors submitted their papers to the journal to be considered for inclusion. Our academic referees blind reviewed all of these submissions individually.

The independence declarations of the Turkic-speaking states in the Caucasus and Central Asia; namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, were enthusiastically recognized first by Turkey in early 1992.

This special issue of *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* is devoted to marking the 25th anniversary of Turkey's recognition of the independence declarations by the Turkic-speaking states.

Although all of the submitted papers included invaluable insights about the topic of this special issue, the following five articles have been selected for inclusion in our special issue upon the positive recommendation of the academic referees. The selected articles of this special issue were judged to have a strong potential in contributing significantly to our understanding of the Turkic-speaking states as well as to their relations among themselves.

The diplomatic and economic aspects of the partnership between Turkey and the Turkic-speaking states is explored in the article entitled "Trade Relations Between Turkey and Kazakhstan on the 25th Anniversary of the Independence of Kazakhstan". The authors of this article, Nevzat Şimşek, Cengizhan Canaltay, and Hayal Ayça Şimşek have been doing research on this region for several years and work at the Eurasian Research Institute, which is based in Almaty. The close diplomatic relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan have brought many business opportunities

for both countries. The authors demonstrate that in less than a quarter century, the volume of exports between Turkey and Kazakhstan has multiplied by 39 times, while imports increased 110 times. As for investment sector, Turkey is the fourth largest investor country in non-energy products. The article highlights the importance of the close relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan in increasing the trade volume between these countries. This win-win model of diplomatic and economic partnership could be considered as a positive example for the other countries too.

In his article titled “Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy on the 25th Anniversary of Restored Independence,” the Special Envoy Amb. Arastu Habibbeyli from Azerbaijan’s Presidential Administration, analyses the evolution of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy over the last 25 years of its independence. In this article of the special issue, the author investigates under what circumstances Azerbaijan became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, how it evolved from being a recipient of international aid to becoming a donor country, how the country has become a reliable energy partner, and finally, how its robust economy has recovered from the severe economic crisis in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. Azerbaijan’s success story under very challenging regional circumstances

demonstrates how demanding it is to achieve so much in such a short period of time.

Azerbaijan’s success story under very challenging regional circumstances demonstrates how demanding it is to achieve so much in such a short period of time.

The following article, which is entitled “A Quarter-Century Pursuit of Independence: Politics of Trade, Energy, and Economic Development in Uzbekistan” is authored by Halil Burak Sakal, a PhD candidate in the International Relations Department at Middle East Technical University. The author scrutinizes the political economy of independent Uzbekistan from a historical perspective. Halil Burak Sakal explores Uzbekistan’s post-Soviet development in three periods and argues that the Uzbek economic model is an important part of Uzbek independence, and, since its independence, helped its economy survive at least two global financial crises without entering into any hegemonic relationship with the advanced economies. In this article, the author presents an optimistic outlook for the future of the Uzbek

economy under the political leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and predicts closer cooperation between Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbors as well as Turkey.

As a regional cultural cooperation organization, TÜRKSOY has been a very effective common platform and has played a key role in the revival and promotion of the national cultures of the Turkic-republics globally.

The importance of close and friendly relations between the Turkic-speaking countries is further highlighted in the fifth article, written by Firat Purtaş, Deputy Head of TÜRKSOY, and Professor of International Relations at Gazi University in Ankara. This article is entitled “Cultural Diplomacy Initiatives of the Turkic-Speaking Republics.” The author explores the initiatives of cultural diplomacy which the Turkic-speaking nations have undertaken at a global level. The main argument put forward in the article is that the newly independent Turkic-speaking republics have determined a culture-based policy for their state building. The article demonstrates convincingly

that as a regional cultural cooperation organization, TÜRKSOY has been a very effective common platform and has played a key role in the revival and promotion of the national cultures of the Turkic-republics globally.

The special issue concludes with an analysis of another important multilateral platform for strengthening closer cooperation and friendly relations among the Turkic-speaking republics, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TurkPA). Ercan Durdular, Senior Advisor to the Speaker of TGNA, explores from an analytical perspective this attempt at promoting parliamentary diplomacy among the Turkic-speaking states. This article, which is entitled “The Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TurkPA): Beyond Parliamentary Diplomacy,” discusses the current status and activities of TurkPA. It argues that TurkPA constitutes an effective forum for parliamentary diplomacy and serves as the parliamentary dimension of the cooperation and integration of Turkic-speaking nations. The author also demonstrates how, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Turkic-speaking nations displayed their dedication to acting together in a coordinated way by establishing TurkPA. In fact, as Ercan Durdular shows, TurkPA has a strong potential for contributing to the diplomatic

resolution of regional problems as well as to the harmonization of laws and policies towards regional integration.

In conclusion, I hope the readers of this special issue will find these articles to be noteworthy contributions to the literature at a time when we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the independence declarations by the Turkic-speaking states. I also believe that the analytical insights of these articles could stimulate further discussions about the future prospects of the Turkic-speaking states. Last but not least, I would like to note that this

special issue of *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* is dedicated to the well-founded fraternal ties between Turkey and the other Turkic-speaking states. Happy anniversaries!!!

This special issue of Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs is dedicated to the well-founded fraternal ties between Turkey and the other Turkic-speaking states.

Trade Relations Between Turkey and Kazakhstan on the 25th Anniversary of Kazakhstan's Independence

Nevzat ŞİMŞEK*, Cengizhan CANALTAY**
Hayal Ayça ŞİMŞEK***

Abstract

Since Kazakhstan gained independence in 1992, bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Turkey have developed in many spheres. The warm relations have brought many business opportunities for both countries. Over 23 years, the amount of exports from Turkey to Kazakhstan have multiplied by 39 times while imports from Kazakhstan have increased by 110 times. As for Kazakhstan's investment sector, Turkey is the fourth largest investor country in non-energy sectors, and 17th in terms of capitalization. Moreover, in terms of compatibility regarding the trade structure, it would be beneficial for Kazakhstan to increase its trade volume as shown with the results of the trade complementarity index. This research looks at the bilateral trade relations between

Kazakhstan and Turkey on the 25th year anniversary of Kazakhstan's independence in order to analyze the bilateral economic relations in different perspectives such as changes in trade amount, trade structure and trade complementarity.

Key Words

Kazakhstan, Turkey, Bilateral Trade Relations, Trade Complementarity Index, Central Asia.

Introduction

Turkey and Kazakhstan have friendly relations in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Although the bilateral trade relationship between Turkey and Kazakhstan has started with a marginal volume of US\$ 30 million in 1992, continuous growth in trade throughout the 1990s increased the trade volume to US\$ 462 million in 2000, and US\$ 3.26 billion in 2010. This number subsequently fell to US\$ 1.85 billion in 2015,¹ despite both country's leaders having set a goal at the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council

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(HLSCC) meeting on 11-12 October 2012 to increase the bilateral trade volume to US\$ 10 billion by 2015.²

Turkey is the fourth largest investor country in non-energy sectors, and 17th in terms of capitalization.

Within bilateral trade relations, Turkey's top export products are gold, optical instruments, textiles, and metallic structures, and its top import products are copper, petroleum gases, zinc, and aluminum. Turkey's exports are diverse with a majority of them consisting of labor-intensive and difficult to imitate products, while in return, she heavily imports raw materials from Kazakhstan.³ The share of the top 10 Turkish export products to Kazakhstan are equal to 36% of the total export amount. This statistic shows that Turkey's export goods are diversified in Kazakhstan-Turkey trade relations. As for the top 10 import products, the figure is 97% of the total import volume.

During the early years of bilateral relations, in order to increase the business potential between the two countries, the "Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement" was signed in August 1995 to relieve companies from an additional burden, thus laying the ground for a

suitable business environment for both countries. In addition, in 1996, the "Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments" and in 1997 the "Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement" were signed to increase bilateral trade between Turkey and Kazakhstan.⁴

Another important agreement in bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Turkey was the signing of Action Plan 2012-2015, on the implementation of the joint economic program "New Synergy" in 2012. This program aimed to increase the number of Turkish companies investing in Kazakhstan. Prior to this agreement, both countries agreed in October 2011 on a memorandum for the creation of a joint Kazakh-Turkish industrial zone.⁵

Currently, Turkish firms mainly operate in the food, construction, hotel management, manufacturing, and medication-chemistry industries, providing jobs for more than 15,000 people. Turkey is the 17th largest investor in Kazakhstan in terms of capitalization and the 4th biggest country in terms of non-energy sector investments. As an example of the latter, in 2015 Turkish construction firms undertook 13 projects with a total worth of US\$ 808 million.⁶

In the political sphere, in the early 1990s, sentimental discourses shaped Turkey's approach to the region. In the

2000s, by developing more pragmatic policies, the relations between the two countries in the economic, energy and military spheres further developed. The Strategic Partnership Agreement that was signed in 2009 paved the way for strengthening the dynamic development of bilateral relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2012 has helped to create an institutional mechanism for further development of the strategic relations between the two countries.⁷

The Strategic Partnership Agreement that was signed in 2009 paved the way for strengthening the dynamic development of bilateral relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan.

Another important feature of the bilateral relations is the cooperation in culture and education. In education, Khodja Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University was established in 1992, and through exchange programs, thousands of students have been studying in Turkey and Kazakhstan since then. Regarding cultural cooperation, in 2010, the International Turkic Academy was established to carry out cultural and

historical projects related to the Turkic nations.⁸

Alongside these bilateral agreements, Kazakhstan and Turkey are also cooperating under various regional and international cooperation efforts such as the UN, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). In addition, a number of multilateral institutions such as the Turkic Council, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY), and the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries (TurkPA) are strengthening the links between Turkey and Kazakhstan through carrying out various mutually beneficial projects.⁹

Recent Economic Outlook of Turkey-Kazakhstan Bilateral Trade Relations

In terms of GDP per capita, Turkey and Kazakhstan's income levels are relatively close to each other. In 2015 Turkey's GDP per capita was US\$ 9,130 while Kazakhstan's was US\$ 10,508. In both countries, GDP per

capita is in a falling trend since 2013. For instance, Kazakhstan's GDP per capita decreased 8% in 2014 and 20% in 2015, falling from US\$ 14,310 in 2013 to US\$ 10,508 in 2015. As for Turkey, the drop is relatively moderate compared to Kazakhstan, with the GDP per capita reduced by 4% in 2014 and 11% in 2015, shrinking from US\$

10,800 to US\$ 9,130¹⁰. Looking at GDP by sector composition in Turkey, in 2015 the contribution of agriculture was 8.5%, industry was 26.4%, and services was 64.9%. For Kazakhstan, these figures in 2015 were 5% for agriculture, 33.2% for industry and 61.7% for services.¹¹

Table 1: Turkey-Kazakhstan Relations Main Indicators (2015)

	<i>Turkey to Kazakhstan</i>	<i>Kazakhstan to Turkey</i>
Total Trade (million US\$)	1859	1859
<i>Export</i> (million US\$)	750	1109
<i>Export Trade Share</i> (%)	0.52	2.78
Investments		
<i>Foreign Direct Investment</i> (million US\$)	22*	26*

* January–August 2016

Source: UN Comtrade.com, at <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017); TCMB.gov.tr, <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TCMB+TR/TCMB+TR/Main+Menu/Istatistikler/Odemeler+Dengesi+ve+Ilgili+Istatistikler/Odemeler+Dengesi+Istatistikleri/Veri+Tablolar> (last visited 04 November 2016).

Turkey and Kazakhstan have relatively balanced trade relations, with Kazakhstan's exports to Turkey being only 1.4 times higher than Turkey's

exports to Kazakhstan. In terms of export trade share, Turkey's exports to Kazakhstan constitute 0.52% while Kazakhstan's exports to Turkey are

2.78% of the total export amount. When we look at Turkey's trade relations with the other Central Asian countries, we see that Kazakhstan is Turkey's second largest export partner after Turkmenistan, and its first import partner. Regarding foreign direct investments, since the beginning of 2016, Kazakhstan has invested US\$26 million in Turkey while Turkish investments in Kazakhstan have reached US\$ 22 million.¹²

In terms of export trade share, Turkey's exports to Kazakhstan constitute 0.52% while Kazakhstan's exports to Turkey are 2.78% of the total export amount.

Turkey's bilateral trade relations with Kazakhstan started in 1992 with a relatively marginal volume of US\$ 19.3 million in exports and US\$ 10.5 million in imports. However, during the period of 1993-1998, export and import volumes significantly increased, with an average of 66% growth rate for export and 99% for import. In this period, export volume increased by 11 times and import volume by 29 times, reaching US\$ 212.8 million and US\$ 295.9 million respectively. Over 23

years of trade, exports have increased by 39 times and imports by 110 times. Also the gap between exports and imports changed in favor of imports by 1.47 times in 2015. This figure reached its peak in 2008, with a 2.6 times difference between imports and exports¹³.

During the period of 1992-2015, Turkey's exports to Kazakhstan grew on average by 26%. Moreover, the period of 2000-2007 was the most stable period for exports, as export volume increased from US\$ 116.1 million to US\$ 1,079 million, with an average growth rate of 36.3%. However, due to the global financial crisis in 2009, the growth rate fell two years in a row, resulting in a 42% decrease in exports, to US\$ 633.5 million in 2009. Since then, export volume has not yet been able to reach its 2007 level, although it came close in 2012 at US\$ 1,069.3 million. Exports volume started to recover in 2010 and had risen with an average of 19.2% until 2013. The growth rate of Turkey's exports started to decrease gradually in 2013 by 2.3%, with the falling trend continuing in 2014 and deepening still further in 2015, with a 23.95% decrease in trade volume¹⁴ It should be noted that here the decline in exports was influenced by Kazakhstan's entrance to the Eurasian Custom Union, which was later transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union.

Table 2: Turkey-Kazakhstan Bilateral Trade Volume and Growth (1992-2015)


Year	Turkey's Export to Kazakhstan (million US\$)	Growth Rate (%)	Turkey's Import from Kazakhstan (million US\$)	Growth Rate (%)
1992	19.35		10.51	
1993	67.80	250,38	43.74	316,17
1994	131.73	94,29	32.30	-26,15
1995	149.79	13,70	86.63	168,20
1996	163.24	8,97	93.69	8,149
1997	210.49	28,94	165.28	76,41
1998	212.88	1,13	253.66	53,47
1999	96.52	-54,6	295.90	16,65
2000	116.14	20,32	346.34	17,04
2001	119.79	3,14	90.34	-73,91
2002	158.65	32,44	201.60	123,15
2003	233.99	47,48	266.63	32,25
2004	355.59	51,96	442.19	65,84
2005	459.94	29,34	558.89	26,39
2006	696.68	51,47	993.72	77,80
2007	1079	54,87	1284.04	29,21
2008	890.60	-17,46	2331.99	81,61
2009	633.50	-28,86	1077.07	-53,81
2010	819.89	29,42	2470.96	129,4
2011	947.89	15,61	1995.11	-19,25
2012	1069.37	12,81	2056.08	3,05
2013	1039.42	-2,80	1760.11	-14,39
2014	977.48	-5,95	1236.26	-29,76
2015	750.15	-23,25	1109.83	-10,22

Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).

As for import dynamics, it should be mentioned that imports followed a similar trend as exports did, but in more volatile structure throughout the period of 1992–2015. The changes in imports growth rates often fluctuated. For instance, in the period of 2000–2008, import volume grew from US\$ 346.3 million to US\$ 2331.9 million, but within a range of 17% to 123%. Due to negative effects of the global financial crisis, Turkey’s imports from Kazakhstan fell by 53% to US\$ 1,077

million in 2009. During the period of 2013–2015, imports reduced by 14.3% in 2013, 29.7% in 2014 and 10.2% in 2015¹⁵. The reason for this decrease in amount could be associated to some extent with the fall in oil prices. For instance, imports of petroleum gases from Kazakhstan consisted of 34% of the total import volume in 2014. In terms of quantity there was only a 7% decrease, but in terms of value there was a nearly 50% decrease in 2015 compared with 2014.¹⁶

Figure 1: Trade Partnership Ranking with Kazakhstan (1992–2015)



Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).


Looking at trade partnership ranking by years, the figures show that Kazakhstan is one of Turkey’s top 40

trade partners. In accordance with the growth rate dynamics of export and import, Kazakhstan’s ranking changes

significantly. Compared with the early 1990s, Kazakhstan's ranking has shown a significant increase. Within the Central Asian region, bilateral trade

relations have grown over the years and Kazakhstan became Turkey's largest trade partner in 2015.¹⁷

Figure 2: Top Export Partners of Turkey 2015 in million US\$)



Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).


Turkey's top 10 export partners reveal Turkey's strong trade relationships with mostly European countries, 6 out of 10, entering the list in 2015. Germany is the major export destination country even though the export volume decreased by US\$ 1.7 billion in 2015 from US\$ 15.1 billion to US\$ 13.4 billion, while exports to the United Kingdom (UK) increased by 6.6% in 2015, allowing the UK to stay in second

The top 10-trade partner list also shows that Turkey has strong trade relations with other neighboring and near abroad countries like Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Iran, alongside the developed economies in the world.

place. In addition, Switzerland, with a 76.9% increase in 2015, entered the list by climbing 4 steps up to 7th place. The top 10-trade partner list also shows that Turkey has strong trade relations with other neighboring and near

abroad countries like Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Iran, alongside the developed economies in the world¹⁸. Among Turkey's top export partners, in 2014 Kazakhstan took 35th place, and in 2015 it was positioned in 38th place.

Figure 3: Top Import Partners of Turkey 2015 (in million US\$)




Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).

Import figures show that Turkey's import partners are diverse, with four European top export partners also constituting Turkey's top import partners, though with different rankings. For instance, Germany stayed in the top 3, France maintains its 6th position, and Spain falls to 10th place. In addition, since 2006 Russia had been Turkey's top import partner, but in 2015, imports from Russia sharply

fell and China took the leadership. Looking at the top 10, it could be seen that the total import volume of the top 3 is significantly higher than the entire rest of the group, as a combination of imports from China, Germany and Russia constituted 23% of Turkey's total import volume for 2015.¹⁹ Among Turkey's top import partners, in 2014 Kazakhstan took 35th place and in 2015 it was positioned in 37th place.

Figure 4: Top Export Partners of Kazakhstan 2015 (in million US\$)




Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).

The figure also reveals that there was a significant decrease in Kazakhstan’s export volume mainly due to the sharp fall in oil prices in 2015, which reduced the revenues from oil exports. Among Kazakhstan’s top export partners, in 2015 Italy was the top export partner while China was second, Russia was fourth, and Turkey was positioned in eighth place. At that point, even though the export volume decreased, Turkey had climbed two steps up from tenth place in 2014. Moreover, an interesting point is that in terms of export destinations, Kazakhstan

and Turkey share six countries. As for Turkey, Kazakhstan is ranked its 38th export partner, while for Kazakhstan Turkey was the 8th largest export partner in 2015.²⁰

Among Kazakhstan’s top export partners, in 2015 Italy was the top export partner while China was second, Russia was fourth, and Turkey was positioned in eighth place.

Figure 5: Top Import Partners of Kazakhstan 2015 (in million US\$)

Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).

For Kazakhstan, Russia and China are valuable import partners since these two countries alone constitute 51% of Kazakhstan's total import volume, while the combination of the rest of the list equals to 27%. The Kazakh and Russian economies have strong relations, which became even more integrated with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015. Like in the export ranking, despite the decrease in the import volume, Turkey stepped up 2 ranks and was positioned in 7th place in 2015.²¹

The difference in the top trade partner countries between Kazakhstan and Turkey requires a detailed analysis of their trade structure. For this purpose,

the trade complementarity index is calculated in the following section.

Trade Complementarity Index (TCI)

In this section, it will be analyzed whether the trade structures of the two countries complement each other. Therefore, the trade complementarity index developed by Michaely will be used.²² This index shows to what extent the two countries are “natural trade partners”. In other words, it expresses how much the import structure of one country overlaps with the export structure of the other. In fact, this index gives important information in order to

see the trade structure of two countries before any trade deal is struck. It is calculated as,

$$TC_{ij} = (1 - \sum(|m_{ik} - x_{ij}| / 2))$$

Where x_{ij} is the share of good i in the global exports of country j and m_{ik} is the share of good i in all imports of country k . The index is zero when no goods are exported by one country or imported by the other and 1 when the export and import shares exactly match.

The trade complementarity index tells us to what extent the reporter country's

export pattern matches with its partner country's import pattern. A high degree of complementarity index is assumed to indicate that the two countries would benefit from increasing their trade volume. This index can also be useful to determine the prospects of potential regional trade agreements. TCI ranges between 0 and 1. A score of 1 indicates that the export structure of country i is perfectly matching with its partner country j 's import structure while a score close to 0 means that these countries are perfect competitors.²³

Table 3: Trade Complementarity Index 1995-2015

Years	Turkey-Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan-Turkey
1995	0,32	0,42
1996	0,32	0,37
1997	0,27	0,35
1998	0,22	0,35
1999	0,23	0,37
2000	0,24	0,37
2001	0,27	0,40
2002	0,25	0,43
2003	0,25	0,43
2004	0,24	0,46
2005	0,26	0,47
2006	0,26	0,53
2007	0,27	0,56
2008	0,23	0,50
2009	0,21	0,46

Source: Calculated by authors using SITC Rev.3 from UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).

In table 3, the calculations are made for the period of 1992-2015. The Turkey-Kazakhstan part, which looks at whether Turkey's import structure matches Kazakhstan's export structure, reveals low values. This means that Turkey's import structure does not fit very well with the goods exported by Kazakhstan. This indicates that there are some obstacles for traditional export goods of Kazakhstan to be exported to Turkey. At this point, regarding the traditional export goods of Kazakhstan like energy exports, it is important to solve the problems such as the Caspian issue and others.


Similarly, the Kazakhstan-Turkey part shows how Kazakhstan's import structure is in line with the Turkey's export structure (or Turkey's export structure with Kazakhstan's import structure). As can be seen in Table 3, the values are higher. This means that Turkey's exported products can be marketed in Kazakhstan. In other words, it can be concluded that the two countries are complementary. Turkey will be able to sell its goods to Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan will be able to buy the goods it needs from Turkey.

The Structure of Trade between Turkey and Kazakhstan

After the trade complementarity index, the trade structure between Turkey and Kazakhstan can be analyzed in more detail at the industry level. For this purpose, the trade structures of Turkey and Kazakhstan are examined for the period of 1992-2015 by distinguishing raw material intensive industries, labor intensive industries, capital intensive industries, and easy to imitate and difficult to imitate R&D industries²⁴. In these calculations, the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) of the three-digit level data obtained from the UN's Comtrade database were used. A total of 258 industry-level calculations were made: 79 raw materials intensive, 62 labor intensive, 37 capital intensive, 28 easy to imitate R&D and 52 difficult to imitate R&D industries (See Appendix 1).

The trade structures of Turkey and Kazakhstan are examined for the period of 1992-2015 by distinguishing raw material intensive industries, labor intensive industries, capital intensive industries, and easy to imitate and difficult to imitate R&D industries.

Figure 6: Sectoral Share of Turkey’s Export to Kazakhstan 1992, 2000, 2010, 2015 (%)




Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).

The sectoral share of Turkey’s exports to Kazakhstan indicates that labor intensive goods and difficult to imitate research goods are the most exported products. During the early years of independence in 1992, labor intensive, capital intensive and difficult to imitate research goods were the main three groups, consisting of 82% of the total export amount. However, throughout the years, there was a shift from capital-intensive goods to mostly labor intensive goods and slightly to

difficult to research imitate goods. Easy to imitate research goods and raw material goods stayed relatively the same, with a slight decrease in 2015. Moreover, over the last five years, another shift has occurred from labor-intensive goods to difficult to imitate research goods. It should be mentioned that labor intensive and difficult to imitate research goods are the largest categories, with continuously increasing shares in Turkey’s export to Kazakhstan.²⁵

Figure 7: Sectoral Share of Turkey's Import from Kazakhstan 1992, 2000, 2010, 2015 (%)



Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).

Turkey's import structure from Kazakhstan is dominated by raw material intensive goods and capital-intensive goods, the clearly dominant categories at 99%. Although in 1992 Turkey imported largely easy to imitate research goods, the share of raw material goods consisted of 24%, and at that time, Turkey did not import

any capital-intensive goods. However, since 2000, the share of both groups, especially raw material intensive goods, has increased significantly. Among these, the main imported products are petroleum products (333, 344) in the raw material intensive goods category, and copper in the capital intensive goods category.²⁶

Table 4: Top 10 Industries of Turkey's Export to Kazakhstan (SITC 3 digit) 1992, 2000, 2010, 2015 (Million US\$)

1992					2000				
Type	Code	SITC Industry	Value	Share	Type	Code	SITC Industry	Value	Share
CI-I	781	Motor vehicles excluding buses	2.28	12,8%	DII-I	764	Telecom equipment	11.2	9,6%
DII-I	872	Medical instruments	1.74	9,8%	LI-I	659	Floor covering	9	7,8%
EII-I	542	Medicaments	1.39	7,8%	LI-I	642	Paper	7.3	6,3%
CI-I	783	Road motor vehicles	0.87	4,9%	DII-I	773	Electric distribution	5.94	5,1%
LI-I	821	Furniture	0.78	4,4%	LI-I	691	Metallic structures	5.54	4,7%
DII-I	724	Textile, leather machines	0.69	3,8%	LI-I	811	Prefabricate building	5	4,3%
RMI-I	421	Fixed vegetable fats and oils	0.68	3,8%	LI-I	893	Articles of plastics	4.5	3,8%
CII-I	554	Soap	0.5	2,9%	CI-I	121	Tobacco	4.4	3,8%
DII-I	741	Heating	0.47	2,6%	CI-I	554	Soap	4.4	3,8%
LI-I	658	Textile Articles	0.46	2,6%	DII-I	727	Food Process Machines	3.97	3,4%
2010					2015				
Type	Code	SITC Industry	Value	Share	Type	Code	SITC Industry	Value	Share
LI-I	897	Gold	62.4	7,6%	LI-I	897	Gold	40.63	5,4%
LI-I	659	Floor covering	41.5	5%	DII-I	871	Optical Instruments	35.12	4,7%
LI-I	845	Other textile apparel	33.8	4,1%	LI-I	845	Other textile apparel	32.33	4,3%
DII-I	773	Electronic distribution equip.	33.3	4%	LI-I	691	Metallic structures	27.63	3,6%
DII-I	775	Household electric equip.	28.2	3,4%	DII-I	728	Other Machines Industrial	25.94	3,4%
EII-I	583	Monofilament of plastics	27.3	3,3%	DII-I	727	Food process machines	24.88	3,3%
LI-I	893	Articles of Plastics	25.9	3,1%	DII-I	775	Household electric equip.	24.28	3,2%
LI-I	691	Metallic structures	23.8	2,2%	LI-I	821	Furniture	21.82	2,9%
LI-I	821	Furniture	21.5	2,6%	LI-I	659	Floor covering	20.80	2,7%
LI-I	699	Manufactured based metal	20	2,4%	DII-I	773	Electronic distribution equip.	19.56	2,6%

Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).

In terms of exports, in 1992 there was a balanced sharing between categories, with capital intensive goods and difficult to imitate goods having the largest shares in terms of number. The total share of the top 10 exported products was equal to 55.2% of the total export amount. After 2000, both the number and share of labor intensive goods in the top 10 significantly increased, while capital intensive goods decreased. For instance, the number of labor intensive goods increased from two in 1992 to five in 2000 and seven in 2010, then falling again to five in 2015. Only difficult to imitate goods show a similar trend. An interesting point is that between the period of 2000-2015, large numbers of products in the top 10 could be used in the construction sector, such as metallic structures, electronic distribution equipment, other industrial machines, household equipment and prefabricated buildings. This could be associated with the construction boom during the 2000s in Kazakhstan, where numerous Turkish construction companies operated. Another point is that although there is a concentration on the export of labor intensive and difficult to imitate goods, in terms of shares, comparing with 1992, the total share of the top 10 products fell from 55.2% to 36.36%, meaning there is an increasing diversification in Turkey's exports to Kazakhstan.²⁷

Looking at Turkey's top import goods from Kazakhstan, it can be seen that imports are heavily dominated by raw material and capital intensive goods. Among these categories, petroleum products (333, 344) and copper's share is significantly larger than any other product. For instance, in 2000 the combination of petroleum crude oil, copper and flat irons (673, 674) was equal to 92.9% of Turkey's total imports from Kazakhstan. Moreover, the share of the top 10 reached 99% in 2010, where a combination of petroleum products (333, 344) and copper constituted 79.96%. As for 2015, the structure was the same, with the share of raw material and capital intensive goods equalling 96% of the total import volume.²⁸

Conclusion

Kazakhstan has a goal of entering the list of the top 30 economically developed countries in the world by 2050. Turkey aims to enter the top 10 most developed countries in the world by 2023, the 100th year anniversary of its establishment. With its young and dynamic population and its economic performance along with the realization of numerous socio-economic reforms and significant infrastructural investments, Turkey is confident on its path to reach that goal. In short, Turkey

Table 5: Top 10 Industries of Turkey's Import from Kazakhstan (SITC 3 digit) 1992-2015 (Million US\$)

1992					2000				
Type	Code	SITC Industry	Value	Share	Type	Code	SITC Industry	Value	Share
CI-I	686	Zinc	3.5	34,1%	RMI-I	333	Petroleum oil crude	169	48,85%
CI-I	682	Copper	1.83	17,4%	CI-I	682	Copper	107	31,12%
RMI-I	211	Hides, Skins	1.63	15,5%	CI-I	673	Flat rolled Iron	30.2	8,72%
CI-I	674	Flat plated Iron	1.11	10,5%	CI-I	674	Flat plated Iron	14.5	4,21%
LI-I	263	Cotton	1.08	10,3%	RMI-I	41	Wheat	12.7	3,68%
RMI-I	278	Other Crude Minerals	0.32	3,1%	RMI-I	282	Ferrous waste	4.1	1,20%
RMI-I	322	Briquettes	0.3	2,8%	DII-I	724	Textile leather machines	1.2	0,35%
RMI-I	291	Crude animal materials	0.17	1,6%	RMI-I	222	Oilseed	0.9	0,29%
RMI-I	248	Wood	0.12	1,1%	RMI-I	278	Other Crude Minerals	0.89	0,26%
LI-I	693	Wire products	0.10	0,9%	RMI-I	223	Oilseed other.	0.83	0,24%
2010					2015				
Type	Code	SITC Industry	Value	Share	Type	Code	SITC Industry	Value	Share
RMI-I	333	Petroleum oil crude	1078.43	43,6%	CI-I	682	Copper	560	50,4%
CI-I	682	Copper	516.63	20,9%	RMI-I	344	Petroleum gases	205.67	18,5%
RMI-I	344	Petroleum gases	380.89	15,4%	CI-I	686	Zinc	155.68	14%
CI-I	686	Zinc	138.31	5,6%	CI-I	684	Aluminum	80.54	7,2%
RMI-I	41	Wheat	114.98	4,6%	CI-I	685	Lead	39.22	3,5%
CI-I	684	Aluminum	109.32	4,4%	RMI-I	334	Petroleum products	14.56	1,3%
RMI-I	282	Ferrous waste	39.34	1,5%	RMI-I	41	Wheat	8.91	0,8%
CI-I	685	Lead	35.46	1,4%	LI-I	651	Textile Yarn	7.66	0,6%
RMI-I	342	Liquefied propane	28.64	1,1%	RMI-I	342	Liquefied propane	6.76	0,5%
RMI-I	274	Sulphur	5.33	0,2%	CI-I	575	Other plastics	5.97	0,4%

Source: UN Comtrade.com, <https://comtrade.un.org/> (last visited 18 January 2017).

and Kazakhstan, with their geostrategic positions as well as their strong geo-economic potential and opportunities, mainly their young, dynamic and well-educated populations, are two leading brother countries.

Turkey and Kazakhstan, with their geostrategic positions as well as their strong geo-economic potential and opportunities, mainly their young, dynamic and well-educated populations, are two leading brother countries.

In conclusion, it should be noted that bilateral trade relations between Turkey

and Kazakhstan have steadily developed over the years, as Kazakhstan has become Turkey's major trade partner in the Central Asian region. Since 1992, the level of bilateral relations has continuously evolved through signing numerous economic and strategic partnership agreements. However, the potentials and possibilities of Turkey and Kazakhstan make it necessary for both countries to further strengthen their relations in order to increase the trade and investments to higher levels in the coming years. Above all, the decisionmakers of both countries aim to reach an annual foreign trade volume of US\$10 billion. Kazakhstan and Turkey have the dynamism, human resources and material potential that would allow both countries to achieve and even surpass this goal.

Appendix 1: SITC Classification **Raw Material Intensive Industries**

SITC 0 Food and live animals
SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuel
SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes

Labor Intensive Industries

SITC 26 Textile fibres and their wastes
SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material
SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured article

Capital Intensive Industries

SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco
SITC 35 Electric current
SITC 53 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
SITC 55 Essential oils and resinoids and perfume materials; toilet cleaning preparations

SITC 62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s.
SITC 67 Iron and steel
SITC 68 Non-ferrous metals
SITC 78 Road vehicles

R&D Industries (Easy to Imitate)

SITC 51 Organic chemicals
SITC 52 Inorganic chemicals
SITC 541 Pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical products
SITC 58 Plastics in non-primary forms
SITC 59 Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.
SITC 75 Office machines and automatic data-processing machines

R&D (Difficult to Imitate)

SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment
SITC 87 Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus, n.e.s.
SITC 88 Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and optical goods, n.e.s.; watches and clocks

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Reconsidering Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy on the 25th Anniversary of Restored Independence

Arastu HABİBBEYLİ*

Abstract

2016 marked the 25th anniversary of the restoration of Azerbaijan's state independence. Able to reinstate independence twice in the past century- in 1918 and 1991- Azerbaijan carries on its ancient and prolific tradition of statehood. This also means twice ridding itself of occupation in a single century and makes state sovereignty the greatest accomplishment and asset for the country. Throughout a 25 year journey under such complicated circumstances, Azerbaijan has gone from being a country with a stagnant economy to becoming the leader nation in the South Caucasus. This nation has become a reliable energy security partner, and has evolved from being a recipient of international aid to a donor country. Initially, an average member of the international community, Azerbaijan eventually reached the level of non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2012-2013). This article reviews the evolution of the foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan over the last 25 years.

Key Words

Azerbaijan, Independence, Energy Security, Balanced and Multi-Vector Foreign Policy, Transportation Corridor.

Introduction

By the late 20th century, a new world order had emerged in the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact's dissolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Regarding its significance, that phase can only be compared to the new political system that followed the Treaty of Westphalia. Changes transpiring in the dawn of the 1990s predetermined the establishment of the new world order. Geopolitical perturbations accompanied the transition from a bipolar to a unipolar world. The unification of Germany, the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as well as the geopolitical shifts caused by the Western orientation of the Central and Eastern European countries culminated in the rise of Eurocentrism and Euro-Atlantic integration.

At the same time, the number of local conflicts and wars around the

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world was on the rise. Observations demonstrate that these minor conflicts played a vital role in the shaping of the new world order. Furthermore, neglect of the principles of international law by the big power centers in the course of military-political clashes and lack of a fair attitude towards the local conflicts engendered doubts about the new order within the system of the international relations. The 20th century was characterised by an increasing number of hotbeds around the world and the commencement of the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world.

It would be helpful to review the foreign policy courses of the newly-independent nations of the late 20th century. Following the collapse of the USSR, three of the 15 former union republics- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia- immediately chose the path of Euro- Atlantic integration. All three eventually became European Union and NATO member states owing to the consistency of that strategic choice. Meanwhile, the rest, albeit joining the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States, were unable to pursue a steady foreign policy line over the next 25 years. Georgia and Ukraine serve as an example. There has been an absolute divergence between the orientation poles that both nations pursued in the first 15 years of their independence and their choices in the following period. In Moldova also,

the ardent pro-Westerners along with the political circles representing the pro-Russian population, have shown themselves capable of influencing the country's strategic choices.

Local conflicts that erupted in the wake of the collapse of the previous system have had a profound impact on the foreign policy of the countries in the Central Asia and all across the post-Soviet space. If, in Central Asia, foreign policy is all about the rivalry over water resources, ethnic conflicts rest at the heart of the problems in the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine.

Local conflicts that erupted in the wake of the collapse of the previous system have had a profound impact on the foreign policy of the countries in the Central Asia and all across the post-Soviet space.

Those were the geopolitical circumstances under which the Republic of Azerbaijan declared its independence on 18 October 1991. This nation has come a long way in those 25 years in terms of its foreign policy. There is a direct link between gaining a deserved foothold in the system of international relations, proving itself

as an equal partner, and the ability to pursue a foreign policy that meets the realities of the new world order.

The foreign policy of independent Azerbaijan can be divided into three phases. The first stage was characterized by the chaos that also characterized the whole political life of the country during the early years of independence between 1991 and 1993. The second phase covers the years Azerbaijan had been led by its National Leader Heydar Aliyev between his rise to Presidency on 15 June 1993 and 12 December 2003 when he passed away. That was a period of stabilization in the aggravated relations with the country's neighbors and the shaping of the founding principles of an independent foreign policy under Azerbaijan's National Leader Heydar Aliyev. The third phase, which covers the period between 2003 and the present, is characterized by the ascending foreign policy course taken as Azerbaijan has transformed itself into a leading nation of the South Caucasus and a reliable partner in broader international relations.

Azerbaijan went through an incredibly complex and arduous period in the early years of its independence. Armenia was pushing forward with the occupation of the country's territories while, due to the crumbling of the previous system, the economy went into a recession, thus also derailing domestic stability.

Conveying the truth about Azerbaijan in the international arena also proved to be a challenge. The Armenian diaspora, with its over 100-year-old, well-structured organization, and the Armenian lobby, being its principal benefactor, had managed to keep Azerbaijan under a kind of information isolation on the international scene. It was no coincidence that during that time, at the behest of the Armenian diaspora, the U.S. adopted a legislative act that prohibited assistance to Azerbaijan- despite the latter being the actual victim of military aggression, and the country whose territory was occupied. Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act adopted in 1992 read, "United States assistance under this or any other Act may not be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh".¹ At the time, that unfair and biased attitude was displayed by other countries as well. All of that produced enormous challenges for the diplomacy of a new sovereign subject of the system of international affairs, the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In the first years of Azerbaijan's independence, the major foreign policy obstacles were, on the one hand, ongoing pressure by the Armenian diaspora

and the Armenian occupation and on the other hand, the incompetency and amateur performance of the duties on behalf of the individuals that then stood at the country's helm. Due to the impulsive nature of the foreign policy and the lack of a systematic approach, the specifics of the geopolitical location of Azerbaijan were not taken into account, and pressing issues received no conceptual consideration.

In the first years of Azerbaijan's independence, the major foreign policy obstacles were, ongoing pressure by the Armenian diaspora and the Armenian occupation.

The lack of conceptual approach in its foreign policy, alongside utopian and detached-from-reality objectives, exacerbated Azerbaijan's relationship with some countries, especially its immediate neighbors. As a result, Azerbaijan found itself isolated in the international arena, its ties with most of the neighboring countries aggravated, and, owing to the efforts of the Armenian diaspora, the country found itself in an information blockade. Therefore, the first phase of independent Azerbaijan's foreign policy can be described as the lost years.

The Phase of Developing Key Foreign Policy Principles and Directions

The shaping of key foreign policy principles and directions commenced in 1993 with the National Leader Heydar Aliyev's return to power. The foreign policy strategy that he had initiated was aimed at rescuing the country from imminent collapse, restoring its territorial integrity and identifying future development strategies. That type of foreign policy completely altered the country's position in the international arena. Escaping international isolation, pursuing a balanced foreign policy, integrating into the global economy, channeling the country's economic potential towards solidifying of its foreign policy positions, arranging a concerted performance by Azerbaijanis living abroad, and ultimately transforming the country into the region's economic powerhouse, constituted the conceptual pillars of that strategy.

A balanced foreign policy, multi-vector cooperation, equal relations, reliable partnership and a pragmatic political course, underpinned by the principle of independent policy, were the factors brought about by the introduction of Heydar Aliyev's visionary strategy into the foreign policy concept of independent statehood. Azerbaijan

began to conduct a balanced and multi-vector foreign policy, taking into consideration the uniqueness of its location in the region. Those were the founding principles that shaped the second phase and that continue to be the case today. Azerbaijan made its strategic choice in the second phase, and the sustainability and consistency of that choice have been a primary reason for its success.

An independent policy based on national interests is the cornerstone of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. It must be noted that there is only a handful of nations capable of pursuing an independent foreign policy in a modern world in which the process of globalization is utterly saturated.

Azerbaijan began to conduct a balanced and multi-vector foreign policy, taking into consideration the uniqueness of its location in the region.

Meanwhile, the geopolitical significance of our country's geographic location compounds that choice. The Caucasus have remained a geopolitically sensitive arena of perpetual rivalry throughout their history. The enduring presence of the bearers of different civilizations, cultures and faiths have left a noticeable

imprint on the political processes in the region. One of the eminent figures of classic geopolitical thought, Karl Haushofer, classified the Caucasus as an historical confrontation zone, and equated it to the Bosphorus, Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal regarding its geographic relevance.²

Owing to its strategic importance, many analysts view the Caucasus on a par with the Balkans and Central Asia. Those three stand out for their geopolitical weight, as well as for their geographic significance stemming from the role of being at the crossroads of different civilizations. It is no coincidence that all three regions are regarded as hot spots in the new world order, where the geopolitical environment is undergoing transformations accompanied by persistent ethnic-religious conflicts.³

Global and regional power centers have always sought to keep the Caucasus within their influence orbit. The struggle for influence in the Caucasus among the major Eurasian powers has historically occurred in the environment of ethnic and religious divergence in the region, deprived of a national consolidating force. Constant infighting between the clans and isolationism has regularly undermined this region, making it vulnerable to external interference.⁴

Therefore, it is rather challenging to implement an independent and

balanced foreign policy based on national interests, in a region that is so sensitive from the geopolitical point of view. This is evident in the foreign policy course of the three countries in the South Caucasus. Armenia is the region's outpost state, where most of the strategic assets are foreign-owned. Georgia encounters problems due to its orientation towards a single pole and due to the inconsistency of its foreign policy outline. For that reason, an independent and balanced foreign policy course distinguishes Azerbaijan from the rest regarding its geopolitical relevance.

The struggle for influence in the Caucasus among the major Eurasian powers has historically occurred in the environment of ethnic and religious divergence in the region, deprived of a national consolidating force.

An independent foreign policy primarily rests on the aspiration to forge equal relations with all countries. Azerbaijan is affiliated with no military-political block and focuses on beneficial cooperation with countries of all shapes and sizes. Azerbaijan does not tolerate the language of pressure,

and cooperation with foreign partners is based solely on reciprocity. This is an essential element that defined the country's foreign policy direction developed in the second phase.

The integration processes that the Republic of Azerbaijan has been involved with are also economic and cultural, rather than military-political. One of the foreign policy priorities of the early years of independence-Euro-Atlantic integration- covered the period of evolution of the country's legislature, identification of favorable trade opportunities, intensive contacts, and cooperation based on mutual interests. At the same time, Euro-Atlantic integration does not conflict with the country's desire to join alternative integration processes and pursuit of bilateral cooperation based on an equal footing. In short, Euro-Atlantic integration by no means impairs Azerbaijan's leeway in its independent foreign policy. At the same time, equal partnership remains the core of that integration.

The status of being a reliable partner on the international scene is another major principle of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. That aim certainly requires a strong political leader and skillful use of the country's economic potential. The place and role of every nation in history are determined by the extraordinary

mission of a brilliant individual who dares to assume the responsibility of playing an indispensable role in the fate of that nation's history and to build solid traditions of statehood thanks to his or her own wisdom and vision. For the Russians that person was Peter the Great, just like George Washington to the Americans, Winston Churchill to the British, Charles de Gaulle to the French, Otto von Bismarck to the Germans, Mao Zedong to the Chinese, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to the Turks; to the Azerbaijanis, that man was Heydar Aliyev.⁵

The status of being a reliable partner on the international scene is another major principle of Azerbaijan's foreign policy.

In this sense, starting from 1993, increasing interest towards our country in the international arena and the implementation of enormous energy projects under the political leadership of Heydar Aliyev transformed Azerbaijan into a trustworthy partner, first regionally and then in the wider geography.

The energy policy shaped by the National Leader Heydar Aliyev and further enhanced under the incumbent

President Ilham Aliyev aimed to uphold the country's national interests. That strategy helped Azerbaijan to secure one of the leading roles in various regional and global projects. Today, Azerbaijan is a steadfast partner in the energy security area and plays a significant role in ensuring the energy security of European countries.⁶

It all started back in 1994, with the signing of the "Contract of the Century". For the first time in history, Azerbaijan unlocked the Caspian Sea for joint development by multinational companies, and managed to attract multi-billion dollar investments in the petroleum industry. Appropriate infrastructure connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Black Sea was created. Back then, many considered delivery of the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea to the Western markets a fantasy. Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia turned the fantasy into reality, when they completed the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline.

Thus, what we call the second phase, spanning 1993-2003, became the time of establishment of all of the founding principles of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. In the third millennium, Azerbaijan is already recognized in the international arena as a country that conducts an independent foreign policy backed by

national interests, a nation that pursues equal cooperation with every nation and international organization, and a dependable partner that implements multi-vector and diversified foreign policy.

New Foreign Policy Horizons

In the third phase, which started in 2003, President Ilham Aliyev has continued the independence path with the well-established traditions and managed to cement Azerbaijan's international position and elevate it to the next level. In the new millennium, Azerbaijan is no longer a mediocre player on the global scene, but an initiator of and participant in many regional-scale projects, as well as a country known for its international prominence.

Committed to an independent policy course that corresponds to its national interests, Azerbaijan develops different projects; continues equal engagement with its partners, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis; duly confronts the international pressure exerted by the Armenian diaspora; and communicates the truth about our country to the wider global audience. At this stage, Azerbaijan's foreign policy goes beyond just one direction and targets mutually beneficial cooperation across the board.

Our country joins integration processes without hindering its foreign policy agenda. It was as part of this phase that Azerbaijan reaffirmed its independent foreign policy course by becoming a member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2011.⁷

The greatest international accomplishment of the last 25 years has undoubtedly been Azerbaijan's election, as a non-permanent member, to the UN Security Council for 2012-2013.⁸ Our country represented the Eastern European group and secured the seat thanks to overwhelming support coming from 155 UN member states. Throughout the election process Azerbaijan's competitors were Armenia, Slovenia and Hungary. Intimidated by Azerbaijan's rising relevance, Armenia opted to pull out at the initial stage. That decision was a clear manifestation of how Azerbaijan had been able to breach the information blockade imposed by the Armenian diaspora on the international scene in the early years of our independence. Azerbaijan eventually secured the full support of the European Union and finished ahead of Slovenia and Hungary- yet another example of our country being recognized as a steadfast partner.⁹

Azerbaijan added a new cooperation format to its foreign policy in the third millennium. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation had been the priority for the first years of independence. The new phase saw the introduction

of more integrated relations and trilateral cooperation formats. Given the presence of certain trends in the region, the realization of such trilateral cooperation formats required greater flexibility. Azerbaijan is the initiator of several trilateral projects. Azerbaijan-Iran-Turkey, Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey and Azerbaijan-Russia-Iran are the platforms for addressing regional matters as well as an important initiative calling for the development of cooperation ties. At the same time, they also display the importance that Azerbaijan attaches to mutually beneficial relations with its neighbors, with the exception of Armenia.¹⁰

The comprehensive development of collaboration with its strategic partners is one of the priority directions for Azerbaijan's foreign policy. Since its independence, Azerbaijan has signed Treaties of Strategic Cooperation with 17 different countries. Along with its traditional partners, the list also includes new countries. Eight of those countries are European nations (Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic). Others include the Turkic nations with whom Azerbaijan shares historic roots (Turkey, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), as well as traditional partners in the post-Soviet space (Russia, Ukraine and Georgia). We also enjoy strategic relations with Pakistan- a nation that fully buttresses Azerbaijan in every international platform.

The comprehensive development of collaboration with its strategic partners is one of the priority directions for Azerbaijan's foreign policy.

Among our strategic partners, relations with the Turkic-speaking countries are of particular importance. The relationship with those countries is determined not just by a high level of political and economic cooperation but also by common roots, religion, history, culture and values. Ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey are characterized by the motto "one nation-two states". No other two countries in the world share so much affinity and pursue such similar foreign policy goals.

Azerbaijan has always proven its reliability in relationships with its partners and neighbors. No matter the situation- Georgia suffering from an energy crisis, the U.S. conducting anti-terrorism operations, or Russia and Iran being subjected to sanctions- all of those countries witnessed Azerbaijan's worthiness. Those were the milestones along Azerbaijan's journey to non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council. With its unique positioning as a member of both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan used its presence in the Security

Council to advocate for concerted efforts in tackling global problems and defending the rule of international law and the principle of justice.

Ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey are characterized by the motto “one nation- two states”. No other two countries in the world share so much affinity and pursue such similar foreign policy goals.

Energy policy has immensely contributed to Azerbaijan’s ability to gain the status of a reliable partner. In the first decade of the new millennium Azerbaijan, together with Turkey and Georgia, managed to build a vast energy infrastructure. The Baku- Tbilisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline commissioned in 2006 was a historic project that has not just enabled Azerbaijan’s access to the world markets but also introduced a new globally important supply corridor. The project was a breakthrough in terms of energy infrastructure in the region and across the entire continent.

Azerbaijan also contributes to Europe’s energy security when it comes to natural gas supply. We all know that development of the Shahdeniz field in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea placed our country within the ranks of

the world’s major natural gas exporters. The commissioning of the Baku- Tbilisi- Erzurum gas pipeline was a remarkable event for the region. This pipeline was the starting point for the delivery of gas to the European markets through Georgia and Turkey. The second decade of the third millennium is witnessing the construction of the Trans-Anatolian (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic pipelines (TAP). If in the 20th century Azerbaijan required foreign support for the realization of such projects, nowadays, Azerbaijan carries the significant financial burden of those projects that will play a serious role in ensuring Europe’s energy security.

The choice of the Trans-Adriatic pipeline project as the main export route for the delivery of the Shahdeniz gas to Europe demonstrates that implementation of any global scale project in this region without Azerbaijan’s consent and involvement is inconceivable. With an estimated price tag of US\$45 billion, the implementation of the Shandeniz-2, TANAP and TAP projects will ultimately redraw Europe’s energy map.¹¹

In the first decade of the new millennium Azerbaijan, together with Turkey and Georgia, managed to build a vast energy infrastructure.

Azerbaijan's energy policy has solidified the country's posture on the international scene and also, quite naturally, enhanced the sustainability of its economy. Azerbaijan's GDP has tripled over the last 12 years, resulting in budget growth by 20 times over the course of this period. Meanwhile poverty levels have dropped from 40% down to five.¹² The country's foreign exchange reserves today stand at around US\$ 40 billion.¹³

The international community recognizes these accomplishments. The World Economic Forum ranks Azerbaijan 40th in its Global Competitiveness Report.¹⁴ The World Bank places Azerbaijan in the "Upper Middle Income" countries group,¹⁵ and the UN Development Program's Human Development Index classifies Azerbaijan as a "high human development" country.¹⁶

Economically potent Azerbaijan has become a regional center and has gained economic leverage in the Mediterranean and Black Sea basins. Today, Azerbaijan's investments are a significant factor in Turkey, Georgia, Romania and Ukraine. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is gradually transforming itself into a transit country and a transportation hub. One of the alternative transportation routes for the Central Asian countries runs through

Azerbaijan. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad connection, which will link different regions with the North-South international transportation corridor, will provide still greater opportunities for bolstering economic cooperation. Thus, economic diplomacy has become a primary direction of Azerbaijan's foreign policy.

Reflection of multicultural values in the foreign policy is aimed at propagating the "Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism" around the world.

One of the most important aspects of the country's foreign policy is the presence of multiculturalism principles, and this reflects its true essence. Indeed, multiculturalism in Azerbaijan is a mirror of the public sentiment and of a thousand- years-old lifestyle. Reflection of multicultural values in the foreign policy is aimed at propagating the "Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism" around the world. Nowadays we see enduring clashes of different religions, cultures and overall divergence. Therefore, it is very relevant that a lifestyle based on tolerance and harmony, the one accepted as Azerbaijan's state policy, is showcased to the world. In this sense, it would

be helpful to review how relevant multicultural values are in Azerbaijani society.

Azerbaijan sits at the crossroads between the East and the West, between Islam and Christianity, and combines the legacy of different civilizations and cultures. Azerbaijan serves as a bridge between the East and the West, and as a point of convergence. Azerbaijan has for centuries absorbed the values that conformed to its natural peculiarities, and eventually developed a growth model of its own, which makes this country a bearer of both Western and Eastern values.

Azerbaijan serves as a bridge between the East and the West, and as a point of convergence.

Historically, representatives of different faiths and cultures coexisted peacefully in Azerbaijan, and that has only enriched this society. Azerbaijan is a Muslim country where the Christians and the Jews have lived side-by-side for centuries. Multiculturalism that implies coexistence based on mutual respect between the representatives of different values is regarded as a lifestyle in Azerbaijan. Throughout history, our country has remained free of religious, ethnic or any other discrimination.

Being an integral part of the Turkic civilization, Azerbaijan honors individual values. The tradition of statehood that has endured throughout every historical phase, as well as the superiority of natural customs and traditions in the society, monotheistic religious views, family values, tolerance towards the bearers of other civilizations, and habits of coexistence make up the founding principles of our lifestyle.¹⁷

The traditions that have evolved throughout the centuries are now an inalienable part of our lives. A statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, delivered at the opening of the 7th UN Alliances of Civilizations Global Forum held in April 2016 in Baku, clearly conveys the society's stance on multiculturalism in Azerbaijan, "Azerbaijan for centuries was a place where religions, cultures, civilizations met. We are not only a geographic bridge between East and West, but also a cultural bridge. For centuries, representatives of religions, cultures lived in peace and dignity in Azerbaijan. Religious tolerance, multiculturalism always was present here. There was no word "multiculturalism", but ideas were always present".¹⁸

In the new millennium, changes in the philosophy of coexistence among

different civilizations, cultures, faiths and even peoples is one of the greatest challenges. The globalization simply cannot survive while being deprived of the coexistence of different cultures. The world no longer accepts the notions of a monocultural or monoethnic society or a country. Moreover, in international relations, no country can prosper in an isolated environment, be it in the political, economic or cultural domain. Humankind can only thrive when there is respect for different values. True, there is a handful of monoethnic countries around the world. Some find themselves isolated for geographic, historic or political reasons. Otherwise it is the embodiment of a chauvinistic and intolerant policy. For example, Armenia stands as a monoethnic country in our region.

Azerbaijan has managed to preserve its own historical traditions against the backdrop of cultural intransigence, the aggravation of West-Islam relations, and the surge of different phobias around the world. In this sense, Azerbaijan has been taking appropriate steps aimed at contributing to intercultural dialogue in the global arena, and this has remained a major component of our foreign policy. The foundation of a new cultural bridge between the West and the East was laid in Baku in 2008, when the city hosted the conference of the Council of Europe's

Azerbaijan has managed to preserve its own historical traditions against the backdrop of cultural intransigence, the aggravation of West-Islam relations, and the surge of different phobias around the world.

Culture Ministers. What made that event special was that their colleagues from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation were also invited. As a follow-up to that process, Azerbaijan initiated and hosted another event in 2009, where the ministers of culture from European countries were able to participate in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Culture Ministers' Conference in Azerbaijan.

Since 2011, Azerbaijan's initiative has become a consistent platform. Every two years Azerbaijan hosts the World Intercultural Dialogue Forum. Baku also hosted the 7th UN Alliances of Civilizations Forum in 2016. That event demonstrated the "Azerbaijani Model of Multiculturalism" to the rest of the world. From this perspective, multiculturalism is a new dimension of Azerbaijan's foreign policy. This is also a thought-provoking challenge for all of humankind.

Nagorno-Karabakh: “Hot” Rather Than “Frozen” Conflict

The biggest challenge that Azerbaijan has encountered in the independence years is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the international arena, restoration of territorial integrity is our primary objective. It is no secret that for over 20 years Azerbaijan’s historical part- Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven adjacent provinces- have remained under occupation by Armenia. As a result of that military aggression and the policy of ethnic cleansing, 20% of our territory has been occupied and over one million people have become refugees and internally displaced persons.

Azerbaijanis were subjected to genocide in the active phase of the conflict. Overnight, on 25-26 February 1992, the armed forces of Armenia, backed by the remainders of the ex-Soviet troops stationed in Khankendi, invaded the city of Khojaly and perpetrated a genocide. As a result, 613 civilians, including 63 children, 106 women and 70 elderly were brutally murdered, some tortured to death.¹⁹

Since the early days of independence the most important task that Azerbaijan’s foreign policy faced has been to communicate the truth about

our country to the wider international audience and expose Armenians’ deceptions. Worldwide recognition of the Khojaly genocide was identified as a primary objective at the 2011 annual gathering of members of the diplomatic service of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Every two years Azerbaijan hosts the World Intercultural Dialogue Forum.

Since then, 13 national parliaments (2012-Mexico, Pakistan and Columbia; 2013-the Czech Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Peru, Romania, Panama and Jordan; 2014-Sudan and Honduras; 2015-Guatemala; 2016-National Council of Slovenia), as well as 19 states in the U.S. and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (2012) have officially recognized the Khojaly Genocide.²⁰ All of this is testimony to Azerbaijan’s having succeeded in delivering the truth about our country to the world.

The OSCE Minsk Group was ostensibly established in March 1992 for the resolution of the conflict. As of December 1996, three countries had performed the duties of the Minsk Group as co-chairs- Russia, the U.S. and France. Regrettably, the conflict still remains unresolved. Although

there has been a ceasefire in place since 1994, armed incidents along the Line of Contact have regularly happened. No progress has yet been made in the negotiations process. Armenia is not interested in the resolution of the problem and aims to keep it frozen. Apparently, both Armenia and the co-chairs are satisfied with the situation as long as a large-scale war is avoidable. However, recent tensions in April 2016, provoked by Armenia, which entailed significant loss of life, and armed clashes with both sides using heavy weaponry, once again demonstrated that the conflict is not in fact frozen, and could ignite at any moment. This event prompted immediate action on behalf of the co-chairs and riveted the attention of the international community to this dispute.

Worldwide recognition of the Khojaly genocide was identified as a primary objective at the 2011 annual gathering of members of the diplomatic service of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has international law on its side with regards to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The international community and all of the international organizations buttress the idea of

Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, with many documents passed to that end. The UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 856, 874 and 884, the UN General Assembly Resolution of 2008, as well as decisions and resolutions adopted by the Non-Allied Movement, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, the European Parliament, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and other international institutions constitute the legal grounds for the resolution of this conflict and are underpinned by the norms and principles of international law. All of these documents reaffirm Azerbaijan's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of its internationally recognized borders.

However, the lack of a fair attitude in the system of international relations continues to obstruct the resolution of this conflict. The present day world order is governed not by international law but at the behest of the big power centers. For them, application of double standards concerning the Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is, of course, a standard practice and the scales are tipped in one side's favor due to Azerbaijan being a Muslim nation and Armenia representing the Christian world. From this perspective, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be considered a geopolitical fault line in light of resurging Islamophobic trends around the world.

Azerbaijan's foreign policy has focused on building a solid legal base for the just resolution of the conflict in line with the country's territorial integrity, across all the international platforms, and the documents passed are a clear demonstration of the country's success in doing this.

Over the course of these years, Azerbaijan's foreign policy has focused on building a solid legal base for the just resolution of the conflict in line with the country's territorial integrity, across all the international platforms, and the documents passed are a clear demonstration of the country's success in doing this. Protraction of the resolution of the conflict stems from the lack of efficient mechanisms within international law and the conflicting geopolitical interests of the global powers.

The Republic of Azerbaijan celebrated the 25th anniversary of its independence in 2016. In this quarter century, the country has succeeded in taking its rightful place in the system of international relations. To date, Azerbaijan has established diplomatic ties with 177 countries and is represented with 91 diplomatic

missions in foreign countries and international organizations, while 62 foreign diplomatic missions operate in Baku.

Despite its complex geopolitical location and tumultuous development path, for all these years, Azerbaijan has managed to conduct an independent and balanced foreign policy backed by its national interests. Equal engagement with all parties has enabled Azerbaijan to implement a mutually beneficial cooperation, transforming our country into an initiator of main regional-scale projects and a trustworthy partner.

Despite its complex geopolitical location and tumultuous development path, Azerbaijan has managed to conduct an independent and balanced foreign policy backed by its national interests.

Conclusion

When Azerbaijan restored its independence from a collapsing Soviet Union in 1991, the country faced enormous challenges as the old system crumbled and the new one was yet

to be established. At the same time, neighbouring Armenia was waging an all-out warfare against Azerbaijan, and trying to occupy Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region. In 2016, Azerbaijan's independence and independent foreign policy marked its 25th year. A retrospective analysis of this quarter-century-long policy reveals that, despite early challenges, Azerbaijan has successfully managed to not only strengthen its fragile statehood and enter into a path of sustainable development, but also pursue a very skillfully crafted foreign policy that has made the country a regional leader and globally respected actor.

Thus, the last 25 years of foreign policy of independent Azerbaijan can be divided into three phases. The first one, between 1991-1993 was characterized by the chaos that was the result of both objective difficulties generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in Nagorno-Karabakh against Armenia (supported by a well-established international diaspora), and subjective problems generated by the incompetence of the country's early political leadership, whose decisions frequently failed to take into account harsh geopolitical realities in our region. The second phase covered the years between 1993 and 2003. This period was launched by Azerbaijan's National Leader, Heydar Aliyev, after his return

to power, and was characterized by a stabilization of aggravated relations with neighbors and the shaping of the founding principles of an independent foreign policy. The third phase has spanned from 2003 to the present, and through this period, under the leadership of President Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan has transformed itself into a leader nation of the South Caucasus and a reliable partner in international relations.

When Azerbaijan restored its independence from a collapsing Soviet Union in 1991, the country faced enormous challenges as the old system crumbled and the new one was yet to be established.

While analysing the last 25 years of Azerbaijan's independent foreign policy, particular attention should also be placed on the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that has resulted in the deaths of about 30,000 people and the occupation of 20% of the internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan. Throughout the last 25 years, Azerbaijan has repeatedly declared the restoration of the country's territorial integrity as the key priority of its foreign policy.

While analysing the last 25 years of Azerbaijan's independent foreign policy, particular attention should also be placed on the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that has resulted in the deaths of about 30,000 people and the occupation of 20% of the internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan gives preference to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but also maintains the right to resort to military power to restore its territorial integrity as international peace efforts visibly fail due to the ineffectiveness of mediations and to Armenia's uncompromising position. As the rise of tensions in early April of 2016 once again demonstrated, the conflict is not frozen and could ignite at any time. Current efforts to maintain the status-quo are no longer sustainable.

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A Quarter-Century Pursuit of Independence: Politics of Trade, Energy, and Economic Development in Uzbekistan

Halil Burak SAKAL*

Abstract

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan chose an original path of economic development policy. Known as the Uzbek model, these policies helped the Uzbek economy survive at least two economic crises over the last two decades. In terms of various macroeconomic indicators, the Uzbek economy outperformed similar countries. This paper divides the post-independence economic policies of the Uzbek leadership into three periods according to various definitive characteristics, and argues that the original path of the Uzbek model has been one of the key factors for the performance of the Uzbek economy. Over the last 25 years, the main motivation behind the occasional changes in the political and economic preferences of the Uzbek leadership has been the pursuit of independence. In its quarter century of economic policies, Uzbekistan's economy has achieved considerable success and has had various opportunities. It is a matter of policy choices to translate this promising outlook into solid and sustainable economic growth.

Key Words

Uzbekistan, Economy, Political Economy, Central Asia, Uzbek Model.

Introduction

This paper is a political economic assessment of Uzbekistan's 25-year pursuit of independence (*mustaqillik*). For some scholars, independent Uzbekistan has pursued a balancing and independent economic and foreign policy refraining successfully from traditional imperial bondages.¹ On the other hand, some scholars classify the policies of independent Uzbekistan as being inconsistent or unpredictable;² see the path of economic reforms as cautious and volatile,³ and emphasize the lack of reforms in Uzbek politics and economy.⁴ The analysis in this paper suggests that the original Uzbek path of independence and the Uzbek model have close relations with its economic policy and economic achievements despite several shocks in the quarter century since independence.

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This paper scrutinizes the political economy of the independent Uzbekistan in three periods, each with their own definitive characteristics, some of which exhibit repeating patterns.⁵ The first period, the initial 10 years of independence from end-1991 to 2001, is a period of economic independence that came to an end with the Russian and Asian crises. The second period lasted another 10 years between 2002 and 2011 during which Uzbekistani authorities aimed at opening the country and its economy to the world. At the end of this second era the devastating impacts of the 2008-10 global economic crisis on the world economy and politics deepened. And the current period since 2011 seems to be a promising new era for the Uzbek economy, despite various signs of economic and political turbulences and uncertainty.

The paper is organized as follows: The following section examines the emergence of Uzbekistan as an independent economy both before and after the Soviet era, and the subsequent sections analyze the three periods of the Uzbek economy, in respective order.

From Cotton Economy to Independence

The people of today's Uzbekistan are the forbearers of the sedentary culture

in Central Asia, practicing agriculture since ancient times. In Fergana, the first irrigated agriculture appeared in the second millennium BC, around Chust and Dalverzin, on the piedmonts or deltas of smaller rivers with seasonal streams. The usage of the great streams of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya became possible after the development of irrigation technologies in the first millennium BC.⁶ The most rapid growth in economic activity and irrigated agriculture occurred between 300 BC and 400 AD when small canals facilitated water distribution, and one of the largest settlements of the time was founded near Marhamad city in Fergana. Cotton harvest has been an ancient practice in the region made possible through sophisticated irrigation works. Europeans have been familiar with Central Asian cotton since the 18th century at the latest, mostly from the mythical narratives of travelers.⁷

In the 1860s, when Russians first appeared as a political power in Central Asia, they observed people of the Fergana and Zeravshan valleys applying irrigated agricultural methods and cultivating cotton.⁸ The Turkestan cotton had to wait until the outbreak of the American Civil War for gaining a foothold in the Russian market. Before the American Civil War, Russians were already familiar with Turkestan cotton, but did not prefer importing it⁹ because

of its “low productivity and quality.”¹⁰ After the American Civil War, with the growing demand from Russia, cotton cultivation in Turkestan increased about 20 times over three decades.¹¹ During the Great War, the importance of the scarce Turkestan cotton peaked and its price increased, but the government interfered in the prices, which led to discontent, even triggering a revolt.¹²

After 1917, the successive Soviet governments concentrated on increasing cotton production for the aim of self-sufficiency in the textile industry, a target which was achieved almost entirely by 1933.¹³ During the planned economy era, the cotton harvest became increasingly significant,¹⁴ inevitably becoming a priority of economic policy. On the other hand, total agricultural production in the Soviet Union began deteriorating at the end of the 1970s until the mid-1980s. The agricultural crisis accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the production of all former Soviet republics combined declined until the early 2000s.¹⁵


The years of *glasnost* and *perestroika* were difficult for the Uzbek government authorities, who felt the pressure of being chastised during Gorbachev’s war on corruption.¹⁶ In this political atmosphere, Islam Karimov became the President of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in 1989,¹⁷ and after a short turbulent period, on August 31, 1991,

the independence of Uzbekistan was declared. Of the foremost significant challenges on the agenda of the newly independent republic were economic transformation and structural reforms.

The agricultural crisis accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the production of all former Soviet republics combined declined until the early 2000s.


The following section is a scrutiny of the initial years, roughly a decade (1991–2001) after independence, during which Uzbekistan depended on imports of food and energy. This was a legacy of the Soviet planned economy era as Uzbekistan’s resources were devoted to cotton production and to some minor industries, such as textiles, canned food production, and extraction (Figure 1).¹⁸ As of 1988, all necessary inputs, including electricity, machinery, food, and energy were imported from other Soviet republics,¹⁹ and almost 40% of the labor force worked in agriculture at the time of independence.²⁰ In 1989, Uzbekistan was the second poorest republic with nearly 44% of its population living on less than 75 rubles per month, the official threshold of poverty at its time.²¹

Figure 1: Uzbekistan’s Share in Soviet Production



Source: B. Plyshevskii, “Reforming the Economies of the CIS: Uzbekistan”, *Problems of Economic Transition*, Vol. 37, No. 9 (1995), pp. 84-85.

Figure 2: Annual GDP Growth, Percent



Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) National Accounts Data”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org> (last visited 20 January 2017). UZB refers to: Uzbekistan, ECS: Europe & Central Asia (last visited 16 February 2017).

The Initial Years

After independence, the Uzbek economy experienced tough days, like almost all other former Soviet republics did, recording consecutive years of contraction and hyperinflation between 1992 and 1995 (Figures 2 and 3).²² This slowdown and turbulence were typical for all newly independent states.²³ What distinguishes Uzbekistan from the others was that after 1995, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Uzbekistan began growing steadily (Figure 2), returning to positive figures as early as 1996. It is important to note that among the newly independent states, Uzbekistan was one of the best performers in terms of output growth and many other macroeconomic indicators.²⁴

As of 1988, all necessary inputs, including electricity, machinery, food, and energy were imported from other Soviet republics, and almost 40% of the labor force worked in agriculture at the time of independence.

While the shrinkage of the GDP in Uzbekistan recovered faster than in the other newly independent states, revenues from the sale of state

enterprises only slightly contributed to this performance as the Uzbek authorities embraced a cautious approach towards privatization, unlike other newly independent states. Between 1993 and 1998, especially with the impact of economic reforms in 1994, privatization contributed just 0.6 % to the GDP on average terms annually.²⁵

It is important to note that among the newly independent states, Uzbekistan was one of the best performers in terms of output growth and many other macroeconomic indicators.

Some scholars relate Uzbekistan's better economic performance to favorable "initial conditions" after independence, as well as to the production of cotton and the pursuit of self-sufficiency in energy.²⁶ Cautious and gradual reforms have also been credited by some authors,²⁷ yet these cautionary policies were subject to criticism on the grounds that they contributed to imbalances, especially in the government budget, and on the grounds that the government expenditures did not make a positive contribution to the economic growth.²⁸

Still, there is little doubt that these policies contributed to the economic independence endeavors to a significant

degree. These policies comprise a whole, known as the “Uzbek model.” The following subsections will investigate the emergence of this model and to what degree it contributed to the economic success story that distinguished Uzbekistan from the other former Soviet states.

The Introduction of the Currency and the Monetary System

As the first and the most important sign of independence, Uzbekistan introduced a currency, the Uzbek som, in two phases, the first between November 1993 and June 1994, and the second between July and August 1994.²⁹ In the first phase, the transition currency, the som-kupon was circulated together with Russian and older Soviet rubles, and then the old banknotes and coins were gradually withdrawn. The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan (CBRU) exchanged the old banknotes with new ones at a rate of 1 to 1. This process of the old currency withdrawal was completed by February 1994. In this first phase, the supply of the som-kupon banknotes began increasing gradually, tripling in the first six months after November 1993.³⁰ After 1994, this supply growth slowed, well into 1997.³¹ In the second phase, the som-kupons were swapped

with brand new soms at a rate of 1 to 1,000.³²

For the sake of comparison, the whole process took 10 months for Uzbekistan, while Kyrgyzstan completed the introduction of the new currency in one week, with the support of expert knowledge from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Uzbeks chose to follow their own methods without getting any support neither from Russia nor from the international institutions, at the cost of currency depreciation and high inflation (Figure 3).

Another important policy tool of the government in the initial years was the foreign exchange policy. There were, and still are, at least three foreign exchange rates in Uzbekistan, one in the auction market, one in the commercial bank market, and one in the unofficial curb market. The former was the largest by 1997 and the rate in this market stays artificially appreciated. Here, the source of foreign exchange is part of export revenues from gold and cotton, “the centralized exports.”³³ The exporters operating in this market change their foreign currencies at a low rate and hence pay an *implicit tax*. Those who can get the cheap foreign currency in this market are “importers of capital goods, raw materials, grains, and some high-priority consumer goods;” some enterprises; and the government for serving public debt.³⁴ They get an


implicit subsidy. The implicit tax on centralized exports and subsidies for centralized imports increased in this period to a level of 56 % by 1999.³⁵ The IMF estimates that with these implicit taxes and subsidies, about 16 % of GDP was transferred from exporters to importers.³⁶

An important policy tool of the government in the initial years was the foreign exchange policy.

The second market is for the banks and exchange offices. The price here is also centrally set and the source of foreign

exchange is the “non-centralized exports”, that is, the export revenues excluding those of gold and cotton. In 1997 and 1998, exporters had to exchange 30% of their trade income at the official exchange rate, while in 1998, this share was increased to 50 % (and more).³⁷ These rules continued to apply in the third period, after the 2010s.³⁸ Only licensed traders can trade foreign currency in this market; individuals are not allowed. The third market is the illegal and unofficial market where excess supply and demand determine the exchange rate. The higher the level of foreign exchange controls, the higher is the level of the margin between the official and unofficial exchange rates. The margin was about 100 % by mid-

Figure 3: Year-end Consumer Price Inflation Growth, Percent Change



Source: International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook October 2016”, <http://www.imf.org>, (last visited 4 January 2017).

1998, and then it increased to about 400 % after the decree on foreign currency restrictions.³⁹ A study by the IMF staff found that the margin between the unofficial market and the official exchange rates had a significant impact on the increase of inflation during these years (Figure 3).⁴⁰


This is one of the reasons why inflation performed in these years relatively worse than the other newly independent states. It was one of the side effects of the initial economic policies. During the same period, Kazakhstan, for instance, gave more importance to controlling inflation and the World Bank research team estimates that this may be the reason why its economy contracted while

the Uzbek economy grew in the first decade after independence.⁴¹ While the developments on the monetary side can be summarized as such, one should also scrutinize the real economy for a complete perspective.

International Trade and the Real Economy

On the real economy side, the first factor that is related to the Uzbek model of economic independence was international trade. By the year 1992, when imports constituted 43 and exports 27 % of the GDP, the Uzbek economy depended on agriculture, especially on cotton.⁴² Especially between 1993 and 1995, of its exports, about two thirds

Figure 4: Imports and Exports of Goods and Services, Percent of GDP



Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, World Bank and OECD National Accounts Data”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org>, (last visited 20 January 2017).


was cotton raw and roughly one fifth was gold.⁴³ This dependence on cotton often adversely impacted Uzbekistan's hydro-political relations, especially with its upstream neighbors in the Aral Sea basin.⁴⁴

In two years, imports decreased to 21 and exports to 17 % of GDP (Figure 4). This was an outcome of some specific policies. First, cotton sown area was decreased; and instead, other products, such as wheat and potatoes, were planted.⁴⁵ Due to an increase in investments in agricultural technology, the yield from cereals and other crops grew significantly during these initial years, surpassing the productivity figures recorded in Europe and Central Asia by the end of the decade (Figure

Due to an increase in investments in agricultural technology, the yield from cereals and other crops grew significantly during these initial years, surpassing the productivity figures recorded in Europe and Central Asia by the end of the decade.

5). This led export revenues from cotton to decrease, but the need for importing food decreased as well, and a near-self-sufficiency was reached by 1998. Before the implementation of these policies, wheat imports were 1 billion US\$ (USD), constituting 40 %

Figure 5: Cereal Yield, Kilograms per Hectare



Source: The World Bank, "World Development Indicators, Food and Agriculture Organization, Electronic Files and Web Site", World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org>, (last visited 20 January 2017). UZB refers to: Uzbekistan, ECS: Europe & Central Asia (all income levels).

of total imports.⁴⁶ On the other hand, as a result of these occasional increases and decreases in the supply of different products, the total agricultural output fluctuated throughout the decade (Figure 7).


Second, oil and gas production increased with the positive contribution of intense imports of capital goods. Although as a consequence of this the import figures in the current account balance sheet were hiked, the aim of energy self-sufficiency was achieved by the year 1996. Oil and natural gas rents rose between 1992 and end-1996 (Figure 6), a period in which Europe Brent spot oil prices fluctuated between the relatively high levels of 13 and 23 US\$ per barrel.⁴⁷ Then, towards the end

of the initial period, with the impact of the crises in the world in 1998-1999, gold, oil and natural gas prices, along with the prices of commodities including cotton, decreased sharply, leading to a downfall in the oil rents (Figure 6) and cotton export revenues.

The low price of cotton, accompanied with state subsidies for domestic cotton production in the richer countries, such as the US, Greece and Spain, had considerable impacts on Uzbekistan's cotton exports.⁴⁸ Also, the emergence of and the increasing demand for synthetic and chemical fibers decreased the relative global demand for cotton.⁴⁹

In general, in this first period, increased domestic food production led to a

Figure 6: Mineral, Natural Gas and Oil Rents, Percent of GDP




Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org>, (last visited 21 January 2017). Minerals included are: tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate.

decline in food imports while export revenues from minerals, energy products, and cotton could not be raised to the desired levels (Figure 6). As a result, the total volume of exports contracted steadily through the end of the 1990s, and the Uzbek economy recorded trade deficits (Figure 4). Some experts argue that the main reason behind the initial deterioration of the external balance was the policy of import substitution accompanied by foreign exchange restrictions.⁵⁰ It should be noted, however, that the low level of global demand for Uzbek exports had a considerable impact on trade deficits, as discussed above. On the other hand, this global price surge influenced Uzbekistan less than the other commodity exporters in the region, partly thanks to the relatively more diversified composition of the Uzbek economy.⁵¹ The positive impacts of this diversification would be observed in the following decade, over the years of openness, as explored in the next section of this paper.

In the initial years, Uzbekistan chose to diversify its economy by channeling resources generated from oil, natural gas and mineral extraction, as well as state revenues from cotton exports, to industrialization.

In the initial years, Uzbekistan chose to diversify its economy by channeling resources generated from oil, natural gas and mineral extraction, as well as state revenues from cotton exports, to industrialization.⁵² In addition, current account transactions were restricted formally in 1997 and a “multiple exchange rate regime” was introduced.⁵³ The aim of the latter was preserving foreign exchange reserves,⁵⁴ reaching self-sufficiency in food and energy,⁵⁵ and finally, decreasing imports and diversifying economic growth by increasing modern industrial production with state support. Particularly in the final years of the period, the initial results of these measures were observed: Between 1998 and 2001, the industry sector received 55 % of all investments, the transport and communications sector got 25 %, and agriculture got 10 %.⁵⁶ The lower level of investments received by the agriculture sector was subject to criticism on the grounds that this may distort income distribution in disfavor of the rural population and the poor.⁵⁷

On the other hand, this was a policy preference, and the government aimed at supporting the rural population and the poor through direct social spending. As indicators of this, spending on healthcare and education remained at relatively higher levels, with healthcare getting about 3 % of GDP and education about 9 percent of

Figure 7: Agriculture, Value Added, Percent of GDP

Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, World Bank and OECD National Accounts Data”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org>, (last visited 20 January 2017).


gross national income (GNI) between 1995 and 2001.⁵⁸ A social assistance system was introduced in 1994 based on *maballa* or district organization. This system provided state assistance to the poor, determined by the *maballa* elders. In the initial years, high amounts of direct subsidies led to a hike in inflation.⁵⁹ In 1994, along with some reforms necessitated by the IMF, subsidies for food, housing, transportation, utilities and energy were lifted.⁶⁰ As a consequence, the level of social transfers decreased. In Fergana, for instance, the number of all households receiving welfare benefits decreased at a rate of one third during the decade,⁶¹ and the amount paid as a percent of state budget dropped by half.⁶² Despite all its setbacks, this original model of social assistance was

founded on solid grounds, and was suggested by some scholars as a model for other regional states.⁶³ On the other hand, as the government transferred substantial amounts to the poor, it was not an easy task for the policy-makers to conduct a balanced as well as an independent fiscal policy during these initial years.

Fiscal Policies, Foreign Investment, and Aid

The policies of industrialization and import substitution had an impact on the increase of external debt cumulatively until 2002, making its peak at about 54 % of GDP (Figure 8). Although the borrowing was mostly long-term public debt (Figure 9),

Figure 8: External Debt Stocks, Percent of Gross National Income




Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, International Debt Statistics”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org> (last visited 22 January 2017).

the average interest paid for this debt remained relatively high in comparison to the following periods (Figure 10). Especially in 1994, with the impact of

the economic reforms promised to the IMF, external loans were guaranteed easily for a short time until 1996, when the promised reforms and the

Figure 9: Debt Stocks, Current USD



Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, International Debt Statistics”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org>, (last visited 22 January 2017).


standby agreement with the Fund were suspended. Finally, in 2001, the IMF ceased all formal relations with the Uzbek government.⁶⁴

The Uzbek government manages its debt through six state-owned banks. Although 28 banks were authorized for foreign exchange transactions by the end of the 1990s, most of these transactions were made by the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan (CBRU).⁶⁵ As of 2001, the CBRU held three quarters of the total financial assets and about two-thirds of the total capital of the entire banking system.⁶⁶ During the initial years after independence, when the new national currency (som) was introduced, a general mistrust in the banking system

prevailed, people preferred to hold large amounts of cash, as compared to people in other newly independent states.⁶⁷ With some regulations and reforms in the banking system at the end of the period, increased levels of liberalization and competition in the system reestablished trust to a

During the initial years after independence, when the new national currency (som) was introduced, a general mistrust in the banking system prevailed, people preferred to hold large amounts of cash, as compared to people in other newly independent states.

Figure 10: Average Interest on New External Debt Commitments



Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, International Debt Statistics”, World Databank, at <http://www.databank.worldbank.org> (last visited 22 January 2017). Dashes indicate the average of the period.

significant degree.⁶⁸ As an indicator, the broad money to GDP ratio was 10 % by 2003, down from 53 % in 1993.⁶⁹

On the other hand, the government had a cautious approach to the banking system too. In the initial years, only a small number of private banks could get official licenses, and their weight in the economy remained marginal. The number of banks by 2001 was 38, of which six were owned by foreign nationals.⁷⁰ The state-owned banks controlled the financial system of the country during the period. Moreover, the interest rates were also set by the state, and the banks had limited access to financial instruments.⁷¹


In this period, the country attracted relatively low but “high-profile” foreign direct investments (FDI) as well (Figure 11), especially from Germany, the US, and South Korea, from companies such as Mercedes-Benz, Coca-Cola, Daewoo and British American Tobacco.⁷² Although some authors criticized the performance of these factories on the grounds that they functioned below capacity in this period,⁷³ and although in the initial years the Daewoo cars were sold only in the domestic market,⁷⁴ they have proved their importance as Uzbekistan’s car exports began increasing in the following periods, even amid decreasing energy and commodity prices, and increased global uncertainties.

The Uzbek Model and Economic Reforms

In these initial years, in general, Uzbekistan was reluctant for the economic reforms. On the other hand, as stated above, it recorded a better economic performance in comparison to other newly independent states. This was perceived as a paradox⁷⁵ and hence classified as the “Uzbek puzzle” by some authors,⁷⁶ even while the Uzbek authorities advertised it proudly as the “Uzbek model”⁷⁷ on international platforms. Pomfret argues that this success of good economic performance contributed to the Uzbek leaders’ self-confidence and an increase in Karimov’s weight in regional and world politics. The Uzbek leadership saw this situation as an opportunity and sought political and economic alliances in the West.⁷⁸ The relations, however, would depend on the economic liberalization, reforms, and political freedom, as perceived by the Western governments and institutions.

In this period, reforms pursued a volatile path with occasional accelerations and slowdowns. The process was cautious and a “shock therapy”⁷⁹ similar to those in other former Soviet states was deliberately avoided. The caution appeared in the spheres of price and foreign exchange controls, as well as privatizations⁸⁰ and

Figure 11: Foreign Direct Investments, Percent of GDP



Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, IFS and Balance of Payments databases of IMF, OECD”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org> (last visited 24 January 2017). Based on the World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. Dashes indicate the average of the period.

open trade. A cautious way was selected for reforms because of the composition of the population and the high level of poverty, and for achieving social and political stability.⁸¹

In the mid-1990s, the outlook for general economic and political reforms in the transition economies was positive, and the overall increase in the level of democracy was promising.

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The optimism on the side of the global economy was hurt by the crises in the late-1990s, and with their impacts on the global and regional scales. A similar pattern can be observed in the second decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and along with the booming world economy, until 2007–2008, when it crashed into the 2008–10 global economic crisis, the worst global economic depression since 1929. The following section scrutinizes this second decade from the perspective of Uzbekistan and its place in the global political economy.

The Years of Openness

After independence, Uzbekistan sought to consolidate its political and


After independence, Uzbekistan sought to consolidate its political and economic independence, especially away from Russian dominance, and tried to open itself to the world economy.

economic independence, especially away from Russian dominance, and tried to open itself to the world economy. The best way for doing this seemed to be aligning with the US. The atmosphere of the global “war on terror” and an overall threat of radicalism, which Karimov had long stressed on various occasions, prepared this ground in the second period. During the initial years, Karimov was a

supporter of economic integration with the Commonwealth of Independent States,⁸² and at the same time, he sought for a balancing alliance from the US.⁸³

An important characteristic of this period (2002-2011), “the years of openness” in this context, was a steep decline in consumer price index (CPI) growth. The increase in consumer prices was brought down from about 27 % in 2001 and 2002 to an average of 13 % during the period (Figure 12). Price controls had a considerable impact on this decrease. Other positive developments followed, under favorable global economic conditions and an optimistic outlook for world demand conditions. Under these circumstances, the endeavors of opening Uzbekistan to the global economy gained pace.

Figure 12. CPI, Annual Percent Change, Average Prices



Source: International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook October 2016”, <http://www.imf.org>, (last visited 4 January 2017). Estimates start after 2014.

Economic Reforms and International Community


The initial signals of openness in this second era after independence were the promises by the Uzbek authorities of economic reforms. First among these was the promise of reforms in the foreign exchange regime. Accordingly, the policies of the previous period, money transfer controls by the CBRU, the state banks, the State Customs Committee, and the Ministry of Finance were subject to change. In October 2003,⁸⁴ the Uzbek authorities agreed to stick to the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF agreement,⁸⁵ which obligated the removal of restrictions on international transactions and the elimination of the multiple foreign currency regimes.⁸⁶ Yet, these reforms could not be realized amid fears of increasing inflation and concerns of the external debt service.⁸⁷ Politically, the events in Andijan in 2005 became a real turning point for these reform policies, as discussed further in this paper.

Since 2002, the Uzbek economy attracted more and more investments from abroad.⁸⁸ In 2002, the foreign direct investments corresponded to less than 1 % of GDP, while in 2011, investments reached to more than 4 % of GDP (Figure 11). In USD terms, the amount increased 25 times, as compared to 2002.⁸⁹ The authorities tried to attract

investments to the energy, chemical, metallurgy, and machine building sectors. The agricultural sector and related industries needed significant investments too. While the foreign investments decreased slightly after the Andijan events in 2005, they climbed to record highs in 2007 and again in 2010, just after the crisis.⁹⁰ With the impact of the investments received from South Korea and Germany, the automobile industry developed in the second period, and energy production surpassed domestic demand slightly,⁹¹ contributing to GDP growth to a significant degree.⁹² By the end of the period, Uzbekistan was consuming 85 percent of the natural gas produced domestically and exporting the remaining volume.⁹³

Since 2002, the Uzbek economy attracted more and more investments from abroad.

During these years, beginning from 2003, the general government recorded budget surpluses and the net lending to borrowing ratio remained on the positive side (Figure 13). These years also witnessed a decrease in debt stocks, which were accumulated in the previous period (Figure 8). The average interest paid for new debt fell to a more sustainable level. Although

Figure 13: Government Balances, Percent of GDP

Source: International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook October 2016”, <http://www.imf.org> (last visited 4 January 2017).

this interest rate increased to 3.2 % reflecting creditors’ risk perceptions after 2005 Andijan events, it decreased back to below-1.5 level by the end of the period (Figure 10).


Changing International Trade Conditions

A definitive characteristic of this period was the change in the Uzbek trade composition. The most dramatic difference was the share of Russia in the trade structure.⁹⁴ By the end of the previous period, about one-third to a quarter of all Uzbek exports had gone to Russia. By mid-2002, this share fell to as low as 17 % and increased only slightly over 25 % throughout

the decade. The share of China and Turkey, on the other hand, increased dramatically from less than 2 % by the end of the previous period to an average of 9 % and about 8 %, respectively, during the entire decade (Figure 14). This trend would continue in the following period.

The main reason behind this increase was the growing economies of the export partners during the 2000s, and particularly the increasing natural gas demand from China. Another positive development was that, especially at the beginning of the second period, the price of Uzbek export commodities rose, contributing to a hike in GDP growth after 2004 from about 4 % to 7-8 %.⁹⁵

Figure 14: Main Export Partners, As Percent of Total Exports




Source: International Monetary Fund, “Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)”, Annualized quarterly data, <http://www.imf.org> (last visited 21 January 2017).

In this period, Uzbekistan remained relatively unaffected by the global price volatility of its exports, since it sold them for lower than international prices. Thus, the price drop of energy and cotton only converged Uzbek prices to the world prices.⁹⁶ Although

workers’ remittances decreased due to the deterioration of the Russian economy affected by the crisis (Figure 23), strict controls and the state-led financial system protected the Uzbek financial sector against the shocks of the 2008-10 crisis.⁹⁷

Figure 15: Main Import Partners, As percent of Total Imports



Source: International Monetary Fund, “Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)”, Annualized quarterly data, <http://www.imf.org> (last visited 21 January 2017).


On the imports side, the previous period witnessed a dramatic surge in the share of imports from Russia from a peak of 37 % by the end of 1994 to as low as 10 % by the early 2000s. This figure recovered during the second period, reaching a peak of 28 % in 2007, but could not climb to the early-1990s level. Imports from South Korea remained high due to imports of car parts to be assembled in the Uzbek plants, imports from Kazakhstan increased from 7 to 12, and China from 3 to 14 % during the entire period (Figure 15).

Exports surpassed imports and a current account surplus was recorded almost throughout the whole period (Figure 16). Also, as another sign of openness, the share of trade in GDP increased from 50 to about 80 % on the eve of the crisis in 2008, after a

slight decrease with the impact of the 2005 Andijan incident. Because of the deteriorating global trade conditions, it dropped to 63 % by 2011 (Figure 17). With the high FDI levels and trade surplus, a current account surplus was recorded throughout the period.⁹⁸

A decisive characteristic of this period was that international politics impacted trade and other indicators. In his 1997 book, Karimov described Uzbekistan as a “front line state” near the borders of the conflict zones of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and worried that the conflict in this region would spread into Uzbekistan and to Central Asia as a whole.⁹⁹ Justified with these concerns and Karimov’s concerns of Russian dominance, he sought a closer alliance with the US,¹⁰⁰ for which he found a chance after 9/11. Even before that,

Figure 16: Imports and Exports of Goods and Services, Current USD



Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, World Bank and OECD National Accounts Data”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org>, (last visited 20 January 2017).

Karimov appreciated US material aid, stating that “no country could undertake democratic and economic reforms without help.”¹⁰¹


Openness, Foreign Aid, and International Politics

In parallel, another important characteristic of this period in the economy was foreign aid. The US aid to Uzbekistan increased during the US-Uzbek rapprochement, especially after 9/11, and peaked in 2002 under the George W. Bush administration, reaching nearly US\$150 million economic and US\$53 million military aid, inflation adjusted.¹⁰² The sharp increase during the previous period brought the net bilateral aid from about


US\$1.4 million in 1992 to US\$129 million by 2001. The assistance has grown in this second period, reaching a peak of US\$211 million in 2004 (Figure 18). Also, the share of the US aid in terms of the total amount of the assistance received by Uzbekistan increased in this period (Figure 19).

However, the Andijan incident in 2005 was a real turning point in Uzbek-US and Uzbek-Russian relations, as a result of which Uzbekistan requested the US to be evicted from the base at Karshi-Khanabad. Furthermore, in 2012, the Uzbek parliament passed a bill to ban all foreign military bases,¹⁰⁴ and Uzbekistan canceled the tax privileges of the US gold mining company Zarafshan-Newmont.¹⁰⁵ This change in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy

Figure 17: Trade, As Percent of GDP



Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, World Bank and OECD National Accounts Data”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org>, (last visited 20 January 2017). UZB refers to: Uzbekistan, ECS: Europe & Central Asia (all income levels).

Figure 18: Net Bilateral Aid Flows from DAC Donors, Current USD

Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators; Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Development Co-operation Report, and International Development Statistics Database”, World Databank, OECD, at <http://www.databank.worldbank.org>, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline>, (last visited 20 January 2017).¹⁰³


priorities was seen as measures taken by Karimov for protecting its rule and regime,¹⁰⁶ especially in the years of consecutive color revolutions.¹⁰⁷ Some authors have tried to explain this change by geographical factors.¹⁰⁸ Others have criticized the geopolitical approaches and explained the change in the US-Uzbek and US-Russian relations with the constructed nature of relations between countries on their conceptualizations of “war on terror” and “Islamic threat.”¹⁰⁹

In late 2005, a “Mutual Defense Pact” between Russia and Uzbekistan was signed. It allowed the use of military bases by either party.¹¹⁰ Also in 2005, Uzbekistan withdrew from

the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, known as the GUAM, as an abbreviation of the four member countries: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova,¹¹¹ which was seen as a gesture for improving relations with Russia. Instead, in 2006, Uzbekistan joined the Russian-dominated CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, from which it had withdrawn in 1999.¹¹²

The decrease in the US bilateral aid after 2005 is noteworthy here, and is well studied in the relevant literature.¹¹³ Trade was also affected (Figure 20). Not only the US but also China¹¹⁴ and Russia¹¹⁵ occasionally played the card of economic assistance in the form of

Figure 19: Net Bilateral Aid from the US, As Percent of Total Aid




Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators; Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Development Co-operation Report, and International Development Statistics Database”, World Databank, OECD, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org>, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline (last visited 20 January 2017).

investments, loans or debt write-offs during this period.

The second period after independence began with an emphasis on

openness, more economic reforms, an improvement of relations with the West, in particular against the increasing dominance of Russia. International

Figure 20: Uzbekistan’s Imports from the US, Percent of Total Imports



Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity- OEC, “What does Uzbekistan export?”, at <http://www.atlas.media.mit.edu> (last visited 5 January 2017).

politics and economy became decisive in this period, especially the US war on terror, color revolutions, and the protests in Andijan, as well as the 2008-10 economic crisis.


Prospects

The third period, in the context of this article after 2011, inherited the economic setbacks of the previous era, the years of openness. In this third period, a new phase commenced in world politics,¹¹⁶ one marked by climate change, lower oil prices, terror threats and occasional conflicts, combined with populist governments in the world, amid promises of economic protectionism. The uncertainty in global politics climbed to levels higher

than the crisis-levels in 2016 (Figure 21). The impacts of these developments on the Uzbek economy are predicted to increase in the future because of factors that will be discussed in this section. The end of the Karimov era and the new government of Mirziyoyev will be decisive factors in this period.

A new phase commenced in world politics, one marked by climate change, lower oil prices, terror threats and occasional conflicts, combined with populist governments in the world, amid promises of economic protectionism.

Figure 21: Global Policy Uncertainty Index, January 2000=100



Source: The World Bank calculations based on the frequency of articles in domestic newspapers. See, The World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects", <http://www.data.worldbank.org> (last visited 20 January 2017).


New Challenges

The previous period exposed some discrepancies for the Uzbek economy that managed to remain hidden during the 1990s. First, it is obvious that Uzbekistan still needs comprehensive reforms, and for doing this, it must attract foreign direct investments, borrow from the international creditors, and receive aid from donors. In the previous period, foreign aid emerged as one of the easiest yet highly politicized ways of securing funds, but the flow of aid depended on Uzbekistan's relations with the global powers, as discussed in the previous section. Another important source, the FDI, does not seem to be as high as it was in the prior period (Figure 11). This is a global trend, having an impact on all


emerging markets, especially on China, an important export market for Uzbek natural gas in the previous period (Figure 22).

In this period, the structure of the Uzbek economy differed from the initial years. The weight of cotton in the economic activity decreased significantly, yet its importance in the regional political economy remained amid global and regional environmental concerns in the Aral Sea basin. Karimov on every occasion criticized Kyrgyz and Tajik leaders who aim to build giant dams on rivers upstream that are arterials of Uzbek irrigation. As a regional energy exporter, Uzbekistan used its position in the Central Asian Power System¹⁷ and threatened to curtail energy transfers upstream, or sometimes even

Figure 22: Total Capital Inflows into Emerging Economies, Percent of GDP



Source: The World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects", <http://www.data.worldbank.org> (last visited 20 January 2017).


Figure 23: Net Current Transfers from Abroad, Current USD

Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, World Bank and OECD National Accounts Data”, World Databank, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org> (last visited 20 January 2017).

intimidated militarily,¹¹⁸ in retaliation for a decrease in the volume of water flowing into its cotton fields.¹¹⁹

In this period, the growth of global goods trade remained below-average

compared to the previous two periods. It seems to continue on this lower level in the medium-term (Figure 25). Along with this, a prolonged recession in Russia and the slowdown of the Chinese economy, together with a

Figure 24: World Commodity Price Changes

Source: The World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects”, <http://www.data.worldbank.org> (last visited 20 January 2017). The World Bank estimates for 2017-2019.

strong USD, will shape the impending priorities of Uzbekistan.¹²⁰ The impacts of the Russian slowdown is reflected by the statistics on workers' remittances, which decreased sharply after 2014 (Figure 23), mostly because of the energy price surge between 2014 and 2016.


The Future of Energy Prices and the Uzbek Economy

The World Bank estimates that energy prices will recover between 2017 and 2019, however, they will most probably remain about one-third below the pre-2014 levels. The decrease of metals and agriculture prices, on the other hand, will not bounce back in the medium-

term, according to estimates (Figure 24).


Until recently, a significant advantage of the Uzbek economy in comparison to other resource-exporting countries in the region was that it emerged relatively less affected by the crises. This was possible with the economic policy adopted by the authorities after independence. However, the current period has its own characteristics and the Uzbek politics and economy will be more exposed to the developments in the world under the circumstances of increasing levels of integration with the global economy. An indicator of this integration may be the growth in the usage of the internet and other communication technologies in the current period (Figure 26).

Figure 25: Growth of Global Goods Trade, in Terms of Volume



Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. See, The World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects", <http://www.data.worldbank.org> (last visited 20 January 2017). The World Bank estimates for 2017-2019.

Figure 26: Communication Technology, Users per 100 People




Source: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report and database”, *World Databank*, <http://www.databank.worldbank.org> (last visited 23 January 2017).

The World Bank estimates that in the medium-term, GDP growth in emerging economies will recover beginning from 2016. Although this may be a positive indicator for the

Uzbek economy, the weak growth prospects for the advanced economies in the upcoming years pose a considerable risk on the external demand and on the FDI side (Figure 27). Uzbekistan

Figure 27: World Growth Prospects



Source: The World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects”, at <http://www.data.worldbank.org> (last visited 20 January 2017). Aggregate growth rates calculated using constant 2010 USD GDP weights. EMDE: Emerging market and developing economies. Shaded area indicates World Bank estimates.

has a special place here, as the World Bank estimates a growth rate of 7.4 % between 2016 and 2019 for the Uzbek economy. This estimation is promising and well above all emerging market economies, commodity exporters and Central Asian states, in general (Figure 28).


In this current period, the leadership of the incumbent president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, will be a crucial determining factor for the future of the Uzbek economy.

In this current period, the leadership of the incumbent president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, will be a crucial

determining factor for the future of the Uzbek economy. Global political and economic developments will continue to shape the path of the reform process initiated in the second period. It is highly unlikely that the Uzbek leadership will diverge away from its policy of economic independence and the successful Uzbek model in the foreseeable future. This is one of the most advantageous and robust aspects of the Uzbek economy and its achievements thus far.

There are further advantages for the Uzbek economy in the short-term as well. First, as stated above, estimates by international organizations indicate a rapid growth for the Uzbek economy in the medium-term. In this respect, Uzbekistan distinguishes

Figure 28: Growth Prospects for Selected Regions



Source: The World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects”, <http://www.data.worldbank.org> (last visited 20 January 2017). 121 UZB refers to: Uzbekistan, EMDE: Emerging market and developing economies, ECA: Europe and Central Asia (developing only).

itself significantly from the other developing countries both globally and regionally. Second, Uzbekistan has a relatively diversified economy, now less dependent on cotton and commodity exports. This is another distinguishing characteristic of the Uzbek economy, as compared to other former Soviet commodity exporters. Under the global political and economic uncertainties, it is a matter of political will to translate these advantages into long-term and sustainable gains for the Uzbek economy and for the Uzbek people.

Conclusion

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan has chosen an original path for economic development and independence. This paper divided the post-independence economic policies of the Uzbek leadership into three periods according to certain definitive characteristics, and argued that the original path of the Uzbek model has been one of the key factors for the performance of the Uzbek economy. Over the last 25 years, the primary motivation behind the occasional changes in political and economic preferences of the Uzbek leadership has been the changing global political economic conditions and the aim for a pursuit of independence under these circumstances.

In these three periods, the global, regional, and domestic political

environment have influenced Uzbekistan's economic performance and policies. The first two eras began with political optimism and ended with economic crises. Despite this, until recently, its original model helped the Uzbek economy survive these economic crisis periods. Furthermore, in terms of various macroeconomic indicators discussed here, the Uzbek economy performed quite well during these periods. The crises in the world economy not only made the Uzbek leadership give priority to economic issues, but also, they have been central to domestic and foreign policy decisions. In other words, the relationship between economy and policy has been dialectical in Uzbekistan. Trade, the FDI, foreign aid, and other similar indicators were influenced by foreign policy decisions as reflected by the numbers discussed in this paper. Domestic developments, such as the 2005 Andijan events, influenced political and economic positions, the level of openness, and the pace of economic reforms in Uzbekistan.

As this paper argues, the primary motivation behind the occasional changes in political and economic preferences has been the pursuit of independence (*mustaqillik*), as understood and identified by the Uzbek leadership. The current period of the world economy has its own characteristics and is open to

fundamental political and economic challenges amongst high levels of global political and economic uncertainties. Although international organizations and official statistics indicate an economic performance well above the world average in the current and coming years, global risks and a slowdown in developed economies may negatively affect the Uzbek economy. To avoid the deteriorating impacts of the recent developments, further diversification of trade markets and economic structure in a sustainable way is necessary.

The legacy of the Soviet Union, especially under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, the bid of China for being a major economic power, as well as the US interests in the region, particularly after 9/11, have been important dynamics to consider with respect to Uzbek political economy. Yet, these are only part of the picture. Regional economic conditions, the Soviet and pre-Soviet legacy of the political and economic history, as well as

the constructed interests and perceived threats of the Uzbek leadership should all be taken into consideration. In parallel, some changes in Uzbek politics and economics may be predicted in the future, on the condition that the interests of Uzbek politics coincide with other actors. A higher emphasis on regional integration and cooperation is a viable and possible option, depending on the development of relations with neighboring states, especially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as with Turkey. The renewed political leadership in Uzbekistan under Mirziyoyev would definitely be a chance for a fresh inception of endeavors for regional cooperation and integration.

To avoid the deteriorating impacts of the recent developments, further diversification of trade markets and economic structure in a sustainable way is necessary.

Endnotes

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Cultural Diplomacy Initiatives of Turkic Republics

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Abstract

This paper's aim is to shed light on cultural cooperation activities carried out among the Turkic republics over 25 years of independence and to analyse initiatives of cultural diplomacy which they have undertaken on a global level. The main argument put forward in this article is that the newly independent Turkic republics determined a culture-based policy for their state building. While this culture-based policy has contributed to the establishment of the nation-state and national identity on the domestic level, it has also contributed to the recognition of these republics as esteemed members of the international community. This paper is an attempt to disclose that as a regional cultural cooperation organization, TURKSOY has been a common platform which has played a key role in the revival of the national culture of the Turkic republics as well as in the promotion thereof on a global scale.

Key Words

TURKSOY, Turkic Republics, Cultural Diplomacy, UNESCO, Turkic World.

Introduction

TURKSOY, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (*Uluslararası Türk Kültürü Teşkilatı*), was founded in 1993 by the Republic of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Referred to as the UNESCO of the Turkic World, TURKSOY is an international organization of cultural cooperation between its member countries, having been established on the basis of their common language, history and cultural values. Its main aims are to strengthen common bonds of heritage among Turkic peoples and to transmit and promote this heritage around the world. Since it is the first multilateral cooperation platform of the Turkic World, TURKSOY's name retains a symbolic value.

In 2016, TURKSOY's founding members celebrated the 25th anniversary of their independence from the former Soviet Union. Over this 25-year period, these countries have

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gone through a major transformation process, overcoming many political, economic and social issues, and even in the midst of this process, have made comprehensive reforms to policies regarding their national cultures and identities. The main aim of these policy reforms was the revival of their traditions and cultural heritages, along with the restoration of their individual national and moral values. These, along with TURKSOY's establishment could be considered a result of the new cultural and foreign policies of Turkic republics after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of five new independent Turkic republics opened up a unique communication channel between Turkey and the Turkic peoples of the former USSR. The willingness of these new republics' heads of states to strengthen their mutual cooperation by promoting a deepened cultural revival, integration and awareness, and to create a platform of multilateral cooperation, laid the groundwork for the establishment of TURKSOY. At the end of 1992, immediately following the first summit of Turkic republics' leaders, TURKSOY's establishment process was launched and its founding agreement was signed on 12 July 1993.

It is claimed that Turkic republics gained independence unexpectedly and without any effort. However, there

are clear traces of Turkic peoples' deep desire and struggle for independence which they obtained in the beginning of the 20th century. In the 19th century, educational reforms carried out by the Jadidist intellectual movement planted the first seeds of nationalism among Turkic peoples. Roots of independence can also be found in the ideas expressed by representatives of two Jadidist organizations: the "All-Russian Muslim Congress" (convened three times between 1905-1907) and the "All-Russian Congress of Muslims" (convened twice in 1917).¹ It could be claimed that the philosophy of the Jadidist intellectuals played a foundational role in TURKSOY's establishment, which embraces the motto published in Ismail Gaspirali's "Tercuman" newspaper: "Unity in language, ideas and actions."

Culture-based policy has contributed to the establishment of the nation-state and national identity on the domestic level, it has also contributed to the recognition of these republics as esteemed members of the international community.

When compared to the fall of other empires, the dismantling of the Soviet Union did not cause much bloodshed. But while their toll may be less than others' throughout history, the Turkic republics paid a heavy price for their bids for independence. The "Urkun" of 1916, a revolt against Soviet forces, resulted in the massive migration and deaths of the Kyrgyz people. In the early 1930s, in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, "famine" was caused by an intensification of collectivization, and resulted in the deaths of millions of people. In 1937 and 1938, the Stalinist regime systematically repressed intellectuals. The effects of these traumas are still felt.

As the new Turkic republics emerged as sovereign states, social and economic issues took priority over cultural affairs, however significant efforts to restore traditional identities were made. Commemorative events were organized to pay tribute to the memories of illustrious personalities of Turkic culture and history including Abay, Manas, Magtymguly, Ali Shir Nava'i, Nizami Ganjavi, Dede Korkut and Koroghlu. The Nowruz Feast, prohibited during the Soviet regime, was officially celebrated once more, and the reputations of intellectuals accused of treachery were restored.

Having overcome the numerous pressing challenges of new independence in the 1990s, Turkic republics pressed onwards with cultural policies and initiated cultural diplomacy on a global scale in the mid-2000s. All along the past 25 years of these republics' independence, TURKSOY has been a key supporter of these nations' cultural renaissance and diplomacy.

The aim of this paper is to give insight into the achievements of Turkic republics in reviving their cultures and to draw attention to their global initiatives through TURKSOY for cultural diplomacy. Each Turkic republic has built its future upon its own unique and extremely precious cultural heritage, and under the auspices of TURKSOY, has worked towards strengthening cultural ties with the other Turkic republics and the world. Through initiatives they take on a global scale, Turkic republics introduce themselves to the world and actively support the development of alliances between nations.

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A Conceptual Approach to the Turkic World: Unity in Diversity

Although the term “Turkic World” may at first glance be perceived as a political term, it is more appropriately considered a cultural concept. While the “Turkic World” explicitly unites the five independent Turkic republics, it extends across state boundaries to more broadly include all neighbouring and kindred communities of Turkic-speaking peoples. From the “Adriatic to the Great Wall”, Turkic peoples live across a vast territory, spanning the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, the Mediterranean basin and beyond. Turkic language and culture serve as the common uniting force of the people living across this extensive territory, and thus are the building blocks of the “Turkic World.” As culture transcends state borders, it is impossible to draw clear lines delimiting the Turkic World.² Given its wide expanse across lands, Turkic culture is in fact characterized by a unity in its diversity of culture, with thousands of years of interaction between peoples.

This cultural diversity is the most distinctive feature of the Turkic World. As the Turkic people did not settle on a single territory, they are distinct from other nations that maintain a

single homeland and identity. While a portion of the Turkic people have always remained in Turkestan, from their birth, Turks have migrated to new places across Europe, Asia and Africa, and have made them their homelands.³

The Turkic World is similar to the collective French-speaking World, the Arabic World or the Hispanic World. Just as Mexico and Bolivia are distinct nations that share the same broader culture, Turkey and Kazakhstan share more similarities than differences in terms of language, religion and culture.

Turkic culture has been existing for many centuries and during this long history, has been enriched by frequent encounters with other cultures. During the height of the Silkroad, the Turkic World saw some of its most glorious periods. Indeed, *maqams*, tales, ornaments, foods, and other elements of Turkic culture in Kashgar reached out to Anatolia, with the Silkroad acting as not only a trade route, but a cultural bridge. The power of trade, ideas and materials across state borders became apparent again at the end of the Cold War, when relations among the Turkic World and other nations were opened up, and a new glorious era for the Turkic World was ushered in.

As an institution that came to the fore in the post-Soviet period, TURKSOY has

played a key role in reviving the cultural interaction among Turkic peoples and in enriching their culture in depth and breadth. Besides the independent Turkic republics, autonomous regions of the Russian Federation have also joined in TURKSOY activities. By its inclusion of these territories, TURKSOY has contributed to the preservation and promotion of these relatively small Russian Federation communities' cultures, including those of the Gagauz, Crimean and Karachay Turks.

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Turkic peoples were one of the earliest nations to avow themselves as Muslims, with Islam being widely adopted as of the mid-8th century. However not all Turks share this religion. Indeed, there have been, throughout history, Turkic peoples with religious beliefs other than Islam. For example, the Gagauz people of southern Moldova and southwestern Ukraine are Orthodox Christian; most of the Khakas of southern Siberia are Shamans; Buddhism is widespread in the Tyva Republic; and Tengriism is

the religious belief of many in the Altai Republic. Respecting the diversity of its members' religious beliefs, TURKSOY plays an inclusive and uniting role by adopting a secular philosophy in its activities.

The UNESCO of the Turkic World

TURKSOY is often referred to as the UNESCO of the Turkic World. To understand whether this is just a rhetorical statement or an accurate comparison, we should consider the fundamental principles and activities of both UNESCO and TURKSOY. UNESCO was founded in 1945 as a specialized agency of the United Nations, tasked with a mission to foster the peaceful coexistence of all peoples of the world through educational, scientific and cultural reform programs. Maintaining the idea that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defense of peace must be constructed", UNESCO primarily utilizes educational and cultural reforms to foster an ingrained collaboration and peace between peoples.⁴ Thus, it can be defined as an organization of cultural diplomacy on a global scale.

UNESCO member countries and bodies have developed many documents

and normative instruments for their cultural reform programs, including conventions, recommendations and declarations. One of its foundational documents is the “Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,” signed in 2005. This convention’s objectives are to “protect and promote the diversity of cultural expression; to create the conditions for cultures to flourish and to freely interact in a mutually beneficial manner.”⁵ TURKSOY realizes this objective among Turkic-speaking peoples and between the Turkic World and other cultures.

TURKSOY is often referred to as the UNESCO of the Turkic World.

UNESCO and TURKSOY both share goals of intercultural collaboration, and TURKSOY has greatly benefitted from working closely with and learning from this renowned organization. In 1996, a cooperation protocol was signed between TURKSOY and UNESCO, through which many events to preserve and promote Turkic heritage have been organized. TURKSOY has celebrated Nevruz in UNESCO Headquarters twice in recent years. The celebration of the 20th anniversary of the foundation of TURKSOY is another example

of cooperation, which was made at the headquarters of UNESCO with a performance of the Arshyn Mal Alan Opera to commemorate its 100th anniversary. In addition to these individual cultural events, TURKSOY actively offers ongoing support for the “International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures 2013-2022”, an important UNESCO initiative which was declared upon the initiative of Kazakhstan. And in January 2015, the Director General of UNESCO, Irina Bokova, paid an official visit to TURKSOY Headquarters, during which she expressed that the cooperation between their organizations has brought about fruitful results.⁶

The formation of the National Commissions and Committees for UNESCO of TURKSOY member countries is another important example of the collaboration between UNESCO and TURKSOY. This group has held meetings since 2008, the sixth of which took place on 9 July 2016 in Istanbul.⁷ Its meetings focus on:⁸

- the preservation of the cultural and natural heritage of the Turkic World
- the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage of the Turkic World
- the preservation of the documentary heritage of the Turkic World
- education and youth

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Some of the concrete results of these meetings are the creation of a group of Turkic-speaking countries on UNESCO platforms; the presentation of joint files regarding issues such as world heritage, intangible heritage, and the declaration of commemorative years and; the organization of events within the framework of the “International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures 2013-2022” and the “Youth Education Camps on Intangible Cultural Heritage.”⁹ As a result of TURKSOY’s collaborative efforts and goals it shares with UNESCO, the above-mentioned National Commissions and Committees along with many other instances of UNESCO support TURKSOY’s informal title as the “UNESCO of the Turkic world.”

A Sui Generis Institution of Cultural Diplomacy

Besides being deemed the UNESCO of the Turkic World, TURKSOY holds

other unique qualifications. While only independent countries can be members of UNESCO, TURKSOY has members which are not independent states, including six autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia (Moldova) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is subjected to isolation by the international community even in the fields of culture and art. Guided by the understanding that culture has no borders, TURKSOY does not cooperate exclusively with the institutions of its member countries but rather embraces opportunities to work with educational and artistic institutions outside its member countries too. As such, it has already worked with organizations within the United States of America, Europe, Iran, China, South Korea, Morocco, and others.

Since TURKSOY is an organization of member countries that share a common language, it may also be compared to the British Council,¹⁰ an institution of cultural diplomacy of the United Kingdom, and to the International Organization of *La Francophonie* (*La Francophonie*, Alliance of French Speaking Countries),¹¹ an institution that aims for the cooperation of France, its French-speaking former colonies, and any other countries that embrace the French language and culture. However, despite its functional

similarity to the British Council or *La Francophonie*, TURKSOY is distinct from them in so far as while these organizations also aim to preserve the memory of their mother nation's colonialist achievements,¹² TURKSOY does not include this as a focus.

TURKSOY is based on the principle of equal participation and common interest of its members.

As TURKSOY's headquarters are located in Ankara, the Turkish capital, Turkey is perceived to have a dominant position within TURKSOY. One might consider TURKSOY to be a bureaucratic institution or NGO within Turkey, however, TURKSOY has no hierarchical or centralistic structure. Indeed, one of its most fundamental features is that it is based on the principle of equal participation and common interest of its members. In line with this equal footing, only a few activities within TURKSOY's history have promoted the individual culture of any one member country. This anti-favoritism policy does not apply for those Turkic-speaking communities whose language or culture is endangered, with exceptions including TURKSOY's publications of the legends of the Khakas, Sakha and Chuvash peoples, and commemorative

events for illustrious artists of the Karachay-Balkar people.

Art as a Means for Dialogue and TURKSOY's Best Practices

The Council of Europe describes intercultural dialogue as "an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that leads to deeper understanding of the other's global perception."¹³ Language is the most fundamental instrument of dialogue amongst people. However, where a common language is unavailable, art emerges as an alternative channel of communication between societies. Indeed, art makes it possible to introduce oneself and one's culture to others, and to understand others, when other communication channels are not available. Thus, all media and subjects of art serve as instruments of peace, for the mutual understanding and rapprochement of societies.

TURKSOY is an organization that considers art to be an important means of dialogue, for its member countries and all cultures. While strengthening ties and interaction among Turkic-speaking peoples, it also aims to introduce the uniqueness and richness of Turkic culture to the rest of the world,

and has often employed art as a means. TURKSOY has carried out many art activities and events that are considered as best practice examples of cultural diplomacy and dialogue. From 1993 to 2016, TURKSOY held 19 Opera Days, 10 Photographers' Gatherings, 5 Sculptors' Gatherings, 7 Congresses of Literature Journals of the Turkic World, 3 Kashgarly Mahmut Short Story Competitions and 5 Seminars on Intangible Cultural Heritage. The Painters' Gatherings of TURKSOY have brought together more than 200 painters from different countries, and now TURKSOY enjoys a unique collection of colourful paintings, which have been exhibited in nearly 100 cities of more than 30 countries, from New York to Tehran and from Florence to Rabat. TURKSOY has thus, introduced Turkic culture to the world from another, dynamic angle.¹⁴

Where a common language is unavailable, art emerges as an alternative channel of communication between societies.

TURKSOY art events have brought together artists and scholars from across the Turkic world, and over time have become comprehensive cultural projects in their own right. These

projects have enabled TURKSOY to cooperate with respected international NGOs and academic organizations, such as the International Council of Traditional Music (ICTM), the International Council of Museums (ICOM) and the International Society for Music Education (ISME). Thanks to these activities, artists from across Turkic republics have been able to share their experiences with the world, expanding their intercultural dialogue.

Youth Projects

Since its establishment in 1993, TURKSOY has sought to enhance the exchange of repertoires, conductors and musicians among Turkic World countries and to introduce Turkic music to the world. It has emphasized the importance of participation by young artists in all its traditional events. Well-known youth projects within TURKSOY are its Youth Chamber Orchestra (established in 2010) and Youth Chamber Choir (established in 2015).

Since its establishment in 2010, the Youth Chamber Orchestra of TURKSOY has performed concerts in the United States of America and several European countries. In August 2016, it gave special performances dedicated to the 25th anniversary of Turkic republics' independence, and did

so within the framework of the ISME conference held in the U.K. and Italy. It has also recorded two albums featuring works by Turkic composers.

Like the above-mentioned orchestra, the Youth Chamber Choir of TURKSOY also gathers selected young artists from the best conservatories of Turkic republics. Gathering 32 students from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Turkmenistan, the Choir successfully represented Turkic republics in the European Choir Games in 2015 and won three gold medals in this competition, where more than 100 choirs and more than 5000 choir members from 37 countries were represented. Thanks to this event, young artists from Turkic countries had the opportunity to directly interact with their counterparts from all corners of the world and had the opportunity to introduce their colourful music to them at the same time.¹⁵ Recently, in 2016, the Choir took part in the Festival of Young Artists Bayreuth and participated in the Harmony International Project launched by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Germany.

Cultural Capitals of the Turkic World

During the European integration process of 1985, an initiative to raise

awareness about the richness and diversity of European culture and to foster collaboration between the citizens of Europe was undertaken. As part of this initiative, European countries decided to declare one of their cities as their cultural capital. Later, in the 1990s, America and the Arab World also began selecting their cultural capitals. After the Summit of the Heads of States of Turkic Speaking Countries was held in Istanbul in 2010, the Turkic World followed suit and began declaring its own cultural capitals. During the summit, and upon TURKSOY's proposal, Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, was declared as the Cultural Capital of the Turkic World for 2012.¹⁶

As the representatives of their national cultures, the Cultural Capitals of the Turkic World host many events throughout the year. These events range from artistic gatherings to theatre and classical music performances, and besides showcasing their cultures, they help to promote their host cities and to increase cultural tourism there. In addition to these events, the Capitals have sought more innovative ones. For the first time in 2013, the Turkvision Song Competition, similar to the Eurovision Song Contest, was held in Eskişehir, followed by another in Kazan in 2014. Rimzil Valiyev, a Tatar journalist, described the Turkvision Song Competition as follows:

“The importance and colourfulness of the Turkvision Song Competition and its impact on the image of Tatarstan and Kazan is the same as that of the *Universiade* 2013 held in Kazan. Compared to the construction of palaces and subways which are worth billions, Turkvision is a much more efficient initiative in terms of its contribution to the image of Kazan, Tatarstan and Russia as well as to the strengthening of ties among tens of countries and peoples.”¹⁷

As the representatives of their national cultures, the Cultural Capitals of the Turkic World host many events throughout the year.

It is clear that these initiatives have played a significant role in introducing Turkic culture as a rich treasure of the global community.

Literature and Commemorative Events

The commemoration of illustrious historic personalities and their legacies within our human society is a well-known practice of UNESCO. Adopting this tradition, TURKSOY

also declares commemorative years to pay tribute to the legacies of renowned authors, artists, theater actors, playwrights, musicians and composers of the Turkic World, honoring their works and thereby introducing them to young generations.¹⁸

Within the framework of these commemorations, two major competitions have been launched in the fields of literature and theater. With TURKSOY’s support, the Eurasian Authors’ Union (*Avrasya Yazarlar Birliđi*), an NGO that has carried out activities in the field of literature for over 10 years, organized the Competition of Short Stories in 2008, dedicated to the commemoration of Kashgarly Mahmut. In 2015, the Union organized the Competition of Theater Plays, dedicated to the commemoration of Haldun Taner, on the occasion of his 100th birthday.

Congresses of literature journals of the Turkic World, regularly held since 2008, have played a key role in literature as they resulted in the submission of short stories by authors of the Turkic World one of whom is declared “Author of the Turkic World” every year by TURKSOY. Individuals awarded with this title so far have been: Ali Akbař (Turkey), İsmail Bozkurt (TRNC), Tolen Abdik (Kazakhstan) and Omar Sultanov (Kyrgyzstan).

The Preservation of Cultural Heritage

Oral history and nomadic traditions are features of the intangible cultural heritage characteristic of the Turkic World. From epic legends to simple folk tales, from lullabies to mourning songs, and from handicrafts to elaborate artisan works, Turkic peoples have a rich and diverse intangible cultural heritage. Preserving, promoting and introducing this heritage to future generations has been TURKSOY's aim in several of its projects. The first book published by TURKSOY dealt with the Manas Legend, which was later included in UNESCO's "List of Intangible Cultural Heritage." TURKSOY later published the legends of Dede Korkut, Kultegin, Ural Batır and Huban Arıĝ. Nevruz, a common tradition of Turkic peoples which tended to disappear in Anatolia, was one of the first festivals to be officially celebrated by TURKSOY after its founding. Minstrels' Gatherings and Traditional Crafts' Fairs have been still other examples of cultural preservation.

Education is one of the most important instruments for safeguarding cultural heritage. Therefore, TURKSOY attaches great importance to cooperating with universities. This aim eventually resulted in the establishment of TURKSOY Chairs,

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similar to UNESCO Chairs. The first TURKSOY Chair was established in 2010, at the Aknulla Bashkort State University in Ufa. Later, TURKSOY established Chairs in Kazakhstan and in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. These Chairs and their departments organize various academic activities to raise awareness about the Turkic cultural heritage and its diversity. Through this awareness, they aim at inspiring young people's appreciation for this heritage so that they have a natural desire to preserve it.

TURKSOY attaches particular importance to the cooperation among museums of its member countries. The Forum of Eurasian Museums, organized by TURKSOY, is a unique platform to enhance cooperation between these institutions. The first Forum of Eurasian Museums was held in 2013

in Bursa and the second in Kazan, the Cultural Capital of the Turkic World for 2014.¹⁹ These Forums do not only address TURKSOY members, however, and so the third forum held in 2015 was hosted by Mongolia, a non-member nation but one with a rich history in Turkic culture. The Forum of Eurasian Museums has given rise to the establishment of an organization similar to ICOM. This marks a major step taken towards the preservation, promotion and transmission of the rich cultural heritage of the great Eurasian civilizations and their unique legacy within the history of humanity.

From epic legends to simple folk tales, from lullabies to mourning songs, and from handcrafts to elaborate artisan works, Turkic peoples have a rich and diverse intangible cultural heritage.

Turkic Republics' Global Initiatives for Cultural Diplomacy

The role of cultural diplomacy can be defined in many ways. As a basic definition, cultural diplomacy, like

other types of diplomacy, is a state instrument of foreign policy. Any tool can serve multiple purposes and, cultural diplomacy has indeed done so. From one angle, it can be claimed that cultural diplomacy is an essential part of the existential struggle against hegemony, in which certain entities become more and more imposing over time and threaten the survival of smaller and more varied groups. From another angle, it can be viewed as an antithesis to the clash of civilizations, as an effort towards peace among peoples. To this end, the newly independent Turkic republics have used cultural diplomacy effectively, strengthening their own cultures and keeping peaceful coexistence in their regions.

In the 2000s, Turkic republics launched several prestigious initiatives of cultural diplomacy on a global scale. The capital of Kazakhstan, Astana, became the Center of Interfaith Dialogue in 2003. In 2008, the Baku Process for Intercultural Dialogue was launched and Baku (Azerbaijan) was declared as the center of multiculturalism. Kyrgyzstan took an innovative step in the field of traditional sports with the first Nomadic Games in 2014. And a year later, Turkmenistan declared the year, 2015, as the “Year of Permanent Neutrality and Peace.”

Baku: the Center of Multiculturalism

Because 20% of its territory is occupied by Armenia, Azerbaijan has based its foreign policy on the restoration of its territorial integrity. Azerbaijan preferentially employs soft power policies as a means to raise awareness about the invasion and occupation. The Eurovision Song Contest, Formula 1 races and European Sports Championships, all hosted by Azerbaijan, are tangible examples of its soft power policy efforts. Compared with these programs, the Baku Process for Intercultural Dialogue is a unique initiative in that it enables direct contact between Eastern and Western civilizations.

The Baku Process for Intercultural Dialogue, comprised of high-level meetings between Western and Eastern countries, was launched in 2008 during the Conference of the Ministers of Culture of the Council of Europe. The conference, entitled, “Intercultural Dialogue as the Basis of Sustainable Peace and Development in Europe and Neighbouring Regions,” brought together not only ministers of the Council of Europe, but also ministers and representatives from member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).²⁰ In 2009, Baku hosted a meeting of OIC

Cultural diplomacy is an essential part of the existential struggle against hegemony, in which certain entities become more and more imposing over time and threaten the survival of smaller and more varied groups.

ministers of culture, inviting members of the European Union as well. Hosting these Baku Process meetings has enabled Azerbaijan to claim a position as an enforcer of intercultural dialogue programs.²¹

After these initial meetings, Baku continued to host important events to further the Baku Process initiatives. In 2010, it held the Summit of Spiritual Leaders of the World and, in 2011, the Forum of Intercultural Dialogue. At the opening ceremony of this forum held in 2011, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, delivered a speech in which he underlined the importance of multiculturalism and explained the principles on which Azerbaijan’s cultural policies are based:

“All these activities and humanitarian reforms are not a coincidence. People from different cultural backgrounds have been living together as a family in Azerbaijan for centuries.

There has never been any ethnic or religious conflict nor any disagreement in Azerbaijan, as this is not something which can be tolerated. This is a tradition to which Azerbaijan is also strongly committed today as an independent country.”²²

Baku Process for Intercultural Dialogue is a unique initiative in that it enables direct contact between Eastern and Western civilizations.

Azerbaijan further contributed to global peace initiatives by hosting the 7th Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) from 25 April to 27 April 2016. In his speech, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, the U.N. High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations, stated that the Baku Process is closely tied to the U. N. Alliance of Civilizations’ initiatives and further stated that it will constitute the most important part of the Forum. Al-Nasser, who extended his gratitude to Ilham Aliyev for declaring the year 2016 as the Year of Multiculturalism in Azerbaijan, stressed that the Baku Process is a true platform for intercultural dialogue between peaceful and inclusive societies on a global scale.²³

Astana - Center for Dialogue Among Traditional Religions

The capital of Kazakhstan, Astana, declared as Cultural Capital of the Turkic World for 2012, had long before served as a key center of dialogue for world and traditional religions. In 2003, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan, launched The Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, and this congress placed Astana as the host center for dialogue among religions and cultures in the Turkic world.²⁴ Recently, in 2012, the Congress created a Council of Religious Leaders, expanding its host city’s position as a facilitator of religious dialogue.

The Fifth Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions was held on 10-11 June 2015, and was attended by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, along with 112 delegates from 44 countries. In the opening speech he held at this congress, the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed that standard systems of checks and balances tend not to function effectively on an international scale, and highlighted the decline of the mutual trust that had been established after World War II, the decline of tourism and mobility, and the increase of information wars waged between former allies. In the context

of these international issues, he stressed the significance of the Congress as a most important component of global “faith diplomacy” and as a platform to help end conflicts and restore mutual confidence.²⁵ In his speech, Ban Ki-Moon drew attention to the timing of the Summit and extended his gratitude to the Kazakh leader for his concrete efforts towards cooperation and mutual respect.²⁶

Kazakhstan played a pioneering role in the United Nation’s launch of the International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures, which aims to preserve peace and sustainable development on a global scale. With the adoption of resolution 62/90, entitled, “Supporting Cooperation for Peace Through Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue,” on 17 December 2007 at the U.N. General Assembly, the year 2010 was declared, “Year of the Rapprochement of Cultures.” As this initiative proved successful, the 36th General Conference of UNESCO, held in November 2011, then declared the years 2013 to 2022, “International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures.” Besides proposing the declaration of this decade, Kazakhstan hosted this program’s opening ceremony²⁷ and, further showed its support by funding the program with 150 thousand dollars in 2012, 200 thousand dollars in 2013, and 100 thousand dollars in 2014.

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Multiculturalism is a key component of Kazakhstan’s cultural policies. Indeed, 130 nations, religions and cultures peacefully coexist in the country. Within the framework of “Kazakhstan 2050,” an initiative launched by Nazarbayev in 2014, the Ministry of Culture of Kazakhstan approved the Concept of Cultural Policies of Kazakhstan. This concept aims to make Kazakhstan the Center of Eurasian Culture by 2030 and the Center of World Culture by 2050.²⁸

Kyrgyzstan: Home of World Nomadic Cultures

As descendants of the Manas people, the Kyrgyz people have a very rich oral tradition. The Kyrgyz government attaches particular importance to nomadic and intangible cultural heritage as essential components of the national culture of Kyrgyzstan. One of the modern revival efforts of their nomadic roots are the Kyrgyz,

“World Nomadic Games,” held for the first time in the summer of 2014. These games, comprised of traditional Kyrgyz sports’ competitions, lasted for one week and saw more than 400 competitors from 19 countries. At the opening ceremony, the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Atambayev, stated that Kyrgyzstan builds its future on the heritage left behind by its ancestors and emphasized the feat the Games have achieved in bringing together all the people of the country, a first in the history of Kyrgyzstan.²⁹

The idea to organize these Games arose during the Second Summit of the Turkic Council, held in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, in 2012. The Declaration issued at the end of the summit stated that this initiative has been welcomed as a sign of respect towards the preservation and revival of the common history, traditions, language and culture of Turkic peoples.³⁰

The World Nomadic Games, which emphasize ethnic sports and culture, play an additional important role in preserving cultural diversity and preventing cultures from deterioration through globalization. As a tribute to nomadic traditions, lifestyles and cultures, and as the trademark of Kyrgyzstan, the World Nomadic Games promoted the national beauty and tourism potential of Kyrgyzstan.

Increased tourism will undoubtedly spark more direct, one-to-one contact and dialogue between individuals from within and abroad, furthering Kyrgyzstan’s contribution to the rapprochement of cultures.

In a list of 10 countries, the United Nations World Travel Organization (UNWTO) ranked Kyrgyzstan as the number one country which will experience a boom in tourism in future decades.³¹ If this prediction comes true, this increased tourism will undoubtedly spark more direct, one-to-one contact and dialogue between individuals from within and abroad, furthering Kyrgyzstan’s contribution to the rapprochement of cultures.³²

Magtymguly Pyragy and Cultural Initiatives of Turkmenistan

As a philosopher and poet who lived in the 18th century, Magtymguly Pyragy is a key personality of Turkmen national culture. Indeed, his character and poems are essential components of the Turkmen people’s mentality and lifestyle.³³ 18 May, the birthday of the great poet, is an official holiday in

Turkmenistan. Magtymguly Pyragy is a cornerstone of the Turkmen cultural heritage; his works have been translated into many languages. His legacy extends beyond his literary works; busts and statues of him are common, as are parks named after him, even outside Turkmenistan, for example in Turkey and Russia.³⁴

For 2014, the 290th anniversary of Pyragy's birth, TURKSOY dedicated the year to his commemoration as a great poet and philosopher of Turkmenistan. To honor his legacy, many events were carried out in Turkey, Turkmenistan, and several other countries. The most impressive of these was an international conference hosted by the President of the Republic of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguli Berdimuhammedov, entitled, "Magtymguly Pyragy and Universal Cultural Values," which took place on 15 May 2014 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. UNESCO Director General, Irina Bokova, TURKSOY Secretary General, Dusen Kaseinov, and many other high-level guests attended the conference. Mrs. Bokova said, "Today, at a time of global change, when all societies are undergoing transformation, I believe these humanist values have never been so vital, and this is the importance of the legacy of Magtymguly Pyragy."³⁵

A state programme, primarily focused on international activities, and aiming

at the development of cultural affairs over the years 2012 through 2016 was approved in Turkmenistan. In 2012, cultural events were organized by China, Germany, Korea, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of their mutual diplomatic relations.³⁶ In the years following 2012, Cultural Days of Turkmenistan were organized in Turkey, Mongolia, Croatia, Armenia and the United Arab Emirates among others.³⁷

A state programme, primarily focused on international activities, and aiming at the development of cultural affairs over the years 2012 through 2016 was approved in Turkmenistan.

In 1995, Turkmenistan obtained the status of permanent neutrality in a U. N. General Assembly vote. In accordance with this new status, Turkmenistan declared the year 2015 as the "Year of Neutrality and Peace" in Turkmenistan. In 2015, the city of Merv, Turkmenistan, was declared the Cultural Capital of the Turkic World. Many events organized throughout 2015 contributed to Turkmenistan's international cultural enrichment and promotion. Colourful opening

and closing ceremonies, conferences and exhibitions, and the 32nd Term Meeting of the Permanent Council of TURKSOY, have been the most prominent events held in the country within this framework. On 12 December 2015 an international conference on “International Cooperation for Peace, Security and Development” was held in Ashgabat. In the speech he delivered at this conference, the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said that Turkey fully supports all international initiatives of Turkmenistan, “which are particularly important for the entire humanity.”³⁸

The ASIADA Games, which will be held in Ashgabat in 2017 with the participation of thousands of athletes from all countries of Asia, will be another significant step toward enhancing the “Open Door” policy of Turkmenistan.

Conclusion

The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, declared that, “the republic is built upon culture.”³⁹ He sought to follow the reforms for linguistic and cultural issues that had been set in the early years of the Republic.⁴⁰ Leaders of newly independent Turkic republics have adopted a similar culture-based approach in revitalizing and developing

their nations. The importance of traditional and spiritual heritages, trivialized under the Soviet regime, was restored and the renewed sense of common national cultures bolstered the republics’ new identities as sovereign nations. The establishment of TURKSOY in 1993, immediately following independence, bears testimony to the solidarity and wish to work together towards a common future.

The importance of traditional and spiritual heritages, trivialized under the Soviet regime, was restored and the renewed sense of common national cultures bolstered the republics’ new identities as sovereign nations.

During the 25 years since their independence, Turkic republics have accomplished many significant achievements in overcoming their individual struggles for sovereignty, strengthening their common cultural ties, and promoting themselves globally. As the “UNESCO of the Turkic World,” TURKSOY has adopted UNESCO’s universal principles on a regional level, focusing on preserving and enriching the cultural diversity of Turkic peoples, contributing to their

mutual rapprochement, and increasing the prosperity and welfare of the world through the sharing of cultural wealth. It has supported its member countries and neighbouring communities by organizing many cultural and artistic events and by collaborating with and helping to found other organizations. TURKSOY acts as a cross-border organization, serving as a cultural bridge between peoples living on a vast territory across Eurasia. With an efficient use of cultural diplomacy, Turkic republics have successfully enforced policies to sustain peaceful coexistence, and TURKSOY has contributed immeasurably to the restoration, preservation, integration, and promotion of Turkic peoples' culture.

Astana, the center of interreligious dialogue, Baku, the center of multiculturalism, Turkmenistan, the active advocate of permanent neutrality, and Kyrgyzstan, the center of traditional sports' competitions, each represent their individual and mutual commitment to preserving their Turkic culture. Over the last

quarter of a century, Turkic republics have faced many global and regional challenges. Despite these challenges, Turkic republics' success in internal and external policies helped strengthen their stability and have brought about significant economic growth and increased social welfare. Above all, these policies have played a key role in contributing to the prestige of Turkic republics in the eyes of the international community. Given the success of Turkic republics and TURKSOY, the adoption of the same approaches of cultural diplomacy by other regional powers would be advisable to work toward peace and stability in Eurasia.

With an efficient use of cultural diplomacy, Turkic republics have successfully enforced policies to sustain peaceful coexistence, and TURKSOY has contributed immeasurably to the restoration, preservation, integration, and promotion of Turkic peoples' culture.

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- 9 The fifth meeting of UNESCO National Commissions and Committees of TURKSOY member countries took place in 2015 in Baku, Azerbaijan. For results of the meeting see http://unesco.org.tr/dokumanlar/duyurular/turksoy_bt.pdf (last visited 24 January 2017).
- 10 Since 1934, the British Council has been carrying out cooperation activities among the United Kingdom and peoples of other countries and linking millions of people to each other in more than 100 countries. According to Martin Davidson, the Chief Executive of the British Council, the British Council carries out activities to promote the values of the United Kingdom and make its culture more appealing by contributing to its prosperity, security and stronger bilateral and multilateral relations. Davidson further notes that a key priority of the British Council is to strengthen the confidence and

- belief in the United Kingdom through mutual confidence and trust among the United Kingdom and peoples of other countries worldwide. In other words, the strategy of the British Council is focused on the fundamental values of the United Kingdom such as the English language, the education system, art and culture of the United Kingdom. See, *Corporate Plan 2014-2016*, British Council, 80 Years of Cultural Relation, pp.2-3, at <https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/corporate-plan-2014-16.pdf> (last visited 10 February 2017).
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Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TurkPA): Beyond Parliamentary Diplomacy

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Abstract

TurkPA, as an example of an international parliamentary institution (IPI), constitutes a forum for parliamentary diplomacy and serves as the parliamentary dimension of the cooperation and integration of Turkic countries in Eurasia. IPIs provide new channels for the exchange of views and sharing of experiences, namely through parliamentary diplomacy. The common goal of those institutions and parliamentary diplomacy is to use debate, dialogue and personal contacts to enable parliamentarians in different countries to better understand each other, help one another, and therefore provide an alternative channel to facilitate intraregional communication. This is why these institutions also carry a symbolic importance. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Turkic states in the region showed their dedication to acting together in a coordinated way by establishing the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking States (TurkPA). Today, TurkPA provides oversight to regional problems, harmonises laws and policies towards regional integration, and makes recommendations for legislation, democratic institutions, election observation missions, and good governance, among other functions.

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Key Words

TurkPA, Inter-Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs), Parliamentary Diplomacy, Regional Parliaments, Role of Parliaments in IR.

Introduction

This paper analyses the nature and role of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TurkPA) as an international parliamentary institution, elaborating on its different functions and structural properties that make it a tool for parliamentary diplomacy. To this end, this section details the definition and characteristics of IPIs in a theoretical sense. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the history, establishment, structure and activities of TurkPA, to demonstrate its characteristics as an IPI. Lastly, other IPIs have been comparatively analysed for discussion based on similarities and differences.

In their 25 years of independence, the Turkic Republics of Central Asia have had many successes, each of which

has been very important and valuable in their respective fields. One of the most important of these achievements was undoubtedly the establishment of the international Turkic organizations based on their commonalities in history, culture and language.

TurkPA, as an example of an international parliamentary institution (IPI), constitutes a forum for parliamentary diplomacy and serves as the parliamentary dimension of the cooperation and integration of Turkic countries in Eurasia.

Serving as the cultural, parliamentary, academic and commercial dimensions of a whole with different but complementary parts, TURKSOY, TurkPA, the Turkic Academy, the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, the Business Council, and the Turkic Council as a roof organization, have all become exemplary models in their respective fields, both in regional and global sense.

TurkPA has taken its place in the international arena as a successful international parliamentary institution in the field of parliamentary diplomacy. It has become the parliamentary dimension of the cooperation and integration among Turkic countries.

As a parliamentary body, it is expected to provide legislative support to the activities and undertakings initiated within the framework of wider Turkic cooperation. However, in addition to this main role, it has much more to offer as a subject and instrument of parliamentary diplomacy.

In order to understand this role, it is necessary to take a closer look at the concept of parliamentary diplomacy. Parliamentary diplomacy is a relatively new phenomenon and it is the product of the current networked context of the global society. Parliamentary delegations around the world have begun to play an important and increasing role in bilateral parliamentary relations with their counterparts or within the parliamentary assemblies of international organizations. The increased activities of parliamentarians on behalf of their parliaments in international fora have been labelled as “parliamentary diplomacy”. It is a kind of soft power, representing a medium level positioned between interstate diplomacy in its traditional form and the more current understanding of transnational cooperation. Parliamentary diplomacy aims to intensify mutual understanding between countries, ensure better representation of citizens in the international sphere, and improve inter-governmental institutions’ democratic legitimacy.

Parliamentary diplomacy aims to intensify mutual understanding between countries, ensure better representation of citizens in the international sphere, and improve inter-governmental institutions' democratic legitimacy.

Furthermore, parliamentary diplomacy also aims at promoting democracy and transparency, as well as lending support for further inter-parliamentary cooperation.¹ Thus, governments are no longer seen as the only actors in the international arena. Cutler defines parliamentary diplomacy as representing “a significant middle way between the traditional means of diplomacy and new means of transnational cooperation.”² Meanwhile, Fiott describes the role of parliamentary diplomacy and international parliamentary institutions like TurkPA, attaching importance to them expressing that they are “critical for the conflict prevention and provision of mediation and means to establish long-term political dialogue on the base of trust and mutual understanding.”³

For people like Malabud and Stavridis, the parliamentarization of international relations is a further step, perceived

as both the result and the cause of democratization:⁴ “Parliamentarians from developing democracies, can gain experience from their counterparts from well-established democracies. For example, [...including parliamentarians or officials from parliamentary secretariats in electoral monitoring missions is (another) advantage...] of parliamentary relations”.⁵ In this way parliamentarians gain more experience, while they also demonstrate how parliamentarians can play non-traditional democratic accountability roles. “Parliamentarians from established democracies can share ‘best practice’ experience with their counterparts from developing democracies.”⁶

Stavridis, one of the pioneering scholars on parliamentary international relations or parliamentary diplomacy, highlights the importance and meaning of the phenomenon of parliamentary diplomacy, suggesting that “all activities and actions that parliamentary bodies and their members take in international relations, can be labelled as parliamentary diplomacy”:

“MPs’ missions abroad and participation in transnational parliamentary bodies; Visits by other MPs and parliamentary delegations to parliaments and other institutions (national or transnational); written

and oral questions, reports and other studies on foreign affairs that take place within a parliamentary body; the activities of transnational parliamentary bodies; parliamentary participation in the monitoring of elections in third countries.”⁷

Thus, TurkPA, like any other international parliamentary institution, is a manifestation of parliamentary diplomacy. It is an independent international institution and product of transgovernmentalism,⁸ aiming at greater Turkic cooperation and consultation as based on commonalities and experience sharing. In the following sections, detailed information and analysis on different aspects of TurkPA are provided to better illustrate how it acts as an IPI and embodies the principles of parliamentary diplomacy.

TurkPA: Historical Background

TurkPA is the product of a lengthy process of intergovernmental deliberations which began with the new millennium. The idea of establishing a Parliamentary Assembly of Turkish Speaking Countries was put forward for the first time by the Speaker of the Kazakhstan Parliament, Mr. Jarmahan Tuyakbay, during the visit of Ömer İzgi, Former President of the Grand

National Assembly of Turkey, to Kazakhstan on March 29, 2001, on the recommendation of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

One month later, President Nazarbayev expressed the proposal for the establishment of a parliamentary assembly among Turkish speaking countries, in İstanbul during the Summit of the Heads of States of Turkish Speaking Countries. Nazarbayev reiterated the same proposal on 17 November 2006 in Antalya, during the 8th Summit of the Heads of States of Turkic Speaking Countries. After Nazarbayev’s initiation and insistence on the idea of establishing a “Parliamentary Assembly of Turkish Speaking Countries”, the Speaker of the Turkish Parliament invited delegations from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to Turkey for a preparatory meeting.

The first working group meeting for the establishment of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkish Speaking Countries was held on 21-22 February 2008 in Antalya with the participation of parliamentary delegations from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. A draft *Letter of Intent* with a draft text of the *Agreement* was signed by the Deputy Speakers of the participating countries. A second

preparatory meeting took place in Astana with delegations from the Parliaments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey in attendance, with the absence of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Nevzat Pakdil, former Vice President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, paid a visit to the capital of Turkmenistan and met with Turkmenistan Parliament Speaker Akça Nurberdiyeva in order to inform him of the developments and to invite Turkmenistan to join in the preparatory meetings of the Assembly. During the visit, Nurberdiyeva stated that “the neutrality policy imposed by Turkmenistan gives priority to bilateral relations instead of multilateral relations and they would closely follow the *Assembly’s* work and that it may be possible to participate in the *Assembly* in observer status in the future.”

Likewise, Former Vice President of the Turkish Parliament Nevzat Pakdil attempted to carry out a visit to Uzbekistan for talks regarding the *Assembly*, however this call was not received positively by Uzbekistan on the grounds that they do not believe in the benefit of international parliamentary organizations.⁹

The back and forth nature of these talks and the way they were initiated and spearheaded by parliamentarians

in all respective countries are a typical representation of IPIs. Even before its foundation, the process of TurkPA’s establishment has in itself been an example of parliamentary diplomacy, strengthening the ties between the parliamentarians of Turkic-speaking countries and serving as a means for international dialogue and rapprochement.

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Thanks to the hard work and joint efforts of the Leaders of the Turkish World, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkish Speaking Countries (TurkPA) was finally established with the Istanbul Agreement on 21 November 2008. The Treaty was signed by Azerbaijan National Assembly President Oktay Asadov, Kazakhstan Senate Vice President Mukhambet Kopeyev, Kyrgyzstan Parliament Speaker Aytibay Tagayev, and former Speaker of the Turkish Parliament Köksal Toptan. TurkPA was established as a result of

the long-term cooperation among the Turkic-speaking Countries, which had started with the First Summit of the Heads of Turkic Speaking States, held in İstanbul in 1992. TurkPA is the first of its kind and unique in being an international parliamentary grouping based on Turkish language, common history and culture. It was established in order to bring national legislations closer and to work in close cooperation on other inter-parliamentary activities.

With the First Article of the İstanbul Agreement on the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries, the parties declared that,

“Parliaments of the Turkic-speaking countries, leaning on historical, cultural and a linguistic community, with a view of the closest interaction in rapprochement of national legislations and other questions, concerning inter-parliamentary activity, have established the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking Countries as an advisory body in order to develop and strengthen inter-parliamentary cooperation.”¹⁰

As can be seen, the founding of TurkPA and the articles lying at its core embrace and promote the intercultural dialogue between parliamentarians, incorporating the core properties of IPIs and highlighting its role as a medium for parliamentary diplomacy.

Principles and Objectives of TurkPA

The primary goals of TurkPA include developing inter-parliamentary cooperation among members by means of parliamentary diplomacy, promoting political and economic dialogue between members, and creating a favourable political climate for elaboration and implementation of different initiatives aimed at strengthening regional and global security.

Beyond the historical, cultural and linguistic unity of its members, TurkPA member countries also have commonalities such as being developing economies and having dynamic population structures.

Beyond the historical, cultural and linguistic unity of its members, TurkPA member countries also have commonalities such as being developing economies and having dynamic population structures. These commonalities provide solid ground for enhanced cooperation among them. Since member countries face similar political, economic, and cultural challenges, TurkPA intends to build joint action within the framework

of inter-parliamentary activities to overcome these challenges. As has been reaffirmed by the Baku Declaration, TurkPA is built on the common will of the member countries to adhere to the principles of national independence, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of state borders, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, and inadmissibility of threat or use of force, and as such it is not against any organization or country in the region. In this context, TurkPA is firmly committed to the principles and values of the United Nations and its Charter, as well as to other universally recognized principles and norms of international law. As explained in the Introduction section, parliamentary diplomacy is a phenomenon that has developed in the broader context of globalised multilateral relations and these interactions with the UN and its principles also showcase this connection.

The Main Responsibilities of TurkPA

In parallel with the goals of parliamentary diplomacy, the Parliamentary Assembly of TurkPA aims to build and strengthen mutual trust among the member countries. According to the Second Article of the Istanbul Agreement “harmonization of legislation of the member countries;

preservation and transfer to the future generations of cultural heritage and values of history, art, literature and other areas which are of importance for Turkic countries; promotion of effective regional cooperation in the fields of education, science and technology; interaction of mass media and providing wider communication aimed at efficient exchange of legal information; creation of favourable conditions for trade and investment; promotion of joint regional economic projects, especially in the field of energy and transport; discussion of political issues on the basis of mutual interest” are the main goals of the establishment of TurkPA.¹¹

Members of the TurkPA seek to facilitate inter-parliamentary dialogue among Turkic-speaking countries in order to generate new ideas and suggestions and to ensure proper legislation for their implementation.

Practically, members of the TurkPA seek to facilitate inter-parliamentary dialogue among Turkic-speaking countries in order to generate new ideas and suggestions and to ensure proper legislation for their implementation. The inclusion of

legislative harmonisation in the aims and activities of TurkPA is a sign of the more practical impact of IPIs, showing that legal integration and cooperation can happen outside of traditional state-to-state bilateral relations.

Organizational Structure of TurkPA

This section details the organisational structure of TurkPA, especially with regards to the governance structure. The common pattern that can be observed is that the structure revolves around equality between all members and a revolving basis of chairmanship, which is a direct reflection of the participatory and equitable nature of IPIs.

At its core, TurkPA consists of the parliamentary delegations of its member countries. Each member country is represented in the Assembly by nine delegates. The Assembly normally holds a plenary session once a year and the supreme body is the *Council of Assembly* composed of the chairpersons of the member parliaments. The Council meets one day prior to the plenary session and coordinates the Assembly's activities.

The TurkPA *Chairmanship* is held for one year by each member country in alphabetical order. Decisions of the Assembly are taken based on

consensus. The Chairman of the Council of Assembly is the Chairman of the member country parliament hosting that session of the Council. The Chairman of the Council of Assembly performs his duties through presiding over the plenary sessions of the Assembly for the duration of one year.

The Commissions consider the issues within their competences, ensure the execution of the decisions adopted by the Council of Assembly and during the Plenary Session, assess documentation and examine proposals submitted to the commissions, and adopt draft reports, recommendations and decisions to be presented at the Plenary Sessions.

At the former stage the Assembly established four commissions; the Commission on International Relations, the Commission on Legal Affairs, the Commission on Economic, Trade and Financial Affairs, and the Commission on Social, Cultural and Humanitarian Affairs. Due to the necessities and because of the agenda, some of the commissions were merged and new ones established. Currently there are still four permanent Commissions, but with different responsibilities. They work under the head of delegation of each member country. Today, the Commission on Environment and Natural Resources is headed by Azerbaijan, the Commission

on Social, Cultural and Humanitarian Issues is headed by Kyrgyzstan, the Commission on Economic Cooperation is headed by Kazakhstan, and the Commission on Legal Affairs and International Relations is headed by Turkey.¹²

National parliaments that are not members of TurkPA and international parliamentary institutions and other organizations may participate in the public meetings of the Assembly as observers and guests upon consent of the Council of Assembly and by invitation of the Chairperson.¹³

The TurkPA *International Secretariat* ensures the effective functioning of the Assembly, the Council and the Commissions. The Secretary General, head of the International Secretariat, manages the overall activity of the Secretariat. The main tasks of the secretariat are; preparation of the necessary documents for meetings of the Assembly, the Council and other bodies; informing the Assembly, Council and other bodies of the data and information support; sending documents to the parliaments; and informing them of the activities organization. The Secretariat employees are obliged to fulfil their responsibilities in line with the interests and objectives of TurkPA.¹⁴

The international status of the TurkPA Secretariat is based on the Host-country

Agreement signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and the TurkPA Secretariat. However, diplomatic immunities recognized by Azerbaijan to the members of Secretariat, are not yet recognized by the other members.

The Secretariat's Budget is made by contributions of the TurkPA member countries determined by their annual GDP.¹⁵ TurkPA's budget was 300,000 euros in 2011, it was raised to 570,000 euros for the year 2012 and 2013, then 650,000 euros for the ongoing years.

Activities of TurkPA

The General Assembly

This section provides a chronological account of the sessions of TurkPA that have convened to date, shedding light on the main policy priorities, areas of action, and concrete steps that were taken. Through these, it is possible to understand the concrete applications of parliamentary diplomacy and see the various roles IPIs can play in furthering relations between countries.

The First Plenary Session of the TurkPA General Assembly took place on 29 September 2009 in Baku. At this meeting, issues such as the establishment of the TurkPA Secretariat, and selection of the headquarters and officials were discussed, and it was decided that the

headquarters would be established in Baku and Azerbaijan would be the first chairman and host country for the new organization. It was also decided that the next chairmen and host countries for the plenary sessions would continue in alphabetical order after Azerbaijan. TurkPA Internal Rules and Secretariat Regulations were accepted and the first declaration of TurkPA was published. It was emphasized in the Declaration that TurkPA would be “beneficial for increasing the cooperation among the member countries and for bringing the people closer to each other.”¹⁶

The Second Session of the TurkPA General Assembly was held on 28 April 2011 in Astana, with Kazakhstan taking over the presidency. An icon and a flag were accepted for TurkPA. Chairs of the Commissions were elected and the amount of the budget was redetermined. A further agreement was reached to make an amendment to the İstanbul Agreement for the addition of the English language to the working languages of TurkPA alongside the national languages. A memorandum of understanding was signed for cooperation between the libraries of the national parliaments. The Declaration of Astana was adopted. The importance of strengthening relations between parliamentarians was emphasized and the contributions of TurkPA to political, economic, and cultural and other fields were praised.

For the first time, during the Fourth General Assembly, held in Ankara, a non-member country, Hungary, participated as a guest to the plenary session.

The financial crisis that was taking place at that time was also mentioned in the Declaration and it was also remarkable that the intention to contribute to the regulation of the new global financial and economic system was declared in the global sense.

Similarly, during the 3rd General Assembly of TurkPA,¹⁷ decisions were taken to develop a business union in various areas. While the content of the Bishkek Declaration is similar to the previous ones, it is noteworthy that the items related to economic issues came to the forefront.

For the first time, during the Fourth General Assembly, held in Ankara, a non-member country, Hungary, participated as a guest to the plenary session. Members jointly declared support for the settlement of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in the Karabakh conflict and for a solution based on the political equality of the two sides in Cyprus within the framework of the United Nations. Members also decided to improve knowledge and experience sharing

among the administrative bodies of their parliaments and to mutually support each other's candidacy in international organizations.¹⁸ At the meeting, the application of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to obtain observer status in TurkPA was addressed, but the decision on this issue was postponed. The participation of Hungary was a great example of how TurkPA's work to date and effectiveness as an important regional platform had come to be embraced by non-member countries as well.

The participation of Hungary was a great example of how TurkPA's work to date and effectiveness as an important regional platform had come to be embraced by non-member countries as well.

TurkPA's 5th General Assembly was organized in Baku on 13 June 2014. The Baku meeting confirmed full support to the Bodrum Declaration of the Turkish Council. During the 4th Heads of States Summit of the Turkic Council, the Bodrum Declaration was adopted to condemn all forms of terrorism and give support to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict. The Bodrum Declaration can be taken as a showcase of how IPIs can lead to the

strengthening of a certain international position held by a group of countries with a common denominator. As such, it constitutes a powerful statement made by Turkic-speaking countries.

Another important development during this session was that Hungary was granted observer status in TurkPA. Despite the insistence of Turkey, no Council or General Assembly resolution was accepted on the observer membership of TRNC and the issue was postponed for the second time. Because of this issue, the scope of the Baku Session and Declaration remained very limited. It was decided that the TRNC would be invited to the meetings of TurkPA as a guest but its observer status would be evaluated later.

The 6th General Assembly of TurkPA was held on 4 December 2015 in Kazakhstan's capital city Astana. In the General Assembly, TurkPA legislative activities and the importance of increasing election observation missions were discussed and appreciated. A consensus was reached on the initiation of granting TurkPA Honour Medals. Once again, the importance of establishing the business union, solidarity of member countries in hosting international conventions and support of each other's candidacy for the posts in international organizations, were emphasized.

TurkPA has gradually developed as an IPI, having shifting priorities and areas of focus depending on the broader political context.

The planned 7th General Assembly of TurkPA in 2016 in Kyrgyzstan has been postponed several times. Finally, it was postponed to 2017 because of the Constitutional referendum in Kyrgyzstan on 11 December 2016.

Based on the developments so far, it can be observed that TurkPA has gradually developed as an IPI, having shifting priorities and areas of focus depending on the broader political context. Its welcoming of observer countries and participation of non-member countries such as Hungary have also rendered it a successful example of parliamentary diplomacy, increasing its presence and importance at the regional level.

Commissions

After the initial phase of TurkPA's establishment, certain structural developments occurred which have increased its practical output and functions. This was mainly through the establishment of commissions that had varying degrees of focus. This section gives an overview of TurkPA

commissions and their area of work to further elaborate on TurkPA's role as an IPI.

In the second half of 2011, specialized commissions started their work, and the first documents of the Commissions were adopted by the Assembly after its Third Plenary Session.

The Commission for Economic Cooperation covers main economic issues, including economic, financial, and commercial relations; energy and tourism; and commercial relations such as transport, import-export volumes, and customs processes that form the backbone of economic relations. The establishment of the Business Council within TurkPA and possible creation of the free economic and trade areas in the member countries are also subjects of this Commission.

The Commission on Legal Affairs and International Relations deals with the constitutions and legal affairs, and shares information about legislative activities in national parliaments between the members. It works on legislative processes and on the harmonization and approximation of legislation. Multilateral cooperation issues and cooperation in international organizations and diaspora matters are discussed under the heading of international relations.

The Commission on Environment and Natural Resources covers the management of natural resources that are very important for the world economy and trade relations. Environmental issues that necessitate multilateral work to protect the environment are also coordinated by this Commission.

The Commission on Social, Cultural and Humanitarian Issues handles issues related to the cultural ties that constitute the foundation of TurkPA: business alliance opportunities in social and humanitarian issues; general issues and works related to Turkish language, translation and education initiatives between Turkish dialects; and other fields of cultural art, are among the topics covered in this commission.

Through the composition and focus areas of the commissions, it can be seen that TurkPA covers all areas of multilateral relations and facilitates relations between its members in all areas from economic cooperation to social and cultural issues. This is a clear demonstration of its important role as a tool for regional cooperation and increased dialogue.

Election Observations

According to Hasanov, the First Secretary General of TurkPA, the main activities of TurkPA have been holding plenary sessions and observing

elections in member states.¹⁹ Election observations are an important additional function of TurkPA, as they constitute a very concrete means through which the members cooperate and interact with each other's democratic systems. Whereas plenary sessions and the relevant work of the commissions, as detailed in the previous section, showcase the soft power of TurkPA and its role as a platform for dialogue and cooperation, election observations are a very specific area in which there are clear and tangible outputs of international importance.

As an important part of parliamentary diplomacy, election observations and experience sharing become one of the most important missions of international parliamentary organizations. It has become an important mechanism for ensuring election integrity in countries undergoing democratic transition or in post-conflict societies. Thus, today observation missions enjoy near-universal acceptance, and can help raise voter confidence and evaluate the legitimacy of an electoral process and its international credibility and respect.²⁰ Election observation missions have also become a learning opportunity for national electoral administrators and election participants. They promote bilateral exchanges of knowledge and information on electoral practices that usually leads to lasting cooperative relations.

Today observation missions enjoy near-universal acceptance, and can help raise voter confidence and evaluate the legitimacy of an electoral process and its international credibility and respect.

To ensure the legitimacy of their work, international observers have to follow internationally recognized standards of conduct. Several organizations that specialize in international observation have developed codes of conduct to guide such observers' behaviour. Like others, TurkPA observer missions obey the Behaviour Codex of International Observers accepted by the United Nations in 2005, and the Principles of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Respecting the sovereignty of the host country and the rules of its election management body is essential to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the election observation missions. *Objectivity, non-interference in the election process, accuracy and abstaining from conflicts of interest* are also among the principles that TurkPA Observer Missions follow.

TurkPA's mandate to observe elections in the member countries has contributed to enhanced cooperation of the Assembly with public administrations and efforts to comprehensively monitor

the national elections processes in the member countries.²¹ In member countries, 15 parliamentary and presidential elections have been monitored by the TurkPA International Observers Mission since 2010.²² Traditionally, TurkPA sends its final reports on results of elections to the leading international institutions, such as the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament. TurkPA's mandate on international observation of elections is recognized and accepted by the international community. For this reason, the Assembly added a special provision to the TURKPA Rules of Procedure in order to further promote the "International Observers Mission" in the non-member countries at the global level, and, if required, on joint observation of elections with other international organizations.

Experience- Exchange Programs

Another important function of TurkPA is the organisation of experience and exchange programmes. In accordance with Article 2 of the İstanbul Agreement, the TurkPA International Secretariat develops experience-exchange programmes among the parliaments of the member countries in order to enhance inter-parliamentary cooperation.

The increasing role of parliamentary diplomacy becomes another tool to promote political dialogue and exchange of views at all levels.

TurkPA realizes experience-exchange programs among Parliamentary staff of member countries. Through the reciprocal visits of parliamentary staff members to the national parliaments of TurkPA members, they become acquainted with the activities of the Departments of Foreign Relations and Protocol, Law and legislation, Permanent Committees, Departments of International Relations, Social Legislation, Economic Legislation, the Press Secretariat, Committees and Commissions, and Information Resources and Technology of the Turkish Parliament. In addition to becoming acquainted with those departments, visitors participate in the preparation of draft laws, works in the permanent committees and get to know each other for future cooperation and consultations. At the end of each visit and seminar, the TurkPA Secretariat issues Certificates of Participation for the staff. This function is a concrete example of how parliamentary diplomacy can foster dialogue, and the exchange of knowledge and best practices between politicians from different countries. Through these

visits, greater unity and communication between Turkic-speaking countries have been achieved.

Relations with Other International Organizations

Since one of the objectives of TurkPA is to contribute to the development of parliamentary diplomacy through the establishment of relations with other parliaments and international regional and global organizations, it gives special importance to present its own identity in international fora. As have been detailed in previous sections, the existence and importance of IPIs should be analysed and understood in the bigger global context of international relations. At a time when multilateralism and soft power is becoming so important, the relationship of IPIs with other international organizations becomes an important area of focus and influence.

The Assembly stands for interaction and strengthening ties with all international organizations, especially those in the Eurasian region, in order to contribute and to maintain operational coherence among various organizations in its own sphere. The increasing role of parliamentary diplomacy becomes another tool to promote political dialogue and exchange of views at all levels. In this

context, TurkPA supports interaction between parliamentary and traditional diplomacy and the establishment of a mutually reinforcing relationship with both inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary institutions. TurkPA pushes such an inter-parliamentary cooperation beyond the boundaries of the Turkic-speaking world. In this context, TurkPA applied for observer status in the UN General Assembly and has declared several times its recognition of and respect for the supreme role of the UN and its values.

Moreover, TurkPA gives particular importance to strengthening a common inter-parliamentary platform for dialogue at a global level. As a result, the Assembly was granted observer status by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)²³ and the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (PUIC), the largest of all inter-parliamentary institutions. Close cooperation between TurkPA and PUIC was enhanced by granting each other observer status on a reciprocal basis.

TurkPA has also established relations with a number of international organizations through its Secretariat. These organizations are the OSCE and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the European Parliament, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, GUAM, the

Baltic Assembly, the Nordic Council, and the Parliamentary Dimension of the Southeast European Cooperation Process. The Assembly has established dialogue with the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures (CICA) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Both organizations granted observer status to TurkPA. As can be seen, TurkPA has fostered its relations with a broad number of organisations with different regional and substantive scopes.

Since 2010, the European Parliament has initiated practical cooperation with TurkPA. In this regard, the Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD) played a key role in the process of establishing long-term relationships between the European Parliament and TurkPA. The OPPD assists the development of regional inter-parliamentary organizations in order to strengthen their capacity of inter-parliamentary legislative cooperation and to share best practices. At the first stage of cooperation with the OPPD, staff of the TurkPA International Secretariat have been invited by the OPPD to take part in a study programme in the European Parliament. As the next stage of this cooperation, OPPD has organized an individual fellowship programme and training events for the TurkPA International Secretariat.

Although TurkPA focuses primarily on economic, social and cultural cooperation, it defines itself as a sub-regional organization aiming to contribute to the promotion of security across the Eurasian region. Consequently, the Assembly pays particular attention to cooperation with the OSCE, the largest regional organization with a comprehensive approach to security and political issues in the region. TurkPA makes its sole contribution to the achievement of the OSCE tasks and objectives. The Organization supports a flexible approach towards establishing a mutually reinforcing relationship with the OSCE on the basis of established principles of equality, inclusiveness and transparency. Since its establishment, TurkPA has constantly maintained regular contact with the OSCE and has supported any opportunities for future cooperation between the two organizations.

Although TurkPA focuses primarily on economic, social and cultural cooperation, it defines itself as a sub-regional organization aiming to contribute to the promotion of security across the Eurasian region.

TurkPA also closely cooperates with the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (the Turkic Council) and TURKSOY in order to shape a joint pattern for economic, political and cultural cooperation among Turkic-speaking states. These relationships are maintained through mutual participation in events and creation of a basis for coordination activities. Thus, a TurkPA delegation participates in the Summits of the Turkic Council, where the Heads of States and Ministers of Foreign Affairs are informed about the TurkPA's activities on a regular basis. The Turkic Council and TurkPA in their adopted documents reiterate their support for each other's activities. Thus, TurkPA in its Astana Declaration,²⁴ expresses its readiness to continue the implementation of summit declarations by contributing to effective interaction with the Turkic Council and TURKSOY.

Presently, TurkPA and the Turkic Council conduct deliberations on institutionalized interaction that would contribute to the promotion of political dialogue and exchange of views among Turkic-speaking states at various levels, as well as to the consolidation of efforts and undertakings for enforcing relations with the international community.

Based on all these relationships, it is possible to observe how TurkPA has gradually increased its importance as an

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IPI bringing together Turkic-speaking countries. Through the diversified relationships with these organisations, it has come to be recognized as an important counterpart in parliamentary diplomacy activities.

Events and Conferences

In the context of cooperation with international organizations and other countries, TurkPA has organized a number of events. The conference on “Parliamentary Diplomacy – TurkPA”²⁵ on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and in line with the policy of fostering the Turkey-Azerbaijan and Turkey-Kazakhstan inter-parliamentary relations was held in the Azerbaijani Parliament. The international conference on “The Role of Parliamentary Democracy in the Process of the Interstate Relations Development” was held at

the Baku State University.²⁶ Likewise, the International Conference on the “Increasing Role of Women Politicians in the 21st Century,” dedicated to the 20th anniversary of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, was organized jointly by TurkPA and the “Women Leaders” Association.²⁷

The TurkPA International Secretariat also organized the International Forum on “The Role of Youth Leadership in the Development Process of Interstate Cooperation”. The aim of the Forum was to bring together young leaders from the various countries to build their personal networks and conduct a dialogue. Young parliamentarians, diplomats, bureaucrats and representatives of international and non-governmental organizations from 25 countries participated in the Forum.²⁸

The TurkPA Secretariat further contributes its utmost effort to the development of cooperation with the public agencies of the member countries, as well as with diplomatic and international organizations present in the host country, the Republic of Azerbaijan. In line with this, meetings were held with the foreign ministers of member countries, certain ambassadors of the EU countries, top officials of the UN mission and the prime UN agencies present in the Republic of Azerbaijan,

officials of the European Council and European Parliament, and heads of inter-parliamentary friendship groups.

The varying nature of topics and TurkPA's willingness to address important questions such as the role of women and youth are important developments. Through these activities, TurkPA has broadened its network beyond the participation of parliamentarians and increased its role of thought leadership and representation.

Publications

One important function of IPIs is to increase understanding between its members and encourage knowledge exchange. For this to happen, it is of utmost importance that there is a minimum level of understanding between participating countries when it comes to their respective governance structures and political priorities. To this end, the TurkPA Secretariat published a series of documents in order to help members better understand each other's administrative structures and parliamentary systems. For this purpose, the member countries collected constitutions which were translated into the five official languages of TurkPA and published.²⁹ Correspondingly, the rules of procedures of each member parliament were translated into the official languages of TurkPA and published separately.³⁰ It is important

to mention that the members see that the parliamentary systems of the member countries differ from each other and have unique properties. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Turkey have a unicameral system while in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, they have bicameral system with different competence. By bringing together the rules of procedures of the member countries' parliaments, it is aimed that the similarities and differences of the parliaments can be understood more clearly, facilitating the analysis and follow-up of the political mechanisms of member parliaments. For this reason, although Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are not members of the organization, their bylaws were included in the project.

Lessons from Other Regional Parliaments

In this section, regional parliament examples from all over the world are discussed to showcase different approaches to parliamentary diplomacy. These IPIs have varying degrees of legislative power, unique characteristics in terms of structure, and different compositions in terms of membership and participation. It is important to see, however, that their main functions still carry the core characteristics identified in the previous sections for IPIs.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)

The IPU is a prototype of an international parliamentary organization and the only organization of this type at the international level. It is *sui generis* in that it is an international parliamentary, political and representative organisation and it enjoys a significant measure of international personality.³¹ The IPU was founded in 1889 as the first international political organization composed of national parliamentarians and acting as an NGO. Overtime it developed from an NGO to an organization of national parliaments. The recent change of *de facto* membership from national groups in parliaments to parliaments by itself was the turning point indicating that the IPU had gotten recognition of its international personality by governments. The IPU has a headquarters agreement with Switzerland and has had the right to set up a diplomatic mission in New York since 1998. It has concluded international treaties with the UN, UN Specialized Agencies, and with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Through advancing and intensifying its cooperation with the UN, a process officially phrased as “providing the parliamentary dimension to the United Nations” has started. Accordingly, following the Cooperation Agreement with the UN, the IPU was granted

observer status in the UN General Assembly, which includes the right to circulate its official documents at the General Assembly. Moreover, for many years it has been organizing parliamentary conferences parallel to UN meetings and conferences. Since 2000, it has been holding World Conferences of Speakers of Parliament every five years and organizing an annual parliamentary hearing at the UN General Assembly. If cooperation becomes even closer, the IPU at some point could become a specialized “parliamentary” agency within the UN system.

The European Parliament

As regards to parliaments, the EP is the most developed example. Its competences evolved overtime. Initially, the EP, like the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, was a forum composed of delegations appointed by national parliaments and selected from their own ranks, with limited consultative functions regarding a small number of issues, and the ability to make legislative proposals prior to their adoption by the Council.³² According to Malabud and Stavridis, the creation of the parliamentary assemblies in Europe after the Second World War had more than just a symbolic value. These assemblies of the Council of Europe, the ECSC and the WEU, served as an interface between the organizations

and the national parliamentarians, and allowed politicians who came from previously warring countries to establish closer contacts, thus promoting the restoration of mutual trust and cooperation between former enemies.³³

On the other hand, the idea of European unification and the pooling of sovereignty was a distinctive feature of the European Community. The European Union's founding fathers Schuman and Monnet's idea of building a polity beyond the nation states led to strong activism on the part of the members of the *Assembly*, which led to the direct election of the EP and to the emergence of European Party formations.

Electoral dynamics, a strong Treaty and elected MPs empowerment, transformed the EP into an exceptional *supranational parliamentary assembly* that has democratic legitimacy and decision-making competencies. It has become the benchmark against which the performance of other regional parliaments are measured.³⁴

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe³⁵

The Parliamentary Assembly was set up as a consultative body of the Council of Europe in 1949. The Assembly brings together 324 delegates and substitutes who are elected members

of parliament in their respective countries. Each national delegation is comprised of between two to eighteen representatives, depending on the country's population, and must reflect the balance of political forces in the respective national parliament.

In the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the parliamentarians are organized not by their national parliaments but according to their political groupings i.e. Socialist Group, Group of the European People's Party, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, European Democrat Group, and the Group of the Unified European Left. These groups are important to ensure that members reflect their own political views, not the interests of their own countries.

The Assembly meets four times a year. During these sessions, the parliamentarians discuss Europe's most pressing socio-political questions. Within the framework of these debates, the Assembly adopts three different types of texts: recommendations,³⁶ resolutions,³⁷ and opinions.³⁸ The Assembly has eight permanent committees.³⁹ Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly is responsible for the election of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, its Human Rights Commissioner and the judges at the European Court of Human Rights.

The Latin American Parliament (PARLATINO)

The Latin American Parliament is a unicameral assembly made up of members of 22 national Latin American and Caribbean parliaments.⁴⁰ PARLATINO was founded in 1964 with the aim of promoting domestic democracy and regional integration. It is composed of national delegations sent by the member parliaments, each of which can appoint up to 12 representatives in a proportion that reflects the weight of the national parliamentary groupings. All member countries have the same voting power regardless of population and attendance. PARLATINO gathers once a year, and it has no decision-making authority and limits itself to issuing nonbinding declarations and recommendations. Its main historical merit was to provide a protective umbrella for democratic political leaders and aspirations during the dark era of dictatorial rule. Because it is composed of national parliamentarians, it is intergovernmental, lacks legislative competencies and is quasi-continental in scope. PARLATINO resembles the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe more than the EP. It is unique in that it stands independently and is not part of a broader organization.

The Central American Parliament (PARLACEN)

PARLACEN was inaugurated in Guatemala City in 1991.⁴¹ It was first envisaged by Central American presidents as a symbol of reconciliation for a region that had been devastated by years of bloody conflicts and political instability. Today it has 132 deputies and 42 parties from six countries. Deputies are elected directly every five years by member country citizens. Each country can elect 20 representatives and have two appointed deputies from former presidents and vice-presidents. PARLACEN is the deliberative body of the Central American Integration System (SICA), initially called the Central American Common Market.

The parliament's legislative competencies are limited to proposal, analysis and recommendation. It cannot pass laws, but it can formally elect, appoint and remove the executive officials of SICA institutions.

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP)⁴²

The PAP, founded in 2004, is the parliamentary organ of the African Union (AU) and currently has 250 members from 50 countries.⁴³ Each parliament sends five representatives, one of which must be a woman. The

PAP is a semi-permanent body that convenes twice a year, has exclusively advisory and deliberative powers, and is tasked with harmonizing national legislation. It focuses more on international issues than on domestic questions, operating as an international debate forum and an instrument of parliamentary diplomacy rather than as a community organ.

The objectives⁴⁴ of the PAP are to facilitate the effective implementation of the policies and objectives of the OAU and ultimately the African Union; to promote the principle of human rights and democracy in Africa; to encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in Member States; to familiarise the peoples of Africa with the objectives and policies aimed at integrating the African Continent within the framework of the establishment of the African Union; to promote peace, security and stability; to contribute to a more prosperous future for the peoples of Africa by promoting collective self-reliance and economic recovery; to facilitate cooperation and development in Africa; to strengthen continental solidarity and build a sense of common destiny among the peoples of Africa; and to facilitate cooperation among Regional Economic Communities and their Parliamentary fora.

Even though PAP prioritizes the representation of all the peoples of

Africa and its members are supposed to act in their personal and independent capacity, deputies are still selected by their own national parliaments.

The Arab Parliament

Members of the Arab League agreed to create an Arab Parliament, and passed a resolution in 2001 to give the Secretary General of the Arab League the power to start and create the Parliament. Subsequently, in 2004, all Arab League Members sent their representatives to the temporary Parliament sessions that took place in the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo, Egypt. It remains largely symbolic, rather than playing an active role in its region.

The Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States

The Commonwealth of Independent States is a regional organization formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Nine out of the 15 former Soviet Republics are member states, and two are associate members (Ukraine and Turkmenistan). Georgia withdrew its membership in 2008, while the Baltic States⁴⁵ chose not to participate.

The CIS has few supranational powers but aims to be more than a purely symbolic organization, nominally possessing coordinating powers in the realms of trade, finance, law making, and security. It has also promoted cooperation on cross-border crime prevention.

The Assembly was established in March 1995 by the leaders of the Supreme Soviets (parliaments) of the Commonwealth countries as a consultative institution to discuss problems of parliamentary cooperation and to develop proposals by the parliaments of the CIS states. Its Assembly consists of parliamentary delegations of the member states. The activities of the Assembly are carried out by the Assembly Council which comprises the leaders of the parliamentary delegations. There is also an Assembly Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General, to ensure the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, its Council and commissions.

Conclusion

TurkPA, like other international parliamentary institutions in Asia, Africa, Europe and America, is a clear manifestation of parliamentary diplomacy together with its symbolic importance. Since governments are no longer sole actors in the

international arena, parliaments and parliamentarians, the representatives of the people, have started to play their role in international relations. Through IPIs, they became more visible in the international arena. IPIs also provide moral legitimation for international decision making procedures. They become the voice of people, represent common sense and make those procedures more transparent, accountable and participatory.

Since governments are no longer sole actors in the international arena, parliaments and parliamentarians, the representatives of the people, have started to play their role in international relations.

Since IPIs enable the use of dialogue, parliamentarians in different countries can better understand each other, help one another and represent their regional identities and commonalities. They all introduce a democratic, popular element into regional and international governance.

Since more and more governmental organizations aim to acquire supranational features and some degree of regional integration and harmonization of laws, parliamentary

structures serve to the purpose of facilitating these goals.

Although different in the level of parliamentariness and in their competences, IPIs all over the world do have a common goal to some degree, namely regional integration, good governance, mediation, conflict prevention and a means to establish long term political dialogue based on trust and mutual understanding.

To this end, TurkPA has successfully managed its role and became the parliamentary dimension of cooperation and integration among Turkic countries. As a parliamentary body, it provides legislative support to

the activities and undertakings initiated within the framework of wider Turkic-cooperation.

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- 22 Dates, places and subjects of those elections were as follows: 11 December 2016 Kyrgyz Republic, Amendment to the Constitution; 26 September 2016 Azerbaijan, Amendment to the Constitution; 20 March 2016 General Assembly Elections of Kazakhstan; 1 November 2015 Turkey, General Election; 1 November 2015 Azerbaijan, General Election; 4 October 2015 Kyrgyzstan, General Election; 6 June 2015 Turkey, General Election; 26 April 2015 Kazakhstan, Presidential Election; 10 August 2014 Turkey, Presidential Election; 9 October 2013 Azerbaijan, Presidential Election; 30 October 2011 Kyrgyzstan Presidential Election; 12 June 2011 Turkey, General Election; 27 April 2011 Kazakhstan, Presidential Early Election; 7 November 2010 Azerbaijan, General Election; 10 October 2010 Kyrgyzstan, General Election.
- 23 The TurkPA Secretary General was admitted to the Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments (ASGP) as a member with observer status. ASGP is a consultative body of IPU and seeks to facilitate personal contacts between holders of the office of Secretary General in any parliamentary assembly.
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- 29 TurkPA Publications, *Constitutions*, <http://www.turk-pa.org/news.php?id=620&lang=en>, (last visited 17 March 2017).
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- 31 Claudia Kissling, “Legal and Political Status of International Parliamentary Institutions”, *Background Paper*, No. 4, Committee for a Democratic UN, 2011, p.22 and 24.
- 32 Malamud p. 108.
- 33 Ibid. p. 109.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/Home-EN.asp> (last visited 17 March 2017)
- 36 Proposals addressed to the Committee of Ministers.
- 37 Decisions by the Assembly which it is empowered to put into effect on its own.
- 38 Answers of the Assembly to questions put to it by the Committee of Ministers.
- 39 <http://www.europewatchdog.info/en/structure/parliamentary-assembly/> (last visited 17 March 2017). Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy; Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights; Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development; Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons; Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media; Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination; Monitoring Committee; Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs.
- 40 Members: Argentina, Aruba, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, the Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela.
- 41 Members: Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama
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- 43 AU member states that have ratified the PAP protocol Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sahrawi Republic, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, UR of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
- 44 <http://panafricanparliament.org/about-pap> (last visited 6 March 2017).
- 45 Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.

Style and Format

Articles submitted to the journal should be original contributions. If another version of the article is under consideration by another publication, or has been or will be published elsewhere, authors should clearly indicate this at the time of submission. Manuscripts should be submitted to: e-mail: perceptions@mf.gov.tr The final decision on whether the manuscript is accepted for publication in the Journal or not is made by the Editorial Board depending on the anonymous referees' review reports.

A standard length for PERCEPTIONS articles is 6,000 to 8,000 words including endnotes. The manuscript should begin with an indented and italicised summary up to 150 words, which should describe the main arguments and conclusions, and 5-7 keywords, indicating to main themes of the manuscript. A title page should be attached to the manuscript, including the title of the manuscript, full name (s) of the authors, academic and/or other professional affiliations if any, complete mailing address, fax and phone numbers of the author to whom proofs and correspondence should be sent. The author is also expected to give a brief biography in a footnote at the beginning of the article. Perceptions also publishes reviews of new books or reports; 'book reviews' are usually around 700-1,500-words."

Manuscripts should be single-spaced written by Times New Roman regular font, 11 point throughout. Justified margins; top and bottom 3 cm, left and right 2.4 cm are required. Manuscripts should be numbered consecutively throughout the paper. Only the first letters of title words should be 'upper case'. Quotations should be placed within double quotation marks ("....."). Quotations larger than four lines should be indented at left margin and single-spaced. Use endnotes and avoid bibliography. British punctuation and spelling should be used throughout. Dates should be in the form 3 November 1996; 1995-1998; and 1990s.

All diagrams, charts and graphs should be referred to as figures and consecutively numbered. Tables should be kept to a minimum and contain only essential data. Each figure and table must be given an Arabic numeral, followed by a heading, and be referred to in the text. Appropriate places of tables should be indicated in the text and tables should be submitted in a separate file. If copyrighted material is used in the article, it is the author's responsibility to obtain permission from the copyright holder.

Names of the authors, places and the publishing houses are required to be written in their original forms. The styles of the references in endnotes should conform the following examples:

Books

John Smith, *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100. John E. Smith (ed.), *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, pp. 100-102. John Smith and Mary Jones, *The Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100. Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, *The Book Title*, p. 100.

In endnotes 'ibid' should be used where possible, but it should not be used where the previous note contains more than one source.

Articles in Journals

John Smith, "Article Title", *Journal Name*, Vol. #, No. # (Month Year), p. #.

Subsequent references should appear as: Smith, "Article Title," p. #.

Articles in Edited Books

John Smith, "Article Title", in Mary Jones, *Book Title*, New York, New York Publishing Co., 1999, p. 100.

Newspaper Articles

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