

PERCEPTIONS

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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of the Foundation of the Republic: Centuries of
Diplomatic Practices

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Europe Reinvented: How COVID-19 is
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Polarity in International Relations:
Past, Present, Future



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Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Centenary of the Foundation of the Republic: Centuries of Diplomatic Practices

The year 2023 not only marks the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye, but also the 500th anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish foreign service. In order to celebrate these two important occasions, we decided to devote this issue to articles that explore various dimensions of the development of Turkish diplomacy since the Ottoman era.

This special issue includes six articles. The first group of articles elaborates on contemporary issues of Turkish diplomacy. In his article, Ambassador Dr. Hasan Ulusoy emphasizes the continuity in Turkish foreign policy in the Republican era through the theoretical perspective of social constructivism. Ambassador (R) Numan Hazar provides an overview of the development of Türkiye's relations with the African countries, particularly in the post-Cold War period. Similarly, focusing on the Republican era, Ebru Canan Sokullu and Ambassador Gülşen Karanis Ekşioğlu seek to explore the role of women in Turkish foreign policy by focusing on the concept of gender turn.

The second group of articles in this issue focuses on the Ottoman and early Republican periods including the piece by Onur Birkan, who elaborates on the institutional evolution of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1808-1908 period. Similarly, Zeynep Bostan highlights the activities of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, who served as the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II, while Aydın Çakmak discusses the significance of the Paris Representation in the development of Turkish diplomacy from the start of the National Struggle in Anatolia to the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye.

We would also like to thank Ambassador Rauf Engin Soysal and Ambassador Armağan İnci Ersoy for their contribution in the discussions of the concept of this issue.

ARTICLE

100 Years of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Perspective

Hasan ULUSOY *

Abstract

Turkish foreign policy displays a distinct identity and certain characteristics that are continuous over the span of a century. This continuity and ideational permanence can be thoroughly explained via a social constructivist theoretical framework. This article employs a conventional constructivist lens to explain and analyze how Türkiye has adopted humanitarian and enterprising qualities in its foreign policy-making since the early Republican era. The initiatives, approaches and practices that have been recently put into effect by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye can indeed be traced back and interpreted as the marks of a distinct foreign policy in the international arena. The applied constructivist framework, which provides a broader analysis of Turkish foreign policy, facilitates a better understanding of its continuity and consistency, encompassing interests defined based on the Republic's distinct identity and guiding principles throughout a century of constant evolution.

Keywords

Republic of Türkiye, Turkish foreign policy, social constructivism, diplomacy, continuity

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Introduction

The Republic of Türkiye, which was founded by the Turkish people led by the great statesman and visionary Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, will celebrate its centenary on October 29, 2023. Given all these years of significant changes, dwelling on possible prospects of the Republic for the present era and beyond certainly requires a retrospective approach, focusing on the general patterns of the country's foreign policy throughout the decades in a comparative manner to the full extent possible.

In this cognitive journey, one should begin with a prevailing observation: Nothing is static; everything is in constant evolution in social life. Cultures engaging in the formation of norms and values are also the product of such evolution. The guiding culture prevalent in Turkish foreign policy is no exception.

Foreign policy is all about pursuing, attaining, preserving and improving the defined national interests of a state.¹ In foreign policy, mainstream schools generally tend to work on analyses based on facts, i.e., outcomes that can be seen and perceived on the ground as the results of a country's policies. However, such outcomes are not exhaustive in providing a good understanding of a state's foreign policy.

Social Constructivism

Social constructivism as a complementary tool can provide a better and more comprehensive understanding of foreign policy.² Social constructivism enables us to provide answers to “why” and “how” questions in foreign policy analyses, whereas mainstream approaches can only provide partial analyses to “what” questions. In a social constructivist approach, both practitioners and academics are brought together to analyze the backgrounds and causes of the prevailing outcomes that are seen on the grounds. ‘Background’ in this context means the whole process leading to the facts of a certain situation, such as the outbreak of a war

Social constructivism enables us to provide answers to “why” and “how” questions in foreign policy analyses, whereas mainstream approaches can only provide partial analyses to “what” questions.

for example. In that sense, background consists of material elements such as history, geography and all the other factors that affect decision-making processes, including the identity of decision-makers.

Social constructivism also helps us better analyze the differing rationales of decision-makers, whereas mainstream schools tend to accept one pattern of rationality governing all situations. Although we can talk about one material reality based on what is seen on the ground, the understanding or interpretation of such a reality can differ according to one or another state, as states are formed and run by humans. This assumption leads us to argue that states are in fact living mechanisms whose rationalities can differ based on their understanding of given situations.

Constructivism lies between the positivist material world as to ontology, and the post-positivist or reflectivist constitution of this world as to epistemology. In this context, to better explain the utility of constructivist theorizing in a positivist, material world, by underlining the fact that things are not fixed or given, but that what is understood as a fact might change according to inter-subjective formation, one can give the following example:³ When throwing a stone into the air, it is easy to predict its route according to the rules of nature and physics. However, when one throws a bird into the air, the route that the bird will follow cannot be predicted *a priori*. The epistemological formation of the bird, i.e., its knowledge and experience, will determine which direction the bird would take. Thus, in order to predict the bird's behavior, one should know the factors shaping the epistemological formation of the bird based on its identity, values, experience etc., all of which are inter-subjective by nature. The same holds true for states, which are formed by human beings whose perceptions of the outside world are based on inter-subjectivism and reflectivism rather than positivism.

The bird-versus-stone metaphor enables us to distinguish states' behaviors as living mechanisms from the understanding of states from a positivist perspective. Additionally, when it comes to comparing different states acting on different rationalities, the following metaphor could provide more illumination: The famous "theatre on fire" scenario of Arnold Wolfers. The scenario is a fire in a theatre in which everyone runs for the exits. Yet, even in these seemingly over-determined circumstances,

the lack of knowledge with regards to social practices or constitutive norms and structures still could not lead us to determine conclusions. Who goes where in the same situation, which affects many at the same time? Answering this question would require knowing more, such as the norms, culture, institutions, social practices and thus identities that constitute the participants, whether humans or groups of humans—states—in a given situation.⁴

These examples are meant to provide a good indication of the utility of constructivism in foreign policy analysis. It is clear that constructivism is not an alternative to, but complementary to the realist understanding of the world and international relations. It provides additional explanations of the realist world outside without rejecting it. Constructivism in its conventional form thus functions on the premises of mainstream scholarship but also complements them with societal premises stressing the importance of identity, culture, norms and interests in shaping states' foreign policies in International Relations (IR). Constructivism does indeed help contemporary IR to provide a more complete picture of “what makes the world hang together.”⁵

In this article social constructivism serves as a theoretical framework in providing some insights about the evaluation of Turkish foreign policy across the span of a century.

Constructivism does indeed help contemporary IR to provide a more complete picture of “what makes the world hang together.”

Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkish foreign policy is a story of continuity in evolution as the national interests of the Republic remain intact. Thanks to a centennial experience, coupled with the legacy of an institutionalized diplomacy of 500 years,⁶ the foreign policy of the Republic of Türkiye has developed its own characteristics composed of various assets and practices that make it distinct in the international arena, while always adhering to the principles of international law and customs, such as *pacta sunt servanda*. Today, Turkish foreign policy can be defined as humanitarian and enterprising and is conducted in a wise and compassionate manner.⁷ It is multifaceted and multidimensional, reaching out to all corners

of the world. In addition to the country's traditional areas of interest and interactions in its adjacent regions, such as Europe including the Balkans in the West, the Black Sea basin in the North, the Caucasus and Central Asia in the East, the Mediterranean basin in the South, as well as the Middle East and its Euro Atlantic ties, Türkiye's policies focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Asia, as a whole, contribute to implementing a holistic approach. Naturally this requires an active diplomacy both at the negotiating table and on the ground. Promoting regional ownership, taking timely initiatives, supporting localized responses to local needs while strongly engaging in multilateralism are still the general patterns today.⁸

Although Turkish foreign policy today might seem to reflect the new approaches of recent times, they are in fact the testimony of continuity. The young Republic, as early as the 1920s, managed to establish its first embassies in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, namely Ethiopia in 1926 and Brazil in 1929.

Although Turkish foreign policy today might seem to reflect the new approaches of recent times, they are in fact the testimony of continuity.

Similarly, already in the 1930s, on the eve of the Second World War, Türkiye initiated the formation of regional organizations in its adjacent geographies, in the Balkans and the Middle East; the Balkan Pact⁹ and Saidabad

Pact¹⁰ are early examples of such regional engagement. The country also worked to improve its relations with the Western powers, many of whom had been its foes during its war of liberation. Atatürk's strategy can be described as an attempt to understand those countries and their perceptions of the world, i.e., the identities leading to their foreign policy strategies, by acting together with them in regional and multilateral settings—which can indeed be considered a constructivist approach to such matters.

The above examples clearly attest to the fact that the current Turkish foreign policy reflects continuity and consistency. Naturally, since the advent of the present millennium, all these attributes of Turkish foreign policy have progressed; the country has taken a strong leap forward leading to a foreign policy more advanced and efficient, thanks to certain facts, such as increased state capacity in all possible areas, from

administration and institutions to economic and technological progress. Türkiye's 260 diplomatic/consular missions abroad, making it the fifth leading country¹¹ in this category, is a good testimony to its increased capacity. Naturally a network of diplomatic/consular representation of this size enables the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be on the ground and thus better understand the realities and rationalities behind the foreign policies of many countries and international organizations, which in turn paves the way for designing tailor-made policies. Similarly, this global presence helps Türkiye function as a genuine connective force between the East and the West and implement a 360-degree approach to issues in the international arena.¹² As we have seen above, these are useful tools in implementing social constructivism in the conduct of foreign policies.

The preceding analysis, conducted in a comparative and retrospective manner, tells us a story of continuity in Turkish foreign policy, empowered with the capability to adjust to the ever-changing conditions of over a century. Certainly, this capability has grown thanks to the country's increased capacities.

The general patterns of Turkish foreign policy have not changed despite their growing multi-dimensionality. On the contrary, they have been enriched by it. Although this policy has been increasingly challenged by the difficulties and constraints of both endogenous and exogenous events, it has nonetheless maintained an unbroken continuity and consistency thanks to the guiding principles of the Republic. The founding principle, "Peace at Home, Peace in the World," touted by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, has provided an identity, indeed a roadmap, for the Republic to follow since its inception to date. Türkiye has always sought to prioritize peace, stability and prosperity in its neighboring geographies and beyond in the attainment of its national interests in international relations.

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Yet this consistency should not lead to a conclusion that Turkish foreign policy suffers from *neophobia*. In fact, it has become even more open to novelties in the post-Cold War era, thanks to its multi-dimensionality and multi-faceted responses to the issues of international politics. To cite a few, the UN Alliance of Civilizations initiative, which is co-sponsored by Türkiye, the Asia Anew Initiative, initiatives towards Latin America and Africa, the country's mediation/facilitation efforts and humanitarian assistance programs (Türkiye ranks as the most generous country on the basis of per capita humanitarian assistance spending) display the multidimensional, proactive, peace-oriented, humanitarian and enterprising aspects of Turkish foreign policy.

Conclusion

In short, one can say that in a world run by political realism, Türkiye has conducted a pragmatic but consistent and principled foreign policy guided by rationality that functions depending on how the state has perceived the outside material world, through the lenses forming its own identity.

One can thus argue with confidence that thanks to its experience and expertise gained over a century, Türkiye will continue to implement its foreign policy in responding to the challenges of the future ahead, with the increasing use of new tools such as mediation,¹³ digitalization¹⁴ and even AI,¹⁵ all of which have already been put to use by the Turkish MFA. In this journey, the Antalya Diplomacy Forum¹⁶ of the Turkish MFA, whose distinctive functions and characteristics have been acknowledged by global society, will likely be highly instrumental in bringing all relevant actors together to deliberate and contribute to the quest for providing common responses to common challenges and needs in the interest of the common future of humankind.

Endnotes

1. See for details, Marijke Breuning, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; and Jean-Frédéric Morin & Jonathan Paquin, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
2. Constructivism in its conventional form complements mainstream scholarship by giving a fuller account of world affairs that are still governed according to realist parameters. The importance of conventional constructivism is that it does not disregard the existence of a world out there. Yet, despite its existence, constructivists argue that this world is socially constructed. In other words, conventional constructivism does not reject the positivist world but approaches it with post-positivist tools to better explain the situation. See: Hasan Ulusoy, *One Policy, Many Identities: The Consistency of Turkey's Foreign Policy with Special Emphasis on its Security Dimension in the Post-Cold War Era, A Constructivist Appraisal*, Istanbul: Isis Press, 2007; Hasan Ulusoy, *A Constructivist Analysis of Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2005.
3. Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1997), pp. 319–363.
4. Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 171–200.
5. John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 855–885.
6. See the speech of H. E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, at the Budget Debates of Turkish Grand National Assembly on December 12, 2022, Ankara, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu-nun-tbmm-butce-gorusmelerinde-yaptigi-konusma-12-12-2022.tr.mfa>.
7. See the Opening Speech of H. E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, at the 10th Ambassadors Conference on August 13, 2018, Ankara, where he described Turkish Foreign Policy as enterprising and humanitarian. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKAN/sayin-bakanimizin-acilis-konusmasi-bkon.pdf>. See also the Opening Speech of H. E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, at the 13th Ambassadors Conference on August 8, 2022, in Ankara, where he announced the theme of the Conference as "Wise and Compassionate Turkish Diplomacy on the Eve of 2023 and Beyond." <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu-nun-xiii-buyukelciler-konferansi-acilis-hitabi-8-8-2022.tr.mfa>.
8. See the Opening Speech of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, at the 13th Ambassadors Conference on August 8, 2022, Ankara, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu-nun-xiii-buyukelciler-konferansi-acilis-hitabi-8-8-2022.tr.mfa>. Also see the speech of Mr. Çavuşoğlu at a meeting with diplomacy reporters on September 14, 2022, Ankara, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu-nun-diplomasi-muhabirleriyle-bulusmada-yaptigi-konusma-14-09-2022.tr.mfa>.
9. The Balkan Pact was signed by Türkiye, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1934 as a way to ensure regional stability and cooperation.
10. The Saadabad Pact was signed by Türkiye, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937 as a non-aggression pact to ensure regional stability and cooperation.
11. See the Opening Speech of H. E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu the 13th Ambassadors Conference on August 8, 2022, Ankara, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu-nun-xiii-buyukelciler-konferansi-acilis-hitabi-8-8-2022.tr.mfa>.
12. Ibid.
13. Türkiye plays a pioneering role in mediation efforts for the peaceful resolution of conflicts all around the world. While Türkiye launched the "Mediation for Peace" initiative with Finland in 2010 at the UN, it also assumes co-chairmanship of Groups of Friends at the UN, the OSCE and the OIC. To ensure dialogue and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, Türkiye has actively exerted efforts in various

geographies and contexts such as Iraq, Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and South Philippines. Most recently, Türkiye played the role of a mediator/facilitator in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War. The first direct political contacts between two sides following the outbreak of conflict were the Grain Agreement, a large-scale exchange of prisoners and the negotiations for the protection of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant—all of which were made possible through Türkiye's timely efforts.

14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye announced the “Digital Diplomacy Initiative” in 2019, and has taken steps in areas such as consular services, public diplomacy, cyber security and foreign policy analysis in this context. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs effectively uses social media tools to inform wider audience with regards to Turkish foreign policy. The Ministry has Twitter accounts in Turkish, English, French and Arabic, and has accounts on Facebook, Instagram and Youtube. The official website of the Ministry is available to audiences in 10 different languages, and the Turkish missions abroad use social media accounts effectively.
15. To strengthen the country's digital infrastructure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used an AI-based Chatbot application called “Hızır” for communicating with its citizens.
16. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF) was initiated and is organized by Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and aims at providing a platform for dialogue. Heads of state and government, ministers, diplomats, members of the business world, the press, academia and youth participate in the Forum to exchange ideas on various issues of common interest in international relations. The first ADF was held in June 2021 under the theme of “Innovative Diplomacy: New Era, New Approaches,” and the second was held in March 2022 under the theme of “Recoding Diplomacy.”

ARTICLE

Turkish Foreign Policy and the Importance of Türkiye's Policy of Outreach to the African Continent

Numan HAZAR *

Abstract

Türkiye attaches special importance to its relations with African countries due to historical, political, economic and cultural factors. Although some claim that Türkiye was late in pursuing a policy of opening up to African countries, it is worth noting that Türkiye opened its first resident Embassy in Africa at Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, in 1926, just three years after the proclamation of the Republic. In this article, Türkiye's policy and specific initiatives toward the African continent will be discussed, and the importance of these initiatives for Turkish foreign policy will be emphasized.

Keywords

Turkish foreign policy, Africa, Türkiye-Africa relations, Action Plan, TİKA

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Introduction

Türkiye attaches special importance to its relations with African countries. There are various reasons for this, nor is Africa a foreign continent to Turks. Before the Turks entered Anatolia in 1071, they established the Tulunid (Tolunoğulları) state (868–905) in Egypt over the Abbasid Empire. Later, the Ottomans prevented Spanish colonialism in North Africa and fought against Portuguese colonialism in East Africa by organizing naval expeditions.

It should be remembered that the Ottoman Empire was also an African state; from the West to the East, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan and the Habesh Eyalet (province) were all part of the Ottoman state. The Habesh Eyalet comprises modern-day Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea as well as the Harar region of today's Ethiopia. In addition, the Ottoman Empire enjoyed close and friendly relations with other African countries, particularly those neighboring its territories.

Both Muslim and Christian African countries were sympathetic to and interested in the Turkish War of Independence conducted under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk against imperialism, as well as the reforms carried out by Republican Türkiye. In turn, Atatürk often emphasized his desire for the liberation of Asian and African countries.¹

During my various contacts as a diplomat, I realized that there are certain foreign perceptions about Türkiye's policy toward Africa that are not in conformity with reality. According to these, Türkiye was 'late' in pursuing a policy of opening up to African countries. Undoubtedly, Türkiye had an intense agenda full of pressing economic, social and political problems in the period following its independence and in the following decades. Despite this state of affairs, Türkiye did not fail to show its interest in and support for Africa at every stage.

It should be underlined that at the beginning of the 20th century, there were only three independent states in Africa. All Africa had been under the yoke of colonial countries; only Ethiopia and Liberia, founded by black people from America, were truly independent at that time. South Africa had become nominally independent in 1910 under the name of the Union of South Africa. However, the head of state was the King of Great Britain, and there was a British Governor-General in the country. Not until 1961 did it gain full independence under the name

of the Republic of South Africa. Similarly, Egypt became independent on paper in 1922, but remained dependent on the UK in the fields of defense and foreign policy. Egypt gained its independence in real terms after the coup d'état in 1952 and became a fully independent state under the leadership of General Mohamed Naguib and later Colonel (General) Gamal Abdel Nasser. In this context, it is worth considering that Türkiye opened its first resident embassy in Africa at Addis Ababa, capital of Ethiopia in 1926, just three years after the proclamation of the Republic.

In this article, Türkiye's policy toward the African continent will be discussed within the scope of the historical process and information will be provided about the initiatives made by Turkish governments from the early Republican days to the present. The importance of these initiatives for Turkish foreign policy will also be emphasized.

African Independence Movements and Decolonization

In accordance with the Atlantic Charter, a joint declaration accepted and released by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1941, colonial peoples gained their freedom after the war and joined the international community as independent states. Thus, in the aftermath of the war, Arab states in Africa, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and the Sudan became independent: Türkiye immediately recognized these countries and opened resident embassies in their capitals.

In contrast, Algeria's struggle for independence was bloody and required a long process. Algeria had been occupied by France in 1830 when it was still a part of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the Washington Treaty which created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 confirmed Algeria's status as a French territory. Since Morocco and Tunisia had signed treaties of protectorate with France of their own will, they became independent earlier because their legal status was different.

After the Second World War, Türkiye faced a serious Soviet threat. The USSR's territorial claims against Türkiye, namely that it should annex Kars, Ardahan and Artvin provinces by making border corrections in Northeast Anatolia, and its demands for a base in (or joint defense

of) the Turkish Straits led Türkiye to seek a security guarantee; it urgently sought to become a member of NATO, which is primarily a defense organization. In this context, Türkiye, with the concern of not confronting France, an important member of the NATO alliance, voted against the inclusion of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in the UN. Ultimately, Morocco and Tunisia gained their independence, a move that was supported by Türkiye.

As indicated before, since Algeria was mentioned by name in the 1949 Washington Treaty that founded NATO, the alliance was required to guarantee France's territorial integrity, which included Algeria as a part of mainland France beyond the sea. This provision in the NATO Treaty was later abolished after Algeria's independence, but at the time, it tied Türkiye's hands. Despite this situation, Türkiye risked annoying France and abstained from all subsequent voting regarding Algeria at the UN. In addition, Türkiye secretly sent arms and military communications equipment to the Algerian freedom fighters via Libya and Tunisia. As a result, French warships started to closely follow Turkish vessels in the Mediterranean. In the end, Türkiye voted for the independence of Algeria

An important development regarding the independence of African states was the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 14, 1960, with Draft Resolution No. 1514.

in 1962 in the UN, recognized Algeria and immediately opened a resident embassy in its capital, Algiers.²

An important development regarding the independence of African states was the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 14, 1960, with Draft

Resolution No. 1514. Supporting this Declaration, Türkiye recognized the independent Sub-Saharan African countries in 1961, opened embassies in the capitals of some and established diplomatic relations with other countries through the accreditation method.

Another important development was the independence of the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau,

Mozambique and Sao Tome-Principe in 1975 after the end of the fascist regime in Portugal. Türkiye also recognized these countries.

Türkiye played a particular role in the independence of Namibia, being a member of the Namibia Council created at the UN for the preparation of South West Africa as an independent state. South West Africa, a former German colony, was designated as a mandate of South Africa after the First World War. Following the Second World War, however, it was placed under the direct responsibility of the UN. The Namibia Council was created by the UN in 1968. South West Africa became an independent state in 1990 under the name of Namibia.

Türkiye's Outreach to Africa

In terms of Türkiye's relations with the African continent, it is necessary to evaluate the Arab countries in North Africa and the Sudan separately. Türkiye, historically, has always had special relations with Ethiopia, which are at present developed in every field. However, Türkiye's relations with Sub-Saharan African countries have not developed enough, although Ankara has recognized the newly independent countries and opened embassies in some of them. The necessity of contacting these countries emerged in 1964 when the need for support from many countries gained importance during the debate of the Cyprus issue at the UN General Assembly. Many independent states in Africa (54 today) were members of the UN at that time.³

Goodwill delegations were thus sent to African countries from time to time, especially starting from 1965, in order to explain Türkiye's Cyprus policy. These delegations consisted of politicians, diplomats, journalists and academics, and they traveled to Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Malawi, Madagascar, Sudan, Libya and Tunisia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Hasan Esat Işık, made the following statement at Türkiye's Grand National Assembly: "The duty of goodwill delegations is not limited to the Cyprus issue alone; the activities of these delegations have a positive effect on giving new momentum to the close and sincere relations we are working to establish between us and the young countries of Africa." Indeed, at

that time, contacts, especially with Sub-Saharan African countries, were aimed at seeking support in the UN General Assembly regarding the Cyprus issue.

The initiatives that were deliberately made to improve Türkiye's relations with African countries in every field began during the government of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in 1978–79. In 1978, the task of managing all relations with Sub-Saharan African countries was given to a separate department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an "Africa Department" was established. The policy that emerged at this time has been dubbed the "African Initiative". In the previous periods, Türkiye's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa were at a low level and were

In 1978, the task of managing all relations with Sub-Saharan African countries was given to a separate department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an "Africa Department" was established.

limited to contacts on specific issues within the scope of duty of a section within the jurisdiction of the General Directorate of the Middle East. In 1978, a Turkish delegation headed by State Minister Orhan Eyüboğlu went to Nairobi for the funeral of Kenya's founding president Jomo Kenyatta, and had contacts with

the leaders of Kenya and Zimbabwe there. Then, with the awareness that the success of opening up to Sub-Saharan African countries depended on the development of economic relations, it was decided that delegations consisting of representatives of the private and public sectors would visit Sub-Saharan African countries.

In this context, delegations visited Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Ethiopia. The issues that African countries focused mostly were the procurement of financial and technical assistance and increasing the number of higher education scholarships. Their requests were met by Türkiye to the fullest extent possible. In this context, medicine, blankets and similar aid was sent to Zimbabwe by ship.⁴

When I visited Zimbabwe's capital Harare with a delegation as part of the African Initiative in 1999, various African Ministers informed me as the head of the delegation that they remembered Türkiye's assistance in 1978 with gratitude. I conveyed their feelings to Ecevit, who was once

again Prime Minister at that time. Ecevit also expressed his satisfaction to me at the progress of Türkiye's relations with Africa.

During Prime Minister Ecevit's government, resident embassies were established in Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania, and Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. After 1980, however, the first of these embassies was closed due to economic reasons and the second due to security problems. The Turkish Embassy in Accra, the capital of Ghana, was also closed due to austerity measures. Since the coalition governments that came to power in Türkiye at that time did not last long, the African Initiative was interrupted.

At a later stage, Türkiye contributed 10 million dollars to a fund created in 1984 within the framework of a program of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to help the Sahel countries suffering from drought. Türkiye's aid program started with medicine and food aid to Somalia. Visits were organized to various countries (Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Mali, the Sudan, Niger and Chad). As a result of the contacts with these countries, a foundry was established in Gambia, an irrigation facility was installed in Senegal and a hospital was built in the Sudan. The State Planning Organization, which carried out this program, organized various training programs for African countries within the scope of providing technical assistance, and experts were sent to some countries.

After the Ecevit period, the second important step was initiated by Prime Minister Turgut Özal. Özal had previously served at the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) in Washington and as the Undersecretary of the State Planning Organization and Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the economy. Based on this background, he had a global vision of the international economy and trade.

One day in 1988, Prime Minister Özal called Ambassador Tanış Bleda, Director General of Economic Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and said:

For Türkiye to increase its exports, it is necessary to enter new markets. Africa seems like a virgin market to me. Before directing our exporters and businessmen to this market, I want you to set up a delegation and go to West African countries and evaluate the situation on the spot. I will send another

delegation to East Africa. When you return, we will do what is necessary according to your impressions.⁵

The delegation headed by Ambassador Bleda visited Senegal, Gambia, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon. The delegation determined that there were opportunities to sell goods to these countries and that these countries were ready to carry out joint projects with Turkish companies. During his contacts in Gambia, upon the request of the authorities of this country, it was decided that Türkiye would conduct gendarmerie training and provide equipment. President of the Republic Kenan Evren and the Gendarmerie General Commander gave the necessary instructions. It has been observed that the friendly relations established with Gambia have been reflected in the votes of this country in the UN. In Nigeria, President Ibrahim Babangida stated that he was a fan of Atatürk and his reforms, and that if he could do in Nigeria half of what Atatürk had done in Türkiye, the face of his country would change. The Turkish delegation also made positive impressions in terms of developing economic relations in Gabon and Cameroon. Prime Minister Özal was impressed by the positive results of the delegation's visits and said that he would convey these impressions to the Turkish business community. Ambassador Bleda added that he had not heard that Turkish businessmen, at least while he was on duty in Ankara, were freeing themselves from the lure of the domestic market and heading toward the African market.⁶

Türkiye's Action Plan for Outreach to Africa

After the Opening to Africa initiative in 1988, no significant progress was made in terms of developing relations with African countries. Türkiye's first attempt to realize its relations with Africa as a whole, comprehensively in all areas and within the framework of a written Action Plan, was launched in 1998.

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The developments regarding the preparation of the Action Plan, in which I was personally involved, took place as follows.

After serving for four years (1991–1995) as Minister-Counselor at our Embassy in Bonn, the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany at that time, after a period of serious and unpleasant problems between Germany and Türkiye, I was promoted to Ambassador and appointed to Lagos, the capital of Nigeria at that time. Since I was also accredited to eight more countries where we did not have resident embassies, my mandate included a large region in West Africa. I worked in Nigeria for about three years. During this period, I emphasized in the detailed reports I submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that there was a great potential for Türkiye to develop its relations with Africa in every field, including economic, political and cultural spheres, and that the sympathy for Türkiye in Africa was an advantage. The information contained in these reports constituted the backbone of the Action Plan for Outreach to Africa, which was given to me to prepare upon my return to Ankara.

On my return from Lagos to Ankara in 1998, I was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the responsibility for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the entire African continent. At that time, the Undersecretary of the Ministry, Ambassador Korkmaz Haktanır, called me and said that it would be beneficial if I were to visit various African countries at the head of a delegation. I emphasized that if the political, economic, commercial and cultural relations with the African continent as a whole were developed, Africans would understand our foreign policy problems in the long run. Upon Haktanır's suggestion, I gave an African briefing to the senior executives of the Ministry. Informing Minister İsmail Cem about this briefing, Haktanır said that the Minister wanted me to prepare an African Initiative Action Plan.

At the end of a series of three-day meetings with the participation of the representatives of the Chief of General Staff and all relevant Ministries, the State Planning Organization and the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA), Türkiye's twelve Ambassadors in Africa, honorary consuls of African countries in Türkiye and private sector umbrella organizations, the Action Plan was prepared, taking into account all of the opinions expressed during these meetings. At the political level, the full support of both President Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was provided.⁷

The comprehensive Action Plan included measures to improve Türkiye's relations with Africa in every field. It included measures such as increasing political contacts through high-level mutual visits and inter-parliamentary visits; increasing the number of Turkish Embassies in Africa; signing economic, commercial and cultural agreements; providing technical assistance; improving air and sea transportation; and increasing the number of higher education scholarships.⁸

In this context, many delegation visits were organized to African countries. Some state ministers presided over the delegations. The delegations that I led included representatives of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, various Ministries, TİKA and State Planning Organization, private sector umbrella organizations and an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Also, head of state and ministerial visits were made from African countries to Türkiye.

With the implementation of the Action Plan, intense contacts between Türkiye and Africa started. This development is also reflected in the trade figures between the two countries. However, the economic crisis that started in Türkiye in 2001 caused pauses in the implementation of the Action Plan. The general elections held in Türkiye in 2002 and the establishment of a new government also prolonged this process.

The Turkish Government Declares 2005 the “Year of Africa”

In 2005, the new government headed by then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan initiated an important Policy of Outreach to the African Continent. In this regard, 2005 was declared the “Year of Africa” in Türkiye, and many breakthroughs were made, while political contacts increased.

In 2005, the new government headed by then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan initiated an important Policy of Outreach to the African Continent. In this regard, 2005 was declared the “Year of Africa” in Türkiye, and many breakthroughs were made, while political contacts increased. From this date until now, President Erdoğan has visited 31 African countries, including the period when he served as prime minister. New embassies were

opened in Africa and Türkiye became a non-regional donor member of the African Development Bank. Türkiye also participated in various African organizations as an observer. For example, it became an observer member of the African Union in 2005 and was later accepted as a strategic partner of the African countries in 2008.

In 2008, the Summit Meeting of Türkiye and African countries with participation of Heads of State and Government was held in Istanbul. As of today, there have been three successful Summits jointly organized by Türkiye and the African Union. The Second Summit was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on November 19–21, 2014, and the Third Summit was hosted by Türkiye in İstanbul on December 16–19, 2021. Thus, the relationship between Türkiye and the Continent has evolved into an institutionalized and mutually reinforcing partnership.

TIKA has established 22 program coordination offices in Africa for foreign aid purposes, including humanitarian aid and technical assistance. The number of African students in Türkiye has significantly increased, and Turkish Airlines (THY) has started to fly to 62 destinations in 41 African countries. The number of Turkish embassies in Africa has increased from 12 in 1998 to 44 today. The number of African embassies in Ankara has increased from 10 in 2008 to 38 today. There have also been significant increases in the figures regarding Türkiye's trade with the continent.⁹ Total trade with Africa rose from \$5.4 billion in 2003 to \$ 40.7 billion in 2022. While Türkiye's trade with Sub-Saharan African countries was 1.3 billion dollars in 2003, it increased to 15.5 billion dollars in 2022.

It is estimated that the total value of Türkiye's direct investments in Africa today exceeds six billion dollars. Turkish contractors have undertaken 1,796 projects in Africa with a total value of \$82.6 billion. In Sub-Saharan African countries alone, 445 projects with a total value of 26.7 billion dollars have been undertaken. At the present time, Türkiye has Business Councils with 45 African countries, 40 of which are Sub-Saharan.

In order to strengthen Türkiye's contractual infrastructure with African countries, Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements have been concluded with 48 countries, Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments Agreements have been signed with 32 countries and

Prevention of Double Taxation Agreements have been established with 17 countries.

Between 2009 and 2019, Türkiye's official development assistance for the 46 Least Developed Countries (LDC), 33 of which are African countries, was 2.5 billion dollars, and Türkiye's total development assistance was 8.7 billion dollars.

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This amount corresponds to 1.15% of Türkiye's GNP.

More than 15,000 African students have benefited from Turkish scholarships since 1992. Currently, 60,954 African students continue their higher education in our country. In addition, the Turkish Maarif

Foundation (TMV) provides education to 20,600 students through its schools in 25 African countries.

At the Third Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit held on December 16–18, 2021 in Istanbul, President Erdoğan gave instructions to donate 15 million vaccines to African countries; 1,730,000 doses of vaccine were sent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 500,000 were delivered to Benin and 200,000 to Niger in March 2022. Again in March 2022, 290,000 doses of vaccine were delivered to Somalia and one million doses were delivered to Tanzania. In April, 2022, 500,000 doses of vaccine were presented to the Malian authorities. Thus, the TURKOVAC vaccine, which Türkiye produced with local resources, has begun to be delivered to our African friends.

In Africa, almost 24.5 million people are in the crisis category and more than 6.4 million people are in the emergency category in a geography that faces three serious drought crises each year. At least 670,000 people in Somalia and at least 170,000 people in Ethiopia have been displaced due to drought. As of Spring 2022, 12 to 14 million people, including approximately 5.7 million children, confront high levels of food insecurity and severe water scarcity across the region. As of June 2022, the number of people experiencing high levels of food insecurity reached 18.4 million in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. It is estimated

that more than 1.5 million animals have already perished in Ethiopia and around 1.5 million in Kenya. In order to reduce the loss of life in the coming period, international aid organizations have requested more than 4.4 billion dollars for this year.

Participating virtually in the High-Level Round Table Meeting on Drought in the Horn of Africa, held in hybrid format in Geneva on April 26, 2022 and led by the UN Humanitarian Aid and Coordination Office (OCHA), Türkiye pledged \$500,000 in aid. In total, approximately \$1.4 billion was pledged at the meeting by 21 donors.

The highest level of participation in the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF) held on March 11–13, 2022, was from African countries; Five Heads of State and Government from 25 African countries, 27 Ministers, including 20 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 2 Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 2 International Organization Representatives participated. Four bilateral meetings at the Presidential level and 17 bilateral meetings at the Ministerial level were held with African countries at the ADF margin.

As can be seen, Türkiye's relations with Africa have made great progress in every field. In this context, it is useful to mention some evaluations circulating abroad regarding Türkiye's relations with Africa. Thomas Wheeler, who served as South Africa's Ambassador to Ankara, said that Türkiye uses its soft power to expand its influence in Africa and develop mutually beneficial trade relations. It is effective in ways similar to those of other countries, yet does not attract the negative reactions faced by other countries. Wheeler emphasizes that the targeted countries responded positively to the initiative.¹⁰

In a report titled, "The New Formation of Turkish Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa-Public Diplomacy and Private Actors" published by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), the developments of Türkiye's African Initiative in terms of political, economic and other relations are noted. The report claims that, despite everything, modest results were achieved in the economic field; for example, Türkiye's political, economic and humanitarian activities in Somalia gained great visibility.¹¹

Kamal Bayramzadeh argues that Türkiye's African Policy was successful, as the country increased its trade volume with Sub-Saharan Africa and

took important steps in the construction sector. Türkiye's relations with Africa have evolved rapidly across political, diplomatic, cultural and commercial dimensions, as Türkiye's institutional involvement in these relations was given a framework.¹²

Julia Harte states that Türkiye has a better reputation than the other active countries on the continent, and that it will gain economic and political advantages if it can maintain this reputation based on good-willed interaction.¹³

It has also been stated that Türkiye's 'new' strategic orientation stemmed "partially" from the decision to reject Türkiye's candidacy for full membership to the European Union at the European Union Council meeting held in Luxembourg in December 1997.¹⁴ However, it should be clear that Türkiye's involvement with the continent predates this decision by at least three decades.

Conclusion

It should be considered natural that Türkiye, which has made serious strides in the economic field since the 1980s and has become a member of G-20—one of the 20 largest economies in the world— makes international expansions in proportion to its strategic importance, economic size and political clout. Nonetheless, it is certainly not possible given today's international conditions for Türkiye's economic orientations, including those toward Africa, to be connected with the goal of establishing a hegemony. Even if it were possible, Türkiye has never had such a goal. It should be kept in mind that Türkiye was never a colonialist power. This is among the many reasons behind the sympathy for Türkiye in Africa. Türkiye's basic approach is to develop economic

Türkiye, which never had a colonial past and set an example in the struggle against imperialism with its national liberation war, is welcomed in Africa along with its economic and political investments in this continent.

and commercial relations with all countries on the basis of mutual benefit and win-win partnerships. In the African context, Türkiye has advantages over China and some other countries in terms of historical affinity and human contacts. As indicated before, Türkiye, which never had a

colonial past and set an example in the struggle against imperialism with its national liberation war, is welcomed in Africa along with its economic and political investments in this continent.

There are some countries that are uncomfortable with Türkiye's position in Africa—especially France. The dissatisfaction of France, which does not want to lose its advantages in Africa, due to Türkiye's achievements, stems from the fact that it considers Türkiye's influence as contrary to its national interests. France's discomfort has been expressed many times by President Emmanuel Macron himself. He even alleged that Türkiye and Russia were pursuing anti-French propaganda in Africa and exploiting post-colonial resentment.¹⁵ In response, a statement made by the spokesperson of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Tanju Bilgiç, on August 27, 2022 announced that Macron's statement was unacceptable. Regardless of what France or Türkiye may say about this issue, it is a fact that the French-speaking countries in Africa want to reduce their dependence on France and diversify their relations.

In conclusion, it would be correct to evaluate Türkiye's African Initiative as a strategic success in terms of Turkish foreign policy. Particularly since the implementation of the Action Plan adopted in 1998, Türkiye has achieved relatively serious and important results in terms of the economic, political, commercial and cultural aspects of its relations with African countries as a whole.

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Women in Diplomacy in Türkiye: Prospects for a Gender Turn

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Abstract

Women in diplomacy serve the national interests of security and prosperity where the hard power essence of foreign policy objectives has prevailed, i.e., in post-conflict reconstruction, in transitions from conflict to stability and in the fields of soft power promotion including cultural transitions, and civil society and business partnerships. Borrowing from Feminist diplomacy theories, this paper will first offer an outlook on the role of women represented in international affairs and diplomacy, and the setting of the foreign policy agenda in Türkiye over the past two decades. In recent decades, the number of women diplomats serving in Türkiye's foreign missions around the world has increased remarkably. This paper will examine the patterns of this 'gender turn' in diplomacy, measuring the perceptions of women in diplomacy. It will also examine the prospects for more inclusive diplomacy with greater participation and active involvement of women in foreign services, the challenges to female leadership roles in international affairs and the prospects for the success of women's leadership for a change of state in international affairs. In-depth interviews were carried out with a sample of 16 female diplomats who serve at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or at other diplomatic missions at varying levels of hierarchy. By presenting

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and analyzing these interviews, this paper will explore the extent to which women in diplomacy have a transformative power in the male-dominated, power-centric foreign policy of a state, and thus if there is truly a gender turn occurring in Turkish diplomacy.

Keywords

Women in diplomacy, gender turn, new diplomacy, feminist foreign policy, Türkiye

Introduction

Over the past decades in foreign policy, the number of women diplomats and women career service workers serving in Turkish foreign missions across the world have increased remarkably. Türkiye has become a pioneering country in the global system in terms of the great size of its diplomatic missions, and its 79 female ambassadors out of a total of 282 as of July 2022. The majority of female Turkish diplomats serve in developing countries. The number of women serving in foreign affairs is an important indicator of a country's soft power, and their distribution across the Global South and North denotes a change in foreign policy attitudes and preferences of diplomatic orientations. Women's participation and inclusion in foreign policy are thus important indicators of a country's soft power.¹ For instance, twelve of Türkiye's female diplomats were serving in European countries as of July 2022 (Portugal, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, France and Austria—the latter are Türkiye's two permanent representatives in Paris and Vienna). Besides this concentration of diplomatic representation with female diplomats, Türkiye's foreign policy has recently adopted a geographical focus also towards Africa. This African "overture" in Turkish foreign policy encompasses not only the country's soft power interests but also its military and defense partnership priorities. In short, Turkish foreign policy is going through a gender turn as a growing number of women diplomats are appointed to countries in diverse geographies and countries with both soft and hard power priorities. As an example, Türkiye's military export to Africa was 83 million USD in 2020, and increased to 288 million USD only in one year. Türkiye's 18th embassy

in Latin America² was recently opened in El Salvador, and a female ambassador was appointed to represent Türkiye there. A new military cooperation is underway between El Salvador and Türkiye, along with an emerging entrepreneurial and humanitarian dimension of this transformation of diplomatic processes.

Sweden was the first country to introduce feminist foreign policy principles in 2014, and the Swedish model still sets the standard as the most widely acknowledged normative model today. The main principles of Sweden's feminist foreign policy center around gender equality and the full implementation of human rights for all women and girls.³ These guidelines set standards for a wider group of countries in the making of feminist foreign policy. Especially after 2014, there has been a growing interest from other countries to understand and adopt these principles. In addition to Sweden, Canada (2017), Mexico, Norway and France (2019) now describe their foreign policy as "feminist".⁴ They were joined by Germany in 2021, after Annalena Baerbock took office.⁵

Despite the richness in research exploring European, Swedish and Canadian feminist foreign policy perspectives and approaches, the literature on the Turkish case remains in the process of maturing. Yet it provides a rich topic of study: The number of female Turkish diplomats has increased remarkably in the last decade. As of July 2022, there were 79 women ambassadors of a total of 282. Overall, 38% of the employees of the Foreign Ministry and 44% of the Director Generals were female in this period. Türkiye's first female ambassador, Filiz Dinçmen, was appointed in 1982—since then the number of female diplomats increased to 8 in 2000, 19 in 2005, 21 in 2010, 60 in 2019 and 79 in 2022.⁶ Among the ambassadors on active duty outside Türkiye, 45 out of 158 ambassadors were female (28.48%).⁷ Turkish diplomacy is far above the world average in the number of female ambassadors: with 28% of its total foreign ambassadors being women, the Turkish Foreign Ministry holds a leading position⁸ compared to the global average of women ambassadors—15%.⁹

Türkiye's statistics represent a quantitative turn. However, it still remains to be seen if the quantitative transformative in the Turkish case is accompanied with progress in terms of a norm transformation that would produce a gender turn in diplomacy. This paper thus investigates the normative elements.

With few exceptions, besides being victims of the discriminating practices and language of traditional diplomacy, women have mainly been hidden figures behind the scenes of international relations.

With few exceptions, besides being victims of the discriminating practices and language of traditional diplomacy, women have mainly been hidden figures behind the scenes of international relations. However, feminist foreign policy has recently received a great scholarly attention. It has become a much-debated field in International Relations (IR) studies, and many scholars have begun to examine the roles, styles and determinants of women's leadership. In particular, the capabilities and leadership of women diplomats brought about to the conduct of foreign affairs and diplomacy, where there are

Indeed, gender has become one of the major issues of diplomacy over the last forty years. Women's representation in the processes of diplomacy, and their roles as the subjects of diplomacy, have become widely discussed with reference to the number of female diplomats and their capabilities, and women's roles in the conduct of conflict resolution, bargaining and progress. Jennifer Cassidy, a former Irish diplomat, proposes that we address the gender of diplomacy, instead of gender and diplomacy.¹⁰ She argues that our perception of diplomacy is shaped by the roles we link with gender. Moreover, it may be argued that a quantitative increase in the number of female diplomats reflects the foreign policy orientation of the country they represent. Does increased female representation automatically mean a more progressive foreign policy? This is a question that still needs to be discussed conceptually and empirically.

Historically, in Western political cultures, the perceived nature of 'state'—strong, rational, competitive, aggressive and autonomous—has been associated with the 'male' image. Generally, success, power and victory, as concepts of international politics, have been defined with reference to masculinity; similarly, the language of foreign policy has been a male-dominated discourse. As Tickner critically discusses in her article, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation", "international relation is a man's world, a world of power and conflict in which warfare is a privileged activity."¹¹ Building upon the obstacles vested in traditional socio-political practices and

understanding, the Swedish flagship in establishing a feminist foreign policy is definitely a remarkable achievement.

On the academic side, the notion of a feminist IR became a concern when the special issue of *Millennium* on “Women and International Relations” was published in 1988. What is today called “feminist foreign policy” was not easily achieved or even formulated. Taking a more balanced perspective, Sjoberg argues that gender does not mean or symbolize a biological class. It rather signifies a symbolic meaning with hierarchies and stereotypes based on the male and female characteristics.¹² Building upon notions of “gender” in or of diplomacy either as biological or stylistic determinants, the normative elements of a feminist foreign policy are indispensable dimensions of a “gender turn”.

Feminist foreign policy is broadly related to certain principles and transformative elements. The former is about rights, especially principles of human rights and dignity. The latter is about the transformation in the traditional ‘masculine’ status quo of ‘state’, and its longer-term consequences for society. That is to say, transformative power should be understood in terms of the promotion of non-violence and demilitarization, and the sustainability of economic and ecological justice.

Women in Turkish diplomacy have been studied elsewhere from a historical perspective with a focus on gender structures in foreign affairs, and types of professions, positions and ranks.¹³ Borrowing from Aggestam and Towns, we argue that there is a (re-)constitution of diplomacy that is intimately linked to gender and the practices of inclusion of women over time in diplomatic representation, which we conceptualize in this paper as a “gender turn”.¹⁴ The concept of gender turn will be discussed with reference to prevailing theoretical approaches to women in foreign policy and gender roles in diplomacy, taking into account arguments that women contribute more positively to peace and global security (UNSC Resolution No. 1325), women leaders are more hawkish than their male counterparts (the Thatcher model) and the Scandinavian model. It will also examine the prospects for a more “inclusive diplomacy” with greater participation and active involvement of women in foreign service, the challenges to female

leadership roles in international affairs and prospects for the success of women's leadership for a change of state in international affairs.

Türkiye as the case under investigation in this paper will be empirically analyzed through in-depth interviews with women diplomats to examine the evidence of a "gender turn". The existence of such a turn and its nature will be explored via interviews carried out with a sample of 16 female diplomats who serve at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or at intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) at an upper level of ranking. Through in-depth interview data, this paper will analyze whether women in diplomacy exert any transformative influence in male-dominated, power-centric traditional foreign policy.

This study will examine the concept of a "gender turn" looking at whether and how the masculine language of foreign policy has been transformed, and whether the increase in the number of women engaging in foreign policy leads or can lead to a transformation from a male-dominated, power-centric language into a more cooperative discourse. The idea of a feminist foreign policy transformation will be studied by looking into the style, capabilities and leadership qualities that women diplomats are bringing to the conduct of foreign affairs and diplomacy.

First, this paper will briefly cover the basic principles of feminist foreign policy in IR via a literature review, with a focus on concepts of transformative power and gender turn. In the second part, the methodological framework will be described. The third, empirical section will analyze the interviews to discuss the perceived gender turn that is occurring, based on the data obtained from 16 women diplomats who have been serving in Turkish diplomatic missions in different parts of the world.

Conceptual Synopsis

Over the past 40 years, gender and women has been a popular topic in International Relations. It has been underlined and discussed in societies that women have been absent from leadership and have not assumed or have been denied access to key political positions. Notably, women have traditionally played only a minor role in shaping and leading international relations. In the language of IR in general, rationality,

aggressiveness and autonomy have been linked to understandings of 'state' and tied to notions of masculinity, whereas concepts such as irrational, dependent and passive have been linked to femininity and, as such, excluded from the realm of 'power' where state business is conducted. The idea of a 'typical' diplomat is associated with a Western male diplomat—rational, strong, tall, polite—and usually white.

According to Garner, women in diplomacy became a topic of discussion primarily when women's mobilization in international movements for gender equality began.¹⁵ More recently, a growing literature on feminist foreign policy and diplomacy has emerged. According to Aggestam and Towns, studies on feminist diplomacy have become a growing academic domain—yet there is still very little knowledge on gender breakdown in diplomacy.¹⁶ The literature has predominantly been produced in Western academia, and focuses primarily on Europe and European practices.

In IR, Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) does not necessarily mean an examination of the influence of biological sex in the making of foreign policy or diplomacy. On the contrary, it is a perspective that brings attention to understandings of the masculine and feminine characteristics at play in the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy. The meaning of gender itself varies across cultures, countries and political systems. As Hooper notes, gender is neither a thing nor a property of an individual's character. It is rather a property of collectivities, institutions and historical processes.¹⁷ Peterson describes feminism as being neither merely about women, nor the inclusion of women to male stream constructions; it is about transforming ways of being and knowing.¹⁸ When the gender aspect of international politics is ignored, this leads to an elevation of masculinity in the subject, as assumptions about gender, which are often shaped by male-centric discourses and practices, go unexamined. By the same logic, merely bringing a gender aspect to the study of IR without examining the often sexist language in which the discussion itself is taking place would be inadequate at best.

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Feminism in foreign policy and FFP is approached in various ways by different IR schools of thought. Realists examine the role of gender in strategic thinking and power politics, which is predominantly a male-dominant domain. According to Tickner, values are associated with hegemonic masculinity and inscribed onto the international behavior of states.¹⁹ The Realist school describes 'state' with a specific focus on its masculine nature. They use a masculine language, in which concepts such as power, interest, military, anarchy, strength and hegemony are coded as masculine. Feminist theory would ask the question: "Who is defining the national interest and are women involved in these decisions?"²⁰ And, "who defines power and the use of it?" and "what would be the indicators of power?"

Liberals examine the position of women in global politics by positing that gender equality is a value that could be reached by including women in all levels of international relations and politics. Liberal Feminists describe discrimination against women in its many forms and discuss the participation of women in global politics. Liberal feminist perspectives underline the importance of equal opportunities in education, women's access to the public sphere and economic equality. Since liberalism emphasizes the role of the individual in international relations and politics, the language of feminist liberalism differs from that of the masculine Realist perspective. Cooperation, consensus and collaboration, for instance, are central in the former. Feminist liberal perspectives criticize mainstream liberal theories because of the inequalities perpetuated through liberal policies and the lack of women in leading positions in international institutions.²¹

Critical Feminism concentrates on the manifestations of gendered identity and gendered power in international relations and politics. Feminist constructivism focuses on the ways that ideas about gender shape and are shaped by global politics, arguing that international relations and politics are social constructs. Power and gender are considered integral elements of construction, and the differences between male and female arise through socialization. From this perspective, the ideas that political actors hold about gender determine their decisions on global politics.

Feminist Post-structuralism underlines linguistic manifestations of meaning, particularly the dichotomies of strong vs. weak, rational vs. emotional and public vs. private, and points to the dominance of masculine language in global politics. Through analysis of the speeches and discussions of actors, this lens reveals how relations of power are constructed. Feminist Post-structuralism focuses on the possibility of searching beyond what is already known or assumed, particularly regarding ways of thinking about 'male' and 'female'. Both Constructivism and post-structuralism help side-step questions of gender.

Last but not least, Ecological Feminism looks for the connections between women and minorities and the non-human environment. This is an important perspective, since there has been a significant increase of literature in recent years on the relations between gender and the environment. Additionally, the environment itself has become a popular topic in international relations. Ecological Feminism explores topics of ecology and the environment from a perspective that highlights the role of gender in these issues.

Based on this brief account of how feminist approaches relate to foreign policy and international relations, this paper borrows from multiple theories and examines the gender turn in Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy taking multiple perspectives into account. It formulates two main arguments. The first is that the gender turn in diplomacy has a transformative impact in traditional, male-dominated, power-centric foreign policymaking. The second argument is that a gender turn in diplomacy is a combination of transformation in size, capacity, status hierarchy and the efficacy of women diplomats on conflict resolution, peace building, and mediational and entrepreneurial capacity in hard and soft power related missions with the receiving countries.

From Instrumental Gender Focus to Normative Gender Turn?

In 2017, there were only 17 female heads of state in the world.²² International, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have long pushed for greater participation of women in diplomacy. In 2000, the UN Security Council established the well-known resolution 1325/1820 on Women, Peace and Security, a milestone

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in feminist foreign policy. The resolution urged member states to include women in peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstructions.

Turkish politics and foreign policy have always been male-dominant fields, although Türkiye was one of the first pioneering countries in

the world where women held their electoral rights prior to many advanced societies. The first female Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, served between 1993 and 1996 as the leader of Türkiye's True Path Party. However, the ancestors of the Turks, as narrated by Dede Korkut, delegated primary importance to women in ruling.²³ The granting of political rights to women during the Ottoman era was a consequence of Westernization efforts in the mid-19th century in the form of limited administrative reforms and the establishment of women's rights such as heritage and education.²⁴ However, as Rumelili and Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm note, "in the Ottoman Empire, Islamic law enforced segregation of the sexes, and deprived Muslim women of key fundamental rights."²⁵ With the establishment of the Republic, women became—albeit slowly—more visible in politics and in rights-based movements in Türkiye. For instance, in June 1923 under the "Women People's Party", the Turkish women movement was politically institutionalized for the first time. As part of the democratization process that started in the 1930s, women gradually gained equal political rights.

Since that time, Türkiye has been among the leading countries in terms of female participation in foreign service and diplomacy. Following Brazil and the U.S., the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the first in the world to open the way for women to be diplomats; Adile Ayda was Türkiye's first female diplomat—she joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1932.²⁶ In 1934, Türkiye was followed by Denmark and in 1939 by Norway. Interestingly, as the pioneer of feminist foreign policy today, Sweden adapted itself rather late, in 1948, in welcoming female professionals into the field of diplomacy.²⁷ However, it was not until 1982 that women could be appointed as an ambassador in Türkiye. Filiz Dinçmen was the first female ambassador appointed in

1982. Despite this early progress, women’s appearance in the ranks of higher status diplomatic positions has remained rather rare. Tansu Çiller, the first female Prime Minister of Türkiye (1993) and who later served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, is iconic of a breakthrough step toward a gender turn in Turkish foreign affairs. Over the last two decades, there has been a quantitative increase in the appointment of female diplomats (Table 1) with almost a six times growth between 2001 and 2022.

Table 1. Women in Diplomacy in Turkish Foreign Service (2001–2022)

	Total # of Ambassadors	# of Female Ambassadors	Proportion of Female / Male Ambassadors (%)
2001	194	12	6.5
2006	193	19	11
2011	193	23	13.5
2016	244	43	21.4
2021	275	73	26.5
2022	282	79	28

Source: Compiled by authors from the resources of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Women’s entrance into the field of diplomacy has not been free of obstacles. Diplomatic procedures in a great number of countries present challenges for women; examples include bans on married women diplomats from taking Foreign Service examinations or urging them to leave their careers after marriage. For its part, Türkiye has never banned female diplomats. The U.S. lifted the marriage ban in 1971, Sweden in the early 1970s and Great Britain in 1973. Türkiye’s liberal approach to women in diplomacy is one of the reasons why Türkiye has more female diplomats compared with global figures.²⁸

Turkish foreign policy has been undergoing transformation in the last two decades under the long, single-party rule of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*),²⁹ and diplomatic trends and structures have also witnessed change. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is determined to expand its diplomatic missions across the world and this determination involves a gender turn: the

number of women diplomats has increased in this period. Longitudinal figures show us that there has been a steady growth in Turkish diplomatic missions across the world. The Turkish MFA had 163 representations in 2002, including 93 Embassies, 58 General Consulates, 11 Permanent Representatives and one Trade Office. By 2022, these figures had reached 277 diplomatic representations, including 146 Embassies, 95 General Consulates, 13 permanent representations, one Trade Office, one Consular Agency and one Consular Bureau. In 2000, the Turkish MFA had eight female ambassadors serving outside of the country. In 2010, this number increased to 21, in 2019 to 60 and in 2022 to 79. To speak of comparative figures, according to MFA data and Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) sources, in 2011 11.9 % of the total population of ambassadors were women; this increased to 26.5% in 2021 and 28% in 2022. While still the preponderant majority, the male ambassador population shrank from 88.1% in 2011 to 73.5% 2021.³⁰

Turkish foreign missions have not only undergone a sea change in terms of the geographic expansion of missions—demographic and procedural transition has become a systemic characteristic of foreign affairs. For instance, the protocols of concourse to enter the Ministry have been altered. On the global scale, the “World is bigger than five” rhetoric of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has paved the way for foreign policy activism toward the less developed parts of the world. 102 ministers from African countries attended the 3rd Africa-Türkiye Cooperation Summit in Istanbul (December 16–18, 2021). Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu declared that the MFA would increase the number of embassies in Africa because of the new determinism.

One of the factors driving this increase is Türkiye’s launch of new diplomatic missions, especially those in Africa and Latin America. In Africa, Türkiye had only 12 embassies in 2002; with the opening of Gine Bissau in 2022, this number has reached 44.³¹ On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, in Latin America, Türkiye had six embassies in 2002; as of 2022 it now has 18 embassies.³²

In the Swedish MFA, women are still overrepresented in administrative units, despite an overall gender parity in the organization for almost two decades.³³ In the Turkish MFA, on the hand, women serve as

consular and expert officers more commonly than as career diplomats.³⁴ Clearly, women are more frequently being promoted to career diplomacy and filling the positions that were previously occupied by their male counterparts in Türkiye. Indeed,

female representation in the Turkish MFA surpasses that of other institutions. At the Ministry and in overseas missions, one third of the total personnel is composed of female diplomats, including career diplomats. There has also been an increase in the number of female diplomats rising to the ambassador level. In the entrance exams of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in 1993–1994, there was equality between male and female candidate numbers. This also effected the increase in number.

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Data and Methods

From this conceptual and empirical point of view, this paper will analyze whether women in diplomacy have a transformative power in a male-dominated, power-centric foreign policy of a state, through in-depth interviews with 16 diplomats. Interviews were conducted face-to-face and online (when the diplomat was on overseas duty, out of the country unable to meet in person or due to health conditions), to go in detail into the Turkish case.

In-depth interviews were conducted to explore a perceived gender turn with data obtained from 16 women diplomats (N=16) serving in Turkish diplomatic missions in different parts of the world. Interviews were conducted between May 16 and June 9, 2022. Seven out of the 16 interviews were conducted online via Zoom, and nine interviews were conducted face-to-face. The total breakdown of interviewees in terms of current diplomatic posts are as follow: One Consulate Specialized Officer (Ankara); one Head of Department (Ankara); three Consul Generals (in EU member states); three counsellors (two in Ankara, one in the EU); eight ambassadors (three in Ankara, one in a Middle Eastern country, one in Southeast Asia, two in Latin America and one

in Africa). To protect the subjects interviewed, for ethical concerns, the interviewees were informed that their responses would be reported anonymously.

As conceptually discussed above, we aim at offering a composite definition of “gender turn” that includes the transformation of masculine language, which is more hard-power centric, into a more value- and norm-driven one, and an increase in the number of female diplomats in foreign missions. This conceptualization was presented to our interviewees at the beginning of each interview. Following upon the conceptual discussion provided in this paper, 13 interview questions were formulated and addressed to the interviewees. These questions were designed to tap the following aspects of a gender turn as perceived and narrated by female diplomats (1) self-narrative of diplomatic career,³⁵ (2) perception of a “gender turn”, (a) perceived parameters of a gender turn if one is noted, (b) normative importance of a gender turn, (3) challenges of gender in foreign policy, (4) prospects for success of a gender turn in diplomacy, (5) gender turn vis-à-vis masculinity, (5a) instrumentality of a masculine tone and (5b) recognition and reception by male counterparts.

The interview data was coded by the authors according to the frequency of key concepts in response categories and a quantitative dataset “*Women in Diplomacy_ the case of Türkiye*” (WiD_TR) was created via SPSS program.³⁶ To maximize the objectivity of the narratives, a double-blind reading of the transcriptions was carried out by the authors.

Empirical Analysis and Discussion

Data were obtained through in-depth interviews with 16 female diplomats working at various hierarchical ranks in different diplomatic missions across the world. In terms of past positions and current service locations, there is a representative geographical variation in our data. Seven of our respondents are currently based in Türkiye, one is based in the Middle East, two in Latin America, one in Africa, one in Southeast Asia and four in Europe. Concerning the variations in terms of country or service, hierarchical ranks, duration of mission, our sample presents a great deal of variety.

Brackets are used in the interviewees' comments below to replace words that would jeopardize their anonymity.

In addition to the questions above, we asked our respondents if they had previously worked in an “F category” country. This classification has been employed since 2011 to categorize countries with a certain level of challenges related to the level of security and physical and political conditions. Previously the “F category” countries were listed under the “E” category. Only one respondent expressed that she had previously worked in an “F category” country and two respondents had served in a “D category” country, which before 2011 was the equivalent of today’s “E” category according to the categorization of the Turkish MFA. Twelve respondents had no such experience to date. One of our respondents further stated that she has now been appointed to an “F category” country. Concerning the F category country, Interviewee #1 expressed that:

I worked in [an F category country] when there was the Ebola epidemic, and the conditions were very hard. Yet as a female diplomat it was a turning point for me. I felt myself very happy that I personally took an active part in Türkiye’s entrepreneurial and humanitarian foreign policy.


Perceptions of a “Gender Turn” Perceived Parameters & Normative Importance

Feminist foreign policy is discussed in the literature and among the practitioners from a materialist or a symbolic perspective, where the former is more a matter of numbers and the latter a matter of values and norms. The quantitative perspective concentrates more on how many positions are allocated to women diplomats in foreign policy. A gradual increase in the numbers of female diplomats, according to this view, is an objective and sufficient criterion for identifying a state’s foreign policy as feminist. In the second approach, feminist foreign policy is considered a normative, value-laden responsibility of foreign policy agency. The third view is a hybrid view that considers feminist foreign policy a combination of quotas and values.

We asked our respondents about their opinion on these different approaches, i.e., how they perceive feminist foreign policy. The exact

question was: *“There are two mainstream approaches to describe feminist foreign policy. The first looks from a quantitative perspective as to the number of female diplomats, the second focuses on the transformation of foreign policy with the norms and value construction to which women diplomats contribute. Considering these two perspectives, what makes a foreign policy ‘feminist’ in your opinion?”* As the responses indicate, an overwhelming majority of respondents expressed that feminist foreign policy is a combination of both views (Table 2).

Table 2. Feminist Foreign Policy: A Quantitative or Normative Issue? (%)



Almost half of the female diplomats interviewed adopt a hybrid approach to feminist foreign policy. However, a “third way” aspect of the discussion highlights the need for women’s participation in foreign policy-making:

In my opinion, feminist foreign policy has neither to do with the numbers nor with femininity of a transformation as such. What makes foreign policy feminist is about the posts women diplomats hold, more about the quality and responsibilities. Yes, true that there are women ambassadors appointed under equal conditions and terms as the male counterparts to foreign missions. Yet what is missing is that female diplomats are not serving at higher ranks in Ankara at the headquarters... there is no woman deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, for instance. Women diplomats are rather the implementers of foreign policy, not the makers of it. And what makes foreign policy feminist depends on if and how women participate in the policy- and decision-making. (Interviewee #14)

Feminist foreign policy depends on the appointment of women to decision-making positions in foreign policy. (Interviewee #15)


Concerning the feminist component of foreign policy being the state’s responsibility or not, we asked our respondents whether they think the integration of feminist perspectives into policy-making and implementation, including that of foreign policy, is a normative responsibility of states, or whether a simple quota mechanism is sufficient for a feminist transformation. The majority expressed that such a transformation is both a normative responsibility and that quotas should support it *in praxis* (Table 3). However, there are competing views on implementing quotas. As stated by Interviewee #2: “Quotas are extremely important. In the absence of a quota requirement, male decision-makers could incline in reducing the numbers of women in certain positions. I strongly believe that quotas are essential instruments to keep women in the field.

Interviewee #3 held the opposite view:

I personally do not believe quotas are successful, as a Turkish woman I can say this. We are the women of a nation which has granted rights to women, and we guarantee our rights under law. Quota mechanisms can work for contexts where women do not have certain rights or [are not] protected under rights.... Moreover, quotas depend on supervisor’s discretion rather than liability, therefore, do not contribute to any substantive transformation in foreign policy.

The interview question (Q6) reads, “*Do you think the integration of a feminist perspective into policy-making and implementation, including that of foreign policy, is a normative responsibility of states? Or is a quota mechanism sufficient for feminist transformation?*” The authors coded the answers below into categories as in Table 3.

Table 3. Perception about a State’s Responsibility in FFP (%)



The figures in Table 2 and Table 3 both tell us that among the female diplomats who participated in this research, a gender turn is about both realistic and symbolic components. As to the perceived gender turn in foreign policy in the Turkish context, our respondents were asked if they think there has been a gender turn in Turkish foreign policy, and to describe the conditions of a feminist transformation.

Seven respondents expressed that a gender turn is occurring in Turkish foreign policy; five said that some transformation has taken place, yet more is needed to accomplish a “gender turn”. How about the missing components that need to be in place to complete a true “gender turn” in Turkish foreign policy? One of the most frequently expressed components

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is the need for “structural reforms” (i.e., “increase in numbers of women diplomats”, “increase in salaries”). To give a representative example, Interviewee #2 stated:

We see a quantitative gender turn in reports, analyses, policies where a feminist perspective is more visible. However, we also need to see reforms in structural changes. Structural reforms such as an increase in numbers of women, equality in salaries; more equality in employment both for men and women should prevail normative transformation and changes in value structures and mentality.

Our respondents expressed that a gender turn at the national level is occurring in parallel with “global trends in improvement in rights.” Interviewee #5 noted, “Improvements recorded at a global scale in human rights, equality, equal representation of women in social life have positive consequences on the transformation of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of a gender turn.” Similarly, Interviewee #2 presented another rights-based perspective, stating that progress in gender equity relates to:

equal representation of women and men... Instead of using the “feminist” term, I’d rather consider gender turn in Türkiye as a

matter of equality between men and women in foreign policy... I believe what is central to this turn is opening more space to women in social life, as well as in foreign policy... and in the Turkish context this space has already been expanded.

As discussed previously, the need for “more female participation in managerial or decision-making positions” is highlighted as another indispensable requirement for a gender turn in Turkish feminist foreign policy, as noted by Interviewee #15:

Yes, it is true that compared to past times there are more women diplomats, more women consulate officers, women officers at the Ministry. However, does this lead to a feminist transformation? I believe this only could happen if there are more women, preferably in Ankara, in managerial or superior decision-making positions.

Interviewee #10 also stressed the need for appointing women to upper ranks in the foreign affairs hierarchy: “I strongly contend that the ranks of women diplomats in hierarchy and their role and impacts on the foreign policy decision-making processes are important. For instance, having a woman Minister of Foreign Affairs, or a Deputy-Minister. This is what gender turn is about.”

Interviewee #4 adds another dimension to this point:

We should also pay attention to what countries women ambassadors are appointed to. For instance, to Washington, to London, there has not been any women diplomat appointed. Important missions, I'd say this in brackets, are not destinations for women in diplomacy as ambassadors. There are fine sweet destinations for women, again in brackets I'd like to say this, that are considered as more appropriate for women to serve.

Last but not least, we asked our respondents their perceptions about the main parameters of a gender turn in foreign policy. Table 4 presents the perceived parameters in multiple keywords. Based on the open-ended responses of interviewees, the most frequently expressed parameter of a gender turn in foreign policy is increased, direct participation in foreign policy decision-making processes (19%). The next three most essential components address the need for a concurrent feminist transformation in the domestic as well as the foreign policy realm (14%), the need

for more female appointments in diplomacy (14%) and a general environment for equality (14%). At a 10% point level, “gender equality” is an integral part of a gender turn.

Table 4. Perceived Major Parameters of Gender Turn in Foreign Policy (%)



Note: The values presented in the table add up to 100 percent. This question is analyzed as a multiple item variable. Items were coded by the authors on the basis of the open-ended responses of the interviewees.

Agreeing on the importance of more women in managerial positions, Interviewee #14 stressed that this is the only dimension in which a gender turn should be built, “to appoint women at hierarchically upper ranks to challenging missions:”

Specifically, for instance, you appoint a woman diplomat to as the Head of Culture Department, to which I’d personally love to be appointed, no offense to my counterparts, but why not to the more complicated units, such as the Head of the Middle East Department, or to the NATO Division, or to the Syria Division? ... It is not only about being a head of any unit, but the paradigm of gender turn requires women at top decision-making positions.

As the analysis so far indicates, a gender turn is perceived to be successful when women’s participation in foreign-policy making is accomplished. And there are legitimate reasons for this, as expressed by the sample of women diplomats in this study. These findings are also in line with the conceptual debate that underlines the capabilities and capacities of women in diplomacy when it comes to decision-making. As far as hard politics issues are concerned, the findings of this analysis bring to mind another dimension of feminist foreign policy that the UNSC

Resolution 1325 reified in the international context: the contribution of women to conflict resolution/peace processes. Half of our respondents expressed that women are more successful than their male counterparts at conflict prevention processes or mechanisms, due to several factors. For example, they cited women “being more skilled in detailed processing of issues” (Interviewee #4, Interviewee #10), “utilizing their soft powers better” (Interviewee #4), “having more developed empathy skills” (Interviewee #6) and “leaning more toward cooperative thinking” (Interviewee #10). In contrast, four of our respondents stated that there is no gender variation; Interviewee #5 stated, “success does not depend on gender but personal qualification and experience.” Three of our respondents highlighted the need for further data on this issue to better judge. As far as the impacts of female diplomacy in conflict resolution, Interviewee #14 stated, “female counterparts might be equipped with certain soft power skills to manage conflicts, but the impacts of their efforts are not known due to the lack of data availability.” Lastly, just one respondent expressed her contention that male counterparts deal with these processes more successfully.

Challenges to Women in Foreign Policy

The second line of our in-depth interview data analysis delved into perceptions about the challenges women face in foreign policy. We focused the challenges on two issues first, asking our respondents if they personally had faced any gender-related challenges, and second, whether in the conduct of their responsibilities there were any positive or negative impacts of being a female diplomat.

In terms of personal challenges, half of our respondents said they had not faced any gender-related challenges during their diplomatic careers. The most cited gender-related challenges to women diplomats noted by the remaining half—either personally experienced or narrated by women colleagues—are related to greater expectations from women diplomats compared to their male counterparts, fraternity structures and networks among the male diplomats that pose obstacles for female diplomats, cultural biases

In terms of personal challenges, half of our respondents said they had not faced any gender-related challenges during their diplomatic careers.

in host or home country and of course marriage and pregnancy-related challenges. One of the respondents, Interviewee #15, ironically noted that being an unmarried female diplomat has been a source of negative discrimination against herself:

As a woman diplomat, I have not faced great challenges, yet as a single female diplomat I would not be able to say so. For instance, if you are single there is no family, kids or a spouse waiting for you to come home; therefore as a single colleague I was asked to work extra hours, or when I asked for an annual leave the married counterparts were given priority.

Gendered foreign policy or diplomacy can produce positive consequences as well as challenges. We asked our respondents if they experienced any positive or negative impacts of feminist foreign policy when establishing diplomatic relations or exerting their diplomatic work at international fora. One of the very constructive implications of this investigation is that none of the respondents expressed any negative consequences, and the majority attested to positive aspects of their work as female diplomats in carrying out their responsibilities. Interviewee #8 stated, “being a woman diplomat that represents the Republic of Türkiye abroad always yields a more positive impression than a male Turkish counterpart.” Friendship patterns in international negotiations or platforms were also mentioned as parts of positive aspects of a gender turn; Interviewee #2 noted, “Women can establish a more friendly and communicative tone; lengthy conversations help build a deeper integration with the host community and these could translate more easily into consequences for diplomatic practices.” Similarly, Interviewee #3 pointed to the fact that:

We, the women, can establish special friendships with First Ladies in host countries, which facilitate our communication in diplomatic conduct... I was the only female Consul General during my mission in [my host country]; at the VIP meetings where only men were allowed and invited, I met with security guards who did not want to let me in the meeting and offered to invite my husband to the same meeting. Only when I told them that I was the diplomat did they let me in involuntarily... In the same country however, I also met with positive discrimination mainly because I established a friendship with the wife of [the

ruler] of that country, who also oversaw certain governmental responsibilities. I was for instance invited many times as a guest to her house. This was a privilege that my male counterparts were not able to enjoy in diplomatic missions.

Prospects for Success of a Gender Turn in Diplomacy

Our interview data help us perceive the framework of a gender turn in diplomacy across normative and realistic dimensions, as well as the challenges of being a female diplomat in the ‘man’s world’ of foreign affairs, as the cliché suggests. Thanks to the many, evidence-based perceptions of female diplomats, the data reveal that certain clichés do not in fact prevail, as their personal experiences suggest.

Self-reported evidence and narratives are essential to helping us map out feminist foreign policy and the extent to which a gender turn is taking place in the Turkish case. And what about the comparison with the world’s leading country—Sweden—when it comes to feminist foreign policy? Swedish foreign policy, as described above, is based on 3Rs: “rights”, “representation”, and “resources.” We asked our respondents how, in their opinion, Turkish foreign policy fits into the Swedish framework. There were a few optimists who considered Turkish feminist foreign policy to be totally at the same level as Sweden’s, and a few moderate optimists who expressed that Türkiye has achieved remarkable progress.

The common wisdom among our respondents, though, was that there has been “some progress” in Turkish feminist foreign policy-making, “yet more is still needed.” For the majority of respondents, Türkiye still has a way to go to catch up with the Swedish progress. For them, when it comes to “representation”, Türkiye’s report is perceived as remarkably successful, albeit with some criticisms that still stand out. For instance, Interviewee #7 stated that “when

I was told that ‘there isn’t any woman diplomat at the table, therefore you attend the meeting,’ I always refused to attend under such circumstances.” When it comes to resources, there are

The common wisdom among our respondents, though, was that there has been “some progress” in Turkish feminist foreign policy-making, “yet more is still needed.”

mixed views. Interviewee #7, speaking from a personal point of view, explained, “I do not think that I am given special rights just because I am a woman.”

Interviewee #8 said,

Concerning rights, as defined by law, there are no differences from other countries; on the contrary, we are even more developed. But when it comes to the implementation of rights, discrepancies are observed. Rights are defined, resources are allocated, representation is inclusive yet the implementation of what is feminist is problematic. And this is largely nested in the social structures under which women diplomats are treated.

Sharing a similar view, Interviewee #9 adds examples:

Despite women’s representation in diplomacy, a pregnant officer or a diplomat still can meet with biases... A traditional male superior does not look at the gender of the personnel, but marital status is more important. Single personnel—regardless of gender—are preferred. This is partially related to requests for professional leave. Married (with either kids or a spouse) is perceived to be more inclined to ask for more leaves.

As this part of the analysis suggests, there is a common and positive perception that in terms of representation—an increase in the appointment of more women diplomats—it is highly possible to speak of an exemplary “Turkish” feminist foreign policy; yet when it comes to the prospect of success in meeting Swedish standards, this largely depends on improvement in terms of the implementation of rights, rather than their codification.

A Feminist Gender Turn vis-à-vis Masculinity

The final part of the analysis of a gender turn as perceived by female diplomats focused on masculinity in foreign policy in terms of the instrumentality of masculine styles of diplomatic conduct and recognition of women in diplomacy by male counterparts. To this end, we asked our respondents for their assessment of the need for a certain level of ‘masculinity’ in diplomacy. The question read, “as a female diplomat, do you think a masculine language and method is

necessary to overcome certain challenges in your profession?” Almost one third of our respondents expressed the necessity of masculinity in the overcoming of certain difficulties in diplomacy. Interviewee #7 associated this necessity with the need for being “assertive” in order to survive and succeed in diplomatically challenging situations. Two other interviewees (#10 and #13) stated instead that the need for masculinity depends on issue-specific factors, such as context and counterparts, and structural dynamics such as societal externalities and systemic push factors. For instance, in host cultures where more conservative cultural characteristics prevail, “congeniality can cause trouble, such as the misinterpretation of the genial temper of a female diplomat; thus a balanced masculine approach and temper may serve to better the diplomatic processes” (Interviewee #12). In contrast, according to four of our respondents, a masculine language or method is not necessary to face challenging situations. The three remaining respondents argued that diplomatic language and methods are genderless.

Despite the plurality of opinions concerning the need for masculinity in language or diplomatic styles, our sample was clearly polarized about how their male counterparts perceive them. Half of the respondents stated that their male colleagues consider and address them as “female colleagues”, whereas the other group expressed no exposure to differentiating or exclusionary attitudes. Respondents in the former group consider the sexist recognition they have received as a natural consequence of the dominant cultural codes in the society (Interviewee #6), specifically as how you describe yourself either as a “woman diplomat” or simply a “diplomat” (Interviewee #8). In a rather constructive perspective, Interviewee #10 said, “I think my male colleagues recognize me as a female diplomat since when they praise my success, they emphasize that I am a woman in diplomacy. However, I never have considered this as something to lament about or as having a pejorative intention.”

Conclusion

What are the implications of a transformation of Turkish foreign policy focus for the gender turn in diplomacy and foreign policy? In addition to the gradual increase in the number of female diplomats, assumptions

about the functions and hierarchy status of women in diplomacy have been revised in the study through the empirical investigation of interview data. One line of debate on the idea of a gender turn is strongly linked with the instrumentality of quota mechanisms for a successful turn. As a part of traditional diplomacy, some positions are filled automatically considering gender differences. Women are, for instance, overrepresented in support functions whereas men remain overrepresented in leading positions, e.g., as ambassadors. However, to speak of a feminist foreign policy normative turn is an indispensable precondition. As expressed by the women diplomats interviewed in this study, the latter is a great challenge that needs to be accompanied by societal, cultural and structural transformations.

Another important implication of this study, which is rather doable within the foreign policy structure, is a more realistic hierarchical turn. Women are definitely visible in the lower ranks of diplomatic hierarchy; thus, a feminist foreign policy in terms of representation has apparently been achieved. Yet the weakest link—and potential area for regression—in terms of a gender turn is observed in the absence of appointments to top-tier decision-making positions.

Concerning the 3R model of the Swedish example, novel directions for Turkish foreign policy need to be reframed with an attempt to raise standards in terms of the “rights” and “resources” that women in diplomacy enjoy and utilize.

Last but definitely not least, by presenting the empirical findings of this study based on in-depth interviews with Turkish women diplomats, this paper aims to offer constructive policy prescriptions to foreign policy-makers; methodological prescriptions to researchers to combine qualitative data with quantitative techniques and thus offer a more composite methodological approach, empirical prescriptions to students of feminist foreign policy that what is presented through in-depth observations still needs to be complimented with quantitatively more representative samples with increased generalizability of conclusions. What is missing in this paper leaves room for future inspiration and research.

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The Institutional Evolution of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Role in Foreign Policy-making (1808-1918)

Onur BİRKAN *

Abstract

During the height of the Ottoman Empire's power, it applied and practiced 'unilateral diplomacy' and avoided reciprocity. However, at the end of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire started to adopt 'mutual diplomacy', sending permanent ambassadors to European capitals. This process became institutionalized with the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1836. Following the establishment of the Ministry, changes and transformations occurred in its institutional structure, reflecting both the turbulence of the times and changes in the Empire itself. This article examines the evolution of the institutional structure of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry (Hariciye Nezâreti) and explores its changes and continuities between the years 1808–1918 as well as its role in the foreign policy-making process across two levels of analysis, reflecting both internal and external factors.

Keywords

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ottoman Foreign Ministry, diplomacy, Turkish foreign policy, chief scribe

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Introduction

From the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in 1299 to the end of the 18th century, the Ottoman State adopted one-sided/unilateral/non-reciprocal diplomacy. Notably, until the period of Mehmet II in the mid-1400s, Ottoman foreign policy would not actualize within the context of conventional foreign policy form, style and features. Therefore, it is not even easy to distinguish between Ottoman domestic and foreign policies in this period, as many of the Empire's actions in domestic politics had consequences in foreign affairs. The foreign policy functions of this period were mostly fulfilled by the affixer of the cipher (*nişancı*). However, he was not within the circle of decision-makers and was rather a policy implementer. From the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 until the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, all classic Ottoman diplomatic understanding and practices remained the same.

Although the European countries sent permanent ambassadors to Istanbul from the 16th century onwards, the Ottomans did not reciprocate for two main reasons. First, Islam was not only a system of belief but also a method of politics for the Ottomans. Therefore, under the conditions of that period, unilateral diplomacy was adopted as a requirement of the current interpretations of Islam.¹ Second, the Ottomans had a sense of superiority over the Europeans at this time, and thus felt no need to adopt mutual diplomacy.²

In the period between 1699 and 1793, which is regarded as the period of treaties and agreements, unilateralism was still essential in Ottoman diplomatic relations. However, some concessions were made after the Empire's military defeats (e.g., acknowledgment of a multilateral document to sustain a peace treaty, a great increase in the number of temporary ambassadors abroad).³ Consequently, during this period, the office of the chief scribe (*reisü'l-küttâb*) gained more importance and took on some characteristics of an organization responsible for foreign affairs. Some scholars even argue that the chief scribe could be regarded as the "foreign minister" of this period.⁴ With the start of the period of reform-minded Selim III, who ruled from 1789 to 1807, the Ottomans started to establish permanent embassies in European capitals, driven by such factors as their decline in military power, increasing threats to Ottoman territorial integrity and independence and the French Revolution.

The literature on the evolution of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry predominantly focuses on Ottoman diplomacy practices, and very little of the literature examines the institutional structuring of Ottoman foreign policy. To examine the institutional development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this article divides this period into four separate sub-periods, focusing mainly on the context of changes and continuities in the Ministry's structure. It seeks to answer the question: What are the factors driving the changes and continuities in the institutional structure of the Ministry in the period between 1808 and 1918? In addition, the article seeks to understand the extent of the effectiveness of the Ministry in foreign policy decision-making processes in each of the sub-periods in terms of these changes and continuities.

The Period of Mahmud II (1808–1839)

The Establishment of the Translation Office

The last 18 years of the reign of Mahmud II witnessed a multitude of serious international political crises due to the Greek revolts that spanned from 1821 to 1829, the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, the Mehmet Ali Pasha revolt in Egypt and the subsequent Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi signed with Russia.⁵ In particular, the Greek uprising and subsequent revolt of Egypt's governor, Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha, quickly shifted from domestic squabble to international affair. The political turmoil and sequence of intense crises increased the need for professional diplomacy. The first step taken in this process was to establish a Translation Office.

In 1811, the Ottoman diplomatic authorities were mainly Greek chargé d'affaires (*maslahatgüzar*).

However, immediately after the

Greek uprising of 1821, all diplomatic posts abroad were abolished, as the Phanariot translators themselves had incited the rebellion and leaked the confidential information of the Ottoman State. To ensure that nothing similar would happen again, the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte (*Babiâli Tercüme Odası*) was established in 1821.⁶

The political turmoil and sequence of intense crises increased the need for professional diplomacy. The first step taken in this process was to establish a Translation Office.

The Translation Office was made up of two departments: a Language Department in which students were taught foreign languages and a Translation Department where advanced students in foreign language worked.⁷ The main purpose of the office was to train Muslims to learn foreign languages and to free the Ottoman State from dependence on Greek translators in foreign affairs.⁸ Although it focused on language training in theory, in practice the office turned into a kind of school to begin the training of future diplomats.

From 1669 to 1821, the chief translator had been under the authority of the Phanariot Greeks, an ethnic minority living in the Greek quarter of Istanbul and playing an important role in the Empire's civil bureaucracy. Thus, the position of the Phanariot Greeks in the Ottoman administration had been strengthened over time. However, after the execution of Constantine Mourouzis in 1821, the procedure of appointing a Greek as chief translator was abandoned.⁹ Subsequently, Bulgarzade Yahya Efendi, a Bulgarian converted to Islam, was appointed to this position, followed by his son Ruh-ul Din Efendi.

A nascent institution, the Translation Office remained small and yielded no satisfactory results until the 1830s. The office's growth in size, prestige and importance took place in the intensive diplomatic process that occurred after the treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in 1833.¹⁰ The salaries of the employees of the office increased to a decent level and Ali Efendi and Safvet Efendi, each of whom would later serve as both Foreign Minister and Grand Vizier, joined the office after serving in the Important Affairs Section (*Mühimme Odası*). Within a few years, Keçecizade Fuad Efendi and Ahmed Vefik Efendi, who had previously served as Grand Viziers, also joined the office.¹¹

The Ottoman State did not have a long-term foreign policy strategy until the Tanzimat period (1839–1876), during which it underwent a transformation both in terms of foreign policy actors and changes in the institutional structure of the Ministry, which reflected strategic changes in foreign policy during this period. Because of the many political, military and economic tensions in play, both at the national/territorial and international level, the changes in foreign policy and diplomatic practices that had begun during the reign of Selim III (1789–1807) continued.

Revitalization of Diplomatic Reform

The incoming sultan, Mahmud II, made significant attempts to re-implement mutual diplomacy, which had ceased to function after 1811, and to resume the reforms initiated by Selim III. The efforts to revitalize diplomatic representations were a way of responding to the pressures of the rapidly growing diplomatic problems of the Ottoman State. Indeed, during the whole of the 19th century, diplomacy was viewed as the only way to save the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, permanent embassies and consulates were re-opened in 1834.¹² In addition to the European capitals Paris, London and Vienna, where embassies already existed, embassies were established in Berlin in 1837, Tehran in 1840, Athens in April 1840, Brussels and the Hague in 1854, St. Petersburg in March 1857, Turin in January 1857, Washington in 1867, Bucharest in 1878, Belgrade in 1879 and Stockholm in 1898.¹³

During the resumption of diplomatic representation after a long period of lapse, many of the same problems that had plagued the period of Selim III emerged once again. The most obvious was the tradition of patronage, favoritism and nepotism in Ottoman bureaucratic life that prevented the rational working of the diplomatic system.¹⁴ The role of personal relations in diplomatic appointments precluded talented and competent persons from being ambassadors, and most diplomatic appointments were shaped by bureaucratic struggles and conflicts in the capital rather than actual diplomatic developments and the state's real and pressing needs. Rather than being an honor in its own right, the granting of ambassadorship in any European capital was seen as the best way to get rid of an unwanted statesman in Istanbul.¹⁵

While these problems bedeviled both periods, there were differences at least in two important aspects. First, the conditions of the 1830s were quite different from the 1790s of Selim III. In the latter period, people within diplomatic

The role of personal relations in diplomatic appointments precluded talented and competent persons from being ambassadors, and most diplomatic appointments were shaped by bureaucratic struggles and conflicts in the capital rather than actual diplomatic developments and the state's real and pressing needs.

organizations were well-prepared for their missions abroad and were foreign-language speakers.¹⁶ The growth of the Translation Office was an important impetus behind this development. Another difference, as Findley notes, was that “the international situation was vastly different, Middle Eastern affairs being now of much greater interest in Europe than they had been forty years earlier.”¹⁷ The collective intervention of the major European powers to remedy the Ottoman-Egyptian crisis in 1839 reveals their common interest in protecting the territorial integrity of the Ottoman State, which they viewed as supportive to their own mercantile ambitions and security.

Domestic Politics and Diplomatic Organization

Mahmud II’s clear aim in supporting diplomatic reform was to ensure centralization and the reassertion of the sultan’s dominance: “Mahmud II was preparing the way for a system of government based on malleable and interchangeable groups instead of powerful and entrenched individuals”—primarily for his own sake.¹⁸ The sultan particularly targeted the Sublime Porte, dismantled the Grand Vizierate (*Sadrâzamlık*) and dispersed most of the authorities of the Porte among newly created institutions. However, while Mahmud II sought to make the sultan the only power and central authority, his actions paradoxically led to the emergence of a new ‘Patriciate of the Pen’, and a new civil bureaucracy (*mülkiye*). The new diplomatic elite differed from those of the previous period not only in terms of their appearance, but also in the form of their education and behavior patterns.

In short, as a result of both the increasing need for professional diplomacy due to international developments and Mahmud II’s domestic centralization policies, significant organizational changes were effected in the administration structure.¹⁹ Although the organizational structure of the Sublime Porte and its dependent offices in the period of Mahmud II was modified right after his death, still it is worthwhile for comparing the organizational chart of this period with the charts of the previous period.²⁰

The institutional changes of the previous period in the office of the chief scribe, combined with the centralization policies of Mahmud II, led to the office’s transformation into the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (*Hariciye Nezâreti*) in 1836. Mehmed Akif Efendi, who had been acting as chief scribe since 1832, became the first statesman with the title of Minister of Foreign Affairs after the change.²¹ In a sense, this may seem like nothing more than a title change, as the Ministry had not completed all of the required structural and institutional changes to become a Ministry as we know it

today. Nonetheless, the change marked a significant break from the past. In the following years, components of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were gradually formed, and a clear, professional structure emerged. First, the office of the Undersecretary was created in November 1836. In early 1838, the Offices of Corresponding Secretary (*mektûbî*) and the Receiver (*âmedî*) were divided into two distinct sections: internal and foreign affairs.²² Moreover, with the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte, the Offices of the Imperial Divan (*Dîvân-ı Hümâyun*) along with the section for Important Affairs (*Mühimme Odası*) created in 1797 and reactivated in 1834, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a fully realized organizational structure as of 1839.²³

In order to neutralize the office of the Grand Vizier, Mahmud II turned its former steward (*kahya bey*) into the first Minister of Civil Affairs (*mülkiye nâzırı*), later changed to Minister of the Interior (*dahiliye nâzırı*), and transformed the position of chief bailiff (*çavuşbaşı*) into the Minister of Justice (*divan-ı deâvi nazırı*). Mahmud II abolished the title of Grand Vizier outright and replaced it with Prime Minister (*başvekil*) to eliminate the traditional role of the Grand Vizier as ‘absolute delegate’. Lastly, he created two new councils—the Consultative Assembly of the Sublime Porte (*Dar-ı Şura-yı Bab-ı Ali*) and the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliyye*).²⁴

The institutional changes of the previous period in the office of the chief scribe, combined with the centralization policies of Mahmud II, led to the office’s transformation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Hariciye Nezâreti*) in 1836.

Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

The foreign policy of the period in question was shaped by both internal and external factors. Indeed, it is quite difficult to distinguish between the domestic and foreign policy of the era, as political crises at the domestic level easily turned into international problems, as in the cases of the Greek rebellion and the insurrection of Mehmed Ali Pasha. These internationalized problems changed Ottoman foreign policy and led to the need for operative diplomatic activities and institutions. In response, Mahmud II reactivated permanent bilateral diplomacy in 1834 and created European-style political institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 1836. While aiming at dismantling the Grand Vizierate with these newly created, European-style institutions, he gave rise to the emergence of new bureaucratic elites. In other words, while Mahmud II wanted to implement centralization policies, he paradoxically created a new, elite bureaucratic force.

In this period, the influence of the Grand Vizier was removed from the foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) process, since his powers were dispersed among the newly created ministries.²⁵ Therefore, in the field of foreign policy, the strength and effectiveness of the officials working under the Minister of Foreign Affairs increased as of 1836. Compared to previous periods, it can easily be deduced that foreign policy officials were stepping into a more professional, institutional identity and were more active in the FPDM process. Thus, the effectiveness of the newly established Ministry in foreign policy increased as a result of institutional centralization at the internal political level and the needs arising in foreign policy strategy due to cross-border developments at the external level.

Tanzimat Period (1839–1876)

Foreign Policy Principles and Ambassador Appointments

The Ottoman Empire entered a new era with the declaration of the Tanzimat edict, which gave rise to some changes in the diplomatic understanding of the Ottoman State. Before the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman State had no pre-determined, long-term foreign policy strategy.

The most important innovation of this period in terms of foreign policy was that state officials began designing the basic principles of diplomatic activities by considering the interests of the State. During this period, certain basic principles and priorities of foreign policy shaped and changed the State's diplomatic practices; these paved the way for a process of integration with European diplomacy and adoption of the principles of international law. The basic principles of the period are outlined below.

The first and foremost aim of the Ottoman statesmen was to protect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman State through diplomacy. Fuad Pasha, who served as Foreign Minister five times, instructed all Ottoman ambassadors abroad to achieve this goal.²⁶ Second, during the Tanzimat period, the emphasis on Islam in foreign relations gradually decreased. Especially after the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the Ottoman foreign policy, which was traditionally built on Islamic law, changed and the concern to harmonize it with the European state system came to the fore. Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris, which was signed after the war, declared that "the Sublime Porte admitted participating in the advantages of the public law and system (Concert) of Europe."²⁷ Islam continued to play a role in Ottoman foreign relations but in a more unobtrusive and modern way. Another, related goal that Ottoman diplomats wanted to achieve was to preserve the status quo, i.e., the integrity of the State, and neutralize the principle of self-determination related to the fomenting of nationalist groups. Finally, Ottoman diplomats strived to prevent European states from interfering in the Empire's internal affairs.

From the Tanzimat period to the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye in 1923, the general rule was to appoint non-professional ambassadors. During this period, 135 diplomatic officers were appointed, only 43 of whom had progressed through all the stages of the profession. Mahmut Esat, who was the first ambassador to pass all the stages of the profession, was appointed to Athens in 1872.²⁸ Of these 135 diplomatic missions, 30 were non-Muslims; 2 were Greeks, 4 were Armenians, 4

The Ottoman Empire entered a new era with the declaration of the Tanzimat edict, which gave rise to some changes in the diplomatic understanding of the Ottoman State.

were Levantines, 3 were Romanians, 3 were Ottoman Europeans, 2 were Christian Arabs, 1 was Bulgarian and the remaining 11 were of varying backgrounds.²⁹ Prior to the Tanzimat period, favoritism and nepotism had prevalence over competence as members of some families had served as ambassadors of the State for three generations. There were even times when father and son were ambassadors at the same time. Until the Constitutional Monarchy (1908), Muslim diplomats were forbidden to take their spouses to foreign countries. This prohibition in diplomatic practices naturally caused some trouble and some of the diplomats married foreign women.³⁰ As for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 52 people served as foreign ministers in the period between 1836 and 1899. Although most were Muslims, there were a small number of non-Muslim ministers as well.³¹

The Institutional Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had been established in 1836 during the reign of Mahmud II, continued its organizational development during the Tanzimat period. In 1871, the Ministry was the most advanced and modern organizational structure of the Porte's components.³² The Foreign Minister had an Undersecretary (*müsteşar*) to assist him; this office was re-established during the Crimean War after having been abolished several times before.³³ Under the Minister and his Undersecretary, the Office of Imperial Divan still occupied a central position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this period, the Department of Imperial Divan (*Dîvân-ı Hümayun Dairesi*) consisted of six sections. The Section of Imperial Divan was in charge of "receiving and responding to communications from foreign ambassadors in Istanbul and raised with the relevant provisions of the international agreements and concessions then in force."³⁴ One of the newly created sections in the Department of Imperial Divan was the Section for Religious Affairs (*Mezâhib Odası*). This section dealt with non-Muslim affairs, including matters of constructing schools and churches and repairing them. "Keeping records on the status of the non-Muslims inside the empire" was also among the duties of this section, which were shifted to the Ministry of Justice in 1877.³⁵ It is thus clear that this new unit was established in the context of rights and freedoms as a result of the Tanzimat reforms.

While other departments of the Foreign Ministry were more specialized and “fixed in their organizational affiliation with the ministry,” the Office of the Imperial Divan was the only department/section subordinate to the Foreign Ministry dealing with heterogeneous responsibilities unrelated to foreign affairs.³⁶

Another office was the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte (*Babiâli Tercüme Odası*), which replaced the Translator of Imperial Divan (*Divân-ı Hümayun tercümanı*). This office was a fundamental component of the Ministry and very effective in the institutionalization of foreign policy. It was presented to the Ottoman bureaucracy as a product of conservative thought and became one of the most respected units of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry with its language-learning and training activities.³⁷ It also trained bureaucrats who approached Western ideas with a moderate understanding.

Another element of the Foreign Ministry was the Chief of Protocol (*hariciye teşrifâtçısı*) created in 1847. The main duty of this officer was to greet foreign civil servants and officials coming from abroad with a ceremony. Thus, the Ministry’s protocol activities were institutionalized.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs (*hariciye kâtibi*) had to deal with cases between Ottoman subjects and foreigners. In 1877, “the title of the head of this office was enlarged to secretary for foreign legal affairs (*deava-i hariciye kâtibi*), the title of his assistants being changed accordingly.”³⁸

One of the most important offices of the Ministry was the Turkish Correspondence Office (*mektûbî hariciye kalemi*). Most likely, the name of this office was inspired by that of the relevant secretary of the Grand Vizier. This office was responsible for conducting Turkish correspondence regarding minorities living within Ottoman borders, and consular affairs in the country.³⁹ This unit was also established in the context of the minority rights promised in the Tanzimat reforms.

The diplomatic intensity incurred by the political environment before the Crimean War increased the need for a Foreign Correspondence Office (*Tabrîrât-ı Ecnebiye Odası*).

This new bureau was by origin an outgrowth of the Translation Office, founded to cope with the increasingly voluminous correspondence in French with foreign ambassadors in Istanbul and Ottoman representatives abroad. From the end of the

Crimean War, the role of the Translation office thus appears to have been limited to the translation of documents coming into the ministry in languages other than Turkish while the Foreign Correspondence Office assumed responsibility for the correspondence of the ministry in French, as the Turkish Correspondence Office did for that in Turkish.⁴⁰

In addition, a new office called the Records Office (*Hariciye Evrak Odası*) was established in 1868–1869 to handle paperwork. In 1869, a Bureau of Nationality (*tabiiyet kalemi*) was created. The main purpose of this office was to search for the nationalities of persons alleged to be under the auspices of foreign powers and identify those who were naturalized through non-formal/unofficial procedures.⁴¹ The fact that non-Muslims were under the influence of foreigners brought nationalist-based thoughts and actions to the agenda. This constantly damaged the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which enjoyed a multinational social structure. The Bureau of Nationality was set up to prevent such separatist attempts to some extent. In other words, this unit was established to maintain unity and solidarity at a time when nationalist tendencies were increasing in the international arena.

In 1869 and 1871, the Ottoman administration succeeded in carrying out the institutionalization of foreign policy in the provinces. Provincial Foreign Affairs Directorates (*İl/Vilayeti Hariciye Müdürlüğü*) was established to coordinate relations with consuls working in the Ottoman provinces and to solve problems arising from the subject of nationality. Taking the demands of the governors into account, directors and translators were assigned to the provinces where foreigners were concentrated. Thus, the demographic distribution of the population, which depended on the sociological structure of the Ottoman Empire, also affected the institutional structure of the Ministry. The central organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took its final shape with the establishment of the Accounting Office for the Foreign Ministry (*Hariciye Muhasebe Odası*) in 1871.

To sum up, the ideological movements that gained momentum in the international arena, the domestic reforms announced due to the pressure of foreign powers and the sociological structure of the State itself were influential in the formation of the institutional structure

of the Ministry. The new institutional units created in this context represent a change from the past.

The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process

The Ottomans were in a defensive position in the field of foreign policy during the Tanzimat period and mainly pursued a ‘balancing policy’, which essentially meant using one great power against another.⁴² The diplomatic reforms and the institutional development of the Ministry took place in this atmosphere.

As a result of the reforms made by Mahmud II, paradoxically, the political activities of the new civil bureaucratic elite increased in the Tanzimat period. Prominent figures of this new elite, Mustafa

The Ottomans were in a defensive position in the field of foreign policy during the Tanzimat period and mainly pursued a ‘balancing policy’, which essentially meant using one great power against another.

Reşit, Sadık Rifat, and Ali and Fuad Pasha, established a monopoly on the important positions of the Porte, especially in the Foreign Ministry and Grand Vizierate, for two main reasons. First, these were statesmen who had been trained in the Translation Office and developed their political leanings by studying abroad in a secular and practical way.⁴³ The second reason was the character of Mahmud II’s successors. Abdülmecid (1839–1861) came to the throne in an extremely dangerous period as an ill-prepared sixteen-year-old. An inexperienced sultan, he could not directly interfere in the work of the civil bureaucracy.⁴⁴ He was followed by Abdülaziz (1861–1876), who was willing to dominate but had no capacity to do so, and finally, Murad V (1876), who had a mental disorder and was overthrown within three months.⁴⁵

Mustafa Reşit Pasha continuously held the Grand Vizierate in the period between 1846 and 1852. In the period between 1852–1854, he took charge of the Foreign Ministry. Later on, he became the Grand Vizier three more times from 1854 until he died in 1858. Ali Pasha became Foreign Minister in 1846 and Grand Vizier in 1856 for the first time. Fuad Pasha likewise served in both positions several times.⁴⁶ Their

oligarchic control of the two leading positions in the civil bureaucracy paved the way for their dominance of almost the entire administrative system: “The linkages of grand vizier and foreign minister became the central element in the political system that the leaders of new elite gradually built up to fill the political vacuum created by the weakness of the sultans.”⁴⁷ Under these circumstances, foreign affairs assumed central importance, and the Foreign Minister became the second man after the Grand Vizier at the Porte. In essence, for the first time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a central component of the foreign policy-making process and administration due in large part to the weakness of the sultans in the executive role.

The Abdulhamid II Period (1876–1909)

The political character of the Tanzimat period was exemplified in the domination of the Porte over the Palace. The sultans of this period lagged behind the Grand Viziers in foresight and capability. However, the death of Fuad Pasha in 1869 and Ali Pasha in 1871 caused a significant change in the structure of the political power that prevailed during the Tanzimat period. After the death of Ali Pasha, Sultan Abdulaziz, together with the Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha, began to reestablish the influence of the sultanate by overthrowing the bureaucratic system of the Tanzimat period. However, the beginning of the rebellion in Herzegovina and the subsequent spread of the rebellion to the Balkan lands raised serious problems—including the threat of foreign intervention and war.

The situation worsened in the following years. In 1876, we see the rule of three different sultans. When Sultan Abdulaziz was overthrown, Murad V took his place but was deposed within three months. Then the little-known prince Abdulhamid II ascended the throne on August 31, 1876.

Abdulhamid II’s main preoccupation was to keep the civil-bureaucratic elite of the Tanzimat period under political control. In part to create a structure for this control, a new constitution was promulgated in 1876 with the impetus of the Young Ottomans. However, the constitution was found to be unworkable and was suspended in 1878 due to the economic and political crises of the period (especially the 1877–1878

Ottoman-Russian war). In the subsequent process, the sultan started to establish his own system and personal dominance.

In this period, economic backwardness, dependence on European financing and expertise for development, the incapability of Ottoman armed forces to defend the State against aggressors, the disloyalty of a large section of the population to the State, political turmoil and foreign interventions were instrumental in determining new strategies for the field of foreign policy.⁴⁸

Ottoman leadership exhibited a profound sense of insecurity and isolation in a world dominated by hostile Christian states. Almost every one of the Empire's neighbors was regarded as a potential enemy with designs on its territory and independence. This sense of insecurity and isolation was rooted in the experience of the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 when the Empire had been abandoned by all in the face of a Russian attack and then subjected to what appeared to be a form of preliminary partition by the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin.⁴⁹

Under these circumstances, the sultan, who brought “the civil-bureaucratic pyramid back under effective political control,”⁵⁰ gathered almost all power into his own hands in the new headquarters called the Yıldız Palace, and personally determined the state's foreign policy strategies. Abdulhamid II's priority was to preserve the integrity and independence of the State through diplomacy.⁵¹ The most important element of his diplomatic understanding was the emphasis on the caliphate claim that he had inherited by birthright. His interest in the idea of Pan-Islamism was an attempt to unite all Muslims, including non-Ottomans, against potential enemies to preserve the integrity and independence of the State.⁵² The discourse of Islamic unity was an approach to increase the Empire's diplomatic bargaining range against the Western imperial powers.⁵³ Yet caliphate politics was a defensive and very cautious orientation; Abdulhamid II was very keen to develop his influence on non-Ottoman Muslim public opinion. Following this logic, he could present himself as the religious leader of all Muslims, and by the prestige he achieved, increase the bargaining power of the Ottomans in diplomacy with the great powers. For this reason, representations and consulates were opened in many parts of

the Islamic world. Additionally, Abdulhamid II presented the Hijaz Railway project, which would carry the prestige of the caliph to the top in the eyes of the entire Muslim community, as the most important indicator of his Pan-Islamist policy.

Abdulhamid II's diplomatic strategy was based on two principles: balance and non-conflict/ non-confrontation. The principle of balance "implied that the Ottoman Empire/[State] must neither draw too close to nor alienate any power,"⁵⁴ and thereby maximize its diplomatic leverage. The principle of non-conflict "implied that the Ottoman Empire/[State] must avoid all situations where it might be exposed to threats of coercion, especially military coercion."⁵⁵

All in all, Abdulhamid II determined the foreign policy priorities of the State himself and applied his diplomatic understanding by gathering all the administrative power into his own hands. Eventually, "Abdulhamid kept his Empire substantially intact and diplomatically independent for thirty years."⁵⁶ In other words, the change in the balance of power in the domestic political sphere (breaking the power of the civil bureaucracy) was the main determinant of state strategy and the foreign policy of this period.

The Foreign Ministry's Institutional Structure

When compared with the previous Tanzimat period, the main central offices of the Foreign Ministry continued to exist even in 1908. Thus, the institutional structure of the Ministry exhibits continuity.⁵⁷ It is noteworthy that more than twenty Foreign Ministers were replaced between 1871 and 1885. However, it is also notable that only two ministers were changed from 1885 to 1909; Kurd Said Pasha served

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between 1885–1895, and Ahmed Tevfik Pasha then served until 1909.⁵⁸ This continuity in the institutional structure of the Ministry is mostly due to the sultan's fortified power over the administration and bureaucracy. Since he was able to determine the target and strategy of foreign

policy with his own political charisma, he did not need institutional change. As a result, the institutional structure of the Ministry remained intact, albeit with a reduction in actual power.

Three bureaus from the Tanzimat era mainly responsible for written work continued to function during Abdulhamid II's reign: Translation Office of the Sublime Porte, Turkish Correspondence Office and Foreign Correspondence Office. Although the duties of these offices did not change, they grew only in terms of size, internal differentiation and composition; for example, in the Foreign Correspondence Office, which had been an Armenian enclave, underwent significant personnel changes.

The official policies of this period were effective in ensuring continuity in the institutional structure of the Ministry; specifically, Abdulhamid II's policy of breaking the political influence of the European states on the Ottomans prevented institutional change, and the basic institutional units of the Ministry remained intact.

Additionally, the offices that existed in 1871, those of the *chef de protocol* of the Foreign Ministry, of Nationality, of Accounts and Foreign Press continued to exist in this period. The most basic function of the last office was to correct false statements in the European press and to inform foreign countries about the policies and progress of the Ottoman Empire.

The functions of the Records Office (*Hariciye Evrak Odası*), which had been established in 1871, were dispersed into separate sections in several other offices. As Findley notes, "the Turkish Correspondence Office had one section, headed by the Foreign Ministry records director (*hariciye evrak müdürü*). There were also records directors in the Translation Office, Foreign Correspondence Office, Directorate for Consular Affairs, Foreign Press Directorate, Directorate of Nationality, and the Office of Legal Counsel."⁵⁹ The main responsibilities of these record sections were to control the flow of information and secure documents relating to current events.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs (*hariciye kâtibi*) was replaced by the Office of Mixed Legal Affairs, which was accountable for "producing legal opinions on certain types of cases arising between Ottoman subjects and foreign nationals."⁶⁰ Some offices were formed by differentiation

among the functions of other bureaus. For example, the Office of Consular Affairs was created in 1873 and then attached to the Foreign Correspondence Office. This new offshoot office was supposed to be responsible for the correspondence of the Ministry with the consular corps.

Another new office to emerge in the early 1880s was the Office of Legal Counsel (*İstişare Odası*), headed by two senior juris consults; these were the legal counselors of the Sublime Porte (*Babıâli hukuk müşavirleri*), and had several assistants and staff working directly under them. Although it is difficult to distinguish the responsibilities of the Office of Legal Counsel from those of the Offices of Mixed Legal Affairs, the basic duty of the Legal Counsel was to offer opinions about the problems occurring between the Ottoman State and other states. “In modern terms, the legal counselors were the advisors of the Ottoman government in international law.”⁶¹

The last unit added to the Ministry was the Directorate of Commercial Affairs, established in 1908 as a branch of the Directorate of Consular Affairs, and thus part of both the Foreign Correspondence Office and the Translation Office.

In addition to these offices and directorates, two more special commissions were added to the central organs of the Ministry as of 1908: Commission for the Selection of Foreign Ministry Officials and Administrative Commission, “of which members consisted only of the director or top supervisory officials of the other offices of the ministry.”⁶² These branches were accountable for the control of appointments and other personal actions in civil bureaucracy.

The Role of the Foreign Ministry in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

From the 1830s onward, especially throughout the Tanzimat period, the Foreign Ministry had a considerable impact on government policies. However, the influence of the Ministry on government decisions changed during the reign of Abdulhamid II. In this period, the power of bureaucrats was severely diminished and the Yıldız Palace became the real center of administration. Naturally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was affected by these developments.

In this period, Abdulhamid II became the most influential identity in diplomacy and decisions taken, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entered a stagnant period in policy-making. The loss of foreign ministers' power in policy-making during Abdulhamid II's reign is evident in the dismissal of more than 20 foreign ministers in the 14 years between 1871–1885.⁶³ The role of the Foreign Ministry during the period was limited to bureaucratic activities, such as the implementation of decisions and the gathering of information, rather than making decisions.⁶⁴ Last of all, while power shifts between political actors at the internal level created continuity in the institutional structure of the Ministry during the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876–1909), it also led to a weakening of the prestigious position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and transformed foreign ministers into policy implementers rather than policy-makers, as they had been in the previous Tanzimat period.

Committee of Union and Progress Period (1909–1918)

Political developments at both the international and domestic level in the early phase of the 20th century forced Abdulhamid II to re-declare the constitution. First, Russia's transition to the constitutional system, characterized as the gendarme of absolutism, followed by Iran in 1906 and China in 1908, set an example for the Ottoman State, which had just suffered a military defeat by Japan in 1904–1905.⁶⁵ Second and more importantly, the opposition of the dissident group called the Young Turks, who demanded expansion in political participation and adopted a liberal philosophy, played a key role in this process. By 1908, the constitution was re-enacted with the support of the Young Turks. Following the suppression of the March 31 rebellion, Abdulhamid II was dethroned by the parliament. In the following process, the role of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in the administration increased, and the effectiveness of the sultan in the administration decreased.⁶⁶

The foreign policy of this period was an extension of domestic politics.⁶⁷ Domestic policy and foreign policy were quite intertwined, making it difficult to distinguish one from the other. In this period, the Foreign Ministry was preoccupied with balancing domestic problems and foreign intervention;⁶⁸ Ottoman foreign policy focused on two

The all-out efforts of the CUP were to align the Ottoman State with the Triple Entente, consisting of Britain, France and Russia, as they deemed it necessary for the liberation of the state.

principles: ensuring the territorial integrity of the State and preserving its autonomy against the great powers.⁶⁹

The all-out efforts of the CUP were to align the Ottoman State with the Triple Entente, consisting of Britain, France and

Russia, as they deemed it necessary for the liberation of the state. As Ahmad remarks, “After they restored the constitution in July 1908, the Young Turks expected a sympathetic response from the Great Powers, especially from Britain and France. Instead, they found themselves facing one crisis after another culminating in their virtual expulsion from Europe.”⁷⁰ It was then that the CUP turned to Germany as a last resort.

From 1908 onward, the Ottoman State went through a series of political and diplomatic crises and failures that paved the way for the collapse of the Ottomans.

On the international scene, first, the distraction that the revolution of 1908 created in Istanbul served as a signal to Austria for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Bulgaria for the proclamation of its independence, and to Greece for the annexation of Crete. With scarcely an interlude, the sequence of troubles continued with the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912, the First and Second Balkan Wars, the First World War, and then the Turkish War of Independence. As on earlier occasions, the new period thus opened with an exceptional series of disturbances. This time, they did not end before the six-hundred-year-old empire had finally collapsed.⁷¹

In the midst of these political crises both internal and external, the transition to a constitutional order caused changes in the organizational structure of the State’s bureaucratic institutions.

Institutional Structure of the Ministry

The Ministry underwent institutional changes with new regulations just before World War I. However, a full structural and operational analysis of the Ministry is difficult to undertake, as there are some uncertainties about the Ministry's operational and hierarchical relationships.⁷² The new regulations united the agencies of the Ministry into groups and defined the connection of some groups to either the Minister or the Undersecretary.

The Undersecretary belonged within the close circle of the Minister, along with two other elements directly subordinate to the Minister: a private secretarial staff (*Kalem-i Mahsus Müdüriyeti*) and a Cipher Directorate (*Şifre Müdüriyeti*). Some of the agencies of the Ministry were attached to the Undersecretary as a group that included the Directorates of Personnel Records, the Press, Nationality Affairs, Records, Translation, Accounts and two other agencies—the Reception Office and the Superintendency of the Offices—whose functions are not clear. The Reception Office may have served to reduce outsiders' access to the Ministry's offices and the Superintendency may have been responsible for the security of the Ministry.

Some agencies directly affiliated with the Undersecretary were divided into sub-sections. For example, the Directorate of the Office “into which the former Domestic Press Directorate (*Matbuat-ı Dahiliye*) had been integrated in April 1913” had a director, an assistant to the director and other branches that included the Public Information Office (*İtibbarat Kalemi*), liable for the dissemination of government information; Reconnoiter Office (*Tedkikat Kalemi*) responsible for analyzing and translating foreign and domestic press; and Administration Office (*İdare Şubesi*) accountable for the enforcement of laws on the press and keeping statistics on the Ottoman Press.⁷³

The other directorates attached to the Undersecretary were also subdivided. The Directorate of Nationality Affairs was divided into the Nationality Office (*Tabiiyet Kalemi*) and the Verification of Nationality Office (*Tasdik-i Tabiiyet Kalemi*); the Accounts Directorate was separated into the Investigation of Accounts (*Tedkik-i Hesabat Kalemi*) and Balance Sheets (*Muvazane Kalemi*); the Records Directorate was divided into the registration of documents and the maintenance of dossiers

(*Kayıt ve Dosya Kalemi*), maintaining the archives (*Hazine-i Evrak*) and receipts and the dispatch of communications (*Mersulat ve Mevrudat Şubesi*).⁷⁴ The last agency directly linked to the Undersecretary was the Translation Directorate, which was the successor of the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte.

Another organizational grouping was the Directorate General, split into two parts. The two directorates general typify the regrouping of “elements of the central organization of the Ministry dealing with diplomatic business, on the one hand, and consular affairs, on the other.”⁷⁵ Some of the customs agencies of the Ministry, whose duties were in the same line, became dependent on one of the new Directorates General.

The Directorate General of Political Affairs included the Important Affairs Office (*Mühimme Odası*) and Circulars Section (*Tamin Şubesi*). The directorate general also included a Directorate of Political Branches split into three sections called first, second and third; the difference between them is uncertain.

The second of the directorates general contained the Directorate of General Consular, Commercial and Mixed Legal Affairs. The Directorate of Consular and Mixed Legal Affairs operated two component offices. The last central agency was the Legal Counsellorship (*Hukuk Müşavirliği*) in charge of serving the entire Ottoman government.

However, from the overthrow of Abdulhamid II to the dissolution of the Empire, the influence of not only the foreign ministers but also the sultan in foreign policy decisions decreased to a great extent.

The diplomatic corps of the State consisted of eight embassies (*büyükelçilik*) and eight legations (*ortaelçilik*). The consular service of the State was made up of honorary and salaried consuls. The salaried consuls were divided into first and second classes;

however, the hierarchical relations between the consuls and diplomatic officials of the Ministry in Istanbul are not obvious.

The Role of the Foreign Ministry in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

To reiterate, the foreign policy of the Young Turks period was an extension of domestic politics, and was shaped and determined not only by dynamics and political settings within the country but also by developments in the international system, as it had been for the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire.

In the Tanzimat period, foreign ministers enjoyed the second most prestigious position after the Grand Vizier at the Porte. In contrast, during the reign of Abdulhamid II, who ruled the State himself, foreign ministers lost their former importance. However, from the overthrow of Abdulhamid II to the dissolution of the Empire, the influence of not only the foreign ministers but also the sultan in foreign policy decisions decreased to a great extent.⁷⁶ In the post-Abdulhamid II periods, two foreign ministers, Mehmet Rifat Pasha (1909–1911) and Mustafa Asım (1911–1912) acted upon the orders of the CUP and did not go beyond the basic principles determined by the party.⁷⁷ When the CUP took absolute control of politics with another coup in 1913, foreign policy principles took shape around the decisions of the six most influential members of the party—Halim, Cavid, Halil, Enver, Cemal and Talat.⁷⁸

In the period of the Unionists, who held power in the final years of the Ottoman State, foreign policy bureaucrats were found to be unreliable, as they had been in the reign of Abdulhamid II. For this reason, the Unionists preferred to send their loyal members to meetings with foreign representatives, rather than sending professional officials of the Foreign Ministry. Thus, during this period, the Ministry lost ground both in foreign policy decision-making and implementation. This is clearly the result of the CUP's control of all political, bureaucratic and civil actors at the internal level.

Conclusion

To understand the roots of Turkish diplomacy, it is important to take a closer look at the evolutionary process in the institutional structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the main pillars that led to its evolution and how the effectiveness of the Ministry in foreign policy

decision-making processes developed based on the Ministry's evolution within the context of changes and continuities in the domestic and international realms. It could be argued that it is not possible to categorically distinguish between the influence and effects of the internal and external levels in the absolute sense. That is, the phenomena of change and continuity in the institutional structure of the Ministry are and were open to developments from both internal and external levels. For example, the nationalist movement spread by the French Revolution affected the Ottoman State due to its sociological structure and multi-religious, multinational cosmopolitanism. The measures taken against the Revolution's ripple effects led to the establishment of new units in the institutional structure of the Ministry, especially in the Tanzimat period. As seen in this example, although the change in the institutional structure depended on the external development due to the French Revolution, it was also driven by the internal situation of the Ottoman State in terms of sociological structure.

Moreover, as Ottoman military defeats led to a loss of the Empire's sense of superiority, the understanding of diplomacy changed and new institutional revisions were made at the Ministry to keep pace with developments in the West. Since this change was due to military defeats, it can be considered the result of developments at the external level.

Along with the evolution in the institutional structure of the Ministry, its role and effectiveness in the foreign policy-making process remained volatile, constantly increasing or decreasing. It should be noted that changes and developments in the institutional structure of the Ministry did not necessarily translate into an increased role or greater effectiveness in the foreign policy-making process. While the needs driving the changes in the Ministry's institutional structure were almost equally tied to developments at both the internal and external levels, the factor that determined the effectiveness of the Ministry in the foreign policy decision-making process rather depended on changes in power balances at the domestic political level. Therefore, there is not necessarily any causal relationship between the institutional development of the Ministry and its role in the foreign policy-making process.

This is not to imply, however, that the institutional evolution of the Ministry in no way affected its role in policy-making. For example,

during the Tanzimat period, when the institutional structure of the Ministry first changed, the role and effectiveness of the Ministry in the foreign policy decision-making process increased. However, this upsurge was due to the decrease in the sultan's power in the executive role, rather than to changes in the institutional structure as such. As a matter of fact, when the institutional structure of the Ministry changed during the CUP period (1889-1906), the role of the Ministry both in the foreign policy decision-making process and the process of implementing decisions was almost non-existent. In this period, the CUP had taken all political, bureaucratic and civil actors under its own control. Although there was a change in the institutional structure of the Ministry in both the Tanzimat and CUP periods, the role of the Ministry in the foreign policy decision-making process increased in the first period and decreased in the latter, being tied primarily to shifts in the balance of power at the domestic political level.

To take another example, the role of the Ministry in decision-making during the reign of Abdulhamid II, when continuity was observed in the institutional structure of the Ministry, significantly decreased compared to the previous period (i.e. Tanzimat). Taken collectively, these examples indicate that the effectiveness of the Ministry in foreign policy decision-making processes is not directly related to changes and continuities in its institutional structure, but rather to power changes among actors at the internal political level.

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ARTICLE

Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Tevfik Pasha: His Contribution to Ottoman Diplomacy in a Challenging Era (1895–1909)

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Abstract

This paper seeks to examine Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's training as a Foreign Service officer and his experiences in embassy missions as well as his activities during the political and diplomatic developments of the era in line with the foreign policy objectives of the Ottoman government. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha (1845–1936), led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its Minister for more than thirteen years. He held the post for the longest term during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II and was one of the most influential figures in Ottoman diplomacy. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's effectiveness in major foreign policy events, his role in decision-making and implementation processes, his communication with Abdulhamid II on diplomatic matters and his relationship with the Ottoman and foreign ambassadors of the time, reveal the characteristic details of Ottoman diplomacy during the era.

Keywords

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abdulhamid II, Ottoman diplomacy, foreign policy

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Introduction

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha is one of the most prominent figures in Ottoman diplomacy, having served as an ambassador abroad for many years and as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the last thirteen years of the era of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909). During the reign of Abdulhamid II, the Sultan had a dominant role in the management of foreign policy and decision-making processes, such that the Sublime Porte was left a very limited space, unlike during the *Tanzimat* period. However, there are a considerable number of instances in which Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, trusted by Abdulhamid II, influenced the Sultan's decisions. Certain implications can be drawn from Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's role in the shaping of foreign policy as a man of duty who acted meticulously in the implementation of the decisions taken.

In this article, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's training as a Foreign Service officer and his experiences in embassy missions will be examined in order to analyze his activity during the political and diplomatic developments of the era in line with the foreign policy objectives of the Ottoman government. His contribution to foreign policy decisions as Minister of Foreign Affairs and his conducting of foreign affairs will be addressed within the framework of the communication networks established with Ottoman diplomatic representatives abroad, foreign embassies in Istanbul, the Sublime Porte, and the Sultan himself.

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's Training and Experiences as a Foreign Service Officer

Toward the end of the *Tanzimat* period and onward, the post of Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not in stable condition. More than twenty people served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Ottoman government between 1871 and 1885. However, between 1885 and 1909, only two people dominated the office: Süleymaniyeli Mehmed Said Pasha (1885–1895) and Ahmed Tevfik Pasha (1895–1909).¹ While Carter Findley defines the long periods of unchanging ministers of foreign affairs during the reign of Abdulhamid II as “stagnation,” there is consideration in the literature that this situation created a “stable appearance” in the administration of the ministry.²

The reasons for Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's long tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs in such a turbulent period are varied. According to Findley, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, like Süleymaniyeli Mehmed Said Pasha, was one of the statespersons who remained in the era of Abdulhamid II "without [being] tainted by it." Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, had "no great diplomatic talent of profound knowledge of affairs, but possess[ed] a complete command of his features, unruffled urbanity of manner, and a composure that no crisis has yet been known to disturb."³

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha had already been recognized by the witnesses of government officials from contemporary states as the right person for this task; in a report sent to the political departments of the British Foreign Office in 1906, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was mentioned with the following words of praise: "An ideal Minister for Foreign Affairs under a régime which has reduced the role of that functionary to that of a buffer between the Palace, whence the foreign policy of the Empire is directed, and the representatives of the foreign powers."⁴ This statement gives an idea about the reason for Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's long stay in the post of Minister. It also indicates how the foreign officers of foreign states perceived the role of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the process of foreign policy decision-making.

According to research conducted on the career paths of Ottoman civil servants, the most successful diplomats who served in various representations abroad would eventually return to the center and serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs. These diplomats could be appointed to other ministerial posts, become a member of the *Şûra-yı Devlet* (Council of State) and finally be appointed as Grand Vizier, the highest office in the Sublime Porte. The grand viziers of the *Tanzimat* era, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Âli Pasha and Fuad Pasha were among the first members of the Foreign Service to enjoy such a career path. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha followed in their footsteps as ambassador, Minister of Foreign Affairs and finally Grand Vizier.⁵

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's training as a Foreign Service officer and his experience in the field of diplomacy resemble the career paths of state officials in efficient and productive bureaucracies. His career started in Foreign Service at the lowest level as a clerk in the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte; he then was trained as a professional diplomat

with assignments in embassies abroad before rising to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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lieutenant). In 1866, he started to work at the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte without salary and was introduced to the profession of Foreign Service. His long years of assignments abroad started when he was appointed as the second secretary of the embassy in Rome in 1872. He took the office as the second secretary of the embassy in Vienna in the last month of the same year, became the second secretary of the embassy in Berlin

in 1873, the chief secretary of the embassy in Athens in 1875 and the first secretary of the embassy in Petersburg in 1876 immediately after the accession of Sultan Abdulhamid II to the throne. During his tenure in diplomatic posts, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha served as chargé d'affaires at the embassies of Rome, Berlin and Petersburg while the ambassadors were on leave. Upon Russia's declaration of war in 1877, he returned to Istanbul from Petersburg, where he was serving as chargé d'affaires, and was appointed as a political officer to Şumnu (Shumen), the headquarter of the Ottoman Army during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–78. After the war, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha returned to Istanbul. He was appointed as chargé d'affaires in Athens in 1879 and promoted to Minister Plenipotentiary in Athens in 1883. In addition to his duty there, he was appointed as a delegate to the Suez Canal Commission in Paris in 1885. In the same year, he was charged as Ottoman ambassador to Berlin and remained in this position for ten years until 1895 when he returned to Istanbul to serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's duty as Minister of Foreign Affairs was completed at the beginning of 1909 with the fall of Kâmil Pasha's government. During the years following the deposition of Sultan Abdulhamid II, he served

as ambassador to London and later, several times as the Grand Vizier of the Second Constitutional regime. His political career ended in 1922 as the last Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire.⁶

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's career path in Ottoman Foreign Service is an uninterrupted one that proceeds in a hierarchical and sequential way as expected from efficient, rational bureaucracies. After entering the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte, the most established unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was promoted from the post of second secretary to chief secretary in various embassies; due to the established practice, he fulfilled the duty of *chargé d'affaires* by undertaking the affairs of the embassy in the absence of the ambassadors he was accompanying. When diplomatic relations were interrupted, he worked at the war zone where his experience and knowledge could be of benefit. During the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–1878, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha controlled the news sent by foreign war correspondents from the front and ensured that it was censored when necessary, thus fulfilling a task related to public relations during wartime. Afterward, he was promoted to minister plenipotentiary and finally became an ambassador. Thus, a professional, career diplomat climbed the career ladder in a rational process and finally became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. After his ten-year stay in Germany, with which the Ottoman Empire was in a conscious rapprochement, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha completed his adventure abroad during the reign of Abdulhamid II. It should also be noted that he did not hold any position in the Ottoman bureaucracy other than Foreign Service—for instance positions related to domestic affairs.

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha demonstrated his merit in the art of diplomacy, which he learned during his tenure in the embassies abroad for many years, during his office as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The education he received in international law from foreign experts, his fluent French and his diligence together formed his capability.⁷ According to witnesses of the era, Abdulhamid II trusted him and assigned him to solve various problems in challenging times. Thus, it is understood that Ahmed Tevfik Pasha fulfilled the criterion of loyalty. During the reign of Abdulhamid II, “merit” and “loyalty” emerged as two criteria that could sometimes conflict with each other in the selection of the statespersons with whom the Sultan would work. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was chosen as the Minister

of Foreign Affairs and remained in this position for a long time; he was regarded as an “ideal” person who fulfilled both criteria.

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha’s participation as the Ottoman delegate to the Suez Canal Commission, established to negotiate and decide on the Suez Canal and the status of Egypt, was one of the experiences that prepared him for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He defended Ottoman interests by participating in the negotiation processes where multilateral diplomacy was carried out.

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Foreign Affairs after Süleymaniyeli Mehmed Said Pasha, who had also previously served as ambassador to Berlin, was a conscious decision taken during the time of rapprochement with Germany.⁸ Early examples of such a preference in the appointments of Ministers of Foreign Affairs can be found in the *Tanzimat* era. Âli Pasha and Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the *Tanzimat* era when close

relations with England established, had also been appointed as London ambassadors first, and later as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha’s Role in Decision-Making Processes as Minister of Foreign Affairs

The gradual increase in Abdulhamid II’s influence in the administration of the state and his concentration of authority created the perception that the role of statespersons serving in the high offices of the bureaucracy in decision-making processes decreased or even completely disappeared during his reign. However, it is necessary to go beyond this assumption and investigate the level of effectiveness of the Sublime Porte as the bureaucratic unit where politics were produced and implemented beside the *Mabeyn*, the top administrative institution of Abdulhamid II’s palace. The role of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha in the decision-making

processes as Minister of Foreign Affairs and his effectiveness in guiding the Sultan's decisions should be evaluated in this context.

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha prioritized seeking all alternatives other than war and communicating with his interlocutors on a peaceful basis throughout his professional life. The testimonies of his contemporaries give the impression that he had a calm and peaceful character. However, he was also a minister who was in favor of using the instrument of war in international relations when he considered it to be best for the national interest of the state. The main purpose of diplomacy is to defend the interests of the state, so for him, it was possible to consider war an option at times.⁹

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was one of the statesmen influential in the decision to declare war against Greece in 1897. In 1897, Greece's decision to annex Crete to its territory developed into an international crisis and the negotiations with great powers yielded no results. Though Abdulhamid II still feared the intervention of the great powers, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha tried to convince the Sultan to go to war, stating that the great powers were unable to intervene in the crisis at the time; they had their own agendas, and it was a favorable time for war.¹⁰

After the war, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha insisted that the peace negotiations should be held with the officials of the six great powers instead of the Greek delegates. The Ottoman administration had lost confidence in the Greek authorities, and it was obvious that the great powers had intervened after all and were directing Ottoman-Greek relations throughout the process. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha ensured that the peace treaty would be concluded and the decisions would be implemented rightfully if they negotiated with the great powers. During the negotiations, the Ottoman Empire was represented by Ahmed Tevfik Pasha who insisted on receiving the determined amount of war reparations from Greece and was successful in this issue compared to others. According to his grandson, Şefik Okday, the latter did not sign the peace treaty until the Greeks had paid the full war reparations agreed upon during the negotiations.¹¹

There is a significant example where the role of the Sublime Porte alongside the Sultan and the *Mabeyn* in decision-making processes was emphasized by Ahmed Tevfik Pasha himself. Around the turn of

the century, the European powers were imposing large-scale reforms to be carried out by the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia. By 1905, they began to press for the establishment of an international financial control mechanism in the region, claiming that the imposed reforms could not be conducted because of financial causes. The project was put forward under the leadership of Britain. The ambassadors of the major states in Istanbul asked to discuss the issue with the Sultan all together. Although the request was rejected, upon their insistence, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha reminded the ambassadors of diplomatic rules and courtesy. He also stated that since it was an internal matter, it was up to the Sublime Porte to decide and that the establishment of an international commission for financial control in Macedonia was an intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Auguste Boppe, the French Chargé d'Affaires, expressed his surprise at the rapid response from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the explicit terminology used.¹²

By pointing to the Sublime Porte's call of duty in this matter, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was in fact stating that not only the Palace but also the government was active in decision-making processes and that these issues could not be discussed directly with the Sultan by ambassadors. It can be contended that a modern state administration and bureaucracy based on division of labor was in effect. On the other hand, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's reaction skillfully prevented the Sultan's decisions from being questioned. In fact, to assert that the relevant issues were under the responsibility of the Sublime Porte was a strategy frequently used by Ottoman statespersons when pressure from the great powers needed to be diffused.¹³

As the foreign ambassadors' insistence persisted, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha and Arab İzzet Pasha's opinion was to stand firm and not step back. In contrast, statesmen such as Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier and Said Pasha, the former Grand Vizier, had expressed their opinion in favor of acquiescing to their demand.¹⁴ In this case, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was little affected by the pressures of foreign ambassadors and was not guided by them. There is no indication that he had close relations with any major state or their embassies in Istanbul; in contrast to some Grand Viziers or prominent statespersons of the period, he was known only for his loyalty to Abdulhamid II. Although Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was a part of the Sublime Porte, a joint approach was achieved during

his tenure between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Palace.

One of the clear indicators of the Sultan's trust in Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was the role he assumed in the first month of his tenure as Foreign Minister in November 1895 during a diplomatic crisis regarding the presence of foreign warships in the Bosphorus. Foreign embassies in Istanbul were only

allowed to keep two small warships, called "stationary," in the Bosphorus. The news that the British embassy intended to pass a British battleship through the Bosphorus in violation of the rule had reached the Palace. Abdulhamid II assigned Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Küçük Said Pasha, former Grand Vizier, to pay a visit to the British, Russian and German embassies to prevent the passage of the ship. After the diplomatic crisis was overcome, Abdulhamid II asked Ahmed Tevfik Pasha whether during the meetings in the embassies Küçük Said Pasha had spoken in a manner faithful to the Sultan's order. Abdulhamid II not only entrusted this critical task to Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, who had just started to work as Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also sought his testimony about Küçük Said Pasha, whom he was planning to appoint as Grand Vizier at the time.¹⁵

During the first years of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's ministry of foreign affairs, the Armenian issue was the most important problem of Ottoman foreign policy. Between 1894 and 1896, the Armenian uprisings had become an international issue due to the intervention of foreign states. The great powers desired to exert pressure on the Ottoman Empire and demanded that the reforms promised in the Berlin Treaty of 1878 be carried out. Meanwhile, the Armenians were circulating propaganda in Europe and seeking help by cultivating public opinion that they had no security of life or property in the Ottoman lands. From the first stage in which he took office, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha instructed the Ottoman embassies abroad to convey news about the attacks and rebellions of Armenian bandits against the local population in various settlements of Anatolia to the statespersons of the country in which

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they were serving, and to the press and the European public in general. Thus, counterpropaganda was being carried out through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁶

While the Armenian incidents continued across the country, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha attempted to solve the issue through diplomatic communication by informing the embassies of France, Germany, Russia and Britain in Istanbul. In turn, these powers transmitted their diplomatic notes to the Ottoman government regarding the Armenian reforms to Ahmed Tevfik Pasha via their ambassadors. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's task was to reply to them and try to convince them by informing them that necessary measures were being taken regarding the Armenian issue.¹⁷

Regarding a note of the European states dated 1895, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha shared his opinion with the Sultan that if the Armenian reform proposed by Britain was accepted, the Bulgarians would demand an autonomous administration, as would the Armenians. Instead of accepting the reforms conveyed in the note, he stated that it would be advantageous to implement the reforms promised in the Treaty of Berlin in all Ottoman provinces.¹⁸

Another diplomatic crisis during Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's term emerged with the request of the United States (U.S.) to upgrade the status of its legation in Istanbul to that of an embassy. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the U.S. desired to be accepted as an active actor in European diplomacy and to be recognized as a great power in diplomatic protocol. It had engaged in reciprocally upgrading the rank of its diplomatic representatives with most states since 1893.¹⁹ The U.S. Department of State expressed the same request through the Ottoman ambassador in Washington in 1897. In Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's opinion, the aim of this request was to include the U.S. representative in Istanbul within the group of ambassadors of the European powers. In this way, the U.S. would have the opportunity to intervene effectively in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's proposal, which Abdulhamid II approved, was to pass over the request by using diplomatic language.²⁰ The issue, which was thus postponed through the efforts of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, was brought up again by the U.S. government several times until the end of his term. Despite

the ensuing crises, during which the U.S. navy even entered the Aegean Sea in an attempt at intimidation, the Ottoman government managed to resist the demand until the end of Abdulhamid II's reign. The U.S. legation was turned into an embassy unilaterally in 1906, while the Ottoman representation in Washington remained a legation until the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Monarchy.²¹

The competition between the European states to undertake the construction of railway lines in the Ottoman Empire was one of the era's most important foreign affairs issues. The ambassadors of the great powers negotiated with Ahmed Tevfik Pasha on the granting of railway line privileges. This was a point where economic interests and politics overlapped. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha endeavored to ensure the most favorable decision to Ottoman interests. In 1899, the privilege for the construction of railway lines to Baghdad and Basra was granted to the Germans. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha informed the German ambassador Marschall von Bieberstein that the extension of these lines to Kuwait would be technically and politically beneficial for both countries. This idea was discussed and approved by the military commission upon Sultan Abdulhamid's request. Marschall transmitted Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's ideas to German foreign affairs officials and stated that by extending the line to Kuwait, Germany could compete economically with the British in the region.²² As expected, the British ambassador opposed the idea.²³ Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's meetings with the ambassadors maintained their importance in achieving balance between the competing parties.

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha and Pan-Islamism

Pan-Islamism was one of the policies on which the Ottoman Empire relied, in the hope of having an impact on the Muslim population living in the colonies of the great powers. Although it had begun to be used at an earlier date, the policy of Pan-Islamism is identified with the foreign policy of Abdul Hamid II, and gained more weight with the support of Germany throughout the period. During Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's tenure, there are interesting examples of how the Ottoman Empire attempted to carry out the policy of Pan-Islamism using various means.

İsmail Hakkı Bey was one of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's two sons and a member of the Ottoman army serving as an aide-de-camp to Abdulhamid II. In

December 1907, the French embassy in the Hague drew the attention of the French embassy to the fact that Bey was trying to gather information about the Muslim population in the East Indies (today Indonesia), a Dutch colony at the time. A letter sent from the embassy to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Bey had contacted Muslims in Java and Sumatra and asked for detailed information about Islamist activities in the region and the names of those who would perform the pilgrimage. The French government found out that in 1906, İsmail Hakkı Bey had requested statistical information from the Tunisian authorities and the administrators of the French colonies of Dahomey, Upper Senegal, Niger, Mauritania and French Congo in Africa about the Muslim population in their regions.²⁴

The French colonial administrations left İsmail Hakkı Bey's questions unanswered. The French government was extremely uneasy about the issue and warned Dutch officials of Bey's inquiries. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, as Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, confirmed his son's activities, but tried to reassure the anxious foreign officials by emphasizing that Bey was acting on the orders of the Sultan as a close aide-de-camp and that this had nothing to do with the policy of Pan-Islamism.²⁵ These examples of their joint efforts as father and son to develop and implement Abdulhamid II's Islamist policies regarding world Muslims should be noted.

Pan-Islamism did not have the power to generate as great an impact as the colonial states feared. However, an incident in the memoirs of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's grandson, Şefik Okday, reveals the perception among the rulers of the great powers about the Ottoman Empire's sphere of influence over Muslim lands. When Ahmed Tevfik Pasha (then Bey) presented his credentials to Emperor Wilhelm I in 1885 to take office as ambassador in Berlin, the Emperor stated that the ambassador of a state neighboring the Ottoman Empire had also presented his credentials the previous day, but he could not remember which state it was, and asked Ahmed Tevfik Bey to remind him of the names of the states neighboring the Ottoman Empire. When it was obvious that none of the neighboring states he named was the state in question, the Emperor called the royal chamberlain who recalled that the ambassador who had presented his credentials the day before was not from a neighboring state at all, but from Kingdom of Siam.²⁶ Wilhelm I's perception that

the borders of the Ottoman Empire, or rather its sphere of influence, extended to Far Asia via the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, indicates the level of the concern regarding Pan-Islamism.

Institutional Changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to develop institutionally during Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's term. The most important institutional innovation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the establishment of a Directorate of Commercial Affairs (*Umûr-ı Ticariye Müdüriyeti*) within the Ministry. On April 20, 1896, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha notified all embassies of the Ottoman Empire with a circular about the new unit. The aim was to protect the commercial interests of the state and to establish commercial relations with new states on new grounds such as trade agreements. Ottoman consuls serving abroad were preparing reports on their observations and advice on the commercial activities of their areas; these reports were sent to the Directorate of Consular Affairs (*Umûr-ı Şehbenderî Müdüriyeti*) of the Ministry. With the establishment of the new department for commercial affairs, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha instructed the consuls to send their reports to the Directorate of Commercial Affairs as well.²⁷ For the improvement of Ottoman foreign commercial activity, the reports on current economic activities and potential commercial opportunities collected from all over the world would form a pool of information and guide the authorities in the development of new policies regarding commercial relations.

Another initiative regarding the organization of correspondence and documents produced in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the re-establishment of the Directorate of Confidential Office (*Kalem-i Mahsus Müdüriyeti*) in 1898. This was one of the central units of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Foreign Correspondence Office (*Tahrirat-ı Hariciye Kalemî*), which had been established in 1879 and then closed. The purpose of its re-establishment was to prevent the circulation of important and confidential documents in French language among the departments and to keep state secrets safe. The chief clerk of the Foreign Correspondence Office, Yusuf Franko Pasha, a well-known figure of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, was appointed director of the Confidential Office, which was later closed again in 1907.²⁸

The Commission for the Selection of Foreign Ministry Officials (*İntihâb-ı Memurin Komisyonu*), one of the permanent commissions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was established in 1899 upon Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's proposal. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha stated that the officials to be appointed for foreign affairs should have "competence, qualification, loyalty and integrity." Officials of foreign missions such as undersecretaries, secretaries, attachés, consuls and clerks would be selected by this commission, which convened under the chairmanship of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁹

The development process of the Ministry's organization abroad continued during Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's term. New diplomatic missions and consulates were opened to respond to the various needs of both foreign and domestic policy.

The development process of the Ministry's organization abroad continued during Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's term. New diplomatic missions and consulates were opened to respond to the various needs of both foreign and domestic policy. For example, the legation in Bern was founded in 1899 because of tensions in Ottoman internal affairs rather

than the development of relations between the Ottoman Empire and Switzerland. Beginning in 1890, opposition to the Sultan had increased throughout the Empire, and a considerable number of political exiles travelled to Europe for various reasons. Some of the Ottoman students abroad joined opposition groups, and the activities of the Young Turks were concentrated in major European cities. The Sultan gave instructions to his diplomatic representatives to monitor opponents living abroad and gather intelligence about their activities. The primary duty of the ambassadors in Paris, London, Brussels, Stockholm, Rome and Bucharest was to follow them up.³⁰

The legation in Bern stands out as a mission opened primarily due to this need. The consulate in Geneva was established in 1898 both to take care of the affairs of Ottoman nationals living there and to keep tabs on the political opponents and Young Turks who were gathering in various cities across Switzerland. On November 13, 1899, the Bern legation was opened and the envoy in Brussels, Karateodori Efendi, was assigned to the Bern legation in addition to his duties.³¹

While the diplomats of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's term were engaged in monitoring the political opponents in line with their instructions, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was not personally interested in the pursuit of the Young Turks and adopted a more neutral attitude in matters related to the internal affairs of the state.³² Indeed, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was a trusted servant of the state first and foremost, and was appointed to offices by both Abdulhamid II and later the Young Turks in the Second Constitutional Era. The longevity of his career can be attributed to his aforementioned neutral attitude. Immediately after the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy and the deposition of the Sultan, some of the statesmen who had served in Abdulhamid's regime were dismissed from their positions, while Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier and ambassador to London.

The expansion of the Ottoman Empire's network of consulates in various parts of the world, especially in cities where commercial activities were concentrated, also continued. Between 1895 and 1909, twenty-six new consulates were opened.³³ These consulates were primarily opened to take care of the affairs of the Ottoman citizens living in the region and to protect the rights of Ottoman merchants. However, special reasons can also be identified for the establishment of some consulates. As mentioned above, the Geneva consulate was opened to follow up on the empire's political opponents in Switzerland. Some consulates were opened within the framework of the Pan-Islamism policy. In Iran, the Linja (Bandar Lengeh) consulate was established to create ties with the Sunni population of the region and to provide intelligence.³⁴ Likewise, Natal in South Africa and Rangoon in Burma (today Myanmar) in India were established with Pan-Islamist motives. It should be recalled that during the 19th century, many people emigrated from the Ottoman Empire to the Americas and Australia, whose governments were accepting migrants for labor from all countries. To take care of the immigrants of Ottoman origin, consulates were opened in Sydney, Australia and Sao Paulo, Brazil during Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's term.³⁵

Conclusion

Abdulhamid II played a leading role in the decision-making processes in the formation of the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's foreign policy decisions were based on knowledge, experience and diplomatic restraint. For all these reasons, he became the longest-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

Tevfik Pasha was an executive who stood out due to his loyalty and honesty and tried to fulfil the instructions he received from the Sultan. Although the scope of his action in the formulation of foreign policy was limited, his experience in foreign affairs, his calm and restrained attitude and,

most importantly, his personality that reassured Abdulhamid II as an anxious Sultan who wanted to be informed about everything, ensured that Ottoman foreign policy was managed reasonably. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's foreign policy decisions were based on knowledge, experience and diplomatic restraint. For all these reasons, he became the longest-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

Although the effectiveness of the Sublime Porte decreased during the reign of Abdulhamid II, Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's steady role as a Minister trusted by the Sultan helped to keep relations between the Sublime Porte and the Palace in balance. The opinion that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in a state of stagnation during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II is not confirmed by the facts. The process of professionalization and complexification in the central units, embassies and consulates continued during this term. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to develop institutionally within the framework of various contemporary foreign policy needs during Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's term.

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33. These included Belgrade (1896), Salmas (1896), Breslau (1896), La Ciotat (1897), Limerick (1897), Tehran (1897), Akmesid (Simferopol) (1897), Sydney (1897), La Rochelle (1897), Geneva (1898), Las Palmas (1898), Linja (Bandar Lengeh) (1898), West Hartlepool (1899), Malm¼ (1901), Turnu Magurele (1902), Kiel (1904), Zurich (1904), Lille (1904), Natal (1904), Rangoon (1905), Vladivostok (1905), D¼sseldorf (1906), Isle of Man (1907), Bradford (1907), Sao Paulo (1908) and Bergen (1909). See: Bostan, *Osmanlı Hariciyesinin Modern Temelleri*, pp. 279–280.
34. Prior to the opening of the consulate in Linja (Bandar Lengeh), the Sunni population in the region was communicated with through the consulate of Bombay. Ibid, p. 234.
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ARTICLE

A Foreign Mission from the National Struggle to the Republic: The Paris Representation

Aydın ÇAKMAK *

Abstract

Turkish-French relations started to improve after the signing of the Ankara Accord of October 20, 1921. Taking a new step in this political environment, the Ankara government decided to open a representation in Paris. Ferid Bey, an important politician of the period, was appointed to this position. However, he was recalled to Ankara in early 1923 following an incident with the French delegation in a meeting at the Lausanne Conference, to which he had been invited to assist. No new appointment was made after Ferid Bey's return to Ankara. Hüseyin Ragıp Bey, who was brought in charge of the Paris Representation, acted as the representative by proxy. Eventually, the Paris Representation was elevated to the level of ambassadorship and Cevad Bey, an experienced diplomat, was appointed as ambassador. By analyzing archival documents, periodicals and copyrighted works, this article examines the establishment and activities of the Paris Representation, which has a special place in the history of Turkish diplomacy, for the first time and in a comprehensive manner.

Keywords

Paris representation, Turkish-French relations, Ferid Bey, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey, Cevad Bey

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Introduction

Even though the Ottoman-French relations, which had a long history, progressed considerably over time, the two states sided with different blocs and fought against each other in the First World War.¹ The fact that the Ottoman Empire was on the losing side and France was on the winning side at the end of the war completely changed the relations between the two states. After the Armistice of Mudros of October 30, 1918, France adopted an occupying and destructive policy toward the Ottoman Empire, which upset Turkish-French bilateral relations in a fundamental way.

The French forces first occupied Istanbul together with the Allied States, and then proceeded to occupy the territories that were left to France by secret treaties. Having settled in Syria and Lebanon under the mandate regime, France took over Turkish territories such as Antakya, Urfa, Adana, Maraş and Antep from the British forces. However, it encountered very strong resistance from the Turkish people there.² The Turkish National Struggle movement, which started in Anatolia, sought to liberate the Turkish lands from occupation with all its strength. The successful resistance of the Turkish national troops established in the region frustrated the hopes of the French government. The financial burden of maintaining the troops on the French state budget was also evident.³

As a result, France's policy toward Ankara government began to change as of the spring of 1920.⁴ Meanwhile, French public opinion had gradually turned in favor of Ankara government⁵—so much so that the Aristide Briand government, which chose the path of compromise, sent Henry Franklin Bouillon, the head of the Foreign Affairs Commission and a former minister, to Ankara for negotiations. As a result of long and intensive negotiations, the Ankara Accord was signed on October 20, 1921, establishing a preliminary peace between the two parties.⁶

Following the signing of the Ankara Accord, a foreign mission named the Paris Representation was established. In this article, the Paris Representation, which has not been the subject of any independent study before, is discussed in detail. Since the Paris Representation has an important place both in the development of Turkish-French relations and the evolution of Turkish diplomacy, analyzing this subject would be very helpful in evaluating Turkish foreign policy in the period that is under consideration.

The First Period in the Paris Representation

After the signing of the Ankara Accord, relations between France and Ankara government started to improve. At that time, Ankara government only had a mission in Italy among the Western countries. Therefore, it was decided to open a foreign mission in the French capital, Paris. Ahmed Ferid [Tek] Bey, a member of the parliament from Istanbul and former deputy finance minister, was appointed as the Paris Representative,⁷ and the staff and salaries of the mission were drawn up.⁸ Ferid Bey's appointment was notified to the French High Commissioner General Pelle,⁹ and a letter of accreditation was written stating his appointment as a plenipotentiary representative to France.¹⁰ After these preparations, Ferid Bey left for France by steamer via Beirut after staying in Adana and its surroundings for a while.¹¹

At the time of Ferid Bey's appointment, moderate winds were blowing between France and the Ankara government. The Turkish army, which had won the Sakarya Battle in September 1921, was preparing for a decisive and final war. This was the atmosphere in which Ferid Bey arrived in Paris on December 1, 1921 and began his semi-official mission.¹² In the statement he gave to *Le Temps* newspaper after he set foot in Paris, he explained that his first duty was to resolve the problems arising from the implementation of the Ankara Accord and that he would work to improve relations between Paris and Ankara.¹³

It should be noted, however, that at the time Ferid Bey took office, there was already another Turkish representation in France. The mission of Nabi Bey, who was representing the government of Istanbul, carried the title of 'Ottoman Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference'. The day after his arrival, Ferid Bey, who had sent his Chief Clerk Hüseyin Ragıp [Baydur] Bey to the Ottoman delegation, expressed his wish to reside in the Ottoman embassy

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building. Upon hearing this, Nabi Bey sent a telegram to Istanbul stating that Ferid Bey had requested to reside in the embassy building with his entourage consisting of four officers upon the orders of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara.¹⁴ Ferid Bey, who met Nabi Bey personally on the same day, repeated his request, explaining that the purpose of staying in the embassy was to give the image of a united country to those with whom he would hold financial negotiations. Nabi Bey, however, replied that this purpose could not be achieved by staying in one building and that the apparent duality of governments was appropriate for the time being in terms of national interests.¹⁵ In any case, a negative response was received from Istanbul. The Ottoman Foreign Minister Ahmed İzzet Pasha, who stated that the Sublime Porte had no knowledge of the negotiations and that the Ankara government did not provide information, stated that residence in the embassy could not be considered appropriate in any way and that Ankara's representatives in other countries could not stay in the Ottoman embassies.¹⁶ In the face of this negative response, the two Turkish representations in Paris could not be merged. Ferid Bey rented a building on Victor Hugo Street, 200 meters opposite the Ottoman Embassy. As in Italy, there was a period of two-headed representation in France. From then on, the two missions continued their duties, sometimes in the same direction, sometimes in different directions, but separately.¹⁷

Inaugurated in late 1921, the Paris Representation was a small mission consisting of four officers and Ferid Bey. Hüseyin Ragıp Bey served as the chief clerk. The second clerk was Cemal Hüsnü [Taray] Bey, who was responsible for sending reports on economic issues.¹⁸ Numan Tahir [Menemenciöglü] Bey later joined this delegation.¹⁹ Thus, at least four people who would assume important roles in Turkish diplomacy in the following years served in the Paris Representation, albeit in different periods.

Ferid Bey's appointment as the representative in France had great benefits for the Ankara government.²⁰ In fact, the first tasks that he would perform in his mission emerged even before he started his journey, when he received instructions from Ankara on issues such as urgently finding money for the supply of arms and ammunition and persuading the French factories to make on-credit sales.²¹ Moreover, he was authorized to sign contracts for the purchase of war materials and military equipment.²²

In the aftermath of the signing of the Ankara Accord, the French government was subjected to fierce attacks both at home and abroad. Ferid Bey had a meeting with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Aristide Briand at this very moment. The French leader made positive statements about the Turkish cause and asked Ferid Bey to convey his respects to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, stating that he was a sincere friend of the Turks. He also emphasized that Ankara was the sole representative of Turkish sovereignty and that Istanbul had to respect this reality. During the meeting between the two men, issues such as the future of Turkish war of independence, relations between Ankara and Paris (as well as their separate relations with London), financial matters and the purchase of military equipment were discussed. Ferid Bey, who recognized the importance of tipping of the French press and public opinion in favor of Ankara during his first contacts in France, also brought up financial issues and the purchase of military equipment. Ferid Bey also believed that Nabi Bey's mission should be taken out of Paris as leading French banks questioned the existence of two rival governments in Istanbul and Ankara.²³

Upon his arrival in Paris, Ferid Bey immediately started to deal with the procurement of supplies and financial matters. He divided the financial issues into five parts and soon realized it would not be possible to secure the political assistance of the French government in these matters as Briand told him that the situation of the French cabinet was delicate and that there was a possibility of his withdrawal. Confirming this information, Ferid Bey reported to Ankara that the Briand government, which had been in power for a long time, was on shaky ground, and that Ankara's interests favored the continuation of the present French cabinet. He also emphasized that borrowing and purchasing from France was unlikely under the current conditions mainly because a lasting peace in Anatolia had not been yet achieved and the legal status of the Ankara government had not been yet determined.²⁴

At the end of his first month in Paris, Ferid Bey summarized France's policy toward Türkiye as "sufficient friendship in theory, maximum hesitation in practice," even though he believed there was a favorable view toward Islam as well as the Turks and Ankara in the French government, parliament and among politicians. However, it was not possible for them to act freely for the time being due to criticism from

Britain, since Anglo-French rivalry was on the rise on a number of issues after the war. Britain seemed to be opposed to the strengthening of France within the framework of its traditional continental European policy, while France was oriented toward a policy of economic pressure and a circle of alliance tilted toward Germany. French initiatives like signing alliance agreements with Belgium and Poland, establishment of the Little Entente, launch of a Scandinavian policy and friendship with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were all part of this objective, as was the policy of rapprochement with the Ankara government and the Caucasus. Thus, the development of France's Turkish policy, which aimed at peace in Anatolia for long-term French political and economic interests, depended to some extent on the shape that the Anglo-French struggle would take.²⁵

Ferid Bey was interested in general political issues in addition to Turkish-French economic relations. As a diplomat serving in one of the main centers international politics, he was busy with many different issues. Meanwhile, the expected development took place and Briand's government resigned, while Raymond Poincaré came to power in

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Paris.²⁶ Ferid Bey was of the opinion that the cabinet change would not make any difference in terms of French general policy,²⁷ as Poincaré had made statements in favor of the Ankara government some time ago. Still, there were concerns in Ankara regarding the government change in Paris. In this respect, Ferid Bey

immediately took action to protect Turkish rights.²⁸ Monsieur Peretti, Chief of the Political Section, also made statements to allay concerns in Ankara about the change of government.²⁹

According to Ferid Bey's assessments, the disagreements between France and Britain did not diminish after the change of French government, but became even more pronounced.³⁰ In fact, these disagreements had existed since the armistice of 1918. Apart from Britain's role in the postponement of German debt and the inclusion of the Bolsheviks in European settlements, the ongoing negotiations for an Anglo-French

treaty which almost tried to make France a British protectorate were the last drops that overflowed the full glass. The general atmosphere in the Washington and Cannes Conferences in 1922 also showed that Paris was mostly alone in its disagreements with London. Ferid Bey made interesting assessments of the leaders of France and Britain in light of such disagreements. According to him, the new French Prime Minister – exaggeratedly dubbed ‘Poincaré-War’ by his opponents – was a man of principle subject to cold balance and judgement, while British Prime Minister Lloyd George was known with his opportunistic, unstable and handful character. The former was a politician who did and said what he thought, while the latter was not afraid of making contradictory statements or expressions. In addition, Poincaré adhered to principles as a former president, while George had a habit of dominating domestic politics in Britain since the war began. In short, it was clear that the two politicians could not easily get along.³¹

Ferid Bey noted that one of the reasons for the disagreement between Britain and France was the Ankara Accord and said of the new understanding in Paris that “if it could, it would bury the accord in the ground.”³² In light of the ongoing Anglo-French disputes, the Paris Representation received instructions from Ankara on various issues.³³ For example, it assisted the Turkish delegation, which was sent to France for military purchases, in political matters.³⁴ Meanwhile General Pellé also paid a visit to the Paris mission. In a meeting held in the presence of President Alexandre Millerand, he stated that it had been decided not to change France’s policy towards Ankara.³⁵ In the same period, Ferid Bey held his first official meeting with Poincaré, during which he expressed the favorable feelings of both Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Ankara government toward France. In response, Poincaré initially only stated that his favorable opinion about Ankara should be trusted and that he could not promise anything more than the assurances he had previously given. However, in response to Ferid Bey’s decisive stance, he softened his statements a little and said that he was sincere in his good intentions.³⁶ In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal Pasha informed Ferid Bey in two separate telegrams that his work in Paris was worthy of thanks, that he followed his official reports with interest and that he found them satisfactory.³⁷

It should also be noted that the Allied States had been preparing for some time to put an end to the ongoing Greek-Turkish war in

Anatolia. Therefore, France became a center for discussions regarding this issue as well. Under these conditions, Yusuf Kemal [Tengirşenk] Bey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ankara government at the time, organized a trip to Paris and London. Among those who welcomed the Turkish delegation in Marseille³⁸ was Ferid Bey as the Paris Representative.³⁹ Soon after, the Allied States announced the armistice with Ankara government on March 22, 1922 and declared their peace terms four days later. However, the conditions of the Ankara government, which accepted the armistice in principle, regarding the evacuation of Anatolia by the occupation forces were not accepted by the great powers.⁴⁰

The Ankara government sent new instructions to the Paris mission at this time. One of them was to analyze the news of a rapprochement between France and Greece.⁴¹ In addition, matters such as thanking the French parliament for the groundbreaking ceremony of the mosque built in Paris,⁴² preventing France from taking the railway material in the Adana region across the border,⁴³ keeping the money given in advance for the submarine and torpedo ordered before the First World War (against other orders) were also on the agenda of the Paris mission.⁴⁴

Thus, the scope of work of the Paris Representation included a wide range of diverse and complex issues. Ferid Bey continued to send reports to Ankara about matters related with French domestic and foreign policy. For example, the turmoil in Tunisia caused by the Paris cabinet, which at first seemed to be an internal matter, suddenly became a matter of concern for Ankara. This was because some French newspapers, citing the revolution in Tunisia, criticized Ankara and even wrote that this movement had been encouraged by the National Struggle in Anatolia. Some politicians, however, stated that Paris should learn from this example and pursue a policy of goodwill toward the Islamic world and Ankara government in particular.⁴⁵

In addition to these developments, Ferid Bey gave detailed information about the oil deposits in Anatolia, stating that the competition for oil was one of the most important political issues of the world and drew attention to the economic and political aspects of the oil industry that were related to the interests of the Ankara government.⁴⁶ Indeed, many organizations of French origin were applying to the Paris mission for the

rights to exploit Anatolia's underground and above-ground riches. One of these was the International Omnium Oil Company, headquartered in Paris. The representatives of the union established by this company stated that they would like to send a delegation to Ankara to investigate the petroleum resources in Anatolia and to exploit the rich oil fields if they were found.⁴⁷

The Paris Representation was also active in press and propaganda activities. Ferid Bey, through his writings, and his wife Müfide Ferid, through her lectures, tried to inform French public opinion and distribute propaganda through official channels.⁴⁸ Ferid

Bey also made attempts to turn France's policy toward Ankara in a positive direction. He tried to influence people who were close to Ankara either out of friendship or interest.⁴⁹ As a matter of fact, Ferid Bey, who reported Poincaré's statement in favor of Ankara upon the question of a Turkish-friendly deputy in the parliament as "we provoked it," used the expression "the purpose has been achieved."⁵⁰ In addition, the press bureau in charge of press relations in the Paris mission carried out very useful activities⁵¹ and Hüseyin Ragıp Bey published a book in French, titled *Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Turkish National Movement*.⁵²

In the summer of 1922, Ali Fethi [Okyar] Bey, the Minister of Interior in Ankara, was on a political trip to Europe that included a stop in Paris⁵³ when the news reached him of the start of the Turkish Great Offensive and the Battle of the Commander-in-Chief. Following the developments closely, Ferid Bey sent a congratulatory telegram to Mustafa Kemal Pasha after the Turkish victory.⁵⁴ He reported that the victory had created repercussions in French public opinion in favor of Ankara.⁵⁵ The Turkish victory was greeted with great joy in Asian and African countries, especially in the Islamic world. Many people in these countries sent congratulatory telegrams indirectly, that is, through the Paris Representation, due to the censorship of the Allies.⁵⁶ During the Çanakkale Crisis with Britain and the Mudanya Armistice signed in October 1922, the Representation carried out intensive activities in

The Paris Representation was also active in press and propaganda activities. Ferid Bey, through his writings, and his wife Müfide Ferid, through her lectures, tried to inform French public opinion and distribute propaganda through official channels.

terms of both negotiations and information flow.⁵⁷ Ferid Bey had an interview with Lord Derby upon his visit to Paris,⁵⁸ as well as with General Townshend, who visited the representative in person.⁵⁹

After the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate by the Ankara government in November 1922, the Paris Representation was moved to the building that had been used as the Ottoman Embassy for years.⁶⁰ It took over the building, keys, fixtures, safe and cipher books of the Embassy. The Ottoman diplomatic missions in Western countries were also temporarily attached to the Representation. Thus, the Paris Representation and Ferid Bey assumed an important role in the process of connecting the Ottoman foreign affairs system to the Ankara government.⁶¹

It was decided that the peace conference to follow the Turkish victory would be held in Lausanne, Switzerland. A delegation headed by İsmet Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was to represent Ankara at the conference. When the opening of the conference was postponed, İsmet Pasha stayed in Lausanne for a short time and travelled to France with a small group including Ferid Bey. Arriving in Paris on the morning of November 15, 1922 İsmet Pasha and his entourage were welcomed by the staff of the Paris mission and some Turkish citizens. In Paris, İsmet Pasha held meetings with various people, including the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Poincaré,⁶² who also attended a dinner organized by Ferid Bey hosting around 35 guests.⁶³

The Paris Representation, which remained as the only Turkish mission in France after the dissolution of the Istanbul government, was interested in the problems faced by Turkish students studying there as well.⁶⁴ It also dealt with the situation of citizens who could not afford to make a living.⁶⁵ In the meantime, it is noteworthy that some people in France, who had not visited the Turkish Embassy for years, applied to the Paris Representation to benefit from the rights of foreigners.⁶⁶

It should be emphasized, however, that Ferid Bey had to defend himself in response to a critical letter that came from the Ministry of Finance regarding his financial activities in Paris. He refused these criticisms and stated that the Turkish government's instructions included the duty to follow up on the purchase of foreign debt and that he was even given certified authorization documents. He also emphasized that he attached special importance to the financial reputation of the Turkish

state and pointed out that he did not request loans by “going from door to door” and that he did not do anything other than what was asked of him by the ministry.⁶⁷ On the same subject, he even wrote a petition to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, namely Mustafa Kemal Pasha,⁶⁸ and sent a letter to Prime Minister Rauf [Orbay] Bey, beginning with the address “my brother.”⁶⁹

As stated before, Ferid Bey was also invited to the Lausanne negotiations to assist the Turkish delegation in financial and economic matters in the absence of Hasan [Saka] Bey. However, Ferid Bey’s reaction to the harsh words of one of the French delegates regarding the Ottoman debt issue in one of the meetings irritated the French side. As a result, Ferid Bey was dismissed despite all the support he received from İsmet Pasha, who described him as “a great ambassador.”⁷⁰ After this incident, Ferid Bey returned to Paris again and continued his mission for some more time.⁷¹ However, the British government criticized Ferid Bey’s statements about the Ottoman debt issue and advised France to expel him from the country. As also indicated in a British intelligence report, the Poincaré cabinet also wanted Ferid Bey to be removed from Paris “because of his pro-German tendencies.”⁷²

As result, Ferid Bey departed from Paris in February 1923 and Hüseyin Ragıp Bey was appointed as the acting representative. Both of these developments were reflected in the Turkish and French press.⁷³ For example, *Le Matin* reported that Ferid Bey had made a farewell visit to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that his leave was indefinite.⁷⁴ It was also reported that either Zekai [Apaydın] Bey, a member of parliament from the Adana province or Nihad Reşad [Belger] Bey would be appointed in his place.⁷⁵

Proxy Period in the Paris Representation

After Ferid Bey’s departure, no permanent appointment was made to the position of representative and it was decided that Hüseyin Ragıp Bey, who was already serving as the chief clerk in the Paris Representation, would manage the mission as a kind of chargé d’affaires by proxy. In this role, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey conducted useful services in Ankara government’s most important foreign mission and in the diplomatic profession at large.⁷⁶ However, at the time of his appointment, the

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Lausanne Conference was interrupted, and a new conflict emerged between Ankara and the Allies due to the issue of capitulations. In this interim period, the Paris Representation became the most important center of communication between the Ankara government and the Western countries as it sent very important information to Ankara regarding the domestic

developments taking place in the Allied States as well as about the ongoing peace talks.⁷⁷

During this period, certain anti-Turkish articles and news appeared in the French press that were particularly critical regarding the "Chester Project" which was launched by the Ottoman-American Development Company in April 1923 for the management of mines in Anatolia. Hüseyin Ragıp Bey emphasized that this project disproved the claim that business could not be conducted with Ankara without capitulations. He also indicated that Ankara would grant privileges to the party that offered the most favorable conditions and that French companies only wasted time in vain to make use of previous capitulations instead of competing with the American company.⁷⁸ Despite such remarks, the French government continued to protest, while the French press published critical pieces about Ankara government's approach in this issue.⁷⁹ Emmanuel de Peretti de La Rocca, who was the Director of Political Affairs, conveyed the reservations of the French government and also complained about other issues such as the closure of a French bank and company in Adana, reduction of French lessons in Turkish high schools and Turkish military build-up on the Syrian border. Hüseyin Ragıp Bey responded to these complaints on the grounds of defense and criticized the remarks made by the French press about Turkish domestic issues.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey also worked to secure the purchase of French military equipment for Ankara.⁸¹ In addition, he closely followed French politics and informed Ankara about the developments. For

example, he reported that the new French government, which had just received a vote of confidence, was not fully trusted in the parliament and that the Ruhr issue – the joint invasion of the Ruhr region in Germany by France and Belgium in January 1923 in response to Germany's failure to pay reparations – had necessitated a vote of confidence. He also reported that the French government was being criticized in the domestic scene for its policies toward the Ankara government.⁸²

The workload of the Turkish representation in France became heavier in light of such developments. For instance, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, resisting the decision taken on the status of foreign schools in Anatolia, sent a diplomatic note stating that this measure, which threatened the existence of the schools, was contrary to the Ankara Accord.⁸³ The Paris cabinet, on the other hand, issued a communiqué to the press regarding the build-up of Turkish troops on the Syrian border,⁸⁴ and also discussed the problems experienced by French merchants, companies and banks in Anatolia.⁸⁵ It also insisted that it should not be necessary to obtain permission from Ankara for French people to travel to Istanbul. In response to this, the French police started to refrain from recognizing visas issued with the Turkish seal by the Paris Representation.⁸⁶

At the same time, it should be mentioned that the Ankara government provided essential support to Turkish students, who had been sent abroad during the time of the Ottoman sultanate or who had travelled with their own means, and helped them complete their education. Within the framework of its reform program, the Ankara government also started to send new students abroad.⁸⁷ The Paris Representation remained at the center of activities related to the students going abroad for education.⁸⁸ In fact, according to a directive issued by the Turkish Ministry of Education, it was made responsible for the affairs of students in Paris, London, Lausanne and Belgium.⁸⁹

Signed on July 24, 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was greeted with joy in various parts of the world. For example, well-known French writer Claude Farrère sent congratulatory telegrams to the Paris Representation, while Muslims living in Tunisia and Marseille expressed their congratulations, underlining their hope that this development would be a new beginning for the strengthening of relations between

Ankara and Paris.⁹⁰ In this regard, one of the most important items on the agenda of Turkish-French relations seemed to be the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, which would also mean the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Ankara did its part and ratified the treaty quickly in August 1923, while the French ratification process took a longer time. Nevertheless, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey, who had been signing the documents “on behalf of the Representative of Paris” until then, started to use the title of “Acting Representative of Paris” in light of these developments.⁹¹

Another area of work of the Paris mission was the activities for the development of the Turkish economy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already instructed its missions abroad to provide information and send reports on European trade centers for Turkish merchants.⁹² Similarly, the Paris Representation became the application authority for individuals and companies wishing to do business with the Ankara government.⁹³ For example, the director of the newspaper *Le Journal* submitted a petition to the Paris Representation on behalf of the capitalist group to which he belonged.⁹⁴

During the days when the Republic of Türkiye was proclaimed in October 1923,⁹⁵ the political atmosphere in France was getting more complicated. In the latest by-elections, the opposition Left Bloc was successful, while the National Bloc, the supporter of Poincaré’s government, lost power. The discontent felt in the majority group in the parliament due to the election results was so strong that the government’s position became fragile. In any case, no one inside or outside the French parliament seemed satisfied with the situation.⁹⁶

Türkiye attached great importance to the principle of reciprocity in the re-established relations with France. An example of this was the endeavor to have a representative in Marseille to reciprocate the installation of a French official serving in Izmir, whose duties would be the same as those of the French official. The request to send Turkish officials to Aleppo and Beirut was partially successful though.⁹⁷ It should also be mentioned that the French government frequently brought up the issue of ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne for about a year after the treaty was signed and even made veiled threats from time to time on this issue. In addition, the news of the dismissal of the French

second principal and teachers at Galatasaray High School was met with reaction in Paris. Some French newspapers interpreted the incident as a sign of growing Turkish hostility toward France.⁹⁸ The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs even stated that such an arrangement, which Paris deemed to be contrary to the 1921 Accord, would have a negative impact before the handling of the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne in the French parliament.⁹⁹ The Ministry then issued a second note, reiterating that Ankara's treatment of French teachers, who had been involved in teaching for half a century, would have a negative affect on the ratification of the treaty.¹⁰⁰ In response to all these reactions, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey had to issue a denial through the *Agency Havas*, *Times* and other press organs.¹⁰¹

Meanwhile, the Paris Representation continued to send to Ankara the requested information and documents about the changes to be made in Türkiye, which was in the process of major reforms.¹⁰² It particularly analyzed the practices in France regarding the reconstruction and repair of the regions that had been devastated after the wars.¹⁰³ In addition, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey supported the establishment and activities of the Paris Turkish Students' Association – more precisely the Paris Turkish Dormitory.¹⁰⁴

The difficult days of the Poincaré government continued in 1924.¹⁰⁵ Hüseyin Ragıp Bey's observations were quite accurate in describing the political situation in France. According to him, the fall of the franc against other currencies and the increase in the cost of living caused great reactions not only among the French public, but also in the press and especially the parliament. Had it not been for these financial problems, the government could still remain in power despite making major political mistakes. Yet, the French people were particularly sensitive about economic issues, as also indicated by the parliament's tough stance about the issue of the Ottoman debt in the Lausanne Conference. The parliamentary debates, in which the government presented decrees and tax increases as counter-measures, were the scene of great struggle for this reason. If the franc continued to fall despite the measures taken, there would be little chance for the government to stay in power.¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, consular activities between Ankara and Paris, which had been interrupted by the First World War, were re-established. The new Turkish state opened a consulate deputation in Paris and the duties of the mission related to citizenship affairs and transactions were started to be carried out by this institution.¹⁰⁷ In the same period, a Turkish consulate general was also established in Marseille, which was a major center of economic relations between the two countries.¹⁰⁸

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about this incident in some French newspapers became a negative instrument used by those trying to delay the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne.¹⁰⁹ It is also interesting to note in this regard that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a now customary note stating that the incident of the seized tugboat in Mersin could delay the ratification of the treaty.¹¹⁰ It also protested against the closure of nine French

schools in İzmir on the grounds that they had failed to remove religious symbols.¹¹¹

While the Paris Representation was under great pressure due to such issues, new developments took place in French politics. The government, which brought the credibility issue to the agenda during the discussion of the pension law, failed to receive the vote of confidence it requested.¹¹² However, Poincaré himself was again given the task of forming the government.¹¹³ The government then made a proposal to send an ambassador to Türkiye as the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne was postponed to the next session of the parliament.¹¹⁴ During this period, the Paris mission worked even at night and on holidays.¹¹⁵

Following a period of turmoil, general elections were held in France in 1924. The May 11 elections resulted in an outcome that had not been foreseen or desired by the government and majority bloc—or the

opposition. The Radicals and the Socialists were the two important winners of the elections, and the leader of the Radicals, Edouard Herriot, became the most authoritative man in the country. Poincaré and his government, which had been in power for more than two years, decided to resign, but they would still continue their work until the opening of parliament. The new majority group in the parliament promised to follow a policy of peace in international relations. Although it was not possible to determine what the change in policy toward Türkiye might be in advance, there was no doubt that it would be quite different from the previous one.¹¹⁶

Hüseyin Ragıp Bey reported the political developments in France back to Türkiye in detail including the opinion of the French politicians, who were likely to come to the government, on the resolution of the disputes and improvement of relations with Türkiye, while also calling for the redefinition and communication of the issues that were expected to be resolved.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper correspondent Faik Sabri Bey conducted an interview with Hüseyin Ragıp Bey in Paris. In the article, it was pointed out that Türkiye's most difficult disputes were currently with France, and that the Paris Representation had been going through a critical period for the last two years. The article also emphasized that Hüseyin Ragıp Bey, who had been carrying out this duty with great success for about a year and a half, had remained stoic, persistent, serious and sincere in his work to support the interests of Türkiye. After this, an interview was held in the Paris embassy and the expected policy of the new government toward Türkiye, as well as other issues including the schools, the southern border and Turkish students in France were discussed.¹¹⁸

Hüseyin Ragıp Bey requested to come to Ankara in order to inform the Turkish government about the establishment of Herriot's government and the developments that could happen in France until the new French government started to work.¹¹⁹ He also pointed out that the restraining of local Turkish newspapers in the regions close to the Syrian border would be beneficial for the relations between Türkiye and France.¹²⁰ However, the Turkish foreign ministry did not deem it appropriate for Hüseyin Ragıp to leave Paris, since it did not want any interruption in the flow of information from France at such a critical period.¹²¹ Thus, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey continued his work in Paris. However, the Turkish government, which was sensitive about maintaining good relations

with Paris, partly listened to his advice and requested the Turkish press organs, to the extent 'permitted by the law', to remain calm in their publications on France.¹²²

Hüseyin Ragıp Bey also wrote a long report about his meeting with Henry Franklin Bouillon, during which Bouillon stated that the new French government was favorable toward Türkiye. Regarding the problem about the French schools in Türkiye, he said, "if I had known that one day I would see these schools completely closed, I would not

Another bone of contention between Türkiye and France was the closure of the French schools in Edirne. The publication of the news about this incident in some French newspapers became a negative instrument used by those trying to delay the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne.

have signed the Ankara Accord."

In response, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey said that the Turkish government, which had abolished the caliphate and closed religious schools in the country, could not grant religious privileges to foreign schools.¹²³

Hüseyin Ragıp Bey also had a favorable interview with the new French Prime Minister Herriot.¹²⁴

Later, he continued to work on issues such as the economy, trade, health and forestry.¹²⁵ Meanwhile, he was given a representative

allowance and his title was raised from chief clerk to undersecretary of the embassy.¹²⁶

The summer months of 1924 were eventful in terms of Turkish-French relations. Türkiye's main expectation from Paris was the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne and embassy-level French representation in Ankara.¹²⁷ However, it took quite a long time for France to ratify the treaty, which it had signed about a year earlier. Factors such as debt coupons, status of the French institutions in Türkiye and the political debates about these issues in domestic politics prolonged the ratification process. Finally, the Treaty of Lausanne was ratified by the French Parliament on August 26, 1924, and by the Senate the following day.¹²⁸

With the ratification of this treaty, a period of peace and developing relations started between the two states. More importantly, there was no longer any obstacle for either side to open an embassy in the other country. However, neither Ankara nor Paris made any appointments regarding this issue. During Hüseyin Ragıp Bey's absence for a brief

period of time, Chief Clerk Celal Hazım [Tepeyran] Bey managed the Paris mission 'on behalf of the Acting Representative of Paris'.¹²⁹ Later, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey's returned to his duties, this time as chargé d'affaires.¹³⁰

During the period of the government in which Ali Fethi Bey served as Prime Minister and Şükrü Kaya served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Türkiye, the Paris Representation was raised to the level of ambassadorship. Cevad [Ezine] Bey, then serving at the Embassy of Bucharest, was appointed as the Paris Ambassador¹³¹ and thus became the first ambassador of the Republic of Türkiye to France.¹³²

On the same day, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey was appointed to the Embassy of Bucharest.¹³³ In other words, the two diplomats switched places in a kind of shuffle. However, they both remained in their posts for some more time. After coming to Ankara and meeting with the authorities, Cevad Bey finally left Istanbul for Paris on January 25,¹³⁴ while Hüseyin Ragıp Bey also left Paris around the same time.¹³⁵

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Cevad Bey presented his credentials to French authorities at a ceremony held on February 1, 1925, and officially began his ambassadorial duties in Paris. This development was met with interest in the French press. According to the *Journal*, the inauguration of Cevad Bey, a Turkish diplomat by profession, did not mean that the diplomatic contacts between the two countries had been completely severed despite the bitter memories of First World War. Hüseyin Ragıp Bey, who was now assigned to the Embassy in Bucharest, was also remembered fondly in Paris for his honesty and courtesy. It should be noted, however, for the relations between the two countries to become fully naturalized, France would also have to appoint an ambassador to Türkiye – a development which indeed took place very soon.¹³⁶

Conclusion

As discussed in the previous sections, after signing the Armistice of Mudros in 1918, the Ottoman Empire left the First World War

defeated, while the Allied States, including France, started to occupy various parts of Anatolia. The French troops occupying the south of Anatolia and the Çukurova region in accordance with the secret agreements made during the war encountered the strong resistance of the Turkish people, while the Turkish National Struggle movement achieved great success throughout the country. In this environment, the French government, realizing that it could not be successful in retaining the territories it occupied in Anatolia, sought an agreement with the Ankara government. The Turkish-French wars were thus ended with the Ankara Accord signed between the Ankara government and France. The Ankara Accord created a favorable political environment between the two sides, and the Ankara government sent Ferid Bey as a plenipotentiary representative to France and established a foreign mission called the Paris Representation. Established in late 1921, the Representation not only endeavored to improve relations between Ankara and Paris, but also assumed the command of the most important Turkish diplomatic center in the West. In Paris, Ferid Bey engaged in propaganda activities with the press and sought to explain the rightfulness of the Turkish cause to the French authorities. He also held important meetings with many officials during his tenure and maintained an intense level of diplomatic activity in times of war and peace, presenting many reports to Ankara. His work was appreciated by both Mustafa Kemal Pasha and İsmet Pasha, which was the main reason for his participation in the negotiations during the Lausanne Conference. However, due to some problems he had with the French delegation during the Lausanne talks, he was recalled to Ankara by the Turkish government in early 1923 and no new appointment was made in his place.

Chief Clerk Hüseyin Ragıp Bey was appointed as the Acting Representative of Paris after Ferid Bey's departure at a time when the Lausanne Conference was interrupted due to disagreements between Ankara and the Allies. In this interim period, the Paris Representation became the most important center of communication of the Ankara government with the Western countries. Closely following the changes in French politics and public opinion, Hüseyin Ragıp Bey dealt with a number of newly emerging problems, while also taking care of Turkish students and citizens in France. At this time, he served as chief clerk, acting representative, undersecretary and charge d'affaires.

Finally, in December 1924, the Paris Representation was upgraded to ambassadorial level and Cevad Bey, an experienced diplomat, was appointed to this post by Türkiye. Yet, it should be recalled that the Paris Representation served in accordance with the foreign policy principles of the new Turkish state such as non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign states, stability and reciprocity. At the same time, it took its place in the history of Turkish diplomacy as an important foreign mission from the era of the National Struggle to the Republic.

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 26. *TDA*, 525/37886-152837-17; *TDA*, 525/37886-152837-18.
 27. *TDA*, 525/37886-152836-20. From Hamid Bey to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 16, 1922.
 28. *TDA*, 525/37886-152838-16. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 1921[1922].
 29. Yavuz, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Döneminde Türk-Fransız İlişkileri*, p. 159.
 30. *TDA*, 525/37864-152750-23. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 21, 1922.
 31. *TDA*, 525/37864-152750-22. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 22, 2022.
 32. *Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Archives [Cumburbaşkanlığı Arşivi- CA]*, 01003568_5. From the Paris Representation to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, February 20, 1922.
 33. *TDA*, 525/38623-156348-57; *TDA*, 525/38623-156348-56.
 34. *TDA*, 525/38588-155984-99. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representation, February 2, 1922.
 35. *TDA*, 525/37886-152838-18. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 21, 1922.
 36. *TDA*, 525/37886-152838-17. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 21, 1922.
 37. *CA*, 01003547-7; Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Atatürk İle Yazışmalar I (1920-1923)*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981, pp. 178–179.
 38. Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, *Vatan Hizmetinde*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2001, pp. 300–308.
 39. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, No. 453, 12 March 1338/1922, p. 1.
 40. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, "T.B.M.M. Hükümeti Umur-ı Hariciye Vekili Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk'in 1922 Martında Yaptığı Avrupa Gezisiyle İlgili Anılar," *Belleten*, Vol. XL, No. 160 (October 1976), pp. 665–666.
 41. *TDA*, 525/37864-152755-19. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ferid Bey and Doctor Hikmet Bey, April 2, 1922.
 42. *TDA*, 525/38610-156227-167. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representation, April 3, 1922.
 43. *TDA*, 525/38622-156329-2. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ferid Bey and Doctor Hikmet Bey, April 4, 1922.
 44. *TDA*, 525/38628-156406-9. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Paris Representation, April 16, 1338/1922.
 45. *TDA*, 525/37863-152729-8. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 11, 1338/1922. In addition to the report, which aroused great interest in Ankara, Ferid Bey stated that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not agree with the newspapers attributing the Tunisian incident to Türkiye (*TDA*, 525/37863-152729-3). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, stated that an organization founded by the palace and the British in Istanbul was sending men to Islamic lands and trying to cause incidents, and that they might have had a hand in the incidents in Syria, Tunisia and Tripoli (*TDA*, 525/37863-152729-2).
 46. *TDA*, 525/38585-155980-29; *TDA*, 525/38585-155980-27.
 47. *TDA*, 525/38585-155978-110. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 13, 1922. Hamid [Hasancan] Bey, the semi-official official of the Ankara government in Istanbul, stated that the delegation from Zaho to Mosul should be allowed to inspect the region and

- that the oil issue was a great rivalry, and described the trip as a blessing because this rivalry between the oilmen could save the Mosul region. See: *TDA*, 525/38585-155978-108.
48. Akyüz, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Fransız Kamuoyu (1919-1922)*, pp. 45 and 215.
49. *TDA*, 525/38627-156396-114; *TDA*, 525/37886-152838-8. For the preparation of a map suitable both for propaganda purposes and for use in schools, see: *TDA*, 525/37886-152838-14.
50. *TDA*, 525/37886-152838-13. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 22, 1338/1922.
51. Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, p. 148.
52. George S. Harris, *Atatürk's Diplomats: Their Brief Biographies*, İstanbul: Isis Press, 2010, p. 324; Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, p. 181.
53. *CA*, 01003712-32/01003712-34; *CA*, 01003768-17/01003768-18. The Memorandum Signed by Yusuf Kemal Bey, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, for Matters Concerning Himself.
54. *CA*, 01016626-415/416; Şimşir, *Atatürk İle Yazışmalar I*, p. 236.
55. *TDA*, 525/37886-152838-4. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 11, 1338/1922.
56. Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Doğunun Kabramanı Atatürk*, Ankara: Bilgi Publishing, 1999, pp. 41–56.
57. Engin Yürür et al (eds.), *Türk Diplomatik Arşivi Belgeleriyle 100. Yılında Mudanya Askeri Sözleşmesi Tutanaklar-Belgeler*, Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2022, pp. 8–15, 20–29, 52–73 and 89–93.
58. *TDA*, 534/36983-148657-21. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 16, 1338/1922.
59. *TDA*, 534/36983-148658-4; *TDA*, 534/36983-148658-7.
60. *TDA*, 525/38634-156446-3. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, report.
61. Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Lozan Günlüğü*, Ankara: Bilgi Publishing House, 2012, pp. 123–126.
62. *Ibid*, *Lozan Günlüğü*, p. 91-125.
63. Salahi R. Sonyel, *Gizli Belgelerle Lozan Konferansı'nın Perde Arkası*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2006, p. 41.
64. *TDA*, 525/38631-155921-230. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 10, 1338/1922.
65. *TDA*, 525/38610-156227-239. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 11, 1338/1922.
66. *TDA*, 525/38632-155934-252. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 12, 1338/1922.
67. *TDA*, 525/38623-156351-5. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 14, 1338/1922.
68. *TDA*, 525/38623-156351-6. From the Paris Representation to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, December 15, 1338/1922. In the same timeframe, Ferid Bey sent another letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha on issues such as representation, the Lausanne Conference and the situation of Britain and France. See: *CA*, 01003517_2.
69. *TDA*, 525/38623-156351-7. From the Paris Representation to the Prime Ministry, December 15, 1338/1922.
70. Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, pp. 155–160. For these correspondences see: Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları (1922-1923)*, Vol. I, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990, pp. 384–386, 421–423, 437, 485–486, 490.
71. *TDA*, 525/38627-156396-182; *TDA*, 525/38634-156440-21; *TDA*, 525/38620-156271-31.
72. Salâhi R. Sonyel, *Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) ve Kurtuluş Savaşı (Yeni Belgelerle) 1918–1923*, Vol. III, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 2008, pp. 1889–1890, 1962.
73. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, No. 741, February 16, 1339/1923, p. 4; *İkdam*, No. 9311, February 16, 1339/1923, p. 1.

74. *Tanin*, No. 130, February 20, 1339/1923, p. 1.
75. İkdam, No. 9313, February 18, 1339/1923, p. 2; *Vakir*, No. 1867, 21 February 1339/1923, p. 1.
76. Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, pp. 181-182.
77. Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları (Şubat-Ağustos 1923)*, Vol. II, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 1994, p. 149-197.
78. *TDA*, 525/38634-156440-41. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 12, 1339/1923.
79. *TDA*, 525/38634-156440-39. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 13, 1339/1923. On the subject, see: *TDA*, 525/38634-156440-36; *TDA*, 525/38634-156440-37; *TDA*, 525/38634-156440-68.
80. *TDA*, 525/38101-155039-15. From the Paris Representation to the Presidency of the Delegation, April 24, 1339/1923.
81. *TDA*, 525/38588-155984-79. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 4, 1339/1923.
82. *TDA*, 525/38101-155039-55; *TDA*, 525/37864-152751-8. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 9, 1339/1923.
83. *TDA*, 525/38101-155039-53. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 9, 1339/1923.
84. *TDA*, 525/38101-155039-54. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 10, 1339/1923.
85. *TDA*, 525/38661-155996-51; *TDA*, 525/38622-156327-7; *TDA*, 525/38634-156440-104.
86. *TDA*, 525/38632-155934-278. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 21, 1339/1923.
87. Aysen İçke, *Atatürk Dönemi Yurt Dışı Eğitimi (1923-1938)*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2018, pp. 47-51.
88. *TDA*, 525/38632-155930-5; *TDA*, 525/38545-156250-6; *TDA*, 525/38545-156250-10; *TDA*, 525/38619-156314-79; *TDA*, 525/38628-156400-18; *TDA*, 525/38619-156314-67; *TDA*, 525/38545-156250-19.
89. *TDA*, 525/38631-155921-240. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 21, 1339/1923.
90. *CA*, 01003720; *BCA*, Institution: 30-10-0-0, Location: 197-350-4. Letter sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 31, 1339/1923.
91. *TDA*, 525/37863-152724-2. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 27, 1339/1923. Hüseyin Ragıp Bey's report dated October 9 was about the title of the mission and the way of correspondence. According to the report, the delegation that arrived in Paris two years ago was known as *Mission Diplomatique Turque*. It would have been appropriate to write this name or the similarly recognized title of the *Turkish Embassy* on the envelopes sent from the Ministry. To prevent the loss of correspondence, *33 Rue de Villejust* should have been added to the envelopes. Some of the correspondence sent from other ministries and addressed only to the Paris Representation arrived by chance through the French word Angora on the cold stamp on the envelope. Therefore, stamps had to be used for such letters to be sent to foreign countries. See: *TDA*, 525/38610-156227-81.
92. *TDA*, 525/38627-156396-183. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, circular, August 28, 1339/1923. For two examples of reports on commercial issues, see: *TDA*, 525/38627-156396-189; *TDA*, 525/38611-154284-33.
93. *TDA*, 525/38612-154285-52. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 1, 1339/1923.
94. *TDA*, 525/38583-155883-1. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 3, 1339/1923.
95. For the congratulations of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: *TDA*, 525/38599-156133-6.

96. *TDA*, 525/37863-152724-7. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 14, 1339/1923.
97. *TDA*, 525/38588-155984-50. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 15, 1339/1923.
98. *TDA*, 525/38604-156220-80. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 15, 1339/1923.
99. *TDA*, 525/38604-156220-81. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 17, 1339/1923.
100. *TDA*, 525/38604-156220-75. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 10, 1339/1923.
101. *TDA*, 525/38604-156220-65. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 17, 1339/1923.
102. *TDA*, 525/38622-156277-8; *TDA*, 525/38661-155994-35.
103. *TDA*, 525/38623-156448-6. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 27, 1339/1923. On the subject, see also: *TDA*, 525/38661-155994-31.
104. *TDA*, 525/38631-155921-216. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 28, 1340/1924.
105. *TDA*, 525/37863-152727-8. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 29, 1340/1924.
106. *TDA*, 525/37863-152727-16. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 11, 1340/1924.
107. *TDA*, 525/38632-155934-71; *TDA*, 525/38632-155934-35; *TDA*, 525/38611-154284-67.
108. *TDA*, 525/38612-154285-163; *TDA*, 525/38612-154285-116; *TDA*, 525/38612-154285-126.
109. *TDA*, 525/38604-156216-19. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 25, 1340/1924.
110. *TDA*, 525/38547-155998-180. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 25, 1340/1924.
111. *TDA*, 525/38547-155998-30. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 14, 1340/1924. Hüseyin Ragıp Bey went to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made the necessary explanation on the subject. He stated that he had made this statement only to enlighten them and that it was neither a negotiation nor a request. He emphasized that the Turkish government, while respecting the treaties, was determined not to accept or even consider any foreign interference in its freedom of movement within its own country. He added that the procedures and conditions to which private schools would be subject had been determined by law, without any attempt to resemble capitulations. See: *TDA*, 525/38604-156215-8.
112. *TDA*, 525/37863-152727-4. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 26, 1340/1924.
113. *TDA*, 525/37863-152727-3. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 27, 1340/1924.
114. *CA*, 01012284. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Presidency, April 7, 1340/1924.
115. *TDA*, 525/38610-156227-95. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 20, 1340/1924.
116. *TDA*, 525/37886-152837-7. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19, 1340/1924. This report was also submitted to the Presidency. See: *CA*, 01012284-20; *TDA*, 525/37886-152837-6.
117. *TDA*, 525/37886-152834-44. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 20, 1340/1924.
118. *Cumhuriyet*, No. 24, May 30, 1340/1924, p. 4; Sabahattin Özel & Işıl Çakan Hacıbrahimoğlu, *Türk Devrimi Müslakatları*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011, pp. 190–192.

119. *TDA*, 525/37886-152834-50. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 9, 1340/1924.
120. *TDA*, 525/37886-152834-49. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 14, 1340/1924.
121. *TDA*, 525/37886-152834-48. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Paris Representation, June 17, 1340/1924.
122. *TDA*, 525/37886-152834-51. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Paris Representation, June 17, 1340/1924.
123. *CA*, 01008660-1/6; *TDA*, 525/37886-152836-4. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 21, 1340/1924.
124. *TDA*, 525/37886-152834-42. From the Paris Representation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1, 1340/1924.
125. *TDA*, 525/38612-154285-44; *TDA*, 525/38623-156350-15; *TDA*, 525/38631-155922-13.
126. *BCA*, Institution: 30-18-1-1; Location: 10-38-15. Decree, August 6, 1340/1924.
127. Serhan Ada, *Türk-Fransız İlişkilerinde Hatay Sorunu (1918–1939)*, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2005, pp. 65–67.
128. Gülden Hacıoğlu (ed.), *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl- Lozan (1922–1923)*, Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü, [No date of publication], pp. 155–156.
129. *TDA*, 525/38619-156308-20; *BOA*, HR.İM., 115/47- 1; *TDA*, 537/7415-43709-1.
130. *TDA*, 525/38599-156135-14; *TDA*, 525/38661-155994-12; *TDA*, 525/38631-155926-11.
131. *BCA*, Institution: 30-18-1-1; Location: 12-60-6. Decree, December 7, 1340/1924.
132. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Sinan Kunalalp, Frédéric Hitzel, *Représentants Permanents de la France en Turquie (1536-1991) et de la Turquie en France (1797–1991)*, İstanbul: Isis Press, 1991, p. 142.
133. *BCA*, Institution: 30-18-1-1; Location: 12-60-12. Decree, December 7, 1340/1924.
134. *Tanin*, No. 822, 25 January 1341/1925, p. 1-2; *Vatan*, No. 651, February 1, 1341/1925, p. 2.
135. *Cumhuriyet*, No. 266, February 1, 1341/1925, p. 2; *Tanin*, No. 829, February 1, 1341/1925, p. 2.
136. *İkdam*, No. 10001, February 4, 1341/1925, p. 1-2; *Tevhid-i Efkar*, No. 1299/4327, February 4, 1341/1925, p. 3.

BOOK REVIEW

Europe Reinvented: How COVID-19 is Changing the European Union

By Peter Van Kemseke

Boeklyn International (Belgium), 2020, 227 pages,

ISBN: 9789463882750

In the last days of 2019, foresight reports, which predict the emerging trends influencing international politics, would be interesting to revisit, as they contain not even a glimpse of an approaching pandemic. Peter Van Kemseke, in *Europe Reinvented*, starts by observing that no country leader or state representative was aware of what was going on in China when Chinese President Jinping gave assurances about the thriving motherland at his annual New Year's speech. Jinping praised his hard-working citizens and assured everyone that the country was doing fine thanks to their elevating works. Among those people still at work at the very last day of the year, however, were health department officials in the Chinese city of Wuhan.

Kemseke, a diplomat and politician, explains the Covid-19 crisis as a nightmare for the EU and the world, but stresses that every crisis presents a unique opportunity to wake up, and that this unprecedented challenge offers a way for EU to reinvent itself.

In the first part of the book, which consists of seven chapters, Kemseke depicts a rather pessimistic view of the first months of 2020. The picture is dark indeed, as neither the EU countries nor EU institutions were prepared to engage in the strict and rapid coordination required to address the onslaught of emergency health situations. Kemseke reminds readers that in the 2010 banking crisis, each country first tried to save their own banks—until they realized that their banks were closely intertwined with other European banks and concluded that a European-wide solution was the only real solution.

Kemseke's analysis of how (un)prepared the EU was in the first months of 2020 in the field of health is especially interesting. In the EU, the health sector is under the national domain rather than EU competency, and governments were reluctant to shift their power to the European level during the crisis. The EU cannot dictate how its members should handle such a situation; the national governments are the ones making such decisions, and the EU could only give advice in complement to national policies. Because of the lack of coordination, an already challenging situation only aggravated while national policies prioritized self-interest.

The diversity of national policies was also evident in the airport practices of EU states. Some EU countries created separate sections for passengers flying in from Chinese risk areas, or organized thermal screenings—whereas others did nothing at all. One possible reason for their inaction was the clear lack of sense of urgency, as Covid-19 was still unknown waters and disinformation was quick to spread. Kemseke dubs this period “confident inaction”.

The first period of the crisis revealed that solidarity among EU members was fragile. When EU health ministers convened in an extraordinary meeting on February 13, 2020, it was once more proved that emergency health response was national responsibility and that coordination was difficult to achieve. At the end of the same month, Northern Italy was hit hard with infected people and the virus spread immediately to the neighboring countries. The first reaction was to blame open borders instead of stressing the importance of solidarity; this call was especially taken up extreme right-wing politicians. Kemseke refers to this period as, “enlightened self-interest”. Although the EU is based mainly on solidarity in which everyone benefits from others' success, national reflexes among EU countries prevailed and the increasing number of infected people signaled a decreased level of European solidarity. Kemseke sees this failure to coordinate as a missing insight.

Despite these early issues, Kemseke presents readers with a reenergizing belief in the EU project, and depicts the ways in which EU solidarity finally emerged in the second and third parts of the book. Being united on several fronts, such as a single market and the Schengen area has been the *raison d'être* of being a part of the EU. For example, any restriction

on the free movement of people led to a host of practical problems with huge impact on the single market which was detrimental to the EU project. Kemseke considers that in every crisis, the Union first needs a meta-crisis, a clash of hurt feelings, before solidarity kicks in.

As Kemseke reiterates in the third section, the outbreak of Covid-19 caused a systemic shock in Europe, which eventually kicked into emergency mode. One of the reasons that the EU decided to wake up from its nightmare was recognition of the reality of the EU's dependence on China and the declining global leadership of the U.S. While the pandemic revealed the fragility of EU solidarity, it also highlighted the vulnerability of democracy and the rule of law. Thus, Covid-19 pushed the Union to draw a line for the sake of its founding values, even during an emergency health situation.

At the end of the book, Kemseke considers that the EU's journey is like a rollercoaster ride, starting with initial denial shifting to surprise and finally to resilience and solidarity. He is not sure whether Covid-19 will have a lasting effect on the EU's future.

It is quite understandable that Van Kemseke would strongly stress that every crisis provides an opportunity for the EU to strengthen itself in unexpected ways. He was in the cabinet of European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and worked for European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič. He experienced the most problematic days of the EU, starting with the banking crisis that transformed into the financial crisis of 2012. These crises following one another, in fact, pushed the Union to be more creative in terms of coping with blows to solidarity as national interests rise. Solidarity is at the very center of the Union; every challenge becomes another highlighting marker on the page of solidarity. First economic crisis, then migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 and now war in Ukraine... While Kemseke repeats the importance of the solidarity yet also complains of its occasional lack, it is hard to be certain that Union actually *does* reinvent itself with every crisis, as he argues, or whether this is just wishful thinking. The book starts with dark pessimism, then shifts its outlook to rising optimism. Maybe it makes more sense to wait for upcoming years, as Kemseke recommends, to see whether the Union will reinvent itself or not. Although this outcome remains to be seen, *Europe Reinvented*

is highly recommended for Social Sciences academics and EU experts who would like to learn more about how Brussels operates.

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BOOK REVIEW

Polarity in International Relations: Past, Present, Future

By Nina Græger, Bertel Heurlin, Ole Wæver and Anders Wivel (eds.)
Palgrave Macmillan, eBook, 2022, 428 pages, ISBN: 978-3-031-05505-8

Following the Cold War, the academic and political discussions on international relations (IR) have been shaped by debates on the current structure and potential transformation of the international order. Although these discussions were closely related to the polarity concept in the first decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, more recent discussions have tended to focus on the liberal structure of the post-Cold War international order and how actors inside and outside the Western world have challenged this structure. *Polarity in International Relations: Past, Present, Future* aims to synthesize these two discussions by investigating the nature and logic behind unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity and nonpolarity. Contributing authors focus on current challenges and opportunities by discussing how different types of polarity affect the international order and foreign policy action space. The book aims to contribute to the concept of polarity while exploring those challenges and opportunities in international order posed by reduced U.S. dominance and greater Chinese influence (p. 7). *Polarity in International Relations* is divided into three main sections grouped around three aims. The first aim is to conduct research on polarity in IR: What do we know about polarity and the logics of uni-, bi-, multi- and non-polarity? The second section develops the polarity concept to comprehend contemporary security and foreign policy challenges, including crises in the new world order: What are the idiosyncratic features of today's international relations, and how do these features condition the impacts of systemic power distribution? The third section aims to apply a fine-grained polarity perspective to

understanding specific foreign policy cases: What does polarity say about how small countries and big powers address their foreign policies and how they approach the challenges of world order? The questions posed in the second and third sections lead to discussions and analyses of transformation and change in IR itself (p. 10–13).

The first section, “Theorizing Polarity” (Chapters 2–8), unpacks the theoretical and conceptual challenges of today’s IR after focusing on the concept of polarity. In Chapter 2, Ole Wæver investigates the concepts that are used in understanding how power can assume the shapes outlined in polarity theory. Wæver is especially interested in the concepts of power balance and polarity and explores what states do when considering concepts in power balance. In Chapter 3, Kai He adopts a neoclassical and realist perspective to examine some of the concepts researched by Wæver regarding polarity and balance. He argues that the interaction between threat perception and polarity shapes the behavior of states as internal balancing, external balancing or both. He further discussed theories of power balance and threat balance, the two foundations of dynamic balancing theory. In Chapter 4, Georg Sørensen highlights the significance of the domestic level and argues that increasing state fragility (including in the Global North) forces states to prioritize domestic issues, leaving some of the most pressing issues that require international cooperation unresolved. At the same time, he argues, special attention should be given to the vulnerable states in the South and that any problems related to liberal economic and its political models should be handled accordingly. In Chapter 5, Øystein Tunsjø explores recent debates on polarity in the international system. Tunsjø compares the balance and stability of the 21st century to that of the 20th century and claims that geopolitics is the critical factor when explaining the differences in balance and stability in these periods. In Chapter 6, Hans Mouritzen associates geopolitics and systemic polarity with foreign policy in his analysis of states’ external maneuvering freedom. He recalls how the Nordic states tested the borders of their freedom of maneuver and came to know them through the difficult process of being disciplined by a great power. In Chapter 7, Revecca Pedi and Anders Wivel present a general view of the connections between different polarity types, and the opportunities and challenges they pose for small countries. These authors recommend what small countries should do

to maximize their influence and interest. In Chapter 8, Sten Rynning disclaims the idea that liberalism and realism are opposite concepts and that they can be detached. Instead, he argues that realism should be considered a corrective agent for liberalism to prevent marginality and boundless demands.

The second section, “Polarity and International Security” (Chapters 9–18), focuses on current issues affecting international peace. Robert Lieber, in Chapter 9, defends the view, held by the U.S., that democracy is of the utmost importance for the international order, in that it encourages market economy and regional peace and is based on rules. According to Lieber, domestic developments in the U.S. might be more challenging for it than international issues regarding the maintenance of the U.S.’s leadership position. In Chapter 10, Jennifer Sterling-Folker proposes that nationalism impacts behaviors on the international stage, and maintains that this is also valid for the U.S. Because of the overwhelming power of the U.S., this fact has significant impacts on IR. In Chapter 11, André Ken Jakobsson evaluates the relationship between the political agenda of the unipolar U.S. and post-Cold War U.S. administrations. In this context, Jakobsson discusses the impacts of the policy changes made during the Trump administration on U.S.-China relations. In Chapter 12, Andreas Bøje Forsby utilizes social identity theory to improve a new logic of structural identity, one that permits the theorization of systemic ideological competition. Forsby claims that ideological problems and overall social identity is critical in determining the general progress of the rivalry between the U.S. and China. In Chapter 13, Camilla Sørensen examines how weakened unipolarity has encouraged and enabled a more assertive and proactive Chinese security and foreign policy. Sørensen further discusses the impact of U.S. foreign policy on stability and peace in East Asia and beyond as part of a post-unipolar international system.

In Chapter 14, Peter Toft develops proposals on polarity and international patterns that change based on the extended theory. In Chapter 15, Eliza Gheorghe explains the differences between the disarmament regime created by the U.S. within the unipolar structure to the disarmament between the Washington and Moscow in the Cold War period. Gheorghe goes on to discuss the victories Washington has claimed thanks to the export controls inherited from the Cold War. In

Chapter 16, Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen opposes the traditional opinion that the Arctic is an exceptional region; on the contrary, for centuries the Arctic region has been part of the international system and continues to reflect developments in systemic relations. According to Bertelsen, the side chosen by Russia in the context of the China-U.S. bipolarity will determine the future of collaboration in the Arctic. Barbara Kunz, In Chapter 17, focuses on the implications of the rivalry between the U.S. and Russia for Europe. Kunz aims to describe those elements that tie the security of Europe to that of the U.S. After discussing the U.S.-Russian dilemma, Kunz analyzes why and how Europe became involved in this rivalry. In Chapter 18, Henrik Larsen examines those actors and international forums that were considered to be most critical for Denmark's post-Cold War foreign policy.

The third and final section, "The Future of Polarity and International Order," concludes with three chapters on the future of polarity in IR. Charles Kupchan, in Chapter 19, states that if U.S. leaders are to construct a new consensus, they need to do so with the "judicious retrenchment" approach, thereby constraining the military commitments of the U.S. in the strategic arena, maintaining the role of great powers to secure peace and accelerating collective action to handle global issues. In Chapter 20, Randall Schweller claims that U.S.-China rivalry is considerably different than that of the former rivalry between the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the Cold War; the current bipolar structure merely exerts weak structural impacts and is best understood as nonpolarity. Finally, in Chapter 21, William Wohlforth, by focusing on the connection between international order and polarity, claims that neither bipolarity nor multipolarity describe anything related to the future order. He views the current polarity less crucial than in the past, since power now is more widely distributed.

Considering *Polarity in International Relations* as a whole, two important distinctions should be made: one empirical and one theoretical. Theoretically, the logic of the polarity of the traditional structure of the international system and an analysis of polarity itself are thoroughly discussed in this book. The international system can indeed be described as multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar; however, the logic of peace and international order presented in the volume cannot be followed completely. Second, empirical results mostly agree with

the predictions of the contributing authors. The U.S. and China have emerged as the great powers of the day; however, regional powers and small states still endeavor to influence the events with their perspectives rather than collaborating with the U.S. or China. Russia, for its part, is no longer polar in its aims and alignment. Nevertheless, it remains a crucial player regarding security and peace in several areas. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 highlights the importance of this fact and demonstrates Russia's potential to wreak havoc on states that were once part of the USSR. In short, the volume would be strengthened by additional attention to Russia's role and the nuances of multipolarity.

In conclusion, the editors and contributors collectively present a valuable reference for the discipline of IR. *Polarity in International Relations* includes chapters on comprehensive theoretical works with thematic subjects that are relevant today and likely to remain important in the long term.

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Title of Book Reviews

Türk Basınında Dış Haberçilik (Foreign News Reporting in the Turkish Media), by M. Mücahit Küçüküyl-maz and Hakan Çopur. Ankara: SETA, 2010, 168 pages, ISBN 9786054023073.

