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ARTICLES

Deciphering Russia's Geopolitical Playbook: Status-Seeking Motivations Through Intervention to Syria

Muhammet KOÇAK[*]

Abstract

This article analyzes the influence of status-aspiration in Russia's military involvement in Syria. By leveraging the literature on status and empirical evidence, I posit that Russia's ambition for prestigious power recognition, rooted in its search for ontological security, has played a significant role in shaping its involvement in Syria. The existing scholarly discourse has considered the status impact on Russia's foreign policies; however, this article differentiates itself by scrutinizing Russia's strategic objectives, rhetoric, and maneuvers throughout its Syrian intervention, while investigating the degree to which status-aspiration motivations coalesce with other elements to mold its participation in the conflict. By spotlighting the historical continuum, I further propose that military interventions have functioned as a vehicle for Russia to affirm its prestigious power status following the failure of non-military strategies to secure recognition of a great power status in the 1990s. Aside from its contribution to the literature, this study also carries pragmatic implications for policymakers in forecasting and reacting to Russia's moves, thereby enriching the nuanced comprehension of its foreign policy conduct and its consequential effects on regional and global stability.

Keywords

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Introduction

In recent years, Russia has pursued an aggressive foreign policy strategy, marked by several military interventions that illustrate its quest for global influence and prestige. Russia's intervention in Syria is one of its most important military interventions given the regional and global significance of the Syrian civil war and the fact that Syria is situated well beyond Russia's territorial borders. What is the overarching goal motivating Russia's adoption of an aggressive strategy? I argue that the quest for status is a crucial factor driving Russia's foreign policy choices. Drawing on empirical data this study argues that Russia perceives its status in relation to other nations and Russia's military intervention in Syria serves as a means of asserting its great power status. Furthermore, this research underscores the fact that Russia's conduct in Syria is consistent with its pattern of behavior in previous interventions, reflecting a broader approach to foreign policy that seeks to enhance Russia's status in the international system.

This paper aims to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of Russia's foreign policy behavior, particularly its military intervention in Syria, by examining the role of status-seeking motivations. By providing insights into the influence of status-seeking behavior on Russia's foreign policy decisions, the paper aims to contribute to the development of more effective policies that address the challenges posed by Russia's pursuit of great power status. Such enhanced understanding will have practical implications for policymakers, equipping them with the necessary knowledge to anticipate and respond more effectively to Russia's actions and helping to foster regional and international stability in an increasingly complex global landscape.

The paper is organized into the following sections: First, a literature review will provide an overview of existing research on the relationship between status-seeking behavior and Russia's foreign policy. Second, the theoretical framework and methodology section outlines the empirical data and comparative case studies used to analyze Russia's foreign policy choices and its quest for status in the international system. Then, I present a background discussion of Russian foreign policy and the Syrian civil war. This section aims to provide the necessary context for understanding the geopolitical landscape within which Russia's quest for status in Syria has unfolded. Subsequently, the main section of the paper offers an in-depth analysis of Russia's strategic objectives, rhetoric, and actions during its intervention in Syria, highlighting the extent to which status-seeking motivations interact with other factors

in shaping Russia's involvement in the conflict. By investigating Russia's behavior through this multifaceted lens, the research seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding of the factors that drive Russia's pursuit of great power status, and its implications for regional and international stability.

Review of the Literature

While several scholars assert that Russian domestic factors significantly contribute to Russia's intervention in Syria, a closer examination of these claims reveals inherent limitations. Proponents of this view contend that Putin capitalizes on Russian nationalism to bolster his foreign policy decisions, such as the annexation of Crimea and other assertive geopolitical moves.[1] They argue that the Russian media and public discourse corroborate Putin's narrative, reinforcing his grip on power.[2] Additionally, it is posited that Putin uses the Syrian intervention to shore up the popularity of the regime by appealing to nationalistic sentiments.[3] Trenin argues that domestic concerns also include issues related to the connection with the extremist groups inside Russia and extremist groups in Syria.[4] The argument, however, is marred by the dearth of empirical evidence. While Russian nationalism and domestic concerns might indeed influence Putin's foreign policy choices, determining his precise motives with certainty proves elusive. In other words, whether these concerns constitute Russia's primary motivation remains highly debatable. Nevertheless, this line of reasoning provokes inquiries that are pertinent to the essence of the Russian social contract and the extent of Putin's control over the state apparatus.

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Several scholars posit that economic factors and related energy considerations can be the key drivers behind Russia's intervention in Syria, emphasizing proposed gas pipelines and access to the Syrian market. Numerous sources emphasize the significance of natural resources and infrastructure in their attempt to analyze foreign involvement in Syria.[5] Central to this narrative is Iran-Iraq-Syria Pipeline, a $10 billion project stretching from Iran to Syria, which presents Russia with an opportunity to control European gas exports. Posing an alternative to the Qatari-proposed pipeline, which would cross Syria towards Türkiye, Russia,

as Europe's main supplier of solid fuels, crude oil, and gas, favored the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline due to stronger ties with Iran, thereby securing lucrative EU market dominance.[6] Other possible economic motivations include Russia's economic diversification efforts, spurred by a domestic crisis caused by plummeting oil prices and international sanctions post-Crimea, aimed at gaining access to the Syrian market, an important buyer of Russian arms. Moreover, with a trade focus pivoting towards the Middle East, Syria emerges as a vital partner in securing Russian gas exports to Europe. According to Borschevskaya, the fall of the Libyan regime, which led to substantial losses in weapon contracts for Russia, might have heightened concerns about similar losses in Syria.[7] While existing literature often emphasizes political and security factors, the role of natural resources and infrastructure should not be discounted as potential motives behind Russia's military intervention in Syria. Overall, however, the discourse often lacks rigorous empirical analysis and it remains unclear whether Russia's economic motivation is an end in itself or serves a broader purpose.

The official justification for Russia's direct military intervention in Syria was to support the Syrian regime in its fight against terrorism. According to the 2014 military doctrine of the Russian Federation, "Russia had the legitimate right to employ the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies to repel aggression against itself and/or its allies … in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation."[8] One strand of the literature noted that the security factor may have played a crucial role in Russia's intervention as it aimed to preserve Syria's unity and contain the threat of terrorist groups to safeguard Russia's regional and national security interests. For instance, Zvyagelskaya shows that besides emphasizing its geopolitical status Russia intervened in Syria to fight terrorism.[9] Manoylo argues that Russia intervened to protect its national security by containing the threats posed by terrorist groups, such as ISIS.[10] Similarly, Khudyakov posits that stabilizing the region to achieve regional security in the Levant remains Russia's chief objective in Syria.[11] There is also a body of literature that argues just the opposite. For instance, Molodykh argues that Russia's stated goal of fighting international terrorism is used to mask its strategic objectives at the regional and global levels,[12] and that Russia's prioritization of targeting the moderate opposition indicates that its core motivation is not to target terrorists.[13] Therefore, despite Kremlin's official motivation, it is hard to suggest that "fighting international terrorism" is its real objective in Syria.

Another strand in the literature, which this article leans towards, points to the importance of Russia's status pursuit in its intervention in Syria. According to Larson and Shevchenko, for example, following the Crimean takeover, Putin sought to re-establish Russia's global status and challenge the image of a declining regional power promoted especially by the Obama administration.[14] Putin aimed to compel the United States to view Russia as an equal, highlighting Russia's power and influence on the global stage. Similarly, Kreutz argues that Russia's quest for maintaining its influence in the Middle East through its support to Syria stems from its pursuit of preserving its status in the international arena as an independent actor that achieves results through dialogue with all regional actors.[15] Pieper argues that Russia's intervention in Syria is a manifestation of its efforts to resist the West's internationalization of certain norms such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its promotion of alternative norms such as the illegalization of intervention in domestic affairs of other states under any condition.[16] Regarding the way Russia protects its status through Syria, Freire and Heller argue that the reason why Russia uses military power despite its faltering economy is because Russia is a status overachiever.[17] Geukjian argues that overachievers typically evade conflict and strive to preserve the status quo, providing them with a greater degree of international influence and recognition from other major powers than their resources alone would justify.[18] To alter this status quo would necessitate significant resource allocation and could result in the loss of the overachiever's status. When faced with challenges to their regional leadership, status overachievers may exhibit aggression within their immediate vicinity. Therefore, it is possible to argue that Russia is a status-inconsistent power that uses military power to make up for its status deficit.[19] Moulikova and Kanet demonstrate that such pursuits stem from Russia's need for ontological security.[20] Tsygankov argues that a similar process played out in Russia's military intervention in Ukraine.[21] In conclusion, this strand of literature underlines the fact that Russia's involvement in Syria is primarily motivated by its ambition to sustain and advance its global status, which Russia advances in order to challenge Western norms and assert its autonomy as a powerful actor. This endeavor has entailed the use of military force as a means of compensating for its status deficit and reinforcing its identity as a status overachiever.

This article also argues that Russia's quest to regain its lost status after the Soviet Union's collapse best explains its intervention in Syria. In the early 1990s, Russia sought collaboration with the West, intending to

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promote democracy and integrate into Western systems. However, the West's disregard for Russia's interests prompted a shift to a more assertive foreign policy, aiming to reclaim status, prestige, and influence.[22] The significance of status concerns can be observed in official documents and leaders' statements. For example, the 1997 National Security Concept emphasized Russia's interests in the post-Soviet region and its role in a multipolar world order.[23] In the 2009 Russian National Security Strategy, Russia contested Western civilization's monopoly on cultural and political values, and opposed the United States' hegemonic global role.[24] Russia's responses to U.S. missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, and potential NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia exemplified its opposition to Western dominance. The Syrian intervention was another link in this chain of Russian attempts to regain its global status. The intervention showcased Russia's military prowess and projected power in a region traditionally dominated by the U.S. and its allies. By challenging the regional dominance of the U.S., Russia could position itself as an indispensable actor, establishing new partnerships and strengthening existing ties with key regional players.

To summarize, a panoply of plausible explanations for Russia's military intervention in Syria surfaces in the literature: domestic considerations, economic factors, the professed fight against terrorism, and the pursuit of international status. Domestic politics and economic and security concerns offer invaluable insights, but fall short of encapsulating the full complexity of Russia's motivations. I contend that the quest for great power status and recognition provides a more compelling framework to comprehend Russia's motivations. As such, this article advocates for a nuanced approach that foregrounds Russia's status-seeking behavior while acknowledging the interplay with other factors. This perspective underscores Russia's pursuit of ontological security and the implications of its status-overachiever identity. Russia's pursuit of status, I argue, was its primary motivator, and provides a novel pathway to understanding Russia's foreign policy behavior in Syria and its broader implications for regional and global stability.

Theoretical Framework

In the realm of international politics, status forms a core element that impacts the decisions and actions of states as they maneuver through the intricacies of the global arena. Rooted in human nature, the quest for status reflects an almost hardwired instinct towards betterment,[25] a mechanism that is also mirrored in the conduct of states. A country's status maintenance or enhancement is a prime objective for policymakers, bestowing upon nations decision-making autonomy and deference from other states. Since status is inherently relational, it cannot be achieved in isolation, but must occur through interactions with other states.[26]

States engage in diverse strategies to attain a higher status in the international arena. Recognition of such a status provides ontological security, facilitating states to form coherent interests and act upon them. A state's insecurity about its status may arise from misrecognition, namely a discrepancy between self-perception and others' perceptions.[27] When misrecognition takes place, states may seek recognition from a constructed status community, acting peacefully and adhering to international norms and rules if successful. However, failure to secure recognition may prompt states to root their identity in material practices, such as a great power voice, military power, and spheres of influence. In the case of Russia, its self-perception as a great power forms a pivotal part of its identity and ontological security, intertwining its historical need for physical security with a narrative of its great power status.[28] This narrative has become an integral part of Russia's identity, constructed over time to address its physical security needs.[29]

The existence of a social hierarchy is widely acknowledged in international relations, with great powers and superpowers holding the highest status. States endeavor to elevate their position in this hierarchy via various strategies aimed at achieving higher status.[30] The literature delineates four primary approaches to understanding status, encompassing the social-psychological approach of Larson and Shevchenko,[31] the rationalist approach of Renshon,[32] the constructivist approach of Murray,[33] and the status immobility approach of Ward.[34] This article utilizes Larson and

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Shevchenko's classification of status-seeking strategies, comprising social mobility, social competition, and social creativity. Social mobility involves a lower-status state adopting norms of the elite group to gain recognition.[35] Social competition entails states using hard power strategies to achieve higher status,[36] and social creativity involves states seeking prestige through distinctive policy or issue areas.[37]

Examining Russia's conduct since the late 2000s through this lens, this article posits that after unsuccessful attempts to secure status recognition through social mobility in the early 1990s, Russia has increasingly adopted social competition as a status-seeking strategy. Characterized by geopolitical competition, this strategy could lead to more conflicts and less cooperation between states. This shift is evident in Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and its attempts to create a multipolar world, challenging U.S. overlay in multiple regions. An analysis of Russia's actions within the context of these status-seeking strategies offers a deeper understanding of the intricate motivations behind its foreign policy decisions, such as its military intervention in Syria.

Russia's Quest for Status in Syria as Observed in Objectives, Rhetoric, and Actions

Russia's strategic aims include preserving the Assad regime and challenging U.S. regional dominance, reflecting a deeper aspiration to reshape the existing geopolitical order. The rhetoric of Russian leadership advocates for a multipolar world while maintaining an image of Russia as a responsible global actor. Russia's military and diplomatic actions in Syria further testify to its competitive capacity to address significant regional crises. By examining these aspects, the article strives to offer a nuanced understanding of how Russia's status pursuit in Syria impacts broader geopolitical scenarios.

Objectives

Moscow's actions in the region are part of a strategy to assert its influence, challenge the global order, and establish itself as a major player in international affairs. Russia's intervention in Syria is driven by several objectives, each of which contributes to the country's pursuit of great power status. These objectives can be divided into three main categories: hampering U.S. hegemonic power, showcasing military power, and increasing its regional influence by protecting its allies. First, by actively engaging in the Syrian conflict, Russia aims to promote global multipolarity thereby challenging the dominance of

the United States in the region and undermining its ability to dictate the course of events.[38] This serves to counterbalance U.S. influence and create a more multipolar world order, in which Russia can assert its own interests more effectively. Second, the conflict has given the country a platform to demonstrate its advanced military capabilities, such as the use of sophisticated weaponry and technology, sending a strong signal to the international community about its strength and resolve.[39] This serves to reinforce Russia's image as a formidable global actor and bolsters its status among great powers. Lastly, Russia's alliance with the Syrian regime contributes to Moscow's strategic interests in the region and reinforces its position as a key global actor.[40] By steadfastly supporting its allies, Russia can maintain a foothold in the Middle East and ensure the continued relevance of its strategic partnerships. Additionally, protecting its allies serves to demonstrate Russia's loyalty and commitment, further enhancing its international standing. In summary, by challenging U.S. hegemony, showcasing its military prowess, and protecting its allies, Moscow asserts its role as a key regional and global player in contemporary international politics.

The objectives of Russia's intervention in Syria serve to advance its status as a great power. By hampering U.S. hegemonic power, Russia highlights the limitations of U.S. influence in the region and presents itself as a key player in the global arena. By demonstrating its advanced military capabilities and technological prowess, Russia attempts to capture international attention to bolster its image as a formidable great power. Despite its economic weaknesses, such display of military strength reinforces the perception of Russia as a resurgent military power and a force to be reckoned with.[41] Lastly, protecting its allies, such as the Assad regime, emphasizes Russia's commitment to upholding its strategic interests and maintaining its influence in the Middle East. By standing by its allies even in the face of international pressure, Russia signals its resolve to defend its interests and showcases its ability to act as a power broker in the region.[42] Furthermore, increasing Russian influence in the Middle East strengthens Moscow's position as a significant player in regional affairs. This enhanced influence allows Russia to shape political outcomes, build alliances, and expand its diplomatic reach, thereby contributing to its perceived status in the international community. This, in turn, further

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strengthens Russia's position in the global landscape and advances its status as a great power.

Rhetoric

Russia's discourse in the Syrian conflict revolves around several key narratives that help to contextualize its involvement and justify its actions. First, through its rhetoric, Moscow emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the affairs of other countries. By positioning itself as a defender of these principles, Russia seeks to contrast its role in Syria with that of Western powers, which it accuses of meddling in the region and exacerbating the conflict. For instance, Putin has criticized the Western strategy of supporting various opposition groups in Syria, arguing that such efforts have led to a protracted and bloody conflict with negative consequences for regional stability.[43] Moscow has attempted to position itself as a more reliable and effective partner in resolving complex international problems, thereby enhancing its status relative to other global powers. This rhetorical strategy highlights Russia's desire to challenge the existing world order and assert its place as an indispensable player in international politics. Another aspect of Russia's discourse focuses on the fight against terrorism, with Moscow claiming that its intervention in Syria is primarily aimed at combating extremist groups such as ISIS.[44] On a number of occasions, Putin has stated that Western involvement in the Middle East is to blame for the rising extremism in the region.[45] This narrative allows Russia to present its actions as being in line with the broader goals of international security and stability, thereby garnering support and legitimacy for its involvement. Russian state officials also raise the issue of the West's need to accept the unfolding multipolar world order. Both Lavrov[46] and Putin[47] underline that the West attempts, in vain, to prevent and contain the formation of a multipolar world order by interfering in the domestic affairs of sovereign states fomenting disorder. It can be argued that compared to an alternative scenario where Russia would have limited influence under U.S. hegemony, a multipolar order potentially offers Russia more influence as a respected great power. Being a great power means that a state is consulted in every question of major importance, whether or not it has individual interests, while other powers are only consulted when they are directly affected by a decision.[48] By utilizing its military capabilities in cases like Syria, Russia increases its influence and cultivate a multipolar order where its increased influence contributes to a geopolitical landscape where Russia holds a superior position in

terms of both status and influence. It is noteworthy that such a strategy is promoted word-for-word by Bashar al-Assad who suggests, "The firm and principled stance that Russia has towards the United States and the West is one of the main contributing factors to the birth of a multipolar world order, sought by all countries and peoples who adhere to the international law and defend their sovereignty and national interests."[49] Overall, Russia's discourse in the Syrian conflict is designed to frame its involvement in a manner that bolsters its image as a key player in the region, while also emphasizing its commitment to international norms and principles.

At the same time Russia's discourse in the Syrian conflict serves as a strategic tool for advancing its status-seeking objectives on the global stage. By emphasizing the importance of international norms, and its fight against terrorism, Moscow positions itself as a responsible international actor that upholds global norms and values. This image bolsters Russia's claim to great power status and helps differentiate it from Western powers, which Russia often accuses of partaking in destabilizing actions in the Middle East.[50] Russian officials have often highlighted their military's success in turning the tide of the conflict in favor of the Assad regime, and their role in facilitating peace negotiations, such as the Astana Process.[51] By emphasizing these achievements, Moscow seeks to demonstrate its indispensability in addressing international security challenges and further its claim to great power status.

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In conclusion, Russia's discourse in the Syrian conflict is a critical component of its status-seeking strategy. By emphasizing the importance of international norms, state sovereignty, and the fight against terrorism, Moscow positions itself as a responsible and indispensable international actor. Moreover, the showcasing of Russia's military and diplomatic capabilities in the Syrian context serves to bolster its claim to great power status. Ultimately, the strategic use of discourse allows Russia to assert its position in the region and challenge the existing world order, contributing to its broader foreign policy ambitions and pursuit of great power status.

Actions

Russia's military, diplomatic, and economic involvement serve to advance Moscow's interests and project its influence in the region. Russia's military actions include deploying its air force for airstrikes against opposition forces, providing logistical support and military equipment to the Syrian Arab Army, and deploying its own ground forces in advisory and special operations roles.[52] These efforts have been crucial in bolstering the regime and shifting the balance of power in its favor, showcasing Russia's ability to impact the conflict's outcome decisively.[53] Second, Moscow has played a significant role in the diplomatic arena, engaging in peace talks and ceasefire negotiations. Initiatives such as the Astana Process and the Sochi talks have been driven by Russia, working alongside regional partners like Iran and Türkiye to shape the conflict's political outcome. These diplomatic efforts have positioned Russia as an indispensable player in the Syrian peace process, further asserting its influence in the region and on the international stage.[54] Lastly, Russia has also been involved in economic action, such as providing financial assistance and investing in Syria's reconstruction efforts. Moscow has extended credit lines, facilitated trade, and supplied essential goods like oil and food to the Assad regime.[55] These economic actions have helped the Syrian government maintain its capacity to function and reinforced Russia's position as a key ally in the region. These three dimensions of Russia's actions—military, diplomatic, and economic—illustrate the diverse ways in which Moscow has sought to assert its presence and further its objectives in Syria.

The various actions undertaken by Russia during its intervention in Syria reveal the underlying status-seeking motivations driving Moscow's foreign policy in the region. Russia's successful shift of the conflict's course in favor of the Assad regime has showcased its military prowess and cemented its position as a key power broker in the Middle East.[56] This demonstration of military and diplomatic capabilities has enhanced Russia's status on the global stage, signaling its determination to play an influential role in resolving international conflicts. Russia's military intervention in Syria has allowed it to counterbalance Western influence in the region and promote a multipolar world order.[57] By directly intervening in a conflict where the United States and its allies had struggled to achieve their objectives, Russia has not only challenged their dominance but also asserted its claim to great power status. By contesting the existing global hierarchy and projecting its capabilities, Moscow has reinforced its status-seeking objectives. Russia's economic

actions in Syria have further demonstrated its commitment to supporting the Assad regime, bolstering its influence in the region. By providing financial assistance, facilitating trade, and investing in reconstruction efforts, Moscow has strengthened its ties with Damascus and secured a long-term presence in the region. This economic engagement has allowed Russia to position itself as a key actor in the Middle East, contributing to its pursuit of greater status on the international stage. Overall, Russia's status-seeking motivations have manifested through its military, diplomatic, and economic actions in Syria, reflecting its broader aspirations to be recognized as a global power.

The decisive impact of its military involvement combined with its influential role in diplomatic negotiations have enhanced Russia's global status, while challenging Western hegemony. Economic endeavors, including providing aid and investing in reconstruction, have consolidated Russian regional presence and ties with Damascus.

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These actions collectively reflect Russia's broader aspiration for global recognition as a significant power, reinforcing the key argument of this analysis.

Conclusion

This research paper has explored the role of status-seeking motivations in shaping Russia's military intervention in Syria. Through a comprehensive analysis of its strategic objectives, rhetoric, and actions, I have shown that Russia's quest for great power status significantly influences its foreign policy choices. The findings of this article suggest that military interventions, such as the one in Syria, serve as a means for Russia to assert its great power status when non-military means have failed to secure recognition from the West.

Russia's pursuit of status in Syria is evident across its strategic objectives, rhetoric, and actions. Moscow's intervention in the conflict has showcased its military and diplomatic capabilities, challenging the prevailing geopolitical order and positioning itself as a key player in the region. The strategic narratives employed by Russian officials highlight Moscow's commitment to upholding international law and advocating

for a multipolar world, further enhancing its international standing. Through a combination of military, diplomatic, and economic actions, Russia has effectively asserted its influence in the Middle East and enhanced its status on the global stage. By examining these multiple dimensions, we gain a deeper understanding of the intricate interplay between Russia's pursuit of status in Syria and the broader geopolitical ramifications that emanate from its endeavors.

Looking forward, we can expect Russia to persist in its endeavor to assert its influence and actively seek opportunities to consolidate its presence in the Middle East. The recalibration of the strategic focus of the U.S. toward China, coupled with a diminishment of its commitments in the region, has engendered a palpable geopolitical void that Russia may be poised to exploit judiciously. As the U.S. presence recedes, Russia is likely to increasingly engage in initiatives aimed at bolstering its military, economic, and diplomatic entanglements with Middle Eastern nations. This calculated approach not only affords Russia the means to extend its sphere of influence, but also furnishes it with invaluable leverage to propagate its vision of a multipolar global order. By positioning itself as a dependable collaborator and mediator in regional disputes, Russia can cultivate more robust affiliations with Middle Eastern states, thereby solidifying its prominence in the regional geopolitical landscape.

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Furthermore, as Russia continues its assertive role in the Middle East, it is probable that it will encounter intricate diplomatic entanglements and give rise to discord with other prominent stakeholders in the region. This process may entail navigating multifaceted relationships with traditional U.S. allies, like Jordan, as well as regional heavyweights like Iran and Türkiye. The intricate interplay between Russia's status-seeking aspirations and its interactions with these actors will represent a pivotal determinant of its forthcoming actions. It is likely that Russia will be compelled to harmonize its interests and objectives, considering both its pursuit of great power status and the regional stability imperatives. Consequently, the forthcoming years may witness a meticulous choreography of diplomacy, military deployments, and economic engagements as Russia endeavors to seize the evolving

dynamics in the Middle East and mold them to serve its overarching foreign policy imperatives.

The practical implications of this research extend to informing policymakers on what to anticipate and how to respond to Russia's actions in international conflicts. A more nuanced understanding of Russia's status-seeking motivations can contribute to the development of effective strategies for managing regional and international stability in the face of resurgent great power competition. Future research may build upon the findings of this paper by examining the role of status-seeking motivations in other cases of Russian foreign policy or by investigating how the interplay between status-seeking objectives and other factors shapes Russia's decision-making processes. Additionally, it would be valuable to explore how the perception of Russia's great power status influences the responses of other international actors and impacts the dynamics of global politics.

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ARTICLE

The Risk-Based Analysis of Climate Change: The Arctic as a Pressing Security Concern within NATO's Strategic Framework and Finland's Accession to NATO

Göktuğ KIPRIZLI*

Abstract

Climate change is a multifaceted problem that has links to ecological transformations, geographical alternations, geostrategic shifts, and political tensions. As a result, it multiplies security challenges for states and international organizations. To capture the multilayered dimensions of climate change, this article recognizes the theoretical model of securitization as a spectrum consisting of threat-based and risk-based security logics. The article explores how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Finland address climate change and, by extension, the challenges emerging in the Arctic region. While NATO pays close attention to climate resilience for preserving the Allied operational effectiveness and ensuring its role in defense and deterrence, both NATO and Finland articulate their concerns over Russia's growing military activities and presence in the High North, where Moscow finds strategic opportunities thanks to the increasing Arctic accessibility because of climate change. The article sheds light on a discussion about potential competition in the Arctic region and points out the paths that might lead to tension beyond it.

Keywords

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Introduction

The security risks produced by climate change appear to be recent phenomena within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Still, the Alliance has been cognizant of the issue for a longer time. The establishment of the Committee on the Challenges to Modern Society in 1969, which was tasked with examining defense-related environmental issues, was the initial step.[1] Although NATO had attempted to integrate environmental protection guidelines and standards into its operations in the 1970s,[2] the Alliance paid more attention to these issues in the 2010s.

The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept was the first document in which the Alliance recognized climate change as a factor affecting its security environment.[3] After adopting the "Green Defense Framework"[4] in 2014 to improve its green profile, NATO published the report entitled "NATO 2030: United for a New Era in 2020." Presenting a forward-looking vision for NATO's strategic environment and political dimension, this report underlines the potential risks posed by climate change with respect to its implications for the Arctic and the High North,[5] NATO's planning on resilience and crisis management, and Allied security and economic interests.[6]

In 2021, NATO introduced a structured and systemized approach by preparing the "Climate Change and Security Action Plan." In the plan, NATO assesses the impacts of climate change on security, frames the issue within the context of the Alliance, and outlines the agenda on climate change and security.[7] More recently, the 2022 Strategic Concept discusses climate change with a comprehensive understanding and specifies the consequences of climate change in connection with NATO's strategic environment, the efforts for civilian crisis management, and the impacts on defense and security.[8]

This short timeline unveils how NATO has integrated the security considerations rooted in climate change into its security agenda with a gradually expanding perception. Hence, this article argues that the climate change policy frameworks adopted by states or international organizations shape how they act on mid-range issues, such as region-specific security challenges posed by climate change, so NATO's and Finland's overall stances on the Arctic question correspond to their

policies on climate change. Security concerns revolving around the Arctic and the recent expansion of the NATO Alliance can crystalize a shift in the center of gravity of European security architecture towards the northeast. Such a North-focusing outlook may request to take into account what happens in the Arctic since the risk of transregional and extra-regional geopolitical confrontations might create a disturbance in the wider geography under the umbrella of NATO.

The article aims to shed new insights in light of the broader logic of securitization theory (ST) into the recent incentives within NATO to engage carefully with the issue of climate change. Having been motivated by NATO's recent enlargement with Finland, the article seeks to build a connection between NATO's strategy for the High North and Finland's policy concept with respect to the Arctic region, and to uncover a foreseeable competitive environment in the Arctic region due to the consequences of climate change. It is crucial to note that the article does not determine the direct causes of conflict between NATO allies and non-NATO Arctic states—the eight Arctic states include Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America—over the High North or how the spillovers of such a conflict may develop along the fault lines outside the region. Nevertheless, the article hints at the overlapping of NATO's strategic orientation and Finland's policy agenda concerning the High North, and it concludes with a prospective analysis of the implications of tension in the Arctic.

The Logic of Security for the Issue of Climate Change

State actors who share identities, values, and meanings lay the foundation of security communities. In establishing a stable peace, the community-building process relies on the development of shared understandings, communication among members, common representations of threats, and the distinction of insider and outsider in partaking in the peace ensured by the community.[9] As the core tenet of a security community is its ability to build a society relying on mutual aid, security communities may impose additional obligations and responsibilities on their members. Still, member states may preserve distinctive interests formed outside of the group dynamics.[10]

The institutionalization of security communities allows for the role of international organizations to be taken into account. An international organization provides a platform that facilitates the design of mutual trust and collective identity, and it disseminates the notions of common fate and unilateral self-restraint.[11] Thus, actors in security communities share the same threats and objectives which should be protected.[12] The success of security communities depends on their ability to adapt themselves and respond to new security concerns.

Composed of the three basic tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security, NATO is a security community emphasizing the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law as the binding factors of the Alliance in the post-Cold War period.[13] To rationalize its present and future existence as a security organization, NATO experienced an epistemic reorientation adjusting its security agenda, and embracing unconventional threats stemming from societal instability and non-military domains.[14]

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The process of incorporating external threats into the agenda of the security community constitutes the basis for conceptualizing regional security complexes.[15] By virtue of the NATO initiatives, over time, the security architecture of the transatlantic area has become a regional security complex since the problems covered and removed from the member states' security agenda have shown a high level of interconnection.[16] At this point, NATO is engaged in the management of present and future security risks identified with instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability,[17] including the issue of climate change and, by extension, its geopolitical and ecological consequences in the Arctic region.

Having recognized the nature of climate change as a threat multiplier that aggravates those extant risks and threats, this study treats climate

change as a matter of macrosecuritization in connection with its intricate dimensions echoing in the Arctic. This understanding merges the implications of climate change on security dynamics with the geostrategic repositioning in the Circumpolar North as a result of competitive state behaviors in the region.[18]

Therefore, ST serves to disclose how NATO has conceptualized its stance on security issues in general. For ST, security necessitates a specific grammar directed to formulating a speech act towards a threat perception regarding a referent object.[19] In addition to the speech act, there are two more elements of ST, namely the securitizing actor and the audience. While the securitizing actor, i.e., NATO and the Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg, performs the speech act, the audience, or NATO member states, makes the decision to accept or reject the speech act aiming at the referent object—NATO member states, their citizens, and/or operational capabilities—that is endangered by the threat (climate change) and needs to be securitized. Thus, this article relies on the official documents published by NATO and the speeches and statements delivered by NATO officials, especially Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (2014-ongoing). The article emphasizes the material provided by the Secretary General as he holds the leadership post and considers himself to be "responsible for all decisions that [the] Alliance has to take […]".[20]

In building its theoretical framework, the study embraces the approach of Diez et al. as they restructured the securitization understanding presented by the Copenhagen School.[21] According to Diez et al., the concepts of threatification and riskification constitute the securitization continuum where threat and risk are subsets of security logic. While threat-based security refers to existential and immediate threats, direct causes of harm, and emergency measures to eradicate and defend against dangers, risk-based security leans on the uncertainty and unease of dangers, the conditions and constitutive causes of making future harmful events possible, and the efforts for managing and governing the potential consequences of harm to more than one referent object concurrently.[22]

These varied security articulations unveil distinct implications of threatification and riskification for climate change. The threatification

of climate change highlights imminent violent conflicts, social tensions, and weakening state security in connection with deteriorating resources and competitive conditions. Short-term immediate measures are the remedies for addressing the threat. Thus, the threatification of climate change provides a legitimate ground for the acceptance and use of extraordinary measures and policy actions.[23] The future-oriented outlook on the riskification of climate change may, however, result in long-term precautionary actions such as fostering the regulatory capacity of international institutions, curbing the level of carbon emissions, constructing resilient infrastructure and societal systems, and managing migration and scarce resources.[24] Therefore, the riskification of climate change confirms that security policies are means to respond to relevant challenges, but these policies are non-exceptional measures and demonstrate ordinary characteristics.[25]

The threatification of climate change highlights imminent violent conflicts, social tensions, and weakening state security in connection with deteriorating resources and competitive conditions.

In this regard, mitigation and adaptation are the backbones of the climate change agenda. Applying this two-component logic of security, the targets of mitigation and adaptation measures determine whether these efforts address threats or risks. If adaptation serves to advance the level of resilience of the population, it means that the adaptation measures respond to riskified security challenges. If adaptation measures refer to the preparations for defending the referent object against the threat, these measures become part of combating a danger defined within the threatification process. Similarly, if the mitigation strategies concentrate on eliminating threats by any means, these strategies correspond to a danger contemplated within the framework of the threatification of climate change. If mitigation strategies employ tools for alleviating the effects of climate-related challenges by forming emissions-trading regimes, it acts as a risk strategy.[26]

NATO Policy Framework for Climate Change

Secretary General Stoltenberg regards NATO as more than a military alliance and reasons the need for NATO's active contributions to combat climate change by invoking Paragraph 3 of the Washington Treaty, which comprises a basis for the responsibility to build a resilient infrastructure for sustaining individual and collective capacity.[27] Thus, Stoltenberg outlines three basic duties for NATO's engagement with climate change.[28] For Stoltenberg, NATO should first *understand* the dynamic linking climate change to security. NATO should be aware of security risks due to increasing competition over scarce resources and migration. Second, NATO should take the necessary actions to cut emissions from military activities and installations to contribute to the *mitigation* of climate change. Third, NATO should *adapt* to extreme weather conditions by modernizing its operation and mission planning, military exercises, and fixed and deployed equipment.

In the first step, NATO acknowledges that climate change multiplies the threats in the Euro-Atlantic region and the Alliance's wider neighborhood.[29] Stoltenberg also indicates that climate change deteriorates weather conditions and precipitation regimes, and this dynamic discloses the indirect role of climate change in exacerbating terrorist activities and migration, increasing competition over scarce resources and creating geopolitical competition in the Arctic.[30] These developments challenge the state of security within NATO's sphere of responsibility,[31] so NATO perceives climate change as a risk-based issue requiring the collective actions of the Alliance.[32]

Additionally, the Secretary General published a report dated 2022 to assess the security impacts of climate change with respect to NATO's strategic environment, the Alliance's assets and installations, NATO's missions and multi-domain operations, and its resilience and civil preparedness.[33] The report considers Europe, North America, the Middle East and North Africa/the Sahel, and the High North within the strategic environment where multiple harmful events, including extreme weather, ocean, and land hazards, can be experienced simultaneously. This aspect reveals the risk discourse employed by the Secretary General as it indicates those conditions and constitutive causes that make future harmful events possible. These articulations also generate shared

meanings that construct NATO as a security community and portray the Euro-Atlantic region as a regional security complex.

With regard to mitigation efforts, Stoltenberg upholds that NATO, as a part of the international community,[34] should recognize the responsibility of addressing climate change.[35] Emissions-reduction measures, sustainable military materials, and the green design of the military formation comply with the integration of renewable energies into NATO's energy mix. Combining these measures with ensuring NATO's military energy security is part of the risk discourse as it aims to manage the process of ensuring the security of operational capabilities within the Alliance.

From the perspective of adapting to climate change, Stoltenberg underlines the harsher environmental conditions for critical infrastructure, equipment, and capabilities to conduct military operations, training, or disaster relief efforts.[36] As climate change tests the effectiveness, mobility, preparedness, and resilience of NATO's military posts, personnel, and equipment, these climatic conditions challenge the Alliance's deployment capabilities and military operativeness, raise time cost, and require a larger budget for financing military operations.[37] Hence, NATO discusses the challenges of climate change for the armed forces, and hints at four operational domains: air, land, space, and maritime.[38]

Exclusive to maritime operations, the Arctic is the most challenging region for NATO's armed forces given the extreme and rapidly changing temperatures.[39] In this sense, Stoltenberg primarily handles the deteriorating environmental conditions in the High North from a military-strategic perspective.[40] The melting of ice leads to critical implications for NATO, as these changes will introduce new maritime navigation lines available for a longer period, facilitate the access of armed forces to the region, and create new opportunities to exploit unattainable natural resources. The second-order security implications of climate change lead to competitive state behaviors, which may be derived

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from the growing military capabilities, existence, and structure of non-NATO nations in the Arctic region. This angle contributes to the risk discourse since it connects the resilience of NATO's military effectiveness to the uncertainty and unease induced by climate change.

The Arctic as a Pertinent Subject for NATO's Security Agenda

The consequences of climate change are revealed in the transformation of the physical environmental across the Arctic region. The careful management of new geopolitical challenges is a priority for NATO's Arctic strategy. Therefore, the first topic is related to the warming of the Arctic Ocean and the melting of the polar ice caps. These environmental changes extend the period of navigability in Arctic waterways through the Northern Sea Route and the Northeast and Northwest Passages. These new conditions attract the attention of regional and non-regional states, which may increase the likelihood of experiencing intense confrontations.[41]

The second challenge is related to the potential competition lines for controlling the exploitation and extraction of untapped natural resources which are located in areas of potentially overlapping territorial claims. In this respect, the third issue is the management of new fishing stocks which may trigger disputes in the region.[42] Another competition can occur with regard to the instalment of physical and digital communication lines.[43] Although enhancing maritime access shortens the time of travel and creates commercial benefits, this situation may also trigger contestations over navigation rights and displeasure regarding the growing interest and existence of non-Arctic countries such as China.[44]

The last risk is the culmination of the abovementioned challenges. It concerns the possible militarization of the Arctic region for the sake of protecting sovereign rights and promoting the safety of navigation.[45] From the perspective of NATO, its presence in the High North relies on Article 5, which institutes the Alliance's collective defense approach to the region.[46] Although NATO pursued the over-the-horizon approach from 2009 to 2013, promoting situational awareness rather than performing military exercises, new conditions reshaped by climate change facilitate the diffusion of transregional and extra-regional

geopolitical dynamics towards the Arctic.[47] Moreover, both regional and non-regional actors give place to the Arctic in their security calculations and military strategies, and Russia and China seek to engage with the region ambitiously.[48]

While exploring the potential consequences of transformative physical environmental changes across the Arctic in connection with NATO's strategic orientation, Russia and China's positioning are critical for understanding the geopolitical and economic dynamics in the region, where they find opportunities to utilize new physical conditions by reason of climate change. From the perspective of Russian policymakers, the Arctic is an inseparable component of the overall Russian military strategy. Russian presence in the Arctic is essential for protecting Russia's territory, improving its strategic deterrence capabilities, and harboring its nuclear submarine fleet. Additionally, Russia's Arctic posture contributes to its projection of acquiring great power status. Relying heavily on the natural resources industry, Russia also regards the resource-rich Arctic region as a zone that would help Moscow protect its economic interests and leading position in the fields of oil, gas, and mining.[49]

> The rapidly changing Euro-Atlantic security complex, on the one hand, led the NATO Arctic states to envisage the Alliance's military presence in the High North to counter the risks posed by Russian aggression.

Describing itself as a "Near-Arctic State, one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle," China aims to utilize the Arctic's physical transformation and pays close attention to the Arctic shipping routes, consisting of the Northeast Passage, the Northwest Passage, and the Central Passage, as lines of the Polar Silk Road scheme in connection with its broader Belt and Road Initiative. Another aspect of Chinese interest in the Arctic focuses on the exploration for oil, gas, minerals, and other non-living resources, and their exploitation.[50] Here, China might pursue diversifying both its network of trade routes and the import of natural resources.

Yet, the concept of Arctic exceptionalism, which outlines that the region is not the subject of intraregional military tensions and is immune to geopolitical competitions experienced elsewhere, has

lost its explanatory power in recent developments.[51] Russia's military involvement in Ukraine reconstructed the global security environment. Stoltenberg stated that NATO, as a defensive alliance, is determined to "preserve security, stability and co-operation in the High North" whereas authoritarian regimes intend to extend their presence towards the Arctic.[52] Stoltenberg refers to, particularly, Russia's enlarging armed forces in the High North. This process brings the entire Circumpolar North into NATO's security agenda. In this regard, Russia's heightening military existence in the High North is a major concern to the Arctic NATO members, as the insider/outsider distinction based on being part of the peace environment sustained by the security community features risks perceptions.

The rapidly changing Euro-Atlantic security complex, on the one hand, led the NATO Arctic states to envisage the Alliance's military presence in the High North to counter the risks posed by Russian aggression. On the other hand, it made Finland and Sweden express their leaning to reposition themselves as part of NATO's collective security umbrella instead of maintaining their non-aligned status.[53]

Finland as a NATO Ally: The Overlap between Finland's and NATO's Security Considerations in the Arctic Region

Although the 2014 Ukraine crisis which resulted in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation increased the level of caution among the Nordic countries, the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022 refashioned the wider European security architecture and urged Sweden and Finland to apply for becoming NATO members. The limited impact of the 2014 armed conflict was based on the assessment that it was a leftover dispute from the time of the Soviet Union. However, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 disclosed Russia's attitude that the Kremlin would not refrain from utilizing its armed forces against its neighbors.[54]

The initial unintended consequence of Russia's Ukraine campaign recalls how Tsarist Russia found itself in the position of limiting its presence in the Arctic. After the defeat of Tsarist Russia in the Crimean War (1853-1856), Russia faced a weakened imperial army, a drained treasury, and an undermined influence in Europe. The country could not sustain its sovereignty in Alaska and thus sold it.[55] Similarly, Russia's

military campaign initiated in 2022 in the Ukrainian geography cost Moscow its geostrategic underpinnings in the Arctic. Accordingly, Russia's recent move caused a shift in Finland's and Sweden's policy frameworks from their long-held militarily non-aligned position to the enthusiastic appeal for membership in NATO. Addressing their concerns, NATO responded in a welcoming way to the two countries' applications to counter any potential aggressive move by Russia.

Following Sweden's and Finland's applications for NATO membership, Türkiye voiced its discontent and reservations regarding the two countries' responsibilities as faithful allies in connection to Ankara's security considerations. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Türkiye (2014-ongoing), articulated that Türkiye preconditioned tighter measures against the PKK and all its extensions, the PYD/YPG in particular, by Stockholm and Helsinki for their prospective membership.[56] Satisfied with Finland's performance in fulfilling its commitments outlined in the trilateral memorandum, Türkiye lifted its withholding of consent.[57]

According to the strategy paper published by the Finnish government, Finland's Arctic policy is composed of four priority areas: climate change mitigation and adaptation, the well-being and rights of indigenous peoples, Arctic expertise, and relevant infrastructure and logistics.

Thus, six of the eight internationally recognized Arctic states are now NATO countries.[58] In its simplest terms, Finland's accession has doubled the length of NATO's border with Russia and may cause NATO to allocate more resources to its defense in connection with Arctic issues. In other words, NATO should inevitably incur responsibility for significantly enlarging its direct border with Russia after Finland's membership, and this reconfigured strategic environment would affect NATO's role in sustaining defense and deterrence in the Alliance's northeastern zone. This expansion can place the Nordic dimension and defense outlook at NATO's forefront and carry NATO's strategic center of gravity to the northern parts of the Alliance. In this respect, the examination of Finland's foreign policy priorities within the context of the Arctic region helps understand which aspects may heighten in NATO's security agenda.

According to the strategy paper published by the Finnish government, Finland's Arctic policy is composed of four priority areas: climate change mitigation and adaptation, the well-being and rights of indigenous peoples, Arctic expertise, and relevant infrastructure and logistics. In addition, Finland is developing a comprehensive understanding of security assessment and building an interconnected security framework that links the Baltic Sea region, Finland's Arctic neighborhood, and the North Atlantic. Considering itself an Arctic country, Finland conceptualizes a perspective consisting of "ecological carrying capacity, climate protection, principles of sustainable development, and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples" that is supposed to guide all activities in the Arctic.[59]

The Finnish government recognizes the changes due to climatic factors as priority issues for the Arctic region. Hence, the impacts of climate change on Arctic navigation lanes reveal "risk-prone" characteristics shaping security and stability with respect to the increasing interest of both regional and non-regional countries in the Arctic.[60] Moreover, while Finland sees climate change as partially responsible for the growing military activities and presence, and the craving for extracting natural resources in the region, it acknowledges that transregional and extra-regional political or military confrontations between great powers affect the balance of the Arctic. At this point, Finland expresses its cautious position towards Russia's tactical positioning, and its growing military and naval activities in the broader neighborhood, as well as Russia's improving installations and increasing presence in the Circumpolar North. As Finland presumes that the development of the Arctic infrastructure, including telecommunication, makes the region part of a wider security agenda, it refers to Russia's and China's involvement at the regional level and emphasizes the counteraction by the United States, Canada, and the European NATO countries for the purpose of upholding their readiness.[61]

At this conjunction, it is important to take note of NATO's cautious approach to Russia. In the 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO explicitly considers Russia to be "the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area."[62] The perceived Russian aggression in the High North is associated with its growing military reinforcements and those related vulnerabilities with

regard to Russia's capabilities, upsetting freedom of navigation in the wider North Atlantic.[63]

Overall, both NATO and the Finish government handle the issue of climate change with respect to its impacts on the Arctic within the framework of the riskification of climate change. These two actors focus on the potential dangers, instability, competitive state behaviors, and confrontations multiplied by the adverse outcomes of changing climatic conditions. They stress the importance of infrastructural and logistical capabilities, the rising militarization, and the awareness of new geopolitical challenges in terms of new navigation routes and resource extraction and exploitation. By considering the overlapping positions between NATO's and Finland's security agendas and the possible dominance within the Alliance's security architecture towards responding to the developments in its northern flank, the Arctic might emerge as an issue imposing new responsibilities on NATO allies located away from the Arctic dynamics.

Conclusion

This article has argued that the actors' approaches to climate change conceptualize the overall framework in response to developments in the Arctic region. Accordingly, the article reveals that the quickening pace of the melting of the polar ice caps alters the geopolitical order, multiplies the risks, and intensifies the race to control and extract the Arctic's potential. Thus, the implications of climate change reveal themselves within the framework of NATO's efforts to promote climate resilience for preserving its operational capabilities and to formulate cooperation on Arctic Administrative Areas with security and military aspects. Also, NATO regards Russia's aggressive attitudes, especially its military action in Ukraine in 2022, as an important development that changes the dynamics in the Northern Hemisphere. Having caused a seismic shift in the security landscape of the North, this critical juncture incentivized a process where NATO and other

Overall, both NATO and the Finish government handle the issue of climate change with respect to its impacts on the Arctic within the framework of the riskification of climate change.

Nordic states think of counteracting Russian aggression. Here, their converging positions on Russia formed the basis for addressing Russia's Arctic interest, which has also been excited by physical alteration in the region due to climate change.

Assuming the theoretical aspect framed by the riskification of climate change, the article, moreover, paves the way for another dimension regarding the discussions about the Arctic. In this sense, the article proposes that Finland's membership in NATO and Sweden's potential successful accession might drag the Alliance into a competitive environment with Russia so that the strategic space of NATO could be gradually oriented towards the North and the security concerns of the Alliance would be heightened by the risk-prone nature of climate change. The more the Nordic countries assume a pivotal position within NATO, the more their security concerns would be instilled into the Alliance's agenda.

There are two potential ways that tension can occur between NATO and Russia. The first scenario is a conflict in the Arctic region, which can emerge at the state-to-state level, intra-Arctic level, or NATO-to-Russia level. The second potential scenario delineates the tensions spilling over onto the security complexes away from the Arctic region. The enclosure of Russia both in the Arctic region and the Baltic Sea due to measures taken by NATO states indicates a geostrategic shift and might pressure Moscow to find new gateways and bastions to bypass these NATO moves or disperse its strategic positioning. These inferences contend that future escalations in the Arctic might not remain isolated and might even evolve into a confrontation requiring the execution of the concept of mutual aid legislated in Article 5 (the principle of collective defense) which constitutes the backbone of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance as a security community.

At this point, NATO allies geographically distant from the Arctic might need to form a strategic scheme against any spillovers, adopt a risk-based understanding to respond to future harmful events, and manage uncertainties originating from the challenges multiplied by climate change in relation to the Arctic region.

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ARTICLE

Internal and External Factors behind the Instability in Sudan

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Abstract

Sudan's recent history has been marked by persistent instability caused by historically shaped internal and external factors which can be associated with the country's colonial history, incomplete and problematic state-building processes, and the interactions of external actors with the country. Internally, Sudan has grappled with long-standing issues such as political and ethnic divisions, economic mismanagement, and social unrest, all of which have fueled discontent and volatility. After examining the internal factors affecting the country's instability, the article delves into the external forces that have shaped Sudan's trajectory, including regional conflicts, foreign interventions, and geopolitical interests. These factors have exerted significant influence on Sudan's internal dynamics, exacerbating existing tensions and undermining attempts at stability. By analyzing the interplay between internal and external factors, the article aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of Sudan's instability, highlighting the complex challenges that the country faces as it strives to achieve lasting peace, social cohesion, and sustainable development.

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Introduction

Sudan, a state located in northeastern Africa, has experienced a tumultuous history marked by recurring periods of instability. From political upheavals to social unrest, Sudan has grappled with numerous challenges that have hindered its progress and threatened its stability. While the causes behind Sudan's instability are multifaceted and interconnected, a closer examination reveals a complex interplay of internal and external factors that have shaped the nation's trajectory.

Internally, Sudan's history has been marred by power struggles, ethnic tensions, economic disparities, and inadequate governance. The country's vast and diverse population, encompassing numerous ethnic and cultural groups, has long struggled for equitable representation and inclusive political participation. The marginalization of certain regions and communities has fostered grievances and fueled ethnic divisions, leading to simmering conflicts that often erupt into violence. Moreover, the economic challenges facing Sudan have been significant contributors to its instability. Chronic inflation, high unemployment rates, and limited access to basic services have bred frustration and dissatisfaction among the populace. Economic mismanagement, corruption, and inadequate infrastructure have impeded development efforts and widened the gap between the affluent and the impoverished, further exacerbating social tensions.

While internal factors have played a pivotal role in Sudan's instability, it is essential to recognize the influence of external forces on the nation's trajectory. Sudan's geographical location and its historical interactions with neighboring countries and regional powers have left it vulnerable to external pressures. Geopolitical interests, resource competition, and proxy conflicts have frequently spilled over Sudan's borders, impacting its internal dynamics and exacerbating existing fault lines.

One notable external factor is the long-standing proxy conflict between regional powers, which has found its arena in Sudan. These powers have often supported rival factions and armed groups, prolonging conflicts and impeding efforts towards peace and stability. Additionally, Sudan's strategic position has made it a conduit for illicit trade, arms smuggling, and the movement of extremist ideologies, further destabilizing the country.

Sudan's relationship with the international community has also had profound implications for its stability. Sanctions imposed by foreign powers in response to human rights abuses and allegations of state-sponsored terrorism have had detrimental effects on the economy

and societal well-being. Conversely, international interventions and peacekeeping efforts have had mixed results, highlighting the complex nature of external involvement in Sudan's affairs.

This article aims to examine and analyze the internal and external reasons behind Sudan's instability, originating from the colonial period legacy and later the neocolonial relations network. A detailed analysis of the reasons behind the recent conflict, which broke out in April 2023, is vital for forming the necessary strategies for the country to achieve peace and stability. In this context, the study consists of two parts. In the first, the internal reasons behind the instability in Sudan are examined by taking the historical, political, economic, and sociocultural factors into consideration. In the second part, the external actors that directly or indirectly affect the instability in Sudan are analyzed.

Internal Reasons behind Sudan's Instability

The internal causes of Sudan's instability can be related to its colonial legacy and inadequacies in state building. Sudan, which has a deep-rooted history and an important geopolitical position, has hosted many civilizations over the centuries. The lands of present-day Sudan were once ruled by the Nubian, Kush, and Meroitic Kingdoms and the Ottoman Empire, and also came under the influence of Western colonial governments.[1] The social cracks and political crises that emerged with the practices of the British colonial administrations persisted in various neocolonial practices in the post-independence period and form the basis of today's problems.

After the 7th century, during the Nubian period, due to commercial activities, the Arabic language and culture began to be influential in the region.[2] Along with the developing trade, the religion of Islam began to spread in the Nubian Kingdom. With the Baqt Treaty, signed between Islamic Egypt and Nubia in AD 656, Islam started to show its influence in both the sociocultural and political field.[3] During this period, it is possible to say that the "Islamic-African culture" was born in the Sudan region.

In the 15th century, during the period of the Funj Sultanate (1504-1820), under a rule defined as an Islamic monarchy, the region witnessed an intense Islamization.[4] With the immigration of Muslim scholars from countries such as Egypt, Hejaz, Yemen, and Morocco, Islamic mysticism sects and schools of Islamic thought began to spread in and around Sudan. During the Funj Sultanate, many Muslim

students traveled from Sudan to the Middle East and Gulf countries to receive Islamic education. Meanwhile, Muslim caravans from West Africa, which were on pilgrimage via Kordofan and Darfur, were also influential in the Islamization and ethnic diversification of this region.[5] As a result of these developments, especially in the northern regions of Sudan, Islamization and Arabization became intense. So much so that during this period, Arabic became a daily spoken language in many parts of Sudan.[6]

In 1821, the territory of present-day Sudan began to be controlled by the Egyptian Governor of the Ottoman Empire, Mehmet Ali Pasha.[7] In 1881, the Mahdit Revolution was carried out by Muhammad Ahmad bin Abdallah, a Nubian Sufi leader who claimed to be the Mahdi.[8] The rule of Muhammad Ahmad bin Abdallah, who declared a *jihad* (holy war) against the Ottoman and Egyptian administrations, did not last long. In 1896, British forces abolished the Mahdist state formation in Sudan and initiated colonial rule that would last until 1956.[9] It should be mentioned that the Darfur Sultanate, led by Ali Dinar, was not under British rule and Dinar continued to show his solidarity to the Ottoman Empire.

The British colonial rule, especially with the "Native Administration" declared in 1921, deepened the gap between the northern, predominantly Muslim, and southern, Christian- and Animist-dominated, regions.[10] The colonial administration paid great attention to the formation of a new elite that would serve British interests in the country and operate the system. For example, Gordon College in Khartoum played a major role in educating the country's elite, excluding non-Muslims and non-Arabic speaking individuals for many years.[11] As a result, the British colonial forces brought more modern education and infrastructure to the Arab- and Muslim-majority northern regions, while less attention was paid to the southern regions which were predominantly inhabited by Nilotic peoples. In fact, the northern elites dominated the administration of the southern regions.

> **Sudan's independence from British rule on January 1, 1956 did not eliminate the country's inter-regional development gap.**

Sudan's independence from British rule on January 1, 1956 did not eliminate the country's inter-regional development gap. The unequal and unjust situation in the colonial order persisted with the new elites and neocolonial policies, which were carefully raised by the British in

the post-independence period, taking care of their own and the British interests instead of the general public. While there were approximately 572 tribes in Sudan in the post-independence period, only three of them, namely the Shaigiyya, Danagla, and Ja'aliyyin tribes, had a weighted representation in the central government.[12] The limited number of ministries given to other southern tribes such as Dinka and Nuer were confined to ministries such as youth, sports, or animal resources. In the table below, the tribal affiliation rates of the ministers in Sudan from 1956, when independence was gained, to 1998, are given in detail.[13]

Table 1: Tribal affiliation of ministers in all Sudanese governments from independence to 1998

Tribe	First democratic government	First military regime (1958–64)	Second democracy (1965–69)	Second military regime (1969–85)	Third democracy (1986–1989)	Third military regime (of Omar al-Bashir, 1989–present)
Danagla	16	8.33	10.20	8.86	8.59	16.11
Mawalid	12	25	–	4.81	1	2.84
Mahass	10	4.17	4.8	8.10	–	5.795
Bederiya	10	–	6.12	2.3	6.25	2.36
Nubians	8	4.17	–	1	1.56	–
Dinka	9	–	6.12	4.56	7.81	7.11
Nuer	5	–	4.8	–	–	–
Halfawiyin	4	4.17	–	1.52	1.56	–
Merafab	3	–	8.16	–	1	0.5
Shukriya	3	–	–	–	–	0.5
Ja'aliyyin	3	12.5	6.12	25.32	8.59	15.17
Shaigiyya	3	16.67	12.24	4.34	9.38	12.80
Zandi	3	–	–	–	2.34	2.37
Funj	1	–	–	1.1	–	–
Ababeda	–	12.50	–	2.78	–	0.5
Jwama'a	–	8.33	–	1.77	1	–
Rekabiyya	–	–	–	4.81	1	–
Rebatab	–	–	–	3.4	1	2.84

Source: Abdu Mukhtar Musa, "Marginalization and Ethnicization in the Sudan: How the Elite Failed to Stabilize a Diverse Country," *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2010), p. 558.

Southern peoples, who complained about the hegemony of the northern ethnicities and bad administration conditions in Sudan, waged uprisings and civil wars against the central government. The first of these civil wars, the Anyanya Rebellion, took place between 1955 and 1972. The civil war developed within the framework of the demands of more political representation and regional autonomy of the

peoples in the south of Sudan and resulted in the death of more than one million people. Following the war, which was ended with the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, permanent peace in the country could not be achieved.[14]

Apart from the inequality of political representation, the utilization of natural resources and the distribution of economic wealth have also caused conflicts between the northern and southern communities. After the Addis Ababa Agreement, the efforts of the northern elites to use the oil resources discovered in regions such as Bentju, Kordofan, Upper Blue Nile, Heglig, and Adar caused great reactions among the southern peoples. In addition, in 1983, President Jaafar Nimeiry ended the autonomy of South Sudan and declared an Islamic government based on sharia law throughout the country, causing the second civil war in Sudan. In this civil war, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which was established in 1983 under the leadership of John Garang, aimed to re-establish an autonomous administration in the south and fought against the central government.[15] This civil war, which was followed with concern in the international arena, especially in neighboring countries, and in which foreign actors also got involved from time to time, ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Nairobi in January 2005. With this agreement, autonomy was first provided to South Sudan, and then, with a referendum in 2011, the way was paved for South Sudan to become an independent state.[16]

> In February 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement took up arms to end the Sudanese central government's oppressive regime against non-Arab peoples.

Another uprising against the central government occurred in 2003 in Darfur. In February 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement took up arms to end the Sudanese central government's oppressive regime against non-Arab peoples. This war witnessed fighting between then-president Omar al-Bashir and the Arab militia known as "Janjaweed," which he founded in 2013, on the one side, and the civilian population, on the other.[17] Later, al-Bashir tried to suppress the revolts against him with intense violent interventions by establishing the paramilitary force "Rapid Support Forces" (RSF), in which the Janjaweed were deployed.[18] The United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established on July 31, 2007 against this fierce war with resolution 1769 of the United Nations

Security Council.[19] However, large-scale conflicts in Darfur continued for many years, causing great instability in Sudan and its surroundings. According to UN reports, while thousands of people have died in the war in Darfur, approximately two million people have had to leave their homes.[20] International Criminal Court prosecutors have prepared an indictment accusing al-Bashir of war crimes in Darfur.[21]

In 2019, the soldiers under the command of Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf overthrew al-Bashir and seized power. After the coup, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) was established and a state of emergency was declared in the country.[22] In July 2019, the TMC and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance reached a political agreement, which was subsequently finalized in the form of the August 2019 Draft Constitutional Declaration. The latter led to the establishment of the Transitional Sovereignty Council on August 20, 2019, serving as Sudan's collective head of state. Within the framework of this newly formed government, the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, in accordance with the August 2019 Draft Constitutional Declaration, appointed Abdalla Hamdok as prime minister. Hamdok proceeded to assemble a cabinet of ministers, and on October 4, 2019, initiated a significant overhaul of leadership within Sudan's public universities. This overhaul involved the removal of 28 chancellors and 35 vice-chancellors, and the appointment of 34 new vice-chancellors. The primary objective of the restructuring was to replace individuals in positions of authority who had been associated with the al-Bashir government.

The tension in the country did not decrease under the Sovereignty Council, and many civilians were killed in the ongoing protests. Although decisions were taken by the Transitional Military Council and the leaders of the protesters regarding the transition to civilian rule, they did not materialize. As a result, Sudan faced a new coup on October 25, 2021.[23] It is known that during this coup process, RSF took part in the streets of Khartoum against protesters. The actions of the RSF were not limited to Sudan as they participated in important missions in the international arena as well. For example, about 1,000 RSF soldiers were sent to Libya in July 2019 to support Haftar's forces. The RSF were also among the Arab coalition forces, including Sudanese army, led by Saudi Arabia with the Sudanese army in the Yemeni civil war.[24]

The RSF caused another conflict in the country in April 2023. After the 2019 coup, a transitional military government and a civilian opposition coalition were established in Sudan. However, in October

2021, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized the administration and detained civilian politicians. Following this development, al-Burhan and RSF leader General Muhammed Hamdan Dagalo stand out as two influential figures in the country's administration. Yet, disagreements over the inclusion of the RSF in the Sudanese army fueled the power rivalry between Dagalo and al-Burhan, causing a new civil war in the country.[25]

As summarized above, Sudan's political life, which consists of civil wars, coups, and political crises, is the main source of instability and poverty in the country. The people of Sudan have not been able to enjoy peace and stability as a result of inequality and injustice, corruption, and the authoritarian leaders inherited from the colonial period. The central government's neglect of the needs and demands of regions such as Darfur, the Blue Nile, and South Kordofan, and the unequal distribution of resources and political representation have led to ongoing political crises, coups, and civil wars in the country.

Another major internal cause of instability is the very poor management of the economy. As mentioned earlier, the country's natural resources, which are actually quite abundant, are controlled by a small number of northern political elites and military leaders,[26] while large masses of people struggle with deep poverty and unemployment. At the same time, the sanctions imposed on Sudan by Western actors like the U.S. due to authoritarian practices such as those of the al-Bashir period deeply shook the country's economy. In the current process, real GDP per capita in Sudan in 2021 was $3,700, putting the country in the 190th place in the world GDP per capita ranking. In addition, approximately 36% of youth aged 15-24 in the country are unemployed.[27]

Apart from the country's political crises, climate change, which has become more evident in recent years, appears as another factor that negatively affects the country's economy and the lives of the Sudanese people. More than 80% of the country's population is involved in agriculture and animal husbandry in Sudan, and climate change causes both a decrease in agricultural incomes and more difficult access to food.[28] According to research, Africa is one of the regions that will be most affected by climate change in the future. In this negative scenario, the current adverse situation in Sudan is also likely to worsen. In fact, the vulnerability of the Nile River, which is a transboundary water source and the primary water source of approximately 67% of the Sudanese people, to temperature increases may increase water scarcity in the states in the Nile basin.[29] This would double the number of ten

million people currently facing food insecurity in Sudan. Meanwhile, the decrease in fertile land and wetlands, and poor management and weak policies in these regions may increase the competition of different communities over resources and even lead to sporadic violent conflicts. For example, competition for resources and fertile lands in the al-Fashaga region between Sudan and Ethiopia may increase in the future within these possibilities.

Another factor that reinforces the instability in Sudan is the displacement and refugee crisis. In 2022, at least 314,000 people had to leave their homes while conflicts over resources continued in Sudan, especially in West Darfur. In previous migration cases, for example at the end of 2022, approximately 3.6 million people were internally displaced in Sudan.[30] What is more, Sudan was already hosting around one million refugees from South Sudan, Eritrea, Chad, the Central African Republic, Yemen, and Syria even before the military clashes began. In fact, this made Sudan the second-largest refugee-hosting country in Africa. In addition, more than one million people, some for more than a decade, are unable to return to their homes due to violence and financial difficulties and are trying to survive in camps in South Darfur.[31] The displacement and refugee crisis, which puts pressure on the country's economy and causes security weaknesses in areas where immigrants are concentrated, is another important obstacle to stability in Sudan.

The clashes between the central army forces and the RSF, which broke out in Sudan on April 15, 2023, can be closely associated with the reasons for instability mentioned above. After its independence, Sudan could not attain political stability and a large part of the Sudanese people could not achieve representation in the corrupt political structures of the putschist and authoritarian regimes. The civil war between the forces of al-Burhan and Dagalo, both of whom want to maintain their privileged positions in terms of political authority and natural resources, and ultimately gain advantage over the other, has killed thousands of people so far and caused many more to leave their homes. This civil war, which disrupts the security of the country and also causes security concerns in the neighboring states, has the potential to continue the ongoing spiral of instability and violence, causing deep crises in the political and economic structures.

External Reasons behind Sudan's Instability

The growing disagreement over a number of cross-border issues, including the construction process of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the war in al-Fashaga and northern Ethiopia, has deepened distrust between Ethiopia and Sudan. The instability in Sudan has showed itself not only with the disagreements with Ethiopia, but also with the border problems with Egypt and South Sudan. This situation threatened relations between states and regional stability and security.

Sudan's Foreign Policy Issues: Water Resources Controversies and Border Disputes

The Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, which was started by Ethiopia in 2011, is the first foreign policy problem causing instability in Sudan. The GERD has emerged as an important infrastructure project in Ethiopia and is of great importance in terms of being the largest hydroelectric power plant and meeting the electricity needed for Ethiopia's rapidly growing economy.[32]

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However, the dam's construction process has led to international discussions. In particular, the dam construction process has caused a crisis between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, with the interest-centered approach of the parties inhibiting reaching a consensus. Despite differing interests, Egypt and Sudan argue that the issue should be resolved through an agreement between the three countries, including Ethiopia. For Egypt, agricultural activities and the supply of drinking water to a population of 100 million along the Nile River are the main reasons for its objections to the dam. Sudan, on the other hand, claims that due to the dense population living around the dam, filling and operating it without reaching an agreement on legal and technical issues will pose a risk in terms of regional security, and opposes Ethiopia's unilateral initiatives.[33] Ethiopia, which covers the entire $4.6 million cost of the dam, will provide electricity to 110 million citizens with the energy to be obtained from the GERD, considers the construction necessary for

the welfare of its citizens, and remains insensitive to disagreements/criticism.[34]

The construction of the GERD has caused reactions from global actors as well. In the face of the exacerbation of the conflict between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, the U.S. ended its aid to Ethiopia. Moreover, the U.S. has argued that the filling and operation of the dam could only be possible with a fair agreement between the parties.[35] The African Union considers it necessary to resolve the issue without threatening regional peace and security, to operate the mediation mechanism to resolve the issue, and to provide technical advice to help the three countries reach a mutual agreement within the scope of the UN Environment Programme. The Arab League has demanded that Ethiopia not act unilaterally without an agreement and that the issue be discussed at the UN Security Council. However, Ethiopia rejected this request due to the politicization and internationalization of the problem.[36] The Office of the UN Secretary-General emphasized that the problem should be resolved through an agreement to be concluded between the parties on a fair, permanent, and equitable basis.[37]

On July 13, 2023, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed jointly acknowledged the need for immediate negotiations aimed at concluding an agreement among Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan regarding the filling and operational protocols of the GERD. Nevertheless, in September 2023, Prime Minister Ahmed made an announcement declaring the successful conclusion of the fourth and ultimate filling of the GERD. Following this development, Egypt promptly criticized Ethiopia's action, deeming it a breach of international legal norms.

The second foreign policy concern affecting Sudan is the al-Fashaga dispute with Ethiopia, whose origins date back to the early 20th century. As Ethiopia plunged into civil war in 2020, Sudanese authorities deployed troops and took control of the disputed al-Fashaga border area. Against this attempt, Ethiopia engaged in heavy clashes with Sudanese troops by deploying federal forces and militias.[38] The fact that the conflict has reached a level that regional allies (Eritrea) have intervened, emerges as the biggest concern in this process.

The third problem is the historically disputed "Halayeb Triangle" issue between Sudan and Egypt. The fact that the Halayeb Triangle region has rich resources such as oil, gold, graphite, nickel, iron and manganese is one of the most important reasons for the conflict between Sudan and Egypt. Especially after Egypt left the Tiran and Senafir Islands to Saudi Arabia with a bilateral agreement, Sudanese authorities began to

reiterate their ownership claims to the region.[39] The troubled region on occasion pits Egypt and Sudan against each other politically and militarily.

The fourth issue is the fact that the separation of South Sudan in the 2011 referendum brought about border problems as the border roads between South Sudan and Sudan are undrawn and not clear. At the same time, the failure to hold the 2011 referendum on whether Abyei would become a part of Sudan or South Sudan led to an increase in conflicts in the region. Moreover, the conflicts that took place in Abyei spread to South Kordofan (especially the occupation of the Heglig oil field) and the Blue Nile, which also became contentious areas.[40] These regional issues include complex issues of nationalism, deep-rooted local grievances, and competition between local tribes for water and pasture in both South Sudan and Sudan.[41] Unresolved problems regarding the border areas led to the outbreak of violence immediately after the separation. Nonetheless, it's crucial to underscore a key aspect here: despite the historical challenges and the unresolved Abyei issue, there exists potential for the preservation of relations between Sudan and South Sudan. For instance, the peace accord between Sudan and rebel groups was successfully ratified in 2020 in Juba with South Sudan playing a mediating role. Additionally, the South Sudanese government has been actively engaged in efforts to bring an end to military conflicts within Sudan.

Policies of Regional and Global Actors on the Axis of Competition and Interest

With the dismissal of Omar al-Bashir and the transition to civilian rule in 2021, a high-intensity armed conflict has erupted across the country since April 15, 2023.[42] The resulting armed conflict between al-Burhan and Dagalo has the potential to end the autocratic rule in Sudan and destabilize the volatile region bordered by the Sahel, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa. However, the deepening of the crisis is based on the struggle of regional and global actors for sovereignty and interests in the region as well as the internal dynamics of Sudan.

While the conflicts between al-Burhan and Dagalo, also known as "Hemeti" continue, the interest of global actors has had an impact on the region.

While the conflicts between al-Burhan and Dagalo, also known as "Hemeti" continue, the interest of global actors has had an impact on the region. Unlike the U.S. and Russia, China is involved with the

international community on issues such as peacekeeping and conflict mediation, and carries out a deep economic engagement in the region. In this context, China's intentions and attempts to intervene in Sudan are important. However, previous peace attempts by China have been inconclusive and China's mediation efforts in Sudan have remained marginal mainly because of its continued preference to stay away from internal struggles in conflict-prone countries; its declining socio-economic and political interests in Sudan; and the complex geopolitical nature of the conflict.[43]

Unlike China, Russia has preferred to take a position in favor of the continuity of its interests in the African continent, especially in Sudan, without being involved with international organizations. Russia's activities in Africa aim to restore its influence under the Soviet Union through arms sales, joint military exercises, and private military companies such as the Wagner Group to train the Sudanese army. As a matter of fact, through the Wagner Group, which has been in Sudan since 2017, Russia aimed to minimize the U.S. and French influence in Africa and to obtain valuable metals such as gold from Sudan, the third-largest mining producer in Africa. Russia wants to use the financial resources it has obtained here for the ongoing war in Ukraine.[44] In addition, there are claims in the West that Russia is providing surface-to-air missiles to the RSF to fight against the Sudanese army, contributing to a protracted armed conflict that has only increased the chaos in the region.[45] The U.S. has reacted to Russia's attempts and announced that Russia, through the Wagner Group, has displaced 1.3 million people in Sudan and supplied weapons to the paramilitary RSF which is a party to the ongoing conflict.[46]

Meanwhile, Sudan is very important geostrategically to U.S. interests both in Africa and the Middle East. Sudan connects Africa and the Middle East, ensuring the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, and is important to the United States because of its role in China's Belt and Road Initiative, and its ties to China in various sectors such as agriculture, energy, and mining.[47] Although the U.S. has imposed sanctions on individuals and institutions that cause conflict and instability in Sudan,[48] it has been criticized for its failure to implement a policy that gives priority to Sudan, the timing and effectiveness of its sanctions, and its failure to apply on a mechanism of responsibility for violations that occur during the conflicts in Sudan.[49]

Another dimension of the instability in Sudan is the competition of regional actors. Although the will to improve bilateral relations between

Israel and Sudan has been demonstrated, Sudan's internal conflicts have prevented any further developments in this field. Israel attaches great importance to its relations with Sudan as it wants to expand the Abraham Accords and improve its relations with other Arab countries via normalization with Sudan.[50] Israel also wants to increase its geostrategic interests in the Red Sea and East Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa, in order to strengthen its relations with sub-Saharan African countries further and benefit from Sudan's rich agricultural and natural resources.[51] However, the power struggle between al-Burhan and Dagalo has rendered Israel's attempts after al-Bashir fruitless. In addition, the internal conflict in Sudan has prevented Israel from forming the strategic security corridor that it is trying to create there in order to expand its regional influence.

Gulf countries, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, have played an important role in Sudan's issues. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have developed strong relations with the al-Bashir regime, which has been subjected to international pressure for its military activities and crimes in Darfur. These relations have been influential in Sudan's foreign policy choices, the most concrete example of which has been Sudan severing its relations with Iran.[52] With the emergence of the 2023 Sudanese crisis, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have established close relations with Dagalo rather than al-Burhan.

Although the Sudan policy of the UAE and Saudi Arabia are similar, they are established on differing motivations. Saudi Arabia places great importance on the Red Sea which is an integral part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's "Vision 2030" that aims to position the Saudi economy as a global hub for trade, innovation, and tourism.[53] In addition, Saudi Arabia attaches importance to its presence in Sudan in order to protect its financial and economic investments in the region – among others, energy, agriculture, water, sanitation, transportation, and telecommunications – and to strengthen the emerging role of Saudi Arabia as a regional actor.

The UAE, on the other hand, wants to eliminate the remnants of the Sudanese regime, especially the Islamists, whom it sees as local, regional, and global enemies, by developing close relations with Dagalo. The UAE's relations with Dagalo date back well before April 15, 2023. The UAE stands as the world's foremost recipient of Sudanese gold, accounting for a staggering 99.2% of the country's gold exports, as per global trade data from 2018. Additionally, the UAE has engaged RSF militiamen to participate in conflicts in Yemen and Libya, thereby

offering financial support to the RSF. Another link is the mining and trading corporation Al Gunade which maintains strong connections with Dagalo and the RSF. The ownership of Al Gunade lies with Dagalo's brother, Abdul Rahim Dagalo, and his sons, while the reported RSF deputy, Abdul Rahman al-Bakri, serves as the general manager. According to one of the documents acquired by the anti-corruption organization Global Witness, Muhammed Hamdan Dagalo himself is a member of the board of directors. After reviewing substantial evidence regarding the activities of Al Gunade and the RSF, Global Witness has drawn the conclusion that "the RSF and an affiliated company have effectively taken control of a significant portion of Sudan's gold industry, likely using it to finance their operations." The organization has gained access to banking records and corporate documents that, in its view, demonstrate that the RSF maintains a bank account in its name at the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (now part of the First Abu Dhabi Bank) in the UAE. This serves as proof of the RSF's financial independence.[54]

Since the onset of military conflicts in Sudan, Turkish authorities have consistently emphasized that the key to resolving these issues lies in dialogue and consensus-building.

With the end of al-Bashir's rule, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not view the democratization process in Sudan favorably, showing his support to the military groups led by al-Burhan and Dagalo which in turn planned a coup against the government of Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Thus, al-Sisi aimed to maintain the status quo in Sudan in line with Egypt's interests.[55] He also prefers that Sudan not follow a foreign policy that could affect Egypt's interests regarding the GERD on the Nile River.[56]

Türkiye holds the potential to play a significant role in stabilizing the volatile situation in Sudan. It is worth noting that Türkiye was among the first nations to recognize Sudan and its capital, Khartoum, officially. The Turkish Embassy in Sudan was established on January 1, 1957. Moreover, Türkiye pursues a policy of maintaining impartiality while engaging with all stakeholders within the country. Since the onset of military conflicts in Sudan, Turkish authorities have consistently emphasized that the key to resolving these issues lies in dialogue and consensus-building. Türkiye gives paramount importance and aligns itself with the principle of "African solutions to African problems," and actively supports regional organizations such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in their

efforts. After the April 15, 2023 events, Türkiye displayed a similar attitude. Having taken initiatives to eliminate the instability in Sudan and end the armed conflict, Türkiye has been in close contact with al-Burhan and Dagalo and has informed both parties that all kinds of support will be provided to prevent the humanitarian crisis, including mediation.[57] After the overthrow of al-Bashir, Türkiye did not become a party to the struggle between the conflicting actors in order not to cause any crisis in its relations with Sudan. Türkiye maintains its presence in the region with foreign policy tools such as public diplomacy.[58]

As has been established above, external factors have been as important as internal reasons in Sudan's inability to achieve peace and stability in the post-independence period. The neo-colonial policies developed after independence and the relations developed in line with the interests of global and regional powers that want to establish influence in the region have relegated the Sudanese people to live in chaos and poverty. The failure of attempts to bring peace and stability to Sudan, which is a center of struggle for interests and power, emerges as the main reason for the ongoing conflicts today.

Conclusion

Sudan's instability is driven by a combination of internal and external factors that have intertwined and perpetuated cycles of conflict and fragility. The state's colonial and neocolonial history is marked by internal power struggles, ethnic divisions, economic disparities, and governance challenges, all of which have contributed to social unrest and political instability. Simultaneously, Sudan's strategic geographical location and its historical interactions with regional powers have exposed it to external pressures, proxy conflicts, and resource competition, exacerbating its internal dynamics.

It is evident that addressing Sudan's instability requires a comprehensive and multifaceted approach that tackles both internal and external factors. It is essential to establish a multisectoral and multilayered strategy supported by international actors in order to ensure sustainable peace and stability in Sudan.

First, the problematic state-building that is at the backbone of Sudan's instability should be reconsidered. Building a functional state that will ensure social reconciliation and rapid and sustainable development is essential for Sudan. To do so, first, the Sudanese government should prioritize inclusive governance mechanisms that ensure equitable

representation of all ethnic and cultural groups. Strengthening democratic institutions, promoting political participation, and fostering dialogue between different communities can help address grievances and foster a sense of national unity. At the same time, the most effective way to ensure democratic consciousness, national unity, and sustainable development in Sudan is to expand the quality of education throughout the country. Due to long years of conflict and lack of budget, eight million children in Sudan today remain out of school.[59] This crowded young generation, lacking in education and facing deep poverty and unemployment in the future, poses a great threat to the stability of the country in the medium and long term.

Second, addressing the economic challenges facing Sudan is crucial to reducing social tensions and building a stable society. The government should implement comprehensive economic reforms aimed at reducing inflation, promoting job creation, improving access to basic services, and combating corruption. Encouraging foreign investment and diversifying the economy can also contribute to long-term stability.

However, the most important factor in ensuring an environment of peace and stability in Sudan is the common will of international actors in this direction. External actors who establish relations with different power centers in Sudan for the sake of their individual interests pit different groups against each other within the country due to their conflicting interests. Since the peace and reconciliation attempts to end this tense atmosphere are mostly carried out by the same actors, the reconciliatory atmosphere is usually short-lived. As a matter of fact, when Sudan's political history is taken into consideration, the peace that was achieved by the mediation of external actors in civil wars and other high-intensity armed conflicts, was shortly followed by more complex conflicts and internal divisions.

At this point, it is possible to say that Türkiye, which has a high level of strategic cooperation with Sudan, is an actor that can contribute to the stabilization of the country. First, Türkiye's policy towards Sudan includes respect for territorial integrity and internal affairs, and is based on the win-win principle. Türkiye has equal distance relations with all ethnic groups and power elites in Sudan. Türkiye-Sudan relations, built on these foundations, consist of initiatives in many fields, including the political, military, economic, and sociocultural areas. Considering the inadequacy of basic services and infrastructure in the country, the projects carried out by Türkiye in the fields of education, health, transportation, and energy in Sudan, and humanitarian aid can meet

the country's important needs. Türkiye supports the issues of the country's economy and youth employment with investment projects that have been or will be realized. With these indicators, Türkiye will be able to make direct and indirect contributions to the stabilization of Sudan. Türkiye is also an important potential mediator for ending the conflicts that broke out in April 2023 and for building peace in the country. History has shown that the actors who previously mediated in ending the conflicts and civil wars in Sudan, in a way, caused these events. In this respect, Türkiye's mediation can be much more effective in achieving lasting peace and stability in Sudan.

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ARTICLE

The Power Transition Basis of Counter-Hegemony in the Context of Neo-Gramscianism: The China-U.S. Rivalry in World Politics

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Abstract

Contrary to the traditional perspective of international relations theories, neo-Gramscian theory perceives hegemonic structure and power transitions in the international system as a result of both material and social interactions. Inspired by neo-Gramscian theory, this article argues that as in hegemony, counter-hegemony is also built on consent, which is created by non-military instruments. Among many instruments building consent, the article focuses on economic, institutional, and ideational ones that make the counter-hegemonic model attractive. In this sense, the rising power must invoke non-material forms of consent to build its "legitimate order" in the same way the hegemon invokes these to maintain its predominance. The article explores counter-hegemony processes via a comparative historical case study of developments in the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana systems. In doing so, it juxtaposes the U.S. positions, initiatives, and counter-hegemony models against Pax Britannica, and those of China against the present Pax Americana. The regional and global reflections of China's counter-hegemony model is analyzed through a neo-Gramscian framework with reference to the U.S. counter-hegemony projection.

Keywords

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Introduction

Regional and global power struggles have been a common feature of world politics throughout history. The distribution of power among states has shaped the structure of world order. The international system across diverse periods has been defined by unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity. However, no established order has been able to continue its existence unabated. Every established order has encountered resistance and faced the rise of alternative models. Traditional theories of International Relations (IR) have not adequately explained these changes and the reorientation in the system. The changes have been associated with the anarchic structure of the system, and the will and search for power stemming from the modern state's appeal to rational authority.[1] The deterministic relationship established by these dynamics, which are considered fixed and given, with international politics is not sufficient to explain, understand and interpret existing developments. This reductive approach towards the relationship is also dysfunctional in providing solutions. As the power relations produced in the modern period can be analyzed only superficially by the existing approaches indexed on material phenomena and factors, the essence of these power relations cannot be fully understood and thoroughly analyzed.

Neo-Gramscian theory, which derives its foundations from Antonio Gramsci's analysis of the power relations between the Italian city-states, has been reformulated and deployed by Robert Cox to analyze international power relations. Gramsci opposed positivist epistemology premised on the universal acceptance of a value-free, unreflective and ahistorical examination of social phenomena. As a matter of fact, social phenomena can only be understood by interpreting dynamic and reflectivist phenomena. Power relations cannot, therefore, be explained by the vicious and reductive judgments of positivist epistemology due to their variable and dialectical structure. In this context, the power structure must control both matter and meaning in

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order to ensure its legitimacy so that complete control can be achieved. Modern power uses "coercive" tools such as the military and police to maintain its political ascendancy and "consent" tools such as media, ideology, values, and norms to maintain its legitimacy.[2]

Each hegemonic power also feeds counter-hegemonic structures. Existing studies in the literature mainly focus on hegemonic power and analyze the power structure of the hegemon, and how power relations are established between actors and power designs.[3] This has led to an analytical neglect of challenges posed against existing orders or hegemons. A systematic study of how hegemony is challenged has so far eluded the relevant literature. However, counter-hegemonic initiatives have the potential to shape existing hegemonic relations and power relations in the next world order. To address this issue, this study aims to analyze the forces that have created a counter-hegemony within the system by challenging the orders of *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana* respectively, which have constituted the foundations for the hegemonic order of modern world politics, by utilizing the neo-Gramscian perspective as a theoretical tool.

In this context, power transition theory can be applied to understand the circumstances in which the counter-hegemon increases its power and how it poses a challenge to the hegemon. Power transition theory, which was introduced in 1958 by Organski in his seminal textbook titled *World Politics*,[4] has become over time one of the most notable structural theories in world politics. The main reason for using this theory here is the question of whether the "satisfied" global power discourse employed in the theory will lead to a smooth transition of leadership to China in a balanced but non-warlike manner. If the main objective is to preserve the international social order by accepting the principles of culture and identity imposed by the West, then the U.S. can transfer hegemony to China just as Britain transferred hegemony to the U.S. in the past. It is important to note at this point, however, that Britain and the U.S. come from the same social and political background. Yet, the probability of war will increase dramatically if China tries to use the power transition to establish its own counter-hegemony by building a principled global culture against Western international rules and norms by harboring well-founded complaints just as Germany practiced counter-hegemony against Britain in the

run-up to World War I and II. This study will explore the principles that China can adopt based on the available choices offered by power transition theory.

The study's main contention is that just as consent is a necessary element in the construction of hegemony, it is of vital importance in the construction of counter-hegemony as well. Economic transition, institutional initiatives and ideational designs, which would be able to remediate the problems of the existing hegemon or hegemonic order, may be conducive to consent; or, in other words, they form a ground for the counter-hegemony strategy in the context of power transition understanding.

In the counter-hegemony process, the main purpose of building consent is to render the current revisionist effort attractive. In doing so, many instruments can be used—especially economic, institutional, and intellectual ones. This article will focus on these three. Culture and identity, which are among the most important instruments in the process of constructing consent, are the subject of a separate study. The seeking of alternative models against the deficiencies of the current hegemony, on which a consensus has been achieved, can enable the construction of consent in counter-hegemony processes. Moreover, consent can also be constructed through the aforementioned three instruments, which are non-military tools and can produce common benefits within a certain circle. At this point, a counter-hegemony model that reveals the deficiencies of the current system and produces benefits for the actors who currently suffer under its shortcomings can emerge on the basis of consent and make itself attractive for all actors.

In addition, the regional and global reflections of China's counter-hegemony will be analyzed from a neo-Gramscian perspective, with reference to the U.S. counter-hegemony projection towards *Pax Brittanica*. The article also explores the limitations and obstacles to a Beijing-centered world order including China's potential to foster the consent elements needed to pursue a successful counter-hegemony initiative against the previous hegemon. Specifically, the study offers a comparative case study exploring the U.S. positions, initiatives and counter-hegemony models, which built a counter-hegemony against *Pax Britannica*, vis-à-vis those of China, which is presently constructing

a counter-hegemony against *Pax Americana*. The case study seeks to ascertain causal mechanisms in the course of the U.S. and China's attempts to establish their counter-hegemony, and closely observes why and how these counter-hegemony attempts were conducted.

Gramsci and the Idea of Hegemony in International Relations

The modern state emerges from the unity of political and civil society. The state does not dominate the political sphere exclusively with "coercive" tools, such as law enforcement, the military, or the police, all of which allow the ruling class to dominate the political sphere. It also enjoys "consent" tools such as the media, education, cultural dominance, and ideology to manage civil society. In other words, the state does not exist only via its monopoly on the use of violence, as Max Weber stated, but also by its ability to create consent.[5] The power established by the combined use of consent and coercive tools is called "hegemony" by Gramsci. One of the primary purposes of hegemony, which is established by consent rather than coercive tools, is to ensure that the values, moral norms and worldview of the ruling class are adopted by the ruled class.[6] Thus, the power relations achieved by force have been rearticulated as elements of consent. In this context, hegemony is also defined by Gramsci as "consensus protected by the armor of force."[7] Robert Gilpin states that hegemony is established as a result of the unity of coercive power over other actors and their desire to participate voluntarily in the system.[8] On the other hand, Joseph S. Nye Jr. considers this difference as an effort by the hegemon to convince other states to adopt its will voluntarily rather than force it upon them.[9]

An active role must be taken to achieve hegemony in the economic sphere. First, national orientations in the social, political, and intellectual sphere should be integrated with global tendencies.[10] Second, institutions should have the capacity to direct civil society and establish moral hegemony, and should include the demands, expectations and interests of the governed classes within power relations and base hegemony on active consent.[11] Intellectual and moral leadership can only be founded on active consent.[12] Finally, ideational designs should construct norms, transformations, and forms by obtaining the universal consent of other groups. Thus, Cox re-conceptualized the phenomenon of hegemony,

which Gramsci uses to explain the relationship between classes on a national scale.[13]

The hegemony achieved through force and consent on a systemic scale means that other states give consent to the dominant state's position, which establishes its global hegemony through the ruling classes.

Hegemony ensures its continuity not by suppressing the other states' demands by force, but by bringing the system into conformity with its demands. In other words, the peripheral countries imitate and emulate the hegemon.[14] Institutions, on the other hand, prepare an environment where different groups are represented and their interests are included in the system. This understanding ensures the continuity of the hegemon, with institutions providing its legitimate basis.[15]

According to Cox, hegemony is a phenomenon that shows its influence on three levels: the social forces shaped by the relations of production, the forms of state and world order. These three levels mutually interact, and Cox emphasizes the importance of relations of production in the interpretation of historic structures. However, relations of production are not just economic relations, and ideas, social norms and social codes are also evaluated within their framework. Against the Westphalian system, which reduces the state to a unitary structure, the social aspect of the state is emphasized, drawing attention to the historical and social interactions of political and civil societies. Cox states, moreover, that a change in production relations on a national scale can change state structures, and a shift in state structures can lead to a transformation in the world order.[16]

These power transitions demanded by the counter-hegemony are implemented both structurally and dynamically. Structurally, they are constructed through hierarchical realizations between nations that cooperate and compete in degrees of economic, political and social power that alter the global order. This hierarchy outlines the relative roles of nations, the rules, the workings of the system, and then, how powerful countries try to manage international politics. This static table

of structure and rules is complemented by dynamic factors that show how and why power transitions occur in the international system. The concept of power links the structural framework to dynamic change. In this sense, the theory predicts that political interactions between nations are based on the status quo, the widespread acceptance of international rules and norms, and the changing commitment of national elites involved in the establishment of hegemony. Power transition theory does not always characterize the leading nation in the global hierarchy as the hegemon, instead creating the concept of the dominant nation. However, in this article, the dominant nation is limited to hegemons. Hence, while the challengers of the dominant nation can potentially be more numerous, the counter-hegemony claim is more limited as it has different variables.[17]

Cox identifies Gramsci's counter-hegemony with the concept of the counter-historical bloc, which in the socialist order was characterized as the proletariat. He describes a power relationship in the international arena through the phenomenon of hegemon, not an ideological counter-historical bloc. Meanwhile, he also explains that a counter-hegemon may rise in opposition to the hegemon's world order. According to Cox, just as counter-hegemonic movements may emerge as a result of joint initiatives that challenge the decisive role of the dominant states in world politics, they can manifest themselves as global alliances of non-governmental organizations or economic organizations that challenge the position of dominant social forces in the center.[18] Cox argues that there is a variety of possible scenarios for the future.[19] The fact is that capitalism builds its hegemony on the moral, social and information production processes, and the economic and systemic sphere has revealed victim classes in these areas. Their consciousness against hegemony causes the aggrieved classes to come together in a counter-hegemonic movement. Therefore, beyond economy-based class aggrievement produced by the system, counter-hegemony should be built on a doctrine which includes all aggrievement by "people-nations"—be it based on gender, race, culture and/or ecology.[20] The resolution of class-based economic aggrievements alone will not abolish capitalist hegemony.

The Counter-Hegemony of the U.S. against Pax Britannica

The post-Vienna Congress order after 1815 is usually regarded as the beginning of British hegemony. According to Karl Polanyi, the onset of British hegemony points to an "unheard-of phenomenon, that is, a century-old peace process" in the history of Western civilization.[21] Britain had achieved an unrivaled position on a global scale with its economic power and established its preeminence in manufacturing, trade, finance and the military. Thanks to its early industrialization with the invention of the steam engine, and later steamships, Britain enjoyed rising industrial production and trade, achieved the highest gross national product in Europe in 1820, and maintained its lead until 1913. In this period, Britain's share of global production rose from 1.9% to 9.5%.[22] Although Britain's share of global industrial production rose to 32% by the 1870s, its share was declining by the time it established its hegemony and it was controlling 24% of world trade in the 1870s.[23]

Economic Transition

Just as the transformations in the international system gave rise to British hegemony, they also undermined its influence and led to the emergence of counter-hegemonic powers. The revisionist policies of the core countries such as Germany, which took advantage of the power vacuum caused by the transformation of the dynamics on which hegemony was founded, laid the groundwork for the collapse of British hegemony.[24] As free trade became unworkable, states shifted towards protectionism in order to guard their economies. As the gold standard broke down, the U.S. managed to increase its share of global industrial production to 29% by 1881, surpassing Britain, and to 38% by 1906.[25] The transformation in the historical structure was further advanced by the relative weakening of British hegemony before World War I and the gradual loss of its global role in the seas; Germany's unification shifting the balance of power; the increasing influence of the U.S.; and, finally, the prementioned collapse of the gold standard.[26] Eric Hobsbawm considers the Great Depression

> The gradual weakening of Britain's economic and ideological dominance in the period after 1870 led to the dissolution of Pax Britannica and the emergence of a non-hegemonic world order.

of 1929 as the development that prepared the end of the gold standard, which shook British economy to its core.[27]

The gradual weakening of Britain's economic and ideological dominance in the period after 1870 led to the dissolution of *Pax Britannica* and the emergence of a non-hegemonic world order. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, in the last quarter of the 19th century, the U.S. and Germany began to challenge Britain, similar to the challenge of Britain and France to the United Provinces in the 17th century, which was a process that saw the replacement of economic liberalism with protectionism.[28] Germany, which completed its unification in 1871, challenged Britain's political and military influence over continental Europe and its colonies, while the U.S. challenged Britain's global role with its industrial capacity. In other words, Germany directly and the U.S. indirectly challenged Britain as counter-hegemons.[29]

Starting with World War I, Britain abandoned its free trade doctrine, which it saw as one of the main pillars of its hegemony, and preferred more protective policies in order to protect its industry and national economy. Germany's challenge against Britain in World War I failed. The period of uncertainty after the war and the economic depression of 1929 forced all countries to follow protectionist, namely beggar-thy-neighbor, policies. The economic cost of the war, its swelling budget deficit, and international economic instability eroded the British economy, which was already stagnant before the war. This situation made the U.S. the new net creditor in global markets and, by implication the counter-hegemon.[30]

Institutional Evolution

The lack of a rule-maker and the prevalence of nationalist (protectionist) economies would cause capitalism's bankruptcy after the war and allow communist ideology to increasingly find opportunities in the global system. According to Patrick K. O'Brien, the U.S. had to be a temporary and relative stabilizer for the anarchic structure created by the chaotic atmosphere of the system in the post-World War II period.[31] According to Susan Strange, on the other hand, the U.S. hegemony was based on three fundamental dynamics: control over outputs, the structural power provided by the privileged position of the dollar in global markets and the ideological power fed by the neoliberal doctrine.[32] Institutions such

as the IMF, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established by the Bretton Woods Conference, and the United Nations, established by the San Francisco Conference, ensured that the U.S. held the leadership role.[33] The U.S. hegemony, which built the infrastructure of financial adequacy and international institutions, tried to establish an international regulatory regime for the continuity of the system by preventing global crises. The IMF and the World Bank both ensured the regulation of loans to be given to states and allowed other states to control financial developments and capital accumulation on a global scale. In short, the U.S. built the global financial system through the international organizations it designed in the post-World War II period and obtained other actors' consent by allowing them to take part in the system and protect their interests. Member countries adopted and observed the economic and political demands of the Bretton Woods institutions to achieve their national development goals. Thus, postwar treaties like Bretton Woods have guaranteed the adoption of U.S. norms through international organizations. The U.S. built the postwar order not on the axis of multilateralism but on the axis of institutionalism.[34] These institutions, which increase the dependence of other actors on the system, form the basis of the leading role of the U.S.[35]

Through the Bretton Woods organizations, the U.S. cooperated with the elite classes and gained influence through them in developing and underdeveloped countries. Through these organizations, the U.S. provided economic and military protection to foreign elites. In return, they tried to build a pro-American political understanding in their countries by being integrated with the dominant historical structure.

> **Through Bretton Woods institutions, the U.S. hegemony has bound the consent of other actors with institutional grounds, unlike the previous hegemonic powers. This situation made the power of the current hegemon more sustainable and strengthened its legitimacy.**

Through Bretton Woods institutions, the U.S. hegemony has bound the consent of other actors with institutional grounds, unlike the previous hegemonic powers. This situation made the power of the current hegemon more sustainable and strengthened its legitimacy. This understanding manifests how the moral leadership of the U.S. was established.[36]

John Agnew states that U.S. hegemony started to weaken in the 1970s when four developments brought about the questioning of the U.S. global role. First, the Vietnam War turned into a military stalemate with serious economic costs. Second, multinational companies shifted their production, especially to the East Asian region, due to cheap labor, which led to a surplus of imports causing a budget deficit. Third, starting in the 1970s, West Germany and Japan began to take a more active role and increase their share of global trade economically. Finally, as a result of the conflict between Israel and Arab countries, the unfaltering U.S. support for Israel led to the OPEC oil crisis.[37] Due to these developments, the Bretton Woods system was gradually phased out as the fixed exchange rate system and was replaced by a floating exchange rate system.[38] The U.S. abandoned the payment of gold in exchange for dollars, turned to wage and price controls, increased taxes on imported products, and finally devalued the dollar. The unilateral policies of the U.S. indicated the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.

Ideational Designs

U.S. hegemony is ideologically based on liberal values, democracy, stability, international peace and human rights.[39] Although the U.S. has ensured its dominance by creating institutions, it has delegated the burden to other states, making them dependent stakeholders of the system and, therefore, increasing the importance of international institutions. These organizations' legal infrastructure was also created in favor of U.S. leadership, and an order was established to control the states' economic, social, and political organizations.[40] Unlike Britain, eschewing colonial initiatives and instead adopting the principle of self-determination has been vitally important in establishing this consent. According to John Ikenberry, the most important reason for other actors' consent rather than resistance to the U.S. hegemony is that the U.S. provides global services such as security, protection, and a free market.[41] Nye, however, believed that the system built by the U.S. after World War I and II is based on Wilsonism and the balance of power.

Challenging the U.S. Hegemony: 1970s-2008

During *Pax Americana*, Washington witnessed ideational, institutional and economic crises. An ideational crisis emerged following the U.S. military intervention in Vietnam in 1963-1973. Washington's attempts to use its superpower status in favor of its national interests, with regard to international norms that underpinned the consent element of its hegemony, called into question the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony.[42] Thus, the necessity for the harmonious and legitimate operation of coercion and consent tools emerged. Using coercion tools in an irrational, exclusive and privileged way, in other words, without considering the international community, may lead to the questioning of the tools that construct consent. Thirty years later, after September 11 attacks, the U.S. also unilaterally invaded Iraq in 2003 by declaring a "global fight against terrorism". However, it could not even fully convince its Western allies about the legitimacy of this military intervention. "You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror" approach adopted by the George W. Bush administration in this process shows that the tools of coercion took precedence over the tools of consent for the U.S. Thus, the harmony between coercion and consent was disrupted.

The institutional crisis faced by U.S. hegemony was the 1971 economic crisis as a result of which the U.S. dollar, the only valid exchange unit on the U.S. gold exchange, was withdrawn from the market. In other words, the U.S. abandoned the Bretton Woods institutions that were at the heart of its economic hegemony. In addition, due to the U.S. support to Israel in the Arab-Israeli wars, the OPEC, which mainly consists of Arab countries, created an artificial scarcity to drive up oil prices, thereby hampering oil-based global production and trade to generate a global crisis. Far from fulfilling its stabilizing role, the hegemonic power, triggered new crises and undermined its leadership role.

> **The institutional crisis faced by U.S. hegemony was the 1971 economic crisis as a result of which the U.S. dollar, the only valid exchange unit on the U.S. gold exchange, was withdrawn from the market.**

The economic crisis took place in 2008 when the U.S.-centered financial crisis turned into a global problem. The situation is considered to have introduced into the background the concepts of risk and control alongside the understanding of "laissez faire et laissez passer" (let it be and let it pass), the basic motto of the neo-liberal policies implemented after the 1980s. The mortgage crisis, which emerged in the real estate market, spread to all financial markets. The U.S.-centered problem spread first to Europe and then to the world and turned into a global economic crisis. The impact of a U.S.-centered crisis on all global markets has caused the developed and developing states to review their integration into the U.S. economy and caused growing economies to take national measures.

Until the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, it was envisaged that U.S. hegemony and unipolar world order would be a prominent and permanent element of international politics.[43] However, with the crisis, U.S. hegemony was shaken, and doubts about the *Pax Americana* increased, all the while China continued its economic growth, enabling global capital to shift from the West to the East.[44] Since the global financial crisis, the military, economic and ideological superiority that forms the basis of U.S. hegemony has gradually been eroding, and Washington is increasingly losing its ascendancy in these areas. However, it should be noted here that the resolution of *Pax Americana* is not the result of a global crisis, but of a process that has been going on for decades. According to Christopher Layne, there are two reasons for the erosion of U.S. hegemony: one external and one internal. The external reason is the rise of China, and the internal reason is the U.S. financial problems. In fact, the point that distinguishes the current weakening of the U.S. hegemony from the weakening in the 1980s is not the existence of an external cause in the context of the rise of a new power, but the chronic budget and current account deficit of the U.S., excessive consumption, low savings,[45] income inequality and stagnant real incomes.[46] As a consequence of its financial and economic decadence, the unchallenged era of U.S. hegemony is waning.[47] Furthermore, at the G20 summit in 2009, President Obama stated that the U.S. could not be an engine for the recovery of global markets, and pointing to the rising powers, he stated that everyone should fulfill their responsibilities.[48] In other words, apart from losing its economic control, the U.S. now lacks the

political and ideological power to rehabilitate or rebuild the system.[49]

According to John Mearsheimer, the liberal international order that the U.S. and its allies tried to build in the post-Cold War period faced three challenges.[50] The first of these was a group of initiatives such as the export of democracy and regime change in authoritarian countries, increased nationalist tendencies on a regional and global scale, and strengthened norms such as self-determination and sovereignty. Second, with globalization, borders are gradually losing their importance. In addition, the deepening and widening of international institutions' decision-making powers over national governments have triggered political and social fragility within liberal states. Thus, national identity and sovereignty once again became the dominant value of political and social events. Finally, hyper-globalization has caused liberal states to lose power economically. With the shift of capital to the Asia-Pacific, liberal states are trapped in a spiral of unemployment, increasing inequality in income distribution, and the gradual weakening of the middle class.[51] Thus, while the global financial system has become increasingly unstable, liberal states have faced severe economic, social, and political tensions. Mearsheimer has pointed out that China gradually increased its production power by taking advantage of the reflections of the hyper-globalizing age. China is seeking to dominate the global market with global projects such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), BRICS, the New Development Bank, Made in China 2025 and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[52] In addition, as Mearsheimer states, China is using its economic influence to try to integrate Asian countries into the order fed by Beijing, rather than by Washington.[53] In short, these initiatives are footprints of the China-centered "bounded order", to use Mearsheimer's term.[54]

China as a Counter-Hegemonic Power against Pax Americana

Drawing on Cox's emphasis on economic capacity, institutions and ideational design in power building, Bo Peng examines China's position in the international system across three historical periods.[55] The first period is between 1949 and 1971 when China refused to take part in the current system and the UN, Bretton Woods and NATO—i.e. the projections of U.S. hegemony. The second period saw the acceptance

and integration process covering the period between 1971 and 2008. During this period, in addition to accepting the norms of the existing system, China constantly sought to entrench its position within the system. The process that began with "ping-pong diplomacy" with Washington in 1971 evolved into competitive cooperation between the U.S. and China, and advanced within the framework of the Deng Xiaoping government's "Reform and Opening-up Policy" of 1978. During this period, the Chinese economy became the second largest in the world with a long-term growth unprecedented in history. Thus, China ceased to be an actor in opposition to the system and integrated into the existing order's institutions. The last period has been ongoing since the 2008 global crisis, and has seen China adopt a more proactive role.[56]

Economic Capacity

In the wake of Mao Zedong's death in 1978, Deng restructured the Chinese economic system and integrated it into the global financial system. By abandoning the ideology-based isolationist model of the Mao era, Deng initiated a development model fed by reform and opening similar to the East Asian Tigers model. The most urgent plan for China was to bring together a country that was isolated during the Mao era with technology and integrate high-value-added products and labor advantage.[57] China grew its GDP each year by more than 10% from 1978 to 2010.[58] It became the world's largest exporter in 2009 and the world's second-largest economy in 2010.[59] The 2008 economic crisis affected both China's economic development and the global markets. China's GDP growth became 7.9% in 2012 and 6.9% in 2017. According

In 1978, China performed about 1% of global industrial production, while by 2015, it was able to perform 12% of global industrial production.

to World Bank data, China's national income increased from $149.541 billion in 1978 to $309.488 billion in 1985, $734.547 billion in 1995, $2.286 trillion in 2005, $11.000 trillion in 2015, and $13.608 trillion in 2018.[60] In 1978, China performed about 1% of global industrial production, while by 2015, it was able to perform 12% of global industrial production.[61] Thus, China has succeeded in surpassing the U.S. by increasing its share in global production.

Table 1: China's GDP Growth

GDP in current prices (trillions of US dollars)

0.3T	0.3T	0.3T	0.3T	0.3T	0.3T	0.3T	0.4T	0.5T	0.4T
0.4T	0.5T	0.6T	0.6T	0.7T	0.9T	1.0T	1.0T	1.1T	1.2T
1.3T	1.5T	1.7T	2.0T	2.3T	2.8T	3.6T	4.6T	5.1T	6.1T
7.5T	8.6T	9.6T	10.5T	11.2T	11.2T	12.1T	13.4T	14.2T	15.5T

PRC Presidents: Li Xiannian | Yang Shangkun | Jiang Zemin | Hu Jintao | Xi Jinping

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, 2019

While the U.S. industrial production was $1.790 trillion in 2006, China has stood at $1.150 trillion. In 2016, the U.S. industrial production amounted to $2.116 trillion, while China's industrial output increased to $3.225 trillion.[62] Thus, as of 2010, the U.S. lost its leadership in global production, which it took over from Britain at the end of the 19th century, to China. China became the largest industrial power in 2010, accounting for almost 20% of global industrial production. As of 2013, China has had the largest share of international trade. In terms of purchasing power parity, China reached $19.617 trillion in 2017, surpassing the U.S. with $19.519 trillion in purchasing power parity, and became the country with the highest purchasing power parity.[63] These developments are perceived as signals of a shift in the global economic balance of power towards Asia.[64]

China's position during this period was described as "wide consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits" by Xi Jinping, China's president. According to him, it is necessary to build a system where all parties have a more equal say in the system and where shares are distributed more fairly. In this context, by announcing the "New Asian Security Concept", China drew attention to the importance of regional security and economic cooperation. By promoting economic integration with regional actors, China strove to build a common regional perspective.

Institutional Processes

China is promoting new international initiatives to strengthen its regional and global position while strengthening its role in existing Western-based organizations. In this context, as mentioned earlier, the AIIB, BRICS, BRI and the New Development Bank stand out as new initiatives that China offers to regional and global governance. The Shanghai Five, designed as a regional and collective security organization, was reformed as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization under China's leadership. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which envisages a free trade agreement that will improve cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, and BRICS, which envisages Chinese partnership with countries such as Russia, India, South Africa, and Brazil, constitute alternatives to the institutional structures of U.S. hegemony. In addition, China established global cooperation with the BRI and enriches alternative institutionalization initiatives by integrating them with different dimensions. This initiative, which aims to connect the East Asian basin with the European basin, covers countries with growth potential along this route. A modern Silk Road has been designed by integrating contiguous land, sea, and rail transportation systems along the route. This initiative is a global design, unlike China's regional initiatives, and foresees the construction of important trade centers at strategic points with port investments made on the sea route. In this context, Chinese companies are carrying out the infrastructure and construction of many ports in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe—such as Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka, Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Lamu in Kenya, Bagamoyo in Tanzania, Piraeus in Greece, and Khalifa in the United Arab Emirates.[65] With the BRI, a significant part of global trade will become integrated with China, increasing China's influence on global trade, and contributing approximately 7% to it. China is building the economic infrastructure of the post-hegemonic order and is integrating itself into this order via the vital networks it has established. [66]

Ideational Instruments

With its counter-hegemonic movement and its regional and global initiatives, China aims to attract the consent of other actors by offering new concepts to the existing global financial doctrine, integration models,

common security understanding, dominant ideology, norms, and paradigms. In other words, China seeks to form a sociopolitical ground for its counter-hegemony strategy. To reformulate the global governance design, China proposes innovative ideas and designs that consider the current power distribution rather than that of the post-Cold War era. Otherwise, it would be impossible to erode the existing hegemonic structure. The fact that China does not interject its political claims in its foreign policy rhetoric shows that it does not want to challenge the U.S. in the sphere of political power. Based on Chinese discourse, such as broad consultation, joint contribution, shared benefits, economic integration and development, China seems to want to maintain the struggle for counter-hegemony in different spheres of power, rather than in the political and military sphere.

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The trade and economic relations based on a win-win understanding that China offers, especially to underdeveloped and developing countries and bilateral relations compatible with a global system that respects the sovereign rights of other countries are seen as an alternative development model. In the words of Joshua Cooper Ramo, the model China presents has been defined as the "Beijing Consensus" in juxtaposition to the "Washington Consensus."[67] Stefan Halper, on the other hand, believes that the American model is no longer the only alternative as the Beijing Consensus provides an alternative to the instruments of the American model (i.e. free market and liberal democracy).[68]

Does China Challenge the Western Hegemonic Model or Seek to Establish a New System?

Arguing that the unipolar structure of the existing order has eroded, Mearsheimer states that the U.S. should give up its claim to international order and surround China by building a "bounded order" as in the Cold

War period.[69] According to Mearsheimer, China will first seek regional and then global hegemony.[70] China's attempts to expand its influence and become a geopolitical power center in its own region, just as the U.S. established a regional sphere of influence against British hegemony in the early 20th century, may pave the way for a U.S.-China conflict.[71] Although China describes its rise as a peaceful rise, China's growth is threatening. Equivalent rises against the then current system can be evaluated with reference. Likewise, Layne considers the rise of China to be no exception making room for itself in the institutional structure of the existing system, since China is seeking to develop new institutional mechanisms to replace existing institutions. By establishing asymmetric relations through these initiatives, China deepens its economy-based dependence and gains a vital position in the eyes of all actors.[72]

According to the general view, even if China increases its dominance in other areas, it is considered incapable of catching up with the U.S. militarily. While Layne states that the U.S. should maintain its military superiority in three vital geographies, namely Europe, the Middle East and Asia, he draws attention to China's goal of being militarily decisive in its region.[73] Therefore, according to Layne, China and the U.S. have different geopolitical strategic priorities. He argues that currently China has the military power to challenge the status quo in Asian region, but it does not have the geopolitical goal of challenging U.S. military supremacy in every corner of the world.

While the U.S. also made global initiatives economically in the *Pax Britannica* process, it adopted a regional strategy rather than a global strategy militarily, since it sought to consolidate its power in Asia instead of colonizing it like Britain. In the same way, while China is developing its global enterprises economically, it signals that it has no intention of balancing the U.S. militarily outside the Asia-Pacific region. At this point, the similarity between the regional military priorities of the U.S. and China rather than global initiatives in their quest for counter-hegemony is remarkable. Just as the U.S. established a regional sphere of influence against British hegemony in the beginning of the 20th century, China would seek to become a geopolitical power center in its region.[74] In short, China has reached the capacity to challenge U.S. hegemony's economic, military and institutional projections on the regional scale.[75]

The second view regarding China's capacity to build hegemony predicts that the rise of China will not pose a threat and will affect the distribution of power in the existing order rather than the order itself, thus preserving the liberal order. According to this view, proposed by Ikenberry, the liberal hegemonic order is gradually weakening.[76] In other words, while the liberal hegemonic order was an "inside order" in the Cold War era, it became an "outside order" in the post-Cold War period.[77] For this, the current liberal order needs to be reshaped, reordered, and reformed according to the existing global design rather than the Cold War design.[78]

Ikenberry states that if the U.S. enters into one-on-one competition with China, China will eventually undermine its global position. However, if the U.S. puts mutual competition with China aside, seeks to strengthen liberal values—if it does not see China's economic growth as a threat—and forces it to stay in the liberal order, it could maintain its global position. Ikenberry argues that the rise of China will not pave the way for geopolitical transformations.[79] Even if the global position of the U.S. erodes, the liberal international order will continue to be the determining dynamic of international politics in the 21st century.[80] In fact, this means that China will never be a hegemonic power, as it will not be able to achieve ideological superiority and rule-making power, or, in other words, gain moral leadership. In short, emerging powers are not challenging liberal norms and institutions but rather the distribution of power in the existing order. Therefore, Ikenberry contends that the structure of the existing system should be reformed, not its essence.[81]

The last view on China's capacity to build hegemony is that China cannot transform the current system or the power distribution in the system. The fact that China can take the place of the U.S. economically does not mean that it can take its place on a geopolitical scale. China ranks 26th according to the latest published index in terms of attractiveness of its values, while the U.S. is in the top three. Meanwhile,

> **China ranks 26th according to the latest published index in terms of attractiveness of its values, while the U.S. is in the top three. Meanwhile, U.S. military spending is four times higher than China's.**

U.S. military spending is four times higher than China's.[82] There are two reasons why China does not choose to challenge the U.S. military role: First, in the hegemonic establishment, such as *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana*, military superiority gradually loses its meaning. The increasing destructiveness of military facilities makes the superiority in this field increasingly meaningless. In this context, deterrence capacity and technological infrastructure are more important than superiority of military power. Second, while the U.S. is searching to maintain its military superiority in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, China considers its military deterrence sufficient at its regional level.

Although other countries are increasing their economic, military, and political shares on a global scale and the share of the U.S. is gradually decreasing, at the moment, it is not possible, including China, for any country to take the global role of the U.S.[83] According to Nye, the U.S. should abandon the Wilsonian interventionist foreign policy approach because each intervention in the name of democracy and liberal values triggers resistance, and Wilson's legacy of developing international organizations must be embraced.[84] Leadership is different than dominance and requires sharing. By sharing its economic and political power through these organizations, the U.S. should gain the consent of other actors and, in this manner, secure its leadership. Thus, Nye argues that the global role of the U.S. cannot be threatened by an emerging economic power from outside, but by emerging populism fed by income and tax inequality at home.[85]

Conclusion

The counter-hegemony model is a concept used within alternative power systems created to challenge hegemony. According to neo-Gramscian theory, in order to create this model, first material dominance must be ensured and then it must be supported by establishing a consent mechanism with social forms. This article focuses on the consent construction aspect of counter hegemony. Challenging *Pax Brittanica*, the U.S. overthrew Britain's power primarily materially, without clashing the international system in place. After World War I and II, when Britain was weak and had lost its international sovereignty, the U.S. took on the role of being a direct counter-hegemon. The U.S. implemented this

by establishing forms of social dominance after gaining material power and upheld *Pax Americana* between 1945 and 1970s. In the 1970s, China could challenge *Pax Americana*, acting in harmony with the international system. Until 2008, China became an important counter-hegemon to *Pax Americana* by realizing material factors in regional and global terms. According to the post-2008 Chinese discourse, an attempt to create a *Pax Sinica* started by activating social forms.

Table 2: Evaluation of U.S. and Chinese Counter-Hegemony Initiatives

	U.S. counter-hegemony	*Chinese counter-hegemony*
Environment	Absence of leadership	Sustaining privileged position of the U.S. (*primus inter pares,* or first among equals)
Order	Multipolar world	Multiplex world[86]
Method	Building counter-hegemony with isolationist policy	Building counter-hegemony by enhancing, deepening, and expanding institutions
Means	Wilsonism and self-determination	"Eastphalian" sovereignty
Aims	Washington Consensus	Beijing Consensus

Table 2 illustrates the distinctions between the two counter-hegemony initiatives when compared according to the neo-Gramscian perspective, which underscores the tools of consent rather than the tools of coercion in the sustainability of hegemony. The different tendencies can be summed along five points. First, when investigating the environment in the counter-hegemony attempts of the two powers, Britain, which was the power that the U.S. would indirectly challenge, had lost its role as hegemon on the world stage in the anarchic period between World War I and II, and the U.S. benefited from the power vacuum in the international system. On the other hand, China is faced with a hegemon that has not lost its power at all. The position of the U.S. might have eroded, but it has sustained its privileged position especially militarily and financially. The U.S. position can be perceived as *primus inter pares*, or first among equals; it accumulated power and founded an order around a single center that consolidated its global role by integrating ideas and norms with economic power. *Pax Sinica* would also represent a hegemonic understanding similar to *Pax Americana* by integrating economic power and ideas in the complex world order.

Second, when *Pax Britannica* was declining, a multipolar order was dominant in the international system. In terms of systemic design, multipolarity referred exclusively to material capabilities. The phenomenon conceptualized as multipolarity in the international system today does not entail only the distribution of material capabilities. Multipolarity at a time when the U.S. led order is in decline signals more than distribution of power. Amitav Acharya conceptualizes the system as a multiplex world,[87] only one component of which is the distribution of power. This concept puts emphasis on various components that influence great power relations, including economic interdependence, domestic systems, norms and multilateral institutions. Thus, the Chinese counter-hegemony initiatives are taking place in a multiplex world rather than the multipolar world in which the U.S. pursued its own counter-hegemony initiatives against Britain.

Third, the U.S. became stronger by methodically pursuing a policy of isolation, protecting its borders from foreign interventions, and promising "bounded and hierarchic order" or "less than global order"[88] rather than international or global order. Beijing provides significant economic input to developing countries through its huge interconnected and deepened investments.[89] It seeks to deepen and institutionalize regional relations with regional organizations, and has embarked on building South-South relations to diversify global governance through organizations such as BRICS, and promoting the BRI to offer a new role model for global cooperation. Increasingly, China appears to be in pursuit of enriching alternative regional and global institutionalization initiatives by integrating them into different dimensions. In this context, China gives its development a universal character.

Fourth, unlike Britain's colonial aggrandizement, the U.S. was able to obtain consent for its counter-hegemony process by adopting the principle of self-determination. However, the hegemon's unilateral action and using "coercion" tools in an irrational, exclusive, and privileged way in other words, without considering the international community—has undermined and led to a questioning of the self-determination principle. China has opposed military interventions to facilitate regime change, the undertaking of responsibility to protect initiatives, and unilateral intervention based on presumed human rights violations, offering instead the model of "Eastphalian

sovereignty" which stresses the right of non-interference.[90] It is a new form of sovereignty that may pave the way for gaining the consent of other actors without engendering worries of unilateral action by the hegemon without the consent of the international community. This is analogous to the self-determination and Wilsonism that attracted actors concerned by the colonial initiatives of Britain to consent to the U.S.-led counter-hegemony.

Last but not least, the liberal values that marked the 20th century are today faced with certain dilemmas. China has proven that economic growth can be achieved not only within the framework of liberal policies but also with an authoritarian approach, especially in the period after the 2008 global financial crisis. In this context, in the international system, where conflicts deepen day by day and instability is increasing, management systems show a more authoritarian orientation. Thus, the magic of the political, economic, military, and ideological projection that China offers is increasingly replacing the appeal of liberalism.[91] However, the Chinese model premised on Beijing Consensus is complicated to imitate unlike the Washington Consensus. China has not been seeking to export its model to other countries until now because the Chinese model is a system that emerged from the political experiences of China and is a product of China's geographical, influence, and demographic structure.[92] On the other hand, it seems that China is becoming an alternative power not only for the Asian countries, but also for other countries of the world. As a potential hegemonic power, it has succeeded in rapidly developing the instruments necessary for its transition to a global player by the changes it has made in its foreign policy understanding.

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ARTICLE

Anglo-Ottoman Relations in the Gulf during the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)

Bilal Emre BİRAL[*]

Abstract

This article sheds light on the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Britain with regard to the Gulf during the reign of Abdulhamid II (i.e. from 1876 to 1909). Anglo-Ottoman relations in the Gulf developed within the framework of the general deterioration of Anglo-Ottoman relations after the mid-1870s. Britain attached great importance to the Gulf due to the region's position on the route to India and did not want the presence of any third power there. Britain tried to achieve this goal through its special relations – particularly by signing protection agreements – with the local sheikhs. On the other hand, as indicated in the Ottoman state documents, the Ottomans regarded Britain not only as a third party, but also as a threat to their empire's presence in the region. Even though a number of factors limited the Ottomans' capacity to challenge Britain, Abdulhamid II followed a realist policy that avoided steps which would empower and increase British dominance in the Gulf.

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Introduction

By the beginning of the 19th century, nationalist movements, internal insurgencies, foreign interventions, and a number of wars had weakened the Ottoman Empire to the point that its viability began to be questioned. The questioning survival of the Ottoman state became known to the Western great powers as the "Eastern Question," and the Ottoman state came to be referred to as the "Sick Man of Europe".[1]

Napoleon's occupation of Egypt (1798-1801) exposed the fact that the Ottoman Empire could not defend its distant territories on its own. The Wahhabi-Saudi Rebellion (1811-1818) in Arabia could only be suppressed with the help of the army of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. Meanwhile Russia encouraged the people of the Balkan territories to rise against the Ottomans and consequently, Ottomans faced a number of nationalist upheavals in the Balkans. The Ottomans had to call Mehmed Ali Pasha again for suppressing the Greek insurgency (1821-1829) which was openly supported by the great powers in the West. After all, Mehmed Ali Pasha himself raised against the Sublime Porte in 1829-1833 and again in 1839.

These developments revealed that the Ottoman Empire had to depend on one or more foreign supporter(s) in order to ensure its survival. Britain became a strong supporter of the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity because it saw the Empire as a useful barrier against Russian expansion toward the Middle East and India. Together with France, Britain intervened in the Crimean War (1853-1856) to avert Russia. However, this support came at a cost. The great powers began to interfere more and more in the Ottoman Empire's internal affairs, exerting strong economic and political influence throughout the empire.[2]

Under these conditions, Ottomans felt threatened from Basra and Yemen in the south to the westernmost cities of the Balkans. Throughout the 19th century, the most important concern for Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals was the elimination of these threats and ensuring the empire's continuity.[3] They were convinced that the territorial integrity and existence of the state were in danger. Furthermore, they believed that "the enemies were increasingly able to operate from within."[4] This indicated that foreign states encouraged several groups within the borders of the empire to seek independence and autonomy.[5] The change

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in British foreign policy towards the Ottoman state coincided with the beginning of Sultan Abdulhamid II's reign. Britain evolved from the guarantor of Ottoman territorial integrity to an enemy of the Ottoman state. In addition to the collapse of the Concert of Europe in the 1870s, Britain began to consider that it did not need a territorially integrated Ottoman Empire. In addition, anti-Ottoman public opinion drove Britain away from the Ottoman Empire following allegations of atrocities against Christians in Bulgaria on the eve of the 1877-1878 Russian-Turkish War.

Britain realized that "maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire" was inexpedient for Britain. For instance, Foreign Minister of Britain Lord Salisbury did not consider leaving Istanbul and the Dardanelles Straits to Russia inappropriate. Furthermore, he contended that since the Crimean War Britain had backed the wrong party; in other words, the Ottoman Empire was no more a barrier against Russian penetration in the Near East and British statesmen became convinced that Egypt would be enough to hold on to India.[6]

The tremendous shift in British foreign policy emerged in the Treaty of Berlin signed in 1878.[7] As a result of the treaty, the Ottoman state was forced to forego two-fifths of its territory and one-fifth of its population and was obliged to make reforms for Armenians in the Eastern provinces with Britain becoming the reforms' supervisor. Additionally, the Ottoman Empire was liable to pay heavy war compensation to Russia.[8] After the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878, the British occupation of Cyprus occurred and in 1881, the French occupied Tunisia. The British invasion of Egypt in 1882 abolished any remaining possibility for a recovery in Anglo-Ottoman relations.

Furthermore, the financial pressure by the West increased excessively at the beginning of Abdulhamid II's rule. The bankruptcy of the treasury was institutionalized with the establishment of the Ottoman Public

Debt Administration in 1881 which left the administration of Ottoman finance in the hands of foreign debtor states.[9]

At the same time, Abdulhamid II's rule began with increased suspicion from the Ottoman side towards Britain due to developments such as the British invasion of Cyprus and Egypt, and the pressure for reforms for Armenians. Additionally, Abdulhamid II suspected British involvement in the coup d'état against Sultan Abdulaziz in 1876 and the subsequent coup attempt (Çırağan Palace Raid) against him by Ali Suavi in 1878.[10]

In addition to the deteriorating Anglo-Ottoman relations, the emerging alliances between Russia and France in 1893 and Britain and France in 1904 on the eve of World War I made benefiting from the conflict of interests of the European great powers difficult for Abdulhamid II.[11] Unlike his predecessors, Abdulhamid II had to ensure the survival of the empire in a different context and with much more limited alliance options.

Consequently, a negative stance quickly developed in the minds of the Ottoman statesmen, intellectuals and, more specifically, Abdulhamid II against Britain. The sultan stated, "Britain is the state which has to be most avoided among [the] Great Powers."[12] Even the well-known Anglophile Ottoman Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha recognized that circumstances had changed since the Crimean War, and Britain might be interested in promoting Armenian and Arab alternatives in Asia.[13] Abdulhamid II and his statesmen believed that Britain would establish "zones of influence" and this would eventually lead to the partition of the Ottoman state.[14]

Under these circumstances, the Ottomans sought a new ally with the view of obtaining assistance for their survival and obstructing the British menace. Thus, a rapprochement began between Germany and the Ottomans since Germany considered the weak Ottoman Empire as a market for its emerging colonial policy that aimed to expand to the East, known as "Drang nach Osten" or "Drive to the East." Germany wanted to benefit from Ottoman resources by peaceful means.[15]

Germany considered that its aims would be better served by the economic, military, and political recovery of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, a strong Ottoman Empire might offer formidable resistance against the Russian and British expansion to the Middle East.

Furthermore, the Ottoman Caliphate might be useful in the Muslim-populated British colonies.[16]

All these factors led to a rapprochement between Germany and the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdulhamid II which witnessed continuous tensions in Anglo-Ottoman relations. This article aims to shed light on this period in Ottoman history which is also important to understand the background of the Ottoman-German alliance in World War I. The first section of the article focuses on the Anglo-Ottoman relations in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Gulf region, while the second section seeks to understand the Ottoman perceptions of the Anglo-Ottoman relations in the Gulf during this time. The third and fourth sections elaborate on how the British and the Ottomans formulated their policies toward the Gulf region under these circumstances.

Anglo-Ottoman Relations in the Arab Provinces of the Ottoman Empire and the Gulf

Abdulhamid II wanted to increase the influence of the Ottoman state in the Arab provinces in order to compensate for the losses in the Balkans after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War. While the Balkans had enjoyed a place of priority in the eyes of the Ottoman state for many years, the Asian and especially Arab parts of the empire came to the fore after this war. What is more, suspicions increased regarding British intentions over the Ottoman territories in Arabia after the occupation of Egypt which Britain pursued in order to protect the route to India after the opening of the Suez Canal. Following the occupation of Egypt, Anglo-Ottoman relations would never be repaired.[17]

Abdulhamid II wanted to increase the influence of the Ottoman state in the Arab provinces in order to compensate for the losses in the Balkans after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War.

The Ottomans were convinced that Britain intended to free Arabs from Ottoman rule by encouraging Arab nationalism, and to establish a rival Arab Caliphate in Mecca or Cairo.[18] Abdulhamid II thought that Britain had designs on the caliphate due to its Muslim population

of approximately 150 million and its notable imperial objectives in the Middle East, such as conquering Arabia and Iraq and steering the Muslim world.

In particular, the Arabian Peninsula was believed to be under British threat based on the premise that Britain attached importance to places from the perspective of the continuation and security of its existence and dominance in India. Therefore, the coasts in Arabia from Qatar to Aden were considered open to British intervention.[19]

Britain considered the entire Gulf as an indispensable part of its imperial ambitions, strategic view, and economic policy. The Gulf was important for Britain because of its colonial presence in India and its plans for Arabia. First and foremost, Britain was concerned about safeguarding the route to India. Lord Curzon, the viceroy of India from 1898 to 1905, pointed out that "British supremacy in India was unquestionably bound with British supremacy in the Gulf, if we lose control of the Gulf we shall not rule long in India."[20] In terms of its plans, Britain could use the Gulf as an entrance point to the Arabian Peninsula from the east.

Considering this imperialist viewpoint, Britain was convinced that it had to hinder any possible rival in the region. The most influential means to exclude other powers were several "protection" agreements signed with the sheikhdoms commencing in the 1820s. Britain never directly occupied any territory in the Gulf, but established special relations with the local autonomous sheikhs which served to control the region and keep away any third power.[21] Britain had been troubled by instances of piracy from the coasts of the Gulf, especially from the so-called Pirate Coast. In the 19th century, the Pirate Coast began to be known as the Trucial Coast as a result of a series of truces signed between Britain and local sheikhdoms in 19th century. . Along with the Pirate Coast, Oman, Muscat,[22] and Bahrain entered into "protection agreements" with Britain that stipulated not to yield any part of their territory to another power and not to enter in relations with a third party without the consent of Britain. Britain also signed protection agreements with Kuwait in 1899 and had very close relations with Qatar with which it signed a protection agreement in 1916.[23]

These agreements were based on the understanding that the sheikhdoms would not sign any agreement or be in relation with another state without British consent in return for the British protection against third parties, particularly against Ottoman rule.[24] In the context of the robust competition of the Western colonial powers in the 19th century, Russia, France, and, lastly, but in a most serious manner, Germany in the late 19th century and early 20th centuries tried to infiltrate the region. For instance, a Russian railway plan that would extend from Kuwait to the Mediterranean port of Tripoli (Kapnist Plan) in 1897-99 was taken very seriously by the British authorities.[25] As a result of the alliances established with France and Russia in 1904 and 1907, respectively, the two countries ceased to be threats for Britain. However, with its well-known Berlin-Baghdad railway project, Germany continued to threaten British interests in the Gulf until the beginning of World War I.[26]

> The Berlin-Baghdad railway brought together Germany and the Ottoman state, and served Germany's economic and strategic interests and ambitions in the Middle East.

The Berlin-Baghdad railway brought together Germany and the Ottoman state, and served Germany's economic and strategic interests and ambitions in the Middle East. It could have also ensured a more active presence for the Ottomans in the Gulf. For instance, the new railway could have made the fast transportation of Ottoman troops to the region possible.[27] Britain was aware that the Berlin-Baghdad railway with a terminus in the Gulf would weaken British interests in Iraq, Persia, and, more importantly, India by bringing together Germany and the Ottoman Empire at a strategically important location.[28] For example, Lord Lansdowne, the British foreign minister, declared in the House of Lords that "[w]e [the British] should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port on the Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and that we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal."[29] This concern led to the protection agreement between Kuwait and Britain mentioned above.

While Britain was against any power establishing a presence in the Gulf, the Ottoman Empire did not view itself as an outside power in the region and, in fact, considered the British there as an outside power.

The Ottomans realized even before Abdulhamid II's rule that British supremacy would be a threat to the Ottoman sovereignty over the Gulf and beyond. This outlook was in parallel with similar policies carried out in several peripheral regions such as Yemen, Transjordan, and Libya within the framework of the Tanzimat centralist reforms. One of the main objectives of these centralist regulations was to consolidate the empire against the challenges from within and abroad. Indeed, these peripheral regions turned into the frontiers and defense lines of the empire.[30]

As a manifestation of this centralist policy, the northern sheikhdoms in the Gulf, including Kuwait, Hasa, Qatar, and inner Najd, were reincorporated into the Ottoman state with the military campaign of 1871 in the time of the Baghdad governorship of Midhat Pasha (1869-1872) whose aim was to counter the British threats.[31]

On the one hand, Midhat Pasha attached importance to Anglo-Ottoman relations as did prominent figures of the Tanzimat such as Rashid, Ali, and Fuat Pashas. On the other hand, these figures calculated that the campaign overall would be more beneficial to the Ottoman state despite certain possible negative consequences.[32] Ali Pasha, the Ottoman grand vizier in 1871, tried to guarantee Britain that the Ottoman government had no intention of threatening British interests in the Gulf, but he failed.[33] Thus, Abdulhamid II continued to pursue the policy of consolidation in the Gulf.[34]

Ottoman Perspective of Anglo-Ottoman Relations in the Gulf

Considering the heavy British influence in the Gulf, Ottoman bureaucrats and the region's notables concluded that the British influence stemmed from the sheikhdoms that acted as British allies. Employing local actors in foreign interventions could be seen in other parts of the Ottoman Empire as well such as the Christian minorities which actively participated in riots across the empire.[35]

Bahrain greatly disturbed the Ottomans because of its independence under British protection. It was considered a base for Britain. It could provide weapons and ammunitions for coastal tribes through Bahrain.[36] After the 1899 protection treaty, Kuwait, as a northernmost sheikhdom, was considered by the Ottomans a considerable barrier separating Basra,

the center of the province, from the southern sheikhdoms.[37] Although the British opposed arms trafficking (in principle), they turned a blind eye to the arms trafficking of Mubarak al-Sabah, the ruler of Kuwait from 1896 to 1915, in order to undermine the Ottoman presence in the region.[38]

According to the report of the Ottoman Council of Ministers (*Meclis-i Vükela*) in 1904, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, the founder and first king of modern Saudi Arabia who seized Riyadh from the Rashidis in 1902 and then ruled Saudis until his death in 1953, was deemed an ally of Britain.[39] Ottomans occasionally even lost their trust in Ibn Rashid,[40] the tribal dynasty which was never under the protection of Britain but rather of the Ottomans. Suspicions aroused due to the accusations by rivals of Rashidis and certain Ottoman officials, as well as his suspicious relations with Britain.[41]

For the Ottomans, the Gulf was not an isolated and remote part of the empire, but a strategic and vulnerable point for the entire Ottoman Empire and Arabia. The proximity of the Gulf to Hejaz was a concern for the Ottoman statesmen. Like the British outlook on India, Hejaz had a prominent importance in the minds of the Ottomans. The Ottomans fought with Portugal in the 16th century primarily to protect Hejaz.[42] The significance of Hejaz increased during the era of Abdulhamid II as keeping it under Ottoman rule strengthened the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate and Ottoman rule over Arabia.[43] The importance of the Gulf for Hejaz compared with other parts of the empire can be easily understood by the fact that the Ottomans considered even North and Central Africa as a "primary line of defense" for their rule over Hejaz and Arabia.[44] The rise of the Wahhabis from Najd in the early 19th century always remained in the minds of the Ottoman statesmen.[45]

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Keeping this outlook in mind, the rise of the local sheikhdoms and the clashes among them were considered to be a British policy for reaching Hejaz.[46] For instance, an order was directed to the Basra governor

(*Vali*) that any clash between Mubarak al-Sabah and Ibn Rashid must be prevented in order to pre-empt any British penetration.[47] Similar concerns were observed two years later, in 1904, with respect to a struggle between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid. The rise of Ibn Saud and his competition with Ibn Rashid intimidated Ottomans because the former could reach Medina following a possible victory over the latter.[48]

British Policies in the Gulf against the Ottomans

The Ottomans believed that Britain was using various means to control the sheikhdoms in the Gulf.[49] Britain pursued an "intelligent and cautious" policy in the region, using indirect instead of direct control. It provided weapons and money to local sheikhs, but refrained from interfering in their local affairs, positioning itself as a protector.[50]

Britain encouraged local tribal leaders to rebel against the Ottoman state, as this would serve its interests by destabilizing the region and providing a pretext for British intervention. The insurrections became possible through new arms and equipment provided to the local tribes by the British.[51]

British ships sailing in the Gulf were accused of participating in the smuggling of weapons in the region, using Bahrain as a hub. The Ottoman naval presence in the Gulf coasts from Qatar to Aden was acknowledged as inadequate or non-existent, making gun smuggling possible for Britain.[52] The rebellion of Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani in 1893, who ruled Qatar from December 1878 to July 1913 and is regarded as the founder of the state of Qatar, could not be suppressed by the Ottomans and was considered a direct result of British-led gun smuggling.[53]

Despite the well-known British nominal opposition to gun smuggling, they ignored this principle in the case of tribes that were allied to them against the Ottomans. Troeller asserts that Lord Curzon believed that preventing the flow of arms to Ibn Saud would likely increase the possibilities of Ottoman dominance in the Gulf's hinterland. He believed that this would, obviously, damage British influence in Kuwait and along the coast, and stated that "once again principle bowed to expediency."[54]

According to the Ottoman sources, the coercion against local leaders and population was another British tool: Britain, if needed, coerced locals to act in line with its policies and objectives. Britain intimidated sheikhs when its interests required, and forced local people to obey the interests of sheikhs under its protection. For example, Britain forced locals who escaped the oppression of the Bahraini Sheikh by moving Zibare (Qatar) to return to Bahrain.[55]

Ottomans believed that the dominance of Britain in the Gulf was possible thanks to British ships. Using the aforementioned tools such as provocation, arms smuggling, and coercion was only possible because of the existence of British ships. In addition, British ships performed symbolic functions by saluting the sheikhs which implicitly implied their autonomy and the supremacy of Britain over the region.[56]

With an aim of showing British pre-eminence in the Gulf, Viceroy Lord Curzon made a journey, escorted by several ships, towards the region in 1903. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne described Lord Curzon's journey as a British declaration to retain its paramount position in the Gulf. The journey served as a subtle warning to Russia, France, Germany and, obviously, the Ottoman state.[57]

The Ottoman Positioning in the Gulf

Ottomans thought hard on how to keep the region under their rule. They tried to apply certain policies in parallel with the priorities of the era of Abdulhamid II and the policies that followed after the Tanzimat. Abdulhamid II's Islamist policies were not useful in the region; the heads of the tribes did not care about religion as an imperative to bind them to the Ottoman state. In fact, pragmatic considerations rather than imperatives of religion played a significant role in understanding the politics in the Gulf. If the local leaders acknowledged their submission to the Caliph, i.e., Abdulhamid II, this was not because of their

The lack of Christian missionary activities in the region, unlike in the other parts of the Ottoman Empire such as Jordan, was also partly responsible for the lesser influence of religion as a motivation for attracting people to the Ottoman state against British intervention.

belief in the religious authority of the sultan, but because of temporary pragmatic interests.[58]

The lack of Christian missionary activities in the region, unlike in the other parts of the Ottoman Empire such as Jordan, was also partly responsible for the lesser influence of religion as a motivation for attracting people to the Ottoman state against British intervention. In fact, missionaries were a "catalyst of change" in the Ottoman society which led to a demand for a "defensive reaction from the government".[59] Yapp argues that the European powers avoided missionary activities in the Gulf, and states that "they [European powers] preferred that the Gulf should remain in cocooned seclusion."[60] Consequently, the people of the Gulf did not need to take refuge in the Ottoman state as a shelter against Christian influence.

The Ottoman Empire claimed sovereignty over the Gulf based on historical, legal, and geographical arguments. For instance, in the official instruction sent by the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ottoman Ambassador in London, it was reiterated that the Ottoman Empire could not accept an agreement between Britain and Mubarak al-Sabah given that Kuwait was not a sovereign, independent state and Mubarak was a subject of the Ottoman Empire. The ambassador was ordered to share with his counterparts that Sheikh Mubarak acknowledged his loyalty to the sultan in his ordinary official communications with the governor (*mutasarrıf*) of Najd, and that his official relations with the Ottoman state could not be ignored by any state. It was emphasized that if an agreement were to be signed regarding the security of commercial ships on the coasts of Najd, it could only be done with the Ottoman state, not with a local sheikh. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also referred to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which was guaranteed by the international agreements to which Britain was part. In this regard, Kuwait was part of the Ottoman Empire so the intervention of foreign powers could not be accepted.[61]

Tahsin Pasha, the highest-ranking official at Yıldız Palace, forwarded the Palace's feedback on the treaty/protocol between Mubarak al-Sabah and Britain to the grand vizier. Therein, it was stated that the treaty/ protocol would only hold Mubarak al-Sabah accountable - not the

people nor the land of Kuwait.[62] At the same time, the Ottomans were unable to defend their sovereignty claims through military means and confront Britain directly. In fact, Abdulhamid II and his administration did not take risks in defense of a nominal rule.[63] This Ottoman policy was based on the belief that any conflict with the British would have more serious negative consequences for the Ottoman presence in the region and would lead to increased British intervention. Therefore, the Ottomans sought to maintain the status quo and did not want to provide the British with a reason to transform their de facto dominance in the Gulf into a de jure presence.

What is more, the Ottomans even requested from the local sheikhs who were close to them not to confront Britain or the sheikhs under British protection. The Ottomans were convinced that any disorder, regardless of who initiated it, might give Britain a pretext for further intervention into the region, which would ultimately allow for the consolidation of British supremacy.[64]

> **By the 1850s, the Tanzimat reforms and, before them, Mahmud II's centralist reforms had succeeded in eliminating the autonomy of the local leaders (ayans) in the provincial centers of the Ottoman Empire such as Basra. Nevertheless, Ottoman authority did not reach beyond certain provincial centers such as south of Basra.**

Ottoman officials occasionally acknowledged and discussed the de-facto situation in the Gulf. The governor (*vali*) of Basra in 1893 underlined that Kuwait was not under the direct administration of the Ottoman state: it was ruled by the al-Sabah family and they received a particular symbolic quantity of dates (*hurma*) from the state as a salary. The governor indicated the nominal status of the Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait. The yearbooks (*salnames*) also pointed to the status of the district governor (*kaymakam*) of Kuwait as "honorary" (*fahri*), which indicated the nominal character of the title.[65] For instance, when an Ottoman corvette was sent to Kuwait to interfere in an internal dispute, it was blocked by a British ship.[66]

As already discussed, the main factor that made the influence of Britain over the Gulf possible was the autonomy of the tribes. Ottoman sovereignty would have been more influential if a stronger authority had been established whereby the state could directly enter into relations with individuals by bypassing the local leaders. Although these tribes were under nominal Ottoman rule, they could enter into direct relations with Britain whenever they thought it would maximize their interests. In other words, the tribes could manipulate both the Ottoman state and Britain.

By the 1850s, the Tanzimat reforms and, before them, Mahmud II's centralist reforms had succeeded in eliminating the autonomy of the local leaders (*ayans*) in the provincial centers of the Ottoman Empire such as Basra. Nevertheless, Ottoman authority did not reach beyond certain provincial centers such as south of Basra. Autonomous tribal authority in the peripheral regions of the Arabian Peninsula retained significant autonomy, including the ability to collect taxes and administer justice within communities. In these regions, the tribes shared sovereignty with the state, according to Rogan.[67] Midhat Pasha's military mission in 1871 tried to bring the Gulf under a centralist rule, but it was too late for establishing a powerful centralist administration that could have both abolished the autonomy of the tribes and inhibited British intervention in the context of the changed Anglo-Ottoman relations.

To understand the level of independence enjoyed by the sheikhdoms better, it is helpful to compare their status with that of the Hejaz region under Ottoman rule. Despite the long-standing autonomy and privileges of the sharifs of Mecca, Abdulhamid II had the power to depose and exile them, as happened with Sharif Hussein, who was sent to Istanbul - similar actions were not possible in the Gulf. For example, the Ottomans were unable to exile Mubarak al-Sabah to Istanbul despite their wishes.[68]

There is also another aspect of the British penetration of the Gulf region that should be kept in mind: the Ottoman struggle with the local Gulf leaders did not stem from Arabist-separatist inspirations that existed in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, including several areas of Arabia such as Syria and Lebanon.[69] In those regions, the Ottomans had to deal with the autonomy, "fierce independence," and belligerence of the

desert tribesmen rather than the ethnic ideological objectives of the people in the Gulf.[70] It should be also kept in mind that the autonomy of the local leaders was strong due to the fact that they were backed by Britain. In this context, the Ottomans could not even trust the sheikhs close to them who were always assumed to be playing a double game.

Conclusion

The Ottoman Empire conquered the Gulf region, covering today's Kuwait, Qatar, Hasa, Najd, and Bahrain, in the era of Süleyman I (1520-1566), but Ottoman direct control of the region was very short-lived. By the end of the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire had lost its direct control over the area. In 1871, the Ottoman government attempted to re-establish its central authority in this region.

The Ottoman reconsolidation policy in the Gulf coincided with the great shift in the British foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire in the mid-1870s. Britain turned away from being a defender of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire to becoming the most fervent supporter of its disintegration. Britain changed its strategic view of the Middle East and South East Asia after the opening of the Suez Canal, and adopted a negative stance before and after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War. After the Treaty of Berlin, in addition to its negative stance on the issue of minorities and Ottoman debts, Britain occupied Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt in 1882 in order to protect the Suez Canal.

As a result, Britain began to be deemed as the most hostile state in the eyes of Ottoman elites and especially Sultan Abdulhamid II who suspected British involvement in the coup d'état against Sultan Abdulaziz and himself. The Ottoman Empire searched for a new ally and found a potential one in Germany that saw the Ottoman Empire as a likely partner in its own imperial ambitions. The Ottomans, on their part, saw Germany as a prospective supporter against Britain and the other Western great powers.

The Berlin-Baghdad railway was an ambitious project that connected Germany and the Ottoman state, serving Germany's economic and strategic interests in the Middle East while potentially strengthening the Ottoman presence in the Gulf. Conversely, the British considered the

railway a threat to their interests in the region and its presence a manifestation of a third power in the Gulf.

Abdulhamid II sought to increase Ottoman influence in Arab provinces after losing territory in the Balkans during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878.

The Gulf was especially important for Britain because of its colonial empire in India and its plans for Arabia. Britain's main concern was safeguarding the route to India and it did not consent to a possible rival in the Gulf region.

However, there were heightened Ottoman suspicions about the British intentions towards Ottoman territories in Arabia. The Ottomans believed that Britain was encouraging Arab nationalism in order to establish a rival Arab Caliphate in the Middle East, and saw the Arabian Peninsula as under threat from British intervention. The coasts of Arabia from Qatar to Aden were seen as vulnerable to British intervention due to their strategic importance to British dominance in India.

The Gulf was especially important for Britain because of its colonial empire in India and its plans for Arabia. Britain's main concern was safeguarding the route to India and it did not consent to a possible rival in the Gulf region. With these considerations in mind, it signed several "protection" agreements with the local sheikhdoms.

The Ottoman Empire, however, did not view itself as an outside power to the region. On the contrary, it considered Britain as an outside power which was weakening its rule in the region. According to the Ottomans, the British influence resulted from the fact that a number of sheikhdoms had developed close relations with Britain which encouraged local tribal leaders to rebel against the Ottoman state. British ships were accused of smuggling arms to the tribes, and using coercion against local leaders and people. All these tools were possible by means of British ships, and consequently, while the Ottomans strived with various means, they could not overcome the autonomous sheikhs' relations with Britain. Ultimately, this enabled British dominance in the region.

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ARTICLE

Adam Watson, Raison de Système, and the Practice Turn: Revisiting the Work of Diplomat in the English School

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Abstract

This contribution focuses on the concept of raison de système developed by Adam Watson, a career diplomat and a member of the English School of International Relations. I trace the concept of raison de système across Watson's work, which he deploys against raison d'état, and lay out how its scope has expanded to include economic issues and the collective security agenda since the 19th century. I also consider how raison de système relates to change, culture, ethics, and the role of diplomatic agency in international society. I conclude with an overall assessment of Watson's contribution to our thinking about international society and point to the ways in which his scholarship can be fruitfully synthesized with the recent practice turn in diplomatic studies.

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Introduction

This contribution offers an overview of the concept of *raison de système* as proposed by Adam Watson, one of the historian members of the English School of International Relations (henceforth ES) and a career diplomat. Watson coined this term to highlight the social structure of international society and used it repeatedly throughout his writings. Watson's fondness for the term, however, has not been picked up by too many others in the broader literature or even within the ES literature. As Buzan notes, together with the other ES term "standard of civilization", Watson's *raison de système* needs to be properly examined as an ES term.[1] In recent years, Gülmez briefly mentioned it in his discussion of an emerging "cosmopolitan diplomacy" in the world. Gülmez did not argue that Watson's concept amounts to cosmopolitan diplomacy, but that it can potentially begin to take us beyond limited definitions of state-centric diplomacy.[2]

Raison de système may appear to be an elusive concept confined to Watson yet it essentially epitomizes the very argument that classical ES theorists put forward. Indeed, it is a vital concept for better understanding the ES argument that emphasizes the tension between different imperatives like the maintenance of an inter-state order and the need to provide justice for all humans around the world. *Raison de système*, with a focus on the interplay between the structural and the individual levels, straddles this particular tension and invites us to reconsider how it plays out repeatedly. A related point is that the English School is a macro-historical theory and it is often difficult to examine micro-level processes using the school's approach. From my perspective, *raison de système* builds a bridge between these different levels and helps us make sense of the "everyday" in international society. Watson has therefore contributed a very valuable concept to the ES theory.

While critical, the concept of *raison de système* raises a number of questions at the same time. In this contribution, I review the concept of *raison de système* throughout Watson's research in order to specify exactly how he employs it and to discuss some of the broader theoretical issues that follow. My objective in this analysis is twofold: to institute clarity to the concept and to consider its wider theoretical implications for diplomacy and IR theory.

Watson relates *raison de système* first and foremost to individuals' beliefs in and loyalties towards international society which then lead to the assumption of moral obligations towards the latter. The utmost moral obligation is to ensure the continuity of international society. On this basis, Watson privileges certain periods in history such as the 19th-century Concert of Europe as a period with the strongest sense of *raison de système*, and certain figures like Metternich as having the strongest

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sense of *raison de système*. Section I specifies the scope and definitions of the term, and elaborates why Watson thinks the Concert system or Metternich were so special in terms of *raison de système*.

Meanwhile, Watson's concept resembles a more recent concept, Booth and Wheeler's "security dilemma sensibility". As the authors emphasize, their approach draws from the ES theory and the works of Butterfield in particular who kept emphasizing the need to empathize with the standpoint of the adversary.[3] In Section I, I also examine the similarities between *raison de système* and the security dilemma sensibility. Is this particular ES concept also related to the proposed security dilemma sensibility?

Section II deals with the question of change in international society. *Raison de système* seems to reproduce the status quo and works to make sure that international society continues in its *existing form*. Neumann already refers to Watson's (and Kissinger's) understanding of diplomacy as a "systems-maintaining" one.[4] Sharp, who has utilized the concept extensively in his attempt to develop a diplomatic theory of international relations, describes *raison de système* as "keeping the whole show going."[5] Watson demands that especially great powers labor meticulously to maintain the continuity of international society and underlines that our first moral responsibility is to preserve international society. Is it therefore the case that *raison de système* and change are mutually exclusive terms? Section II discusses this question.

Section III considers the degree to which *raison de système* corresponds to a "first image" view of IR that concentrates on the role of individuals over states and the international system.[6] As explained in more detail below, Watson relates diplomacy to the performing of the "social position" of a state in international society by its diplomats which implies a strong sense of diplomatic agency.[7] In this section, I relate Watson's understanding of diplomacy to the recent "practice turn" in diplomatic studies and consider the "diplomatic self"[8] in relation to *raison de système*. In the concluding section, I offer my overall assessment of Watson's scholarship and contribution to our thinking on international affairs.

Raison de Système: Scope and Definition

Raison de système points to the "belief that it pays to make the system work" in Watson's definition.[9] In broader terms, *raison de système* provides a synopsis of the ES approach to IR as it highlights the social structure of international affairs. *Raison de système* is in this sense the response of the ES to *raison d'état* in particular and focuses on those "non-vital interests of states and dynasties and communities that militate against *raison d'état*."[10] In a simple distinction, Watson likened *raison d'état* to the "invisible hand" of the market, but he warned that you cannot rely solely on it in international society. You need *raison de système* and "in practice statesmen were usually aware that they cannot count on the unseen hand."[11] As Buzan and Little underline, others like Wendt[12] have also attempted to develop similar frameworks that concentrate on this deeper social element in IR although Wendt's attempt is less informed by history than Watson's.[13] Watson indeed traces his concept throughout history and identifies periods during which *raison de système* existed in stronger terms, among which the Concert of Europe. But *raison de système* is also about the question of ethics in international society and Watson's thinking on this subject has been influenced by his University of Cambridge history tutor Herbert Butterfield. As Sharp explores in detail, Butterfield was discussing a "virtuous" and "civilizing" diplomacy which could help build a better international society.[14] It was Butterfield who brought into the study of IR

a breadth of concern and generosity of spirit that had its place
in a tough-world dominated by the cruder reaches of realism.
Adam Watson, a skilled diplomat himself and close friend of
Butterfield, noticed the urgency that Butterfield's ethics in
world affairs attached to studying those individuals and states
who had engaged in conflict, who believed themselves to be
right, who believed their opponents to be evil or mad, and yet
who *still stopped fighting* in order to achieve a larger aim.[15]

From Watson's standpoint that larger aim which states and individuals
seek to achieve is to maintain international society.

I have referred to the interest which member states in a system
have in the effective functioning of the system itself, and of
their responsibilities towards it. The conscious sense that
all the states in an international society have an interest in
preserving it and in making it work I have called *raison de
système*.[16]

"Conscious" is a key term here that finds repeated expression throughout
Watson's work. Watson frequently draws an analogy between the solar
system and the international system in the sense that they both operate
mechanistically. International society, in distinction, is put in place
purposefully and requires "tremendous conscious effort" to continue
functioning as Butterfield has underlined as well.[17] *Raison de
système* is a concept that first and foremost postulates the presence
of international society and its purposeful creation by states and
individuals who feel responsible for its protection. Watson refers to
raison de système in more exacting terms as a "sense of the value of international society in all its members,"[18]
and adds that it incurs responsibilities on all to "ensure that the fabric of
the system itself is preserved and its continuity maintained."[19] *Raison de
système* is the cornerstone of Watson's understanding of diplomacy and
great powers have a special responsibility for maintaining it. It is above all
great powers which have to observe *raison de système*, accept a "negative

> **Raison de système is a concept that first and foremost postulates the presence of international society and its purposeful creation by states and individuals who feel responsible for its protection.**

requirement" for NOT damaging the functioning of international society, and agree amongst themselves on certain principles of crisis management.[20] Indeed, Watson notes,

> the potential of diplomacy can be realized when the great powers not merely observe prudent codes of conduct towards each other but also recognize, explicitly or tacitly, that the preservation and effective functioning of their system and of international society must be given priority whenever the point is reached where it appears to be seriously threatened. This attitude is something more than prudence and restraint. It is conscious *raison de système*, the use of diplomacy to achieve the ultimate purpose of an international society of independent states.[21]

As emphasized above, this places *raison de système* in a fundamental tension with demands for (just) change in international society. Watson has not ignored the question of change as I discuss below. However, the question of what the ultimate purpose of international society is appears to be international society itself from his position. Hence, his overall argument is marked by a tendency to stick with the status quo.

Another tendency that marks Watson's work is his preference for supranational systems. Watson devised his own classification of international systems with reference to a metaphorical pendulum made up of four increasing degrees of supranationalism: multiple independences, hegemony, dominion, and empire. Throughout his work, Watson kept emphasizing the pitfalls of the independences part of the pendulum (multiple independences and hegemony) and the benefits of the supranational part (dominion and empire). The supranational part is associated with peace and prosperity even if it may be at the expense of independence.[22] If Bull's chief work was an "implicit defense" of the system of states in his own words,[23] then Watson's was an implicit defense of supranationalism. He once described two sets of ideas associated with each particular part of the pendulum. Accordingly, ideas such as sovereignty, anti-hegemonial coalitions, balance of power, and non-intervention are associated with the multiple independences part, while those such as intervention, standards of civilization, human rights, and the responsibilities of great powers are associated with the

supranational part. The Concert of Europe system is also related to this same supranational part in Watson's analysis.[24] What was so special, then, about this particular system, and how is it related to our central theme of *raison de système*?

Many already pointed to the distinctiveness of the Concert of Europe system. For Kann, the Concert was a "system of international politics according to supra-national and supra-party principles" designed to offer peace and stability for the European continent.[25] For Elrod, the Concert was the first instance of states foregoing their own interests in order not to be placed outside the moral community of Europe, and was a system that was capable of convincing states to observe limits in their actions for the collective maintenance of a peaceful European order.[26] Watson starts discussing the lead-up to this peaceful European order from the 18th century onwards. Accordingly, the 18th century was the "Age of Reason and Balance" with an ongoing multilateral diplomatic dialogue. What was absent was a passionate pursuit of religious and nationalistic ambitions, and there was a very well-functioning balance of power where no state was able to assume a hegemonic position.[27] Watson's dislike of these forces becomes more apparent where he singles out the pursuit of overly nationalistic policies especially as the irresponsible pursuit of what he calls "*passion d'état*."[28] Democracy too could potentially harm diplomacy when "fused with sovereignty that admits no restraint outside itself and with national passion, it can produce a dangerous and intoxicating brew" for Watson.[29] "The level of creative statecraft" in 18th-century Europe, absent in such strong forces as democracy and nationalism, was simply "outstanding" from his perspective.[30]

The Concert marked the "climax of European constructive achievement in the managing of a state's system" in Watson's analysis.[31] One of its most important characteristics was inclusiveness – its diplomatic dialogue included small and medium-sized powers and the system represented three-quarters of the population of Europe at the time.[32] The Concert did not mean the absence of conflicts of interest among its members, but it was a rules-based system for resolving them. Its weakness was its status quo orientations and anti-revolutionary zeal.[33] Metternich and the other figures involved in the Concert developed a solidarity of purpose and their thinking extended system-wide. In connection

with this point, Watson quotes Metternich as saying, "My country is the whole of Europe."[34] *Raison de système* was particularly high during the Concert of Europe era and its members "felt responsible for the functioning of the European society of states as a whole: not always, or absolutely, but strongly enough to make it a rule of the game."[35]

Watson also points to Bismarck as another major figure with a strong sense of *raison de système*. He displayed, in Watson's analysis, a particularly strong sense of *raison de système* when he resisted the urge to create an even larger Germany and excluded Austrian lands. But Bismarck also had a strong sense of *raison d'état* which manifested itself when he re-acquired Alsace and Lorraine from a defeated France.[36]

Since the times of Bismarck, and excluding its complete collapse during World War I, *raison de système* expanded twice in Watson's analysis. The first expansion was with the creation of the League of Nations and the principle of collective security which incurred

> **Watson also points to Bismarck as another major figure with a strong sense of raison de système.**

new responsibilities in international society and a guarantee of the minimum need to survive in international society for each member.[37] The second expansion is more recent and is marked by a move towards the inclusion of international economic affairs. Watson calls this "economic *raison de système*,"[38] and he places the aid-donor relationship that has come to characterize increasingly the relationship between the developed and the developing parts of the world at its center. At its core, *raison de système* is about moral responsibility in international society and refers to the idea that we need to make international society work. Economic *raison de système* is not merely the provision of aid – it is a broader contribution by great powers to collective aid programs together with bilateral aid, "not just on reason of state or charitable grounds but for motives of *raison de système,* in order to make international society function more effectively to the benefit of all its members," argued Watson.[39]

To reiterate, *raison de système* is a concept that points to the moral underpinnings of international society which Watson and Butterfield kept emphasizing. As Vigezzi writes, all 30 papers submitted to the

British Committee on the Theory of International Politics during Watson's chairmanship between 1973 and 1978 were on the subject of ethics in international society.[40] The strong emphasis Butterfield had placed on the subject of ethics, together with other human feelings such as fear, already attracted the attention of Booth and Wheeler when they were developing their concept of security dilemma sensibility. In specific terms, this sensibility refers to

> an actor's intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behavior, including, crucially, the role that one's own actions may play in provoking that fear.[41]

Booth and Wheeler specified three different logics of the security dilemma: fatalist, mitigator, and transcender TRANSCENDER (this should read 'transcender' as in the original source. corresponding respectively to anarchy, society, and community in international affairs. The mitigator/society logic draws attention to the ES theory especially. Overall, the security dilemma sensibility underlines the importance of empathy towards the adversary and its opposite is zero-sum security for us all.[42] In this respect, the security dilemma sensibility and *raison de système* are related: each emphasizes the need for restraint in the conduct of diplomacy. My reading of *raison de système* is that it is at the same time a prior and a first-order concept. It is a response to a curious condition that Bull expressed when discussing the symbolic function of diplomacy in international society, namely why it has been continuing for centuries now. In Bull's words,

> The remarkable willingness of states of all regions, cultures, persuasions and states of development to embrace often strange and archaic diplomatic procedures that arose in another age in Europe is today one of the few visible indications of universal acceptance of the idea of international society.[43]

What follows Bull's observation is another aspect of this curious condition: how new states come into existence having already embraced the rules and norms of international society, or share in *raison de système* the moment they are born into international society. Watson himself

discussed how postcolonial states did not challenge the fundamental pillars of international society but only sought to advance their own position within it. Continuing this discussion, Watson maintained that "[t]o will the state is to will the states system." "So the leaders of the new states," he argued, "whatever their domestic form of government, consider the diplomatic dialogue with other states as now conducted to be a condition or corollary of their own statehood."[44]

Viewed in this respect, *raison de système* refers to a prior intersubjective agreement among all members of international society, old and new, that international society is to exist. As even new states come into the system accepting its fundamentals, international society keeps reproducing itself. To repeat, Watson says that is a way of making sure that international society continues.[45] This self-replicating quality of international society brings me to the question of change in international society and Watson's perspective on this issue. Was Watson a conservative? Was he a defender of the status quo? Or, was he simply pointing to the potential dangers of revolutionary activism in international society?

Raison de Système and Change in International Society

As Vigezzi stresses, the members of the British Committee, including Watson, were on the whole interested in identifying the forces of continuity in international society.[46] This tendency did not go uncriticized – perhaps in the harshest terms by Callahan who likened the Committee to an "old boys' club" seeking to maintain UK/European ascendancy in the world with academic tools.[47] There is a conservative element in the works of the ES tied to the concept of order. For Vincent, however, conservatism is built into the very nature of the concept of order to begin with. Bull's notion of order, again from Vincent's perspective, is a conservative one, but that is not necessarily for the sake of conservatism. Vincent notes that Bull's "iconoclastic, dismissive, tough-minded, ruthless" conception of order is conservative because Bull believed that "authority must reside somewhere if order is to obtain anywhere."[48]

My interpretation of Watson's concept of order is that it is a more *pragmatic* one compared to Bull's. Indeed, Watson made several suggestions for

re-arranging the fundamental rules of international society. These
included recognizing new categories of existence/statehood for resolving
issues such as the status of Palestine or acknowledging aid dependency
and re-arranging the workings of international institutions around
the unequal relationship between the donors and recipients of aid if
necessary.[49] These were all pragmatic suggestions to make international
society work by forgoing certain ideals if and when necessary: forgoing
the ideal of full and independent statehood in the case of Palestine or
the ideal of equality in the case of donor-recipient relations.

All of these suggest that Watson did not shy away from change and in
fact, to the contrary, he advocated some radical ideas. Although it is
crucial to note that the purpose of change is to make the system work
or to maintain *raison de système*. Watson advocated change to the extent
that the system would not collapse in on itself. In his own words,

> *Raison de système* means not a commitment to the status
> quo but the management of orderly change. Maintaining a
> just balance between independent states requires continual
> ad*just*ment. Among the maxims that formulate the wisdom
> born of experience, none is more important than the rule
> that the enemy of today will be the ally of tomorrow, and
> that therefore you should not damage the vital (as opposed
> to the peripheral) interests of another state, especially a
> powerful state. Western traditions of statecraft are based
> on the prudence, the restraint, the elasticity, the sense of
> responsibility of a sophisticated elite, above the passions of
> the crowd. *Raison de système* is thus enlightened expediency,
> or farsighted prudence.[50]

What, then, about the traditions of non-Western states? And as
importantly, can they be reconciled with Western ones? Can *raison de
système* be multicultural or is it a European attribute? Another question
that emerges is can it accommodate multiple ethical standpoints?
Watson was an essentialist on the first question of multiculturalism.
On the second question of ethics, he was once again a pragmatist. Let
me elaborate both issues.

In an earlier contribution, I examined Wight and Watson's views on
culture and called them "culturalists" who do not simply point to the

role of culture but impose culture onto international society.[51] Their culturalism became most obvious when they discussed encounters between Europe and the Ottomans. For Watson, the Ottomans never really became a member of European international society even after they were formally admitted into the Concert of Europe in 1856.[52] The members of international society could, of course, regulate their mutual involvement in the absence of a common culture, much like the Europeans and the Ottomans did for centuries from Watson's perspective. This, Watson compared to the discovery of a community on the Moon: we would not share a common culture with them but would nonetheless formulate rules of co-existence if we were not to exterminate them or they were not to exterminate us.[53] These common rules, however, could not become a substitute for pre-existing cultural bonds in international society for Watson. As early as 1961, Watson was discussing how international society was comprised of different groupings which were separated, among other things, by "an ability to instinctively understand one another."[54] This ability is tied to the existence of common cultural bonds and Watson remained insistent on this point.

Watson even made mention of "excentric circles" in international society, as opposed to concentric circles, on the basis of the four criteria of common morality, law, diplomatic method, and the ability to understand one another quickly.

Several other conditions also marked off different groupings in international society which included "a common conception of international morality and law and of diplomatic method."

Watson even made mention of "excentric circles" in international society, as opposed to concentric circles, on the basis of the four criteria of common morality, law, diplomatic method, and the ability to understand one another quickly. Accordingly, the "the Western, the Communist and the Afro-Asian" excentric circles existed in the 1960s which were "possibly overlapping and possibly united in a universal system of politics, but each constituting in itself an international society."[55] I believe that this extreme cynicism is a reflection of Cold War divisions in international society; Watson is not this pessimistic in his subsequent writings.

As to the question of the existence of common ethical principles
in international society, Watson came up with his own pragmatic
compromises again. Vigezzi writes that Watson readily left aside
the question of what was right or wrong, and regarded this as the
"unanswerable question."[56] What mattered for international society
instead was whether "ethical criteria as valid for the conduct of
international relations, and whether a common recognition by member
states of a system of certain ethical principles is necessary to the
functioning of a state system."[57]

By this time, Watson had already started questioning whether
conventional, Westphalian concepts could be utilized to make sense of
international affairs equally well around the world. Between 1956 and
1959, Watson was head of the African department of the Foreign Office
in London and was appointed as ambassador to the Federation of Mali,
Senegal, Mauritania, and Togo between the years 1960 and 1962.[58]
Shortly after these postings, he published *Emergent Africa*[59] under the
pseudonym Scipio and *The Nature and Problems of the Third World*.[60]
These two books laid the groundwork for Watson's preoccupation with
the question of dependency and the role of hegemony in international
society. He later reflected that his diplomatic assignments in the 1950s
and 1960s across Africa and also Cuba eventually led him to see
statehood and the role of weak states in a profoundly different way
than the rest of other states. As he put it,

> I began to see the new international order that emerged from
> wholesale decolonization not only in Westphalian terms. It
> could also be seen as a core of economically and politically
> developed states, surrounded by an ever more numerous
> periphery of weak and inexperienced states faced often with
> the alternatives of firm government or chaos.[61]

Watson's continuing engagement with the themes of hegemony and
dependence culminated in two full-blown attempts at destroying
the Westphalian myths of independence and anarchy, *The Evolution
International Society*[62] and *The Limits of Independence*[63]. Much like Bull,
he grew increasingly more interested in the actual implementation of
ethical principles in international affairs, departing from his earlier
position that ethical criteria need not constitute a basis of conduct in

the international system. As mentioned earlier, he pushed the agenda of the discussions of the British Committee in the direction of ethical questions under his chairmanship. Still, Watson was not advocating the automatic implementation of ethical principles in the relations between states. What he was suggesting was a diplomatic dialogue, and a bold one, around ethics. Accordingly, Watson called for an ongoing adjustment between ethics and international politics, and a "process of diplomatic pressure in favor of the opinions of mankind."[64] Adjusting ethics and politics as these pressures kept piling up would, of course, require statecraft of the finest quality.

> Prudence is the most responsible virtue of statesmanship. It is the virtue which enables a statesman to bring practical and moral goals into some form of approximation with the stubborn and less than hospitable realities of international politics. The expediency of prudence shades off into the twin virtue of European statecraft, the sense of moral obligation. This ethical sense, unlike calculated prudence, has become stronger as the influence of public opinion on foreign policy grows.[65]

This excerpt wherein Watson merges European statecraft and a process of ethical adjustment in international society gives me a final chance to consider the question of multiculturalism, multiple ethical perspectives, and *raison de système*. Watson was more prepared to accommodate multiple ethical perspectives than he was prepared to accommodate multiple cultures. He kept privileging European statecraft and European practices, and the volume that he co-edited with Bull, *The Expansion of International Society,* told the story of the emergence of a universal international society from a Eurocentric position.[66] In a recent contribution, Neumann urged us to reconsider this global expansion from a *relational* rather than from a Eurocentric perspective.[67]

As for ethics, Watson remained cautious but nonetheless more open. On the caution side, he warned that "right" cannot be the only criterion of ethics as it applies in international society. He qualified it with "reasonable." Accordingly, ethics in international society would be "what is right and reasonable between states."[68] As Cochran notes, the English School made "state consensus the crucial determinant

of ethical possibility" which he believes closes off the possibility of a
more maximal ethics.[69] From the perspective of the ES, however, more
maximal positions, can become a threat to *raison de système.* What we
can do, from Watson's perspective, is to carry on with the diplomatic
dialogue nonetheless.

> It cannot be expected of the diplomatic dialogue between
> independent states that it will transform international relations
> to the point of abolishing the very divergences of interest
> which first give rise to the need for continuous negotiation.
> The most it can achieve is to find acceptable compromises,
> where necessary by introducing other inducements.[70]

Through the diplomatic dialogue, Watson hoped, we could reach a
consensus even on such difficult issues like distributive justice – that is
not distributive justice as such or
as a philosophical concept, but in
a format that can be implemented
in practice in international society.
Watson places this emphasis on
the implementation dimension
for a very simple reason. As
he explains it, we "assume a
distributor" when we ordinarily
speak of the term distributive
justice.[71] Yet in the absence of a
distributor in the international
system, we need to modify our
arguments accordingly. He was thus not advancing any principled
objection to more expansive ethical ideals, but underlining the peculiar
nature of international society.

Through the diplomatic dialogue, Watson hoped, we could reach a consensus even on such difficult issues like distributive justice – that is not distributive justice as such or as a philosophical concept, but in a format that can be implemented in practice in international society.

The emphasis on the specific qualities of international society brings me
to the final question in my analysis of Watson's approach to diplomacy,
namely, that of whether his work tilts towards a "third image" structural
view or towards a "first image" one in Waltz's well-known formulation
where individuals, or diplomats, are at the center.[72] Is *raison de système*
related to man or war? Watson's term "social position" is key to
approaching this question.[73]

Watson on Diplomatic Agency and the Social Position of the Diplomat

As Byman and Pollack remind us, international relations research has been dominated by third image or structural approaches rather than the first image that focuses on individuals. This ignorance of the first image is, as they continue to emphasize, problematic since individuals matter in international politics particularly during great transformations in history or when power is concentrated in the hands of a single leader. In order to highlight the overlooked importance of individuals, they concentrate on five crucial personalities including Hitler and Napoleon, and put forward over a dozen hypotheses as to why individuals matter.[74] In the particular study of diplomacy, Faizullaev points out that the diplomat has mostly been treated as an instrument in foreign policy-making and therefore the study of diplomacy has been depersonified.[75] Meanwhile, Holmes and Wheeler, among others, have pointed to a recent trend toward focusing on the individual diplomat in diplomatic studies. This is essential in that personalities and personality traits can shape vital outcomes such as entry into war or impact international negotiations. To understand these outcomes, we need to turn our attention to the first image. Holmes and Wheeler consider additional details such as why some diplomats instantly bond with one another while others do not. Microsociological studies of diplomacy that focus on diplomats are thus essential from the perspective of making sense of these puzzles.[76] In recent years, such studies are increasing. Towns's work on gender and diplomacy[77] and Nair's work on the practice of face-saving among ASEAN diplomats[78] are among these new works. How, then, is the role of the individual in the ES literature and in the works of Adam Watson?

A strong concern with the human condition, Jackson observes, permeates the international system category of the ES and it is what distinguishes its understanding of system from that of Waltz's neorealism. According to Jackson, we need to read the ideas and beliefs held by political leaders when we are reading the "international system" category of the ES.[79] Indeed, these beliefs and ideas mattered a significant deal from Watson's perspective. During the British Committee discussion sessions, Vigezzi notes, together with Michael Howard, Watson insisted on the role of individuals and especially intellectuals who could push for peace-loving

ideals and transform the international system.[80] In this respect, there is already a strong first image view of IR in Watson's and indeed in the English School's work. The particular concept of *raison de système* is in fact a reversal of what Faizullaev calls the "depersonification of diplomacy."[81] *Raison de système* is a strong statement in favor of diplomatic agency and in this respect Watson's understanding of diplomacy aligns with constructivist and practice-oriented approaches in diplomatic studies that are becoming more popular. Yet, *raison de système* is not merely an emphasis on any sort of diplomatic agency: it is diplomatic agency of a certain kind. Faizullaev's concept of the "diplomatic self" can be particularly useful here in elaborating this point. I discuss both issues below starting with the similarities between Watson's understanding of diplomacy and recent constructivist/practice-oriented scholarship.

As Adler-Nissen's underlines in her extensive review, (neo)realists and (neo)liberals do not pay much attention to diplomats. The IR theories that pay attention to the diplomat, apart from the English School, are rationalist game theory, foreign policy analysis, the practice turn, and post-structuralism.[82] Constructivist and practice scholars have in particular studied the ways in which diplomacy is a process of learning, interaction, and socialization among diplomats. Constructivists scholars have focused on how diplomats perform, reproduce, and change states' interests while practice scholars have accorded quite a large role to diplomatic agency. Their focus has been on the everyday practices of diplomats and how practice shapes diplomacy.[83] For Neumann, Watson also sees diplomacy as an ongoing social practice.[84] Indeed, Watson used the phrase "social position" to stress this.

> In the diplomatic life of Moscow, for instance, Soviet diplomats find that the insistence on such observances as black-tie dinners, ritual toasts, meetings at airports, comes especially from the representatives of new states, whereas the embassies of established Western powers are more inclined to informality and to cut down on ceremony in order to concentrate on exploratory dialogue. This is what one might expect. The more secure the *social position* of an individual is, the more casual and informal he is prepared to be.[85]

These respective positions assumed by existing Western and new diplomats are social hierarchies or what Pouliot called "diplomatic pecking orders" in the recent practice scholarship on diplomacy. Pouliot examines how these "pecking orders" function in multilateral organizations such as NATO and the EU.[86] He departs from the same premises that Watson does and stresses that the sovereign equality of states is a myth. In practice, the international system operates hierarchically. The day-to-day functioning of the "diplomatic pecking order" in multilateral organizations is the starkest empirical evidence of hierarchy in the international system. "Exceptional diplomats punching way above their country's weight certainly exist (and matter), but in the grand scheme of things, pecking orders primarily rest on much less heroic practices," Pouliot notes.[87] Otherwise, however, the "diplomatic pecking order" makes and remakes our hierarchical international system every day. "The pecking order can be a brutal reality," Pouliot concludes.[88] This approach is quite similar to Watson's where he notes that "the international order is the setting in which, through interdependence, new states are schooled in the – sometimes disappointing and painful – limits of independence."[89]

The practice turn in diplomatic studies can thus be fruitfully synthesized with ES theorizing on diplomacy and Watson's views on hierarchy in particular. One final point that I wish to discuss is who those "exceptional diplomats" with an ability to punch above their weight or place in the "pecking order" can be. The "diplomatic self" can help us further describe the qualities of such exceptional diplomats who will have an exceptional sense of *raison de système* as well. The diplomatic self, as Faizullaev says, is a merger of two different selves: the individual self and the state self of the diplomat. Both can be strong in some diplomats whereas in the case of diplomats who have allegiance problems to the sending state, state selfhood may be weak and these diplomats can even defect in the end. Others may identify with the state very strongly and thus have a very dominant state selfhood.[90] These selfhoods are also tied to the "social positions," to use Watson's phrase, of the diplomats' states.[91] The greater the reputation of a state, "the higher its diplomat's self-esteem" will be, Faizullaev notes.[92] A diplomat with a great sense of *raison de système* will be one who can transcend his or her strong state selfhood and act for the interests of international society as a whole –

much like when Bismarck was able to transcend his state selfhood and refrain from creating an even larger Germany as in the example Watson provides.

This is distinct from the "revolutionary diplomat" who, as Sharp explains, tries to find a balance between the revolutionary ideal and the requirements of international society.[93] Testing times such as the Suez Crisis can be another significant measure of diplomatic selfhood. In the British Committee, the Suez Crisis gave way to an engaging discussion on diplomatic agency. The specific question, raised by Mackinnon in 1962, was what duties individuals have toward their states and what alternative loyalties they may have. Mackinnon continued to mention the possibility of conflicting loyalties,[94] and maintained that as in the case of some in Britain during the Suez Crisis, we may have "loyalty to an international society or to a certain conception of international society." "Individuals," Mackinnon contended, "may transfer their loyalty from their own state to the international society."[95] *Raison de système* need not mean a "transfer of loyalty" to international society, but it certainly refers to an ability to transcend narrow state selfhoods especially during challenging times like the Suez Crisis. The Suez episode is also useful in demonstrating how diplomatic agency and *raison de système* are linked as the *belief* that they need to make international society work forces diplomats to make adjustments between their individual and state selfhoods. These adjustments also reflect how diplomats make and remake international society "every day" and as they do, they resolve the tensions that emerges between our conflicting imperatives.

Conclusion

Adam Watson was a seasoned diplomat, a member and the third chairperson of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, a published author, and a scholar. In addition

Watson's studies in hierarchical international systems in particular can help us reimagine some very problematic assumptions that we hold about international society.

to articles and book chapters, he authored seven books, co-edited a volume with Bull, and edited Butterfield's 1981 book *The Origins of History*[96] following his death.[97] I believe that Watson's most valuable

contribution has been to push us to confront uncomfortable questions around dependency, equality, and statehood in international society. As Buzan and Little emphasize, his work sharply exposes the inconsistencies between the actual theory and practice of international society which we need to tackle.[98] As Buzan later emphasized with Schouenborg, Watson's studies in hierarchical international systems in particular can help us reimagine some very problematic assumptions that we hold about international society.[99]

Watson's contribution to diplomatic theory has been praised as well. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States* (1982) is regarded as a seminal text in the subject area.[100] Prior to writing *Diplomacy*, Watson had set himself the task of writing a good book on the theoretical aspects of diplomacy since Nicolson's book on the same topic.[101] In Wright's review, Watson has "succeeded admirably" in this self-appointed task.[102] An equally good review of *Diplomacy* has been provided by Miller.[103] Neumann's approach to *Diplomacy* is somewhat cynical. He notes that the book is formally unreferenced. In terms of substance, Neumann writes, "It is still more a number of (often highly fruitful and stimulating) observations rather than a sustained effort to theorize diplomacy as an historically and socially occurring phenomenon."[104]

From my perspective, the greatest opportunity *Diplomacy* offers us is to develop our understanding of hierarchy in international society further by combining Watson's work with the recent practice turn in the study of diplomacy. Critics of the English School have complained that the ES has put forward a series of concepts but offered no clue as to how they can be studied in empirical terms on the ground.[105] How, for instance, do we study Watson's hierarchy in everyday terms? Pouliot's extensive work in multilateral organizations demonstrates that hierarchy exists and can be observed in each and every single interaction among diplomats.[106] Watson's overall approach to international society is shaped by an emphasis on practice which he says "outruns" our theoretical assumptions about it all the time. Practices which work for the benefit of international society, Watson contends, eventually become codified in theory.[107] Looking ahead, a promising research agenda that emerges from Watson's research is the study of which particular practices work in diplomacy and how these may reshape diplomatic theory over time.

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BOOK REVIEW

Asian Geopolitics and the US-China Rivalry

By Felix Heiduk (ed.)
Routledge, E-book, 2022, 254 pages,
ISBN: 9781003106814

As a result of competition between the U.S. and China within the Asia-Pacific region, gaining a comprehensive understanding of the intricate dynamics of geopolitics and geo-economics in these two nations has become imperative. It is equally crucial to evaluate the far-reaching implications of this rivalry. The volume of essays titled *Asian Geopolitics and the US-China Rivalry*, under the editorship of Felix Heiduk, assembles a consortium of leading experts who offer a multifaceted and insightful analysis of this intricate strategic landscape. The compilation traverses a diverse array of subjects, including but not limited to U.S.-China relations and their repercussions on regional actors, the contours of Chinese regional strategy, regional security paradigms, the realm of economic competition and soft power dynamics, and the role played by other major global powers such as Japan, India, and Australia.

Drawing from empirical evidence and employing diverse theoretical frameworks, the authors present a range of perspectives on these pivotal issues. They underscore the challenges and opportunities ahead, emphasizing that effectively addressing the regional challenges necessitates a deep understanding of the Sino-U.S. competition and a nuanced comprehension of the intricate web of interactions involving other regional stakeholders.

The book is composed of twelve chapters, commencing with an introduction by Felix Heiduk. The author sets the stage by delineating the Sino-American rivalry's profound potential to recalibrate Asia's geopolitical landscape. He underscores the imperative for regional states to navigate the evolving dynamics adroitly. Chapter 2, authored by R. Foot, focuses on the impacts of globalization on regional confidence and unity, juxtaposed with the potentially fragmenting effects of the

U.S.-China rivalry. Chapter 3, penned by R. Medcalf, explores the long-term consequences of this rivalry. It places a premium on the need for strategic foresight and long-term planning for regional cooperation to manage the multifaceted challenges posed by this rivalry.

Joo Hee Kim, in Chapter 4, provides a reasonable examination of creative and adaptive strategies. Kim brings into sharp focus the promotion of multilateralism and regional stability, particularly emphasizing the role of middle powers. Chapter 5, authored by L. Jones, accentuates the broader ramifications of the Sino-U.S. rivalry, transcending state transformation and security paradigms. Simultaneously, it underscores the necessity for participatory and inclusive processes and advocates for a more comprehensive approach to security and state transformation.

The book extends its purview into case studies, dedicating its analytical chapters to specific regions and countries in the Asia-Pacific. These include the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia, and individual countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, the Philippines, Malaysia, and South Korea. In these chapters, the authors employ a discerning lens to examine economic and domestic actors, the intricate dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction and development, and the evolving institutional framework under the shadow of the U.S.-Chinese rivalry. Despite the variegated approaches undertaken, all the chapters converge on a common theme: the pressing need for enhanced regional cooperation and dialogue. They collectively advocate for an adaptable, nuanced, and comprehensive strategy to confront the ramifications of the U.S.-Chinese competition.

The richness of this volume emanates from its interdisciplinary approach to dissecting the rivalry between the U.S. and China and its profound implications for Asia. Drawing from various fields, including economics, international relations, security studies, and political science, the book provides a robust and holistic analysis. Furthermore, it offers a meticulous examination of the formidable challenges and issues besetting the region, with claims substantiated through a wealth of primary and secondary sources. A laudable strength lies in the book's diverse perspectives, encapsulated within essays authored by individuals from disparate backgrounds. This diversity of viewpoints contributes to the depth and richness of the analysis.

However, notwithstanding these merits, there exist notable avenues for improvement. Regarding the bibliography, while a substantial portion of

the book pivots on case studies focused on Asian countries, most essays rely exclusively on English-language sources. Few references are made to sources in German, Chinese, or Korean, for example. Additionally, some chapters exhibit a substantial dependence on news and magazine articles, occasionally constraining the depth of analysis. Consequently, there is a discernible inclination toward overemphasizing theoretical frameworks and concepts, sometimes leaving readers yearning for a deeper understanding of the practical applicability of the research. A conspicuous absence is the lack of a dedicated concluding chapter or concluding remarks, potentially limiting the transference of the results of the case studies to broader regional or global contexts.

That said, the book aptly illuminates the strategies and policies embraced by diverse regional actors to navigate the treacherous waters of the U.S.-China conflict and safeguard their interests. It brings together contributions from scholars and experts representing a spectrum of backgrounds and perspectives. Consequently, it furnishes a multifaceted and nuanced comprehension of the intricate dynamics shaping the geopolitics of Asia. Furthermore, it underscores the far-reaching implications of the U.S.-China rivalry for the region and the broader international order, highlighting the indispensability of regional cooperation and multilateralism. These facets balance diplomatic, economic, and security considerations, ultimately reducing reliance on either of the two global superpowers.

Given the diverse interests and viewpoints spanning Asia and beyond, a comprehensive and context-specific understanding of the U.S.-China rivalry has become increasingly essential. *Asian Geopolitics and the US-China Rivalry* is a pertinent and invaluable addition to the scholarly discourse on Asia's geopolitics, the U.S.-China interplay, and their resounding impacts. It is poised to be of immense significance for academics and researchers alike, as well as for policymakers, business leaders, and all those deeply invested in the development of Asia and its global ramifications.

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BOOK REVIEW

Homemaking in the Russian-Speaking Diaspora: Material Culture, Language and Identity

By Maria Yelenevskaya and Ekaternia Protassova (eds.)
Edinburgh University Press, E-book, 2023, 256 pages,
ISBN: 9781474494519

Home is a concept which has extensive and multiple reference points. It can refer to a physical space where people dwell, and it can extend to a country where people live or to which they feel they belong. It also has intangible and sentimental characteristics reflected in lifestyle, daily practices, objects, or in the language of individuals. In this sense, "home" goes beyond the physical boundaries and obtains a transnational character that enables immigrants to build "home" away from their home countries. Setting off from this viewpoint, *Homemaking in the Russian-Speaking Diaspora: Material Culture, Language and Identity* aims to present home-making practices of Russian-speaking immigrants in various countries. Comprising ten chapters, the contributors come from various disciplines such as linguistics, sociology, anthropology, international relations, and migration studies. Although published in 2023, the submission of the chapters was completed in 2020. Therefore, as the editors highlighted, the studies cover the period before the Russia-Ukraine war and reflect the home perceptions of immigrants before the war.

This comprehensive study involves cases and research from various countries, namely Greece, the United Kingdom, Japan, Finland, Australia, the United States, Uruguay, Israel, and Türkiye. The studies are mainly interpretative and descriptive as most of the chapters are based on in-depth/semi-structured interviews with Russian-speaking immigrants who migrated from Russia and post-Soviet countries.

Interviews are mostly conducted in Russian and comprise of various immigrant profiles including different generations, genders, marital statuses, social classes, and migration backgrounds. Along with the interviews, the authors conducted face-to-face group discussions and archival research, collected data from social media and forums of Russian-speaking people, and accessed statistical data. Chapters also present passages from interviews, and photographs from archives and immigrants' homes. While immigrants have individual and unique narratives about their experiences, these visual collections and expressions from interviews enable readers to capture similarities between home-making practices in different countries.

The introduction of the book offers a clear framework that underpins the chapters and guides the readers throughout the book. Home is referred to as a communicative space, a symbol, and an identity. The changing meaning of home in migration is also discussed. The authors approach and investigate "home-making in Russian-speaking diaspora" within the scope of language, identity, and material cultures. The main questions revolve around how material cultures and language affect the identity and home-making practices of Russian-speaking immigrants reciprocatively. How do selecting, keeping, and abandoning material objects contribute to home-making? How do the adaptation to a new culture, the host-country environment, and new daily practices change the meaning and functionality of these objects? Although the prominent research questions are shaped around material objects and home relations, the book also addresses the questions of communicating space, and the role and place of language and social relations in home-making in the diaspora.

In Chapter 1, Kira Kaurinkoski approaches home-making practices in the Russian-speaking diaspora from the perspective of social relations and sociocultural practices. The chapter covers the different stages of migration to Athens from the 1917 Russian Revolution to the post-Soviet period, and presents how home-making practices took shape in these different stages. Subsequent chapters (2-5,8) focus on the role of material objects and possessions in migration and home-making, and the interaction between immigrants and their material objects are examined. In Chapter 2, the concept of "diasporic objects" becomes prominent. Anna Pechurina identifies objects as "diasporic" since

they are not only reminders of the attachment to home but also of being away from home. These objects bring together past and present, and create a sense of home in the host country. In Chapter 3, Ksenia Golovina supports a similar argument for the case of Japan. Golovina explores how the material objects in the immigrants' homes reflect "material stories" as they store the immigrants' "experiences, memories, affects, emotions and aspirations". Immigrants do not only attribute positive meanings to objects; material objects also reflect negative connotations relating home. Golovina argues that with both positive and negative connotations, these objects affect the immigrants' relations and perceptions about home and host country. Researching the home-configuration of Russian-speaking immigrants to neighboring country Finland, in Chapter 4, Ekaterina Protassova and Kirill Reznik investigate how Russian-speaking individuals in Finland perceive home; why they keep some objects and get rid of others while configuring their homes; and how the meaning of these objects has changed. While answering these questions in the context of home-making, the authors also draw attention to generational differences. The host-country environment and integrating into host society can be considered one of the reasons of these generational differences. In the Australian context, examined in Chapter 5, Marika Kalyuga analyzes how the host-country environment affects the meaning and functionality of material possessions. Kalyuga examines how objects or possessions may lose their material/functional value but keep their sentimental value. Taken together, these analyses expose how objects do not have fixed values, meanings, or functions, but, in fact, are open to change depending on the generations, time, physical and cultural environment, and personal experiences. Maria Yelenevskaya's research on the Israeli case in Chapter 8, demonstrates the psychological and stabilizing role of material objects in immigrants' home while adopting to the new country. These objects reflect their home-country environment and bring the past to the present, or their home country to the present moment. Yelenevskaya draws attention to the generational differences in relation to both objects and language.

The Los Angeles (Chapter 6) and Uruguay cases (Chapter 7) focus on home-making based on sociocultural and language practices. In the case of Los Angeles, author Sasha Razor researches Russian restaurants and cafés in Hollywood which were established between the 1920s and

1980s. Having a Russian interior and exterior design and a Russian atmosphere, these places function as a home for the Russian-speaking community where its members could find cultural references, a sense of home, and speak the Russian language. As Razor states these establishments "fulfill the socio-communicative function." Razor also discusses how starting in the 1960s sociopolitical developments and the identity and migration background of the owners affected the changes in the Russian restaurants in Los Angeles. In the Uruguay case, Gleb Pilipenko discuses Russian culture and language in the city of San Javier. Here, at the beginning of immigration, the Russian language was used in homes, but through generations the use of the language disappeared. The chapter explores how and why the use of the Russian language transformed and nearly disappeared in time. Yet, still, one can find Russian language references in the city keeping their symbolic meaning. In other chapters, the use of the Russian language by immigrants and its role in home-making are also underlined implicitly or explicitly. In Chapter 8, Maria Yelenevskaya, for example, refers to the bilingual and multilingual characteristics of the home and its effects on material culture. In the example of Türkiye in Chapter 9, Laisan Şahin investigates how Russian-speaking women of different ethnic origins (Russian, Azerbaijanis, and Tatars in this case) form and describe home while they reconcile and negotiate the different cultures and values of their home and host countries. The chapter emphasizes individual differences and experiences of immigrants in home-making. The author also brings attention to the role of communication technologies in home-making practices and relations with homelands. The last chapter (Chapter 10), written by Larissa Aronin, makes reference to the material culture of multilingualism (MCM) and Dominant Language Constellations (DLC) theory. On the basis of global transformation and interconnectedness, Aronin promotes the "multi-diverse" and "interconnected" characteristics of "materialities and language" in home-making, and reviews the research presented in this volume within the framework of the "multilingual materialities of home." Based on this concept, she underlines the prominent features of Russian-speaking immigrants and their home-making practices. It should be noted that, for researchers, "multilingual materialities of home" can be a helpful tool to be applied to other research cases on immigrant communities.

The book presents home-making in the diaspora as an ongoing, living process. Within the different migration stories, home-host country environments, and social and cultural relations, home is continuously constructed and reconstructed by immigrants. This (re)construction process reflects on the language practices and material objects of immigrants as well. Language and material objects can serve as tools which secure the immigrants' identity, enhance their sense of belonging, and create a safe place where that feel "at home". Nonetheless, their meaning and function is open to transformation. The Russian-speaking diaspora contains a wide geography, different ethnicities, and different cultural/historical reference points. With this challenging but also distinctive feature, this volume presents the home-making practices of Russian-speaking immigrants in a comprehensive way. Moreover, while the study highlights common characteristics in home-making practices, the writers do not disregard the individual differences derived from individuals' narratives, experiences, and the recollection of past memories.

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Title of Book Reviews

Türk Basınında Dış Habercilik (Foreign News Reporting in the Turkish Media), by M. Mücahit Küçükyıl-maz and Hakan Çopur. Ankara: SETA, 2010, 168 pages, ISBN 9786054023073.